TCR_Public/130908.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

           Sunday, September 8, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 249


                            Headlines

AAMES MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $12MM of RMBS from 2 Deals
ACAS CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating on Class E Notes
ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. M-2 Tranche to 'Ca'
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
ARCAP 2003-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC+'

ARCAP 2004-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC'
ATRIUM IX: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-A: Moody's Ups Cl. 5-M-1 Debt Rating to Ca
BANC OF AMERICA 2006-I: Moody's Cuts Cl. 2-A-1 Debt Rating to Ba2
BBCMS 2013-TYSN: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to Class E CMBS

BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR8: Moody's Keeps C Rating on Cl. G Securities
BEAR STEARMS 2007-TOP26: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. A-J Secs.
BELHURST CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
BRAZOS STUDENT: Fitch Upgrades Series 2003 B-1 Rating From 'BB'
CD 2007-CD5: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes

CENTEX HOME 2004-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 RMBS Tranches
CHASE EDUCATION: Fitch Upgrades Subordinate Note Rating From 'BB'
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2008-C7: Moody's Cuts Cl. E Debt Rating to C
COMM 2004-LNB2: S&P Raises Rating on Class H Notes to 'B-'
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1999-C2: Moody's Cuts X Secs. Rating to Caa2

CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C4: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
CSMC TRUST 2013-7: DBRS Rates $5.8MM Cl. B-4 Certificates 'BB'
CSMC TRUST 2013-7: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B-3 Notes
DENALI CAPITAL CLO X: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
DLJ COMMERCIAL 2000-CF1: S&P Affirms CCC+ Rating on Cl. B-4 Notes

DRYDEN XVIII: Moody's Lowers Rating on $14MM Class B Notes to Ba3
DUCHESS III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'Ba1'
GALE FORCE 2: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes From 'BB'
GEM LIGOS III: Moody's Mulls Downgrade of Two EM CDO Note Classes
GLOBAL LEVERAGED I: Moody's Affrims B2 Rating on Cl. I Notes

GOLDMAN SACHS 2010-C2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 9 Debt Classes
GRAYSON CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on $31MM Class D Notes to 'B1'
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on X-C Debt to Caa1
GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR2: S&P Lowers Rating on A-2 & B Secs. to 'D'
GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: Moody's Keeps Ratings After Equity Transfer

GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: Moody's Rates Class G Certificates 'B3'
HALCYON LOAN 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
HIGHLAND PARK I: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Four Note Classes
HSBC HOME 2007-3: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Class M-2 Notes
I-PREFERRED TERM II: A.M. Best Hikes $26.20MM Notes Rating From B

IMPALA TRUST: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating to Class E Notes
ING IM CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC4: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. D Notes to Caa3
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Cert Classes
JP MORGAN 2006-S3: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 RMBS Tranches to Caa1

JP MORGAN 2012-C8: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. F Certificates
KANAWHA COUNTY: Moody's Rates Student Housing Revenue Bonds 'Ba1'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Cuts Rating on 4 Certs to 'C'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2003-C8: Moody's Cuts X-CL Notes Rating to Caa1
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2008-C1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Certs

LEAF RECEIVABLES 2011-1: DBRS Rates Class E-1 Securities 'BB'
LOOMIS SAYLES I: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2003-CANADA 10: Moody's Ups Cl. K Certs Rating to B1
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-WMC2: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 RMBS Classes
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-A6: Moody's Ups Cl. II-A-4 Debt Rating to Caa3

ML-CFC 2006-1: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'B(low)(sf)'
MORGAN STANLEY 1998-CF1: Moody's Hikes Cl. G Certs Rating to Caa3
MORGAN STANLEY 2000-F1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Note Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class K Certs to D
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: DBRS Cuts Rating on Cl. A-J Debt to 'BB'

N-STAR REAL VII: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
NORTHSTAR 2013-1: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to Class C Notes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL VII: Moody's Lifts Cl. E Notes Rating From Ba1
REAL ESTATE 2007-1: Moody's Keeps 'Caa2' Rating on Class L Certs
OCEAN TRAILS I: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' rating on Class D Notes

OCEAN TRAILS CLO IV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT XVII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
PEACHTREE FRANCHISE: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
SAN GABRIEL I: Moody's Affirms  1 Rating on Class B-2L Notes

SAYBROOK POINT: Moody's Hikes Rating on $252MM Cl. A Notes to Ba2
SCHOONER TRUST 2004-CF2: DBRS Hikes Cl. L Debt Rating to BB(high)
SLM STUDENT 2007-6: Fitch Ups Subordinate Note Rating From 'BB'
WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $721MM of 25 RMBS Tranches
WEST TRADE I: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 6 Note Classes to 'D'

WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C5: Moody's Keeps B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs

* Moody's Takes Action on $1.3 Billion of 70 RMBS-Backed Loans
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $834-Mil. of Suprime RMBS Deals
* Moody's Takes Action on $556-Mil. of 51 RMBS Tranches
* Moody's Takes Action on $223MM of 15 RMBS Tranches from 6 Deals
* Moody's Takes Action on 5 Alt-A RMBS-Backed Loans from 2 Issuers

* Moody's Takes Action on $215.6MM RMBS From 3 Issuers
* Moody's Lifts Ratings on $1.2BB of RMBS from Various Issuers


                            *********


AAMES MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $12MM of RMBS from 2 Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of one tranche
and upgraded the ratings of two tranches from two transactions,
backed by subprime mortgage loans, issued by Aames Mortgage Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-4

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2002-1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
In addition, the rating actions reflect correction of errors in
the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models
previously used by Moody's in rating these transactions.

For all of the transactions, the pooling and servicing agreements
state that principal and interest collections are commingled first
and then used to make payments on the bonds. However, the cash
flow models used in prior rating actions incorrectly applied
separate interest and principal waterfalls. Due to the discovery
of this error, three tranches issued by these transactions were
placed on watch on May 14, 2013. The errors have now been
corrected, and these rating actions reflect these changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


ACAS CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to ACAS CLO 2013-2 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-2 LLC's
$375.75 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 4,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable to the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which it
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2654%-12.8133%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds, that are
      available before paying uncapped administrative expenses and
      fees; subordinated hedge termination payments; collateral
      manager incentive fees; and subordinated note payments, to
      principal proceeds for additional collateral asset purchases
      during the reinvestment period.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1770.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

ACAS CLO 2013-2 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-2 LLC

Class                Rating                 Amount
                                          (mil. $)
A-1A                 AAA (sf)                99.00
A-1B                 AAA (sf)               140.00
A-1C                 AAA (sf)                10.00
A-2A                 AA (sf)                 43.75
A-2B                 AA (sf)                 10.00
B (deferrable)       A (sf)                  28.00
C (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                20.00
D (deferrable)       BB (sf)                 18.00
E (deferrable)       B (sf)                   7.00
Subordinated notes   NR                      38.45

NR--Not rated.


ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. M-2 Tranche to 'Ca'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche,
downgraded the ratings of two tranches, and confirmed the rating
of one tranche from three transactions, backed by subprime
mortgage loans, issued by various trusts.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
OP1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT3

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
7.6% in June 2012 to 8.2% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of its ongoing surveillance, Fitch Ratings affirms six and
revises the outlook on two classes of AmeriCredit Automobile
Receivables Trust 2012-4 transaction as follows:

-- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Positive from Stable;
-- Class C at 'Asf'; Outlook to Positive from Stable;
-- Class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The rating affirmations are based on available credit enhancement
and loss performance. The collateral pool continues to perform
within Fitch's expectations. Under the credit enhancement
structure, the securities are able to withstand stress scenarios
consistent with the current rating and make full payments to
investors in accordance with the terms of the documents.

The ratings reflect the quality of AmeriCredit Financial Services,
Inc.'s retail auto loan originations, the strength of its
servicing capabilities, and the sound financial and legal
structure of the transaction.

Rating Sensitivity

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected base case loss proxy and impact available loss coverage
and multiples levels for the transaction. Lower loss coverage
could impact ratings and Rating Outlooks, depending on the extent
of the decline in coverage.

In Fitch's initial review of the transaction, the notes were found
to have limited sensitivity to a 1.5x and 2.5x increase of Fitch's
base case loss expectation. To date, the transaction has exhibited
strong performance with losses within Fitch's initial expectations
with rising loss coverage and multiple levels consistent with the
current ratings. A material deterioration in performance would
have to occur within the asset pool to have potential negative
impact on the outstanding ratings.


ARCAP 2003-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust (ARCap 2003-1)
and the corresponding grantor trust certificates from the same
series.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'BB (sf)' ratings on the
class B notes and the corresponding class B grantor trust
certificates.  In addition, S&P withdrew its ratings on the class
A notes and the corresponding class A grantor trust certificates
following the full paydown of the class (see list).

The downgrades and affirmations reflect our analysis of the ARCap
2003-1 transaction's liability structure and the credit
characteristics of the underlying collateral using S&P's global
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of pooled structured
finance assets criteria.  The lowered ratings on the class C and D
notes and the corresponding grantor trust certificates reflect the
application of the largest-obligor test, which is part of the
criteria's supplemental stress test.  The largest-obligor default
test assesses the ability of a rated CDO of pooled structured
finance liability tranche to withstand the default of a minimum
number of the largest credit or obligor exposures within an asset
pool, factoring in the underlying assets' credit quality.  S&P
affirmed its rating on the class B notes and the corresponding
grantor trust certificates because it believes the class has
sufficient credit enhancement to support the current rating.

The downgrades also reflect the transaction's exposure to
underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) collateral
that has experienced negative rating actions.  The downgraded CMBS
collateral is from three transactions and totals $39.4 million
(32.4% of the total asset balance).  The lowered ratings on the
class C and D notes and the corresponding grantor trust
certificates reflect the combination of the downgraded collateral
and the largest-obligor default test.  S&P lowered its rating on
class E notes and the corresponding grantor trust certificates to
'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' because S&P determined that the class is
unlikely to be repaid in full.

According to the Aug. 21, 2013 trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $120.4 million, while the transaction's
liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled
$429.0 million.  This is up from $414.4 million in liabilities at
issuance.  The transaction's current asset pool includes CMBS
tranches from nine distinct transactions issued between 1999 and
2003 ($120.4 million, 100%). Of the underlying collateral,
$40.1 million (33.4%) are rated 'D (sf)' or has credit opinions of
'cc (sf)'.

S&P's analysis of ARCap 2003-1 reflected its exposure to the
following certificates that Standard & Poor's have lowered in
ratings or credit opinions:

   -- JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
      2002-CIBC5 (not rated) (classes J, K, and L; $22.6 million,
      18.8%);

   -- Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2001-PB1
      (classes M and N; $9.8 million, 8.1%); and

   -- Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-KEY2
      (class S; $7.0 million, 5.8%).

ARCap 2003-1 is a multi-tiered structure, which issued 10
individual rated notes and seven rated grantor trust certificates.
The class A through G notes were each repackaged into separate
newly formed individual grantor trusts, each of which issued
certificates.  Each note receives cash flow from the underlying
CMBS collateral, which is directly passed through to the
corresponding grantor trust certificates.  Accordingly, the
ratings on the grantor trust certificates are dependent on the
ratings on the corresponding notes.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include adescription of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations

            Rating      Rating
Class       To          From
C           CCC+ (sf)   B+ (sf)
D           CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)
E           D (sf)      CCC- (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class C
Grantor trust certificate

      Rating
To            From
CCC+ (sf)     B+ (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class D
Grantor trust certificate

      Rating
To            From
CCC- (sf)     CCC+ (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class E
Grantor trust certificate

      Rating
To            From
D (sf)        CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations

Class        Rating
B            BB (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class B
Grantor trust certificate

Rating
BB (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations

                Rating
Class       To          From
A           NR          BBB- (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class A
Grantor trust certificate

    Rating
To          From
NR          BBB- (sf)


ARCAP 2004-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust (ARCap 2004-1)
and three corresponding grantor trust certificates from
the same series.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
three other classes from the same transaction and the
corresponding grantor trust certificates.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the
ARCap 2004-1 transaction's liability structure and S&P's analysis
of the interest shortfalls affecting the transaction, as well as
the potential for increased interest shortfalls based on S&P's
analysis of the underlying collateral.  S&P affirmed its ratings
on the class A, B, and C notes and the corresponding grantor trust
certificates because S&P believes the classes have sufficient
credit enhancement to support the current ratings.

The downgrades also reflect the transaction's exposure to
underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) collateral
that has experienced negative rating actions.  The downgraded CMBS
collateral is from six CMBS transactions and totals $82.9 million
(45.9% of total asset balance).  S&P also considered the potential
for additional classes to experience interest shortfalls in the
future.  S&P lowered its ratings on the class F notes and the
corresponding grantor trust certificates to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' because S&P determined that this class is unlikely to
be repaid in full.

According to the Aug. 19, 2013 trustee report, ARCap 2004-1 is
collateralized by 43 CMBS classes ($180.5 million, 100%) from 10
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2004.  The
transaction's liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled
$342.9 million.  This is up from $340.9 million in liabilities at
issuance.  Of the underlying collateral, $30.3 million (16.8%) are
rated 'D (sf)' or has credit opinions of 'cc (sf)'.

S&P's analysis of ARCap 2004-1 reflected exposure to the following
certificates that Standard & Poor's have lowered in ratings or
credit opinions:

   -- Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11 (classes H, J, K,
      L, and M; $22.5 million, 12.5%);

   -- JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
      2003-CIBC6 (not rated) (classes K, L, M, and N;
      $18.2 million, 10.1%);

   -- JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
      2003-LN1 (classes K and L; $18.0 million, 10.0%); and

   -- Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 2004-TOP13 (not
      rated) (classes K, L, M, and N; $13.6 million, 7.5%).

According to the Aug. 19, 2013 remittance report, the transaction
has experienced cumulative interest shortfalls that total
$33.6 million, which affected the class E notes and all of the
classes subordinate to it.  The interest shortfalls affecting the
ARCap 2004-1 classes were due to interest shortfalls that affected
16 of the underlying CMBS transactions, which totaled $241,644 for
this reported period.

ARCap 2004-1 is a multi-tiered structure, which issued 10
individual rated notes and seven rated grantor trust certificates.
The class A through G notes were each repackaged into separate
newly formed individual grantor trusts, each of which issued
certificates.  Each note receives cash flow from the underlying
CMBS collateral, which is directly passed through to the
corresponding grantor trust certificates.  Accordingly, the
ratings on the grantor trust certificates are dependent on the
ratings on the corresponding notes.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations

              Rating
Class     To          From
D         CCC (sf)    B- (sf)
E         CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)
F         D (sf)      CCC- (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class D
Grantor trust certificate

    Rating
To          From
CCC (sf)    B- (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class E
Grantor trust certificate

    Rating
To          From
CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class F
Grantor trust certificate

    Rating
To          From
D (sf)      CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations

Class     Rating
A         BBB- (sf)
B         BB (sf)
C         B (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class A
Grantor trust certificate

Rating
BBB- (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class B
Grantor trust certificate

Rating
BB (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class C
Grantor trust certificate

Rating
B (sf)


ATRIUM IX: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Atrium
IX/Artium IX LLC's $747.75 million floating- and fixed-rate notes
following the transaction's effective date as of May 10, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P said

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Atrium IX/Artium IX LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     522.00
B1                         AA (sf)                       52.00
B2                         AA (sf)                       35.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        66.50
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      38.25
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       34.00


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-A: Moody's Ups Cl. 5-M-1 Debt Rating to Ca
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of eight
tranches and upgraded the ratings of four tranches in four
transactions backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Banc of America
Funding and Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-A Trust

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 5-M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-E

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR6

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. Grantor Trust A-1B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun
19, 2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR7

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. Grantor Trust A-1B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun
19, 2013 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of build-up in credit
enhancement on the bonds and stable performance of the underlying
pools. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance,
and reflect the exposure of the affected bonds to tail risk due to
the pro-rata pay nature of the transactions. The ratings of these
securities are being capped to A3 (sf) or below due to the tail
risk.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


BANC OF AMERICA 2006-I: Moody's Cuts Cl. 2-A-1 Debt Rating to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class 2-A-1
and confirmed the rating of Class 6-A-1 from Banc of America
Funding 2006-I Trust, backed by Prime jumbo loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-I Trust

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

The action reflects recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. These rating
actions consist of one downgrade and one confirmation. The
downgrade of Class 2-A-1 is due to higher expected losses on the
underlying pool than previously anticipated.

The actions also reflect the correction of an error in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow model used by
Moody's in rating this transaction, specifically in how the model
handles principal and interest allocation for this transaction.
The cash flow model used in past rating actions incorrectly used
separate interest and principal waterfalls. However, the pooling
and servicing agreement for this transaction provides that all
collected principal and interest is commingled into one payment
waterfall to pay all promised interest due on bonds first, and
then pay scheduled principal. Due to the discovery of this error,
a number of tranches were placed on watch on May 14, 2013. The
error has now been corrected, and these rating actions take into
account the correct interest and principal waterfall.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


BBCMS 2013-TYSN: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to Class E CMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
commercial mortgage backed securities, issued by BBCMS 2013-TYSN
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

* Interest-Only Class

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to one regional mall. The
borrower underlying the mortgage is a special-purpose entity
(SPE), Tysons Galleria LLC.

The ratings are based on the collateral and the structure of the
transaction.

Moody's rating approach for securities backed by a single loan
compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying property with
the credit protection offered by the structure. The structure's
credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum deterioration in
property value that the securities are able to withstand under
various stress scenarios without causing an increase in the
expected loss for various rating levels. In assigning single
borrower ratings, Moody's also considers a range of qualitative
issues as well as the transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The Tysons Galleria loan is secured by the Borrower's fee simple
and leasehold interest in 308,805 SF contained within a 820,738
SF, three-level regional mall anchored by Macy's (259,993SF),
Nieman Marcus (132,000 SF) and Saks Fifth Avenue (120,000). All
three anchors own their respective space. The Property is located
just off the I-495 Beltway in McLean, VA which is approximately 17
miles west of Washington, DC. Other notable national tenants in
occupancy include Chanel, Gucci, Burberry, Louis Vuitton, Versace,
Hugo Boss, Tory Burch, Emporio Armani, Ralph Lauren, Henri Bendel,
Yves Sant Laurent, Bally, Salvatore Ferragamo, Bottega Veneta and
Michael Kors. Additionally, the Property offers a significant
restaurant and entertainment component with tenants such as The
Cheesecake Factory, Maggiano's Little Italy, P.F. Chang's China
Bistro, Legal Seafood and Wildfire. The Property was constructed
in 1988 and is in excellent condition. As of June 2013, the
Property, including non-collateral space, was 96.9% occupied by 90
tenants.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two
factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely
driven by the LTV of the underlying loan.

Moody's Trust LTV Ratio of 84.2% is in-line with other fixed-rate
single-property loans that have previously been assigned an
underlying rating of Ba2.

