TCR_Public/130901.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, September 1, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 242


                            Headlines

1ST FINANCIAL 2013-1: DBRS Rates Sr. Cash Collateral Acct BB(high)
AGATE BAY 2013-1: Fitch Rates $3.47MM Class B-4 Certificates 'BB'
ALESCO PREFERRED XIV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B Notes to Caa2
APIDOS CDO I: Moody's Hikes Rating on $8MM Class D Notes to Ba1
ASSET SECURITIZATION 1997-D4: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on B-3 Notes

BATTALION CLO II: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB'
BATTALION CLO IV: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating to Class E Notes
BBCMS 2013-TYSN: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating to Class E CMBS
BEAR STEARNS 2003-TOP10: S&P Raises Rating on Class J Notes to BB+
BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR7: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes

BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP 22: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. F Certs to CCC
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: Fitch Cuts Rating on 3 Securities to 'C'
BLACK DIAMOND 2005-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $35MM Debt
CAPITAL AUTO 2013-3: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Class E Notes
CARLYLE BRISTOL: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB-'

CENT CLO 17: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CHATHAM LIGHT II: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes From Ba1
CIFC FUNDING 2006-I: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to BB+
CITIGROUP 2006-C5: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Certs to 'Csf'
CITIGROUP 2012-GC8: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Debt

COMM 2012-CCRE2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Debt
COMM 2013-300P: Fitch Rates $28MM Class E Certificates 'BB+'
CREDIT SUISSE 2000-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certs
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP3: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class L Certs to CCC
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-TFL1: Moody's Keeps Ratings over Rights Deal

CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED 2002-18: Moody's Cuts Rating on 5 Certs
DRYDEN XI-LEVERAGED 2006: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Notes to Ba1
DRYDEN XVIII: Supplemental Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings
FIRST UNION 2001-C4: Moody's Takes Action on Three CMBS Classes
FLATIRON CLO 2007-1: Supp. Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings

G STREET FINANCE: Supplemental Deal No Impact on Moody's Ratings
GLACIER FUNDING II: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
GMAC COMMERCIAL 1997-C1: S&P Hikes Rating on Cl. G Notes From B+sf
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Rights Transfer No Impact on Ratings
GOLDMAN SACHS 2010-C2: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes

GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C1: Moody's Cuts XC Certs Rating to 'Ba3'
GREYWOLF CLO II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2010-C1: DBRS Confirms BB rating on Class E Securities
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Cl. F Certs
GULF STREAM-COMPASS 2005-II: Moody's Confirms Cl. D's Ba2 Rating

HERTZ CORP ABS: Series 2009-1 Amendments No Impact on Ratings
HEWETT'S ISLAND: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
INDEPENDENCE II CDO: Fitch Hikes Rating on $73.61MM Notes to 'C'
JP MORGAN 2003-ML1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. N Certs to Caa2
JP MORGAN 2006-FL1: S&P Withdraws D Ratings on 4 Note Classes

JP MORGAN 2006-LDP7: Moody's Cuts Rating on 3 Securities to 'C'
JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on $17MM Class G Notes
LANDMARK VIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on $20MM Class E Notes to Ba2
LB-UBS 2005-C2: Fitch Lowers Rating on $29.2MM Cl. C Certs to Bsf
LEGG MASON II: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Rating on Class C Notes

LIBERTY CLO: Moody's Confirms Ba2(sf) Rating on $49MM Cl. B Notes
LIBERTY CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class B Notes
MAGNETITE V: Moody's Hikes Rating on $11MM Class D Notes to Ba3
MASTR ARM 2005-4: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Rating on Class A-2 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 1998-WF2: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class K Notes

MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: S&P Cuts 2 Note Class Ratings to 'D'
MORTGAGE FINANCE 2005-S2: Moody's Ups Rating on 2 Secs. to Ba2
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL IV: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes
N-STAR REAL VIII: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Debt Classes
NELNET STUDENT 2008-1: Fitch Raises Sub. Notes Rating From 'BB'

NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2006-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2007-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
NEWSTAR TRUST 2005-1: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Cl. E Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
PRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL 2003-PWR-1: S&P Cuts Cl. G Notes Rating to D

RESIDENRIAL FUNDING: Moody's Hikes Rating on $87MM Subprime RMBS
SALOMON BROTHERS 2002-KEY2: S&P Cuts Cl. Q Certs Rating to 'CCC-'
SALOMON BROTHERS VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. L Debt to B1
SDART 2013-A: Moody's Rates Class E Notes 'Ba2'
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2004-7: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 RMBS Classes

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2013-11: Fitch Rates Class B-4 Certificates 'BB'
SLM PRIVATE 2002-A: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class C Certs.
SLM PRIVATE 2005-B: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class C Certs.
SOUND POINT III: Moody's Rates $10MM Class F Notes 'B2(sf)'
STEERS SERIES 2004-1: Moody's Ups Rating on $19MM Certs to B1

SYMPHONY CLO I: Moody's Raises $13.5MM Cl. D Notes' Rating to Ba1
TRAPEZA EDGE: Moody's Lifts Rating on $6MM Class 1 Notes to 'B3'
TRIMARAN CLO VI: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class B-2L Notes to Ba1
VERITAS CLO II: Moody's Lifts Rating on $9.5MM Cl. E Notes to Ba2
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Certs

WELLS FARGO 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms B2 Ratings on Cl. F Certs
WYANDANCH UNION: Moody's Raises Underlying Rating From 'Ba1'

* Fitch Says U.S. Auto ABS Losses Rise as 'Softer Fall' Approaches
* Moody's Says US Commercial Property Market Held Steady in 2Q
* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Belmont's Tax Allocation Bonds
* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating for Glendale's Tax Allocation Bonds
* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on La Habra's Tax Allocation Bonds

* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Lemoore's Tax Allocation Bonds
* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating for San Juan Capistrano's TABs
* Moody's Reviews Ratings on 18 Deals Exposed to U.S. Banks
* Moody's Takes Action on 28 RMBS Tranches Issued from 2005-2008
* Moody's Takes Action on $1.5-Bil. of RMBS Issued 2004 to 2007

* Moody's Takes Action on $522MM of Alt-A RMBS From 5 Issuers
* Moody's Eyes Upgrades for Ten LEAF Receivables Securities
* Moody's Takes Action on 2005-2006 RMBS Tranches From 21 Issuers
* Moody's Takes Action on $310MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2003-04
* Moody's Ups Rating on $152MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006

