TCR_Public/130922.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

          Sunday, September 22, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 263


                            Headlines

ABFC 2003-OPT1: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three RMBS Classes
ABFS MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $25MM of Subprime RMBS
ACCESS GROUP 2004-2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to B
ACCESS TO LOANS: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 17 Note Classes to 'B-'
ACCREDITED MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on $195MM RMBS Deals

AIR CANADA 2013-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class C Certs.
ALM VII(R): S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class D Notes
ALM VII(R)-2: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class D Notes
AMAC CDO I: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Takes Action on $2BB Secs Issued 2006-2007

AMERICAN HOME 2006-4: Moody's Cuts Rating on II-A-1 Secs. to Caa3
ARBOR REALTY 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
ARBOR REALTY 2004-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. D Notes
ARBOR REALTY 2005-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Class G to K Notes

ARES VR: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB-'
ARGENT SECURITIES 2003-W2: Moody's Cuts Rating on M-3 Notes to B1
ARROYO CDO I: Moody's Upgrades Two Note Classes to Caa2
BALLYROCK CLO 2006-2: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
BOCA HOTEL: Fitch Expects to Rate $77MM Class D Certs 'BB+'

BOCA HOTEL: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
CAPTEC FRANCHISE: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 5 Note Classes
CEDAR FUNDING II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
CGBAM 2013-BREH: Rights Transfer No Impact on Moody's Ratings
CGMT 2013-GC15- DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class E Certificates

CIFC FUNDING 2013-III: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2012-GC8: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Certs
COBALT CMBS 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class D Certs.
COMM 2003-LNB1: Rockefeller Loan Defeasance No Impact on Ratings
COMM 2004-LNB3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to 'Csf'

COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Certs to 'Caa2'
COMM 2005-FL11: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 CMBS Tranches to 'Caa3'
COMM 2013-LC13: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
COMM 2013-THL: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to Cl. F Certificates
CONCORD REAL 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. L Notes

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 2012-3: Fitch Affirms BB- Cl. C Cert. Rating
CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C5: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Class G Certs. to CCC
CREST EXETER: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'C'
ELEMENT EQUIPMENT: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class C Notes

EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2013-2: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class D Notes
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
FIRST UNION 2001-C4: S&P Raises Rating on Class O Notes to 'B+'
FIRST UNION 2001-C2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class N Notes to 'B-'
FREMF 2011-K703: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Cl. X-2 Certs

FREMF 2011-K704: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class X2 Secs.
FREMF MORTGAGE 2012-KF01: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating for X Certs
G-FORCE CDO 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. O Certs
GOLDMAN SACHS 2006-GG8: Rights Transfer No Impact on Ratings

GRAMERCY REAL 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to B3
HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
JP MORGAN 2004-PNC1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class H Certs.
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Certs
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC16: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. C Certs to Caa3

JP MORGAN 2007-C1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 10 Certs
JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC20: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Certs
JP MORGAN 2012-PHH: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class E Notes
LEAF RECEIVABLES 2013-1: Moody's Rates Cl. E-2 Notes '(P)Ba2sf'
KEYCORP STUDENT 2006-A: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Jr. Sub. Notes Rating

LAKESIDE CDO II: Moody's Lifts Rating on $1BB Notes to 'Caa2'
LATITUDE CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B+'
LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C4: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. J Notes to Ba1
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Cuts Cl. K Certs Rating to C
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Certs

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on A-J Certs
LB-UBS MORTGAGE 2005-C2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 4 Certs
LEHMAN MORTGAGE 2008-4: Moody's Cuts Cl. A1 Notes Rating to Caa3
MADISON PARK III: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class D Notes
MARATHON CLO II: Moody's Hikes Rating on $12MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1

MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CANADA 15: Moody's Affirms L Certs' Caa2 Rating
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on $4MM Cl. E Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2000-PRIN: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on X Secs.
MORGAN STANLEY 2004-4: Moody's Hikes Rating on 5 RMBS Secs. to Ba1
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-35: Moody's Hikes Rating on $75MM Notes to B3

NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: S&P Assigns Prelim 'BB-' Rating on Cl. E Notes
NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Transactions
OHA LOAN 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
PALMER SQUARE 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
PEGASUS 2006-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Class A1 Notes

PEGASUS 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'B2'
PREFERRED TERM XI: Moody's Raises Ratings on 3 Notes to 'Caa3'
PREFERRED TERM XIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Notes to Caa3
PREFERRED TERM XXV: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Notes to 'Ca'
RALI TRUST: Moody's Takes Action on $1BB RMBS Issued 2006 to 2007

ROCK 2001-C1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class X2 Notes to 'Caa3'
SAGAMORE CLO: Moody's Hikes $3MM Class D Junior Notes to 'Caa3'
SALOMON BROTHERS 2001-C1: S&P Ups Rating on Cl. H Certs to 'B-'
SALOMON BROTHERS 2001-C2: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class J Certs
SATURNS SEARS 2003-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on $47MM Secs. to Caa2

SCHOONER TRUST 2004-CCF1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on 2 Certs
SHELLPOINT ASSET: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class B-4 Notes
SECURITY NATIONAL 2002-2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 RMBS Classes
SORIN REAL IV: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
SUMMIT LAKE: Moody's Confirms $14.5MM Ba2 Rating on B-2L Notes

SYMPHONY CLO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $14MM Class D Notes
TRIMARAN CLO IV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes to Ba1
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C32: S&P Cuts Ratings on Cl. E & F Certs to 'D'
WASATCH CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ba2'
WELLS FARGO 2010-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs.

WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs

* Fitch: Bank TruPS CDOs Combined Default & Deferral Rate Stable
* Fitch: US Timeshare ABS Delinquencies Dips to Lowest in 5 Years
* Fitch Notes Tame August for U.S. CMBS Delinquencies
* Moody's Takes Action on $628MM of RMBS Issued 2005 to 2008
* Moody's Takes Action on $206MM Housing Loans Issued 1995-2006

* Moody's Takes Action on $378MM of RMBS from Lehman and IndyMac
* Moody's Takes Action on $399MM RMBS Tranches from Five Issuers


                            *********

ABFC 2003-OPT1: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three RMBS Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of three
tranches from ABFC 2003-OPT1 Trust, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFC 2003-OPT1 Trust

Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The rating actions also reflect the late recognition of
losses related to principal forbearance modifications that
Homeward undertook before July 2012 for this transaction. Homeward
Residential Inc. had serviced the transaction until Ocwen Loan
Servicing acquired Homeward in December 2012. Previously, on June
14, 2013 , following Ocwen's announcement of the loss recognition,
Moody's had placed these tranches on review for downgrade. The
rating action on the bonds concludes this review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


ABFS MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $25MM of Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches and confirmed the underlying ratings of two other
tranches from four transactions issued by ABFS Mortgage Loan
Trust, backed by subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-4

Cl. A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-1

Cl. A-1, Current Rating B3 (sf); previously on May 22, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B3,
Outlook Positive on May 21, 2013)

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2001-4

Cl. A, Current Rating B3 (sf); previously on May 22, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B3,
Outlook Positive on May 21, 2013)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
The rating actions also reflect correction of errors in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models previously
used by Moody's in rating these transactions.

The cash flow models used in previous rating actions for these
transactions incorrectly applied separate interest and principal
waterfalls. In the impacted deals, all collected principal and
interest is commingled into one payment waterfall to pay all
interest due on the bonds first, and then pay principal. Due to
the discovery of these errors, these tranches were placed on
review on May 14, 2013. The errors have now been corrected, and
these rating actions reflect the changes.

The methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


ACCESS GROUP 2004-2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to B
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its 'AA+ (sf)' rating
on the class A-2 notes from Access Group Inc.'s series 2004-2 to
'B (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' and placed it on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  S&P also placed the 'A (sf)' rating on the
class B notes from the same transaction on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The lowered rating on the class A-2 notes reflects the likelihood
that this class will not receive full and timely principal at its
legal maturity date of Jan. 25, 2016.  In contrast to the class
A-2 notes, the ratings on the class A-3, A-4, and A-5 notes are
unaffected, as their legal maturity dates are longer dated (2024,
2032, and 2043, respectively).  Aside from the shorter maturity
date, S&P believes a number of secondary factors contribute to the
risk of non-payment of this class, including: the rate at which
the student loan collateral pool is amortizing, the transaction's
cash releasing structure at 101% total parity (transaction has
been releasing since April 2009), and the pro rata payment of
principal to the class B notes after the step-down date (October
2012).

The CreditWatch placement on the class B notes reflects S&P's view
that the non-payment of the class A-2 note principal at its legal
maturity raises the risk that the class B notes could experience
an interest shortfall concurrently.  According to the
transaction's payment waterfall, if a senior class of notes has an
outstanding balance on its respective maturity date, then the
transaction will make the necessary principal payments to the
respective class of senior notes (in this case, class A-2) before
making any interest payments due to the class B notes.  The funds
that would otherwise be available to pay the class B note interest
could be allocated to pay principal to the class A-2 notes.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements within the next
90 days.  Upon the conclusion of further analysis and scenario
testing around the class A-2 and B note payment prospects, S&P
will then take any further rating actions it considers
appropriate.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Access Group Inc.
Floating-rate student loan asset-backed notes series 2004-2

             Rating                  Rating
             To                      From
A-2          B (sf)/Watch Neg        AA+(sf)


ACCESS TO LOANS: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 17 Note Classes to 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the senior and subordinate notes for
Access to Loans for Learning Student Loan Corp - 1998 Master Trust
IV (ALL SLC 1998). The notes were removed from Rating Watch
Negative and assigned a Negative Rating Outlook. Fitch used its
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'U.S. FFFELP
Student Loan ABS Criteria' to review the transaction.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade on the senior and subordinate notes reflects
insufficient credit enhancement to support the current ratings. CE
consists of excess spread and overcollateralization. Furthermore,
senior notes benefit from additional credit enhancement provided
by the subordinate notes.

On May 17, 2013, Fitch updated its FFELP student loan ABS criteria
to include a new surveillance analytical tool. Based on its
updated criteria, Fitch has determined that the notes do not have
sufficient enhancement to support the current ratings at their
release levels of 110% for senior parity and 102% for total
parity.

The main driver of the downgrades is due to interest rate risk
embedded in the tax-exempt auction rate securities which make up
approximately 28% of the outstanding notes, in addition to the 56%
that are taxable auction rate securities, which are paying
interest at a contractually determined maximum rate due to failed
auctions. All notes do not benefit from a net loan rate and as
such interest rates can increase to maximum rates of 14% to 17%.

Fitch analyzed the current interest rates on the bonds in addition
to the effect on the trust if the interest rates on the bonds were
to increase to the maximum rates applying the LIBOR up interest
rate stresses. In both scenarios, the bond's coupon will increase
enough to compress excess spread and erode parity.

Fitch applied qualitative adjustments to the ratings in order to
account for long maturity horizon that leaves some limited upside
potential (such as favorable rate environment or successful
auction).

Rating Sensitivities

Since FFELP student loan ABS rely on the U.S. government to
reimburse defaults, 'AAAsf' FFELP ABS ratings will likely move in
tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults, interest and basis risk account for
the majority of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan
transactions. Additional defaults, interest and basis shock beyond
Fitch's published stresses could result in future downgrades.
Likewise, a buildup of credit enhancement driven by positive
excess spread given favorable interest rate and basis factor
conditions could lead to future upgrades.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Access to Loans for Learning Student Loan Corp -
1998 Master Trust IV Senior Class Notes

-- Series 2000 Class A-3 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2002 Class A-4 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2002 Class A-5 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2003-1 Class A-7 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2003-1 Class A-8 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2003-1 Class A-9 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2003-1 Class A-10 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2003-2 Class A-11 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2003-2 Class A-12 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2004 Class A-13 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2007 Class IV-A-14 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2007 Class IV-A-15 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2007 Class IV-A-16 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2007 Class IV-A-17 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative;

-- Series 2007 Class IV-A-18 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative.

Access to Loans for Learning Student Loan Corp -
1998 Master Trust IV Senior Class Notes
Subordinate Class Notes

-- Series 1998 Class C-1 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'Bsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Negative;

-- Series 2003-1 Class C-2 downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'Bsf';
   Removed from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook
   Negative.


ACCREDITED MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on $195MM RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 14 tranches
from seven transactions backed by subprime mortgage loans issued
by Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2003-2

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2003-3

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2004-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
In addition, the rating actions reflect correction of errors in
the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models
previously used by Moody's in rating these transactions.

For all of the transactions, the pooling and servicing agreements
state that principal and interest collections are commingled first
and then used to make payments on the bonds. However, the cash
flow models used in prior rating actions incorrectly applied
separate interest and principal waterfalls. Due to the discovery
of this error, these tranches were placed on watch on May 14,
2013. In addition, the cross-collateralization and allocation of
losses were incorrectly coded in the cash flow models used for the
previous rating actions. The errors have now been corrected, and
these rating actions reflect these changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


AIR CANADA 2013-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class C Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has updated the ratings for multiple enhanced
equipment trust certificates (EETC) subordinated tranches to
reflect the updated ratings criteria which was published on
Sept. 12, 2013.

The following ratings have been affirmed:

Air Canada 2013-1 Pass Through Trust:

-- Class B certificates at 'BB+';
-- Class C certificates at 'BB-'.

Hawaiian Airlines 2013-1 Pass Through Trust:

-- Class B certificates at 'BB'.

US Airways 2012-1 Pass Through Trust:

-- Class B certificates at 'BB+'.

US Airways 2012-2 Pass Through Trust:

-- Class B certificates at 'BB+'.

US Airways 2013-1 Pass Through Trust:

-- Class B certificates at 'BB+'.

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2013-1

-- Class B certificates at 'BB+'.

Based on the application of Fitch's updated criteria, the
following rating has been upgraded:

British Airways Pass Through Trust Series 2013-1

-- Class B certificates to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'.

Rationale:
The one notch upgrade reflects Fitch's expectation that the
British Airways 2013-1 B tranche would receive superior recovery
in a potential liquidation scenario.

Based on the application of Fitch's updated criteria, the
following ratings have been downgraded:

US Airways 2012-1 Pass Through Trust:

-- Class C certificates to 'B+' from 'BB-'.

US Airways 2012-2 Pass Through Trust

-- Class C certificates to 'B+' from 'BB-'.

The one notch downgrade of the US Airways C tranches reflects a
recalibration of Fitch's ratings based on the newly incorporated
recovery component of the subordinated tranche methodology. In a
potential liquidation scenario where the aircraft are rejected and
repossessed, Fitch expects the C-tranche holders would experience
minimal recovery. Notching for these two tranches now consists of
a +2 notch adjustment for a high-to-moderate affirmation factor
and a -2 notch adjustment based on expected recovery, and the
ratings are now equal to US Airways' IDR of 'B+'.

The update to the criteria does not impact Fitch's view on the
underlying credit quality of US Airways. US Airways' IDR remains
'B+', Outlook Positive.

Criteria Update:

Fitch's revised methodology incorporates a recovery component into
the subordinated tranche ratings process and breaks up the prior
maximum four notch uplift from the affirmation factor into two
components, including the presence of a liquidity facility.
Ratings are assigned through a three step approach:

1) Between 0-3 notches of uplift are applied based on the
affirmation factor (i.e. the likelihood that the airline will
affirm the aircraft in a bankruptcy scenario).

2) One notch of uplift is assigned for the inclusion of a
liquidity facility. In most cases, EETC B tranches will include a
liquidity facility, whereas C tranches will not.

3) Fitch then incorporates a recovery analysis. For B tranches,
Fitch may choose to assign one additional notch of uplift (for a
maximum potential of 5 notches from the underlying IDR) in cases
where the expected recovery is well above average compared to
similar transactions.

For C tranches, Fitch generally expects recovery to be minimal.
Therefore, Fitch will generally adjust the ratings downward by 1-2
notches based on Fitch's Corporates recovery criteria.


ALM VII(R): S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to ALM
VII(R) Ltd./ALM VII(R) LLC's $777.1 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
zroadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis
      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2676% to 12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test during the
      reinvestment period, a failure of which will lead to the
      reclassification of up to 50% of excess interest proceeds
      that are available prior to paying uncapped administrative
      expenses and fees, subordinated hedge payments, collateral
      manager subordinated fees, supplemental reserve account
      deposits, and subordinated note payments to principal
      proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral assets
      during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1699.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

ALM VII(R) Ltd./ALM VII(R) LLC

Class              Rating            Amount
                                   (mil. $)
A-1                 AAA (sf)        498.850
A-2                 AA (sf)          95.950
B (deferrable)      A (sf)           77.100
C (deferrable)      BBB- (sf)        55.050
D (deferrable)      BB- (sf)         25.775
E (deferrable)      B (sf)           24.375
Subordinated notes  NR               80.000

NR-Not rated.


ALM VII(R)-2: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to ALM
VII(R)-2 Ltd./ALM VII(R)-2 LLC's $846.125  million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis
      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2676% to 12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test during the
      reinvestment period, a failure of which will lead to the
      reclassification of up to 50% of excess interest proceeds
      that are available prior to paying uncapped administrative
      expenses and fees, subordinated hedge payments, collateral
      manager subordinated fees, supplemental reserve account
      deposits, and subordinated note payments to principal
      proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral assets
      during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1702.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

ALM VII(R)-2 Ltd./ALM VII(R)-2 LLC


Class              Rating            Amount
                                   (mil. $)
A-1                 AAA (sf)        543.175
A-2                 AA (sf)         104.475
B (deferrable)      A (sf)           83.950
C (deferrable)      BBB- (sf)        59.950
D (deferrable)      BB- (sf)         28.050
E (deferrable)      B (sf)           26.525
Subordinated notes  NR               86.175

NR-Not rated.


AMAC CDO I: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of eight classes of Notes issued
by AMAC CDO Funding I due to key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

AMAC CDO Funding I is a static (the reinvestment period ended in
November, 2011) cash transaction backed by a portfolio of: i)
whole loans and senior participations in whole loans (94.8% of the
pool balance); ii) B-Note debt (3.5%); and iii) mezzanine loan
interests (1.7%). As of the August 20, 2013 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $320.4 million from $400 million at
issuance, with the principal paydown directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes. The paydowns are a result of regular
amortization of collateral and the failure of certain par value
tests.

There are no assets that are considered impaired interests as of
the August 20, 2013 trustee report, the same as at last review.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,009
(compared to 4,153 at last review). The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (0.9% compared to 0.8% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (7.3% compared to 0.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(6.0% compared to 15.0% at last review), B1-B3 (25.8% compared to
20.0% at last review), and Caa1-C (60.0% compared to 64.2% at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.9 years, compared to 3.4 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 55.2%, compared to 54.4% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 29.3%, compared to 29.1% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption, down
from 55.2% to 50.2% or up to 60.2% would result in a rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward and 0 to
2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Takes Action on $2BB Secs Issued 2006-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 11
tranches and confirmed the ratings of six tranches from six
transactions, backed by Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by American
Home Mortgage.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-5

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Tr 2006-3

Cl. I-1A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. I-2A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-1

Cl. I-1A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. I-2A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-2

Cl. II-A-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. II-A-1C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2007-2

Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. I-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. I-3A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

These actions reflect recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. These rating
actions consist of 11 downgrades and six confirmations.

The actions also reflect the correction of an error in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by
Moody's in rating these transactions, specifically in how the
models handle principal and interest allocation. The cash flow
models used in past rating actions incorrectly used separate
interest and principal waterfalls. However, the pooling and
servicing agreements for these transactions provide that all
collected principal and interest is commingled into one payment
waterfall to pay all promised interest due on bonds first, and
then to pay scheduled principal. Due to the discovery of this
error, these tranches were placed on review on May 14, 2013. The
errors have been corrected, and these rating actions take into
account the correct interest and principal waterfall.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


AMERICAN HOME 2006-4: Moody's Cuts Rating on II-A-1 Secs. to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
from one transaction, backed by Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by
American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-4.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-4

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

These actions reflect recent performance of the underlying pool
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pool.

The action also reflects the correction of an error in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow model used by
Moody's in rating this transaction, specifically in how the model
handles principal and interest allocation. The cash flow model
used in past rating actions incorrectly used separate interest and
principal waterfalls. However, the pooling and servicing
agreements for this transaction provides that all collected
principal and interest is commingled into one payment waterfall to
pay all promised interest due on bonds first, and then to pay
scheduled principal. Due to the discovery of this error, the Cl.
II-A-1 tranche was placed on review on May 14, 2013. The error has
been corrected, and the rating action takes into account the
correct interest and principal waterfall.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


ARBOR REALTY 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all rated classes of Arbor Realty
Mortgage Securities Series 2004-1, Ltd. / LLC (ARMSS 2004-1)
reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 61.6%. Fitch's
performance expectation incorporates prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.

Key Rating Drivers

ARMSS 2004-1 is a CRE collateralized debt obligation (CDO) managed
by Arbor Realty Collateral Management, LLC (Arbor). As of the July
2013 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was
substantially invested as follows: B-notes (55%), whole loans/A-
notes (21%), preferred equity (15%), mezzanine debt (8%), and cash
(2%). Approximately 11.7% of the pool is currently defaulted while
a further 51.7% are considered Loans of Concern. Fitch expects
significant losses on many of the assets as they are highly
leveraged subordinate positions.

The CDO exited its reinvestment period in April 2009. Total
paydown to class A-1 from loan payoffs scheduled amortization and
asset sales since last review was minimal at $9.8 million.
Realized losses totaled more than $15 million over the same
period. The CDO is currently under collateralized by approximately
$23 million. As of the July 2013 trustee report, all par value and
interest coverage test were in compliance.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 89.7% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 6.4% from, generally, year-end 2012 or trailing 12
months 1Q 2013. Recoveries are below average at 31.3% due to the
high percentage of subordinate debt.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
preferred equity position (13.1% of the pool) on an over 150
property multifamily property portfolio located across nine
states. As of Dec. 31, 2012, occupancy was 85%. In early 2013, the
senior debt was modified into an A/B note structure and
transferred out of special servicing. Fitch modeled a full loss in
its base case scenario on this overleveraged position.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is related to an A-note and B-note (10.9%) secured by a portfolio
of five full and limited service hotels located in Daytona Beach,
FL. The portfolio was previously in bankruptcy, and an Arbor
affiliate took title to the properties in February 2011. While new
management has been installed at the properties, it is expected to
take time for performance at all five properties to stabilize. A
sixth poorly performing hotel was sold in December 2012 with
proceeds applied to the senior debt. Fitch modeled a term default
and a substantial loss on these loan interests in its base case
scenario.

The transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates. The default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various defaults
timing and interest rate stress scenarios as described in the
report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. The
breakeven rates for classes A and B are generally consistent with
the ratings listed below.

The Stable Outlook on class A generally reflects the class's
seniority in the capital stack and expectation of continued
further paydown over the near term. The Negative Outlook to class
B reflects the potential for further negative credit migration of
the underlying collateral.

The ratings for classes C and D are based on a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each classes credit enhancement.

Rating Sensitivities
If the collateral continues to repay at or near par, classes may
be upgraded. The junior classes are subject to further downgrade
should realized losses begin to increase.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $65.5 million class A at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51.6 million class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $27.6 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 10%;
-- $11.2 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.


ARBOR REALTY 2004-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of four classes of notes issued
by Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2004-1. The
affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2004-1 is a currently
static (reinvestment period ended in April 2009) cash transaction
backed by a portfolio of b-note debt (39.5% of the pool balance);
whole loans and a-notes (37.3%); and mezzanine loan interests
(23.2%). As of the August 30, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate
note balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, has
decreased to $319.6 million from $469.0 million at issuance, with
the paydown currently directed to the senior most outstanding
class on notes. The Class C and Class D note balances are lower
than issuance as a result of a "turbo" feature that was active
during the transaction reinvestment period.

There are seven assets with a par balance of $36.7 million (12.6%
of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the August 30, 2013 Trustee report. While there
have been realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,919
compared to 8,177 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 0.5% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.0% compared to 1.1% at last review), B1-B3
(7.1% compared to 6.8% at last review), and Caa1-C (92.9% compared
to 91.6% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.1 years compared to 2.7 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 19.4% compared to 21.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9%, the same as that at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
19.4% to 9.4% or up to 29.4% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 8 notches downward and 0 to
5 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


ARBOR REALTY 2005-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all rated classes of Arbor Realty
Mortgage Securities Series 2005-1, Ltd. / LLC (ARMSS 2005-1)
reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 42.8%. Fitch's
performance expectation incorporates prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.

Key Rating Drivers

ARMSS 2005-1 is a CRE collateralized debt obligation (CDO) managed
by Arbor Realty Collateral Management, LLC (Arbor). As of the
August 2013 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO
was substantially invested as follows: whole loans/A-notes (50%),
B-notes (29%), mezzanine debt (12%), preferred equity (5%), and
cash (5%). Approximately 12% of the pool is currently defaulted
while a further 38% are considered loans of concern. Fitch expects
significant losses on many of the assets as they are highly
leveraged subordinate positions.

The CDO exited its reinvestment period in April 2011. Total
paydown to class A-1 from loan payoffs scheduled amortization and
asset sales since last review was minimal at $5.7 million.
Realized losses totaled approximately $8 million over the same
period. The CDO is slightly under collateralized by approximately
$5 million. As of the August 2013 trustee report, all par value
and interest coverage test were in compliance.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 78.4% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 11.7% from, generally, year-end 2012 or trailing 12
months 1Q 2013. Recoveries are average at 45.5%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
B-note (6.2% of the pool) secured by a 43-story office building
located in downtown St. Louis, MO. The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2012 due to imminent default. A subsequent
loan restructure, which closed in November 2012, eliminated
amortization payments and provided an interest rate reduction,
among other terms. Fitch modeled a full loss in its base case
scenario on this overleveraged position.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a preferred equity position (4.7% of the pool) on an over 150
property multifamily property portfolio located across nine
states. As of Dec. 31, 2012, occupancy was 85%. In early 2013, the
senior debt was modified into an A/B note structure and
transferred out of special servicing. Fitch modeled a full loss in
its base case scenario on this overleveraged position.

The transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates. The default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various defaults
timing and interest rate stress scenarios as described in the
report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. The
breakeven rates for classes A-1 through D are generally consistent
with the ratings listed below.

The Stable Outlook on class A-1 through C generally reflect the
classes' seniority in the capital stack and expectation of
continued further paydown over the near term. The Negative Outlook
to class D reflects the potential for further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral.

The ratings for classes E through H are based on a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each classes credit enhancement.

Rating Sensitivities

If the collateral continues to repay at or near par, class A-1 may
be upgraded. The junior classes are subject to further downgrade
should realized losses begin to increase.

Fitch affirms and revises the Rating Outlook for the following
classes as indicated:

-- $111.7 million class A-1 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40.4 million class A-2 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57 million class B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.5 million class C at 'Bsf; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.7 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;
-- $6.8 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $13.3 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $9.9 million class G at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $13.5 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.


ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Class G to K Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes issued by ARCap 2004-1
Resecuritization, Inc. (ARCap 2004-1). The affirmations are a
result of amortization of the capital structure.

Key Rating Drivers:

Since the last rating action in October 2012, approximately 17.4%
of the collateral has been downgraded. Currently, 99% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and
66.6% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and below, compared to
97.3% and 67.7%, respectively, at the last rating action. Over
this time, the class A notes have received $11.7 million for a
total of $31.6 million in principal paydowns since issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. Based on this analysis, the credit enhancements for
the class A through D notes is consistent with the rating
indicated below.

For the class E through K notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class E and F notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf', indicating
that default is probable. Similarly, the class G through K notes
have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.

The Stable Outlook on the class A notes reflects Fitch's view that
the notes will continue to delever. The Negative Outlook on the
class B notes reflects the increasing obligor concentration and
the potential for adverse selection as the portfolio continues to
amortize.

Rating Sensitivities

In addition to those sensitivities discussed above, further
negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by SF PCM
as well as increasing concentration in assets of a weaker credit
quality could lead to downgrades.

ARCAP 2004-1 is backed by 43 tranches from 10 commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) transactions and is considered a CMBS B-
piece resecuritization (also referred to as first loss commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation [CRE CDO]/ReREMIC) as
it includes the most junior bonds of CMBS transactions. The
transaction closed April 19, 2004.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $25,483,439 class A notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable
   from Negative;
-- $30,600,000 class B notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $26,500,000 class C notes at 'CCCsf'
-- $8,500,000 class D notes at 'CCCsf'
-- $30,700,000 class E notes at 'CCsf';
-- $13,600,000 class F notes at 'CCsf;
-- $36,000,000 class G notes at 'Csf';
-- $13,000,000 class H notes at 'Csf';
-- $31,500,000 class J notes at 'Csf';
-- $20,500,000 class K notes at 'Csf'.


ARES VR: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C and D notes from Ares VR CLO Ltd., a cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Ares Management LLC.
At the same time S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, A-3, and B notes.

Ares VR CLO Ltd. ended its reinvestment period in February 2011.
Since S&P's October 2012 rating actions, the transaction has
experienced substantial paydowns.  These paydowns were
significantly more than what S&P anticipated in its analysis based
on the maturity profile of the loans in the portfolio, as noted by
the trustee in the Sept. 20, 2012, report that S&P referenced for
its October actions.  The paydowns were a combination of
unscheduled and scheduled prepayments.

Since S&P's October 2012 actions, the class A-1, A-2, and A-3
notes have collectively paid down a total of $132.5 million and
are currently less than 5% of their original notional balance.
The total paydown since S&P's October 2012 actions was
approximately 49% of the then-total pool of assets.

Due to lower senior note balances, the overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios increased significantly.  Based on the August 2013 trustee
report, the O/C ratios have improved as follows:

   -- The class A/B ratio is 231.7%, up from 154.9% in September
      2012;

   -- The class C ratio is 175.3%, up from 136.8% in September
      2012; and

   -- The class D ratio is 115.7%, up from 109.8% in September
      2012.

In addition, the transaction continues to have a low level of
defaults.  According to the August 2013 trustee report, Ares VR
CLO had only two defaulted obligations with a par of $3 million.

Based on S&P's review of the cash flow and the supplemental test
results, it raised its ratings on the class C and D notes to
reflect the increased credit support.

The affirmations reflect the class A-1, A-2, A-3, and B notes'
sufficient credit support at their current ratings.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings it
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them.  S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Ares VR CLO Ltd.

          Rating       Rating
Class     To           From

C         AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
D         BBB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ares VR CLO Ltd.

Class     Rating

A-1       AAA (sf)
A-2       AAA (sf)
A-3       AAA (sf)
B         AAA (sf)


ARGENT SECURITIES 2003-W2: Moody's Cuts Rating on M-3 Notes to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by Argent Securities 2003-
W2.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W2

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The action reflects the recent performance of the underlying pool
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pool. The
downgrade is primarily the result of recent interest shortfalls
that are unlikely to be recouped because of a weak interest
shortfall reimbursement mechanism.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


ARROYO CDO I: Moody's Upgrades Two Note Classes to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Arroyo CDO I Limited:

$38,800,000 Class B Senior Subordinated Floating Rate Notes Due
2036 (current balance of $10,186,002), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on July 13, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

$10,000,000 Class C-1 Subordinated Floating Rate Notes Due 2036,
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on February 26, 2009 Downgraded
to Ca (sf);

$16,000,000 Class C-2 Subordinated Fixed Rate Notes Due 2036,
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on February 26, 2009 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
December 2012. Moody's notes that the Class B Notes have been paid
down by approximately 50.7%, or $10.5 million since December 2012.
Based on Moody's calculation, the Class B and Class C
overcollateralization (OC) ratios are at 384% and 98%,
respectively.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the Class B Notes benefit from
receiving excess interest proceeds that are diverted upon the
failure of the Class C OC test. Moody's expects that Class C Notes
will also benefit from such interest proceeds diversion after
Class B Notes are paid off. Moody's said that it expects this test
to continue to fail in the near term, resulting in the continued
diversion of such interest proceeds to benefit the Class B Notes
and Class C Notes.

Arroyo CDO I Limited is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a diversified portfolio of corporate assets and
structured finance securities such as CMBS, RMBS and other ABS
securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8-9 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. Among the uncertainties in the residential
real estate property market are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss, assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Investment grade and below rated assets notched up by 2
rating notches:

Class B: +1

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Moody's Investment grade and below rated assets notched down by 2
rating notches:

Class B: -1

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1


BALLYROCK CLO 2006-2: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the Class
A, B, C, D, and E notes from Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Ballyrock
Investment Advisors LLC.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's
removed all of these ratings from CreditWatch, where they had been
placed with positive implications on July 9, 2013.

The upgrades mainly reflect increased credit support available to
the rated notes as the deal continues to amortize and pay down the
senior notes.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2013.
Since then, it has paid down approximately $241.1 million to the
Class A note, which is now at 46% of its original note balance.

The paydown of the notes increased the overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios in the transaction.  The trustee provided the following O/C
ratios in the August 2013 monthly report:

   -- The Class B O/C ratio was 151.50%, up from 125.80% in the
      October 2011 trustee report, which S&P used for its November
      2011 analysis.

   -- The Class C O/C ratio was 134.0% compared with 118.20% in
      October 2011.

   -- The Class D O/C ratio was 118.70% compared with 110.80% in
      October 2011.

  -- The Class E O/C ratio was 112.40% compared with 107.50% in
     October 2011.

Defaults among assets have decreased since October 2011.  Based on
the August 2013 trustee report, which S&P referenced for the
rating actions, the transaction contained no defaulted assets,
down from the $2.91 million noted in the October 2011 trustee
report, which S&P used for its last rating action in November
2011.  Furthermore, the amount of assets from obligors rated in
the 'CCC' category was reported at $15.08 million in August 2013,
down from $31.99 million in October 2011.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class        To           From
A            AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B            AAA (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C            AA+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D            BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E            BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:              Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Ltd.
Co-issuer:           Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Inc.
Collateral manager:  Ballyrock Investment Advisors LLC
Trustee:             U.S. Bank National Association
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


BOCA HOTEL: Fitch Expects to Rate $77MM Class D Certs 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Boca Hotel Portfolio
Trust 2013-BOCA Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2013-BOCA.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $176,800,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $425,000,000* class X-CP 'NR';
-- $425,000,000* class X-EXT 'NR';
-- $64,200,000 class B'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $77,000,000 class D 'BB+sf; Outlook Stable;
-- $74,000,000 class E 'NR'.

* Notional and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based upon information received from the
issuer as of Aug. 28, 2013.

The certificates in this transaction represent the beneficial
interests in a trust that holds a $425 million mortgage loan
secured by four hotel properties located in Florida. The loan is
sponsored by entities managed by affiliates of Blackstone Group,
L.P. and Blackstone Real Estate Partners IV L.P.

Key Rating Drivers

Geographic and Asset Concentration: The loan is secured by four
hotels (1,852 keys) located in Florida, with two in Fort
Lauderdale and one each in Boca Raton and Naples. In addition, the
Waldorf Astoria Boca Raton Resort & Club accounts for
approximately 60.8% of the trailing 12-months (TTM) ended June
2013 net cash flow (NCF) and 69% of the appraised value. The loan
is more susceptible to single-event risk related to a market.
Hotel performance is considered to be more volatile due to the
segment's operating nature

High Leverage on Full Debt Stack: The total debt package includes
mezzanine financing in the amount of $370 million that is not
included in the trust. Fitch's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) for the full debt stack are
0.73x and 152.9%, respectively. However, Fitch's DSCR and LTV for
the trust component of the debt are 1.37x and 81.8%, respectively.

Asset Quality and Market Positioning: The properties received
Fitch property quality scores ranging from 'A-' to 'B'. The
properties offer resort-type amenities, two 18-hole golf courses,
and marinas located along the intercoastal waterway. Since
acquiring the portfolio in 2004, approximately $309 million has
been invested in the renovation of the hotels by the sponsor since
2005, with an additional $28.5 million in capital improvements
planned at the Boca Raton Resort & Club and $16 million in marina
improvements at the Hyatt Regency Pier Sixty-Six Resort & Spa.

Diversified Revenue Sources: For the TTM ended June 2013,
approximately $81 million of non-room and non-F&B revenue was
generated by the portfolio, representing 32.9% of the portfolio's
total revenues. Ancillary revenues include marina operations,
membership dues and initiation fees and rental income.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch found that the pool could withstand a 83.7% decline in value
and an approximately 69.9% decrease in the most recent actual cash
flow prior to experiencing $1 of loss to the 'AAAsf' rated class.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings of class A (rated
'AAAsf' by Fitch) and found that a 17% decline in Fitch NCF would
result in a one-category downgrade, while a 42% decline would
result in a downgrade to below investment grade.


BOCA HOTEL: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Boca Hotel Portfolio Trust 2013-BOCA's $425.0 million
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-BOCA.

The note issuance is an commercial mortgage-backed securities
zransaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $425.0 million, secured by first lien
mortgages on the borrowers' fee and leasehold interests in four
full-service hotels and three marinas in Florida, all furniture,
fixtures, and equipment and personal property owned by the
borrowers used to operate the properties, and any of the
borrowers' interests in the operating leases.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 13,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning and ending loan-to-value ratio of 72.1%, based on its
estimate of long-term sustainable value of the properties backing
the transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1803.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Boca Hotel Portfolio Trust 2013-BOCA

Class       Rating        Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)     176,800,000
X-CP        BB (sf)   425,000,000(i)
X-EXT       BB (sf)   425,000,000(i)
B           AA- (sf)      64,200,000
C           A (sf)        33,000,000
D           BBB- (sf)     77,000,000
E           BB (sf)       74,000,000

(i) Notional balance.


CAPTEC FRANCHISE: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 5 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on the
outstanding Captec Franchise Receivables Trusts:

Series 1996-A

-- Class A affirmed at 'Csf', RE revised to 60% from 70%, and
   subsequently withdrawn;
-- Class B affirmed at 'Csf'/RE 0% and subsequently withdrawn.

Series 1998-1

-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B affirmed at 'CCCsf'/RE 100%;
-- Class C affirmed at 'Dsf'/RE 0%.

Series 2000-1

-- Class B affirmed at 'CCCsf'/RE 100%;
-- Class C affirmed at 'Dsf' RE revised to 10% from 0%;
-- Class D affirmed at 'Dsf/RE 0%';
-- Class E affirmed at 'Dsf/RE 0%';
-- Class F affirmed at 'Dsf/RE 0%'.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of the class A and B notes of the 1996-A series
reflects the fact that Fitch believes that default remains
inevitable for both classes. The revision of the RE for the class
A notes to 60% from 70% is based on future expected principal
receipts. Fitch has withdrawn its ratings as they are no longer
considered relevant to the agency's coverage as default of all
remaining notes is considered inevitable. Furthermore, the series
contains only one remaining obligor. As a result, the ability of
the transaction to continue to make payments on any class of notes
has become reliant on the performance of this single obligor.

The affirmations reflect each class of notes' ability to pass
stress case scenarios consistent with the current rating levels.
The Stable Outlook assigned to class A-3 in series 1998-1 reflects
Fitch's view that the current rating is not expected to change
within the next 12-24 months, based on recent performance trends
and available credit enhancement. The revision of the RE for the
class C notes in 2000-1 reflects the change in principal recovery
expectation to that class.

Fitch will continue to monitor this transaction and may take
additional rating action in the event of changes in performance
and credit enhancement measures.

Sensitivity Analysis
Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults could produce
loss levels higher than the current expectations and impact
available loss coverage. Lower loss coverage could impact ratings
and Rating Outlooks, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.

The performance of the transactions will be affected by the
performance of the largest obligors. Any prepayments will have a
positive impact on the performance and future net loss coverage.
Conversely, delinquencies and defaults from the loans to the
largest obligor will have a negative impact on the remaining life
of the transaction.


CEDAR FUNDING II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Cedar
Funding II CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding II CLO LLC's $330.50 million
fixed- and floating-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of July 23, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Cedar Funding II CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding II CLO LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     228.00
A-X                        AAA (sf)                       6.50
B-1                        AA (sf)                       25.00
B-2                        AA (sf)                       10.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        20.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      17.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       24.00


CGBAM 2013-BREH: Rights Transfer No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that the Directing
Certificate Holder has elected to terminate Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, the existing Special Servicer, and to
appoint Strategic Asset Services LLC as the successor Special
Servicer. The Proposed Special Servicer Transfer and Replacement
will become effective upon satisfaction of the conditions
precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement.
Moody's has determined that this proposed special servicing
replacement will not, in and of itself, and at this time, result
in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any class
of certificates rated by Moody's for CGBAM Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-BREH (the Certificates).
Moody's opinion only addresses the credit impact associated with
the proposed designation and transfer of special servicing rights.
Moody's is not expressing any opinion as to whether this change
has, or could have, other non-credit related effects that may have
a detrimental impact on the interests of note holders and/or
counterparties.

The last rating action for CGBAM 2013-BREH was taken on July 30,
2013. The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

On July 30, 2013, Moody's assigned ratings to nine classes of CMBS
securities, issued by CGBAM Commercial Series 2013-BREH:

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-ACP, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-BCP, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-NCP, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)


CGMT 2013-GC15- DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class E Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2013-GC15 (the Certificates), to be issued by Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2013-GC15.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

Classes X-B, X-C, D, E and F have been privately placed pursuant
to Rule 144A.

The Class X-A, X-B and X-C balances are notional.  DBRS ratings on
interest-only certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers
the interest-only certificate's position within the transaction
payment waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

Up to the full certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and
Class C certificates may be exchanged for Class PEZ certificates.
Class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for up to the full
certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and Class C
certificates.

The collateral consists of 97 fixed-rate loans secured by 129
commercial, multifamily and manufactured housing properties.  The
transaction has a balance of $1,115,180,033.  The pool exhibits a
DBRS weighted-average term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
debt yield of 1.51 times (x) and 9.4%, respectively.  The DBRS
sample included 35 loans, representing 61.9% of the pool.  The
pool has a high concentration of properties located in urban
markets (25.5% of the pool), which benefit from a larger investor,
consumer and tenant base even in times of stress.  The pool
benefits from diversity in terms of location, loan size and
property, with a concentration level equivalent to a pool of 44
equal-sized loans.

Loans secured by hotels represent 14.8% of the pool, including two
of the largest ten loans.  Hotel properties have higher cash flow
volatility than traditional property types because their income
(which is derived from daily contracts rather than multi-year
leases) and their expenses (which are often mostly fixed) are
quite high as a percentage of revenue.  These two factors cause
revenue to fall swiftly during a downturn and cash flow to fall
even faster because of the high operating leverage.  None of the
loans in the pool have additional existing secured debt in place
that is subordinate in right of payment to the trust balance.
Future additional secured debt is not permitted for any of the
loans in the pool.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure
and underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to
ongoing surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades
by DBRS after the date of issuance.


CIFC FUNDING 2013-III: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to CIFC
Funding 2013-III Ltd./CIFC Funding 2013-III LLC's $369 million
fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated, speculative-grade, senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis
      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2590%-12.8133%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization coverage tests, a
      failure of which would lead to the diversion of interest and
      principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the rated notes
      outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which would lead to the reclassification of up to
      50.00% of excess interest proceeds that are available prior
      to paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
      collateral manager subordinated and incentive management
      fees, and subordinated note payments to principal proceeds
      to purchase additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1798.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CIFC Funding 2013-III Ltd./CIFC Funding 2013-III LLC

Class                 Rating          Amount (mil. $)
A-1A                  AAA (sf)                 119.00
A-1B                  AAA (sf)                 125.00
A-2A                  AA (sf)                   21.00
A-2B                  AA (sf)                   33.00
B (deferrable)        A (sf)                    30.00
C (deferrable)        BBB (sf)                  23.00
D (deferrable)        BB (sf)                   18.00
Subordinated notes    NR                        49.00

NR-Not rated.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2012-GC8: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-GC8 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are based on stable performance of the underlying
collateral pool. As of the August 2013 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 0.9% to
$1.03 billion from $1.04 billion at issuance. Full year 2012
financials were available for 52 (95.4%) of the remaining 57 loans
in the pool.

The largest loan of the pool (11%) is the Miami Center, which is
secured by a 786,836 square foot (sf), class A office tower
located on Biscayne Bay in downtown Miami. The property is the
second largest office building in the state of Florida. It is 35-
stories and includes an attached 9-story parking garage with 918
spaces. Additionally, 45% of the property's net rentable area
(NRA) is leased to investment-grade tenants or top law firms. The
servicer-reported occupancy as of first-quarter 2013 was 82%.

The second largest loan, 222 Broadway (9.7%), is secured by a
786,552 sf office tower located in Manhattan's Financial District.
Bank of America (BofA) had owned and occupied the property from
2008 to 2012 when they entered into a sale-and-leaseback
transaction with a 10-year lease agreement for approximately 76%
of the NRA. In May 2013, BofA gave back 15% of their space upon
its expiration, which has been re-leased to a new tenant, We
Works. As per the property's rent roll, the first-quarter 2013
occupancy increased to 84.6% from 79.1% at issuance.

The third largest loan, 17 Battery Place South (8.8%), is secured
by a 428,450 sf office tower located in Manhattan's Financial
District, adjacent to Battery Park and overlooking New York
Harbor. The 13-story office tower is part of a 31-story building,
which also contains luxury rental apartments. As of the second-
quarter 2013, the servicer-reported occupancy was approximately
94.6%.

Rating Sensitivity

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains stable. Due to the
recent issuance of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch
does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a
material economic or asset level event changes the transaction's
overall portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $49.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $181.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $379.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80.3 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $93.6 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61.1 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.5 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $812.3 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes G and X-B certificates.

COBALT CMBS 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class D Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed the super
senior classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from Cobalt CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2006-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses
primarily due to the declining valuations of the specially
serviced assets. Fitch modeled losses of 17.1% of the remaining
pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total 19.5%,
including $190.4 million (7.5% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 33 loans (33.4%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 16 specially serviced
assets (21.5%).

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 30.8% to $1.77 billion from
$2.56 billion at issuance. One loan (0.6% of the pool) is
defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes A-J
through P.

Rating Sensitivity

The 'AAA' rated classes are expected to remain stable due to
continued paydown. The 'BB' rated class may be subject to future
downgrades should pool performance deteriorate and losses exceed
projections. In addition, the distressed classes (rated below 'B')
may be subject to further rating actions as losses are realized.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (representing
3.5% of the pool) secured by a 537,400 SF class A office property
located in downtown Cincinnati, OH. The loan transferred to the
special servicer in December 2012 after the former largest tenant,
Chiquita Brands International, vacated upon its lease expiration
in November 2012. In January 2013, a majority of the TIC ownership
structure filed bankruptcy. The Special Servicer is pursuing lift
stay to proceed with foreclosure in Ohio State court. A receiver
(CBRE) was recently appointed. The property is currently 66%
occupied. Cash management is in place.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses (2.4%) consists
of a 227,000 SF class A office campus located in Scottsdale, AZ.
At issuance this property was 100% leased to DHL with a lease
expiration date of June 20, 2012. In fourth quarter 2009, DHL paid
a lease termination fee and vacated the building. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in March 2010 and the property
became a REO asset in November 2011 through foreclosure. The
property is currently 48% occupied by two tenants. Cushman and
Wakefield is engaged to lease the asset.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (2.9%)
secured by a 585,222 SF office property located in Windsor,
Connecticut. The loan transferred to special servicing in July
2012 for monetary default. A large tenant (22.7% of the property),
whose lease expires in October 2013, has vacated but is still
paying rent. Currently, the property is 87% leased. Asset manager
is dual tracking foreclosure and loan modification.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and revises Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $253.1 million class A-M to 'BBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
   Negative;
-- $208.8 million class A-J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 10%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $107.7 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $74.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $723.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $292.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.6 million class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $28.5 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.8 million class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, AMP-E1 and AMP-E2 certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO
certificates.



COMM 2003-LNB1: Rockefeller Loan Defeasance No Impact on Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that 75 Plaza, LLC, the
Borrower for the 75 Rockefeller Plaza mortgage loan, has elected
to defease the loan with U.S. Government Securities. The proposed
defeasance will become effective upon satisfaction of the
conditions precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the defeasance transaction. Moody's has
determined that this proposed defeasance will not, in and of
itself, and at this time, result in a downgrade or withdrawal of
the current ratings to any class of certificates rated by Moody's
for COMM 2003-LNB1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

Moody's opinion only addresses the credit impact associated with
the proposed defeasance. Moody's is not expressing any opinion as
to whether this change has, or could have, other noncredit related
effects that may have a detrimental impact on the interests of
note holders and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for COMM 2003-LNB1, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates was taken on July 18, 2013. The
methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

In the July 18, 2013 action, Moody's upgraded the ratings of two
classes, downgraded one classes and affirmed ten classes of COMM
2003-LNB1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as
follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)


COMM 2004-LNB3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to 'Csf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed 13 classes of COMM 2004-LNB3, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2004 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2004 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2008 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Confirmed at
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Confirmed at A2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to higher than expected losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below-investment grade P&I classes are commensurate
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of
the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the expected credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.9% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
5.6%. Realized losses have increased from 1.4% of the original
balance to 1.6% since the prior review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12 compared to 14 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 36% to $862 million
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 54% of the pool. Twelve loans, representing 23% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains three loans with investment grade
credit assessments, representing 32% of the pool.

Eighteen loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $21.9 million (51% loss severity on
average). One loan, representing 4% of the pool, is currently in
special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the Beau Terre
Office Building Loan ($33 million -- 4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 371,000 square foot Class B office property located
in Bentonville, Arkansas. The loan transferred into special
servicing in May 2010 due to imminent monetary default. A
foreclosure sale occurred in September 2011, and the property is
now real estate owned (REO). Occupancy was 53% in December 2012
compared to 45% in February 2012, and 97% at securitization. The
special servicer is pursuing a leasing opportunities for the
property.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $37.2 million loss (69% expected loss overall) for the
specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 95%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 87% compared to 91% at Moody's prior
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 16% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
8.9%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.17X, respectively, compared
to 1.35X and 1.12X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Garden State
Plaza Loan ($130 million -- 15% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in a $520 million mortgage loan. The loan
is secured by a super-regional mall owned by Westfield in Paramus,
New Jersey. The mall anchors are Macy's, Nordstrom, JC Penney,
Neiman Marcus, and Lord and Taylor. As of year-end 2012 reporting,
the mall was 98% leased compared to 97% the prior year. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 1.61X,
respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.58X at last review.