The Moody's Trust Actual DSCR of 1.44X (amortizing) and Moody's
Stressed Trust DSCR of 0.90X are considered to be in-line with
other Moody's rated loans of similar respective leverages.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-A
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. Moody's analysis
also uses the CMBS IO calculator v1.0 which references the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Single Borrower CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 16%, or 25%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa class would be Aa2, A2, or Baa3, respectively. Parameter
Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time; rather they are designed to
provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might
change if key input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR8: Moody's Keeps C Rating on Cl. G Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2005-
PWR8 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X1, is consistent with the expected credit performance of
its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 2.8% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 6.3%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss figure is 6.2% of the original,
securitized deal balance, compared to 6.9% at Moody's last review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 37 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 payment date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 24% to $1.3 billion
from $1.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 166 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 50% of the pool. The pool includes two
loans with investment-grade credit assessments, representing 4% of
the pool. Eleven loans, representing approximately 13% of the
pool, are defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Sixty loans, representing 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Sixteen loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $72 million (4.1% average loan loss
severity). Currently three loans, representing 2% of the pool, are
in special servicing. Moody's has assumed an aggregate $9.9
million loss (40% expected loss overall) from the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 17 poorly-
performing loans representing 5% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $16 million loss
(20% expected loss severity based on a 50% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 92% and 35% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 85%, the same as last review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.48X and 1.24X, respectively, compared to
1.52X and 1.22X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Lock Up Storage
Centers Portfolio Loan ($46 million -- 3% of the pool). The loan
is secured by a 14 Class A self-storage sites across the United
States totaling 957,000 square feet. The property is also
encumbered by a $35 million B note that is held outside the trust.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 2.35X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 2.05X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the JL Holdings --
Burger King Portfolio A-Note Loan ($12 million -- 1% of the pool).
The loan was split into a $30 million A-note and a $29 million
dollar B-note which is held outside the trust. The loan is secured
by 79 fee and 11 leasehold interests in standalone Burger King
restaurants located in Los Angeles, Alabama, Mississippi and
Florida. The total combined portfolio occupancy was 92% as of
December 2012. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR
are Aa2 and 2.78X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 2.69X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool.
The largest loan is the One MetroTech Center Loan ($164 million --
12% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 933,011 square foot,
23-story Class A office property with a 270 car garage built on
1.6 acres of land in Brooklyn, New York. The office occupancy was
95% in April 2013 compared to 91% at last review. Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to
88% and 1.08X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Park Place Loan ($50 million -- 4%
of the pool). The loan is secured by a 351,955 square foot office
complex in Florham Park, New Jersey. The property was 94% occupied
as of June 2012, the same as last review. Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.3X, respectively, compared to 79% and
1.29X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Ballston Office Center Loan ($43
million -- 3% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 178,452
square foot, 10-story office building located in Arlington,
Virginia. The property is 91% leased to the US Coast Guard as of
May 2013. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.93X
respectively, the same as last review.


BEAR STEARMS 2007-TOP26: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. A-J Secs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has confirmed the ratings of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-TOP26 (the Trust) as
follows:

-- Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class AM at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-J at BB (sf)
-- Class B at B (low) (sf)
-- Class C at CCC (sf)
-- Class D at CCC (sf)
-- Class E at C (sf)
-- Class X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-2 at AAA (sf)

Classes A-1A, A-3, A-4, A-AB, AM, A-J, B, X-1 and X-2 have Stable
trends. Trends are not assigned for classes rated CCC and below.

The rating confirmations taken as part of this review reflect the
most recent leasing activity with respect to the largest loan in
special servicing.

The largest loan in special servicing is Prospectus ID #7 (909 A
Street), representing 2.8% of the pool.  This loan is secured by a
Class A office property that was constructed in 1988, located in
downtown Tacoma, Washington.  The property has excellent curb
appeal and is centrally located.  The sponsor, Ilahie Holdings,
acquired the property in 2006 at a purchase price of approximately
$63.7 million, with a cash equity contribution of almost $16.0
million to close.  The property's sole tenant, Russell Investments
(Russell), moved its headquarters to Seattle and vacated the
property in October 2010.  The Russell lease was scheduled to
expire in November 2013 with the loan maturity in February 2017.
As the tenant was not expected to renew their lease, DBRS
previously simulated a loss on this loan using a stabilized value
analysis.

Over the past few months, there has been positive leasing activity
at the subject property, with a lease to State Farm Insurance for
the entire building, with the borrower funding costs outside of
the already collected reserves.  State Farm will move into the
property in phases, taking occupancy of 33.1% of the NRA on
October 1, 2013, an additional 65.8% of the NRA on January 1, 2014
and is expected to be in full occupancy of the building by April
1, 2014.  The new tenant's annual base rent, on a psf basis, will
start at $18.7, however, contractual rent bumps will grow the
annual base rent to $21.2 psf, which is in line with what the
previous tenant paid.  The State Farm Insurance lease has an
initial five-year term, with an option to extend an additional
five years with 12 months notice.  DBRS has conservatively re-
underwritten the cash flow for this particular loan based on the
information available regarding the State Farm lease.  Based on
the conservatively re-underwritten DBRS NCF, the loan is expected
to cover just above 1.1x during the early portion of the lease
term, but DBRS considers the probability of cash flow improvement
quite strong, given the contractual rent bumps associated with the
State Farm lease.  While DBRS expects to have a clearer picture of
the property performance once State Farm has been in occupancy for
some time, the outlook for this loan is certainly more favorable
than the previously modeled loss.  The outlook over the remaining
loan term is strong; however, given the initial five-year lease
term, there is still refinance risk associated with this loan.

The 909 A Street loan is expected to return to the master servicer
in the near term, following the recent execution of the State Farm
lease.  Outside of this loan, the remaining loans in special
servicing are not considered nearly as pivotal, as there are only
three additional loans, representing 0.5% of the pool, in special
servicing.

While the outlook for the specially serviced loans has improved
significantly over the past 12 months, 63 loans, representing
27.1% of the current pool balance, remain on the servicer's
watchlist.  The most pivotal loan on the servicer's watchlist is
Prospectus ID#6, Viad Corporate Center (3.3% of the current pool
balance).

This loan is secured by a Class A office property in the Midtown
submarket in Phoenix, just north of McDowell Road on Central
Avenue.  The 24-story high-rise was constructed in 1991,
originally serving as the national headquarters for the Dial
Corporation.  The property includes an auditorium and conference
facilities, a fitness center and a performing arts theater.  The
loan transferred to the special servicer in March 2009 after the
borrower sent a request for relief given a perceived value decline
in the subject since the loan's origination.  The most recent
appraisal obtained by the special servicer, dated May 2011, valued
the property at $43.0 million, down from $105.5 million at
issuance.  In May 2011, the special servicer processed the sale of
the property and loan assumption that resulted in a $9.0 million
principal writedown of the outstanding $65.0 million balance on
the loan.  In addition, the new borrower funded a capital reserve
in the amount of $8.0 million for TIs, LCs and capital repairs.
Outstanding interest due in the amount of approximately $2.0
million at the time of the assumption was also forgiven as part of
the transaction.  A realized loss of $9.0 million for the
principal writedown was applied to the Trust in June 2011, with an
additional $2.0 million reimbursed to the master servicer from
principal for interest advances made that were deemed
nonrecoverable.  The loan was transferred back to the master
servicer in August 2011.

Although several small leases have been signed since the property
was sold, the April 2013 rent roll shows the occupancy rate is
still low, at 62.0%.  The largest tenants at the property are
Cavanagh Law Firm (7.9% of the NRA), Stinson Morrison Hecker, LLP
(7.0% of the NRA), and Viad Corporation (5.3% of the NRA) with
leases that expire in 2018, 2022 and 2021, respectively.  Rollover
is minimal over the next few years, with six tenants, representing
6.0% of the NRA scheduled to expire through the remainder of 2013
through 2015.  There are no leases scheduled to roll in 2014 as of
the April 2013 rent roll.  The balance of the leasing reserve was
$4.5 million as of August 2013, according to the loan level
reserve report.  According to CoStar, Class A office properties
within a five mile radius of the subject property reported a 22.7%
vacancy rate and a 23.5% availability rate, as of August 2013
data.  CoStar projects the average vacancy rate within a five mile
radius of the subject property to increase through YE2015.  The
Trust's exposure, at $118 psf (down from $136 psf prior to the
principal writedown) is considered moderate.  DBRS continues to
monitor this loan on a monthly basis for leasing updates, given
the depressed occupancy rate.

Since the last full surveillance review conducted by DBRS in
August 2012, five loans have been liquidated, with $38.5 million
in losses to the Trust, and fortunately, only one small loan
representing 0.06% of the pool has transferred to special
servicing since that time. While significant losses to the Trust
have been experienced over the past 12 months, the change in the
DBRS outlook for the 909 A Street loan, along with the performance
of the remaining loans in the transaction, support the ratings
confirmations.

The pool benefits from the overall performance of the largest
loans in the pool, with a weighted-average DSCR of 2.2x at YE2012
for the nine (31.7% of the pool) loans in the top 15 that are not
on the servicer's watchlist or in special servicing and 15 loans
(18.9% of the pool) that are shadow-rated investment grade.  Three
of the loans shadow-rated investment grade, representing 12.4% of
the pool, are in the top 15.


BELHURST CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, A-3, B, and C notes from Belhurst CLO Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
INVESCO Senior Secured Management Inc.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class D and E notes and principal
protected notes.  Finally, S&P removed its ratings on the class A-
1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, and E notes from CreditWatch with positive
implications, where S&P had placed them on July 9, 2013.

Belhurst CLO Ltd. is in its amortization phase, and continues to
pay down its senior notes.  Since S&P's January 2013 rating
actions, the class A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes (all pari passu) were
collectively paid down a total of $161.82 million and are
currently about 42% of their original notional balance.

These paydowns have resulted in an increase in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the notes,
leading to S&P's upgrades.  As of the Aug. 7, 2013 trustee report,
all O/C ratios have increased from the December 2012 ratios, which
S&P used for its January 2013 rating actions.

   -- The O/C ratio for classes A and B is 146.3%, up from 124.8%
      in December 2012;

   -- The O/C ratio for class C is 122.1%, up from 113.1% in
      December 2012; and

   -- The O/C ratio for class D is 115.3%, up from 109.5% in
      December 2012.

In addition, the underlying asset portfolio's credit quality has
improved during this period.  As per the August 2013 monthly
trustee report, the percentage of 'CCC' rated obligations held in
the portfolio decreased to 2.7% from 4.7% in December 2012.  The
transaction continues to hold a low level of defaults--about
$4.48 million in August 2013, up from $4.7 million in December
2012.

S&P's affirmation of the ratings on the class D and E notes
reflects the availability of credit support at the current rating
level.

The principal protected notes are backed by a strip from a senior
unsecured bond issued by Fannie Mae, a U.S. government-related
entity whose rating is linked to the sovereign rating on the U.S.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Belhurst CLO Ltd.
                    Rating
Class            To           From
A-1              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C (deferrable)   AA-(sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D (deferrable)   BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E (deferrable)   BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

Class                           Rating
Principal protected notes       AA+ (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:              Belhurst CLO Ltd.
Co-issuer:           Belhurst CLO Corp.
Collateral manager:  INVESCO Senior Secured Management Inc.
Trustee:             The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


BRAZOS STUDENT: Fitch Upgrades Series 2003 B-1 Rating From 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the 'AAAsf' ratings assigned to the senior
student loan asset-backed notes and upgrades the subordinate
student loan asset-backed notes to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf' issued by:
Brazos Student Finance Corporation pursuant to the 2003 Indenture
of Trust (BSFC 2003); The Rating Outlook on the senior notes,
which is tied to the sovereign rating of the U.S. government,
remains Negative, and the Outlook on the subordinate notes remains
Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The collateral supporting the notes is composed of 82.27% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP)loans and Health Education
Assistance Loan Program (HEAL)loans and 17.73% private student
loans. The affirmation on the senior notes and the upgrade on the
subordinate notes are based on the sufficient level of credit
enhancement, consisting of any combination of
overcollateralization, excess spread and subordination to cover
the applicable risk factor stresses. The parity ratios have been
steadily increasing. As of June 2013, the senior parity and total
parity for BSFC 2003 are 139.65% and 103.25% respectively;
however, Fitch only gives credit up to the 103% total parity cash
release level. The projected remaining defaults on the private
student loans are expected to range between 6% and 8% using proxy
data. A recovery rate of 15% was applied, which was determined to
be appropriate based on data provided by the issuer.

Rating Sensitivities

Since FFELP student loan asset backed securities rely on the U.S.
government to reimburse defaults, 'AAAsf' FFELP ABS ratings will
likely move in tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside
from the U.S. sovereign rating, defaults and basis risk account
for the majority of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan
transactions. Additional defaults and basis shock beyond Fitch's
published stresses could result in future downgrades. Likewise, a
buildup of credit enhancement driven by positive excess spread
given favorable basis factor conditions and better performance
from private student loans could lead to future upgrades.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Brazos Student Finance Corp., Student Loan Asset-Backed Notes,
2003 Indenture of Trust:

-- Series 2003 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Series 2003 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Series 2003 B-1 upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf';
   Outlook Stable.


CD 2007-CD5: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 17 classes of CD
2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-CD5 as follows:

CL. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

CL. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

CL. AJ, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

CL. A-JA, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

CL. AM, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

CL. A-MA, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

CL. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

CL. C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2011 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

CL. D, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2011 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

CL. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2011 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

CL. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

CL. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

CL. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

CL. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

CL. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

CL. XP, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

CL. XS, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of Classes A-4 through E are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The ratings of Classes F through K are consistent with Moody's
expected loss and thus are affirmed.

The ratings of the IO Classes, Classes XS and SP are consistent
with the expected credit performance of their referenced classes
and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.1% of the
current pooled balance compared to 6.5% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus cumulative realized losses is now 9.7% of
the original pool balance compared to 9.5% at the last review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29 compared to 32 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 13, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to $1.69
billion from $2.10 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 132 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool. The pool includes one loan with a
credit assessment, representing 0.3% of the pool.

Eighteen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $83.7 million (47% loss severity
overall). There are currently 12 loans, representing 6% of the
pool, in special servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$47.5 million loss (42% expected loss on average) for these
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 13 poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $18.8 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and full year 2012
financial for 97% and 94% of the pool's non-specially serviced
loans, respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 111% compared to 113% at
last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 13% to the most recently available net operating income
(NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.0X, respectively, compared to
1.33X and 0.97X, respectively, at last review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the 14144 Ventura Office
Building Loan ($4.5 million -- 0.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 48,000 square foot (SF) office building located in Sherman
Oaks, California. As of December 2012, property was 95% leased
compared to 89% at last review. Moody's credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.69X, respectively, compared to Baa3
and 1.70X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 27% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Lincoln Square Loan ($160 million -- 9.5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 406,000 SF office building
located in Washington, DC. The loan represents a 72.7% pari-passu
interest in a $220 million loan that is interest-only throughout
its entire ten year term, maturing in July 2017. The collateral is
also encumbered by a $65.0 million B-Note. As of June 2013, the
property was 97% leased, the same as at last review. The largest
tenant is Latham & Watkins LLP, which represents 57% of the net
rentable area (NRA); lease expiration January 2016. The second
largest tenant is the U.S. Government which represents 12% of the
NRA; lease expiration December 2013. Moody's analysis incorporates
a stressed cash flow due to its concerns about potential
volatility due to lease rollover. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 139% and 0.68X, respectively, the same as last review.

The second largest loan is the USFS Industrial Distribution
Portfolio Loan ($157.5 million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is
secured by 37 cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted warehouse
properties and an office property. The loan represents a 33.3%
pari-passu interest in a $472.4 million loan. The properties are
located in 25 states. The properties are 100% leased to the US
Foodservice, Inc. through July 2027. Performance has been stable.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 1.0X, respectively, the
same as last review.

The third largest loan is the Charles River Plaza North Loan
($145.0 million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
355,000 SF office building located in Boston, Massachusetts. The
loan represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a $290 million loan.
The collateral is also encumbered by a $20.0 million B-Note. The
property is 100% leased to Massachusetts General Hospital through
May 2029. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 136% and 0.69X,
respectively, compared to 147% and 0.64X at last review.


CENTEX HOME 2004-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 RMBS Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches issued by Centex Home Equity Company Loan Trust 2004-1,
backed by subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Company (CHEC) Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 7, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 7, 2013 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 7, 2013 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 7, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 7, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 7, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects the recent performance of the
underlying pool and in particular, Moody's updated expected
remaining losses on the pool. The rating action also reflects
correction of an error in the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW)
cash flow model previously used by Moody's in rating this
transaction.

The cash flow model used in the previous rating actions for Centex
2004-1 incorrectly calculated the cumulative loss trigger. Due to
the discovery of this error, six tranches were placed on review on
May 7, 2013. The error has now been corrected, and the rating
action reflects the change.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


CHASE EDUCATION: Fitch Upgrades Subordinate Note Rating From 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior notes at 'AAAsf' and
upgrades the subordinate note to 'Asf' from 'BBsf' issued by Chase
Education Loan Trust 2007-A. The Rating Outlook on the senior
notes, which is tied to the sovereign rating of the U.S.
government, remains Negative. The Rating Watch Positive on the
subordinate note has been removed and assigned a Stable Outlook.
Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation on the senior notes and the upgrade on subordinate
note are based on stable trust performance and the sufficient
level of credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor
stresses. While both the senior and subordinate notes will benefit
from future excess spread, the senior notes also benefit from
subordination provided by the class B note.

The total parity ratio has been stable and the senior parity ratio
has been increasing. The senior parity is currently 105.31% and
total parity is 100% as of June 2013.
In Fitch's analysis, the notes passed the cash flows corresponding
to their rating stresses.

Rating Sensitivities

Since FFELP student loan ABS rely on the U.S. government to
reimburse defaults, 'AAA'sf FFELP ABS ratings will likely move in
tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults and basis risk account for the majority
of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.
Additional defaults and basis shock beyond Fitch's published
stresses could result in future downgrades. Likewise, a buildup of
credit enhancement driven by positive excess spread given
favorable basis factor conditions could lead to future upgrades.

Prior to the upgrade class B of Chase Education Loan Trust 2007-A
was on Rating Watch Positive.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Chase Education Loan Trust 2007-A:

-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; removed from Rating
   Watch Positive; Outlook Stable.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2008-C7: Moody's Cuts Cl. E Debt Rating to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes and
downgraded six classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2008-C7 as
follows:

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-MA, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-JA, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. The ratings of the below investment
grade P&I classes are consistent with Moody's expected loss and
thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is
consistent with the expected credit performance of its referenced
classes and thus is affirmed.

The downgrades are due to higher than anticipated realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.2% of the
current balance compared to 7.0% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus cumulative realized losses are now 13.0% of the
original securitized balance compared to 12.0% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19 compared to 17 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 21, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $1.26
billion from $1.85 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 78 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 47% of
the pool.