* S&P Lowers Ratings on 59 Classes from 43 US RMBS Deals to 'D'
* S&P Lowers 257 Ratings on 173 U.S. RMBS to 'D(sf)'
* S&P Hikes Rating on 23 Classes From 20 CDO Transactions


                            *********


1ST FINANCIAL 2013-1: DBRS Rates Sr. Cash Collateral Acct BB(high)
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned ratings to the following classes issued by
1st Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust III, Series 2013-1:

- Series 2013-1 Notes, Class A rated AAA (sf)

- Series 2013-1 Notes, Class B rated AA (high) (sf)

- Series 2013-1 Notes, Class C rated 'A' (high) (sf)

- Series 2013-1 Notes, Class D rated BBB (high) (sf)

- Series 2013-1 Notes, Senior Cash Collateral Account rated BB
   (high) (sf)

- Series 2013-1 Notes, Intermediate Cash Collateral Account rated
   BB (sf)


AGATE BAY 2013-1: Fitch Rates $3.47MM Class B-4 Certificates 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to Agate Bay Mortgage
Trust 2013-1 (ABMT 2013-1):

-- $400,743,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $400,743,000 class A-IO notional certificates 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;
-- $10,637,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,466,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,296,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,473,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

The 'AAAsf' rating on the senior certificates reflects the 7.70%
subordination provided by the 2.45% B-1, 1.95% class B-2, 1.45%
class B-3, 0.80% class B-4 and 1.05% class B-5. The $429,476,952
class A-IO-S notional certificate and the $4,559,489 class B-5
certificates will not be rated by Fitch.

Fitch's ratings reflect the high quality of the underlying
collateral, the clear capital structure and the high percentage of
loans reviewed by third party underwriters. In addition, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as the master servicer and Christiana
Trust will act as the trustee for the transaction. For federal
income tax purposes, elections will be made to treat the trust as
one or more real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs).

ABMT 2013-1 will be Agate Bay Residential Mortgage Securities
LLC's first transaction of prime residential mortgages. The
certificates are supported by a pool of prime fully amortizing
fixed-rate mortgage loans. The aggregate pool included loans
originated by Guaranteed Rate, Inc. (21.3%), RPM Mortgage, Inc.
(19.7%), Opes Advisors, Inc. (19.7%) and other various mortgage
lending institutions, each of which contributed less than 10% to
the transaction.

As of the cut-off date, the aggregate pool consisted of 549 loans
with a total balance of $434,174,489; an average balance of
$790,846; a weighted average original combined loan-to-value ratio
(CLTV) of 69.9%, and a weighted average coupon (WAC) of 3.9%.
Rate/Term and cash-out refinances account for 62.7% and 11.9% of
the loans, respectively. The weighted average original FICO credit
score of the pool is 770. Owner-occupied properties comprise 96.7%
of the loans. The states that represent the largest geographic
concentration are California (46.4%), Illinois (12.2%) and
Washington (10.5%).

Key Rating Drivers

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists of 30-
year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans to borrowers with strong
credit profiles, low leverage and substantial liquid reserves. A
69.9% CLTV provides a significant buffer against potential home
price declines. Strong borrower quality is reflected in the 770
weighted average (WA) original FICO, $350,747 WA household income
and $322,789 WA liquid reserves.

Originators with Limited Performance History: A large portion of
the pool was originated by lenders with limited non-agency
performance history. While the significant contribution of loans
from these originators is a concern, Fitch considers the credit
enhancement (CE) on this transaction sufficient to mitigate the
originator risk.

High Geographic Concentration: The pools' primary concentration
risk is California, where 46.4% of the properties are located. In
addition, the metropolitan areas encompassing San Francisco, San
Jose, Oakland and Los Angeles combine for 36.1% of the collateral
balance and represent four of the top 10 regions. The regional
concentration resulted in an additional penalty of roughly 15% to
the pool's lifetime default expectation.

Transaction Provisions Enhance Performance: Similar to recent
transactions rated by Fitch, ABMT 2013-1 contains binding
arbitration provisions that may serve to provide timely resolution
to representation (rep) and warranty disputes. In addition, all
loans that become 120 days or more delinquent will be
automatically reviewed for breaches of reps and warranties.

Moderate Due Diligence Findings: Third-party loan-level due
diligence was conducted by Clayton Holdings LLC (Clayton) on 100%
of the pool. While the review resulted in minimal credit and
compliance findings, it identified 19% of the pool in Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) designated disaster areas as
part of its property valuation review. Fitch considered these
findings as part of its analysis and performed sensitivities
adjusting property values to account for potential damage.

Limited Operating History: Two Harbors Investment Corp. (Two
Harbors) was formed in 2009 and is a publicly held REIT. While
management has extensive mortgage industry experience, ABMT 2013-1
is Two Harbors' first securitization using its own depositor.
Fitch conducted a conference call with Two Harbors in June 2013 to
discuss its organizational structure, conduit strategy, due
diligence, and property valuation approaches and methodologies.
They have been active as a loan aggregator and investor in both
agency and non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS). Although the current form of Two Harbor's conduit
initiative is relatively new, Fitch did not identify material
weaknesses in its discussions with the company.

Robust Representation Framework: The representation, warranty and
enforcement mechanism (RW&E) framework is viewed positively by the
agency as it is consistent with Fitch's criteria. The transaction
benefits from life of loan representations and warranties (R&W),
as well as a backstop by the sponsor, TH TRS Corp., in case of
insolvency of the related originator. The sponsor's repurchase
obligations will also be guaranteed by its parent, Two Harbors,
for the life of each loan.

Seller Interests Aligned with Investors': A Two Harbors affiliate
is expected to be the initial subordinate investor in the
transaction and, thus, have a direct economic interest in the
performance of the transaction. As holder of the first-loss class
in the transaction, the controlling holder has an incentive to
maintain the credit quality of the asset pool, which would include
enforcing the repurchase obligations of the contributing
originators on defaulted loans.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The
implied rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis on areas where the model
projected lower home price declines than that of the overall
collateral pool. The model currently projects sustainable MVDs
(sMVDs) at the MSA level. These regions are Chicago-Joliet-
Naperville in Illinois (10.3%) and Dallas-Plano-Irving in Texas
(3.3%). Fitch conducted sensitivity analyses assuming sMVDs of
10%, 15%, and 20% for these identified metropolitan area. The
sensitivity analyses indicated no impact on ratings for all bonds
in each scenario.

Another sensitivity analysis was focused on determining how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 13.0% for this pool. The analysis indicates there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.