The second-largest loan with a credit assessment is the 731
Lexington Avenue Loan ($93 million -- 11% of the pool), which
represents a participation interest in a $233 million senior
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 690,000 square foot office
condominium located within the East Side office submarket of
Midtown Manhattan. The property is 100% leased to media firm
Bloomberg, L.P. through February 2029. The property is also
encumbered by an $86 million B-Note, which is held outside the
trust. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and
2.41X, respectively, compared to A3 and 2.31X at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the Tysons Corner
Center Loan ($55 million -- 6% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in a $298 million mortgage loan. The loan
is secured by a three-level super-regional mall located in McLean,
Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C. The mall was 100% leased as
of year-end 2012 reporting compared to 99% at Moody's last review.
The loan sponsor is Macerich. The mall has been a consistent
strong performer and stands to benefit from the planned 2014
opening of an extension to the Washington Metro subway system. The
new Tysons Corner station will provide direct access to the
property. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
Aaa and 2.50X respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.38X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Centreville Square I & II Loan ($55
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 312,000 square
foot grocery-anchored retail center located in Centreville,
Virginia. The property, located 30 miles southwest of Washington,
D.C., was 85% leased as of June 2013. The anchor tenant --
Shopper's Food and Pharmacy, a regional discount grocery retailer
and a subsidiary of SuperValu, Inc. (47,000 square feet, 15% of
property NRA) -- vacated in June 2013. Moody's analysis
incorporates higher vacancy due to loss of the anchor tenant.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 89% and 1.07X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 3 Beaver Valley Loan ($36 million -
- 4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 263,000 square foot
office building located in Wilmington, Delaware. The property is
100% leased to a subsidiary of Farmers Insurance Group. The
tenant's lease expiration is co-terminus with loan maturity in
January 2015. Moody's analysis incorporated a lit/dark
calculation, using a 50% lit renewal probability to account for
the risk of the property going "dark" - or being vacant following
the lease expiration of the current single tenant. The lit/dark
analysis considers a "dark" value based on current market rents.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.08X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.03X at last review.

The third largest loan is a multifamily portfolio ($33 million --
4% of the pool), secured by three cross-collateralized apartment
properties located in suburban Buffalo, New York. The largest
property is Williamstowne Apartments, a 525-unit complex located
in Cheektowaga, New York. The two remaining properties have a
combined 372 units and are located in Cheektowaga, and Tonawanda,
New York. Portfolio occupancy was 88% as of July 2013 reporting.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and 0.95X,
respectively, compared to 120% and 0.85X at last review.


COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Certs to 'Caa2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of seven classes
affirmed eight classes of COMM 2005-C6 Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Ca
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade are due increased credit support due to paydowns and
amortizations, lower than expected realized losses since last
review and improved deal performance. The affirmations of the
investment-grade P&I classes are due to key parameters, including
Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. The ratings below-investment grade
classes are consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus
affirmed. The rating of the IO Class, Class XC, is consistent with
the expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus
affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.1% of the
current balance. At last full review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 8.6%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 24 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29% to $1.61
billion from $2.27 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 110 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
53% of the pool. Five loans, representing 3% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities. The pool
contains one loan with an investment grade credit assessment,
representing less than 1% of the pool.

Thirteen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $73.3 million (48% loss severity on average).
Currently eight loans, representing 6% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Tropicana
Center Loan ($51.6 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured
by a 578,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in Las
Vegas, Nevada. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
March 2009 due to payment default and is currently 90+ days
delinquent. A receiver is in place and the loan currently in the
process of being sold.

The remaining seven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. The master servicer has recognized appraisal
reductions totaling $45.1 million for the specially serviced
loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $35.1 million loss (36%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $16.4 million loss (19% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating
results for 99% of the pool. Excluding special serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 86%
compared to 91% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.71X and 1.22X, respectively, compared
to 1.66X and 1.07X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with an investment grade credit assessment is the 9701
Apollo Drive Loan ($4.1 million -- 0.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 94,000 SF office building located in Largo (Prince
George's County), Maryland. The loan is fully amortizing and has
paid down 44% since securitization. The loan matures in May 2020.
Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and
3.02X, respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.21X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 31.2% of the
pool. The largest loan is the Lakewood Center Loan ($218.0 million
-- 13.5% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest
in a 2.1 million SF super-regional mall located in Lakewood (Los
Angeles County), California. The loan is also encumbered by
additional debt in the form of a $32 million B-Note, held outside
of the Trust. The mall is anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney and
Target. The property was 94% leased as of July 2013, which was the
same at last review. Performance has remain stable since last
review and the trailing twelve-month anchor tenant sales are in-
line with national averages. The loan is interest only throughout
the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.15X,
respectively, compared to 75% and 1.18X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Kaiser Center Loan ($147 million --
9.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 914,000 SF Class A office
building located in Oakland, California. The property was 88%
leased as of July 2013 compared to 97% at last review. The largest
tenants are BART (34% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease
expiration July 2021) and the Regents of the University of
California (UCLA) (13% of the NRA; lease expiration April 2021).
The property's cashlow has increased considerably since 2011,
largely due to rent steps and increases in other income. The loan
is interest-only throughout the entire term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 120%
and 0.84X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Private Mini Storage Portfolio Loan
($139.3 million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of 38 self-storage facilities totaling 23,410 units
located in six states. The loan is also encumbered by additional
debt in the form of a $33 million mezzanine loan. Portfolio
performance has improved largely due to increased occupancy, which
was 82% as of June 2013 compared to 77% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to
97% and 1.03X at last review.


COMM 2005-FL11: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 CMBS Tranches to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two Interest
Only (IO) Classes that were Under Review for Possible Downgrade in
Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, COMM 2005-FL11. Moody's rating
action is as follows:

Cl. X-2-DB, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 20, 2013
B3 (sf) Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-3-DB, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 20, 2013
B3 (sf) Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to the realization of an anticipated loan
payoff of a high credit quality loan. On December 20, 2012,
Moody's placed Classes X-2-DB and X-3-DB under review for possible
downgrade citing the status of the specially serviced
Whitehall/Starwood Golf Portfolio Loan which was expected to pay
off. This would have left the ratings on the IO Classes linked to
one REO loan. On March 20, 2013, and on June 20, 2013, Moody's
continued the reviews as the Whitehall/Starwood Golf Portfolio
Loan had not paid off, but was still expected to pay off. The loan
paid off in August 2013. Moody's does not rate the two remaining
principal Classes K and L.

This review concludes the prior rating action dated June 20, 2013.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

The methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 89%
to $11.4 million from $105.2 million at the prior review. The pay
down is due to pay off of the Whitehall/Starwood Golf Portfolio
Loan which had a credit assessment of Ba3. The two IO classes
reference the one remaining loan in the pool.

The only loan in the pool, the DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio
Loan ($11.4 million), is in special servicing. This loan
represents a pari-passu interest in a $153.4 million first
mortgage loan. The pari-passu pieces are included in two other
transactions, GECMC 2005-C4 and GMACC 2006-C1. The loan has paid
down 41% since securitization.

The loan was originally secured by 35 single tenant buildings
leased to Mervyn's. Mervyn's filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in July 2008, closed all its stores and rejected the
leases on all the properties in this portfolio. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2008 due to Mervyn's
filing for bankruptcy protection. The special servicer is focused
on selling or releasing the properties. Eighteen properties have
been sold. Seven of these sales happened in March 2013. Fourteen
properties are fully or partially leased. Three properties are
vacant. The loan is REO. Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio is over
100%, the same as last review. Moody's current credit assessment
is C, the same as last review.

The pooled Class L has experienced losses of $71,206 as of the
current payment date. In addition, there are interest shortfalls
totaling $89,168 to Class L. Moody's does not rate the two
remaining principal classes K and L.


COMM 2013-LC13: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to COMM 2013-LC13 Mortgage Trust's $1.077 billion
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-LC13.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 57 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $1.077 billion, secured by the fee
and leasehold interests in 97 properties across 27 states.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 16,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect the credit support provided by the
transaction structure, S&P's view of the underlying collateral's
economics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's
relative diversity, and S&P's overall qualitative assessment of
the transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1813.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

COMM 2013-LC13 Mortgage Trust

Class            Rating                 Amount ($)
A-1              AAA (sf)               68,822,000
A-2              AAA (sf)              237,427,000
A-SB             AAA (sf)               73,298,000
A-3              AAA (sf)               47,500,000
A-4              AAA (sf)              100,000,000
A-5              AAA (sf)              227,408,000
X-A              AAA (sf)           847,415,000(i)
X-B              NR                 164,363,000(i)
X-C              NR                  66,015,713(i)
A-M              AAA (sf)               92,960,000
B                AA- (sf)               68,709,000
C                A- (sf)                45,806,000
D                BBB- (sf)              49,848,000
E                BB- (sf)               28,292,000
F                B+ (sf)                 9,431,000
G                NR                     28,292,713

(i) Notional amount.
NR - Not rated.


COMM 2013-THL: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to Cl. F Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
CMBS securities, issued by COMM 2013-THL, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-CP*, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)


CONCORD REAL 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. L Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the rating of seven classes of notes issued
by Concord Real Estate CDO 2006-1. The affirmations are due to key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Concord Real Estate CDO 2006-1 is a static (the reinvestment
period ended in December, 2011) cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(23.6% of the pool balance); ii) whole loans (23.2%); iii) B-Note
debt and rake bonds (28.5%); iv) mezzanine loan interests (21.4%);
and v) CRE CDO and Re-remic debt (3.2%). As of the August 26, 2013
Trustee Report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preference shares, has decreased to $276.8 million from
$465.0 million at issuance, as a result of the combination of the
junior notes cancellation to Classes C through H notes and of the
paydown directed to the senior most outstanding class of notes
from voluntary and involuntary prepayment of collateral and
failing of certain par value tests. In general, holding all key
parameters static, the junior note cancellations results in
slightly higher expected losses and longer weighted average lives
on the senior Notes, while producing slightly lower expected
losses on the mezzanine and junior Notes. However, this does not
cause, in and of itself, a downgrade or upgrade of any outstanding
classes of notes.

Five assets with a par balance of $47.7 million (14.7% of the pool
balance) were listed as defaulted securities as of the August 26,
2013 Trustee Report. Moody's expects significant losses to occur
on these assets once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,724
compared to 4,417 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (7.1% compared to 10.7% at last
review), A1-A3 (2.4% compared to 6.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(5.4% compared to 0.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (9.7% compared to
1.1% at last review), B1-B3 (12.9% compared to 11.7% at last
review), and Caa1-C (62.4% compared to 70.5% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.7 years, compared to 3.0 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 26.3% compared to 24.8 % at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.0%, compared to 14.1% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 26.3% to 36.3% or down to 16.3% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 4 notches upward and
2 to 4 notches downward respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 2012-3: Fitch Affirms BB- Cl. C Cert. Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following ratings:

Continental Airlines 2012-2 Pass Through Trust

-- Series 2012-2 Class A certificates at 'A',
-- Series 2012-2 Class B certificates at 'BBB-'

Continental Airlines 2012-3 Pass Through Trust

-- Series 2012-3 Class C certificates at 'BB-'

The 'A' rating on the class A certificates is based on a top down
analysis that focuses on overcollateralization and the ability of
the structure to withstand a severe stress scenario. Fitch's
stress analysis applies various haircuts to the collateral value,
assumes a full draw of the transaction's 18 month liquidity
facility as well as incorporating remarketing/repossession costs
equal to 5% of the portfolio value. Using these assumptions, Fitch
estimates that the maximum stress level LTV through the life of
the transaction is 94.2%, which implies full recovery for the A
tranche holders with some headroom.

The 'A' rating is further supported by a high affirmation factor
(the likelihood that the airline would affirm the collateral pool
in a bankruptcy scenario) and the quality of the collateral pool.
The underlying collateral consists of 2012 - 2013 delivery 737-
900ERs and 787-8s, both of which Fitch considers to be quality
Tier 1 aircraft, and which are viewed as being strategically
important to United's fleet plan.

The subordinated tranche ratings reflect Fitch's updated EETC
criteria, which was published on September 12, 2013. The updated
methodology prescribes a three step process to determine the
subordinated tranche ratings; 1) ratings are notched up from the
airline's IDR by 0-3 notches based on affirmation factor, 2) a one
notch uplift is provided for the presence of a liquidity facility,
and 3) one additional notch of uplift may be assigned to B
tranches that exhibit superior recovery prospects for a maximum
potential uplift of 5 notches.

The 'BBB-' rating on the Continental 2012-2 class B certificates
reflects a full five notch uplift, reflecting Fitch's view that
the B tranche benefits both from a high affirmation factor and
from recovery prospects that are well above average compared to
similar deals.

The 'BB-' rating on the Continental 2012-3 class C certificates
reflects a three notch uplift based on the affirmation factor,
offset by a one notch downward adjustment based on recovery
expectations.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of four and
affirmed the ratings of nine CMBS classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of the four P&I bonds are due to increased credit
support resulting from paydowns and amortization as well as
anticipated paydowns from maturing and defeased loans.

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I bonds are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The ratings of
the below investment grade P&I bonds are consistent with Moody's
expected loss and thus are affirmed. The ratings of the IO Classes
are consistent with the credit performance of their referenced
classes and thus are affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.8% of the
current pooled balance compared to 4.4% at last review. The deal
has paid down 25% since last review. The deal has experienced
$40.5 million of realized losses. Moody's base expected loss plus
realized losses is 3.9% of the original pooled balance, compared
to 5.1% at last review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22 compared to 45 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 51% to $801.9
million from $1.62 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 140 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 35% of the pool. The pool includes 35
loans with an investment grade credit assessment, representing 18%
of the pool. There are 15 defeased loans representing 27% of the
pool balance.

Seventy loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a realized loss of $40.5 million (44.2% loss severity). There are
currently six loans, representing 3% of the pool, in special
servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 7.4% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $15.7 million loss (19% expected loss) from the
specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 83%
of the pool balance. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 76%. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.46X, respectively.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Beverly Center
Loan ($88.1 million -- 11% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in the senior component of a $267 million
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by the leasehold interest in an
eight-story regional mall located in Los Angeles, California. The
loan is also encumbered by a $41 million B-Note which is held
outside the trust. The mall anchors are Bloomingdale's, Macy's and
Macy's Men's Store, all controlled by Macy's Inc. The
Bloomingdale's and Macy's stores constitute 38% of the net
rentable area (NRA) with both leases expiring in March of 2017.
The mall was 96% leased as of year-end 2012 compared to 97% leased
at last review. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3
and 1.37X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.39X at last review.

The remaining credit assessments are associated with 34
residential cooperative loans which represent $56 million in total
loan balance, or a 7% share of the overall pool. Moody's credit
assessment for this group of loans is Aaa.

The top three conduit loans represent 8% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Northfield Square Mall Loan ($25.3 million --
3% of the pool), which is secured by a regional mall located in
Bourbonnais, Illinois, approximately 50 miles southwest of
Chicago. The anchors are Carson Pirie Scott, Sears, JC Penny and a
multiplex theater. The mall was 91% leased as of March 2013,
compared to 89% at the prior review. Simon Property Group is the
loan sponsor. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and
1.33X, respectively, compared to 89% and 1.16X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Claremore Apartment Homes Loan
($19.7 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 332
unit apartment complex located in San Antonio, Texas. The property
has not been performing well due to high repairs and maintenance
expenses despite high occupancy and increasing rental income for
each year since 2010. The property was 97% occupied as of January
2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 137% and 0.71X,
respectively, compared to 128% and 0.76X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Northland Portfolio Loan ($17.4
million -- 2.2% of the pool). The loan is secured by three
apartment complexes; two in Texas and one in North Carolina. As of
March 2013, the properties occupancy's ranged from 93% to 97% with
a combined occupancy of 96%. The performance has improved each
year since 2010 due to increased rental income. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.57X, respectively, compared to 71% and
1.39X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C5: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Class G Certs. to CCC
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes, upgraded three classes,
and affirmed 17 classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp. series 2005-C5, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Key Rating Drivers
The downgrades reflect a greater certainty of loss expectations of
the overall pool, including anticipated losses from the specially
serviced loans, since Fitch's last rating action. Upgrades to rake
classes 375-A, 375-B, and 375-C reflect the defeasance of the
supporting 375 Park Avenue B-Note, which occurred in April 2013
subsequent to the last rating action. Fitch modeled losses of 4.6%
of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 6.1%, including $74.3 million (2.5% of the original
pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 72
loans (21.6% of the pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes six specially serviced assets (3.9% of the pool).

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 21.1% to $2.32 billion from
$2.94 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 17 loans
(17.1% of the pool) are defeased, including the largest loan in
the pool. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes K
through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially serviced
loan (1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 313,847 sf (square
feet) office property located in Phoenix, AZ. The loan transferred
to special servicing effective March 2013 due to Monetary Default
and a receiver was appointed in April 2013. Occupancy and DSCR
were 93% and 1.20x as of YE (Year End) 2012. However, per the June
2013 rent roll, property occupancy has since declined to 76%, in-
line with market vacancy.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a 90,804 sf
retail center located in Chino, CA (0.6% of the pool). The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2011 due to a decline in
occupancy. The loan became REO in August 2012. The leasing agent
is pursuing new and renewed leases; per the special servicer, as
of August 2013 the asset is 82% leased following the execution of
a new fitness user lease. The servicer anticipates timing for sale
by YE 2013.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a
308,353 sf retail center located in Littleton, CO, approximately
10 miles southwest of Denver (1.8% of the pool). Occupancy
previously declined in 4Q 2011 due to Stein Mart vacating (11% of
GLA). Occupancy was 82% and DSCR was 1.07x as of YE 2012.

Rating Sensitivity
The ratings for the majority of the classes are expected to remain
stable. Class A-J has a negative Rating Outlook as an increase in
expected losses may not support the current rating. Classes B
through F have strong credit enhancement relative to their ratings
and have Stable Outlooks; however, these classes may be
susceptible to rating downgrades should performance deteriorate
further and losses be greater than expectations. The distressed
classes (those rated below 'B') are expected to be subject to
further downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks as indicated:

-- $21.8 million class D to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18.1 million class E to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29 million class F to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable
   from Negative;
-- $36.3 million class G to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch upgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $5.1 million class 375-A to 'AAAsf' from 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $8.9 million class 375-B to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $19.8 million class 375-C to 'AAAsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
   Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

--$6.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$52.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$425.6 million class A-1-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$290.2 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$224.8 million class A-J at 'AAsf'; Outlook Negative;
--$24.9 million class B at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
--$47.6 million class C at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$21.8 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
--$32.6 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
--$32.6 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
--$7.3 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
--$10 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class S certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings on the interest-only class A-X, A-SP and A-Y certificates.


CREST EXETER: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed six classes issued
by Crest Exeter Street Solar 2004-1, Ltd./Corp (Crest Exeter 2004-
1). The downgrades are a result of negative migration on the
underlying collateral.

Key Rating Drivers:
Since the last rating action in October 2012, approximately 10.2%
of the collateral has been downgraded. Currently, 42.6% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and
28.1% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and below, compared to
57% and 24.3%, respectively, at the last rating action. Over this
period, the class A notes have received $64.3 million for a total
of $243.1 million in principal paydowns since issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. The class A through C notes are passing above their
current rating category. However, the notes were affirmed given
the increased concentration and risk of adverse selection. The
credit enhancement for the class D notes is consistent with the
rating indicated below.

For the class E notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to
the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below). Given the
high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class E
notes have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.

The Stable Outlook on the class A and B notes reflects Fitch's
view that the transaction will continue to delever. The Negative
Outlook on the class C notes reflects junior position of the notes
and risk of adverse selection as the portfolio continues to
delever.

Rating Sensitivities
In addition to those sensitivities discussed above, further
negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by SF PCM
as well as increasing concentration in assets of a weaker credit
quality could lead to downgrades for the more junior classes. The
senior notes are expected to be paid in full in the near term.

Crest Exeter 2004-1 is a cash flow commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) which closed on April 29,
2004. The collateral is composed of 51.1% commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS), 21.7% real estate investment trusts
(REITs), 18.9% commercial real estate loans (CREL), and 8.3%
structured finance CDOs (SF CDOs).

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $18,301,917 class A-1 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,553,998 class A-2 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,377,070 class B-1 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,214,777 class B-2 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,675,414 class C-1 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $13,759,337 class C-2 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes as indicated:

-- $5,026,242 class D-1 to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
-- $11,371,872 class D-2 to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
-- $3,794,142 class E-1 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
-- $5,513,647 class E-2 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'.


ELEMENT EQUIPMENT: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its rating to Element
Equipment Finance L.P.'s $400 million variable-rate equipment
contract-backed notes series 2013-B.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by loans and leases associated with fixed wing aircraft,
helicopters, and flight simulation systems.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The initial and future borrower/lessee's estimated credit
      quality.The flight equipment's collateral value.

   -- Element Financial Corp.'s perceived ability as servicer, and
      Portfolio Financial Servicing Co.'s ability to perform the
      necessary servicing functions as the back-up servicer.

   -- The portfolio concentration limitation and related borrowing
      base determination that adjust the leverage based on the
      portfolio's risk.

   -- A reserve account funded with 12 months' interest expense.

   -- The transaction's legal and payment structures.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1815.pdf

RATING ASSIGNED

Element Equipment Finance L.P.
Variable-rate equipment contract-backed notes series 2013-B

Class         Rating                 Amount (mil. $)
                                 Maximum(i)    Closing
A-1           BBB (sf)                150.0        0.0
A-2           BBB (sf)                100.0       55.0
B             BBB- (sf)                75.0       16.5
C             BB (sf)                  75.0       16.5

(i) The maximum notional amount represents the maximum
     outstanding balance of each of the series 2013-B note
     classes.


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2013-2: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned final ratings to the following classes
issued by Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-2:

- Series 2013-2 Notes, Class A rated AAA (sf)
- Series 2013-2 Notes, Class B rated 'A' (sf)
- Series 2013-2 Notes, Class C rated BBB (sf)
- Series 2013-2 Notes, Class D rated BB (sf)


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Exeter
Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-2's $500.00 million automobile
receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securitization backed by
subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 49.06%, 41.01%, 34.47%,
      and 24.33% credit support for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 2.55x, 2.10x, 1.60x, and 1.30x our 17.0%-18.0% expected
      cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the rated
      notes by the assumed legal final maturity dates under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that S&P believes is
      appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A,
      B, and C notes would remain within one rating category of
      its 'AA (sf)', 'A (sf)', and 'BBB (sf)' ratings,
      respectively, during the first year; and its ratings on the
      class D notes would remain within two rating categories of
      its 'BB (sf)' rating.  These potential rating movements are
      consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria, which
      outlines the outer bound of credit deterioration as a one-
      category downgrade within the first year for 'AA' rated
      securities and a two-category downgrade within the first
      year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under the
      moderate stress conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1793.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-2

Class    Rating       Type          Interest           Amount
                                    rate             (mil. $)
A        AA (sf)      Senior        Fixed              317.71
B        A (sf)       Subordinate   Fixed               67.71
C        BBB (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed               48.17
D        BB (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed               66.41


FIRST UNION 2001-C4: S&P Raises Rating on Class O Notes to 'B+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
O commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from First Union
National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2001-C4, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to
'B+ (sf)' from 'B (sf)'.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
'B- (sf)' rating on the class P certificates from the same
transaction.  Furthermore, S&P withdrew its ratings on the class
L, M, and N certificates from the same transaction following the
full repayment of each class' principal balance, as noted in the
transaction's August trustee remittance report.

S&P's rating actions follows its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of all of the remaining assets in
the pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available
to the trust.

S&P raised its rating on the class O certificates to 'B+ (sf)'
from 'B (sf)' because it believes the available credit enhancement
for the affected tranche is greater than its most recent estimate
of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.
The upgrade also reflects S&P's view of the future performance of
the transaction's collateral, and the deleveraging of the trust
balance.

S&P affirmed the 'B- (sf)' rating on the class P certificates
because it expects the available credit enhancement for this class
will be within its estimated necessary credit enhancement
requirement for the current outstanding rating.  Also, S&P
affirmed its rating on this class to reflect the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets, as well
as the transaction-level changes.

Although S&P could possibly further raise the ratings on the class
O and P certificates based on their available credit enhancement
levels, its analysis also considered the remaining small pool
size, the delinquent four assets (out of the remaining six) that
are with the special servicer, the limited liquidity support
available to these classes, the accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding, and the potential for additional interest shortfalls.

S&P withdrew its ratings on the class L, M, and N certificates to
reflect the full repayment of the class' principal balance, as
noted in the transaction's August 2013 trustee remittance report.
Classes L, M, and N had beginning balances of $14.1 million,
$7.3 million, and $7.0 million, respectively, and were repaid in
full from the Overlook at Great Notch loan disposition.

As of the Aug. 14, 2013 trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $649,543, which
were offset by $986,965 from the Overlook at Great Notch loan
disposition.  The monthly interest shortfalls were primarily
related to the reimbursement of prior advances of $465,726, non-
recoverable interest of $170,186, interest on advances of $48,465,
current appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) of
$17,220, modified interest rate reduction of $8,968, and special
servicing fees of $(61,022), which is negative due to the recovery
from the Overlook at Great Notch loan disposition.  Furthermore,
here were additional recoveries this month from the Overlook at
Great Notch loan disposition: a net interest adjustment of
$184,769, a modified interest rate adjustment of $8,968, and a
master servicer fee adjustment of $1,116.  This resulted in a net
recovery of $532,275 to the trust.

As of the Aug. 14, 2013 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool consisted of three loans and three real estate owned (REO)
assets with an aggregate principal balance of $24.6 million, down
from 137 loans with an aggregate balance of $978.6 million at
issuance.  Currently, the trust consists of five specially
serviced assets ($23.6 million, 96.0%) and one performing loan
($989,798, 4.0%).  To date, the transaction lost $8.8 million or
0.9% of the transaction's original pooled certificate balance.
Details on the one performing loan are as follows:

   -- The Walgreens-Moreno Valley CA loan ($989,798; 4.0%) is
      secured by a 15,120-sq.-ft. retail property in Moreno
      Valley, Calif.  The sole tenant is Walgreen Co., whose lease
      expires on April 30, 2060.  As of Dec. 31, 2012, the
      reported debt service coverage (DSC) ratio and occupancy
      rate were 1.76x and 100.0%, respectively.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

As of the Aug. 14, 2013 trustee remittance report, two loans and
three REO assets ($23.6 million, 96.0%) were with the special
servicer.  Details on the five specially serviced assets are as
follows:

   -- The Talon Court Office REO asset ($6.5 million, 26.3%) is
      the largest asset in the pool and with the special servicer,
      LNR Partners LLC (LNR).  The asset consists of a
      55,172-sq.-ft. office property in Auburn, Wash.  The
      reported exposure is $7.3 million, and a $2.4 million
      appraisal reduction amount (ARA) is in effect against the
      asset.  The loan was transferred to special servicing on
      June 1, 2011 because of monetary default; the property
      became REO on March 9, 2012.  According to LNR, the asset
      was sold on July 24, 2013 for $3.225 million.  S&P expects a
      significant loss upon the asset's eventual resolution.