Two loans are on the master servicer's watchlist, representing 5%
of the pool. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated since securitization,
generating a loss of $122.3 million (56% average loss severity).
Currently, there are ten loans in special servicing, representing
approximately 13% of the pool. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Bush Terminal Loan ($50.0 million -- 3.9% of the pool),
which is secured by 16 flex/industrial properties totaling 5.98
million square feet (SF) located in Brooklyn, New York. The pooled
loan represents a 17% pari-passu interest in an $300.0 million
interest-only first mortgage. At securitization, the sponsor had
planned to capitalize on the property's significant near-term
tenant rollover by renovating and converting some of the
industrial buildings to office space. The original income
projections were never achieved due to the sponsor's difficulty in
releasing the renovated space. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in January 2011 due to payment default. In April 2012,
the loan was modified into A/B structure. The pooled $50.0 million
portion was divided into a $31.6 million A-2 note and an $18.3
million B-2 note. The $250 million pari passu loan, which is in a
separate transaction, was split into a $158.3 million A-1 note and
a $91.6 million B-1 note. The borrower contributed $15.4 million
as additional equity, which was applied to the accrued interest on
the A-notes, an additional $10.0 million toward a capital
expenditure and tenant improvement reserve account and a $5.0
million letter of credit. The interest rate on the loan was
reduced to 4.68% from 6.28% for the A notes; payments would be
interest-only through April 2013. In August 2013, the loan was re-
modified. The subsequent modification closed on August 19, 2013
and funded on August 20th, 2013. The terms of the new modification
include an increase in Supplemental Borrower New Equity from $25.0
million to $75.0 million; an increase in the return on equity from
10% to 12%; and an extension of the A-Note interest-only pay rate
of 4.68% an additional 24 months (until August 6, 2015). The
Capital Event Waterfall was modified to reflect a payout of 80% to
the Borrower and 20% to the Lender on the B Note. The B note was
paid down by $7.5 million. A guarantee of $7.5 Million is to
remain in place until the loan is paid in full.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Alexandria Mall
Loan ($48.5 million --3.7% of the pool). The loan is secured by an
anchored mall located in Alexandria, Louisiana. The loan was
transferred to the Special Servicer on October 12, 2012 for
Imminent Default. The property is the only regional mall within a
90-mile radius. The mall anchors include JC Penny, Dillard's (not
part of the collateral) and Sears (not part of the collateral).
The mall is managed by Jones Lang LaSalle. The loan will be
monitored while information is gathered and discussions with the
Borrower take place. The loan remains current. The remaining
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.
The master servicer has recognized a total of $50.6 million in
appraisal reductions for six out of the ten loans in special
servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $76.2 million loss (53%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool and has estimated a
$14.5 million loss (34% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loan.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's was provided with full
year 2012 and partial year 2013 operating results for 96% and 93%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 103% compared to 112% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.09X, compared to 1.22X
and 0.92X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the One Liberty Plaza Loan ($244.1 million --
19.2% of the pool), which represents at 29% pari-passu interest in
an $829.3 million first mortgage. The collateral consists of a 2.2
million SF office building located in lower Manhattan. As of
December 2012, the property was 99% leased, the same as at last
review. Major tenants include the law firm Cleary Gottlieb (22% of
the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration 12/31/2030), Goldman
Sachs (12% of the NRA; lease expiration 4/30/2015); FINRA (12% of
the NRA; lease expiration 2/28/2021); Zurich American Insurance
(12% of the NRA; lease expiration 5/31/2017) and Bank of Nova
Scotia (10% of the NRA; lease expiration 5/31/2014). Approximately
17% of the NRA expires within the next 12 months. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 116%
and 0.82X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Lincoln Square Loan ($60.0
million -- 4.7% of the pool), which represents a 27% pari-passu
interest in a $220.0 million first mortgage. The loan is interest-
only throughout its entire ten-year term, maturing in July 2017.
The collateral is also encumbered by a $65.0 million B-Note. The
loan is secured by a 406,000 SF Class A office building located in
Washington, DC. As of June 2013, the property was 97% leased, the
same as at last review. The law firm Latham & Watkins leases 58%
of the NRA through January 2016. The second largest tenant is the
U.S. Government which leases 12% of the NRA through December 2013.
The master servicer has been notified that the U.S. Government
will not renew its lease. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 139%
and 0.68X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Huntsville Office Portfolio
II ($40.2 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by three
cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans located in
Huntsville, Alabama. The properties are located in the county of
Madison, Alabama, located in the far northern region of Alabama.
As of December 2012, the properties had a combined occupancy of
95% compared to 97% at last review. Approximately 5% of the leases
will expire during 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and
1.27X, respectively, compared to 88% and 1.22X at last review.


COMM 2004-LNB2: S&P Raises Rating on Class H Notes to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2004-LNB2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its
ratings on three other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions reflects its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised ratings on the certificates reflects its expected
available credit enhancement for these tranches, which S&P
believes is greater than its most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the rating levels.  The upgrades also
reflect S&P's views regarding the current and future performance
of the transaction's collateral; Standard & Poor's weighted
average loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt service coverage (DSC)
of 50.8% and 2.1x, respectively; and the amortization of the trust
balance, including the expected repayment in full of the largest
loan in the transaction, the Tysons Corner Center ($129.1 million,
30.4%).  The raised ratings also reflect the deleveraging of the
pool, as it has paid down 27.3% in the last year.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflects its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmed ratings also reflects the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets as well as
the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement may suggest further positive
rating movements on the certificate classes, S&P's analysis also
took into consideration its view on available liquidity support to
the classes and that 46 performing loans secured by real estate
($290.5 million, 68.5%) have final maturities in 2013 and 2014.
S&P also considered the future impact of workout fees associated
with seven loans totaling $14.2 million (3.4%) that were
previously with the special servicer.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the Class X-1 interest-only
(IO) certificates based on our criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

COMM 2004-LNB2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
            Rating
Class   To           From           Credit enhancement (%)
B       AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)                        19.06
C       AAA (sf)     AA- (sf)                        16.79
D       AA- (sf)     BBB (sf)                        12.25
E       A+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)                       10.26
F       A (sf)       BB (sf)                          7.99
G       BBB- (sf)    B (sf)                           5.43
H       B- (sf)      CCC- (sf)                        2.88

RATINGS AFFIRMED

COMM 2004-LNB2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-4        AAA (sf)                  25.02
J          CCC- (sf)                  1.74
X-1        AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1999-C2: Moody's Cuts X Secs. Rating to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of three classes,
downgraded one class and affirmed three classes of Commercial
Mortgage Asset Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-C2 as follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of the three P&I bonds are due to increased
subordination resulting from amortization and payoffs coupled with
improved credit quality from defeasance. The pool has paid down
42% since last review and defeasance now accounts for 49% of the
pooled balance which fully covers Classes C and D and a majority
of Class E.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.

The downgrade of the IO Class X is due to paydowns of highly rated
reference classes.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.4% of the
current pooled balance compared to 1.0% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.1% of the
original pooled balance, the same as last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2 the compared to 4 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from Conduit and Large Loan models in formulating a
rating recommendation. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 8, 2013.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 19, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $95 million
from $775 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 33% of the pool, with the top three conduit loans
representing 48% of the pool. There are six defeased loan
representing 49% of the pool, of which $7 million is scheduled to
pay off in 2014 and $39 million in 2018.

There are currently no loans on the watchlist or in special
servicing. Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool,
resulting in a realized loss of $61.3 million (52% loss severity
overall).

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool balance. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is
54%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of
14% to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.48X and 2.29X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The largest loan is the Westin Denver Tabor Center ($31.3 million
-- 33% of the pool), which is secured by a 430-room full-service
hotel located in downtown Denver, Colorado. The hotel is part of
an upscale mixed-use complex that includes a 570,000 square foot
(SF) office building and an urban mall. The loan matures in
December 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 46% and 2.61X,
respectively, compared to 46% and 2.58X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Auerbach Retail Portfolio Loan ($10
million -- 10.5% of the pool), which is secured by two retail
properties located in California. As of June 2013, the properties
were 97% leased, the same as last review. The portfolio's two
largest tenants have 2018 and 2017 lease expirations. The loan
matures in February 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77%
and 1.4X, respectively, compared to 79% and 1.38X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Regal Cinema Loan ($4.4 million --
4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 17-screen movie theatre
located south of Cleveland in Medina, Ohio. The property is triple
net lease. The loan matures in September 2019. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.77X, respectively, compared to 64% and
1.87X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C4: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2004-C4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of all of the remaining assets in
the pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available
to the trust.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimated
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmations also reflect S&P's review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets as well as
the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movements on the class B, C, D, E, and F
certificates, S&P's analysis also considered the number of loans
on the master servicers' combined watchlist ($62.6 million,
11.6%), the loans currently with the special servicer, the
liquidity support available to the remaining classes, as well the
near-term maturity of 94.4% of the entire pool before year-end
2014.  As of the Aug. 16, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
trust experienced interest shortfalls totaling $56,912 primarily
due to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts and
special servicing fees of $52,545 and $4,367, respectively.  The
interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and including
class G.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-X and A-Y
interest-only (IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating
IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C4

Class       Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
A-1-A       AAA (sf)                       35.69
A-6         AAA (sf)                       35.69
A-J         AAA (sf)                       21.25
B           A (sf)                         13.90
C           BBB+ (sf)                       9.17
D           BB- (sf)                        7.33
E           CCC (sf)                        4.97
F           CCC- (sf)                       3.39
A-X         AAA (sf)                         N/A
A-Y         AAA (sf)                         N/A

N/A--Not applicable.


CSMC TRUST 2013-7: DBRS Rates $5.8MM Cl. B-4 Certificates 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned the following ratings to the Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2013-7 issued by CSMC Trust 2013-7
(the Trust).

-- $339.8 million Class A-1# rated at AAA (sf)
-- $30.0 million Class A-2 rated at AAA (sf)
-- $339.8 million Class A-X-2* rated at AAA (sf)
-- $30.0 million Class A-X-3* rated at AAA (sf)
-- $369.8 million Class A-X-1* rated at AAA (sf)
-- $369.8 million Class A-5(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $369.8 million Class A-X-4*(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $369.8 million Class A-X-5*(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $339.8 million Class A-10(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $369.8 million Class A-6(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $30.0 million Class A-11(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $258.8 million Class A-3(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $110.9 million Class A-4(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $258.8 million Class A-7(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $110.9 million Class A-8(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $74.0 million Class A-12(e) rated at AAA (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-1 rated at AA (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-2 rated at 'A' (sf)
-- $7.4 million Class B-3 rated at BBB (sf)
-- $5.8 million Class B-4 rated at BB (sf)

# -Denotes super senior class.  This class benefits from
    additional protection from the senior support bond (i.e. Class
    A-2) with respect to loss allocation.
* -Denotes interest-only certificates.  The class balances
    represent notional amounts.
(e)-Denotes exchangeable certificates.  These certificates can be
    exchanged for combinations of initial exchangeable
    certificates as specified in offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings in this transaction reflect the 7.50% of
credit enhancement provided by subordination.  The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect 6.10%, 4.60%, 2.75% and
1.30% of credit enhancement, respectively.  Other than the
specified classes, DBRS does not rate any other classes in this
transaction.

The Trust contains a portfolio of prime residential mortgage
loans.  The originators for the mortgage pool are Guaranteed Rate,
Inc. (32.7%), Quicken Loans Inc. (7.7%), Caliber Home Loans, Inc.
(6.9%), Sierra Pacific Mortgage Company, Inc. (6.8%), RPM
Mortgage, Inc. (6.5%), Skyline Financial Corp. (6.0%), Broker
Solutions, Inc. d/b/a New American Funding (5.6%), BofI Federal
Bank (5.2%), and various others originators (22.6%).  The loans
will be serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing Inc. (98.0%), PHH
Mortgage Corporation (1.5%) and First Republic Bank (0.5%).  Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") will act as the Master Servicer
and Securities Administrator.  Christiana Trust, a division of
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will serve as trustee.  The
transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a traditional one.

The originators provide traditional life-time representations and
warranties to the Trust.  The enforcement mechanism for breaches
of representations includes automatic breach reviews by a third-
party reviewer for any seriously delinquent loans and resolution
of disputes are ultimately subject to determination in arbitration
proceeding.  The loans (except for First Republic) also benefit
from representations and warranties back-stopped by the seller,
DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit
Suisse (USA), Inc., in the event of an originator's bankruptcy or
insolvency proceeding and if the originator fails to cure,
repurchase or substitute such breach or loans.  However, such a
backstop is subject to certain sunset provisions that give
consideration to prior loan performance.

DBRS views the representation and warranties features for this
transaction to be consistent with CSMC 2013-IVR1, CSMC 2013-IVR2,
CSMC 2013-IVR3, CSMC 2013-IVR4 and CSMC 2013-6, and of stronger
quality than that of two previous Credit Suisse prime jumbo
transactions (CSMC 2012-CIM3 & CSMC 2013-TH1).  However, the
relatively weak financial strength of certain originators coupled
with the sunset provisions on the backstop by DLJMC still demand
additional penalties and credit enhancement protections.  The full
description of the representations and warranties standard, the
mitigating factors and the DBRS analysis are detailed in the
related rating report.


CSMC TRUST 2013-7: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B-3 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its rating to CSMC
Trust 2013-7's $388.771 million mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-7.

The certificate issuance is a residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by residential mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The pool's high-quality collateral.

   -- The quality of DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc.'s flow acquisition
      program, as well as Quicken Loans Inc.'s origination
      quality.

   -- The credit enhancement and the associated structural deal
      mechanics.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
zescription of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1762.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CSMC Trust 2013-7

Class   Rating          Amount       Interest
                      (mil. $)       rate (%)(i)
A-1     AAA (sf)        339.800        3.0000
A-2     AAA (sf)         29.983        3.0000
A-X-2   AAA (sf)       Notional (ii)    (iii)
A-X-3   AAA (sf)       Notional (iv)    (iii)
A-X-1   AAA (sf)       Notional (v)      (vi)
A-5     AAA (sf)        369.783        3.0000
A-X-4   AAA (sf)       Notional (v)     (iii)
A-X-5   AAA (sf)       Notional (v)     (vii)
A-10    AAA (sf)        339.800        3.5000
A-6     AAA (sf)        369.783        3.5000
A-11    AAA (sf)         29.983        3.5000
A-3     AAA (sf)        258.848        3.5000
A-4     AAA (sf)        110.935        3.5000
A-7     AAA (sf)        258.848        3.0000
A-8     AAA (sf)        110.935        3.0000
A-12    AAA (sf)         73.957        (viii)
B-1     A (sf)            5.596       Net Wac
B-2     BBB (sf)          5.997       Net Wac
B-3     BB (sf)           7.395       Net Wac
B-4     NR                5.797       Net Wac
B-5     NR                5.198       Net Wac

  (i) The certificates are subject to a net WAC cap.
(ii) The class A-X-2 certificates will accrue interest on a
      notional amount equal to the class principal amount of the
      class A-1 certificates.
(iii) The excess, if any, of (a) the lesser of the net WAC for
      such distribution date and 3.500% per year over (b) the
      lesser of the net WAC for such distribution date and 3.000%
      per year.
(iv) The class A-X-3 certificates will accrue interest on a
      notional amount equal to the class principal amount of the
      class A-2 certificates.
  (v) The class A-X-1, A-X-4, and A-X-5 certificates will each
      accrue interest on a notional amount equal to the aggregate
      class principal amount of the class A-1 and A-2
      certificates.
(vi) The excess, if any, of (a) the net WAC for such
      distribution date over (b) 3.500% per year.
(vii) The excess, if any, of (a) the net WAC for such distribution
      date over (b) 3.000% per year.
(viii) A fraction, expressed as a percentage, the numerator of
      which is 100% of the interest payable on the exchanged
      portion of the corresponding initial exchangeable
      certificates, multiplied by 12, and the denominator of which
      is the class principal amount of the class A-12 certificates
      immediately before such distribution date.
NR - Not rated.
N/A - Not applicable.
WAC - Weighted average coupon.


DENALI CAPITAL CLO X: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Denali
Capital CLO X Ltd./Denali Capital CLO X LLC's $379.25 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of July 16, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P said.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Denali Capital CLO X Ltd./Denali Capital CLO X LLC

Class                Rating                 Amount
                                          (mil. $)

A-1L                 AAA (sf)               255.50
A-2L                 AA (sf)                 37.75
A-3L (deferrable)    A (sf)                  37.00
B-1L (deferrable)    BBB (sf)                19.50
B-2L (deferrable)    BB- (sf)                20.00
B-3L (deferrable)    B (sf)                   9.50


DLJ COMMERCIAL 2000-CF1: S&P Affirms CCC+ Rating on Cl. B-4 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class B-4 and B-5 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from DLJ Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CF1, a U.S. CMBS
transaction.

"Our affirmations follow our analysis of the transaction,
primarily using our criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  Our analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the sole remaining asset in the
trust, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.  The affirmations reflect our expectation that the
available credit enhancement for these classes will be within our
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current outstanding ratings," S&P said.

While the available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movements on the two classes, S&P's analysis also
considered the potential of additional interest shortfalls related
to the sole remaining asset, the specially serviced Paradyne
Corporation real estate owned (REO) asset ($13.1 million), as well
as their historical interest shortfalls.

As of the Aug. 12, 2013 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had a trust balance of $13.1 million, down from
$886.2 million at issuance.  The pool consists of one specially
serviced REO asset, down from 128 loans at issuance.  To date, the
transaction has experienced losses totaling $34.6 million
(3.9% of the transaction's original pooled certificate balance).

The Paradyne Corporation REO asset ($13.1 million, 100%) comprises
a 332,689-sq.-ft. office property in Largo, Fla.  The asset has a
total reported exposure of $13.4 million.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC (CWCapital), on May 13, 2010, as a result of a maturity
default, and the property became REO on July 2, 2012.  CWCapital
stated that the property is being marketed for sale, and it
expects the asset to be sold by the end of 2013.  An appraisal
reduction amount of $8.8 million is in effect for this asset.
According to the July 31, 2013 rent roll, the property was 63.5%
occupied.  CWCapital indicated that the debt service coverage is
projected to be 0.69x, based on reported budgeted 2013 net income.
S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

As it relates to the above asset resolution, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

DLJ Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CF1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating                   Credit enhancement (%)

B-4        CCC+ (sf)                         91.61
B-5        CCC- (sf)                         74.69


DRYDEN XVIII: Moody's Lowers Rating on $14MM Class B Notes to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the
following notes issued by Dryden XVIII Leveraged Loan 2007
Limited:

$14,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
October 25, 2019, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on August 30,
2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes
reflects the deterioration in par value of the collateral pool
since the last rating action. Moody's calculated a current Class B
overcollateralization ratio of 105.1% compared to 106.1% at the
time of the last rating action. Moody's also notes that the
underlying portfolio includes a number of investments in
securities that mature after the stated maturity date of the
notes. Based on the July 15, 2013 trustee report, securities that
mature after the stated maturity date of the notes currently make
up approximately 1.99% of the underlying portfolio. These
investments potentially expose the notes to market risk in the
event of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable
during the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to
effect significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, higher spread and diversity
levels compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
August 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2579 compared to 2639 at
the time of the last rating action. Moody's also modeled a spread
of 3.35% compared to 2.91% and Diversity of 70 compared to 63
modeled in August 2011.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $412.9 million, defaulted par of $1.0 million,
a weighted average default probability of 18.18% (implying a WARF
of 2579), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.98%,
and a diversity score of 70. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Dryden XVIII Leveraged Loan 2007 Limited, issued in October 2007,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2063)

Class B: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3095)

Class B: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


DUCHESS III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Duchess III CDO S.A.:

EUR 54,000,000 Class B Second Priority Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2018 (current outstanding balance of EUR 43,416,130), Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR 10,750,000 Class C-1 Third Priority Secured Fixed Rate Notes
due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; and

EUR 23,000,000 Class C-2 Third Priority Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible.

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

EUR 7,000,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed Rate Notes
due 2018, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on October 4, 2011
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); and

EUR 8,750,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2018, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on October 4, 2011
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
September 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been
fully paid down, and the Class B Notes, (i.e., the senior-most
class of notes), have been paid down by approximately 19.6% or
$10.6 million since September 2012. Based on the latest trustee
report dated July 22, 2013, the Senior, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 222.9%, 125.4% and
104.1%, respectively, versus September 2012 levels of 137.5%,
108.0% and 98.1%, respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the July 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor ("WARF") is currently
3681 compared to 3037 in September 2012. Additionally, Moody's
notes that its calculated WARF is 4968 primarily due to the
application of certain adjustments with respect to the default
probabilities associated with Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs")
constituting more than 3% of the collateral pool.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's announced that it had
concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class B, Class
C-1 and Class C-2 Notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that time,
Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC ratios
resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments during
the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par of EUR 83
million and GBP 12 million, defaulted par of EUR 6 million, a
weighted average default probability of 30.97% (implying a WARF of
4968), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.99%,
and a diversity score of 17. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Duchess III CDO S.A., issued in July 2004, is a multi-currency
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured and mezzanine loans denominated in Euros and
British Pounds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through CEs. Moody's analysis reflects the application of
certain adjustments with respect to the default probabilities
associated with CEs. Specifically, for each CE where the related
exposure constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's
applied a 2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade. This adjustment
was applied to approximately 29% of the pool.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3974)

Class B: 0

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Class D-1: +2

Class D-2: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5962)

Class B: 0

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1

Class D-1: 0

Class D-2: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to European obligors: The rating of the structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the European economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of Euro area sovereigns could negatively impact
the ratings of the notes.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.