In its analysis, Fitch considered placing a greater emphasis on
recent economic performance in determining market value declines.
While the loan loss model Fitch used looks to three years of
historical data and one year of projections, this does not
incorporate recent notable economic improvement. To reflect the
more recent economic environment, a sensitivity analysis was
performed using two years of historical economic data and two
years of projections. The result of this sensitivity analysis was
included in the consideration of the loss expectations for this
transaction. The sensitivity analysis resulted in a base sMVD
decline from 13.0% to 11.9%.


ALESCO PREFERRED XIV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B Notes to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding XIV, Ltd:

$12,000,000 Class X First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due December 23, 2016 (current balance of $7,000,000.00),
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 5, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$430,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due September 23, 2037 (current balance of $345,973,419.97),
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 5, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$80,500,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due September 23, 2037, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
August 5, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$103,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes due September 23, 2037 (current balance of
$107,874,937.04), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on August 5,
2013 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 Notes, an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios as well
as the improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio. The deleveraging is due to the redemption of underlying
assets and diversion of excess interest after paying interest on
the Class A-1 and A-2 Notes. Moody's notes that the Class B, C-1,
C-2 and C-3 notes continue to defer interest due to the failure of
the Class A overcollateralization test.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 8.2% or $31.0 million since September 2012, due to
the diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying assets. As a
result of this deleveraging, the Class A-1 notes' par coverage
improved to 155.83% based on Moody's calculation. According to the
latest trustee report dated July 31, 2013, the Class A, Class B
and Class C overcollateralization test ratios are reported at
128.15% (limit 131.70%), 102.28% (limit 108.39%) and 83.53% (limit
103.65%) respectively, versus September 2012 levels of 122.08%,
98.98%, and 82.00%, respectively. Going forward, the Class A1
notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the proceeds from future redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool.

Moody's also notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) has
improved to 1273.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, and
weighted average recovery rate are based on its published
methodology and may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool to have a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $539.1 million, defaulted/deferring par of $82.0
million, a weighted average default probability of 23.37%
(implying a WARF of 1273), Moody's Asset Correlation of 18.1%, and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 8.43%. In
addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Alesco Preferred Funding XIV, Ltd, issued on December 21, 2006, is
a collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks and insurance companies that are generally not publicly
rated by Moody's. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS
without public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive their credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data reported
as of Q1-2013. For insurance TruPS without public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of Moody's Insurance team based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual
statutory financial reports.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011, and "Updated Approach to
the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in
October 2009.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Cross Sector Rating Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8.9 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 88 points from the
base case of 1362, the model-implied rating of the A1 notes is one
notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the WARF is
decreased by 180 points, the model-implied rating of the A1 notes
is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to banks that are deferring interest on
their TruPS but satisfy specific credit criteria and thus have a
strong likelihood of resuming interest payments. Under this
sensitivity analysis, Moody's gave par credit to $9.0 million of
bank TruPS. In the second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran
alternative default-timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower
likelihood of a large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +1

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +0

Moody's notes that this transaction is still subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty although its outlook on the
banking sector has changed to stable from negative. The pace of
FDIC bank failures continues to decline in 2013 compared to the
last four years, and some of the previously deferring banks have
resumed interest payment on their trust preferred securities.
Moody's continues to have a stable outlook on the insurance
sector, other than the negative outlook on the U.S. life insurance
industry.


APIDOS CDO I: Moody's Hikes Rating on $8MM Class D Notes to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Apidos CDO I, Inc.:

$13,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$8,000,000 Class D Fixed Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017, Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$265,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $47,327,253), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on February 14, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$15,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

$20,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in February 2013. Moody's notes that the Class
A-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 61% or $72.8
million since the last rating action in February 2013. Based on
the latest trustee report dated July 16, 2013, the Class A, Class
B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 164.67%, 133.14%, 118.72% and 111.30%, respectively, versus
February 2013 levels of 142.82%, 124.01%, 114.45%, and 109.27%,
respectively. The overcollateralization ratios reported in the
July trustee report do not include the July 29, 2013 payment
distribution, when $24.2 million of principal proceeds were used
to pay down the Class A-1 Notes.

Notwithstanding the improved overcollateralization ratios, Moody's
also notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on Moody's calculations, securities that mature
after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 10.7% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's announced that it had
concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class C and
Class D Notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's
said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the issuer's
ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC ratios
resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments during
the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $116.2 million, defaulted par of $3.8 million,
a weighted average default probability of 13.72% (implying a WARF
of 2452), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.18%,
and a diversity score of 35. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Apidos CDO I, issued in August 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans
and CLO tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1962)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2943)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


ASSET SECURITIZATION 1997-D4: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on B-3 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Asset Securitization Corp.'s series 1997-D4, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations follows S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the pool's remaining assets, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflects S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
S&P affirmed its ratings on these classes to also reflect the
remaining assets' credit characteristics and performance, as well
as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movements on classes B-3 and B-4, S&P affirmed its ratings
on these classes because its analysis also considered their
historical interest shortfalls and its view on the available
liquidity support and the potential for additional interest
shortfalls in the future.  S&P believes these increased interest
shortfalls may result from the sole specially serviced asset
($5.1 million, 10.9%).

As of the Aug. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $46.4 million, down from
$1.40 billion at issuance.  The pool comprises one loan and one
real estate owned (REO) asset, down from 121 loans at issuance.
To date, the transaction has experienced losses totaling
$21.0 million, or 1.5% of the transaction's original certificate
balance.  Details on the two remaining assets, one of which is
with the special servicer, are as follows:

The Kmart Distribution Center loan ($41.3 million, 89.1%), the
larger of the two remaining assets in the pool, is secured by two
industrial distribution warehouse properties in Greensboro, N.C.
and Brighton, Colo., totaling 2.8 million sq. ft.  Both properties
are 100% triple net leased for 25 years until March 1, 2022, to
Kmart Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Sears Holdings Corp.
(CCC+/Stable).  The leases are not bondable to Kmart Corp.  The
master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported a debt
service coverage of 1.23x for the three months ended March 31,
2013.

The Lincoln Park Center REO asset ($5.1 million, 10.9%), the
smaller of the two remaining assets in the pool, comprises a
175,679-sq.-ft. retail center in Lincoln Park, Mich.  The asset
has a reported total exposure of $5.3 million.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III), on July 10, 2010, due to payment delinquency, and the
property became REO on Dec. 20, 2012. C-III stated that once the
environmental issue (an abandoned oil underground storage tank) at
the property is remedied, it will evaluate the liquidation
strategies and resolution timing.  The master servicer has deemed
the asset nonrecoverable.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
asset's eventual resolution.