   -- The Lincoln Place REO asset ($5.9 million, 24.0%), the
      second-largest asset in the pool, consists of a
      43,135-sq.-ft. retail property in Santa Fe.  The reported
      exposure is $7.1 million.  The loan was transferred to
      special servicing on May 16, 2011 because of imminent
      monetary default; the property became REO on June 25, 2012.
      According to LNR, they are pursuing a value added strategy
      by leasing up the property.  S&P expects a minimal loss, if
      any, upon the asset's eventual resolution.

   -- The Grove Market Shopping Center REO asset ($5.8 million,
      23.5%), the third-largest asset in the pool, consists of a
      75,491-sq.-ft. retail property in Loxahatchee, Fla.  The
      reported exposure is $6.0 million and a $2.4 million ARA is
      in effect against the asset.  The loan was transferred to
      special servicing on Sept. 9, 2011 because of a maturity
      default; the property became REO on Oct. 16, 2012.  The loan
      matured on Aug. 1, 2011.  According to LNR, Crossman & Co.
      has been engaged as the property manager and leasing agent.
      The 2013 budget and business plan have been approved.  S&P
      expects a moderate loss upon the asset's eventual
      resolution.

   -- The Dixie Farm Business Park loan ($3.9 million, 15.7%) is
      secured by a 124,000-sq.-ft. industrial property in Houston.
      The total reported exposure is $3.9 million.  The loan was
      transferred to special servicing on Oct. 4, 2011 because of
      a maturity default.  According to LNR, the loan has been
      modified, and the modification terms include, but are not
      limited to, extending the maturity date to Feb. 1, 2016 from
      Sept. 1, 2011 and reducing the interest rate to 4.50% from
      7.25%.  LNR informed S&P that it plans to return the loan to
      the master servicer in the near term.

   -- The Vintage Business Park loan ($1.6 million, 6.5%) is
      secured by a 12,996-sq.-ft. office property in Juneau,
      Alaska.  The total reported exposure is $2.0 million.  The
      loan was transferred to special servicing on June 2, 2011
      because it matured on May 1, 2011.  According to LNR, the
      borrower proposed a deed in lieu of foreclosure, and the
      lender is evaluating the offer.  S&P expects a minimal loss,
      if any, upon the loan's eventual resolution.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C4

                Rating
Class      To            From          Credit enhancement (%)

O          B+ (sf)       B (sf)                         86.43

RATING AFFIRMED

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C4

Class      Rating                      Credit enhancement (%)

P          B- (sf)                                      67.64

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C4

                Rating
Class      To            From

L          NR            BB- (sf)
M          NR            B+ (sf)
N          NR            B (sf)

NR-Not rated.


FIRST UNION 2001-C2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class N Notes to 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2001-
C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

These rating actions follows S&P's analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of all of the remaining assets in
the pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available
to the trust.

S&P lowered its rating on the Class N certificates to 'B- (sf)'
from 'BB (sf)' because the class had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for two consecutive, months and S&P
projects that interest shortfalls will continue.

S&P lowered its ratings on Classes O and P certificates to
'CCC- (sf)' and 'D (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' and 'B (sf)',
respectively, because S&P expects interest shortfalls to continue,
and S&P believes the accumulated interest shortfalls will remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Class O had an
accumulated interest shortfall outstanding for six months, and
Class P had an accumulated interest shortfall outstanding for
seven months.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movements, S&P's analysis also considered the remaining
small pool size, four remaining assets are delinquent and with the
special servicer, the limited liquidity support available to these
classes, accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding, and the
potential for additional interest shortfalls.

As of the Aug. 14, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $161,136,
primarily related to the reimbursement of prior advances of
$107,118, non-recoverable interest of $61,173, current ASER of
$20,662, special servicing fees of $4,459, and a master servicing
fee adjustment of $361.  Of the principal, $31,912 was used to
cover the interest shortfalls.  The interest shortfalls affected
all classes.

As of the Aug. 14, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool consisted of one loan and three real estate owned (REO)
assets with an aggregate principal balance of $21.4 million, down
from 107 loans with an aggregate balance of $1.0 billion at
issuance.  All of the remaining assets are with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).  To date, the transaction
experienced losses totaling $34.9 million (3.5% of the
transaction's original pooled certificate balance).

                    SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

As of the Aug. 14, 2013, trustee remittance report, one loan and
three REO assets ($21.4 million, 100.0%) were with the special
servicer.  Details on the four specially serviced assets are as
follows:

   -- The 610 Weddell REO asset ($7.7 million, 36.0%) is the
      largest asset both in the pool and with LNR.  The asset
      consists of a 63,072-sq.-ft. industrial property in
      Sunnyvale, Calif. The reported exposure is $10.1 million,
      and a $4.0 million appraisal reduction amount (ARA) is in
      effect against the asset.  The loan was transferred to
      special servicing on June 10, 2010, due to maturity default,
      and the property became REO on Aug. 29, 2011.  The loan
      matured on June 1, 2010.  According to LNR, the property is
      currently under contract.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon
      the asset's eventual resolution.

   -- The Regency Pointe Shopping Center REO asset ($5.0 million,
      23.5%), the second-largest asset in the pool, consists of a
      67,063-sq.-ft. retail property in Jacksonville, Fla.  The
      reported exposure is $5.6 million, and a $919,860 ARA is in
      effect against the asset.  The loan was transferred to
      special servicing on April 5, 2011, due to maturity default,
      and the property became REO on May 15, 2012.  The loan
      matured on April 1, 2011.  According to LNR, they are
      pursuing a value-added strategy by leasing up the property.
      S&P expects a minimal loss, if any, upon the asset's
      eventual resolution.

   -- The Bayshore Palms loan ($4.6 million, 21.4%), the third-
      largest asset in the pool, consists of a 200-unit
      multifamily property in Safety Harbor, Fla.  The reported
      exposure is $6.0 million.  The loan was transferred to
      special servicing on Jan. 7, 2009, due to a monetary
      default.  According to LNR, legal counsel has been engaged
      and foreclosure has been filed, which has been stayed due to
      a bankruptcy filing on April 20, 2012.  The court scheduled
      final confirmation for July 31, 2013.  S&P expects a minimal
      loss, if any, upon the asset's eventual resolution.

   -- The Towneplace Suites - Tallahassee REO asset ($4.1 million,
      19.0%) is secured by a 95-room extended-stay lodging
      property in Tallahassee, Fla.  The total reported exposure
      is $5.2 million, and a $2.7 million ARA is in effect against
      the asset.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
      on Nov. 10, 2010, due to a maturity default, and the
      property became REO on Oct. 16, 2012.  The loan matured on
      Nov. 1, 2010.  According to LNR, Great American Hotel Group
      (Ocean Hospitalities) has been engaged as property manager.
      The 2013 operating budget and business plan have been
      approved.  LNR has started to undertake the necessary
      improvement plans at the property.  S&P expects a
      significant loss upon the asset's eventual resolution.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered a
minimal loss to be less than 25%, a moderate loss to be between
26% and 59%, and a significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C2

                Rating
Class      To            From          Credit enhancement (%)
N          B- (sf)       BB (sf)                        87.66
O          CCC- (sf)     B+ (sf)                        60.03
P          D (sf)        B (sf)                         41.61


FREMF 2011-K703: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Cl. X-2 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes of
FREMF 2011-K703 Mortgage Trust, Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-K703 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The ratings of the IO Classes,
Classes X-1 and X-2, are consistent with the expected credit
performance of their referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.8% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
2.3%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 45, the same at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 26, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1.0% to $1.21
billion from $1.23 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 71 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 35% of
the pool. There are no defeased loans or loans with investment
grade credit assessments.

Two loans, representing 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

There are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool's loans. Moody's weighted average LTV is 91%
compared to 96% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 5.4% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 8.76%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.52X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.45X and 1.00X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the pool. The largest
loan is The Pavilions Loan ($82.9 million -- 6.8% of the pool),
which is secured by a 932-unit multifamily property located in
Manchester, Connecticut. Improvements consist of 34 garden-style
apartment buildings, two leasing office/clubhouse buildings, a
recreation center building, four maintenance buildings and 13
carport buildings. As of March 2012, the property was 91% leased
compared to 92% at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 107% and 0.89X, respectively, compared to 109% and 0.86X at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is The Park at Arlington Ridge II Loan
($52.5 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 395-
unit multifamily property located in Arlington, Virginia.
Improvements consist of 24 three-story apartment buildings. As of
March 2013, the property was 96% leased, the same at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 0.98X, respectively,
compared to 92% and 0.97X at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Casoleil Apartments Loan ($48.2
million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 346-unit
multifamily property located in San Diego, California.
Improvements consist of 17 three-story apartment buildings, a
clubhouse/leasing office, 16 garage buildings and a fitness
center. As of June 2013, the property was 96% leased, the same at
last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.89X,
respectively, compared to 102% and 0.90X at Moody's last review.


FREMF 2011-K704: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class X2 Secs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes of
FREMF 2011-K704 Mortgage Trust as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. X1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The ratings of the IO Classes,
Classes X1 and X2, are consistent with the expected credit
performance of their referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 3.1 % of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 3.0%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss figure was 3.1% of the original,
securitized deal balance, compared to 3.0% at Moody's last review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 47, the same as at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 26, 2013 payment date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.19 billion
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 65 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 6.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 31% of
the pool.

One loan, representing 2% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Currently, one loan, representing 2% of the pool, is in special
servicing. This loan is the Stonebridge ranch Loan which is
secured by a 464 unit multifamily complex located in McKinney,
Texas. The loan was transferred to special servicing in February
2012 due to an imminent default resulting from action taken
pursuant to a SEC investigation of the borrowers. The borrowers
were accused of commingling investor funds and paying returns to
investors from new equity raises. A liquidation plan was filed in
March 2012 and the borrower's properties will be marketed for
sale. Moody's expects a small loss from the liquidation of this
loan.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 92% and 60% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding the specially serviced loan, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 103% compared to 106% at last full review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.5%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.6%.

Excluding the specially serviced loan, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.38X and 0.92X compared to 1.31X and 0.89X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The top three loans represent 13% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Rosslyn Heights Apartments Loan ($73.5 million -- 6.2% of the
pool), which is secured by a 366 unit multifamily property
consisting of four, six-story apartment buildings and one
clubhouse located in Arlington, Virginia. As of December 2012 the
property was 97% leased, the same as at securitization. The
property is in close proximity to the central business district
(CBD) of Washington, D.C. Performance has remained stable. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 0.87X, the same as at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Farms at Cool Springs Loan ($41.3
million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 474 unit
multifamily located 18 miles south of Nashville in Franklin,
Tennessee. As of March 2013 the property was 93% leased, the same
as at last review. The improvements consist of 21 three and four-
story apartment buildings, a clubhouse/leasing office and five
parking structures (711 spaces). The property was originally
constructed in 1998 with no significant renovation occurring since
construction. Performance has remained stable. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 100% and 0.99X compared to 104% and 0.90X at
last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Highlands at West Village
Loan ($41.2 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
292 unit multifamily property located in Smyrna, Georgia, about
seven miles northwest of Atlanta's CBD. The improvements consist
of nine three and four story apartment buildings and three parking
decks. As of March 2013 the property was 91% leased compared to
89% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and
0.88X, the same as at last review.


FREMF MORTGAGE 2012-KF01: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating for X Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes
issued by FREMF Mortgage Trust, Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-KF01 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X, is consistent with the expected credit performance of its
referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.7% of the
current balance. This is the first full review since
securitization.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 41 compared to 49 at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 26, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 15% to $1.2 billion
from $1.4 billion at securitization. Since securitization twelve
loans have been prepaid and the Certificates are now
collateralized by 68 floating rate loans secured by 68 properties.
The mortgage loans range in size from less than 1% to 9% of the
pool, with the top ten loans representing 36% of the pool.

One loan, representing less than 0.5% of the pool, is on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Currently, there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 82%
of the pool's loans. Moody's weighted average LTV is 109% compared
to 110% at securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.73X and 0.89X,
respectively, compared to 1.68X and 0.88X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 16% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Gables Summerset Loan ($99.5 million -- 8.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a 752 unit multifamily property located in San
Diego, California. The property was built in 1987 and renovated
between 2007 and 2011. The collateral consists of 53 two-story
buildings, a clubhouse/leasing office, four laundry rooms and five
pool cabanas. The property was 96% leased as of March 2013
compared to 97% at securitization. The loan is interest only
throughout its entire five year term. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 115% and 0.80X, the same as at securitization.

The second largest loan is the Orion at Roswell Village Loan
($46.9 million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 668
unit multifamily property located in Roswell, Georgia. The
property was built between 1995 and 1997 and renovated in 2010.
The collateral consists of 29 two-, three-, and four-story
apartment buildings, a leasing office, fitness center building and
18 garage structures. As of December 2012 the property was 93%
leased compared to 95% at securitization. The loan has an initial
two-year interest only term and thereafter amortizes on a 360
month schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 116% and 0.81X,
respectively, compared to 118% and 0.80X at securitization.

The third largest loan is Lincoln Las Colinas Loan ($45.5 million
-- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 510 unit Class A
multifamily property located in Irving, Texas. The property was
built in 2009 and consists of seven three- and four-story
buildings. The complex includes 953 parking spaces (of which 587
are housed in a multi-level parking garage). As of December 2012
the property was 92% leased compared to 95% at securitization.
Property performance has improved since securitization due to an
increase in rental revenue. The loan has an initial two-year
interest only term and thereafter amortizes on a 360 month
schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 120% and 0.81X at securitization.


G-FORCE CDO 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes issued by G-Force CDO 2006-1
Ltd./Corp (G-Force 2006-1). The affirmations are a result of
amortization of the capital structure.

Key Rating Drivers:
Since the last rating action in October 2012, approximately 25.8%
of the collateral has been downgraded and 23.2% has been upgraded.
Currently, 65.2% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 31.7% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and
below, compared to 60.7% and 22.4%, respectively, at the last
rating action. Over this time, the class A notes have received
$11.7 million for a total of $31.6 million in principal paydowns
since issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. Based on this analysis, the credit characteristics of
classes A-2 and SSFL are generally consistent with the ratings
assigned below.

For the class A-3, JRFL, and F through G notes, Fitch analyzed the
sensitivity of each class to the default of the distressed assets
('CCC' and below). Given the high probability of default of these
assets and expected limited recovery prospects upon default and
the risk of shortfalls in the payment of timely interest to the
classes, Fitch has affirmed the class A-3 and JRFL notes at
'CCsf', indicating that default is probable. Similarly, Fitch has
affirmed the class F through J notes at 'Csf', indicating that
default is inevitable.

On the Dec. 4, 2009 payment date, the transaction entered into an
event of default (EOD) due to the failure to pay the full and
timely interest on the class E notes. Subsequently, the class B
through D notes have defaulted on their timely interest payments.
Therefore, Fitch has affirmed the class B through E notes at
'Dsf'.

The Stable Outlook on the class A-2 notes reflects Fitch's view
that the transaction will continue to delever. The Negative
Outlook on the class SSFL notes reflects the potential of adverse
selection as the portfolio continues to amortize.

Rating Sensitivities
In addition to those sensitivities discussed above, further
negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by SF PCM
as well as increasing concentration in assets of a weaker credit
quality could lead to downgrades.

G-Force 2006-1 is a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) that closed on Sept. 13, 2006. The
transaction is completely collateralized by commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS).

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $21,542,701 class A-2 at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Stable
   from Negative;
-- $135,273,000 class A-3 at 'CCsf';
-- $91,534,331 class SSFL at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $67,000,000 class JRFL at 'CCsf';
-- $42,921,000 class B at 'Dsf'
-- $18,709,000 class C at 'Dsf'
-- $31,916,000 class D at 'Dsf'
-- $28,614,000 class E at 'Dsf';
-- $14,652,185 class F at 'Csf';
-- $26,736,247 class G at 'Csf';
-- $20,166,948 class H at 'Csf';
-- $27,840,457 class J at 'Csf'.


GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. O Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of five classes and
affirmed 11 classes of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C1 as
follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of the five P&I bonds are due to increased credit
support as well as anticipated paydowns from loans approaching
maturity that are well positioned for refinance. The deal has paid
down by 49% since Moody's last review.

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I bonds are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The ratings of
the below-investment grade P&I bonds are consistent with Moody's
expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X-1, is consistent with the credit performance of its
referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.2% of the
current pooled balance compared to 2.0% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 2.4% of the original
pooled balance compared to 2.6% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25 compared to 35 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 72% to $353.4
million from $1.27 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 60 mortgage loans ranging in size from 9% to
less than 1% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 44% of the pool. There are ten defeased
loans representing 13% of the pool balance.

Eighteen loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $19.7 million (25.5% loss severity). There are
currently three loans, representing 3% of the pool, in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced exposure is the
Muncie/Eaton Manufactured Home Portfolio Loan ($4.2 million --
1.2% of the pool). The loan is secured by two manufactured housing
communities located in Muncie and Eaton Indiana. The property was
48% leased as of August 2013. The special servicer indicated it
intends to foreclose on the property.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 3.5% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $6.3 million loss (27% expected loss) from the
specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool balance. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 75%.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.50X and 1.40X, respectively.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Elmwood Shopping Center Loan ($31.4 million --
8.9% of the pool), which is secured by a four building outdoor
retail center located in Harahan, Louisiana, approximately 10
miles west of New Orleans. The three largest tenants are Alton
Ochsner Medical Foundation (18% of the NRA; lease expiration in
December 2017), Marshalls (8% of the NRA; lease expiration in
October 2017) and OfficeMax (7% of the NRA; lease expiration in
December 2017). As of June 2013, the property was 97% leased
compared to 98% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
67% and 1.52X, respectively, compared to 75% and 1.37X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Devonshire Reseda Shopping Center
Loan ($26.6 million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by an
183,000 square foot single-story shopping center located in
Northridge, California. The three largest tenants are LA Fitness
(25% of the NRA; lease expiration in February 2022), Albertsons
(19% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2014) and REI (9% of
the NRA; lease expiration in August 2015). Smart and Final is in
the process of signing a 15 year lease to occupy the space
currently occupied by Albertsons. Details are being worked out for
Albertsons to terminate early allowing a rent free period for
Smart and Final to renovate. As of June 2013, the property was
100% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.38X,
respectively, compared to 88% and 1.1X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Greens at Shawnee Loan ($20.4
million -- 5.8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a suburban
apartment complex located 25 miles southwest of Kansas City in
Shawnee, Kansas. The property was 93% leased as of year-end 2012,
the same as at year-end 2011. Performance has improved each year
since 2010 due to increased rental income. Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.18X respectively, compared to 92% and
1.00X at last review.


GOLDMAN SACHS 2006-GG8: Rights Transfer No Impact on Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that the Controlling Class
Representative intends to replace LNR Partners, LLC as the Special
Servicer and to appoint C-III Asset Management LLC as the
successor Special Servicer (the "Proposed Special Servicer
Replacement"). The Proposed Special Servicer Replacement will
become effective upon satisfaction of the conditions precedent set
forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement. At
this time, the proposed transfer will not, in and of itself,
result in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any
class of certificates rated by Moody's for GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-GG8. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the proposed transfer of special servicing rights.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have
significant effect on yield and/or other payments to investors.
This action should not be taken to imply that there will be no
adverse consequence for investors since in some cases such
consequences will not impact the rating.

The last rating action for GSMS 2006-GG8 was taken on January 28,
2013. The methodology used in monitoring this transaction was
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions",
published in September 2000.

On January 28, 2013, Moody's downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed 15 classes of Goldman Sachs 2006-GG8 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)


GRAMERCY REAL 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed the ratings of four classes of notes issued by Gramercy
Real Estate CDO 2007-1, Ltd. The upgrade is due in part to the
current insurance financial strength of MBIA Insurance
Corporation. The affirmations are due to key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-FL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-FX, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1, Ltd. is a static cash transaction
backed by a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) (77.5% of the pool balance); ii) whole loans and senior
participations (13.9%); iii) mezzanine loan interests (3.2%); and
iv) B-note debt (0.4%). As of the August 15, 2013 payment date,
the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $1.06 billion from $1.1 billion at
issuance, as a result of the paydown directed to the senior most
class of notes from the combination of principal repayment of
collateral, resolution and sales of defaulted collateral, and the
failing of certain par value tests. Also, MBIA Insurance
Corporation provides a guarantee on the scheduled payment of
interest and principal related to the Class A-2 Notes.

Moody's ratings on structured finance securities that are
guaranteed or "wrapped" by a financial guarantor are generally
maintained at a level equal to the higher of the following: a) the
rating of the guarantor (if rated at the investment grade level);
or b) the published or unpublished underlying rating. Moody's
approach to rating wrapped transactions is outlined in Moody's
special comment entitled "Assignment of Wrapped Ratings When
Financial Guarantor Falls Below Investment Grade" (May 2008); and
Moody's November 10, 2008 announcement entitled "Moody's Modifies
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities Wrapped by
Financial Guarantors".

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,047
compared to 3,772 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (0.5% compared to 1.9% at last
review), A1-A3 (3.8% compared to 1.8% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(6.9% compared to 10.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (2.0% compared to
9.8% at last review), B1-B3 (38.7% compared to 30.7% at last
review), and Caa1-Ca/C (48.1% compared to 44.9% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.5 years compared to 4.3 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 17.7% compared to 20.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0% compared to 9.7% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 17.7% to 7.7% or up to 27.7% would result in rating
movements on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch downward or 0 to 1
notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The rating implementation guidelines used in this rating were
"Assignment of Wrapped Ratings When Financial Guarantor Falls
Below Investment Grade" published in May, 2008 and "Moody's
Modifies Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities Wrapped
by Financial Guarantors" published in November 2008.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Highbridge Loan Management 2013-2 Ltd./Highbridge Loan Management
2013-2 LLC's $378.5 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2600%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees, subordinated hedge and
      synthetic security termination payments, portfolio manager
      incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to principal
      proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1713.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Highbridge Loan Management 2013-2 Ltd./
Highbridge Loan Management 2013-2 LLC

Class                     Rating             Amount
                                           (mil. $)
A-1                       AAA (sf)           260.00
A-2                       AA (sf)             43.00
B-1 (deferrable)          A (sf)              22.50
B-2 (deferrable)          A (sf)               9.50
C (deferrable)            BBB (sf)            19.50
D (deferrable)            BB (sf)             16.00
E (deferrable)            B (sf)               8.00
Subordinated notes        NR                  35.55

NR-Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2004-PNC1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class H Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., series 2004-PNC1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates (JPMCC 2004-PNC1).

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to stable performance of the pool. Fitch
modeled losses of 2.3% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 6.2%, including $51.2 million
(4.7% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated 17 loans (13%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes one specially serviced asset (1.7%).

As of the September 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 35.2% to $711.1 million from
$1.1 billion at issuance. Seventeen loans (30.4%) are currently
defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes H
through NR.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a 236 unit
multifamily property (0.9%) located in Arlington, TX. The most
recent occupancy reported by the master servicer is 62% as of
March 2013 and the property is not producing sufficient income to
meet its debt service obligations, although the loan remains
current.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a 47,367
square foot (sf) medical center (0.8%) located in Corona, CA. The
property is not producing sufficient income to meet its debt
service obligations and occupancy was 45% as of December 2012. Per
a November inspection, the third floor is damaged due to vandalism
while occupied units remain in good condition.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on the class A-1A through E notes are expected to be
stable as the credit enhancement remains high. The class F and G
notes may be subject to further downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $16 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $426.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28.8 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.7 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17.8 million class D at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11 million class E at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.5 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $11 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 95%;
-- $9.2 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 notes have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class NR notes.

Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 18 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corporation,
Series 2005-LDP2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below-investment grade classes are consistent with
Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO
Class, Class X1, is consistent with the expected credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 8.1% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 8.3%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss is 8.9% of the original,
securitized deal balance, compared to 9.1% at Moody's last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 51 compared to a Herf of 55 at Moody's prior
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 payment date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to $1.7 billion
from $2.9 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 214 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 32%
of the pool. Fifteen loans, representing approximately 7% of the
pool, are defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Thirty-nine loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-seven loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $126 million. Currently, 17 loans,
representing 16% of the pool, are in special servicing. The
largest specially serviced loan is the CityPlace One Loan ($113
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a seven property
portfolio located in the mid-county sub-market of St. Louis. The
loan transferred to special servicing in April of 2012 for
maturity default. The property was 90% leased as of January 2012.