5) Currency exposure: The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR
denominated assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will
have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available
to the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.


GALE FORCE 2: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes From 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the Class
A, B, C, D and E notes from Gale Force 2 CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by GSO
Capital Partners L.P.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's removed
these ratings from CreditWatch with positive implications.

The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the Class A notes and a
subsequent increase in the overcollateralization (O/C) available
to support the notes since January 2012, when S&P last raised its
ratings on all of the notes except Class D.  Since that time, the
transaction has further paid down the Class A notes by
approximately $341.91 million.  The transaction exited its
reinvestment period in July 2012 and has rapidly paid down the
Class A notes, increasing the collateralization and credit support
across the capital structure. On the most recent payment date
(July 15th), the Class A notes were paid down by $91.2 million,
bringing them to 6.58% of their original balance.

S&P raised its ratings on the Class B, C, D, and E notes above the
original ratings to reflect the significant improvement in the O/C
available to support the notes.  The O/C increased primarily due
to the aforementioned paydowns.  The trustee reported the
following O/C ratios in the August 2013 monthly report:

   -- The senior Class A/B O/C ratio was 285.73% compared with a
      reported ratio of 124.55% in December 2011.

   -- The Class C O/C ratio was 180.08% compared with a reported
      ratio of 116.01% in December 2011.

   -- The Class D O/C ratio was 136.33% compared with a reported
      ratio of 109.48% in December 2011.

   -- The Class E O/C ratio was 114.14% compared with a reported
      ratio of 104.78% in December 2011.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Gale Force 2 CLO Ltd.
                 Rating
Class      To           From
A          AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B          AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C          AAA (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D          AA+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E          BBB- (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Gale Force 2 CLO Ltd
Co-issuer:          Gale Force 2 CLO Corp
Collateral manager: GSO Capital Partners L.P.
Underwriter:        Wachovia Securities Inc.
Trustee:            Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


GEM LIGOS III: Moody's Mulls Downgrade of Two EM CDO Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade two tranches from GEM LIGOS III Ltd.:

$24,000,000 Class C Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on April 13, 2012 Downgraded to Ba2
(sf)

$12,000,000 Class D Notes (Current Balance $9,537,391.29), B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on April
13, 2012 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the review for possible downgrade is a
result of the deteriorating credit quality of the portfolio and
the large pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap that is
currently out of the money causing the subordinate interest
coverage tests to fail.

The credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the June 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 1851
compared to 1134 in April 2012. The WARF deterioration is due to
the rapid amortization of the portfolio with higher rated assets
maturing before assets with lower ratings. Additionally the amount
of non-defaulted assets rated Ca increased to $11.6 million or
3.3% from no Ca rated assets in April 2012.

Moody's notes there is a possibility that the Class C and D notes
may begin to defer interest on the next semi-annual payment date
in September. A deferred interest balance would deteriorate the
overcollateralization ratios for these classes as the credit
deterioration has not been offset by the deleveraging on the
senior notes.

GEM LIGOs III, issued in March 2006, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior unsecured
loans and bonds from emerging market corporate and sovereign
issuers

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013, and "Moody's Revises Its Methodology For Emerging Market
CDOs" published in April 2007.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the bond market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially when they experience jump to default.

5) The deal has a pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap
that is currently out of the money. If fixed rate assets prepay or
default, there would be a more substantial mismatch between the
swap notional and the amount of fixed assets. In such cases,
payments to hedge counterparties may consume a large portion or
all of the interest proceeds, leaving the transaction, even with
respect to the senior notes, with poor interest coverage. Payment
timing mismatches between assets and liabilities may cause
additional concerns. If the deal does not receive sufficient
projected principal proceeds on the payment date to supplement the
interest proceeds shortfall, a heightened risk of interest payment
default could occur. Similarly, if principal proceeds are used to
pay interest, there may ultimately be a risk of payment default on
the principal of the notes.


GLOBAL LEVERAGED I: Moody's Affrims B2 Rating on Cl. I Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity Fund
I:

$40,500,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due December 20, 2018, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July
15, 2013 Upgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade.

Moody's confirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$23,750,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due 2018, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

$18,500,000 Class E-1 Fifth Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due 2018, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$7,750,000 Class E-2 Fifth Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due 2018, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$25,000,000 Class I Combination Notes Due 2018 (current rated
balance $3,418,631), Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on July 15,
2013 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Moody's affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$265,000,000 Class A First Priority Senior Notes Due 2018 (current
outstanding balance of $126,857,401), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$39,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Notes Due 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Moody's also placed under review with direction uncertain the
following notes:

SGD 13,200,000 Class P-2 Principal Protected Notes Due 2018
(current rated balance SGD 9,949,910), Baa2 (sf) Placed Under
Review Direction Uncertain; previously on December 6, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in December 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 48.82% or $121 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated July 31, 2013, the Class A/B and Class C
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 167.69% and 134.78%,
respectively, versus October 2012 levels of 144.77% and 126.86%,
respectively.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class C,
Class D, Class E-1, Class E-2 and Class I Combination Notes
announced on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's said that it had
upgraded and placed certain of the issuer's ratings on review for
upgrade primarily as a result of substantial deleveraging of the
senior notes and increases in OC ratios resulting from high rates
of loan collateral prepayments during the first half of 2013.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the July 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 3774
compared to 3306 in October 2012.

The action on the Class P-2 notes reflects a change to Moody's
rating of the Class P-2 SGD Strip, which currently consists of
SGD11,000,000 in face value of a Singapore dollar-denominated
stripped zero coupon bond due December 20, 2018, issued by Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc. Moody's current senior unsecured rating of
Merrill Lynch & Co. is Baa2 placed under review with direction
uncertain. Moody's conducted no cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios on this note because the rating is a pass-through of the
rating of the underlying entity.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $301.68 million, defaulted par of $21.89
million, a weighted average default probability of 29.42%
(implying a WARF of 4417), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 45.44%, and a diversity score of 37. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity Fund I, issued in
December 2006, is a collateralized loan obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans, with significant
exposure to middle market loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Class I Combination
Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months, which
represent approximately 20.06% of the collateral pool.
Additionally, for each CE where the related exposure constitutes
more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch
equivalent assumed downgrade. This adjustment was applied to
approximately 4.32% of the pool.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3534)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class E-1: +1

Class E-2: +1

Class I Combination: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5301)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E-1: -1

Class E-2: -1

Class I Combination: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.

4) The deal has a pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap
that is currently out of the money. If fixed rate assets prepay or
default, there would be a more substantial mismatch between the
swap notional and the amount of fixed assets. In such cases,
payments to hedge counterparties may consume a large portion or
all of the interest proceeds, leaving the transaction, even with
respect to the senior notes, with poor interest coverage. Payment
timing mismatches between assets and liabilities may cause
additional concerns. If the deal does not receive sufficient
projected principal proceeds on the payment date to supplement the
interest proceeds shortfall, a heightened risk of interest payment
default could occur. Similarly, if principal proceeds are used to
pay interest, there may ultimately be a risk of payment default on
the principal of the notes.


GOLDMAN SACHS 2010-C2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 9 Debt Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes of
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities trust 2010-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the IO Classes,
Class X-A and X-B, are consistent with the expected credit
performance of their referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 2.0% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 2.1%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss is 1.9% of the original,
securitized deal balance, compared to 2.1% at Moody's last review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24, the same as at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 25, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 6, 2013 determination date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $852 million
from $876 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 43 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 52% of
the pool. The pool contains five loans with investment grade
credit assessments, representing 14% of the pool.

Currently one loan, representing 1% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses and currently there are no
loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 100% and 83% of the pool's loans. Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 87% compared to 92% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 14.8% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.65X and 1.24X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.17X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Cole Portfolio I
Loan ($31.5 million -- 3.7% of the pool balance), which is secured
by a fee interest in 20 single tenant properties located across 13
states. The portfolio consists of 17 retail properties, two
industrial properties and one ground leased parcel that is
improved with a retail building. In aggregate, the portfolio
contains approximately 555,095 square feet (SF) and was 100%
leased as of March 2013. Only one lease, representing 9% of the
net rentable area (NRA) expires during the loan term. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.52X,
respectively, the same as last review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Cole
Portfolio II Loan ($30.0 million -- 3.5%), which is secured by a
fee interest in 14 single tenant properties and one multi-tenant
industrial property located across 11 states. In aggregate, the
portfolio contains approximately 331,521 SF and was 100% leased as
of March 2013. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
Baa3 and 1.55X, compared to Baa3 and 1.51X at last review.

The third largest loan with a credit assessment is the Payless and
Brown Industrial Portfolio Loan ($28.2 million -- 3.3%), which is
secured by two single tenant industrial properties. The Payless
Distribution Center represents the larger of the two properties
and totals approximately 801,651 SF of the Northbrook Industrial
Park in Brookville, Ohio. The property was built in 2008 and has
32' ceiling heights, three grade drive-in doors 76 dock high
doors, and approximately 24,853 SF of office space. The remainder
of the collateral is represented by the Brown Shoe Distribution
Center, a 351,723 SF warehouse/distribution building located in
Lebec, California within the Tenjon Industrial Complex. The
property was built in 2008 and has 32' ceiling heights, a single
grade drive-in door, 38 exterior docks with levelers, and
approximately 11,869 SF of office space. Moody's credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.78X, compared to Baa2 and 1.72 at
last review.

The fourth largest loan with a credit assessment is the ARC Credit
Portfolio 2 Loan ($19.6 million -- 2.3%), which is secured by 10
single tenant retail properties located across five states. In
aggregate, the portfolio contains approximately 116,107 SF that
was 100% leased as of December 2012. All of the properties are
occupied by investment grade tenants. Moody's credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.61X, respectively, the same as last
review.

The fifth largest loan with a credit assessment is the Ruxton
Towers Loan ($11.9 million -- 1.4%), which is secured by a 16-
story apartment building containing 208 units and built in 1927.
The property is located in the Upper West Side of Manhattan, NY.
The property was 99% leased as of June 2013, the same as last
review. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and
1.74X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.68X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the 52 Broadway Loan ($88.0 million -- 10.3%),
which is secured by a 19-story, 399,935 SF, Class B office
building located in downtown Manhattan, New York. The property was
constructed in 1982 and renovated in 2002 at a cost of $4.5
million ($11.25 PSF). The United Federation of Teachers has
occupied the entire building since the 2002 renovation. They are
currently operating under a long term net lease expiring in August
2034. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.92X,
respectively, the same as last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Cleveland Office Portfolio
Loan ($62.8 million -- 7.4%), which is secured by two separate
office properties located at the intersection of East 9th Street
and St Clair Avenue NE in downtown Cleveland, Ohio. One Cleveland
Center is a 34-story, Class A high-rise office building containing
approximately 543,728 SF. The building was constructed in 1983 and
renovated in 2009. The Penton Media Building is a 20-story, Class
A high-rise office building containing approximately 600,291 SF.
The building was constructed in 1974 and has never undergone a
major renovation. Both properties offer attached parking garages
and ground floor retail. In total, the portfolio was 77% leased as
of March 2013 compared to 74% at last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.15X, respectively, the same as last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Station Square Loan ($59.8
million -- 7.0%), which is secured by a 669,982 SF mixed use
property located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The property is
comprised of five buildings containing 449,384 SF of office space
and 220,308 SF of retail space, two open-air parking lots offering
approximately 2,500 spaces, a covered parking garage offering
1,210 spaces, docks leased to the Gateway Clipper Fleet, marina
slips, an outdoor amphitheater leased to a third party operator,
and land under a gas stations owned by a third party operator. The
age of the improvements vary, with the oldest structure built in
1897 and the newest structure built in 2001. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 93% and
1.11X at last review


GRAYSON CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on $31MM Class D Notes to 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Grayson CLO, Ltd.:

$68,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due November 1, 2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
August 8, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

$75,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due November 1, 2021, Upgraded to Ba3
(sf); previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

$31,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due November 1, 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $18,075,526), Upgraded to B1 (sf);
previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

$90,000,000 aggregate face amount of Grayson Combination Trust
2006 Pass Through Certificates due November 1, 2021 (current rated
balance of $61,303,064.87), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
August 8, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$1,015,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $922,206,093),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

$111,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on August 8, 2011
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$72,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously
on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from a higher spread level compared to the
level assumed at the last rating action. Moody's modeled a spread
of 3.34% compared to 3.05% at the time of the last rating action.
Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported collateral
quality and overcollateralization ratio are stable since the last
rating action.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $1.3 billion, defaulted par of $96.6 million,
a weighted average default probability of 20.9% (implying a WARF
of 2856), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.4%,
and a diversity score of 52. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Grayson CLO, Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Combination Trust
2006 Pass Through Certificates was "Using the Structured Note
Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2285)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: +1

Class A-2: +2

Class B: +2

Class C: +1

Class D: +1

Combination Trust: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3427)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: -2

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Combination Trust: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on X-C Debt to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes,
upgraded four classes and downgraded one class of Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2006 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of four investment grade classes is due to increased
credit support as the result of significant pay downs, including
the $120.2 million US Bank loan, amortization and the anticipated
pay downs of $152.2 million of defeased loans and other loans
approaching maturity.

The affirmation of three investment grade P&I classes is due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below investment grade P&I classes are consistent
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The IO Class, Class XC, is downgraded based on the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of its referenced classes
incorporating the expected pay downs of $152.2 million of defeased
loans and loans approaching maturity.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.4% of
the current balance compared to 8.2% at last review. While the
base expected loss percentage increased due to the 56% pay down
since last review, the base expected numeric loss declined $18.9
million. Moody's base plus realized losses totals 4.7% of the
original balance compared to 5.7% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to 10 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated December 20, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 7, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 56% to $379.7 million
from $1.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 30 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 45% of the pool. There are six defeased loans, representing
40% of the pool, that are backed by U.S. government securities.
All six defeased loans mature by December 5, 2013. There are no
loans with an investment grade credit assessment.

There are presently nine loans, representing 22% of the pool, on
the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As
part of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $29.9 million loss
(47.3% loss severity on average). Currently six loans,
representing 17% of the pool, are in special servicing and are
secured by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$41.9 million loss for the specially serviced loans (65% expected
loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 100% and 67% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 84% compared to 96% at last review. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.9% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.2%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.36X, respectively, compared to 1.24X
and 1.18X, respectively, at last full review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Generation Company Hotel
Portfolio Loan ($32.5 million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is
secured by the borrower's interest in a nine property portfolio of
Candlewood and Suburban Lodge hotels in Virginia and North
Carolina. These hotels were 71% occupied as of December 2012; the
same as at last review. Financial performance had declined between
2010 and 2011 but December 2012 financial results suggest
improvement. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.42X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.38X at last review. The
servicer expects this loan to pay off on October 1, 2013.

The second largest conduit loan is the Manaport Plaza Loan ($18.7
million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 249,547 SF
strip retail center located in Manassas, Virginia. The property
was 90% leased as of June 2013; the same as at last review. The
three largest tenants are Food Lion, Marshalls and Advance Auto
Parts. All three tenants have long-term leases in place. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.38X respectively, compared to
79% and 1.3X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 8670 Wilshire Boulevard Loan
($13.6 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 53,981
SF medical office building located in Beverly Hills, California.
The property was 95% leased as of August 2013 compared to 100% at
last review. Financial performance increased between 2011 and 2012
and significant recent leasing activity has limited the prior
lease expiration risk at this property. This loan matures December
2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.64X
respectively, compared to 72% and 1.5X at last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR2: S&P Lowers Rating on A-2 & B Secs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-2 and B certificates from GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
series 2006-RR2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The downgrades reflect principal losses experienced by the two
classes, as noted in the Aug. 23, 2013, trustee report.  According
to that report, the class A-2 certificates experienced a
$30,054,585.12 principal loss, reducing the class' balance to
$77.9 million from $107.9 million at issuance.  The class B
certificates experienced a $31,802,000.00 principal loss, reducing
the class' balance to zero from $31.8 million at issuance.

Classes C through J, which S&P had previously downgraded to
'D (sf)', also experienced principal losses this period that
reduced their class balances to zero.  The losses experienced by
those classes resulted from the transaction's exposure to
underlying CMBS collateral that has experienced $132.6 million in
principal losses this period.

According to the Aug. 23, 2013, trustee report, GS Mortgage
Securities Corp. II series 2006-RR2 is collateralized by 53 CMBS
classes ($499.1 million, 100%) from 42 distinct transactions
issued between 1998 and 2006.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: Moody's Keeps Ratings After Equity Transfer
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed of a non-permitted equity
transfer request of the Copper Beech Portfolio Loan in GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2011-GC5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-GC5. The transfer would allow for a
staged equity transfer of the Cooper Beech Portfolio Loan from
Copper Beech Townhome Communities Twenty Eight SPE, LLC et al
(borrower), to a wholly-owned subsidiary of Campus Crest
Communities, Inc. (purchaser).

The borrower has structured the acquisition to occur as an initial
purchase of 48% of the membership interests of the borrower and
the future purchase of the remaining 52% of the membership
interests of the borrower, pursuant to three purchase options that
may be exercised over an approximate three year period (although
the options may be exercised sooner). Concurrently with the
initial transfer, Campus Crest Communities, Inc. will be added as
a guarantor for the non-recourse carve-outs and environmental
indemnitor for the loan. During the second stage of transfer a
change in the property management to Campus Crest Communities,
Inc.'s management company will occur. The proposed Transfer will
become effective upon satisfaction of the conditions set forth in
the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the proposed transaction and determined that
this action will not in and of itself, result in a downgrade or
withdrawal of the current ratings to any class of certificates
rated by Moody's for GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-GC5,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC5.
Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with
the proposed amendment, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion
as to whether the amendment has, or could have, other non-credit
related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the
interests of holders of rated obligations and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-GC5,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC5 was
taken on August 15, 2013. The principal methodology used in this
rating was "Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS
Transactions" published in April 2005.

On August 15, 2013, Moody's affirmed the ratings of 12 classes of
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-GC5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC5 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: Moody's Rates Class G Certificates 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
fifteen classes of CMBS securities, issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2013-GCJ14, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-GCJ14.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. PEZ, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 84 fixed rate loans secured
by 132 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.57X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.04X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 102.5% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio (inclusive of subordinated, mezzanine and debt-like
preferred equity financing) of 105.8% is also considered when
analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated debt.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.39, which is higher
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009. The high weighted average grade is indicative of the
below average market composition of the pool and the stability of
the cash flows underlying the assets.

The pool's small market percentage is 29.6%, which is slightly
above other multi-borrower deals rated by Moody's since the
financial crisis and implies that the assets in the pool are
generally in major markets. Properties situated in major markets
tend to exhibit more cash flow and capitalization rate stability
over time compared to assets located in smaller or tertiary
markets.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is
25.1. The transaction's loan level diversity is in-line with
Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower transactions issued
since 2009. With respect to property level diversity, the pool's
property level Herfindahl Index is 34.3. The transaction's
property diversity profile is in line with the indices calculated
in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa classes with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals. The transaction was structured with additional
subordination at class A-S to mitigate the potential increased
severity to class A-S.