As it relates to the above asset resolution, minimal loss is
considered to be less than 25% of the current asset balance,
moderate loss is between 26% and 59%, and significant loss is 60%
or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Asset Securitization Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-D4

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)

B-3        BB+ (sf)                     89.64
B-4        CCC+ (sf)                    44.30


BATTALION CLO II: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on four
classes of notes from Battalion CLO II Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction, and removed them
from CreditWatch with positive implications, where S&P had placed
them on July 9, 2013.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating
on one other class of notes.

The transaction is currently in its amortization phase and has
commenced the paydown of the notes.  The upgrades largely reflect
paydowns of $208.29 million to the class A-1 notes since the
transaction was rated in August 2012.  Because of this, credit
support to the tranches increased, reflecting the increased
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class of notes:

   -- The class A O/C increased to 190.72%, up from 129.54% in
      August 2012;

   -- The class B O/C ratio is 148.08%, up from 118.42% in August
      2012;

   -- The class C O/C ratio is 130.04%, up from 112.44% in August
      2012; and

   -- The class D O/C ratio is 117.69%, up from 107.75% in August
      2012.

The transaction has no defaults according to the August 2013
monthly trustee report, and the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio has been stable since the deal closed in August 2012.

The affirmation of the class A-1 notes reflects the sufficient
credit support available to the notes at the current 'AAA (sf)'
rating level.

S&P's rating on the class C notes is limited by its largest
obligor default test, which intends to address the potential
concentration of exposure to obligors in the transaction's
portfolio.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings currently assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED, REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Battalion CLO II Ltd.

                Rating
Class        To         From

A-2          AAA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B            AA+ (sf)   A (sf)/Watch Pos
C            A+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D            BBB+(sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Battalion CLO II Ltd.

Class       Rating

A-1         AAA (sf)


BATTALION CLO IV: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Battalion CLO IV Ltd./Battalion CLO IV LLC's
$378.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 28,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2654%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which would lead to interest
      and principal proceed diversion to reduce the rated notes'
      outstanding balance.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which would lead to the reclassification up to
      50% of excess interest proceeds that are available before
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
      subordinated hedge payments, reserve deposits, portfolio
      manager incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to,
      during the reinvestment period, principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets or, after the
      reinvestment period, to paydown the secured notes as per the
      note payment sequence.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1759.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Battalion CLO IV Ltd./Battalion CLO IV LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                241.00
A-2                    AA (sf)                  50.00
B (deferrable)         A (sf)                   35.00
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 22.00
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  19.00
E (deferrable)         B (sf)                   11.00
Subordinated notes     NR                       39.00

NR--Not rated.


BBCMS 2013-TYSN: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating to Class E CMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
seven classes of commercial mortgage backed securities, issued by
BBCMS 2013-TYSN Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates.

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

* Interest-Only Class

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to one regional mall. The
borrower underlying the mortgage is a special-purpose entity
(SPE), Tysons Galleria L.L.C.

The ratings are based on the collateral and the structure of the
transaction.

Moody's rating approach for securities backed by a single loan
compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying property with
the credit protection offered by the structure. The structure's
credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum deterioration in
property value that the securities are able to withstand under
various stress scenarios without causing an increase in the
expected loss for various rating levels. In assigning single
borrower ratings, Moody's also considers a range of qualitative
issues as well as the transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The Tysons Galleria loan is secured by the Borrower's fee simple
and leasehold interest in 308,805 SF contained within a 820,738
SF, three-level regional mall anchored by Macy's (259,933SF),
Nieman Marcus (132,000 SF) and Saks Fifth Avenue (120,000). All
three anchors own their respective space. The Property is located
just off the I-495 Beltway in McLean, VA which is approximately 17
miles west of Washington, DC. Other notable national tenants in
occupancy include Chanel, Gucci, Burberry, Louis Vuitton, Versace,
Hugo Boss, Tory Burch, Emporio Armani, Ralph Lauren, Henri Bendel,
Yves Sant Laurent, Bally, Salvatore Ferragamo, Bottega Veneta and
Michael Kors. Additionally, the Property offers a significant
restaurant and entertainment component with tenants such as The
Cheesecake Factory, Maggiano's Little Italy, P.F. Chang's China
Bistro, Legal Seafood and Wildfire. The Property was constructed
in 1988 and is in excellent condition. As of June 2013, the
Property, including non-collateral space, was 96.9% occupied by
approximately 90 tenants.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two
factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely
driven by the LTV of the underlying loan.

Moody's Trust LTV Ratio of 84.2% is in-line with other fixed-rate
single-property loans that have previously been assigned an
underlying rating of Ba2.

The Moody's Trust Actual DSCR of 1.44X (amortizing) and Moody's
Stressed Trust DSCR of 0.90X are considered to be in-line with
other Moody's rated loans of similar respective leverages.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-A
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. Moody's analysis
also uses the CMBS IO calculator v1.0 which references the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Single Borrower CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 16%, or 25%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa class would be Aa2, A2, or Baa3, respectively. Parameter
Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time; rather they are designed to
provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might
change if key input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


BEAR STEARNS 2003-TOP10: S&P Raises Rating on Class J Notes to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-TOP10, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on four other classes from the
same transaction.

The rating actions follows S&P's analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrades reflect S&P's expected available credit enhancement
for these classes, which it believes is greater than its most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the most
recent rating levels.  The raised ratings also follows S&P's view
regarding the current and future performance of the collateral
supporting the transaction, as well as the deleveraging of the
trust balance.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on these classes to also
reflect the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining assets, as well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on classes K, L, M, and N, S&P affirmed its
ratings on these classes because its analysis also considered its
view on available liquidity support and the potential for
additional interest shortfalls in the future.  S&P believes these
increased interest shortfalls may result from the four assets with
the special servicer ($29.3 million, 47.9%) and from any of the
three loans on the master servicer's watchlist ($8.7 million,
14.2%).

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.78x
and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 28.6% for 13
of the 19 remaining assets in the pool.  S&P's DSC and LTV
calculations exclude four assets ($29.3 million, 47.9%) that are
with the special servicer (details below) and two defeased loans
($9.9 million, 16.2%).

As of the Aug. 13, 2013 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $61.3 million, down from
$1.21 billion at issuance.  The pool comprises 16 loans and three
real estate owned (REO) assets, down from 167 loans at issuance.
To date, the transaction has experienced losses totaling
$3.3 million, or 0.3% of the transaction's original certificate
balance.  Four ($29.3 million, 47.9%) of the remaining 19 assets
are with the special servicer.  In addition, three loans
($8.7 million, 14.2%) were reported on the master servicer's
watchlist.  Excluding the four specially serviced assets and two
defeased loans, one loan ($1.5 million, 2.5%) reported a DSC of
less than 1.10x.