The remaining 16 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
commercial, office, self-storage, retail and industrial property
types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $89 million loss (32.8%
expected loss overall) for the specially serviced loans. Moody's
has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly performing
loans representing 24% of the pool and estimates an aggregate $19
million loss (15% expected loss overall) for these loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 86% and 57% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 93% compared to 95% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.48%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.18X, respectively, compared to
1.44X and 1.14X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 13% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Shops at Canal Place Loan ($90 million --
5% of the pool), which is secured by 215,000 square feet (SF) of
retail space in a 2.15 million square foot (SF) mixed use complex
located in New Orleans, Louisiana. The mixed use complex includes
a 438-room Wyndahm Hotel and a 32 story office property, neither
of which are part of the collateral. The main anchor of the retail
space is Saks Fifth Avenue, which leases about 50% of the retail
space through 2019. The property was 97% leased as of March 2013
compared to 92% at last review. Moody's current LTV and stressed
DSCR are 116% and 1.39X compared to 120% and 1.34X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Hutchinson Metro Center Loan ($82
million -- 5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 424,000 SF
office building located in the Bronx, New York. The property was
100% leased as of March 2013, the same as at last review. Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and 1.02X compared to 103%
and 0.94X at last review.

The third largest loan is The Russ Building Loan ($60 million --
4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 509,368 SF office
building located in San Francisco, California. The property was
98% leased as of March 2013. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR
are 57% and, 1.67X, the same as at last review.



JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC16: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. C Certs to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
affirmed nine classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-CIBC16 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to greater realized and expected losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans, as well as increased
interest shortfalls from loan modifications. One & Two Prudential
Plaza, the largest loan in the deal, was recently modified with a
hope note and interest rate reduction.

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
rating of below-investment grade P&I classes are consistent with
Moody's expected loss and thus affirmed. The ratings of the IO
Classes, Class X-1 and X-2, are consistent with the expected
credit performance of their referenced classes and thus affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.3% of
the current balance. At last full review, Moody's base expected
loss was 11.2%. Moody's base expected loss plus cumulative
realized losses now represents 12.8% of the original securitized
balance compared to 11.6% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24 compared the same at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 29% to $1.53 billion
from $2.15 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 103 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
52% of the pool. No loans have defeased and there are no loans
with an investment grade credit assessment.

There are currently 32 loans, representing 30% of the pool, on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization resulting in an aggregate realized loss totaling
$116.7 million (average loss severity of 53%). There are five
loans, representing 15% of the pool, currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the One and Two
Prudential Plaza Loan ($168.0 million -- 13.4% of the pool), which
is secured by two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted Class A
office buildings located in the East Loop sub-market of Chicago,
Illinois. The loan represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a
$410.0 million first mortgage. Effective June 6, 2013 the loan was
split into an A/B Note structure. The Restated Promissory Notes A-
1 and A-2 are $168 million each and Promissory Notes B-1 and B-2
are $37.0 million each. The loan modification included a 300bp
interest rate adjustment on the A-Note for 36 months and deferred
interest on the B-Note. The borrower contributed $60.0 million in
additional equity to fund a combined tenant improvements, leasing
commissions and capital expenditure reserve. The loan remains
locked out to prepayment until July 1, 2015. This loan
modification will generate monthly interest shortfalls totaling
approximately $420,000 for each of the two A notes and $187,000
for each of the two B notes.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. The master servicer has recognized appraisal
reductions totaling $4.9 million for the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $85.6 million loss (37%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loans representing 11% of the pool and has estimated an
$28.9 million aggregate loss (18% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating
results for 98% of the performing pool. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 100%, which was the same at last full review. Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.10X, respectively,
compared to 1.32X and 1.05X at last full review. Moody's actual
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 19% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Prime Retail Outlets Portfolio Loan
($107.1 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by three
outlet centers totaling 808,000 SF. The properties are located in
Lee, Massachusetts; Gaffney, South Carolina and Calhoun, Georgia.
The portfolio was 90% leased as of March 2013 compared to 93% at
last review. Financial performance has steadily improved since
2009 and the loan has also amortized 7% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.45X, respectively,
compared to 78% and 1.31X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Sequoia Plaza Loan ($92.7 million -
- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by an office park consisting
of three condominium office buildings constructed between 1988 and
1990 in Arlington, Virginia. The improvements are situated within
two miles of Pentagon City and Crystal City and there is a shuttle
providing access to the DC Metrorail. The loan is currently on the
watchlist due low DSCR due to reduced revenue from lower
occupancy, tenant delinquencies and decreased rental rates.
However, the borrower recently signed a lease with Arlington
Public Schools ("APS") for over 62,000 SF of additional space
which would bring the total occupancy up to 92% as of June 2013
compared to 75% as of December 2012. Moody's analysis reflects the
additional benefit of the recent lease and increased occupancy.
The loan is interest only for the entire term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 148% and 0.73X, respectively, compared to 199%
and 0.54X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Retail Portfolio Loan ($86.0
million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by four anchored
retail centers, two unanchored retail centers, and one suburban
office property totaling approximately 933,000 SF. Major tenants
include Dick's, Loews Cinemas, TJ Maxx and Kmart. The portfolio
was sold by Centro to Blackstone in 2011 as part of the
acquisition the Centro's real estate portfolio. Portfolio
performance has declined year-over-year due to a decrease in total
occupancy, which was 85% as of April 2013. The loan is interest
only for the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112%
and 0.92X, respectively, compared to 103% and 1.00X at last
review.


JP MORGAN 2007-C1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 10 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 22 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below-investment grade P&I classes are consistent
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of
the IO Classes, Class X-1 and X-2, are consistent with the
expected credit performance of their referenced classes and thus
are affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Based on its current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement levels for rated
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.1% of
the current balance compared to 14.4% at last review. Realized
losses increased to 2.5% of the original balance from 0.9% since
the prior review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 15.1% of the original pooled balance compared to 14.6% at
last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17 compared to 19 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to $1.06
billion from $1.18 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 53 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool. The top ten loans represent approximately
68% of the pool.

Twenty loans, representing approximately 39% of the pool, are on
the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As
part of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated since securitization, of which
six loans generated an aggregate loss of $29.1 million (36%
average loss severity). Currently there are five loans in special
servicing, representing approximately 9% of the pool balance. The
largest specially serviced loan is the Westin Portfolio Loan
($103.4 million -- 9.7% of the pool), which is secured by two
Westin Hotels -- the Westin La Paloma, a 487-key full-service
hotel in Tucson, Arizona and the Westin Hilton Head, a 412-key
full-service ocean front hotel in Hilton Head, South Carolina. The
loan represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a $206.8 million loan
that is also held within JPMCC 2008-C2. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in October 2008 due to imminent default. The
borrowed filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in November 2010. The
special servicer modified the loan in May 2012. The loan was later
deemed non-recoverable by the master servicer in August 2012 and
the servicer began recovering advances from the trust. This is
resulting in monthly interest shortfalls of $611,000 and monthly
principal losses of $190,500. To date, the loan's total
outstanding advances and appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions (ASERs) are $27.9 million.

The second largest loan in special servicing is the Landmark
Office Center Loan ($22.8 million -- 2.1% of the pool).
Transferred to special servicing in April 2012 for imminent
default, the loan is secured by a 297,000 square foot office
building in Indianapolis, Indiana. As of March 2013, the property
was 60% leased. The master servicer recognized a $15.8 million
appraisal reduction in August 2013. Total outstanding advances and
ASERS are $2.76 million.

The remaining specially serviced loans are a mix of industrial,
office and retail. Moody's has estimated $92.7 million (68%
expected loss) for four out of the five specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, representing 12% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $23.4 million loss (18% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B through T
have experienced $22.7 million in cumulative interest shortfalls.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, ASERs, extraordinary trust
expenses and loan modifications.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's was provided with full
year 2011 and 2012 operating results for 86% and 89% of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 109% compared to 115% at last full review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.20X and 1.0X, respectively,
compared to 1.16X and 0.95X, respectively, at last full review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 30% of the pool.
The largest loan is the American Cancer Society Plaza Loan ($133.2
million -- 12.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 996,000 SF
office building located in Atlanta, Georgia. The largest tenant is
the American Cancer Society, which leases approximately 28% of the
net rentable area (NRA) through June 2022. As of June 2013, the
property was 83% leased compared to 82% at last review. Net
operating income improved 11% since last review, primarily due to
an increase in base revenues and a decrease in operating expenses.
The loan matures in September 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 141% and 0.75X, respectively, compared to 150% and 0.85X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Block at Orange Loan ($107.1
million -- 10.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 701,171 SF
outdoor outlet mall built in 1998 and located in Orange,
California. The loan represents a 50.0% pari-passu interest in a
$214.2 million loan. As of March 2013, the total mall was 99%
leased compared to 91% last review. The mall's in-line space was
97% leased. Net operating income increased 23% due to an increase
in occupancy and revenues. The loan matures in October 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 0.96X, respectively,
compared to 115% and 0.82X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Gurnee Mills Loan ($75.0 million --
6.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.8 million SF mall (1.55
million SF serves as collateral) built in 1991 and located between
Chicago and Milwaukee in Gurnee, Illinois. The loan represents a
23.4% pari-passu interest in a $321.0 million loan. As of June
2013, the property was 94% leased compared to 93% at last review.
The loan matures in July 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
124% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 123% and 0.77X at last
review.


JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC20: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes and
downgraded the ratings of nine classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-CIBC20 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of Classes H, J and K are consistent with Moody's expected
loss and thus are affirmed. The two IO Classes, Class X-1 and X-2,
are affirmed since they are consistent with the expected credit
performance of their referenced classes. Based on Moody's current
base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The downgrades of the nine P&I classes are due to higher realized
and anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.2% of
the current balance compared to 11.5% at last review. Base
expected loss plus realized losses to date totals 13.5% of the
original pool balance compared to 12.7% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22 compared to 24 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 15% to $2.2 billion
from $2.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 107 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
50% of the pool. No loans have defeased and there is one loan
representing less than 1% of the pool with an investment grade
credit assessment.

There were 40 loans, representing 39% of the pool, on the master
servicer's watchlist. Two watchlisted loans were recently
transferred to special servicing due to imminent payment default
since the August 12, 2013 distribution date, reducing the number
of watchlisted loans to 38. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization resulting in an aggregate realized loss totaling
$96.8 million (average loss severity of 58%). There are now eleven
loans, representing 10% of the pool, in special servicing. Since
the most recent August 12, 2013 distribution date, three loans
were transferred to special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Clark Tower Loan ($60.8 million -- 2.8% of
the pool), which is secured by a 657,245 square foot (SF) office
building located in Memphis, Tennessee. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in September 2013 due to imminent payment
default. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $135.2 million loss
(59% average expected loss) for all specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 33 poorly
performing loans representing 23% of the pool and has estimated an
$77.2 million aggregate loss (30% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 99%
of the performing pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 106% compared to
110% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 10.7% to the most recently available
net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.00X, respectively,
compared to 1.28X and 0.93X, respectively, at last full review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the 1564 Broadway Loan ($18.3
million -- 0.8%), which is secured by a 52,657 SF mixed use
property located in Times Square in New York, New York. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.55X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.56X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 28% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is a Retail Portfolio Loan (formerly
Centro - New Plan Pool 1; $297.1 million -- 13.8%), which is
secured by a portfolio of 18 retail properties that are cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted and total 3.1 million SF. The
properties are located in 12 states, with the largest
concentrations in Georgia (20%), Florida (14%) and Texas (13%).
The portfolio was 91% leased as of December 2012 compared to 90%
at last review. The loan has begun amortizing on a 360-month
schedule maturing in September 2017. The portfolio was purchased
by BRE Holdings, which is an affiliate of Blackstone Realty.
Financial performance had declined between 2010 and 2011 but
rebounded back to 2010 levels in 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 115% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 119% and 0.82X
at last review.

The second largest loan is the Gurnee Mills Loan ($246.0 million -
- 11.4%), which is a pari-passu interest in a $321.0 million first
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a
1.8 million SF regional mall located in Gurnee, Illinois. The
mall's major tenants include Sears, Bass Pro Shops Outdoor World
and Kohl's. The property was 94% leased as of December 2012
compared to 93% as of March 2012. Financial performance increased
slightly in concert with increased occupancy. The loan is
interest-only for its entire ten-year term maturing in July 2017.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 124% and 0.76X, respectively,
compared to 123% and 0.77X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Sawgrass Mills Mall Loan ($139.4
million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is a pari-passu interest in an
$850 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 2.0 million SF mall located in Sunrise,
Florida. The mall's major tenants include Burlington Coat Factory,
J.C. Penney and Regal Cinema. The property was 96% leased as of
December 2012, the same as at last review. The loan is interest-
only for its entire seven-year term maturing in July 2014.
Financial performance declined since last review and looming major
tenant lease expirations increase near-term leasing risk. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to
90% and 0.99X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2012-PHH: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes of
JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-PHH,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-PHH.
Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. X-CP, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) remaining within acceptable
ranges. The rating of the IO Class, Class X-CP, is consistent with
the credit quality of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.
The certificates are collateralized by a single floating rate loan
backed by a first lien commercial mortgage related to the fee
simple interest in the Palmer House Hilton, a 1,639 full-service
hotel located in Chicago, Illinois. The hotel is performing as
expected showing improvements in operating performance.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

The methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 payment date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance remains unchanged from
securitization at $175 million. The Certificates are
collateralized by a single floating rate loan backed by a first
lien commercial mortgage related to the fee simple interest in the
Palmer House Hilton, a 1,639 full-service hotel located in
Chicago, Illinois. In addition to the trust debt there is non-
trust mezzanine loans for a total of $365 million in total debt
outstanding.

The property's Net Cash Flow (NCF) for trailing twelve month
period ending June 2013 was $35.8 million up from $31.3 million
achieved during the trailing twelve month period ending September
2012. Moody's stabilized NCF is $28.5 million, and stabilized
Moody's value is $272 million, the same as at securitization.

Moody's trust loan to value (LTV) ratio is 64%, the same as at
securitization. Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for the trust is at 1.76X, the same as at securitization.
The trust has not experienced any losses or interest shortfalls
since securitization.


LEAF RECEIVABLES 2013-1: Moody's Rates Cl. E-2 Notes '(P)Ba2sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings of
(P)Prime-1 (sf) to the Class A-1 notes, (P)Aaa (sf) to the Class
A-2 notes through Class A-4 notes, (P)Aa2 (sf) to the Class B
notes, (P)A1 (sf) to the Class C notes, (P)Baa1 (sf) to the Class
D notes, (P)Ba1 (sf) to the Class E-1 notes and (P)Ba2 (sf) to the
Class E-2 notes that LEAF Receivables Funding 9, LLC (LRF 2013-1
or the issuer) will issue on the transaction's closing date. LEAF
Commercial Capital, Inc. (not rated) will be the servicer for the
transaction, U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank; Aa3
stable) will be the back-up servicer, and while the Class A notes
are outstanding, Assured Guaranty Corp. (Assured; A3 stable) will
be the Class A note guarantor and control party for the
transaction.

The collateral backing the notes will consist of fixed rate leases
and commercial loan contracts acquired or originated primarily by
LEAF Capital Funding, LLC (LEAF or the originator), and secured by
the related underlying office equipment and other equipment.
Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the LRF 2013-1
pool is 3.50% and its Aaa level is 22%.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 9, LLC

$87,500,000 Class A-1 Notes, Assigned (P)Prime-1 (sf)

$70,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$65,000,000 Class A-3 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$50,042,000 Class A-4 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$7,850,000 Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$18,036,000 Class C Notes, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

$7,682,000 Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

$11,189,000 Class E-1 Notes, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

$7,682,000 Class E-2 Notes, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The provisional ratings that Moody's assigned to the notes are
based primarily on: (1) the credit quality of the collateral pool
to be securitized, which will be highly diverse by obligor,
obligor industry type and obligor location, but somewhat
concentrated by equipment type; 2) the continued strong, stable
performance of similar collateral that LEAF originated, including
that for LEAF's prior three transactions and its managed
portfolio; 3) the level of credit enhancement available to support
the notes; 4) the sequential pay structure; and 5) the strong
back-up servicing arrangement with U.S. Bank and the presence of
Assured, a highly-rated guarantor, to provide strong oversight,
which in Moody's view, will mitigate operational risk for this
transaction.

Credit enhancement available to support the notes will consist of
overcollateralization, subordination (in the case of the Class A,
Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E-1 notes), a non-declining
reserve account and excess spread. At closing, hard credit
enhancement available to support the notes is expected to equal
19.9% for the Class A notes, 17.6% for the Class B notes, 12.2%
for the Class C notes, 9.9% for the Class D notes, 6.5% for the
Class E-1 notes and 4.2% for the Class E-2 notes. The credit
enhancement for the notes will build over time because of the
sequential pay structure, the excess spread trapping mechanism and
the non-declining reserve account. The Class A notes will also
benefit from a financial guaranty insurance policy by Assured;
however, the other forms of credit enhancement (i.e., excluding
the Class A insurance policy) are sufficient to support the (P)Aaa
(sf) ratings Moody's assigned to the Class A notes.

The presence of Assured, a highly-rated guarantor, will provide
strong support in the form of oversight that goes beyond the Class
A insurance policy. This oversight, in Moody's view, is a strong
mitigant of operational risk for this transaction that is not
directly linked to the financial strength rating of Assured. As a
result, the ratings of the notes, including the Class A notes,
would likely be unaffected by even a multi-notch downgrade of
Assured. Should however the Class A insurance policy be terminated
or Assured be downgraded to below investment grade, Moody's would
revisit Assured's role in mitigating operational risk as it
relates to Moody's rating of the notes.

The issuer will use amounts in the prefunding account to acquire
additional contracts from the originator during the initial three
months of the transaction, subject to Assured's consent and other
conditions. Although the amount of additional contracts the issuer
can acquire during the prefunding period is significant at about
25% of the overall pool, Assured has a strong financial incentive
to ensure that the additional contracts the issuer acquires does
not weaken the credit quality of the overall pool.

There will be a minor amount of exposure to end-of-lease equipment
value in this transaction because the collateral value being
advanced against will include a portion of the residual value
assigned to the equipment under the lease contracts. The residual
value to be securitized at closing is expected to equal about 2%
of the discounted pool balance of all contracts.

V Score

Moody's has assigned an Assumption Volatility Score of Medium to
LRF 2013-1, stronger than the Medium/High score it assigned to the
U.S. Small Issuer Equipment Lease and Loan ABS sector. The V Score
indicates "medium" uncertainty about critical assumptions.

Significant deviations from the sector within the individual
categories include the following: 1) Moody's assigns a score of
medium to issuer/sponsor/originator's historical performance
variability, stronger than the medium/high it assigns to the
sector because of the relatively stable performance of LEAF's
collateral; 2) Moody's assigns a score of medium to market value
sensitivity, weaker than the low/medium Moody's assigns to the
sector because of the transaction's exposure to residuals; 3)
Moody's assigns a score of low/medium to experience of,
arrangements among and oversight of transaction parties, stronger
than the medium it assigns to the sector because of the
transaction parties' significant securitization experience,
including Assured's oversight role; and 4) Moody's assigns a score
of low/medium to back-up servicer arrangement, stronger than the
medium it assigns to the sector because of the strong back-up
servicing arrangement with U.S. Bank that will be in place at
closing and Assured's oversight role.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by Equipment Leases and
Loans" published in March 2007.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 5.35%, 8.05%,
or 10.35%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class A
notes might change from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)Aa1 (sf), (P)Aa3 (sf),
and (P)A2 (sf), respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 4.00%, 5.40%
or 6.50%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class B notes
might change from (P)Aa2 (sf) to (P)Aa3 (sf), (P)A2 (sf), and
(P)Baa1 (sf), respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 3.90%, 4.80%
or 5.80%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class C notes
might change from (P)A1 (sf) to (P)A2 (sf), (P)Baa1 (sf), and
(P)Baa3 (sf), respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 3.85%, 4.80%
or 5.90%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class D notes
might change from (P)Baa1 (sf) to (P)Baa2 (sf), (P)Ba1 (sf), and
(P)Ba3 (sf), respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 3.90%, 4.65%
or 5.40%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class E-1
notes might change from (P)Ba1 (sf) to (P)Ba2 (sf), (P)B1 (sf),
and (P)B3 (sf), respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 3.60%, 4.15%
or 5.10%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class E-2
notes might change from (P)Ba2 (sf) to (P)Ba3 (sf), (P)B2(sf) and
less than (P)B3 (sf), respectively.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


KEYCORP STUDENT 2006-A: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Jr. Sub. Notes Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
itch Ratings has affirmed the senior, subordinate, and junior
subordinate notes at 'A-sf', 'B+sf', and 'CCsf' respectively for
KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2006-A (Group II). The Rating Outlook
for the senior notes remains Stable, and the Rating Outlook for
the subordinate note remains Negative. Fitch used its 'Global SF
Criteria' and 'U.S. Private SL ABS Criteria' to review the
transaction.

Key Rating Drivers
The affirmations on the senior, subordinate, and junior
subordinate notes reflect sufficient loss coverage multiples to
support the existing ratings. Fitch estimates remaining defaults
to range from approximately 26-29%.

As of the May 31, 2013 report, parity levels equal 147.87%,
108.15%, and 96.05% respectively for senior, subordinate, and
junior subordinate classes.

The Negative Outlook for the subordinate class is driven by an
increase in projected default levels in excess of Fitch's initial
expectations. Fitch projected future losses and derived loss
coverage multiples based on the latest performance data. The
projected net loss amounts were compared to available credit
enhancement to determine the loss multiples appropriate for each
rating category. Credit enhancement consists of a combination of
excess spread, overcollateralization, and subordination.

As the junior subordinate class C notes' current rating classifies
these notes as a distressed structured finance security, Fitch has
calculated a Recovery Estimate (RE), which represents Fitch's
calculation of expected principal recoveries as a percentage of
current note principal outstanding. The RE for the junior
subordinate class C notes was calculated to be 0% given Fitch's
calculation of expected net recoveries and principal balance of
the notes as of the latest reporting period.

Rating Sensitivities
As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels
than the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and
remaining loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make
certain note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating
actions, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the trusts.

Fitch affirms the following ratings:

KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2006-A (Group II):

-- Senior class II-A-3 at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Senior class II-A-4 at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Subordinate class II-B at 'B+sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Junior Subordinate class II-C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.


LAKESIDE CDO II: Moody's Lifts Rating on $1BB Notes to 'Caa2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Lakeside CDO II, LTD.:

$1,170,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due 2040 (current outstanding balance of
$168,258,474), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 15, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating upgrade is primarily a result of
deleveraging of the Class A-1 Notes and an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratio since the last rating
action in March 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have
been paid down by approximately 61% or $267 million since the last
rating action. Based on the Moody's calculation, the Class A-1
overcollateralization (OC) ratio is at 156.5% versus the March
2012 level of 111.1%. Moody's also notes that the principal
proceeds account currently has about $7.8 million of cash, which
Moody's expects will be used to pay down Class A-1 Notes on the
next payment date in October, 2013.

Lakeside CDO II, LTD., issued in March 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS and SF
CDOs originated from 2001 to 2004.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8-9 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.

Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment . Among the uncertainties
in the residential real estate property market are those
surrounding future housing prices, pace of residential mortgage
foreclosures, loan modification and refinancing, unemployment rate
and interest rates.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss, assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa1 and below rated assets notched up by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Moody's Caa1 and below rated assets notched down by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0


LATITUDE CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, and C notes from Latitude CLO I Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Lufkin
Advisors LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch with positive
implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1 and D notes.

The affirmation on the class A-1 notes and the upgrades reflect an
increase in available credit support to the transaction.  Since
S&P's June 2012 rating actions, the transaction has paid down the
class A-1 noteholders by $100 million, leaving 25% of its initial
issuance amount left, according to the August 2013 trustee report.
As a result of the paydowns, the class A overcollateralization
ratio has increased to 158% from 128% in May 2012.

In June 2012, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes, despite the improvements in the portfolio's credit quality,
because they had exposure to long-dated assets.  Currently, the
portfolio continues to hold a large balance of long-dated assets,
exposing the transaction to market value risk.  The market value
stresses S&P applied constrained the rating on the class C notes
to 'B+ (sf)' and resulted in its affirming its 'CCC- (sf)' rating
on the class D notes.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them, and will take
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Latitude CLO I Ltd.

              Rating
Class     To          From
A-2       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1       A+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2       A+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
C         B+ (sf)     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Latitude CLO I Ltd.

Class     Rating
A-1       AAA (sf)
D         CCC- (sf)


LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C4: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. J Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed four classes of LB Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C4 as follows:

Cl. G, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 24, 1998 Assigned
B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of two P&I classes are due to increased credit
enhancement resulting from payoff and loan amortization as well as
overall stable pool performance. The pool balance has decreased
27% since last review.

The affirmation of one investment grade P&I class is due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The ratings of
Classes K and L are consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus
are affirmed. The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent
with the expected credit performance of its referenced classes and
thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed class is sufficient to
maintain its current rating. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.7% of the
current pooled balance compared to 5.0% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus cumulative realized losses is now 2.3% of
the original pool balance , the same as at the last review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19 compared to 24 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

In rating this transaction, Moody's also used its credit-tenant
lease (CTL) financing methodology approach (CTL approach) . Under
Moody's CTL approach, the rating of the CTL component is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds. This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease. The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan. The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default. Moody's also considers the overall
structure and legal integrity of the transaction. For deals that
include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's currently uses a
Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public CDO rating model
CDOROMv2.8-9 to generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess
the ratings.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $69.0
million from $2.02 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 42 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 55% of the pool. Ten loans, representing 12% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains a credit tenant lease (CTL)
component, representing 32% of the pool.

Six loans, representing 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a $42.1 million loss (30% overall
loss severity). Four loans, representing 9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. All specially serviced loans are
secured by retail properties. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$1.3 million loss for the specially serviced loans (32% expected
loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 100% and 80% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's weighted average LTV
is 67% compared to 69% at last review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.2%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.35X and 2.04X, respectively, compared to 1.27X and
1.76X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 24% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Pinnacle Center Loan ($6.6 million -- 9.6% of
the pool), which is secured by a 230,000 square foot (SF) retail
property located in Thornton, Colorado. As of July 2013 the
property was 88% leased compared to 75% at last review. The
largest tenant is Hobby Lobby, which leases 21% the net rentable
area (NRA) through June 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
86% and 1.26X, respectively, the same as last review.