In terms of waterfall structure, the transaction contains a group
of exchangeable certificates. Classes A-S (Aaa (sf)), B (Aa3 (sf))
and C (A3 (sf)) may be exchanged for Class PEZ (A2 (sf))
certificates and Class PEZ may be exchanged for the Classes A-S, B
and C. The PEZ certificates will be entitled to receive the sum of
interest and principal distributable on the Classes A-S, B and C
certificates that are exchanged for such PEZ certificates. The
initial certificate balance of the Class PEZ certificates is equal
to the aggregate of the initial certificate balances of the Class
A-S, B and C and represent the maximum certificate balance of the
PEZ certificates that may be issued in an exchange.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.62
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship, and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1, which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 23%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa Super Senior class would be Aaa, Aaa, and Aa1,
respectively; for the most junior Aaa rated class A-S would be
Aa1, Aa2, and Aa3, respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time; rather they are designed to provide a quantitative
calculation of how the initial rating might change if key input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. Parameter
Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each scenario
from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint. Qualitative
factors are also taken into consideration in the ratings process,
so the actual ratings that would be assigned in each case could
vary from the information presented in the Parameter Sensitivity
analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


HALCYON LOAN 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Halcyon
Loan Advisors Funding 2013-1 Ltd./Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding
2013-1 LLC's $462.90 million fixed- and floating-rate notes
following the transaction's effective date as of May 20, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2013-1 Ltd./
Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2013-1 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     325.00
A-2A                       AA (sf)                       34.00
A-2B                       AA (sf)                       22.80
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                        34.60
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      25.00
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       21.50


HIGHLAND PARK I: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Four Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed the ratings of six classes of notes issued by Highland
Park CDO I, Ltd. The upgrade is due to rapid redemption of the
underlying collateral. The affirmations are due to key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Highland Park CDO I, Ltd. is a static (the reinvestment period
ended in February, 2012) cash transaction backed by a portfolio
of; i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (37.6% of the
pool balance); ii) real estate investment trust (REIT) (8.0%);
iii) whole loans (22.5%); iv) corporate term loans (12.3%); v) B-
Notes (3.8%); vi) common stock (6.7%); and viii) CRE CDO and Re-
remic debt (9.2%). As of the July 31, 2013 Trustee Report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preference
shares, has decreased to $422.6 million from $600.0 million at
issuance, as a result of the combination of the junior notes
cancellation to Class C and Class D notes and of the paydown
directed to the senior most outstanding class of notes from
voluntary and involuntary prepayment of collateral and failing of
certain par value tests.

Twenty-four asets with a par balance of $136.5 million (41.9% of
the pool balance) were listed as defaulted securities as of the
July 31, 2013 Trustee Report. Moody's expects significant losses
to occur on these assets once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,715
compared to 5,613 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (7.0% compared to 5.0% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(4.4% compared to 3.4% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (19.1% compared to
29.5% at last review), B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 4.3% at last
review), and Caa1-C (69.5% compared to 57.8% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.0 years, compared to 4.7 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 22.9% compared to 26.5 % at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 7.1% at last review.
The increase in MAC is due to higher credit risk collateral
concentrated in fewer collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, released on May 16,
2013, was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect
on the capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are are
particularly sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.
Holding all other key parameters static, changing the recovery
rate assumption up from 22.9% to 32.9% or down to 12.9% would
result in average rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 6
notches upward and 0 to 5 notches downward respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


HSBC HOME 2007-3: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Class M-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 36
tranches, downgraded the ratings of 10 tranches and upgraded the
ratings of two tranches from 10 transactions, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans, issued by HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-2

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-3

Cl. A-3F, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3V, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-4

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3F, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3V, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-1

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-S, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3F, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3V, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-2

Cl. A-M, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-S, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3V, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3F, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-3

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PT, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
In addition, the rating actions reflect correction of errors in
the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models
previously used by Moody's in rating these transactions.

For all of the transactions, the pooling and servicing agreements
state that principal and interest collections are commingled first
and then used to make payments on the bonds. However, the cash
flow models used in prior rating actions incorrectly applied
separate interest and principal waterfalls. Due to the discovery
of this error, 52 tranches were placed on watch on May 1, 2013. In
addition, for HSBC 2005-1, 2005-2, 2005-3, 2006-1, and 2006-2, the
principal payment waterfall and allocation of losses were
incorrectly coded in the cash flow models used for the previous
rating actions. The errors have now been corrected, and these
rating actions reflect these changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


I-PREFERRED TERM II: A.M. Best Hikes $26.20MM Notes Rating From B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Co. has upgraded the debt ratings on four tranches and
affirmed the debt ratings on three additional tranches of a multi-
tranche collateralized debt obligation (CDO) co-issued by two
bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicles: I-Preferred Term
Securities II, Ltd. (Cayman Islands) and I-Preferred Term
Securities II, Inc. (Delaware) (collectively known as I-Preferred
Term Securities II and issuers).  The outlook for all ratings is
stable.

The principal balance of the rated notes are collateralized by a
pool of trust preferred securities, surplus notes and secondary
market securities (collectively, the capital securities),
primarily issued by small- to medium-sized insurance companies.
The capital securities are pledged as security to the notes.
Interest paid by the issuers of the capital securities are the
primary source of funds to pay operating expenses of the issuers
and interest on the notes.  Repayment of the note principal is
primarily funded from the redemption of the capital securities.

These rating actions primarily reflect: (1) the current issuer
credit ratings (ICR) of the remaining issuers of the capital
securities and the number of terminated capital securities; (2) a
stress of up to 250% on the assumed marginal default rates of
insurers (derived from Best's Idealized Default Rates of
Insurers); (3) the amount of capital securities considered to be
in distress; (4) recoveries of 0% after the default of the capital
securities; and (5) qualitative factors such as the effect of
interest rate spikes; subordination level associated with each
rated debt tranche; the adjacency of very high investment grade
ratings to very low non-investment grade ratings in the
transaction's capital structure; and the possibility that
additional redemptions of highly-rated entities will leave lower-
rated companies in the collateral pool.

The debt ratings could be upgraded or downgraded and/or the
outlook revised if there are material changes in the ICR of the
remaining insurance carriers, an increase in the number of
defaulted capital securities or significant termination of the
number of existing capital securities.

The following debt ratings have been upgraded:

I-Preferred Term Securities II

-- to "bbb" from "bb+" on $86.50 million Floating Rate Class B-1
    Mezzanine Notes Due May 22, 2033

-- to "bbb" from "bb+" on $9.50 million Fixed/Floating Rate Class
    B-2 Mezzanine Notes Due May 22, 2033

-- to "bbb" from "bb+" on $52.25 million Fixed/Floating Rate
    Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes Due May 22, 2033

-- to "bb-" from "b" on $26.20 million Floating Rate Class C
    Mezzanine Notes Due May 22, 2033

The following debt ratings have been affirmed:

I-Preferred Term Securities II

-- "aaa" on $151.80 million Floating Rate Class A-1-A Senior
    Notes Due May 22, 2033

-- "aaa" on $68.00 million Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes
    Due May 22, 2033

-- "aaa" on $7.00 million Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-3 Senior
    Notes Due May 22, 2033

These are structured finance ratings.


IMPALA TRUST: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned preliminary ratings to
seven classes of auto-, equipment-, fixtures- and fittings-, and
medical practice loan-backed, floating-rate, pass-through notes to
be issued by Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. as trustee of IMPALA Trust
No. 1 - Sub Series 2013-1.

The transaction is a securitization of fully and partially
amortizing Australian-dollar, auto-, equipment-, and fixtures- and
fittings-backed finance leases, commercial hire-purchase
agreements, and goods mortgages mainly offered to health-industry
participants and accountants, as well as practice loans offered to
health-industry participants.  The receivables were originated by
Investec Professional Finance Pty. Ltd. and Investec Bank
(Australia) Ltd.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The creation of a new special-purpose subseries, coupled
      with the transaction's legal structure.  The entity, IMPALA
      Trust No. 1 - Sub Series 2013-1, meets Standard & Poor's
      special-purpose entity criteria.

   -- The credit support for each class of notes, which is
      provided in the form of subordination comprising 8.4%
      provided at 'A-1+ (sf)' and 'AAA (sf)', 6.6% provided at 'AA
      (sf)', 5. 2% provided at 'A (sf)', 3.6% provided at
      'BBB (sf)', 3.1% provided at 'BB (sf)', and 2.4% provided at
      'B (sf)'.

   -- Liquidity support equal to 1.11% of the outstanding amount
      of receivables, amortizing to 50% of the initial limit.
      Liquidity will be funded from note issuance at closing, and
      will be held in the liquidity account.  Principal
      collections also may be used to meet short-term liquidity
      demands.  With exception of the class A notes, a class of
      notes cannot draw down liquidity or principal if there are
      unreimbursed charge offs against that class of notes.

   -- The seller notes do not have access to these liquidity
      mechanisms.

   -- The condition that all contractual payments, including the
      residual or balloon payments, are an obligation of the
      borrower.  As a result, the issuer is not exposed to any
      market-value risk associated with the sale of the autos,
      equipment, and fixtures and fittings (on performing loans),
      which is a risk that may be associated with other products,
      such as operating leases.

   -- The benefit of a fixed-to-floating interest-rate swap
      provided by Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. to
      hedge the mismatch between the fixed-rate interest and
      rental payments on the receivables, and the floating-rate
      coupon payable on the notes.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard and Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1773.pdf

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

Please refer to the initial rating report for any additional
regulatory
disclosures that may apply to a transaction.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Class              Rating           Amount (mil. A$)
A1                 A-1+ (sf)         55.0
A2                 AAA (sf)         199.7
B                  AA (sf)            5.0
C                  A (sf)             4.0
D                  BBB (sf)           4.3
E                  BB (sf)            1.5
F                  B (sf)             1.79
Senior seller      N.R.               5.0
Junior seller      N.R.               1.9

N.R.--Not rated.


ING IM CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on ING IM
CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2013-1 LLC's $556.5 million floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
May 31, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ING IM CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     393.00
A-2                        AA (sf)                       66.75
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                        42.75
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      29.25
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       24.75


JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC4: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. D Notes to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of one class and
affirmed three classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2002-CIBC4 as follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade is due to higher than expected losses from troubled
loans and loans in special servicing.

The ratings of Classes C and E are consistent with Moody's
expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X-1, is consistent with the expected credit performance of
its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.9% of
the current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 10.7%. Realized losses have increased from 11.7% of the
original balance to 12.3% since the prior review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.0% of the original
pooled balance compared to 12.4% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis.

Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf)
and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit
assessments is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is
based on the credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10 compared to 11 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated November 28, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $42.7
million from $798.9 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 83% of the pool. One loan, representing 4% of the
pool, has defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains no loans with investment grade credit
assessments.

Four loans, representing 35% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $98.7 million (93.4% loss severity
on average). This includes The Highland Mall loan, which was
liquidated at a 120% severity. Currently three loans, representing
18% of the pool, are in special servicing. These loans are secured
by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $4.8
million loss for the specially serviced loans (64% expected loss
on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 92%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 64% compared to 58% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 14%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.56%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.19X and 1.88X, respectively, compared to
1.37X and 1.95X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The three largest conduit loans represent 40% of the outstanding
pool balance. The performance of these loans has remained stable
since the last review.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Cert Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 19 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-LDP1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-JFL, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below investment grade classes are consistent with
Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO
Class, Class X1, is consistent with the expected credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.6% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
5.4%. Realized losses have increased from 2.0% of the original
balance to 2.1% since the prior review. Moody's base expected plus
realized losses represent 5.1% of the original securitized balance
compared to 5.3% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20 compared to 23 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 20, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 45% to $1.6 billion
from $2.9 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 165 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 48% of the pool. Sixteen loans, representing 8% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains one loan with an investment grade
credit assessment, representing 2% of the pool.

Thirty loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $59.1 million (47% loss severity on
average). Nine loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Independence Plaza Loan ($19.4 million -- 1.2% of the pool), which
is secured by a 252,000 square foot (SF) retail center located in
Hamilton Township, New Jersey. The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2010 due to payment default. The borrower
subsequently consented to receivership and foreclosure and a
receiver was appointed in October 2010. Extensive settlement
discussions have taken place with no resolution to date.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $30.2 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (40% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for ten poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $13.9 million loss (19% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 87%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 86% compared to 87% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 8.7%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.15X, respectively, compared to
1.45X and 1.12X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Harbor Court Loan ($27.5
million - 1.7%), which is secured by the leased fee interest in
the land beneath a 31-story mixed-use project located in Honolulu,
Hawaii. The improvements consist of a 202,000 square foot office
building, 120 residential condominium units and a 1,046-space
parking structure. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Baa3 and 1.30X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 32% of the pool. The largest
performing loan is the Woodbridge Center Loan ($186.5 million --
11.8% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in
a 1.6 million square foot (557,000 square feet of loan collateral)
regional mall located in Woodbridge, New Jersey. The mall is
anchored by Sears, Macy's, Lord & Taylor, J.C. Penney and Dick's
Sporting Goods. As of March 2013, the in-line tenant space was 87%
leased compared to 84% at last review. The loan sponsor is General
Growth Properties. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and
1.09X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.12X at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the One River Place
Apartments Loan ($180.0 million -- 11.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 921-unit Class A multifamily property located in New
York City. The property also includes 42,000 square feet of ground
floor retail space that is currently fully leased. The apartment
component of the property is 99% leased as of March 2013 compared
to 97% at last review and 95% at securitization. Performance
improved in 2012 over the prior year due to an increase in rental
revenue. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 0.99X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Pier 39 Loan ($137.0
million -- 8.7% of the pool), which is secured by the leasehold
interest in a 242,300 square foot specialty retail center located
in the Fisherman's Wharf area in San Francisco. The collateral is
encumbered by a ground lease that expires in 2042 and has no
renewal options. As of December 2012, the property was 97% leased
compared to 95% at last review and 96% at securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to
101% and 0.97X at last review.



JP MORGAN 2006-S3: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 RMBS Tranches to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
tranches and upgraded the ratings of three tranches from one RMBS
transaction issued by J.P. Morgan. The actions impact
approximately $16.1 million of RMBS issued from 2006.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S3

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-8, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, these rating actions reflect the
correction of an error in the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW)
cash flow model used by Moody's in rating this transaction. In the
September 19, 2012 rating action, the model distributed principal
to the bonds in group two sequentially, in order of numerical
ranking, rather than to each bond from its related subgroup. This
error has now been corrected and these rating actions reflect this
change.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


JP MORGAN 2012-C8: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. F Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed all classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8 as follows:

-- Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-S, A-SB, X-A and X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Classes C and EC at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

The trends on all classes are Stable.

The pool consists of 43 loans, secured by 84 multifamily and
commercial properties, with a weighted-average debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and weighted-average debt yield of 1.60
times (x) and 10.1%, respectively.  The transaction has
experienced 0.9% of collateral reduction since issuance as a
result of amortization.  The pool benefits from a relatively low-
leverage financing, and a healthy amortization schedule.  Nine
loans in the pool amortize on schedules of 25 years or less, and
the pool is scheduled to amortize 14.8% by maturity.

The pool is concentrated by property type, with 26.4% of the pool
secured by retail properties.  The largest loan in the pool,
Battlefield Mall (Prospectus ID#1, 11.1% of the current pool
balance), is also the largest retail property in the pool. Five
loans representing over 20% of the pool, including Battlefield
Mall, are located in tertiary markets.  Battlefield Mall is
considered a strong regional mall and benefits from superior
sponsorship by the owner/operator, Simon Property Group, Inc.
Other retail loans were modeled with a penalty for below-average
cash flow stability for reasons including rural or tertiary
locations, single-tenant occupancy and location in a weak market.


KANAWHA COUNTY: Moody's Rates Student Housing Revenue Bonds 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 long-term underlying
rating to The County Commission of Kanawha County, West Virginia
Student Housing Revenue Bonds (The West Virginia State University
Foundation Project) Series 2013. The outlook on the bonds is
stable.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating and outlook reflect the University's strong affiliation
with the Project, the relative strength of the specific support
guarantees from the University (rated Baa1 negative), satisfactory
real estate fundamentals including market position and demand, a
strong legal structure and satisfactory projected financial
performance.

The Series 2013 bonds are limited obligations of the Issuer, The
County Commission of Kanawha County, payable from the pledged
revenues from a 291-bed student housing facility to be built on
the campus of the West Virginia State University; and further
secured by a lien on underlying assets and contracts, as specified
in the security agreements between the West Virginia State
University Foundation (the "Borrower) and The Huntington National
Bank (the "Bond Trustee"). Otherwise, the bonds are non-recourse
obligations of the Borrower.

The West Virginia State University Foundation (the "Foundation")
is a West Virginia nonprofit corporation whose primary purpose is
to support the West Virginia State University. The Foundation will
serve as the Borrower and Sponsor/Owner of the Project.

The West Virginia State University (the "University", rated Baa1
negative) is a State-supported institution of higher education
located in Institute, West Virginia. The University will provide
property management services, including marketing the Project as
part of its existing student housing program.

AUDG Institute, LLC (the "Developer), a Georgia limited liability
company affiliated with Ambling University Development Group, LLC,
will serve as the developer of the Project.

Strengths:

- Satisfactory projected debt service coverage of 1.23x in first
year following stabilization

- Strong University affiliation through strategic and legal ties,
including: University-managed, replacement housing with central
on-campus location, and application of the University's 2-year on-
campus housing requirement

- Additional support through subordination of Project operating
expenses, guaranteed by the University, and presence of a
contingent lease agreement, whereby the University guarantees a
fixed charges coverage ratio of 1.00x on the bonds

- University's incentive to operate efficiently given its legal
claim on surplus cash flow

- Experienced developer specializing in student housing nationwide

Challenges:

- Recent trend of declining enrollment levels at the University,
although expected to stabilize as evidenced by positive enrollment
statistics for the fall 2013 term

- Trend of low occupancy rates in the University's existing
housing, which management attributes to their unwillingness to
enforce the University's housing requirement given the physical
undesirability of the existing housing; furthermore, if new
housing does not achieve improved occupancy rates, the Project may
need to rely on University for coverage of operating expenses.

- Construction and lease-up risk, partially mitigated by
capitalized interest, developer reputation and other guarantees,
including ability to house students in alternative location in
case of delays

- Standalone project financing in which revenues flow out each
year, rather than being retained in Project funds for capital
reinvestment

- Absence of financial obligation from University towards the
bonds, although the University is providing significant operating
expense and revenue back-stop guarantees to the project

Outlook

The outlook is stable given the University's strong affiliation
with the project, satisfactory real estate fundamentals including
market position and demand, and satisfactory projected financial
performance.

What could change the rating -- UP?:

- The issuance of the certificate of occupancy, full lease-up and
strong financial performance of the Project for a minimum of two
years

What could change the rating -- DOWN?:

- Prolonged construction delays

- Failure to lease up at the expected occupancy and rent levels

- Failure to achieve a minimum debt coverage level of 1.10x after
first stabilization year

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Housing
Projects published in July 2010.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Cuts Rating on 4 Certs to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed 12 classes
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust (LB-UBS) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2005-C2.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in actual and expected losses
across the pool since last review. Fitch modeled losses of 16% of
the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 10.9%, including $47.5 million (2.4% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 24 loans
(36.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes eight specially
serviced assets (4.2%).