The Butler Commons loan ($5.8 million, 9.5%), the fifth-largest
nondefeased asset in the pool and the largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist, is secured by a 77,446-sq.-ft. retail
center, shadow anchored by Wal-Mart Stores Inc., in Butler
Township, Penn.  The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist because two large tenants comprising 26.1% of the gross
leasable area (GLA) have leases that expired in the first half of
2013.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo),
reported a DSC of 1.83x for year-end 2012.  According to the June
2013 rent roll provided by Wells Fargo, occupancy dropped to 89.4%
from 100% because the tenant comprising 10.6% of the GLA vacated
upon its lease expiration, while the other tenant renewed its
lease until June 30, 2018.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

As of the Aug. 13, 2013 trustee remittance report, one
nonperforming matured balloon loan and three REO assets totaling
$29.3 million (47.9%) were with the special servicer, C-III Asset
Management LLC (C-III).  Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs)
totaling $5.0 million are in effect against two of the specially
serviced assets.

The Power Plaza Shopping Center loan ($11.0 million, 18.0%), the
largest nondefeased asset in the pool, is the largest asset with
the special servicer.  The loan has a reported exposure of
$11.1 million.  The loan is secured by a 112,155-sq.-ft. retail
strip center in Vacaville, Calif.  The nonperforming matured
balloon loan was transferred to C-III on Nov. 21, 2012 because of
imminent default.  The loan matured on March 1, 2013. C-III
indicated that it is currently negotiating a loan modification
with the borrower.  According to the June 30, 2013 rent roll, the
property was 68.1% occupied.  The reported DSC was 0.67x for the
six months ended June 30, 2013.  Based on the revised 2013
appraisal value, we expect a minimal (if any) loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

The Foothills Gateway REO asset ($6.4 million, 10.4%), the second-
largest nondefeased asset in the pool, comprises a 68,163-sq.-ft.
suburban office building in Phoenix, Ariz.  The asset has a
reported exposure of $7.4 million.  The loan was transferred to
C-III on Dec. 6, 2011 due to imminent payment default, and the
property became REO on July 25, 2013.  According to the
March 31, 2013 rent roll, the property was 54.9% occupied. C-III
is currently evaluating its liquidation strategies on this asset,
and an ARA of $2.3 million is in effect against the asset.  S&P
expects a moderate loss upon the asset's eventual resolution.

The College Square Shopping Center Phase I REO asset
($6.1 million, 10.0%), the third-largest nondefeased asset in the
pool, consists of a 126,004-sq.-ft. retail property in Stockton,
Calif.  The asset has a reported exposure of $8.0 million.  The
loan was transferred to C-III on Dec. 7, 2009 due to imminent
payment default after the termination of the Mervyn's lease.  The
property became REO on Nov. 29, 2010.  According to C-III, it is
in the process of leasing up the vacant space.  The reported
occupancy is currently at 88.0%.  C-III plans to market the
property for sale.  Based on the 2013 appraisal value, S&P expects
a minimal (if any) loss upon the eventual resolution of this
asset.

The 1140 East Altamonte Drive REO asset ($5.8 million, 9.5%), the
fourth-largest nondefeased asset in the pool, comprises a
105,883-sq.-ft. retail center in Altamonte Springs, Florida.  The
asset has a reported exposure of $7.0 million.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on May 12, 2010 because of
imminent payment default, and the property became REO on
Jan. 10, 2013.  The property is reported to be 56.0% occupied.
According to C-III, the property had deferred maintenance items
and was also vandalized, and incurred heating, ventilation, and
air conditioning damages in April 2013.  C-III stated that repairs
are scheduled to be completed in September 2013.  An ARA of
$2.7 million is in effect against this asset, and S&P expects a
moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

As it relates to the above asset resolution, minimal loss is
considered to be less than 25%, moderate loss is between 26% and
59%, and significant loss is 60% or greater.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-TOP10
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Rating
Class        To          From            Credit enhancement (%)

E            AAA (sf)    A- (sf)                         93.50
F            AA+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)                       78.66
G            A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)                        66.30
H            BBB (sf)    BB+ (sf)                        48.99
J            BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)                         41.58

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-TOP10
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)

K          BB- (sf)                     31.69
L          B+ (sf)                      24.27
M          B (sf)                       19.33
N          B- (sf)                      14.38


BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR7: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes and
downgraded three classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-PWR7 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on our current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The affirmations of
the below investment grade P&I classes are due to the ratings
being consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating of the
interest-only class, Classes X1, is consistent with the expected
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

The downgrades are due to expected increases in interest
shortfalls resulting from modified and specially serviced loans.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.5% of the
current balance compared to 6.2% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus cumulative realized losses are now 6.2% of the
original securitized balance compared to 6.6% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 32 compared to 39 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $762.3
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 109 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 37%
of the pool. One loan, representing 1% of the pool, has an
investment grade credit assessment.

Thirty-one loans, representing 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $27.8 million (33% loss severity
overall). Currently one loan, the Quintard Mall Loan ($31.7
million -- 4% of the pool), is in special servicing. This is a
357,000 square foot (SF) mall located in Oxford, Alabama. As of
December 2012, this property was 92% leased. The loan transferred
to special servicing in May 2013 due to the a payment default.
Discussions with the borrower regarding an acceptable workout are
on-going at this time. Moody's has estimated a significant loss
for this loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $19.9 million loss from these loans and the
specially serviced loan.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial-year 2013
operating results for 95% and 38% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 91% compared to 93% at last review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.49X and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 1.17X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Visalia Medical Center
Loan ($6.5 million -- 1% of the pool), which is secured by a
95,590 SF medical office building located in Visalia, California.
The property is 100% leased to Visalia Medical Clinic through
December 2019. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR
are Baa1 and 1.77X, respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.72X at
last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Campus at Marlborough Loan ($55.1
million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a 530,895 SF Class
A office building located in the MetroWest office submarket of
Marlborough, Massachusetts. The property was 95% leased as of
March 2013 compared to 100% leased at last review and 90% at
securitization. Property performance has been stable. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.39X, respectively, compared to 89%
and 1.15X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at Boca Park Loan ($50.9
million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a 277,472 square
foot (SF) retail center located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The property
transferred back to the Master from Special Servicing on October
17, 2012 with a loan modification. As of November 16, 2012, the
loan was modified with an increase in loan term and IO term by 48
periods and 108 periods, respectively. Interest rate also
decreased from 5.25% to 4.75% and will change over time. The
property was 95% leased as of March 31, 2013. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 147% and 0.66X, respectively, compared to 148%
and 0.70X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Marquis Apartments Loan ($41.3
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 641-unit
multifamily complex located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. The
property was 42% leased as of December 2012 compared to 70% at
last review. This large drop in vacancy is due to the decision by
the borrower to shut down units in order to complete a significant
maintenance project. A new management company, Vantage, has
stepped in to buy the property, payoff the loan and refinance the
property. An expected timeframe is 60 days for this transaction.
The loan represents a 90% pari-passu interest in a $45.8 million
loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.75X,
respectively, compared to 132% and 0.74X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP 22: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. F Certs to CCC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and revised the Recovery
Estimate of two classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust (BSCMST), series 2006- TOP22 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade is based on the increase in modeled losses to the
pool since the last review. The pool's aggregate principal balance
has been paid down by 30.1% to $1.192 billion from $1.705 billion
at issuance. Fitch modeled losses of 4.61% of the remaining pool,
expected losses based on the original pool balance are 3.7%, of
which 0.42%, are losses realized to date. Fitch designated 34
loans (16.3%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include three
specially serviced loans (2.6%).