The second largest loan is the Chesterfield Meadows Shopping
Center Loan ($5.3 million -- 7.7% of the pool) which is secured by
a 70,000 SF retail center located in Richmond, Virginia. As of
March 2013 the center was 81% leased compared to 80% at last
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.43X,
respectively, the same as last review.

The third largest loan is the Forest Hill Shopping Center Loan
($4.3 million -- 6.2% of the pool) which is secured by a 75,000 SF
retail center located in Forest Hill, Texas. As of December 2012
the center was 98% leased, the same as last review. The largest
tenant is Brookshire Grocery Company which leases 78% the NRA
through November 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and
1.36X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.28X at last review.

The CTL component includes 16 loans secured by properties leased
under bondable leases. The largest CTL exposures are Sweetbay
Supermarket ($7.4 million, 10.7% of the pool; parent Delhaize
America, LLC; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa3; stable
outlook), Walgreen Co. ($4.1 million, 6.0% of the pool; Moody's
senior unsecured rating Baa1; negative outlook), and CVS/Caremark
Corp. ($3.9 million, 5.8% of the pool; Moody's senior unsecured
rating Baa2; positive outlook).

The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for the
CTL component is 1,701 compared to 1,731 at last review. WARF is a
measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The
bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within
the pool.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Cuts Cl. K Certs Rating to C
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes,
upgraded three classes and downgraded two classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2007 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the three investment grade P&I classes are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the four below-investment grade P&I classes are
consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus affirmed. The
rating of the IO Class, Class X-CL, is affirmed due to the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) being consistent with the
ratings of its referenced classes.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement level for the affirmed class is sufficient to maintain
their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and
the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans,
the credit enhancement level for rated classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The upgrades of three P&I classes are due to increased credit
support due to amortization and payoffs as well as anticipated
paydowns from defeased loans and other loans approaching maturity
that are well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by
47% since Moody's last review. There are 12 defeased loans
representing $84.5 million coming due within the next six months.

The downgrades of the two below investment grade P&I classes are
due to an increase in Moody's expected loss resulting from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.8% of the
current balance, compared to 4.3% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss is now 4.4% compared to 4.3% at
last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 11 compared to 10 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 68% to $401.2
million from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 56 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool. Thirteen loans representing 24% of the pool
have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities. The
pool contains two loans with credit assessments, representing 19%
of the pool.

Five loans, representing 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $26.5 million (28% loss severity).
Currently eight loans, representing 9% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Plaza Vista
Mall Loan ($11.7 million -- 3% of the pool). This loan is secured
by a 227,149 square foot (SF) retail center located in Sierra
Vista, Arizona. The property is currently undergoing a lease up
strategy and has an expected to be marketed for sale in late 2015.
As of July 2013, the property was 40% leased, in line with last
review. Hobby Lobby and C-A-L Ranch stores have both signed leases
starting in January 2014 with a total of 127,247 SF which would
bring the occupancy up to 96% leased. The lease up of this space
will also end the concessions that were triggered by co-tenancy
clauses from Walmart vacating the property in 2010.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Warm Springs
Loan ($9.6 million -- 2% of the pool). This loan is secured by an
office property located just south of McCarren airport in Las
Vegas, Nevada. This loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2012 due to GSA vacating, leaving the property 46%
leased. The special servicer is pursuing foreclosure.

The remaining specially serviced loans are represented by a mix of
property types. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $20.9 million
loss (60% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $1.5 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 81% compared to 78% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.34X, respectively, compared to
1.56X and 1.36X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Ruppert Yorkville
Towers Loan ($37.8 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by
825-unit multifamily high-rise complex located on the Upper East
Side of Manhattan. The complex was completed in 1975 and converted
to a condominium structure in 2003. The collateral for the loan
includes 432 unsold residential units, unsold storage units and
53,810 SF of commercial space. A portion of the unsold units are
occupied by pre-conversion tenants at below market rental rates.
As of December 2012, the property was 93% leased. Moody's credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.05 X, respectively,
compared to Aaa and 1.76X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Farmers Market
Loan ($37.7 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a
228,339 SF mixed-use retail and office property originally built
in 1940 (renovated in 2002) located in Los Angeles, California.
The property was 99% leased as of December 2012, the same as the
last two reviews. Property performance has improved due to an
increase base and percentage rents as well as expense
reimbursements. The loan benefits from amortization and matures in
March 2014. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa1
and 2.72X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and 2.27X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 25% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Maritime Plaza I and II Loan
($65.8 million -- 16.4% of the pool), which is secured by two
office buildings (totaling 351,452 SF) located in the Capitol Hill
submarket of Washington, D.C. The properties were 89% leased as of
December 2012 compared to 93% at last review. The largest tenant
is Computer Sciences Corporation (45% of the NRA; lease
expirations in October 2013 and November 2014). The loan benefits
from amortization and matures in March 2014. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 73% and
1.33X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Voice Road Shopping Center ($21.1
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 131,452 SF
retail property located in Carle Place, New York. The property was
83% leased as of July 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104%
and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.90X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Woodland Meadows Loan ($13.1million
-- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 248-unit multifamily
property located in Spring, Texas. The property was 98% leased as
of June 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.36X,
respectively, compared to 76% and 1.21X at last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed 24 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-C4 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. HAF-5, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Confirmed
at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. HAF-6, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. HAF-7, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. HAF-8, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. HAF-9, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. HAF-10, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below investment grade P&I classes are consistent
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of
the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the expected credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

The affirmations of six non-pooled or rake classes are due to
sufficient credit support for the current ratings. The rake
classes are currently supported by the B-notes associated with the
70 Hudson Street Loan and the Fountains of Miramar Loan.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.9% of the
current pooled balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 11.3%. Realized losses have increased from 1.6% of the
original pooled balance to 2.6% since the prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.5% of the
original pooled balance compared to 11.0% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in its analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17 compared to 18 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
pooled aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to $1.59
billion from $1.98 billion at securitization. The pooled
Certificates are collateralized by 118 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 61% of the pool. Two loans, representing less than
0.5% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains two loans with investment grade
credit assessments, representing 5% of the pool.

Twenty-one loans, representing 45% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate pooled realized loss of $50.8 million (46% loss severity
on average). Additionally, there was a $4.4 million loss to the
HAF-11 rake class as a result of the liquidation of the AMLI of
North Dallas Loan B-note. Fifteen loans, representing 11% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest loan in
special servicing is the Rivergate Plaza Loan ($58.5 million --
3.7% of the pool), which is secured by two office buildings
totaling 302,000 square feet (SF) and located in Miami, Florida.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in September 2009
due to imminent monetary default and became real estate owned
(REO) in July 2010. The property underwent capital improvements to
both the exterior and interior which were completed in 2012. As of
May 2013, the collateral was 73% leased. The special servicer
indicated that it is currently marketing this asset for sale.

The remaining 14 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $97.0 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (54% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 1% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $3.3 million loss (16% expected loss on average) from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 96%
of the pool. Moody's conduit portion excludes special serviced,
troubled loans and loans with credit assessments. Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 105% compared to 108% at Moody's prior
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 7.1% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 1.27X and 0.94X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the 70 Hudson Street
Loan ($70.6 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
409,000 SF Class A office building located in Jersey City, New
Jersey. The property is also encumbered by a $46.1 million B-note,
which is a junior non-pooled component that is a part of the
collateral for the multi-loan HAF rake bonds. The property is 100%
leased to Barclay's Capital through January 2016. The lease
expires three months prior to the loan maturity date. Financial
performance has improved due to a rent bump in 2012. Despite the
positive NOI growth, Moody's is concerned about potential
refinance risk at loan maturity in 2016. Due to the single tenant
nature of this loan, Moody's value reflects a lit/dark analysis.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.46X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.43X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Fountains of
Miramar Loan ($12.3 million -- 0.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 139,000 SF anchored retail center located in Miramar,
Florida. The property is also encumbered by an $11.7 million B-
note, which is a junior non-pooled component that is a part of the
collateral for the multi-loan HAF rake bonds. The property is 100%
leased as of March 2013, which is the same as at last review.
Performance has remained stable on this loan. Moody's credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.60X, respectively,
compared to A3 and 1.66X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 37% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the One Federal Street Loan
($262 million -- 16.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.1
million SF Class A office tower located in the Financial District
of Boston, Massachusetts. The property is also encumbered by a
$111.5 million mezzanine loan, which is interest only and
coterminous with the A-note's maturity. Property performance
dropped significantly in 2011 due to the lease expirations of Bank
of America and State Street Bank (which accounted for 37% of the
net rentable area (NRA)). The occupancy was 65% as of June 2013
and the loan is on the watchlist due to low DSCR, however, based
on recent leasing activity the occupancy is expected to increase
to above 80% by year end 2013. Moody's analysis incorporates a
positive benefit for the newly signed leases and quality of the
asset. The loan is interest-only throughout the term and matures
in June 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and 0.91X,
respectively, compared to 103% and 0.89X at last review.

The second largest loan is the One New York Plaza Loan ($182.2
million -- 11.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 50% pari-
passu interest in a $364.3 million loan. The loan is secured by a
2.4 million SF Class A office property located in Lower Manhattan.
The property's largest tenant is now Morgan Stanley (57% of net
rentable area; lease expiration December 2029) after the bank
renegotiated its lease and subleased 800,000 SF which was formerly
leased to Wachovia. The property was 84% leased as of September
2013 compared to 82% at last review. The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist due to lower DSCR and it has still not fully recovered
from Goldman Sachs vacating 559,000 square feet (23% of the NRA)
at its lease expiration in 2010. The loan's sponsor is Brookfield
Office Properties. Moody's analysis incorporates a positive
benefit for the quality of the asset and its location in
Manhattan's financial district, which according to CBRE had an
8.2% vacancy as of Q2 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69%
and 1.34X.

The third largest loan is the 215 Fremont Street Loan ($141.4
million -- 8.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 373,000 SF
Class A office building located in the Financial District of San
Francisco, California. Charles Schwab Corporation leases the
entire building as its headquarters (Moody's senior unsecured
rating of A2, stable outlook) through June 2024. The loan is
interest-only for the entire term and matures in May 2016, eight
years prior to the lease expiration. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 126% and 0.73X, respectively, the same as last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on A-J Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust (LBUBS) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2007-C2.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement of the
remaining classes relative to Fitch's expected losses and also
considers the recent liquidation of 21 loans in special servicing.
Fitch modeled losses of 5.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 15.2%, including $427.8
million (12% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 32 loans (19.7%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes two specially serviced assets (0.3%).

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 41.8% to $2.07 billion from
$3.55 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes A-M through T.

In July 2013 Fitch had downgraded classes A-J through J to 'D'
after the classes experienced principal write downs following the
bulk liquidation of 21 specially serviced loans. ORIX Capital
Markets, the special servicer, had placed the foreclosed real
estate for sale as part of a marketing campaign focused on
distressed loans and REO asset sales. The recoveries from the
dispositions paid in full the A-2 and A-AB classes, and partially
repaid class A-3 and the multifamily directed class A-1A. (For
more information please refer to 'Fitch Downgrades 9 Distressed
Classes of LBUBS 2007-C2', dated July 22, 2013, available at
www.fitchratings.com.)

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Watergate 600
loan (6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 12-story, 289,286
square foot (SF) office building in Washington, DC. As of June
2013 the building is 99% occupied. The two major property tenants
include Atlantic Media (65% net rentable area [NRA]) whose lease
is through 2023, and Blank Rome LLP (29% NRA) whose lease expires
in December 2018. The subject loan matures in April 2017. The year
end (YE) December 2012 net operating income (NOI) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) reported at 1.28x. The loan remains current
as of the August 2013 payment date. Although Fitch calculated
losses based on in-place cash flow and a stressed cap rate, losses
may be mitigated given the strong location and stable performance
of the asset.

The second largest contributor to losses is the Delamar Hotel
(1.78%), which is secured by an 82-room full service boutique
hotel located in Greenwich, CT adjacent to the Greenwich Harbor
boat docks. The property performance has seen positive trends
since trending downwards in 2009 due to the sluggish economy. For
year-to-date June 2013, occupancy reported at 63%, ADR was
$299.83, and RevPAR was $188.26, respectively, versus 57.6%,
$304.98, and $175.85 for YE 2010. The partial interest-only loan
has been amortizing since March 2012. The YTD June 2013 NOI DSCR
reported at 0.91x. Based on the YE 2012 NOI and YE 2011 NOI,
amortized DSCR calculates to 1.03x and 0.98x, respectively. The
loan remains current as of the August 2013 payment date.

The next largest contributors to expected losses are three loans
secured by office buildings located in Louisville, KY loan (1.6%),
McLeansville, NC (1.5%), and Meridian, ID (1.5%). All three
properties are 100% leased to Citicorp North America. / Citigroup
Inc. (rated 'A' by Fitch) through December 2019. The subject loans
all mature in April 2017. The YE 2012 NOI DSCR has reported at
1.17x for the three loans since issuance. The loan remains current
as of the August 2013 payment date. Fitch had further stressed the
cap rates on the subject properties in its analysis due to the
properties single tenancy and tertiary office markets. Fitch had
calculated losses based on in-place cash flow and stressed cap
rates; however, losses may be mitigated due to the credit tenancy
and lease expirations over 1.5 years past the loan maturities.

Rating Sensitivity

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-3 and A-1A are Stable due to
sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown. The Negative
Outlook on class A-M reflects above-average loan concentration
concerns, with the top two loans representing 36% of the pool and
the top 15 loans representing 70%. In addition, the Negative
Outlook reflects interest shortfalls, which are currently being
incurred as of the August 2013 distribution date. The class could
be downgraded should interest shortfalls continue to impact the
class for an extended period of time.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated and revises the
Rating Outlook on class A-1A as indicated:

-- $1.1 billion class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $370.5 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $355.4 million class A-M at 'Asf', Outlook Negative;
-- $283.1 million class A-J at 'Dsf', RE 65%;
-- $0 class B at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class C at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class D at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-AB certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class P, Q, S and T certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP,
X-W and X-CL certificates.


LB-UBS MORTGAGE 2005-C2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 4 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes of
LB-UBS Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of Classes A-4 through C, are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The ratings of
Classes D through K are consistent with Moody's expected loss and
thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO Class, Class X-CL, is
consistent with the expected credit performance of its referenced
classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.8% of
the current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 15.6%. Realized losses have increased from 2.3% of the
original balance to 2.4% since the prior review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.8% of the original
pooled balance, the same at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 11 compared to 12 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 47% to $1.03
billion from $1.94 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 76 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 68% of the pool. Four loans, representing 7% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains three loans with investment grade credit
assessments, representing 22% of the pool.

Seventeen loans, representing 45% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $47.5 million (19% loss severity on
average). Eight loans, representing 4% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The eight specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$16.7 million loss for the specially serviced loans (39% expected
loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 20.9% of the pool and has estimated
an aggregate $119.9 million loss (56% expected loss based on a 67%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 95%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 101% compared to 103% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 2% to
the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.42X and 1.01X, respectively, compared to
1.43X and 0.99X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the 909 Third Avenue
Loan ($196.4 million -- 19.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
32-story office tower in the Third Avenue office submarket of
Midtown Manhattan. The property was 99% leased as of June 2013
compared to 92% in March 2012. The largest tenant is the US Postal
Service, which leases 492,000 square feet (38% of property NRA) on
the building's lower levels. The tenant recently renewed for five
years until October 2018. The loan sponsor is Vornado. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.12X at last review.

The second-largest loan with a credit assessment is the Hartz Fee
Portfolio Loan ($13.5 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is
secured by the leased fee interest in land improved with three
commercial properties in Secaucus, New Jersey, six miles west of
Midtown Manhattan. The improvements include two limited service
hotels and a single-tenant retail building. The ground leases
include rent steps. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are A2 and 1.32X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the 895 Broadway Loan
($13.1 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 5-story
office property in the Midtown South office submarket of New York
City. The property is 100% leased, which is unchanged since
Moody's last review. Leases for 100% of the building are scheduled
to expire in December 2014. Moody's analysis reflects a stabilized
cash flow based on current market rent and vacancy levels. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.92X
respectively, the same as at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 31% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Woodbury Office Portfolio ($132.0 million -- 12.9% of
the pool), which consists of two-cross collateralized senior loans
originally secured by 32 primarily office properties in suburban
Long Island, New York. The Woodbury I loan group includes ten
properties which were 81% leased at year-end 2012. The Woodbury II
loan group includes 19 properties which were 75% leased as of Q1
2013. Three properties from the Woodbury II loan group were
released with proceeds paying down the A-Note balance. RXR Realty,
the loan sponsor, gained control of the portfolio in 2010 through
a foreclosure of the mezzanine position. The loans were modified
in October 2011 into an A/B Note structure whereby the two A-Notes
continue to pay interest at the original contract rate and
interest is accrued for the two B-Notes. The Woodbury I and II
loans were cross-collateralized as part of the loan modification.
The total B-Note balance is currently $79 million. Moody's current
A-Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.86X, respectively,
compared to 106% and 0.92X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Civica Office Commons Loan ($113.5
million -- 11.1% of the pool), which is secured by an 8-story
Class A office complex located in downtown Bellevue, Washington,
10 miles East of Seattle. The property was 88% leased as of March
2013 compared to 98% at Moody's last review. The largest tenants
are Wells Fargo & Company (Moody's senior unsecured rating A2,
ratings under review), Waggener Edstrom Worldwide and Microsoft
Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured rating Aaa, stable outlook).
The loan sponsor is Brickman, a real estate investment group based
in New York City. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 117%
and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 119% and 0.82X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the senior portion of the Park
80 West Loan ($72.0 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured
by a 490,000 square foot Class A office property located in Saddle
Brook, New Jersey, a suburb of New York City. The loan was
modified on March 26, 2012 with an A/B Note structure. The
modification split the former $100 million interest-only loan into
a $72 million A-Note and a $28 million B-Note. The A-Note
continues to pay interest at the original contract rate, while
interest on the B-Note is accrued and deferred until the
occurrence of a capital event. The property was 67% leased as of
March 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 143% and 0.68X,
respectively, compared to 114% and 0.85X at last review.


LEHMAN MORTGAGE 2008-4: Moody's Cuts Cl. A1 Notes Rating to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Cl. A1 from
Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-4.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-4

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects the recent performance of the pools of
mortgages backing the underlying bond and the rating of the
underlying bond. The resecuritization bond is backed by Cl. 2-A1
issued by Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-9 transaction. The Cl. 2-A1
bond is currently rated Ca (sf).

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities" published in February 2011.

The methodology used in determining the ratings of the underlying
bonds was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in June
2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.

As part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
loss on the underlying bond backing the resecuritization Lehman
Mortgage Trust 2008-4 by an additional 10% and found that the
implied rating of the resecuritization bond Cl. A1 retains its
rating at Caa3 (sf).


MADISON PARK III: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Madison Park Funding III, Ltd.:

$11,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$33,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$40,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

$24,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

$6,000,000 Class Q Notes Due 2020 (current rated balance of
$3,114,475), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$381,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$100,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$22,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in October 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from a higher weighted average spread of
3.74% compared to 3.01% at the time of the last rating review.
Additionally, the deal is modeled with a shorter weighted average
life assumption compared to the last review. Moody's also notes
that the transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios are
stable.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $674.8 million, defaulted par of $15.6
million, a weighted average default probability of 20.36%
(implying a WARF of 2795), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.49%, and a diversity score of 73. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Madison Park Funding III, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Class Q Notes was
"Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes"
published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2235)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: +1

Class B: +3

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class Q: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3353)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: -1

Class A-3: -3

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class Q: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


MARATHON CLO II: Moody's Hikes Rating on $12MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Marathon CLO II Ltd:

$22,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Deferrable Interest
Secured Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July
15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

$22,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Deferrable Interest
Secured Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July
15, 2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$12,300,000 Class D Floating Rate Subordinated Deferrable Interest
Secured Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July
15, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$273,000,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes, Due
2019 (current outstanding balance of $75,176,624.88), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on December 13, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$12,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes, Due
2019, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 13, 2012 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in December 2012. Moody's notes that the Class
A-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 39% or $121.2
million since December 2012. Based on the latest trustee report
dated August 15, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization (OC) ratios are reported at 177.93%,
145.50%,122.64%, and 112.94%, respectively, versus November 9,
2012 levels of 134.4%, 122.18%, 111.79% and 106.82% respectively.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class B
Notes and Class C Notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that time,
Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC ratios
resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments during
the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $175.74 million, defaulted par of $6.37
million, a weighted average default probability of 21.84%
(implying a WARF of 3153), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.13%, and a diversity score of 27. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Marathon CLO II Ltd., issued on December 22, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2520)

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3780)

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CANADA 15: Moody's Affirms L Certs' Caa2 Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of six classes and
affirmed ten classes of Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-Canada
15 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2009 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2009 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2009 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to increased credit support as well as
anticipated additional credit support resulting from paydowns of
defeased loans and other loans approaching maturity that are well
positioned for refinance.

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The ratings of the IO Classes,
Classes XC-1 & XC-2, are consistent with the credit performance of
their referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.8% of the
current balance, the same as at last review. Moody's base expected
loss plus realized loss is 1.2%, the same as last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May
2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 18 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 38% to $273.1
million from $444.0 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 42 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 41% of the pool. Six loans, representing 27% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by Canadian Government
securities.

Four loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
approximately a $630,000 loss (41% loss severity). There are
currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
modest loss from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 financials for 94% of the
pool.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's weighted average LTV is 72%,
the same as at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.53X and 1.42X, respectively, compared to 1.51X and 1.38X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 17.5% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the Calloway Saint John Loan ($19.8
million -- 7.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 271,000 square
foot (SF) Wal-Mart anchored retail center located in St. John, New
Brunswick. The retail center is also shadowed anchored by a
Canadian Tire Store and Kent Home Improvement Centre. Wal-Mart
leases 47% of the net rentable area (NRA) through November 2019.
As of July 2013, the property was 94% leased compared to 95% at
last review. The loan is full recourse to Calloway REIT. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.39X, respectively, as compared
to 70% and 1.31X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 276-288 St Jacques Loan
($14.6 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by 236,000
SF office property located in Old Montreal, Quebec. As of
September 2012 the property was 97% leased, the same at last
review. The Government of Quebec leases approximately 57% of the
NRA with lease expirations ranging from 2015-2017. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 64% and 1.61X, respectively, compared to 72% and
1.42X at last review. The loan is scheduled to mature on October
1, 2013 and payoff is expected upon maturity.

The third largest conduit loan is the Prospera Portfolio ($13.4
million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by eight cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted office properties located in
Abbotsford, British Columbia. The properties total 108,000 SF. The
portfolio has benefited from 2% of amortization since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.49X, respectively,
compared to 73% and 1.37X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on $4MM Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Morgan Stanley Investment Management
Croton, Ltd.:

$16,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2018, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2013 Upgraded to
A2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$175,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Term Notes Due 2018 (current
outstanding balances of $47,509,411.95), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on March 8, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due 2018 (current
outstanding balances of $13,574,117.69), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on March 8, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$14,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on March 8, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$4,000,000 Class B Senior Fixed Rate Notes Due 2018, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on March 8, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$14,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2018, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf);

$4,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2018, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on March 8, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in March 2013. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 52.9% or $68.6 million
since March 2013. Based on the latest trustee report dated August
5, 2013, the Senior Overcollateralization and Mezzanine
Overcollateralization ratios are reported at 154.1% and 111.2%,
respectively, versus March 2013 levels of 128.2% and 106.2%,
respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since March 2013. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2922 compared to 2581
in March 2013.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the August 2013 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 20.3% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity. Notwithstanding
the increase in the overcollateralization coverage for the Class D
Notes and Class E Notes, Moody's affirmed the ratings of the Class
D Notes and Class E Notes due to the market risk posed by the
exposure to these long-dated assets.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $118.8 million, defaulted par of $6.3 million,
a weighted average default probability of 18.59% (implying a WARF
of 2922), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 52.54%,
and a diversity score of 37. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Morgan Stanley Investment Management Croton, Ltd., issued in
December 2005, is a collateralized loan obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2338)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B Floating: 0

Class B Fixed: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3506)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B Floating: 0

Class B Fixed: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


MORGAN STANLEY 2000-PRIN: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on X Secs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings one class and
affirmed four classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I
Trust 2000-PRIN as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2006 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of Class E is due to increased credit enhancement from
paydowns and amortization and overall stable performance. The pool
has paid down by 89% since securitization.

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X, is consistent with the ratings of its reference classes
and thus affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated grade classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.6% of the
current balance. At last full review, Moody's base expected loss
was 3.0%. Moody's base expected loss plus cumulative realized
losses remains at .05% of the original securitized balance,
consistent with the prior review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to 16 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 23, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 89% to $68.4
million from $597.9 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 29 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
71% of the pool. No loans have defeased and there are no loans
with an investment grade credit assessment.