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 47.1% to $1.03 billion from
$1.94 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, four loans
(6.6% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes C through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Woodbury Office
Portfolio II (14.4% of the pool) which is secured by 22 office
properties totaling 1.1 million square feet (sf) located in Long
Island, NY. The original $163.6 million loan had transferred to
special servicing in January 2010 for imminent default. The loan
was modified in August 2011 while in special servicing. Terms of
the modification included an extension to the original loan term
and bifurcation of the loan into a senior ($104.5 million) and
junior ($51.4 million) interest-only component; the senior A-note
has since paid down to $96.5 million. Although losses are not
expected imminently, any recovery to the subject B-note is
contingent upon full recovery to the A-note proceeds at the loan's
maturity in December 2015. Unless collateral performance improves,
recovery to the B-note component is unlikely.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Woodbury
Office Portfolio I (6.18%) which is secured by 10 office
properties containing approximately 480,000sf, located in Long
Island, NY. The original $63.5 million loan had transferred to
special servicing in January 2010 when the borrower had requested
a modification of the loan terms, including an extension of the
April 2010 maturity date; the loan matured in April 2010 without
repayment. The loan was modified in August 2011 while in special
servicing. Terms of the modification included an extension to the
original loan term and bifurcation of the loan into a senior
($35.5 million) and junior ($28 million) component. Although
losses are not expected imminently, any recovery to the subject B-
note is contingent upon full recovery to the A-note proceeds at
the loan's maturity in December 2015. Unless collateral
performance improves, recovery to the B-note component is
unlikely.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is Park 80 West
(9.75%) which is secured by a two-building, 505,000sf office
complex located in Saddle Brook, NJ. The original $100 million
loan transferred to special servicing in December 2009 due to
imminent default. The loan was modified in March 2012 while in
special servicing. Terms of the modification included a
bifurcation of the loan into a senior ($72 million) and junior
($28 million) component. Although losses are not expected
imminently, any recovery to the subject B-note is contingent upon
full recovery to the A-note proceeds at the loan's maturity in
February 2015. Unless collateral performance improves, recovery to
the B-note component is unlikely.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-4, A-AB, and A-5 remain Stable due to
sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown. The Negative
Outlook on classes A-J, B, and C reflect Fitch's concern over the
modified loans Classes A-J, B, and C may be subject to negative
rating actions should realized losses be greater than Fitch's
expectations. The distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected to be subject to further downgrades as losses are
realized.

Fitch downgrades the following classes:

-- $121.7 million class A-J to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
   Negative;

-- $13.9 million class B to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Negative;

-- $29.2 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $193 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.8 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $470.7 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.9 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%.
-- $41.4 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $17 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $17 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $17 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.2 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $15.8 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class N, P, Q and S certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP
and X-CL certificates.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2003-C8: Moody's Cuts X-CL Notes Rating to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms the ratings of two classes,
upgrades eight classes and downgrades one class of LB UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-C8 as follows:

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2008 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the one investment grade P&I class is due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement level for the affirmed class is
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The affirmation of
the one below investment grade P&I class is due to the rating
being consistent with Moody's expected losses.

The upgrades of eight P&I classes are due to increased credit
support due to amortization and payoffs as well as anticipated
paydowns from defeased loans and other loans approaching maturity
that are well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by
82% since Moody's last review. Virtually the entire pool matures
within the next six month, including eight defeased loans,
representing $77.1 million. Classes D through H are completely
covered by defeased loans that mature in 2013.

The interest-only class, Class X-CL, is downgraded based on the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of its referenced classes
incorporating the expected pay downs of $77.1 million of defeased
loans and other loans well positioned for refinancing.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.2% of the
current balance compared to 3.2% at last review. Although the
percentage has increased from last review, the dollar amount has
actually decreased significantly from $25.3 million to $10.5
million. Moody's base expected plus cumulative realized losses is
now 1.8% of the original, securitized pool compared to 2.8% at
last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8 compared to 13 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 21, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $146.3
million from $1.4 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 23 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool. Nine loans representing 57% have defeased
and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Four loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $14.5 million (21% loss severity
overall). Currently five loans, representing 10% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
PGA Commons Loan ($6.5 million -- 4% of the pool). The loan is
secured by a retail and office property located in Palm Beach
Gardens, Florida. The property was 21% leased as of July 2013 and
was deemed non-recoverable by the Master Servicer on June 4, 2013.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Centerpoint
Shopping Center Loan ($3.6 million - 2% of the pool), which is
secured by an anchored retail shopping center located in Waco,
Texas. The loan transferred to special servicing due maturity
default.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Summergate
Shopping Center Loan ($2.3 million -- 2% of the pool), which is
secured by a retail center located in the Las Vergas Valley. The
property is currently 79% leased as of December 2012. The loan
transferred to special servicing on December 24, 2012 for payment
default and the lender is dual tracking foreclosure and
receivership.

The remaining specially serviced loans are represented by a mix of
property types. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $9.7 million
loss (64% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 89% and 80% of the performing pool
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 75% compared to 84% at last
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.50X and 1.41X, respectively, compared to
1.36X and 1.21X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the One Sound Shore Drive Loan ($13.6
million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a suburban office
building located in Greenwich, Connecticut. The property was 97%
leased as of June 2013, the same as at last review. Performance
has improved since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
85% and 1.24X, respectively, compared to 101% and 1.04X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Jeffrey Plaza Loan ($11.8
million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a retail center
located in Chicago, Illinois that is anchored by Dominick's
grocery store. The loan is on the watchlist for an upcoming
maturity date of September 11, 2013. Per the servicer, it is
expected to pay off by maturity. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
73% and 1.41X, respectively, compared to 95% and 1.08X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 43 Avenue C Loan ($6.4
million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 28-unit
multifamily property located in New York City. Per the servicer,
this loan is expected to pay off by September 11, 2013. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.15X, respectively, compared to
80% and 1.13X at last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2008-C1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 15 classes of LB
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2008-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2008
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the four investment grade P&I classes are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. The ratings of the ten below investment
grade P&I classes are consistent with Moody's expected loss and
thus are affirmed. The rating of the interest-only class, Class
XW, is consistent with the expected credit performance of its
referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.5% of
the current balance compared to 10.4% at last review. Moody's base
expected plus cumulative realized losses is now 14.0% of the
original securitized pool compared to 13.0% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15, the same as at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 13, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to $897.2
million from $1.0 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 60 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool. There is one loan with a credit assessment,
representing 11% of the pool. One loan representing less than 1%
has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

Thirteen loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $44.0 million (71% loss severity
overall). This is an increase from $36.6 million in realized
losses at last review. Currently eight loans, representing 10% of
the pool, are in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Memphis Retail Portfolio Loan ($24.9 million--2.8% of
the pool). The loan was originally secured by five retail
properties located around Collierville, Tennessee, approximately
25 miles east of Memphis. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2011 as the result of monetary default. A
receiver was appointed in August 2011 and the servicer continues
to pursue foreclosure. As of April 2013, two properties sold for a
total of $2.4 million and the strategy for the remaining
properties is to lease up and stabilize them prior to marketing
them for sale.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Sutton Plaza
Loan ($21.0 million - 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
retail property located in Mount Olive Township, New Jersey. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2011 as the
result of monetary default. The property was formerly anchored by
A&P which vacated after the company filed for bankruptcy. This
loan was modified with an A/B note split consisting of a $5.6
million B-note, an increase in IO periods and a decrease in
interest rate from 5.9% to 3.0%. The A-note is expected to return
to the Master in September 2013, once all post-closing
requirements are satisfied.

The remaining specially serviced loans are represented by a mix of
property types. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $40.7 million
loss (46% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $12.9 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 54%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 96% and 55% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 104% compared to 108% at
last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 13% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.03X, respectively,
compared to 1.28X and 0.99X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with the credit assessment is the Chevy Chase Center Loan
($96.0 million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured by a 397,744
square foot (SF) mixed-use property located in Chevy Chase,
Maryland. Office space represents 56% of the net rentable area
(NRA) with retail space representing the remainder of the
property. The largest tenant is The Mills Limited Partnership,
which leases 51% of the NRA through March 2016. As of December
2012, the property was 94% leased, the same as at last review. The
loan fully amortizes on a 240-month schedule and matures in
November 2026. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR
are Baa3 and 1.52X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.42X at
last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 33% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the Westfield Southlake Loan ($140.0
million -- 16% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.4 million SF regional mall located in
Merrillville, Indiana. The mall is anchored by Sears (not part of
the collateral), J.C. Penney, and Macy's (not part of the
collateral). The property was 98% leased as of April 2013,
compared to 96% at last review. The loan is interest-only for its
entire ten-year term maturing in January 2018. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.12X, respectively, compared to 92% and
1.03X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Regions Harbert Plaza Loan
($87.6 million -- 10% of the pool), which is secured by a 613,800
SF office property built in 1989 and located in downtown
Birmingham, Alabama. The largest tenants include Regions Bank,
which leases 35% of the NRA through December 2017, and Balch &
Bingham LLP, which leases 23% of the NRA through October 2022. The
property was 98% leased as of May 2013, the same as at last
review. Performance remains stable. The loan had a 24-month
interest only period but is currently amortizing on a 360-month
schedule maturing in March 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
93% and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 97% and 1.09X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Westin Charlotte Loan ($70.9
million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is a pari-passu interest in a
$174.3 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 26-
story, 700-room full service hotel located in Charlotte, North
Carolina. Property performance has improved since last review and
is expected to improve going forward. The loan had a 12-month
interest only period but is now amortizing on a 360-month schedule
maturing in January 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 136%
and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 157% and 0.74X at last
review.


LEAF RECEIVABLES 2011-1: DBRS Rates Class E-1 Securities 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
The ratings of the LEAF Receivables Funding 6, LLC - Equipment
Contract Backed Notes, Series 2011-1 remain Under Review with
Negative Implications due to the existence of an Event of Servicer
Termination related to the breach of a delinquency performance
trigger.  The placement of the ratings Under Review with Negative
Implications had originally been taken on June 24, 2013.  If
exercised, the Event of Servicer Termination could affect future
performance of the collateral.  The outstanding ratings will
either be confirmed or downgraded depending on the resolution of
this situation.

Delinquency performance has improved since the breach with the
current month 91+ day delinquencies below 3% in the most recent
Series 2011-1 Monthly Servicer Report delivered in connection with
the August 20, 2013 payment date.  However, while delinquency
performance has in the current period migrated within more
anticipated ranges, the additional defaults recorded and greater
obligor concentration in the remaining portfolio increase the
potential for stress on the transaction, particularly upon the
junior most rated security, the Class E-2.

DBRS will continue to monitor delinquency aging, defaults and
recoveries, and will resolve the Under Review with Negative
Implications as soon as sufficient information becomes available.

DBRS has also discontinued the AAA (sf) rating of the Class A
notes due to the repayment of the notes.


Issuer                             Debt Rated      Rating   Rating
                                                   Action
------                             ----------      ------   ------

LEAF Receivables Funding 6, LLC -  Series 2011-1,  Disc.-   Disc.
Equipment Contract Backed Notes,    Class A        Repaid
Series 2011-1

LEAF Receivables Funding 6, LLC -  Series 2011-1,  UR-Neg.  AA(sf)
Equipment Contract Backed Notes,    Class B
Series 2011-1

LEAF Receivables Funding 6, LLC -  Series 2011-1,  UR-Neg.  A(sf)
Equipment Contract Backed Notes,    Class C
Series 2011-1

LEAF Receivables Funding 6, LLC -  Series 2011-1,  UR-Neg. BBB(sf)
Equipment Contract Backed Notes,    Class D
Series 2011-1

LEAF Receivables Funding 6, LLC -  Series 2011-1,  UR-Neg.  BB(sf)
Equipment Contract Backed Notes,    Class E-1
Series 2011-1

LEAF Receivables Funding 6, LLC -  Series 2011-1,  UR-Neg.  B(low)
Equipment Contract Backed Notes,    Class E-2                (sf)
Series 2011-1


LOOMIS SAYLES I: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Loomis Sayles CLO I, Ltd.:

$296,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $291,607,444.74), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on August 24, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

$20,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aa2
(sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

$20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$21,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf)

$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020
(current outstanding balance of $9,968,976.60), Affirmed B1 (sf);
previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in October 2013 as well
as the expectation of deleveraging following the end of the
reinvestment period. In consideration of the reinvestment
restrictions applicable during the amortization period, and
therefore limited ability to effect significant changes to the
current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a
higher likelihood that the collateral pool characteristics will
continue to maintain a positive buffer relative to certain
covenant requirements. In particular, the deal is assumed to
benefit from a higher weighted average spread (WAS). Moody's
modeled WAS of 3.24% compared to the covenant level of 2.8%.

Moody's notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on the
latest trustee report dated July 18, 2013, the WARF is currently
2437 compared to 2649 in August 2012.

Moody's also notes that the deal has accumulated a large principal
proceeds balance. Based on the July 2013 trustee report, the
principal proceeds balance totaled $134 million, or approximately
35.5% of the total par. Moody's ran various scenarios to test the
sensitivity of the ratings to the timing and magnitude of the use
of principal proceeds to amortize the notes.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, WARF, diversity score, and WARR, are based
on its published methodology and may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $369 million, defaulted par of $9.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 14.72% (implying a WARF of
2585), a WARR upon default of 50.02%, and a diversity score of 42.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Loomis Sayles CLO I, Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2068)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3102)

Class A: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.


MERRILL LYNCH 2003-CANADA 10: Moody's Ups Cl. K Certs Rating to B1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of nine classes and
affirmed two classes of Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-Canada
10 as follows:

Cl. D-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to increased credit support resulting from
pay downs and amortization. The pool has paid down by 85% since
Moody's last full review and 93% since securitization. In
addition, there are two loans representing, 10% of the pool, that
Moody's anticipates paying off at maturity within the next two
months.

The affirmations of the IO classes are consistent with the
expected credit performance of their referenced classes and thus
are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current balance compared to 1.9% at last review. Base expected
losses and realized losses have decreased to 0.2% of the original
balance from 0.9% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 12 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated January 25, 2013.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $30.3
million from $460.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 49% of the pool. Six loans, representing
approximately 94% of the pool, are 100% recourse.

Four loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. Two of these loans, representing 10% of the
pool, are on the watchlist due to approaching maturity. The Master
Servicer informed Moody's that the borrowers are in the process of
refinancing the loans. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not realized any losses and currently there are no
loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 45%
compared to 61% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 2.64X,
respectively, compared to 1.48X and 2.03X, respectively, at last
full review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The three largest conduit loans represent 78% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is The Junction (Phase I) Loan ($14.9 million --
49% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in
Phase 1 of 370,000 square foot (SF) power center (194,000 SF of
collateral) located in Mission, British Columbia. The loan is
encumbered with a $7.0 million B-note held outside the trust. The
collateral is anchored by Sav-on-Foods, which leases 30% of the
net rentable area (NRA) through 2018. As of January 2013, the
property was 98% leased compared to 99% at last review. The loan
is full recourse to RioCan, the sponsor, and is amortizing on a
22-year amortization schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
36% and 2.81X, respectively, compared to 39% and 2.59X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the CLA-721523 aka 4441-76th Avenue SE
Loan ($5.9 million -- 19.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
324,000 SF industrial property in Calgary, Alberta. As of March
2013, the property was 96% leased, the same as at last review. The
property's largest tenant is MC Commercial, which leases 61% of
the NRA through June 2019. The loan's sponsor is H&R REIT, a
publicly traded company that owns and manages over 54 million
square feet of commercial real estate. The loan is benefitting
from amortization and full recourse to the sponsor. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 45% and 2.21X, respectively, compared to 44%
and 2.27X at last review.

The third largest loan is CLA 75880 aka 6045 Edwards Boulevard
Loan ($2.79 million -- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
73,000 SF industrial property located in Mississauga, ON. The
property is 100% leased to Parmalat Dairy and Bakery through
January 2015 with a 7-year lease renewal option. The loan matures
in May 2015. The loan is benefitting from amortization and is full
recourse to Metrus Properties, the sponsor. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 38% and 2.60X, respectively, compared to 34% and
2.96X at last review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-WMC2: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 RMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC2. The
transaction is backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC2

Cl. S, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance of this transaction
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pool. The
upgrades are primarily as a result of improved performance on the
related pool over the past year.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-A6: Moody's Ups Cl. II-A-4 Debt Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four
tranches from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-A6,
backed by Alt-A loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-A6

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012
Confirmed at C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and faster amortization of the bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


ML-CFC 2006-1: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'B(low)(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has downgraded one class of the ML-CFC Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Series 2006-1 as follows:

-- Class D from B (sf) to B (low) (sf)

In conjunction with the rating action, DBRS has changed the trend
on Class D to Stable from Negative.

DBRS has also confirmed nine classes in the transaction with
Stable trends as follows:

-- Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class AM at AAA (sf)
-- Class AJ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class AN-FL at A (low) (sf)
-- Class B at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)

In addition, three classes were confirmed with no trends as
follows:

-- Class E at CCC (sf)
-- Class F at C (sf)
-- Class G at C (sf)

As of the August 2013 remittance report, 116 of the original 152
loans remain in the pool with a total pool balance of $1.3
billion, which represents a collateral reduction of 42.7% since
issuance.  The largest 15 loans in the pool display stable
performance with a weighted-average debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.38x and a weighted-average debt yield of 10.5%,
respectively.

The rating actions taken as part of this review reflect the
current outlook for the nine specially serviced loans,
representing 6.3% of the current pool balance, including five
loans representing 3.1% of the current pool balance, which have
transferred to special servicing within the past 12 months.  Since
issuance, 20 loans have liquidated, resulting in realized losses
to the trust of $87.3 million.  Within the past 12 months, six
loans liquidated from the trust at a weighted-average loss
severity of 47.7%, with total realized losses of $28.3 million.
The most recent liquidation occurred with the July 2013 remittance
report; Prospectus ID #11 Inglewood Park was liquidated at a 72.6%
loss severity, resulting in a $5.7 million loss to the trust.

The largest loan in special servicing is Prospectus ID #24
Breckenridge Park Portfolio, which represents 1.4% of the pool and
is secured by a portfolio of 11 Class B warehouse/office flex
buildings located in Tampa, Florida.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer in February 2013 for imminent default.  At
the time of transfer, the borrower reported that operating
expenses were not being paid due to cash flow shortfalls and they
would cease to cover any shortages moving forward.  The loan
remains delinquent and payments are due from March 2013.
According to the special servicer, tenants have been vacating the
property as a result of deteriorating property conditions and as a
result, occupancy has steadily decreased from 77.2% at YE2011 to
65.2% at YE2012 and to 60.1% as of February 2013.  The YE2012 cash
flow of $1.1 million represents a 29.3% decline from issuance and
is not expected to improve in the near term with the borrower's
2013 budget estimating a $1 million net cash flow (NCF) shortfall
by the end of the year.  A May 2013 appraisal valued six of the
buildings, representing 74.7% of the allocated loan balance, at
$11.7 million, down from $16.3 million at issuance.  An updated
appraisal for the remaining properties has not been received, but
indications suggest a decline in value for the remaining
properties.  The borrower has requested an interest-only payment
modification, which is currently being explored by the special
servicer in conjunction with foreclosure.  DBRS expects there to
be losses to the Trust with the resolution of this loan.

There are 32 loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing 22.6%
of the current pool balance as of the August 2013 remittance
report.

The largest loan on the watchlist is Prospectus ID #8, CNL-Cirrus
MOB Portfolio II, which represents 4.4% of the current pool
balance.  This loan is secured by a portfolio of six medical
office properties located across three states.  Four properties
are located in Texas and the other two are in Missouri and
Arizona.  The loan was added to the servicer's watchlist in
October 2011 for a low DSCR, which can be partially attributed to
a decline in occupancy and the expiration of the interest-only
period.  Occupancy has declined from 91% at issuance to 78% in
2011.  As of the March 2013 rent roll, the portfolio occupancy
rate remains at 78%.