Rating Sensitivity

The Rating Outlook remains Negative for classes D and E.
Downgrades are possible on these classes if additional loans
transfer to special servicing or the pool experiences an increase
in expected losses.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a 308-room
full service, Marriott flagged hotel, located in Orlando, FL (1.1%
of pool) The resort faces strong competition from the large number
of properties in the sub-market which cater to the same customer
segment. Performance has continued to decline, with the full year
2012 occupancy at 56% and the resulting debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) at 0.66x. The slide in performance is due to the
borrower aggressively lowering rates in order to attract more
customers. The loan remains current.

The second largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses consists
of an asset (0.5%) secured by a 55,735 sf medical office property
located in Phoenix, AZ. The asset, which is real estate owned
(REO), has a third-party manager in place and a number of
maintenance items are being addressed, including repairs from hail
damage and replacement of the roofing system. The property was
recently listed for sale and the special servicer is evaluating
offers before determining the next steps in the workout.

The next largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses consists of
a loan (0.42%) secured by a 118,095 sf three-story office building
located in Lexington, KY. The occupancy rate at the subject
remains low at 25%, and occupancy is unlikely to improve in the
short-term due a large amount of deferred maintenance and
functional obsolesce. The special servicer completed the process
of appointing a replacement property manager and is evaluating the
initial management report to determine the best course of action
in disposing of the asset.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and revises Recovery
Estimates as indicated:

-- $14.9 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 70%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and Outlooks as indicated:

-- $12.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $563.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $169.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $170.5 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125.7 million class A-J at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32 million class B at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.8 million class C at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.6 million class D at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $14.9 million class E at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $14.9 million class G at 'CCCsf'; RE0% from RE100%.
-- $8.5 million class H at 'CCsf'; RE0% from 35%;
-- $10.7 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE0%;
-- $2.1 million class K at 'CCsf'; RE0%;
-- $6.4 million class L at 'Csf'; RE0%;
-- $2.1 million class M at 'Csf'; RE0%;
-- $2.1 million class N at 'Csf', RE0%;
-- $0.9 million class O at 'Csf'; RE0%.

Fitch does not rate $0.0 million class P. Classes A-1, A-2, and A-
3 have repaid in full. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: Fitch Cuts Rating on 3 Securities to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes and affirmed 14 classes
of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2007-
TOP28 (BSCMSI 2007-TOP28).

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses. Fitch
modeled losses of 5.3% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 6.2%, including $28.5 million
(1.6% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated 58 loans (33.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes four specially serviced assets (1.7%).

Over 50% of the pool consists of retail properties, including
eight the Top 15 loans, the largest of which is the largest loan
in the pool, representing 11.1% of the collateral. While updated
rent rolls were provided by the servicer; recent sales information
was not. Fitch made conservative assumptions in its modeling on
these loans.

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 13% to $1.53 billion from
$1.76 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(3.5% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes L through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the RiverCenter I &
II loan (3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold
interest in two adjacent office buildings totaling 550,000 sf. The
properties, which are located outside Cincinnati in Covington, KY,
have seen an overall decline in performance over the last few
years. As of May 2013, occupancy was reported at 68%, down from
73.5% in July 2012. Further, the second largest tenant (10% of
NRA) recently renewed its lease at 15% lower than its current
rent.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Pavilions
at Hartman Heritage loan (1.5%), which is secured by a 220,000 sf
retail property located in Independence, MO. As of July 31, 2013,
occupancy was 75.7%. While the property saw an over 60%
improvement in property cash flow between year-end 2012 and 2011,
the property is still performing significantly below expectations
at issuance when occupancy was 92%.

Rating Sensitivity

The ratings on the senior classes A-3 through B are expected to
remain stable. Classes C and D are subject to downgrade should
expected losses increase in the future. The distressed classes are
subject to further downgrade as losses are realized.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $17.6 million class F to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $19.8 million class G to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $15.4 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $2.2 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $2.2 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $60.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $64.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $841.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $117.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $176.1 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $114.5 million class A-J at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $30.8 million class B at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15.4 million class C at 'BBsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $28.6 million class D at 'Bsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $22 million class E at 'CCCsf', RE 35%;
-- $2.2 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $154,558 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class P certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


BLACK DIAMOND 2005-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $35MM Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of the
following notes issued by Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Ltd.:

$431,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $127,108,253), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$200,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $23,728,685), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on May 26, 2005 Assigned Aaa (sf);

$50,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on September 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$75,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on April 27, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$70,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on December 21, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$61,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017, Affirmed
A3 (sf); previously on December 21, 2012 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

$6,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due June 2017, Affirmed A3
(sf); previously on December 21, 2012 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

$35,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017, Affirmed
Ba2 (sf); previously on December 21, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating affirmations taken on the notes
are consistent with the net impact of deleveraging of the senior
notes combined with deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since the rating action in December 2012.
These two factors offset each other and their combined effect is
credit neutral to the rated notes.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes and Class A-1A Notes have
been paid down by approximately 38% or $79 million and 66% or $46
million, respectively, since the rating action in December 2012.
Notwithstanding the benefits of deleveraging, however, the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated moderately
since the last rating action. In particular, Moody's calculated
the collateral portfolio to have a weighted average spread (WAS)
of 3.42%, compared to 3.76% at the time of the December 2012
rating action, respectively. Additionally, Moody's notes that the
underlying portfolio continues to include a number of investments
in securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes.
Based on the July 2013 trustee report, Moody's calculates that
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes
currently amount to about $90 million, and make up approximately
21% of the underlying portfolio. These investments potentially
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the
time of the notes' maturity. In Moody's analysis, the
characteristics of the long-dated asset exposure warrants the
modeling of average liquidation values that results in a
significant reduction in effective collateral coverage for the
notes.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $479 million, defaulted par of $51 million, a
weighted average default probability of 16.73% (implying a WARF of
2745), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.57%,
and a diversity score of 34. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Ltd., issued in April 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2196)