Thirteen loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $588,000 loss (1% loss severity on
average). There are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 7% of the pool and has estimated a
modest loss from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating
results for 94% of the performing pool. Excluding the troubled
loan, Moody's weighted average LTV is 38% compared to 41% at last
full review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.6%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.51X and 4.09X, respectively, compared to 1.49X and 3.65X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The top three performing loans represent 35% of the pool. The
largest loan is the Liberty Square Shopping Center Loan ($12.7
million --18.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 346,000 square
foot (SF) retail center located in Burlington (Burlington County),
New Jersey. The center is anchored by Wal-Mart, ACME Supermarket
and Marshall's. As of February 2013, the property was 98% leased
compared to 89% at last review. Marshall's (10.5% of net rentable
area) who had a lease expiration in January 2013, recently renewed
their extension option out to 2018. Property performance has been
stable and the loan is benefitting from amortization, paying down
37% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 41%
and 2.47X, respectively, compared to 49% and 2.06X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Stop & Shop Loan ($5.9 million --
8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 190,000 SF anchored
retail center located in 15 miles southwest of Boston,
Massachusetts. The collateral is located along US Route 1, a main
commercial corridor. Home Depot, which occupies 61% of the gross
leasable area (GLA), owns its own improvements has a 97-year
ground lease through September 2097. Home Depot has prepaid the
ground rent for its parcel and does not pay reimbursements. Stop &
Shop, which leases 34% of the GLA, has a 21-year lease through
June 2018. No other tenant occupies more than 2% of the GLA. As of
March 2013, the property was 100% leased, compared to 98% at last
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.35X,
respectively, compared to 81% and 1.29X, at last review.

The third largest loan is the 5560 Katella Avenue Loan ($5.1
million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 215,000 SF
single-tenant industrial property located in Cypress, California.
The property is 100% leased to Global Experience Specialist
through December 2015. Performance has remained in line with last
review, although due to the single tenant nature of this building,
Moody's value reflects a stressed cashflow derived from a dark/lit
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.78X,
respectively, the same as at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-4: Moody's Hikes Rating on 5 RMBS Secs. to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five
tranches backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. 1-A-9, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-10, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-11, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-12, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-14, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-35: Moody's Hikes Rating on $75MM Notes to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that the following rating
action on Morgan Stanley ACES, Series 2006-35, a corporate
synthetic collateralized debt obligation transaction (the
"Collateralized Synthetic Obligation" or "CSO"). The CSO
references a portfolio of corporate senior unsecured bonds.

  $75,000,000 Class I Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2016,
  Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on February 25, 2009 Downgraded
  to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's rating action is the result of the shortened time to
maturity of the CSO, the level of credit enhancement remaining in
the transaction, and the stable credit quality of the reference
portfolio.

The credit quality of the portfolio remains stable with a weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of 1379 in September 2013 compared to
a WARF of 1389 in April 2013, after adjusting for credit events.
6.4% of the portfolio is rated Caa1 or below, compared to 4.0%
from the last review. There are 27 reference entities with a
negative outlook compared to 17 with a positive outlook, and 3
entities on watch for downgrade compared to none on watch for
upgrade.

The portfolio has experienced six credit events, equivalent to 6%
of the portfolio based on the portfolio notional value at closing.
Since inception, the subordination of the rated tranche has been
reduced by 4% due to credit events on CIT Group, Idearc Inc.,
Kaupthing Bank HF., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Thomson and
Syncora Guarantee Inc. In addition, the portfolio is exposed to
Clear Channel and Norske Skogindustrier ASA, neither of which have
had credit events, but nonetheless have senior unsecured ratings
of Ca.

The CSO has a remaining life of 3.5 years.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.8-9 .

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are given in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the base case, where a higher number of
notches correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-versa:

- Moody's reviews a scenario consisting of reducing the maturity
   of the CSO by six months, keeping all other things equal. The
   result of this run is one notch higher than in the base case.

- Market Implied Ratings ("MIRS") are modeled in place of the
   corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default probability
   of the reference entities in the portfolio. The gap between an
   MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating is an indicator
   of the extent of the divergence in credit view between Moody's
   and the market. The result of this run is three notches higher
   than in the base case.

- Moody's performs a stress analysis consisting of defaulting all
   entities rated Caa1 and below. The result of this run is one
   notch lower than in the base case.

Moody's notes that key model inputs used in its analysis are based
on the published methodology and may be different from the
manager/arranger's reported numbers. In particular, rating
assumptions for all publicly rated corporate credits in the
underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review for Possible
Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or "Negative Outlook".

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model. For a description
of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the CDOROM user's
guide on Moody's website.

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality. Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities. The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee. Although the impact of these decisions is
mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of
these decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty
in Moody's assumptions. Given the tranched nature of CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility. All else
being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more junior
or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario anticipated by Moody's of a gradual recovery in the
corporate universe. Should macroeconomics conditions evolve, the
CSO ratings will change to reflect the new economic developments.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: S&P Assigns Prelim 'BB-' Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Northwoods Capital X Ltd./Northwoods Capital X LLC's
$324.50 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 16,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflects S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread) and cash flow structure, which can
      withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
      CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
      the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which it
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2654%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50.00% of excess interest proceeds that are available before
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees, collateral
      manager subordinated and incentive management fees, and
      subordinated note payments to principal proceeds to purchase
      additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1811.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Northwoods Capital X Ltd./Northwoods Capital X LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
X                      AAA (sf)                  2.50
A-1                    AAA (sf)                165.00
A-2                    AAA (sf)                 45.00
B-1                    AA (sf)                  22.00
B-2                    AA (sf)                  20.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   31.50
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 19.50
E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)                 19.00
Subordinated notes     NR                       42.50

NR--Not rated.


NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches from two transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans,
issued by Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2003-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2004-1

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
In addition, the rating actions reflect correction of errors in
the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models
previously used by Moody's in rating these transactions.

The cash flow models used in prior rating actions incorrectly
double counted the excess spread reduction on the transactions,
understating the amount of excess spread benefit to the bonds. The
errors have now been corrected, and these rating actions reflect
these changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


OHA LOAN 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on OHA
Loan Funding 2012-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2012-1 Inc.'s
$330.0 million in fixed- and floating-rate notes following the
transaction's effective date as of June 1, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The effective date for a
CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer--as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure--provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction could benefit from allowing a window
of time after the closing date for the collateral manager to
acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This window
of time is typically referred to as a ramp-up period.  Because
some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets from the
new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period could give
collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analyses of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

After S&P issues an effective date rating affirmation, it will
periodically review whether, in its view, the current ratings on
the notes remain consistent with the credit quality of the assets,
the credit enhancement available to support the notes, and other
factors, and S&P will take rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

OHA Loan Funding 2012-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2012-1 Inc.

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (Mil. $)
X                          AAA (sf)                        0.0
A                          AAA (sf)                      220.0
B-1                        AA (sf)                        30.5
B-2                        AA (sf)                        19.0
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                         25.5
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                       18.0
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                        17.0


PALMER SQUARE 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Palmer
Square CLO 2013-2 Ltd./Palmer Square CLO 2013-2 LLC's
$425.25 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's cash flow structure, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined
      in the corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
      criteria, which can withstand the default rate projected by
      Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's expectation of the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, assessed using its
      cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
      assigned ratings under various interest rate scenarios,
      including LIBOR ranging from 0.2761%-12.8133%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balances.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1810.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Palmer Square CLO 2013-2 Ltd./Palmer Square CLO 2013-2 LLC

Class                     Rating                   Amount
                                                 (mil. $)
A-1a                      AAA (sf)                 266.10
A-1b                      AAA (sf)                  10.00
A-2                       AA (sf)                   66.60
B (deferrable)            A (sf)                    32.10
C (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                  23.00
D (deferrable)            BB (sf)                   18.30
E (deferrable)            B (sf)                     9.15
Subordinated notes        NR                        38.55

NR--Not rated.


PEGASUS 2006-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Class A1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of one class of
notes issued by Pegasus 2006-1. The affirmation is due to key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A1, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Pegasus 2006-1 is a static synthetic transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities reference
obligations (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool balance). As of the August
16, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $121.5 million, the
same as at issuance.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 168 compared to 128 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated reference obligations and assessments for non-
Moody's rated reference obligations is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (73.3%
compared to 83.3% at last review), A1-A3 (20.0% compared to 10.0%
at last review), and Baa1-Baa3 (6.7%, same as last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.1 years compared to 2.9 years at
last review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 58.2% compared to 60.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 56.2% compared to 55.7% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes within the reference obligation pool.
Holding all other key parameters static, stressing the current
ratings and credit assessments of the reference obligations by one
notch downward or one notch upward affects the model results by
approximately 0 to 2 notches negatively and 1 notch positively,
respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


PEGASUS 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of one class
of notes issued by Pegasus 2007-1. The downgrade is due to
deterioration in underlying reference obligations performance as
evidenced by transition in Moody's weighted average rating factor
(WARF), and weighted average recovery rate (WARR). The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
Synthetic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A1 Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Pegasus 2007-1 is a static synthetic transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities reference
obligations (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool balance). As of the August
16, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $113.4 million, the
same as at issuance.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 168 compared to 128 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated reference obligations and assessments for non-
Moody's rated reference obligations is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (57.1%
compared to 60.7% at last review), A1-A3 (21.5% compared to 17.9%
at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (14.3%, compared to 17.9 at last
review) and Ba1-Ba3 (7.1% compared to 3.6% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.9 years compared to 3.7 years at
last review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 51.6% compared to 53.2% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 37.2% compared to 59.8% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes within the reference obligation pool.
Holding all other key parameters static, stressing the current
ratings and credit assessments of the reference obligations by one
notch downward or one notch upward affects the model results by
approximately 1 to 2 notches negatively and 1 notch positively,
respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


PREFERRED TERM XI: Moody's Raises Ratings on 3 Notes to 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XI, Ltd.:

$343,000,000 Floating Rate Class A1 Senior Notes Due September 24,
2033 (current balance of $223,906,970), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on August 5, 2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$70,000,000 Floating Rate Class A2 Senior Notes Due September 24,
2033, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 5, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$124,500,000 Floating Rate Class B1 Mezzanine Notes Due September
24, 2033, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 27, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

$13,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B2 Mezzanine Notes Due
September 24, 2033, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 27,
2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

$65,500,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B3 Mezzanine Notes Due
September 24, 2033, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 27,
2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A1 Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios.

Moody's notes that the Class A1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately $14 million or 6% since September 2012, due to
diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying assets. As a
result of this deleveraging, the Class A1 Notes' par coverage
improved 178.7% from 165.5% since September 2012, as calculated by
Moody's. Based on the latest trustee report dated June 19, 2013,
the Senior Principal Coverage Ratio is reported at 136.13% (limit
128.00%) versus September 2012 levels of 128.03%. The Senior
Principal Coverage Test has been cured since September 2012. As a
result, the Class B Notes resumed interest payments and all
deferred interest on the Class B Notes has been fully paid. Going
forward, the Class A1 Notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the proceeds from future
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A1
and Class A2 Notes announced on August 5, 2013. At that time,
Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes, increase in the
overcollateralization (OC) ratios, and improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolios.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in its rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $393,605,000, defaulted/deferring par of
$167,250,000, a weighted average default probability of 18.86%
(implying a WARF of 877), Moody's Asset Correlation of 18.34%, and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition
to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Preferred Term Securities XI, Ltd., issued on September 2003, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q2-2013.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 360 points from the
base case of 877, the model-implied rating of the Class A1 Notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 20 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A1 Notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $49 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A1: +1

Class A2: +2

Class B1: +2

Class B2: +2

Class B3: +2

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A1: +1

Class A2: +1

Class B1: +1

Class B2: +1

Class B3: +1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities.


PREFERRED TERM XIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Notes to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XIII, Ltd.:

$276,250,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due March 24,
2034 (current balance of $179,269,853), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on Aug 5, 2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

$27,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due March 24,
2034, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$7,750,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-3 Senior Notes Due March
24, 2034, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$21,500,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-4 Senior Notes Due March
24, 2034, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$98,350,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due March 24,
2034 (current balance of $101,980,268), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

$21,450,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
March 24, 2034 (current balance of $22,241,757), Upgraded to Caa3
(sf); previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

$44,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes Due
March 24, 2034 (current balance of $45,624,116), Upgraded to Caa3
(sf); previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
September 2012.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 15.3% or $32 million since September 2012, due to
diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying assets. As a
result of this deleveraging, the Class A1 Notes' par coverage
improved to 179% from 140% since September 2012, as calculated by
Moody's. Based on the latest trustee report dated June 19, 2013,
the Senior Principal Coverage Ratio is reported at 132.28% (limit
128.0%), versus September 2012 level of 110.81%. The Senior
Principal Coverage Test has been cured since June 2013. As a
result, the Class B Notes resumed interest payments and the
deferred interest on the Class B Notes has started to be repaid.
Going forward, the Class A-1 Notes will continue to benefit from
the proceeds from future redemptions of any assets in the
collateral pool.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1,
A-2, A-3 and Class A-4 Notes announced on August 5, 2013. At that
time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes, increase in the
overcollateralization (OC) ratios, and improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolios.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in its rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $318 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $137 million, a weighted average
default probability of 21.84% (implying a WARF of 1064), Moody's
Asset Correlation of 18.0%, and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors that
are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of triggering an Event of
Default, recent deal performance under current market conditions,
the legal environment, and specific documentation features. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Preferred Term Securities XIII, Ltd., issued on March 17, 2004, is
a collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank
trust preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q2-2013.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 210 points from the
base case of 1064, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 Notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 190 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 Notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $27.5 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class A-4: 0

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +2

Class B-3: +2

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class A-4: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class B-3: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities.


PREFERRED TERM XXV: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Notes to 'Ca'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXV, Ltd.:

$482,600,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due June 22,
2037 (current balance of $311,699,482), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
previously on August 5, 2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade

$129,400,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due June 22,
2037 (current balance of $127,091,526), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
previously on August 5, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade

$61,400,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes due June 22,
2037 (current balance of $63,159,807), Upgraded to Ca (sf);
previously on June 24, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

$25,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes due June
22, 2037 (current balance of $29,511,453), Upgraded to Ca (sf);
previously on June 24, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of Class A-1 Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in October 2012.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 12% or $42 million since October 2012, due to
diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying assets. As a
result of this deleveraging, the Class A-1 Notes' par coverage
improved 164.6% from 143.9% since October 2012, as calculated by
Moody's. Based on the latest trustee report dated June 24, 2013,
the Senior Principal Coverage Ratio, Class B Mezzanine Principal,
Class C Mezzanine Principal Coverage Ratio and Class D Mezzanine
Principal Coverage Ratio are reported at 115.39% (limit 128%),
96.29% (limit 115%), 80.49% (limit 105%) and 73.55% (limit
100.3%), respectively, versus June 2012 levels of 108.97%, 91.48%,
76.89% and 70.47%, respectively. Going forward, the Class A-1
Notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the proceeds from future redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool.

Moody's also notes that the deal suffers from a deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) increased
to 1198 compared to 953 as of October 2012.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1
Note and Class A-2 Notes announced on August 5, 2013. At that
time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes, increase in the
overcollateralization (OC) ratios, and improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolios.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in its rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $510.4 million, defaulted/deferring par of
$257 million, a weighted average default probability of 26.15%
(implying a WARF of 1198), Moody's Asset Correlation of 14.98%,
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 7.3%. In
addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Preferred Term Securities XXV, Ltd., issued on March 22, 2007, is
a collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks and insurance companies that are generally not publicly
rated by Moody's. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS
without public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive their credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data reported
as of Q2-2013. For insurance TruPS without public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of Moody's Insurance team based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual
statutory financial reports.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 140 points from the
base case of 1198, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 Notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 110 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 Notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $49 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +2

Class A-2: +2

Class B-1: +3

Class B-2: +3

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class B-1: +1

Class B-2: +1

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities. Moody's continues to have a stable outlook
in the insurance sector.



RALI TRUST: Moody's Takes Action on $1BB RMBS Issued 2006 to 2007
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of eleven
tranches from eight transactions backed by Option ARM loans,
issued by Residential Accredit Loans, Inc.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RALI Series 2006-QO10 Trust

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: RALI Series 2006-QO4 Trust

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: RALI Series 2006-QO5 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: RALI Series 2006-QO8 Trust

Cl. I-A2A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: RALI Series 2006-QO9 Trust

Cl. I-A2A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: RALI Series 2007-QO1 Trust

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: RALI Series 2007-QO3 Trust

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: RALI Series 2007-QO4 Trust

Cl. A-1-a, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

The actions reflect the correction of errors in the Structured
Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by Moody's in
rating these transactions, specifically in how the models handle
interest allocation for these transactions. The cash flow models
used in past rating actions used a separate interest waterfall.
However, the pooling and servicing agreements for these
transactions provide that all collected principal and interest is
commingled into one payment waterfall to first pay all promised
interest due on bonds , and then pay scheduled principal. Due to
the discovery of these errors, eleven tranches were placed on
watch on May 14, 2013. The errors have now been corrected, and
these rating actions reflect these changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


ROCK 2001-C1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class X2 Notes to 'Caa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms one, upgrades one and downgrades
one CMBS classes of ROCK 2001-C1, Series 2001-C1 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. K, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. X2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of the one P&I class is due to increased credit
support due to amortization and payoffs. The deal has paid down
89% since Moody's last review and 99% since securitization.
Interest shortfall risk remains at this class.

The affirmation of the one P&I class is due to the rating being
consistent with Moody's expected losses.

The interest-only class, Class X-2, is downgraded based on the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of its referenced classes
and the significant paydowns of highly rated classes.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.2% of the current balance, compared to 32.0% at last review.
Moody's base expected plus cumulative realized losses is now 2.8%
of the original, securitized pool compared to 4.0% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 5 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $8.0 million
from $908.2 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 4 mortgage loans ranging in size from 12% to 50%
of the pool.

There are currently no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.
The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $25.5 million (27% loss severity).
There are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 100% and 25% of the pool respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV is 64% compared to 66% at last
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 13% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.23X and 1.97X,
respectively, compared to 1.21X and 1.81X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 89% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the Stone Creek Apartments Loan ($4.0
million -- 50% of the pool), which is secured by a 132-unit
apartment complex located five miles south of the Dayton CBD. The
property was 92% leased as of June 2013, compared to 86% at last
review. The borrower was having issues refinancing as there was an
erosion issue at the property. The asset manager has now confirmed
that the erosion issue has been resolved with the construction of
a new retaining wall. The property is currently under contract
concerning a possible sale, planning to close around October 18,
2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 91% and 1.07X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Villa Del Lago Apartments
Loan ($1.6 million -- 21% of the pool), which is secured by a 216-
unit multifamily property located in Shreveport, Louisiana. The
property was 92% leased as of June 2013, compared to 93% at last
review. This loan benefits from full amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 35% and 2.78X, respectively, compared to 38% and
2.58X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Staples Loan ($1.4 million
-- 18% of the pool), which is secured by retail property located
in Middletown, Rhode Island. This property is 100% occupied by
Staples, with a Moody's rating of Baa2 and a lease expiration on
November 1, 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 53% and 2.26X,
respectively, compared to 52% and 2.31X at last review.


SAGAMORE CLO: Moody's Hikes $3MM Class D Junior Notes to 'Caa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Sagamore CLO, Ltd.:

$16,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Note Rights Due
2015 (current outstanding balance of $15,559,877.07), Upgraded to
A1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Note Rights Due 2015
(current outstanding balance of $486,246.16), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

$3,000,000 Class D Junior Mezzanine Deferrable Note Rights Due
2015; Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on February 12, 2013
Upgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization (OC) ratios since early 2013.
However, Moody's indicated that the upgrades are tempered by
concerns over a persistent and growing concentration in assets
that mature after the maturity of the notes and increasing
exposures to single large obligors.

Moody's also announced that it has concluded its review of its
ratings on the issuer's Class C-1 Notes and Class C-2 Notes
announced on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's said that it had
upgraded and placed certain of the issuer's ratings on review
primarily as a result of substantial deleveraging of the senior
notes and increases in OC ratios resulting from high rates of loan
collateral prepayments during the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes, Class A-2 Notes, Class A-3
Notes and Class B Notes have been paid in full and that the Class
C-1 Notes and Class C-2 Notes have paid down by 2.75% or
$440,122.93 and $13,753.84, respectively since the beginning of
2013. Based on the latest trustee report dated August 7, 2013, the
Class C OC ratio is reported at 177.5%, versus the January 2013
level of 118.5%.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes, many of which are in CLO tranches with
speculative-grade ratings and limited liquidity. Based on Moody's
calculation, securities that mature after the maturity date of the
notes currently make up approximately $14.7 million or 56.8% of
the underlying portfolio, including $10.5 million or 40.7% of CLO
tranches. These investments potentially expose the notes to market
risk in the event of their liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity, or default risk in the event that they are unable to be
sold for cash on or before the notes' maturity. In consideration
of the concentration in such assets relative to the remaining
outstanding balance of the Class D Notes, Moody's views the Class
D Notes to be particularly sensitive to such risks.

In analyzing the Class D Notes, Moody's observed that the Class D
Notes are structurally subordinated in the priority of payments,
with the notes paid pro rata with the Class 1 Preference Shares
after certain uncapped expenses are paid. According to Moody's,
this feature increases the possibility of interest and principal
shortfalls arising with respect to the Class D Notes.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's examined the
underlying portfolio using a double-binomial analysis that assumes
two pools: one pool consisting of "long-dated" CLO securities,
with a performing par balance of $10.5 million, and another pool
consisting of corporate loans with a performing par balance of
$15.3 million. Moody's also assumed a principal proceeds balance
of $1.3 million and defaulted par of $6.0 million. The corporate
loan pool is assumed to have an overall weighted average default
probability of 12.6% (implying a WARF of 3164), an overall
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.7%, and a
diversity score of 9. The CLO securities pool is assumed to have
an overall weighted average default probability of 6.9% (implying
a WARF of 2306), an overall weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 25.0%, and to be highly correlated, with an effective
diversity score of 1. After any modeled defaults, the long-dated
CLO pool is assumed to be liquidated at the maturity of the deal
at an average assumed net liquidation price of 25.0% of par. The
default and recovery properties of the collateral pools are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis and the corporate loan
pool is subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probabilities are
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Sagamore CLO, Ltd., issued in October 2003, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans and CLO securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013. In
addition, due to the low diversity of the collateral pool, CDOROM
2.8-9 was used to simulate a default distribution that was then
applied as an input in the cash flow model.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months, which
represent approximately 1.9% of the collateral pool. Additionally,
for each CE where the related exposure constitutes more than 3.0%
of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch equivalent
assumed downgrade. This adjustment was applied to approximately
6.8% of the pool.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2531)

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3797)

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -2

Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes a loan asset's terminal value
upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
current market value. For CLO assets, Moody's assumes a terminal
value upon liquidation at maturity of each asset to be its
recovery rate. Exposure to long-dated assets with limited
liquidity (such as speculative-grade CLO securities) may also
introduce payment default risk to the extent that the issuer is
unable to sell them for cash on or before the CLO's legal
maturity.

4) Issuer concentration: 34.8% of the portfolio comprises assets
by three large obligors which poses concentration risk to the
deal. The performance of the portfolio will be significantly
impacted should any of these large issuers default or suffer
deterioration in credit quality.


SALOMON BROTHERS 2001-C1: S&P Ups Rating on Cl. H Certs to 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the Class
H commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Salomon
Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust's Series 2001-C1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction to
'B- (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The upgrade follows S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of all of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The raised rating on the Class H certificates reflects Standard &
Poor's expected credit enhancement for this class, which S&P
believes is greater than its most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the respective rating level.  The raised
rating also reflects S&P's view regarding available liquidity
support and the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral.

While the available credit enhancement level (reported at 20.74%
according to the Aug. 19, 2013, remittance report) may suggest
further positive rating movement on Class H, S&P's analysis also
considered the reduced liquidity support due to the subordinate
Class J certificates incurring principal losses of $17.2 million
(90.5% of its original certificate balance), historical interest
shortfalls, as well as single-tenant exposure on the largest loan
in the pool, the Best Buy - Jacksonville loan ($3.9 million,
45.1%).

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted Standard & Poor's debt service coverage (DSC) ratio of
1.40x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 40.0% for the seven
remaining loans in the pool.

As of the Aug. 19, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $8.7 million, down from
$952.7 million at issuance.  The pool comprises seven loans, down
from 183 loans at issuance.  To date, the transaction has
experienced losses totaling $62.5 million (6.6% of the
transaction's original certificate balance). The master servicer,
Midland Loan Services (Midland), reported one loan ($2.8 million,
32.6%) on its watchlist, which S&P discusses below.  There are
currently no loans reported in special servicing.

                   TWO LARGEST REMAINING LOANS

The Best Buy - Jacksonville loan ($3.9 million, 45.1%) is the
largest remaining loan in the trust.  The loan is secured by a
45,914-sq.-ft. retail building located in Jacksonville, Fla., and
is 100% leased and occupied by a Best Buy store with a lease
expiration of Feb. 10, 2020.  The loan has a final maturity of
March 1, 2015.

The Hilby Station Apartments loan ($2.8 million, 32.6%) is the
second-largest remaining loan in the trust.  The loan is secured
by a 117-unit apartment complex located in Spokane, Wash.
According to a servicer-provided rent roll dated April 30, 2013,
116 of the 117 units are leased and occupied.  The loan has a
final maturity of April 1, 2021.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


SALOMON BROTHERS 2001-C2: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class J Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+ (sf)' rating
on the Class J commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust's Series 2001-C2, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmation follows S&P's analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of all the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for the Class J certificates will be within its
estimated necessary credit enhancement requirement for the current
outstanding rating.  S&P also affirmed its rating on the class to
reflect the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining assets as well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on Class J, S&P affirmed its rating on this class
because of the available liquidity support and the potential for
additional interest shortfalls from the specially serviced assets.
Specifically, S&P considered the potential for the Holiday Inn
Asheville Airport loan to be deemed non-recoverable.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted Standard & Poor's debt service coverage (DSC) ratio of
1.02x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 20.5% for the Stanley
Court Apartments loan ($0.4 million, 2.2%).  S&P excluded the four
specially serviced assets ($11.1 million, 60.2%) and two defeased
loans ($6.9 million, 37.6%) from the calculation.