The Ballas Medical Plaza, located in the St. Louis suburb of Creve
Coeur, representing 34.6% of the CNL-Cirrus MOB Portfolio II loan
balance, has struggled since early 2010 when the largest tenant
vacated causing occupancy to drop to 48%.  As a result, the
respective DSCR has steadily decreased from 0.84x at YE2010 to -
0.05x at YE2012.  Despite the poor performance of the Missouri
property, the property in Denton, Texas, which represents 34.6% of
the allocated loan balance, has experienced improved performance,
offsetting the difficulties of the Missouri property.  The Denton
property previously suffered from a dispute among the physicians
at the property, resulting in a decline in referrals and
ultimately the property's performance.  The dispute has been
resolved and the respective DSCR increased from 0.32x at YE2011 to
1.65x at YE2012.  The portfolio DSCR has increased from 0.54x at
YE2011 to 0.93x at YE2012, but still remains well below the
issuer's underwriting level of 1.38x.

DBRS has confirmed the shadow rating of one loan, representing
0.9% of the current pool balance.


MORGAN STANLEY 1998-CF1: Moody's Hikes Cl. G Certs Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed one class of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-CF1 as follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2003
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of Class F is due to increased credit support
resulting from paydowns, defeasance, and amortization. The upgrade
of Class G is to bring it into alignment with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating of the IO Class X is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.2% of the
current pooled balance compared to 3.3% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 7.4% of the original
pooled balance, the same as last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7 compared to 12 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from Conduit and Large Loan models in formulating a
rating recommendation. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated December 20, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $39.6
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 22%
of the pool, with the top five conduit loans representing 62% of
the pool. There are two defeased loans representing 17% of the
pool balance.

Three loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $83.6 million (61% loss severity). There is
currently one loan, representing 4% of the pool, in special
servicing. The specially serviced exposure is the Home Sweet Home
Loan ($1.4 million -- 3.5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
two story, 34 unit (57 bed) assisted living facility located in
Colma, California. According to the remittance report, the
property is an independent care facility that is vacant and "non-
operational". The special servicer is pursuing a foreclosure.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.2 million loss (24.5% expected loss overall) from the specially
serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool balance. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is
51%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of
7.5% to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.58X and 2.51X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 50% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the Bristol Market Place Loan ($8.7
million -- 21.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 99,256 square
foot (SF) retail center located in Santa Ana, California. As of
June 2013, the property was 92% leased compared to 93% at last
review. Overall, the property is stable and the loan is
benefitting from amortization. The loan matures in May 2018.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.84X, respectively,
compared to 58% and 1.76X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Van Dorn Station Loan ($6.5
million -- 16.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 74,464 SF
retail center located in Alexandria, Virginia. Comcast, which
occupied 36% of the net rentable area (NRA), vacated its space at
lease maturity in December 2010. The property was 68% leased as of
June 2013 compared to 60% at last review. The loan has amortized
over 26% to date which has helped offset the decrease in cash flow
coming from the property due to the low occupancy. The loan
matures in March 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 49% and
2.31X, respectively, compared to 59% and 1.92X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Gardenside Shopping Center Loan
($4.4 million -- 11.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 187,866
SF anchored retail center located in Henderson, Kentucky. The
property was 77% occupied as of June 2013, the same as in June
2011. Kmart and Goody's occupy 58% of the NRA with leases through
June 2015 and January 2012, respectively. The loan matures in July
2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.40x,
respectively, compared to 74% and 1.47x at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2000-F1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Mortgage Capital Owner Trust, Series 2000-F1:

-- Class B upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to
   Stable from Positive;
-- Class C upgraded to 'BBB'sf from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class E affirmed at 'Csf'/RE 100%;
-- Class F affirmed at 'Csf'/RE 100%;
-- Class G affirmed at 'Csf'/RE 100%.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade of the class B and C notes reflect the robust credit
enhancement available to the classes and the material
concentrations of defeased collateral which should provide for
stable performance. The affirmation of class D notes reflects the
notes' ability to pass a stress case scenario consistent with the
current rating level. Fitch affirmed classes E, F, and G at 'Csf'
due to their subordinate position which exposes the classes to the
performance of large obligors over the long term; however, current
recovery estimates remain at 100%.

Fitch will continue to monitor this transaction and may take
additional rating action in the event of changes in performance
and credit enhancement measures.

Rating Sensitivities

As the majority of the pool consists of collateral in defeasance,
the performance of the senior classes will be tied to the future
performance of the currently high credit quality collateral
providers. The performance of the subordinate notes is exposed to
the performance the few large remaining obligors. However, as the
transaction continues to amortize, positive rating actions on the
subordinate tranches could be possible as credit enhancement
builds and relative exposure to larger obligor performance
lessens.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class K Certs to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 classes and affirmed 10 classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust (MSC 2007-IQ16) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-IQ16 due to due to increased
loss expectations from loans in special servicing.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades are a result of higher expected losses primarily
associated with loans in special servicing. The affirmations
reflect sufficient credit enhancement of the remaining classes
relative to Fitch's expected losses. Fitch modeled losses of 11.7%
of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 13.5%, including $90.6 million (3.5% of the original
pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 51
loans (19.0%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 21
specially serviced assets (14.2%).

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 15.8% to $2.19 billion from
$2.6 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(0.3% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes G through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 754,882 sf
regional mall (1.8% of the pool), located in Ashtabula, OH. The
asset became REO in November 2012. The mall has only two remaining
anchors from the original five at issuance. The remaining anchors
are JC Penney and K-Mart. The mall was approximately 50% occupied
as of August 2013. Fitch anticipates significant losses based on
recent valuations.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 744-key,
full-service hotel (4.1%) located in Daytona Beach, Florida. The
asset became REO in August 2013. As of YE 2012, the hotel achieved
TTM occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR of 66.0%, $129.57, and $85.49,
respectively, surpassing its competitive set averages of 57.0%,
$120.41, and $68.66. Results over the same period in 2011 for TTM
occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR were 62.5%, $129.25, and $80.76,
respectively. The servicer is formulating a strategy for
disposition.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a 379,685 sf
Wal-Mart anchored retail property (3.5%) located in Milford, CT.
As of June 2013, occupancy of the center was 96%. Occupancy for
the center improved with HomeGoods taking possession of the vacant
Circuit City space in April 2012. As of YE 2012, DSCR of the
property was 1.08x. The loan is current as of August 2013.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on the investment grade rated classes remain
Stable due to increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown
of the classes. The 'AA' rated classes, while expected to remain
stable may be subject to further downgrade based on the
performance and recovery prospects of REO assets in special
servicing. The distressed classes (those rated below 'B-sf') are
subject to further downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks
and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $194.7 million class A-M to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook to
   Stable from Negative;

-- $20 million class A-MFL to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook to
   Stable from Negative;

-- $44.9 million class A-MA to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook to
   Stable from Negative;

-- $131 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 95%;

-- $30 million class A-JFL to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 95%;

-- $33.7 million class A-JA to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 95%;

-- $19.5 million class B to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

-- $26 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

-- $16.2 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

-- $38.9 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

-- $29.1 million class K to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $204.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $19.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $1.3 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $13 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

-- $35.7 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

-- $26 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

-- $26 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class O, P, Q and S certificates. Classes
A-1 and A-2 have paid in full. Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: DBRS Cuts Rating on Cl. A-J Debt to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has downgraded the following classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust, Series 2007-IQ16:

-- Class A-J to BB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class A-JFL to BB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class A-JA to BB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class B to B (low) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class C to CCC (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class D to C (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class E to C (sf) from CCC (sf)
-- Classes F to C (sf) from CCC (sf)
-- Class K to D (sf) from C (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the remaining
classes in the transaction.  The trends on Class A-M, Class A-MA
and Class A-MFL were changed to Negative from Stable and the
trends on Class A-J, Class A-JA, Class A-JFL and Class B were
changed to Stable from Negative.  The trends of Classes A-1A, A-3,
A-4, X-1 and X-2 remain Stable.

The downgrades are a result of projected losses associated with
loans currently in special servicing.  There are 21 loans in
special servicing, representing 14.2% of the current pool balance.
This includes five loans, representing 3.2% of the current pool
balance, which have transferred to special servicing over the past
12 months.  Since issuance, 21 loans have liquidated from the
trust, resulting in a realized loss of $94.2 million.  DBRS
projects an additional $176.8 million of loss from the 21 loans
currently in special servicing. The largest additional loss is
projected to come from two loans, Hilton Daytona Beach (Prospectus
ID#4) and Ashtabula Mall (Prospectus ID#10), which are the primary
loans of concern with this review.

The trend change on Class A-M, Class A-MFL and Class A-MA is the
result of the remote chance for the potential for interest
shortfalls to affect the subject classes given the additional loss
expectations from the specially serviced loans and the uncertainty
of the timing of advance reimbursements when specially serviced
loans are liquidated from the Trust.  DBRS does not view these
classes to be at risk for principal loss.  As to be expected, when
specially serviced loans are liquidated from the trust, the master
servicer will recoup its outstanding advances first from gross
proceeds from the loan liquidation and if insufficient funds are
available, from available interest due to the bonds.  This becomes
a greater concern when the master servicer deems loans non-
recoverable, as in addition to outstanding advances, which must be
recovered from net proceeds, accumulated interest from the non-
recoverable determination date will also be recovered.  Given that
Ashtabula Mall was deemed non-recoverable in April 2013 based on
its further deterioration in value to $6.3 million, and that
current outstanding advances total $2.8 million, losses are
expected to exceed 100% of the loan's outstanding loan balance,
thereby increasing the risk for a prolonged advance recovery.  The
potential interest shortfall issue is further complicated by the
fact that the transaction has two master servicers, each of which
is currently making advances on specially serviced loans in the
transaction.  While both master servicers, Wells Fargo and
Berkadia, are experienced master servicers and do not desire to
recoup interest from investment-grade rated classes, there is a
potential risk that each entity could recoup interest in the same
reporting period, which could cause interest shortfalls to affect
the subject classes.  The pooling and servicing agreement gives
them the right to extend their reimbursement or take it in one
lump sum.  DBRS expects to receive more information on the
timeliness of the liquidations from the special servicer in the
upcoming months in addition to monitoring both master servicer's
advances to understand the recovery strategy in order to further
evaluate the potential for shortfalls to rise up to the Class A-M,
Class A-MFL or Class A-MA level.

The Hilton Daytona Beach loan is secured by a 744-key full-service
hotel in Daytona Beach, Florida, that was originally built in 1988
and last renovated in 2005.  The property is located on Atlantic
Avenue across the street from the beach and is considered the
premier hotel in the area.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in October 2011 due to imminent payment default as a
result of insufficient cash flow.  The borrower and the lender had
been negotiating a loan modification, but ultimately, the borrower
agreed to a stipulated foreclosure, with the lender taking title
to the property in August 2013.  According to the June 2013 STR
report, T12 figures have improved, with the occupancy rate at
68.55%, ADR at $131 and RevPAR at $90.  While these figures are
slight improvements over the same period in 2012, the property's
revenue is still below figures reported at issuance.
Additionally, the property requires between $15 million and $18
million in extensive renovations in order to maintain its high
property quality, according to the servicer.  Included in the
renovations are new roofing, external concrete work and painting,
pool and spa upgrades, guest room and bathroom renovations and
meeting room and banquet hall renovations.  A January 2013
appraisal valued the property at $65.5 million; an increase of
approximately $11.4 million over the January 2012 appraisal.
While the new appraisal does take into account the cost of the
needed renovations, the subject's value remains far below the
issuance appraisal of $150.3 million, suggesting a significant
potential loss associated with the resolution of this loan.

The Ashtabula Mall loan is secured by a 750,000 sf regional mall
in Ashtabula, Ohio, which is approximately 60 miles northeast of
Cleveland.  The loan transferred to special servicing in September
2010 due to imminent default and is now in receivership.
According to the June 2013 rent roll, the property has a physical
occupancy rate of 56.9%.  Kmart and JC Penney are the two
remaining anchor tenants at the property of the original five.
Sears vacated in July 2012 after its lease expired, Steve and
Barry's vacated in December 2008 after it filed for bankruptcy and
Dillard's vacated in January 2008 shortly after securitization.
Dillard's continues to pay rent on its dark space until its lease
expires in February 2014.  Performance at the property continues
to be well-below levels at issuance.  The June 2013 annualized NOI
was $1.6 million compared with $4.6 million at issuance.  The
December 2012 servicer site inspection reported that the property
was in Average condition; however, photos of the asset show there
to be very little foot traffic and few cars in the parking lot at
the mall.  Additionally, outstanding repairs to the roofing and
parking lot have yet to be completed.  The property received an
updated appraisal of $6.3 million in January 2013 compared with
$16.2 million in February 2012, $26.6 million in January 2011 and
$57.8 million at issuance.  Due to the most recent appraisal, the
master servicer deemed this loan non-recoverable in April 2013.
DBRS expects there to be significant losses to the Trust with the
resolution of this loan.

As of the August 2013 remittance report, 203 loans remain in the
pool out of the original 234 loans.  The top 15 loans in the pool
by loan balance (excluding the three loans in special servicing)
continue to exhibit stable performance, reporting a weighted-
average debt service coverage ratio of 1.36x and a weighted-
average debt yield of 8.6%.  Approximately 17.0% of the collateral
has been reduced since issuance, with 71.8% resulting from loan
amortization, loan repayment and liquidation proceeds.  The
remaining 28.2% of collateral reduction is a result of realized
losses to the Trust.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated five loans, representing 5.1% of
the current pool balance, as investment-grade loans.  DBRS has
confirmed that the performance of these loans remains consistent
with investment-grade loan characteristics.

As of the August 2013 remittance report, there are 21 loans in
special servicing and 49 loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 14.2% and 18.1% of the current pool balance,
respectively.

As part of its review, DBRS analyzed the top 15 loans, the
specially serviced loans, the loans on the servicer's watchlist
and the shadow-rated loans, which comprise approximately 65.9% of
the current pool balance.


N-STAR REAL VII: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-2, A-3, and B notes from N-Star Real Estate CDO VII Ltd.,
a collateralized debt obligation transaction backed by commercial
mortgage-backed securities assets, to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)'.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, C, D-FL,
D-FX, and E notes.

The rating actions follows a default on the interest payments due
to these nondeferrable classes on the most recent payment date,
Aug. 26, 2013.  Therefore, S&P lowered its ratings on the class
A-2, A-3, and B notes to 'D (sf)' according to its criteria.

The transaction has triggered an event of default (EOD) and the
controlling class (the class A-1 noteholders) has voted to
accelerate the pay-down of the notes.  The EOD changes the payment
sequence in the payment waterfall and diverts all available
interest and principal proceeds, after paying the senior fees and
the hedge counterparty, towards the class A-1 notes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class A-1 notes to
reflect its belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating level.

S&P also affirmed its 'CC (sf)' ratings on the class C, D-FL,
D-FX, and E notes to reflect its belief that these deferrable
notes will not receive any interest or principal payments until
the notes senior to them in the capital structure are fully paid
down.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

N-Star Real Estate CDO VII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

N-Star Real Estate CDO VII Ltd.

Class               Rating
A-1                 CCC- (sf)
C                   CC (sf)
D-FL                CC (sf)
D-FX                CC (sf)
E                   CC (sf)


NORTHSTAR 2013-1: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to
notes issued by NorthStar 2013-1, Ltd.:

Class A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's ratings of the Class A Notes, Class B Notes, and Class C
Notes address the expected loss posed to noteholders. The ratings
reflects the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
loans, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

NorthStar 2013-1 is a static cash flow CRE CLO. The issued notes
is collateralized initially by a pool of 10 commercial real estate
loans in the form of whole loans and senior participations ("A-
notes"). Approximately 80% of the assets are ramped as of the
closing date with a par amount of $425,228,536 and a weighted
average spread of 5.0%. The remaining par balance of $106,307,134
may consist of additional whole loans and senior participations;
subject to certain eligibility criteria and collateral quality
tests. The ramp-up period is six (6) months with a transaction
effective date of February 2014.

NS Income Administration Agent, LLC is an affiliate of NorthStar
and will provide administration services to the asset pool during
the ramp-up period and static period. Wells Fargo Bank, NA will
act as primary servicer of the underlying collateral.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CLO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has completed credit assessments for all of the
collateral. Moody's modeled a WARF of 3600.

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 6.0 years as of the effective date.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 52.1%.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 29.5% corresponding to a pair-wise
correlation of 35%.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the Advisor with respect to the
collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate and rating factor assumptions of the
underlying collateral. Holding all other key parameters static,
stressing the recovery rate downward from 52% to 47% would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of 1
notche downward. Holding all other key parameters static,
stressing the WARF from 3600 to 3958 would result in an average
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of 1 notche downward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector continues to exhibit growth albeit at a slightly
slower pace. The multifamily sector should remain stable with
moderate growth. Gradual recovery in the office sector continues
and will be assisted in the next quarter when absorption is likely
to outpace completions. However, since office demand is closely
tied to employment, Moody's expects regional employment growth to
provide market differentiation. CBD markets continue to outperform
secondary suburban markets. The retail sector exhibited a slight
reduction in vacancies in the first quarter; the largest drop
since 2005. However, consumers continue to be cautious as
evidenced by sales growth continuing below historical trends.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with robust securitization activity of
commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low
interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the US CRE Derivatives sector, as described in the
special report titled, "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in
the U.S. CMBS Sector."

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL VII: Moody's Lifts Cl. E Notes Rating From Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Northwoods Capital VII, Limited:

$25,000,000 Class A-4 Floating Rate Notes Due October 22, 2021,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 16, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf);

$30,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due October 22, 2021,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 16, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf);

$37,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October 22,
2021, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on September 16, 2011
Upgraded to A2 (sf);

$32,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October 22,
2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September 16, 2011
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

$10,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October 22,
2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on September 16, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$162,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 22, 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 16, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf);

$50,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Delayed Drawdown Notes Due
October 22, 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 16,
2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$100,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due October 22, 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 28, 2006 Assigned Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in October 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, higher spread, and higher
diversity levels compared to the levels assumed at the last rating
action. Moody's modeled a WARF, WAS, and diversity score of 3257,
4.1%, and 44, respectively, compared to 3600, 3.2%, and 35,
respectively, at the time of the last rating action.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $541.1 million, no defaulted par, a weighted
average default probability of 24.3% (implying a WARF of 3257), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.8%, and a
diversity score of 44. The default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Northwoods Capital VII, Limited, issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2606)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class A-4: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +3

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3908)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class A-4: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Sensitivity to default timing scenarios: The junior and
mezzanine notes of this CLO structure rely significantly on excess
interest for additional credit enhancement. However, the
availability of such credit enhancement from excess interest is
subject to uncertainties relating to the timing and the amount of
defaults. Moody's modeled additional scenarios using concentrated
default timing profiles to assess the sensitivity of the notes'
ratings to volatility in the amount of excess interest available
after defaults.


REAL ESTATE 2007-1: Moody's Keeps 'Caa2' Rating on Class L Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 16 classes and
upgraded two classes of Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1 as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XP-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XP-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR
and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable
ranges. The ratings of the four interest-only classes, Class XC-1,
XC-2, XP-1 and XP-2, are consistent with the expected credit
performance of their referenced classes and thus are affirmed.
Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings.

The upgrades of the two P&I classes are due to increased credit
support resulting from paydowns and amortization.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 1.7% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus cumulative realized losses are now 1.4% of
the original securitized balance compared to 1.5% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20 compared to 24 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 26, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 26% to
$379.6 million from $514.0 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 61 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 54% of the pool. Two loans representing 10% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by Canadian Government
securities. Two loans, representing 20% of the pool, have
investment grade credit assessments.