Class A1: 0

Class A1A: 0

Class A1B: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D1: +2

Class D2: +2

Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3294)

Class A1: 0

Class A1A: 0

Class A1B: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D1: -1

Class D2: -2

Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the bond/loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
impact on the notes' ratings. Alternatively, however, the issuer's
election to reinvest certain principal or sale proceeds could
result in pushing back the timing of maturities and principal
receipts.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.

4) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal is allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
has the flexibility to deteriorate some collateral quality metrics
to the covenant levels. In particular, Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis.


CAPITAL AUTO 2013-3: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust (CARAT) 2013-
3.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2013-3

Class A-1a, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-1b, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class C, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Class D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's cumulative net loss expectation is 4.00% and the Aaa level
is 21.50% for the aggregate CARAT 2013-3 pool. This expectation
encompasses both the initial pool collateral, and our assumptions
around the composition of additional receivables added to the pool
during the initial one-year revolving period. Moody's net loss
expectation and Aaa Level for the CARAT 2013-3 transaction is
based on an analysis of the credit quality of the underlying
initial pool collateral, an assumption and analysis of the
composition of additional collateral that will be added during the
initial one-year revolving period, historical performance trends,
the ability of Ally Financial Inc. (formerly GMAC Inc.) to perform
the servicing functions, and current expectations for future
economic conditions.

The CARAT 2013-3 Class A-1 Notes are divided into the A-1a Notes
that bear interest at a fixed rate, and the A-1b Notes that are
unhedged, and bear interest at a floating rate corresponding to 1-
month LIBOR.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is consistent
with the Medium V score assigned for the U.S. Sub-prime Retail
Auto Loan ABS sector. The V Score indicates "Medium" uncertainty
about critical assumptions. This is the third public retail loan
securitization for Ally Financial under the CARAT platform, and
third composed of non-prime collateral. The previous
securitizations closed in January and June of 2013. Ally Financial
has securitization experience that dates back to the mid-1980's.
Ally Financial's bank subsidiary, Ally Bank, has sponsored
numerous prior public retail prime auto loan securitizations since
2009. CARAT 2013-3 should benefit from this experience having Ally
Financial as the servicer for the transaction.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS, published in May 2013.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed from 4.00% to 6.50%
the initial model-indicated output might change from Aaa to Aa1
for the Class A notes, from Aa2 to A3 for the Class B notes, from
A1 to Baa3 for the Class C notes, from Baa2 to B1 for the Class D
Notes, and from Ba2 to below B3 for the Class E Notes.. If the net
loss were changed to 8.00% the initial model-indicated output
might change to Aa2 for the Class A notes, to Baa3 for the Class B
Notes, to Ba3 for the Class C Notes, to B3 for the Class D Notes,
and to below B3 for the Class E Notes. If the net loss were
changed to 10.50% the initial model-indicated output might change
to A1 for the Class A notes, to Ba3 for the Class B Notes, and to
below B3 for the Class C Notes, Class D Notes, and Class E Notes.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


CARLYLE BRISTOL: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, and C notes from Carlyle Bristol CLO Ltd., a
cash flow collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by
Carlyle Investment Management LLC, and removed them from
CreditWatch with positive implications.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed and removed from CreditWatch with positive implications
its rating on the class D notes.

Since S&P's March 2012 rating actions, it has observed the
following improvements in the transaction:

   -- The class A notes have paid down by $234 million, to 27% of
      the initial issuance amount;

   -- As a result of the paydowns, the class A
      overcollateralization (O/C) ratio has increased to 148%,
      from 120% before the March 2012 rating actions; and

   -- The recovery rate assumptions used for S&P's cash flow
      analysis, calculated based on the recovery rating assigned
      to each loan (or if no recovery rating is assigned, the
      seniority of the loan) have led to a 5% increase in the
      weighted average recovery rate assumption at the 'AAA'
      stress level.

The transaction does not have exposure to any long-dated assets
and the balance of 'CCC' rated assets has decreased to
$7.9 million from $17.7 million.  The paydowns and higher recovery
rates have significantly increased credit support for the upgraded
classes.

Currently, the largest obligor test constrains the ratings on the
class C and D notes.  This test addresses the potential
concentration of exposure to certain obligors in the transaction's
portfolio.  Because the collateral pool is relatively diverse
(with exposure to more than 90 obligors) and because of the
overall performance improvements noted above, S&P raised its
rating on the class C notes one notch above that indicated by the
largest obligor test.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them, and will take
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Carlyle Bristol CLO Ltd.

          Rating      Rating
Class     To          From
A-1       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1       AA+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2       AA+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C         BB- (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D         B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


CENT CLO 17: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Cent
CLO 17 Ltd./Cent CLO 17 Corp.'s $370.50 million fixed- and
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of March 22, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) closes
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P said.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P added.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P noted.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Cent CLO 17 Ltd./Cent CLO 17 Corp.

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     262.00
A-2A                       AA (sf)                       22.50
A-2B                       AA (sf)                       20.00
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                        29.00
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      19.50
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       17.50


CHATHAM LIGHT II: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes From Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Chatham Light II CLO, Ltd.:

  $27,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
  Notes due August 2019, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July
  15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
  Possible Upgrade;

  $24,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
  Notes due August 2019, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July
  15, 2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  $21,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate Notes
  due August 2019 ((current outstanding balance of $17,568,975),
  Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on December 14, 2012 Upgraded
  to Ba1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  $381,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due August
  2019 (current outstanding balance of $178,794,065 ), Affirmed
  Aaa (sf); previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  $40,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due August
  2019, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 14, 2012
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
December 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been
paid down by approximately 42% or $128.7 million since December
2012. Based on the latest trustee report dated July 22, 2013, the
Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios
are reported at 144.0%, 130.6%, 120.7% and 114.3%, respectively,
versus November 2012 levels of 133.1%, 123.5%, 116.1%, and 111.2%,
respectively. Moody's also notes the trustee reported
overcollateralization ratios in the July 22, 2013 trustee report
do not reflect the recent payment of $45 million to the Class A-1
Notes on August 5, 2013.