As of the Aug. 13, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $18.4 million, down from
$877.6 million at issuance.  To date, the transaction has
experienced losses totaling $43.8 million (5.0% of the
transaction's original certificate balance).  The special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital), has
indicated that the Sunrise Trade Center asset has since been sold
at auction for $4.45 million, resulting in additional losses that
will be reflected in the September trustee remittance report.
Excluding the Sunrise Trade Center asset, the pool comprises six
loans, down from 139 loans at issuance.  There are no loans on
the master servicer's watchlist.

As of the Aug. 13, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced $52,888 in monthly interest shortfalls related to
interest not advanced of $16,904, an appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction (ASER) of $12,475, and the application of
$23,464 in interest received to principal.  The interest
shortfalls affected only Class K, which we previously downgraded
to 'D (sf)'.

                    SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

The Aug. 13, 2013, trustee remittance report reported four assets
($11.1 million, 60.2%) with the special servicer, CWCapital.
Details of the four loans are below:

The Sunrise Trade Center asset ($4.8 million, 26.2%), the largest
asset with CWCapital, is secured by a 71,749-sq.-ft. retail
property in Rancho Cordova, Calif.  The loan transferred to
special servicing on Sept. 29, 2011, because of maturity default
and became REO on April 9, 2012, via a foreclosure sale.
According to the special servicer, the property was sold on
Sept. 4, 2013, for $4.45 million.

The Holiday Inn Asheville Airport loan ($3.7 million, 20.0%), the
second-largest asset with CWCapital, is secured by a 150-room
Clarion hotel, in Fletcher, N.C.  The nonperforming matured
balloon loan has a reported total exposure of $5.0 million.  The
loan transferred to the special servicer on June 25, 2010, because
the borrower executed an unauthorized franchise change that
resulted in an event of default.  The loan has remained with the
special servicer since the initial transfer and had a maturity
date of Aug. 1, 2011.  According to CWCapital, a receiver was
appointed on Sept. 19, 2011, and foreclosure is in process.
CWCapital indicated that the property achieved 42% occupancy and a
$69.90 average daily rate for the trailing 12 months ending
June 2013.  S&P expects a significant loss upon this asset's
eventual resolution, which is considered to be a loss greater than
60% of the outstanding principal balance.

The Park 2000 - Building K asset ($1.6 million, 8.6%) is secured
by a 33,806 sq. ft. industrial flex building in Las Vegas, Nev.
The loan transferred to special servicing on April 26, 2011,
because of imminent maturity default and became REO on Feb. 27,
2012, via a foreclosure sale.  According to CWCapital, the
property is 60% occupied as of Aug. 1, 2013, and is currently
being marketed for sale.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this
asset's eventual resolution, which is considered to be a loss
between 26% and 59% of the outstanding principal balance.

The Park 2000 - Building H asset ($1.0 million, 5.5%) is secured
by a 16,748 sq. ft. industrial flex building in Las Vegas, Nev.
The loan transferred to special servicing on April 26, 2011,
because of imminent maturity default and became REO on Feb. 27,
2012, via a foreclosure sale.  According to CWCapital, the
property was 67% occupied as of Aug. 1, 2013, and is currently
being marketed for sale.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this
asset's eventual resolution.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AFFIRMED

Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates Series 2001-C2

Class          Rating       Credit enhancement (%)
J              B+ (sf)                       55.81


SATURNS SEARS 2003-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on $47MM Secs. to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the
following units issued by SATURNS Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp.
Debenture Backed Series 2003-1:

$46,808,075 of 7.25% Callable Units due June 1, 2032; Downgraded
to Caa2; previously on January 5, 2012 Downgraded to Caa1

Ratings Rationale:

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.00% Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. debentures due
June 1, 2032, which were downgraded to Caa2 by Moody's on
September 17, 2013.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the rating on the
certificate.


SCHOONER TRUST 2004-CCF1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on 2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms six, upgrades seven classes of
Schooner Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-CCF1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. IO-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IO-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the three investment grade P&I classes are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement level for the affirmed class is
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The affirmation of
the one below investment grade P&I class is due to the rating
being consistent with Moody's expected losses.

The upgrades of seven P&I classes are due to increased credit
support due to amortization and payoffs as well as anticipated
paydowns from defeased loans and other loans approaching maturity
that are well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by
32% since Moody's last review. The entire pool matures by the end
of 2013.

The affirmations of the interest-only classes, Classes IO-1 and
IO-2, are due to the rating being consistent with the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of their referenced classes.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.2% of the current balance, compared to 2.5% at last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized loss is now 0.9%,
compared to 1.8% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12 compared to 17 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 64% to $170.5
million from $474.0 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 32 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool. Eight loans representing 17% of the
pool have defeased and are secured by Canadian Government
securities.

Eight loans, representing 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.1 million (24% loss severity). There
are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 96% and 83% of the performing pool
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 59% compared to 62% at last
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 12% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.66X and 1.92X,
respectively, compared to 1.60X and 1.83X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 33% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Fortis Portfolio Loan ($22.1 million -- 13% of
the pool), which is secured by four Holiday Inn hotels located in
multiple cities in southern Ontario. The loan is amortizing on a
264-month schedule maturing in November 2013. The loan has paid
down 26% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
64% and 1.90X, respectively, compared to 54% and 2.23X at review.

The second largest loan is the Cherry Lane Shopping Centre Loan
($20.7 million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by a 269,716
SF anchored retail center located in Penticton, BC. The loan is
amortizing on a 300-month schedule maturing in December 2013. The
loan has paid down 23% since securitization. The loan is on the
watchlist for the largest tenant, The Bay (35% of the NRA), with a
lease expiration in June 2013, however, they have extended their
lease to June 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 50% and
2.17X, respectively, compared to 51% and 2.12X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Merivale Place Loan ($13.7 million -
- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 157,657 SF shopping mall
located in Ontario. The property was 100% leased as of January
2012, the same as of January 2011. Performance has been steadily
improving over the past three years. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 51% and 2.12X, respectively, compared to 55% and 1.96X at last
review.


SHELLPOINT ASSET: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class B-4 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Shellpoint Asset Funding Trust 2013-2 $302.772 million
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-2.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by first-lien residential mortgage loans
secured by one- to four-family residential properties,
condominiums, and planned unit developments.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 12,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The high-quality collateral included in the pool; and

   -- The credit enhancement provided and the associated
      structural deal mechanics.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1802.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Shellpoint Asset Funding Trust 2013-2


Class       Rating       Amount    Expected interest
                       (mil. $)          rate (%)(i)
A           AAA (sf)    284.254                 3.50
A-IO        AAA (sf)       (ii)                (iii)
B-1         AA (sf)       8.025              Net WAC
B-2         A (sf)        4.321              Net WAC
B-3         BBB (sf)      3.086              Net WAC
B-4         BB (sf)       3.086              Net WAC
B-5         NR            5.865              Net WAC

   (i) The certificates are subject to a net WAC cap.
  (ii) The notional amount for class A-IO will equal the class A
       outstanding balance.
(iii) Equal to the excess, if any, of the net WAC over 3.50.
   NR - Not rated.
   WAC - Weighted average coupon.


SECURITY NATIONAL 2002-2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 RMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches, Class A-3 and Class M-1 from Security National Mortgage
Loan Trust 2002-2. In addition, the Class A-3 was placed on watch
for further downgrade. The transaction is backed by Scratch and
Dent RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on May 7, 2009 Downgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The action is a result of the $8.0 million of losses that have
written down the balance of Class M1 and 50% of Class A-3 balance
in August 26, 2013.

The servicer stated that these losses are the result of the sale
of certain delinquent and current loans as well as advances
recoupment by the servicer. Class A-3 was placed on watch for
downgrade as Moody's seeks further clarification from the servicer
on future repurchases on the collateral. Moody's plans to take
final action once it receives further details.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.


SORIN REAL IV: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of nine classes
of notes issued by Sorin Real Estate CDO IV Ltd. The affirmations
are due to key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation and collateralized loan
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2012 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2012 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Sorin Real Estate CDO IV Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed
by a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(40.6% of the pool balance); ii) B-note debt and rake bonds
(39.2%); iii) whole loans and senior participations (17.8%); and
iv) CRE CDO bonds (2.4%). As of the July 29, 2013 payment date,
the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including income
notes, has decreased to $249.6 million from $400.0 million at
issuance, as a result of the paydown directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes from the combination of principal
repayment of collateral, resolution and sales of defaulted
collateral, and the failing of certain par value tests.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3,646
compared to 3,922 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (4.5% compared to 16.1% at last
review), A1-A3 (7.2% compared to 5.6% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(12.6% compared to 9.8% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (19.0% compared
to 12.1% at last review), B1-B3 (7.8% compared to 6.0% at last
review), and Caa1-Ca/C (48.9% compared to 50.4% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.4 years compared to 3.0 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 21.9% compared to 27.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 19.9% compared to 11.2% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 21.9% to 11.9% or up to 31.9% would result in rating
movements on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward or 0 to
2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


SUMMIT LAKE: Moody's Confirms $14.5MM Ba2 Rating on B-2L Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Summit Lake CLO Ltd.:

$15,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2018,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to A2
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Moody's confirmed the rating of the following notes:

$14,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $13,948,395), Confirmed at Ba2
(sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$35,520,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $34,710,776), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on January 28, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$44,880,000 Class A-1LR Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due February
24, 2018 (current outstanding balance of $8,677,694), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on January 28, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$16,500,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 28, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf);

$18,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in January 2013. Moody's notes that the Class
A1-LA Notes have been paid off and Class A-1LR Notes have been
paid down by approximately 70% or $20 million since the last
rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated August 15,
2013, the Senior Class, Class A, Class B-1L and Class B-2L
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 179.67%, 144.38%,
123.49% and 109.27%, respectively, versus December 2012 levels of
137.16%, 123.27%, 113.39% and 105.75%, respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
slightly since the last rating action. Based on the August 2013
trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2736 compared to 2693 in December 2012.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class B-1L
Notes and Class B-2L Notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that
time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC ratios
resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments during
the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $118.2 million, defaulted par of $2.6 million,
a weighted average default probability of 17.70% (implying a WARF
of 2939), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.07%,
and a diversity score of 32. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Summit Lake CLO Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2351)

Class A1-LB: 0

Class A-1LR: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3526)

Class A1-LB: 0

Class A-1LR: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


SYMPHONY CLO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $14MM Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Symphony CLO II, Ltd.:

$51,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$33,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf); and

$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to A3 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$40,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Revolving Notes Due 2020, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$205,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on December 27, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf);

$16,600,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020, Affirmed
Ba1 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
and

$14,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020, Affirmed
Ba3 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and the benefit of the short period of time remaining
before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2013.
Based on the latest trustee report dated August 16, 2013, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2456 compared to 2773
in August 2012. In addition, considering the reinvestment
restrictions applicable during the amortization period, and
therefore limited ability to effect significant changes to the
current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a
higher likelihood that the collateral pool characteristics will
continue to maintain a positive buffer relative to certain
covenant requirements. In particular, the deal is assumed to
benefit from a higher weighted average recovery rate (WARR) and
higher weighted average spread (WAS) compared to the last rating
review. Moody's modeled a WARR of 49.93% and a WAS of 3.49%.
Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
overcollateralization ratios are stable.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $405 million, defaulted par of $4 million, a
weighted average default probability of 18.82% (implying a WARF of
2571), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.93%,
and a diversity score of 55. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Symphony CLO II, Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2057)

Class A1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A3: +1

Class B: +2

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3085)

Class A1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: -1

Class A3: -3

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.


TRIMARAN CLO IV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Trimaran CLO IV:

$16,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due December 1, 2017,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on January 22, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf);

$15,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December 1, 2017,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on January 22, 2013 Upgraded to A3
(sf);

$16,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December 1, 2017,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on January 22, 2013 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$258,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December 1, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $82,373,789), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on January 22, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$25,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December 1, 2017,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 22, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the last rating action in January 2013. Moody's notes that the
Class A-1L Notes have been paid down by approximately 53% or $93.6
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated August 21, 2013, the Senior Class A, Class A, Class
B-1L and Class B-2L overcollateralization ratios are reported at
154.3%, 136.3%, 122.8% and 111.1%, respectively, versus December
2012 levels of 133.6%, 123.8%, 115.8% and 108.3%, respectively. In
addition, the trustee reported weighted average recovery rate
increased to 53.43% from 51.02% over the same time period.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Moody's notes that the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated since the
last rating action. Based on the August 2013 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2624 compared to 2481
in December 2012.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $170 million, defaulted par of $6 million, a
weighted average default probability of 16.6% (implying a WARF of
2751), a weighted average spread of 3.42%, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 53.1%, and a diversity score of 25.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Trimaran CLO IV, issued in September 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2201)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3302)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -1

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C32: S&P Cuts Ratings on Cl. E & F Certs to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on the class E and F commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-C32, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 11 other classes.

S&P's rating actions reflects its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

"We lowered our ratings on the class E and F certificates to
'D (sf)' because we believe the accumulated interest shortfalls
will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  As of the
Aug. 16, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls totaling $1.5 million, primarily
related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts of
$689,741 on nine ($338.5 million, 11.3%) of the 16 specially
serviced assets ($551.4 million, 18.5%), shortfalls of $435,514
because of deferred interest on three modified loans
($220.2 million, 7.4%), nonrecoverable interest of $229,341,
special servicing fees of $118,872, and workout fees of $10,206,"
S&P said.

"The affirmations of our ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect our expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within our estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmations  also reflect our review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets as well as
the transaction-level changes," S&P added.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class IO interest-only
(IO) certificates based on our criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C32
            Rating
Class   To           From           Credit enhancement (%)
E       D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                        9.68
F       D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                        8.40

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C32

Class      Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-2        AAA (sf)                  35.94
A-PB       AAA (sf)                  35.94
A-3        BBB- (sf)                 35.94
A-4FL      BBB- (sf)                 35.94
A-1A       BBB- (sf)                 35.94
A-MFL      B (sf)                    23.13
A-J        B- (sf)                   14.65
B          CCC+ (sf)                 13.21
C          CCC- (sf)                 11.61
D          CCC- (sf)                 10.65
IO         AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


WASATCH CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Wasatch CLO Ltd.

$60,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022
(current outstanding balance of $59,235,976), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$429,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 (current outstanding balance of $423,537,229), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$24,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to A1
(sf);

$42,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 22, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1(sf);

$29,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on August 22, 2011
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

$13,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf);

$7,400,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2022 (current rated balance
of $1,747,721.63), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 22,
2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

$10,000,000 Type III Composite Notes due 2022 (current rated
balance of $558,208), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on August
22, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, higher spread and diversity
levels compared to the covenant levels. Moody's also notes that
the transaction's reported collateral quality and
overcollateralization ratio are stable since the last rating
action.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $625 million, defaulted par of $11 million, a
weighted average default probability of 21.84% (implying a WARF of
2787) a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.71% and
a diversity score of 88. The default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Wasatch CLO Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Composite Notes was
"Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes"
published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal
(sensitivities for the Composite Notes are omitted because Moody's
views the qualitative considerations relating to the Composite
Notes to be a relatively more significant driver of its rating
opinions than changes in default probability):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2230)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +2

Class C: +1

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3344)

Class A-1a: -1

Class A-1b: -1

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


WELLS FARGO 2010-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Wells Fargo Bank
N.A.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2010-
C1.

Key Rating Drivers

Affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance since
issuance. Since issuance, there have been no loans in special
servicing. As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 4% to $706.2
million from $735.9 million at issuance. Per the servicer
reporting, one loan (0.9% of the pool) is defeased. While the
performance of the Top 15 is generally stable, Fitch has
designated two loans (6.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs).

The largest FLOC (4.9% of the pool) is the First Tennessee Plaza
and Cedar Ridge loan, which is secured by two office properties
(549,947 square feet) located in Knoxville, TN. As of March 2013,
the portfolio is 80.3% leased compared to 90.8% at issuance. The
decline is due to tenant vacancies prior to their scheduled lease
expirations in 2012. The current balance of the tenant reserve is
$849,030.

The other FLOC (1.1% of the pool) is secured by a 115-unit student
housing complex, located near Western Michigan University in
Kalamazoo, Michigan. As of year- end 2012, the property is 90.2%
leased compared to 94% at issuance. Debt Service Coverage Ratio
(DSCR) has shown a downward trend for the past two years, at a
reported 0.90x at year-end 2012 compared to 1.15x the previous
year. Occupancy has experienced downward pressure due to new
competition in the local student housing market. The current
balance of the capital improvement reserve is $77,032.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through F remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown. Additional
information on rating sensitivity is available in the report
'Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2010-C1' (Nov. 22, 2010),
available at www.fitchratings.com.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $132.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $443.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $575.6 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31.3 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.8 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

(*) interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $16,557,805 class G certificates or the
$130,617,805 interest only class X-B.


WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-LC5 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, series 2012-LC5.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. The pool has had no specially serviced
or delinquent loans since issuance. The pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 0.9% to $1.27 billion from $1.28
billion.

The servicer has placed the fourth largest loan, 100 Church Street
(6.3% of the pool, a New York City office property on its watch
list. The loan is nearing completion of a $22 million renovation
including a complete upgrade of the lobby and other capital
improvements. At issuance, the property was 84% occupied with a
1.33x DSCR. The servicer reported YE 2012 DSCR declined to 1.05x
as a result of concessions and contractual rent bumps that did not
yet take effect. The latest reported DSCR as of June 2013
increased to 1.41x.

The largest loan in the pool, Westside Pavillion (12.1%) is
secured by a 755,448 sf, three-level urban mall, 535,448 sf of
which serves as the collateral for the loan. The property is
located in Los Angeles, CA and anchored by Macy's (noncollateral),
Macy's Home, Nordstrom, and Landmark Theatres. As of YE (Year End)
2012, the subject was 98% occupied with a 1.76x NOI DSCR.
Occupancy is in-line with issuer underwriting while NOI is
performing ahead of expectations.

Rating Sensitivity

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through F and interest only
classes X-A and X-B remain Stable. Due to the recent issuance of
the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic
or asset level event changes the transaction's overall portfolio-
level metrics. Additional information on rating sensitivity is
available in the 'Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-LC5'
(Oct. 17, 2012) New Issue report, available at
www.fitchratings.com.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $69.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $156.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $556.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1, 005,830,596* Class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $118,138,000* Class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $124.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76.6 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.8 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.

A comparison of the transaction's Representations, Warranties, and
Enforcement (RW&E) mechanisms to those of typical RW&Es for the
asset class is available in the following report:

-- 'Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-LC5 -- Appendix'
   (Oct. 17, 2012).


* Fitch: Bank TruPS CDOs Combined Default & Deferral Rate Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
According to the latest index results published by Fitch Ratings,
the number of combined defaults and deferrals for U.S. bank TruPS
CDOs has remained stable at 27.7% at the end of August.

In August, one deferring bank representing $10 million of
collateral cured and subsequently redeemed as the result of an
acquisition. Only one new bank representing $10 million of
collateral in one CDO defaulted during the month. There were no
new deferrals.

Year-to-date, there have been 10 new deferrals and defaults
compared to 36 over a comparable period last year. Cures continue
to trend higher, with 44 cures year to date compared to 29 last
year.

Across 79 TruPS CDOs, 221 bank issuers have defaulted and remain
in the portfolio, representing approximately $6.4 billion.
Additionally, 291 issuers are currently deferring interest
payments on $4 billion of collateral. This compares to 358
deferring issuers totaling $5.3 billion of collateral at this time
a year ago.


* Fitch: US Timeshare ABS Delinquencies Dips to Lowest in 5 Years
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Quarterly U.S. timeshare ABS delinquencies fell to the lowest
level since 2007, according to the latest index results from Fitch
Ratings.

Total delinquencies for second quarter-2013 (2Q'13) were 3.05%,
down from 3.27% in 1Q'13 and 3.29% in 2Q'12. Delinquencies have
largely normalized at their historical levels following the
dramatic increases of 2008 and 2009.

Defaults for 2Q'13 remained consistent with 1Q'13, finishing at
0.72%. However, they are down from the 0.82% observed at the same
time last year. That said, defaults remain elevated from pre-
recessionary levels. Some of the recent improvement is attributed
to slight shifts in the composition of the index. Transactions
from issuers with lower historical delinquency and default rates
were added in 2012.

Fitch's Rating Outlook for timeshare ABS remains Stable due in
part to the delevering structures found in timeshare transactions
and ample credit enhancement levels.

Fitch's timeshare ABS index is an aggregation of performance
statistics on pools of securitized timeshare loans originated by
various developers. Expected cumulative gross defaults on
underlying transactions can range from 10% to above 20%. While
delinquencies and defaults may vary on an absolute basis, most
transactions supporting the index exhibit similar overall trends.

The Fitch timeshare performance index summarizes average monthly
delinquency (over 30 days) and gross default trends tracked in
Fitch's database of timeshare asset backed securities (ABS) dating
back to January 1997 and is available on a quarterly basis.


* Fitch Notes Tame August for U.S. CMBS Delinquencies
-----------------------------------------------------
The U.S. CMBS delinquency rate fell at a calmer pace last month
following a record drop in July, though monthly late-pays may be
in store for another healthy drop in the next month or two,
according to the latest index results from Fitch Ratings.

CMBS late-pays fell 10 basis points (bps) in August to 6.68% from
6.78% a month earlier. This comes after plunging 40 bps from June
to July. Despite the modest drop last month, Fitch's delinquency
rate is poised for another dip once an impending modification of
the $678 million Skyline Portfolio loan is finalized.

The Skyline Portfolio is spread across three CMBS transactions and
is backed by eight office buildings in Falls Church, VA totaling
roughly 2.5 million square feet. The loan transferred to special
servicing in March 2012 for imminent default. The sponsor,
Vornado, cited the Defense Base Realignment and Closure statute
(BRAC) as contributing to recent and upcoming vacancies at the
properties. Resolution of the Skyline loan in and of itself will
contribute to a 12-bp drop in Fitch's CMBS delinquency rate.
Skyline is currently the second largest delinquent loan in Fitch's
index, behind only Stuy Town.

Delinquency rates for all major property types fell last month,
led by hotels. Current and previous delinquency rates are as
follows:

-- Industrial: 9.41% (from 9.56% in July);
-- Hotel: 7.68% (from 8.04%);
-- Office: 7.56% (from 7.59%);
-- Multifamily: 7.30% (from 7.41%);
-- Retail: 6.23% (from 6.37%).


* Moody's Takes Action on $628MM of RMBS Issued 2005 to 2008
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 55
tranches, upgraded the ratings of six tranches and confirmed the
ratings of five tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued
by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-3 Trust

Cl. X-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-11, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-14, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-17, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-20, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-7

Cl. 1-A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-A1

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 8-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-4

Cl. IIIA-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-3

Cl. IA-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IA-15, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-8

Cl. IIA-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2006-1

Cl. IA-7, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. IVA-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5F

Cl. 3A-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 8A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 8A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 8A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A4

Cl. 3-A-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-A2

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: PHH Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-CIM1

Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-3A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-3A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-4A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-4A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: PHH Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-CIM2

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2005-S5 Trust

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-2 Trust

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-7, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-16 Trust

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The downgrades reflect the exposure of the affected
bonds to tail risk due to the pro-rata pay nature of the
transaction. In addition, some downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance and/or structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for the bonds than previously anticipated.
The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and faster pay-down of the bonds due to high prepayments.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

Subject to the results of a stress scenario analysis, Moody's caps
the ratings of bonds exposed to tail-end risk to A3 (sf) or below,
unless the bonds are expected to pay off within a year or are
expected to pay off well before the underlying pool is expected to
be small pool (100 loans).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $206MM Housing Loans Issued 1995-2006
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 13 tranches
from eight transactions, backed by manufactured housing loans, and
issued between 1995 and 2006.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-MH1

Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Financial Capital Securitization LLC, Series
1997-I

Class M, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2009 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-04

B-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-05

B-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-10

B-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2009 Confirmed at
B3 (sf)

Issuer: Greenpoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 1999-5

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-1B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Associates Manufactured Housing 1997-2

M, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc. Series 1997-D

M, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2009 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The rating action consists of 13 upgrades. The upgrades are
primarily due to the build-up in credit enhancement due to
sequential pay structures and non-amortizing subordinate bonds.
Performance has remained generally stable from Moody's last
review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $378MM of RMBS from Lehman and IndyMac
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 18
tranches and upgraded the rating of one tranche from six
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Lehman and IndyMac.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR35

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-5

Cl. AX, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-7

Cl. 2-A7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-9

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-2

Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A10, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The rating actions reflect the change in principal and
loss allocation to certain senior bonds subsequent to credit
support depletion, and the level of undercollateralization of
bonds relative to their collateral.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $399MM RMBS Tranches from Five Issuers
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
tranches and confirmed the ratings of five tranches backed by
Subprime RMBS loans, issued by various trusts.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE3

Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2003-HE2

Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3A, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3C, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-OP1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT1

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT2

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating
performance or structural features resulting in higher expected
losses for the bonds than previously anticipated.

The rating actions also reflect the late recognition of losses
related to principal forbearance modifications that Homeward
undertook before July 2012 in these transactions. Homeward
Residential Inc. had serviced these transactions until Ocwen Loan
Servicing acquired Homeward in December 2012. Previously, on June
14, 2013, following Ocwen's announcement of the loss recognition,
Moody's had placed twelve of these tranches on review for
downgrade. These rating actions on the bonds concludes this
review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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