Five loans, representing 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any realized losses to date and
currently there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.9 million aggregate loss (12% expected loss based on a 40%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 81% and 90% of the conduit pool,
respectively. The conduit portion of the pool excludes troubled
and defeased loans as well as the two loans with credit
assessments. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 78% compared
to 83% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.48X and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.30X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Atrium Pooled
Interest Loan ($38.7 million -- 10.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 1.05 million square foot (SF) mixed-use complex
located in Toronto, Ontario. The loan is a pari passu interest in
a $116.0 million first mortgage loan. There is also a $74 million
B-Note secured by the property that is not part of this
transaction. The collateral was 97% leased as of January 2013
compared to 98% at last review. H&R REIT acquired the subject
property in June 2011. Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.76X, respectively, compared to A2 and
1.78X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Langley Power
Centre Loan ($37.5 million -- 9.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 228,000 SF anchored retail center located in Langley, British
Columbia. The property was 99% leased as of January 2013 compared
to 97% at last review. The loan is 100% recourse to RioCan Real
Estate Investment Trust. Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.14X, respectively, compared to Baa2
and 1.0X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 20% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Dundee Mississauga Office Loan ($28.6 million
-- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by two office/flex
properties, one office and one industrial property, all located in
Mississauga, Ontario. The portfolio was 95% leased as of March
2013, which is the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.42X, respectively, compared to 85% and
1.15X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the Sundance Pooled Interest Loan
($24.8 million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 180,000
SF office building located in Calgary, Alberta. The property was
100% leased as of April 2013, which is the same as last review and
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 100% and 0.95X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Hudson Vancouver Loan ($20.5 million
-- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a six property portfolio
of mixed use properties totaling 82,500 SF. The portfolio contains
both office and retail properties. As of January 2012, the
properties had a combined occupancy of 96%, the same as at last
review. The loan is full recourse to the sponsor. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.06X, respectively, the same as at last
review.


OCEAN TRAILS I: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Ocean Trails CLO I:

$21,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$259,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $256,993,053), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$16,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

$13,250,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf);

$13,250,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in October 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread compared to the level
assumed at the last rating action. Moody's modeled a WAS of 3.37%
compared to 2.77% at the time of the last rating action. The deal
has also benefitted from an increase in WARR. Moody's also notes
that the transaction's reported overcollateralization ratio are
stable since the last rating action.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $328.6 million, defaulted par of $7.1 million,
a weighted average default probability of 18.00% (implying a WARF
of 2559), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.76%,
and a diversity score of 67. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Ocean Trails CLO I, issued in November 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2047)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +2

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3071)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: 0

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.


OCEAN TRAILS CLO IV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Ocean
Trails CLO IV/Ocean Trails CLO IV LLC's $366.65 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the  rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria;

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.28%-11.57%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which would lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1741.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Ocean Trails CLO IV/Ocean Trails CLO IV LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
X                      AAA (sf)                  2.65
A                      AAA (sf)                242.50
B                      AA (sf)                  51.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   25.75
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 20.25
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  16.50
F (deferrable)         B (sf)                    8.00
Subordinated notes     NR                       36.00

NR-Not rated.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XVII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Octagon
Investment Partners XVII Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners XVII
LLC's $376.50 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.26%-12.87%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds, which are
      available before paying uncapped administrative expenses and
      fees; subordinated hedge termination payments; collateral
      manager incentive fees; and subordinated note payments to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
zredit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1751.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Octagon Investment Partners XVII Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners
XVII LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (Mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                141.00
A-2                    AAA (sf)                 85.00
A-3                    AAA (sf)                 25.00
B-1                    AA (sf)                  40.00
B-2                    AA (sf)                   5.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   31.75
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 21.75
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  17.75
F (deferrable)         B (sf)                    9.25
Subordinated notes     NR                      37.277

NR-Not rated.


PEACHTREE FRANCHISE: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on Peachtree
Franchise Loan Notes, Series 1999-A:

-- Class B affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C affirmed 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class D affirmed 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class E affirmed 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of the class B notes reflects the class's ability
to pass stress case scenarios consistent with the current ratings,
as well as its exposure to growing obligor concentrations. Classes
C, D, and E were affirmed at 'Dsf' as the classes have suffered
principal writedowns. Due to accumulated interest shortfalls, the
recovery estimates for these classes is 0%. Fitch will continue to
monitor this transaction and may take additional rating action in
the event of changes in performance and credit enhancement
measures.

Rating Sensitivities

Due to the substantial remaining obligor concentrations, the
performance of the notes could be impacted by the performance of
certain large obligors. This is a primary driver of the current
'Bsf' rating assigned to the class B notes. The notes may be
eligible for positive rating actions if loan amortization or
prepayment were to lessen these relative concentrations.
Conversely, deterioration in performance of these obligors may
warrant negative rating actions on the class B notes.


PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of eight classes of Notes issued
by Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd. The affirmations are due to the key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd. is a currently static cash transaction
backed by a portfolio of whole loans (74.8% of the pool balance)
and mezzanine loan interests (25.2%). As of the August 26, 2013
Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $397.5 million from
$1,000.0 million at issuance, with the paydown currently directed
to the senior most outstanding class of notes (Class C Notes), as
a result of the sale of certain performing and non-performing
assets and the failure of certain par value tests. However, as of
the most recent trustee report, none of the assets in the pool are
generating interest proceeds.

There are six assets with a par balance of $91.9 million (65.3% of
the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted securities
as of the August 26, 2013 Trustee report. While there have been
realized losses on the underlying collateral to date, Moody's does
expect moderate to high losses to occur on the defaulted
securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,639
compared to 7,310 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 1.1% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 1.6% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(0.0% compared to 3.8% at last review), B1-B3 (0.0% compared to
4.9% at last review), and Caa1-C (100.0% compared to 88.6% at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.0 years compared to 5.0 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 36.7% compared to 29.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9%, the same as that at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, released on May 16,
2013, was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect
on the capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
36.7% to 26.7% or up to 46.7% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 12 notches downward and 0
to 7 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


SAN GABRIEL I: Moody's Affirms  1 Rating on Class B-2L Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by San Gabriel CLO I Ltd.:

$25,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due September 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 26, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

$29,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due September 2021,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September 26, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$273,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due September 2021
(current outstanding balance of $268,495,314.74), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on September 26, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Up to $40,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
September 2021 (current outstanding balance of $39,339,972.85),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 26, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

$15,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due September 2021,
Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on September 26, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

$16,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due September 2021
(current outstanding balance of $16,135,314.91), Affirmed B1 (sf);
previously on September 26, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in September 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
benefits from higher spread relative to the covenant. Moody's
modeled a Weighted Average Spread of 3.26%, compared to the
covenant of 2.10%.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $400 million, defaulted par of $11 million, a
weighted average default probability of 18.53% (implying a WARF of
2594), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.06%,
and a diversity score of 70. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

San Gabriel CLO I Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2075)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: +1

Class A-3L: +3

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3113)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: -2

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


SAYBROOK POINT: Moody's Hikes Rating on $252MM Cl. A Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Saybrook Point CBO, Limited:

$252,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Notes, Due 2031 (current
outstanding balance of $5,600,124), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on March 15, 2012 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in March 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately $10.6 million or 60%
since the last rating action. Based on Moody's calculation, the
Class A overcollateralization ratio is currently at 423.2%, versus
the March 2012 level of 184.4%.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on Moody's calculation, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 3635 compared to 2225
in March 2012.

Saybrook Point CBO, Limited, issued in February 2001, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
ABS, RMBS, CMBS and CDOs originated from 2000 to 2003.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applies the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the collateral
pool. Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a
normal (or "Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset
correlation framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are
generated by applying within the simulation the distributional
assumptions, including correlation between recovery values.

Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
collateral pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exists a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and the residential real
estate property markets.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss, assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa rated assets notched up by 2 rating notches:

Class A: +1

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Moody's Caa rated assets notched down by 2 rating notches:

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0


SCHOONER TRUST 2004-CF2: DBRS Hikes Cl. L Debt Rating to BB(high)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has upgraded nine classes of Schooner Trust, Series 2004-CF2
as follows:

-- Class C to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
-- Class D to AAA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class E to AA (sf) from A (high) (sf)
-- Class F to A (high) (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class G to A (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class H to BBB (high) from BB (sf)
-- Class J to BBB (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class K to BBB (low) (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class L to BB (high) (sf) from B (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on Classes A-1, A-2, X
and B at AAA (sf).

The trend on all classes is Stable.

The upgrades are a result of continued cash flow growth in the
pool, especially in the Top 15; the resolution of one loan
previously in special servicing; the defeasance of nearly half of
the pool balance; and the healthy refinance outlook for the
outstanding loans.

The pool has experienced approximately 35% of collateral reduction
since issuance, with 51 loans remaining outstanding.  Since the
last surveillance review of this transaction, no loans have
repaid; however, five loans have been fully defeased since the
last review.  As of the August 2013 remittance, a total of 14
loans, representing 44% of the current pool balance, are fully
defeased, including six loans in the Top 15.  Non-defeased loans
in the Top 15 benefit from strong sponsorship and recourse to
sophisticated borrowers.  One loan, representing 1.1% of the pool,
is scheduled to mature in December 2013, with all remaining loans
in the pool scheduled to mature in 2014.  The current weighted-
average debt yield for the pool is 17.2%.

Two loans remain on the servicer's watchlist for below-threshold
debt service coverage ratios.  Combined, these loans make up only
1.7% of the current pool balance, and DBRS does not view either of
these loans as being at risk of payment default.  Any potential
loss incurred by the watchlist loans would be fully absorbed by
the unrated class.


SLM STUDENT 2007-6: Fitch Ups Subordinate Note Rating From 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior notes at 'AAAsf' and upgrades the
subordinate note to 'Asf' from 'BBsf' issued by both SLM Student
Loan Trust 2007-6 and SLM Student Loan Trust 2007-8. The Rating
Outlook on the senior notes, which is tied to the sovereign rating
of the U.S. government, remains Negative, while the Rating Watch
Positive on the subordinate note is removed and assigned a Stable
Outlook.

Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation on the senior notes and the upgrade on subordinate
note are based on stable trust performance and the sufficient
level of credit to cover the applicable risk factor stresses.
While both the senior and subordinate notes will benefit from
future excess spread, the senior notes also benefit from
subordination provided by the class B note.

The parity ratios for trust 2007-6 and 2007-8 have been stable.
The senior parity is currently 104.14% and total parity is 100% as
of June 2013 for trust 2007-6 and 104.13% and 100% for trust
2007-8.

In Fitch's analysis, the notes passed the cash flows corresponding
to their rating stresses.

Rating Sensitivities

Since FFELP student loan ABS rely on the U.S. government to
reimburse defaults, 'AAAsf' FFELP ABS ratings will likely move in
tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults and basis risk account for the majority
of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.
Additional defaults and basis shock beyond Fitch's published
stresses could result in future downgrades. Likewise, a buildup of
credit enhancement driven by positive excess spread given
favorable basis factor conditions could lead to future upgrades.

Prior to today's upgrade class B of both SLM Student Loan Trust
2007-6 and SLM Student Loan Trust 2007-8 were on Rating Watch
Positive.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2007-6:

-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; removed from
   Rating Watch Positive; Stable Outlook;


SLM Student Loan Trust 2007-8:

-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; removed from
   Rating Watch Positive; Stable Outlook.


WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $721MM of 25 RMBS Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 19
tranches, upgraded the ratings of three tranches, and confirmed
the ratings of three tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans,
issued by Washington Mutual.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR11
Trust

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR6
Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR7
Trust

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR8
Trust

Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR9
Trust

Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR4

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR5

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-S1

Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-AR5

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, the downgrades reflect the exposure of the
affected bonds to tail risk due to the pro-rata pay nature of the
transaction. The upgrades are a result of improved performance of
the pool underlying WaMu 2001-AR5 transaction over the past year.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

Subject to the results of a stress scenario analysis, Moody's caps
the ratings of bonds exposed to tail-end risk to A3 (sf) or below,
unless the bonds are expected to pay off within a year or are
expected to pay off well before the underlying pool is expected to
be small pool (100 loans).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


WEST TRADE I: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 6 Note Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and subsequently withdrawn the
ratings on all notes issued by West Trade Funding CDO I, Ltd./ LLC
(West Trade I), as follows:

-- $860,494,802 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;

-- $58,823,322 class A-2 notes downgrade to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;

-- $50,869,143 class B notes downgrade to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;

-- $15,250,464 class C notes downgrade to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;

-- $13,569,009 class D notes downgrade to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;

-- $8,943,519 class E notes downgrade to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn.

Key Rating Drivers

West Trade I entered an Event of Default on July 8, 2013 due to a
default of interest payments on the non-deferrable class A-1
notes. On July 16, 2013, the majority of the controlling class
holders voted to accelerate and liquidate the transaction. The
final liquidation proceeds distributed on Aug. 29, 2013 were only
sufficient to repay $221.9 million of the class A-1 notes,
realizing a 20.5% recovery on the notes' par balance immediately
prior to the sale. There were no funds available to make payments
to the noteholders of any other remaining classes.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C5: Moody's Keeps B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-C5 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the 11 P&I classes is due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR
and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable
ranges. The ratings of the two interest-only (IO) classes, Class
X-A and X-B, are consistent with indicated WARF of their
referenced classes and are affirmed. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current pooled balance compared to 2.3% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis.

Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf)
and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit
assessments is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is
based on the credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, the same at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 20, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $1.07
billion from $1.09 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 57% of
the pool. The deal does not contain any loans with credit
assessments or any defeased loans.

Three loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses and currently does not
contain any specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 92% and 65% of the conduit, respectively.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 91% compared to 97% at
last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11.6% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.06X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 34% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Domain Loan ($202.9 million -- 19.0% of the
pool), which is secured by the borrower's condominium interest in
a 1.23 million square foot (SF) lifestyle center located in the
"Golden Triangle" area of Austin, Texas. The property was
developed by Simon Property Group, the loan sponsor, in two phases
between 2007 and 2010. The total cost was approximately $388
million ($441 per SF) and constitutes 50% of the Domain
condominium, which also includes 828 residential units that are
not part of the collateral. The property is anchored by Neiman
Marcus, Macy's, Dillard's, Dicks Sporting Goods and an 8-screen
movie theatre. The collateral was 92% leased as of March 2013
compared to 89% leased at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 87% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 95% and 0.94X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Puck Building Loan ($85 million --
7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a condominium interest in
seven floors of a 239,000 SF mixed-use building located in the
SoHo office submarket of Manhattan, New York. The property was 97%
leased as of March 2013, the same as last review. The property has
strong historical occupancy but was being repositioned at
securitization. Previous ballroom and catering space was converted
into office and retail space. Recreational Equipment Inc. (REI)
has its flagship New York City store at this location. The
property had been on the watchlist for low debt service coverage
as several tenants had rent abatement periods. Over $7 million of
reserves were established at securitization to cover debt service
shortfalls during the rent abatement period that has now ended.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.86X, respectively,
compared to 108% and 0.88X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Arbor Walk and Palms Crossing Loan
($79.8 million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by two
anchored retail centers totaling 793,000 SF. Simon Property Group
is the loan sponsor. Arbor Walk is located less than a mile away
from Simon's Domain lifestyle center in Austin, Texas. The two
retail assets are not considered direct competitors as each caters
to a different consumer segment. Arbor Walk is anchored by Home
Depot, Marshalls and Jo-Ann Fabrics. Arbor Walk and Palm Crossings
are both 99% leased as of March 2013. Palm Crossings is located in
McAllen, Texas and is anchored by Hobby Lobby, Sports Authority
and Beall's. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 95% and 1.05X at last review.



* Moody's Takes Action on $1.3 Billion of 70 RMBS-Backed Loans
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 66
tranches and confirmed the ratings of four tranches backed by
Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2004-S3

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IIA-3, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IIA-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IIA-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IIA-6, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IIIA-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-G

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4A, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-A

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2012
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-B

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2012
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-C

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2012
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-B

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-A1

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, MLMI Series 2003-A2

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-4-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, MLMI Series 2003-A5

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-H Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-N Trust

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2013
Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-6 Trust

Cl. A-10, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-AA Trust

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-G Trust

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-K Trust

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-12, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-P Trust

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-R Trust

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-S Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-V Trust

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, the downgrades reflect the exposure of the
affected bonds to tail risk due to the pro-rata pay nature of the
transactions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

Subject to the results of a stress scenario analysis, Moody's caps
the ratings of bonds exposed to tail-end risk to A3 (sf) or below,
unless the bonds are expected to pay off within a year or are
expected to pay off well before the underlying pool is expected to
be small pool (100 loans).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.



* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $834-Mil. of Suprime RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 8 tranches backed by
Subprime RMBS loans, issued by various trusts.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-HE2

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-6

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD2

Cl. II-A-1, Current Rating A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 14,
2013 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Downgraded
to A2, Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating
performance or structural features resulting in higher expected
losses for the bonds than previously anticipated.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $556-Mil. of 51 RMBS Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 49
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches backed by Prime
Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-S2

Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. 3-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-10

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-5, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2002-TBC2

Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Provident Funding Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2003-S11 Trust

A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-1

Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-6

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-1

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-4

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-AX, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-AX, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, the downgrades reflect the exposure of the
affected bonds to tail risk due to the pro-rata pay nature of the
transaction.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

Subject to the results of a stress scenario analysis, Moody's caps
the ratings of bonds exposed to tail-end risk to A3 (sf) or below,
unless the bonds are expected to pay off within a year or are
expected to pay off well before the underlying pool is expected to
be small pool (100 loans).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $223MM of 15 RMBS Tranches from 6 Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches and upgraded the ratings of ten tranches in six
transactions backed by Alt-A loans issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-6CB

Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2004-3

Cl. II-AR-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-AR-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-MR-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2004-9

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-7

Cl. A1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of build-up in credit
enhancement on the bonds and stable performance of the underlying
pools. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance on
the underlying pools - the delinquencies on the pools underlying
Sequoia 2003-2 and SAMI 2002-AR4 transactions have increased
significantly over the past year.

The principal methodology used in these rating actions was "US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on 5 Alt-A RMBS-Backed Loans from 2 Issuers
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches and downgraded the ratings of two tranches backed by Alt-
A RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2004-2

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-17A

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: PAMEX Mortgage Trust 1999-A

A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance of the underlying pool - serious
delinquencies (as a percentage of current pool balance) on the
pool underlying PAMEX 1999-A have increased from 10.99% to 15.99%
over the past year.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $215.6MM RMBS From 3 Issuers
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from three transactions
backed by Alt-A/Option ARM loans, issued by MASTR Alternative Loan
Trust 2002-3, GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-OA1, and GSR Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-OA1.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-OA1

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-OA1

Cl. 2A-3A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2002-3

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B3,
Outlook Positive on May 21, 2013)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are primarily a result of the recent performance of
the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on the pools. The upgrades are a result of build-up in credit
enhancement on the bonds and stable performance of the underlying
pool.

The actions also reflect the correction of errors in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by
Moody's in rating these transactions, specifically in how the
models handle interest allocation for these transactions. The cash
flow models used in past rating actions used a separate interest
waterfall. However, the pooling and servicing agreements for these
transactions provide that all collected principal and interest is
commingled into one payment waterfall to first pay all promised
interest due on bonds , and then pay scheduled principal. Due to
the discovery of these errors, four tranches were placed on watch
on May 14, 2013. The errors have now been corrected, and these
rating actions reflect these changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Lifts Ratings on $1.2BB of RMBS from Various Issuers
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 29 tranches
backed by subprime RMBS loans from nine transactions issued by
various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-
HE1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-1B1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14,
2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Financial Guarantor: CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. (Insured
Rating Withdrawn on Nov 12, 2009)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-B

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Cl. M5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
INABS 2005-C

Cl. A-I-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-II-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-II-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
INABS 2005-D

Cl. A-I-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-II-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-II-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WCH1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WCW1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ4

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2006-1
Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
The upgrades are due to improvement in collateral performance,
and/ or build-up in credit enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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                  *** End of Transmission ***