Moody's also announced that it had concluded its review of its
ratings on the issuer's Class B Notes and Class C Notes announced
on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's said that it had upgraded
and placed certain of the issuer's ratings on review for upgrade
primarily as a result of substantial deleveraging of the senior
notes and increases in OC ratios resulting from high rates of loan
collateral prepayments during the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $330 million, defaulted par of $5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 16.9% (implying a WARF of
2696), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.24%,
and a diversity score of 48. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Chatham Light II CLO, Ltd., issued in August 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2157)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +2

Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3235)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Alternatively, however, the issuer's
significant participation in amend-to-extend activities would
result in pushing back the timing of maturities and principal
receipts for affected loan collateral.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal is allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
has the flexibility to deteriorate some collateral quality metrics
to the covenant levels. Notably, the post-reinvestment period
reinvesting criteria does not require that a purchased asset have
a maturity equal to or less than the maturity of the replaced
asset. As a result, Moody's tested for a possible extension of the
actual weighted average life in its analysis in consideration of
the post-reinvestment period reinvesting criteria for maintaining
the weighted average life of the portfolio, as well as concerns
about potential participation in amendments to extend loan
maturities.


CIFC FUNDING 2006-I: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1L, A-1LR, A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L notes from CIFC Funding
2006-I Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed
by Commercial Industrial Finance Corp., and removed them from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where S&P placed them on
July 9, 2013.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AA+ (sf)'
rating on the class P-1 notes, which is backed by a U.S. Treasury
strip certificate.

The upgrades reflect increased credit support following paydowns
to the class A-1L and A-1LR notes since our May 2012 rating
actions.  The affirmation reflects S&P's view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating level.

Principal amortization has resulted in $190.17 million paydowns to
the class A-1L and A-1LR notes in aggregate since S&P's May 2012
rating actions, which were based on the April 10, 2012, trustee
report.  The class A-1L and A-1LR notes' outstanding balance is at
approximately 51% of its original balance.  The transaction's
overall overcollateralization (O/C) ratio tests have benefited
from the principal paydowns; for example, the senior class A O/C
ratio has increased to 132.03% from 122.99% before the July 22,
2013, payment.

The underlying portfolio's credit quality has improved over the
same period.  According to the July 2013 trustee report, the
amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's asset
portfolio fell since the May 2012 rating actions.  The transaction
held $24.81 million of 'CCC' rated collateral in July 2013, down
from $45.75 million in April 2012.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised
CIFC Funding 2006-I Ltd.

Class           Rating
          To             From
A-1L      AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1LR     AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L      AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L      AA+ (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1L      A+ (sf)        BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2L      BB+ (sf)       BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed
CIFC Funding 2006-I Ltd.

Class           Rating
P-1             AA+ (sf)


CITIGROUP 2006-C5: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Certs to 'Csf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed eight classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C5 as
follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 16, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 16, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 16, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 16, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 16, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses from troubled and
specially serviced loans.

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below-investment grade P&I classes are consistent
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The ratings of
the IO classes, Class XC and XP, are consistent with the expected
credit performance of their referenced classes and thus are
affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.4% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
8.2%. Moody's based expected loss plus realized losses is now
11.2% of the original pooled balance compared to 10.4% at last
review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 43 compared to 44 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 23% to $1.6 billion
from $2.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 174 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 38%
of the pool. One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

Forty-five loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $85.3 million (43% loss severity
on average). Sixteen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the One & Two Securities Centre Loan ($67 million -- 4.1%
of the pool), which is secured by two office buildings totaling
521,957 square feet (SF) located in the Buckhead submarket of
Atlanta, Georgia. The loan transferred to special servicing in
December 2010 due to imminent default and became real estate owned
(REO) in November 2011. The property was 76% leased as of December
2012 compared to 79% at last review; 22% of the net rentable area
(NRA) expires within the next 12 months. The special servicer
indicated that the loan will be listed for sale in the next 60
days. The remaining fifteen specially serviced loans are secured
by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $74.5
million loss for the specially serviced loans (41% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 18 poorly
performing loans representing 17% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $48.5 million loss (18% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 85%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 96% compared to 103% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.14X, respectively, compared to
1.36X and 1.05X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool. The largest
loan is the IRET Portfolio Loan ($122.6 million -- 7.5% of the
pool), which is a comprised of nine office properties located in
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and Kansas. The portfolio totals
approximately 937,000 SF. The loan is interest-only for its entire
10-year term and matures in October 2016. The portfolio was 82%
leased as of April 2013 compared to 81% at last review. The 2012
property performance decreased due to lower base rents and expense
reimbursements. Due to the decline in performance, Moody's
considers this as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 178% and 0.59X, respectively, compared to 138% and 0.76X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the 801 South Figueroa Street Loan
($120 million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 443,271
SF office building located in Los Angeles, California. The loan is
interest-only for its entire 10-year term and matures in October
2016. The property was 94% leased as of March 2013 compared to 88%
at last review with approximately 20% of the NRA expiring in the
next 12 months. A significant portion of this space is rented at
above market rents. Moody's analysis reflects stabilization of the
building at market rents and market vacancy. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 119% and 0.84X, respectively, same as at last
full review.

The third largest loan is the Tower 67 Loan ($100 million -- 6.1%
of the pool), which is secured by a 449-unit multifamily property
located in the upper west side of Manhattan. The property was 97%
leased as of December 2012 compared to 98% at last review.
Property performance has been stable. The loan is interest-only
for a 10-year term and has an anticipated repayment date of July
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 76% and 1.07X at last review.


CITIGROUP 2012-GC8: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 20012-GC8 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on our current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The ratings of the IO Classes, Class X-A and X-B, are consistent
with the expected credit performance of their referenced classes
and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 1.9% of the current deal balance.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20 compared to 20 at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a Pre-Sale dated September 6, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.03 billion
from $1.04 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 57 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 60% of
the pool. The pool includes one loan with an investment-grade
credit assessment, representing 1% of the pool.

Currently there is one loan on the master servicer's watch list
and none in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 96% and 80% of the performing pool,
respectively. Moody's weighted average LTV is 98%, compared to 99%
at securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.60X and 1.10X, respectively, compared to 1.61X and 1.07X at
securitization. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the ARCT III Portfolio Loan
($12 million -- 1% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
portfolio of 27 unanchored retail centers across the United
States, totaling 233,218 square feet. Most of the properties were
built from 2010-2012, while four were built from 1995-2010. All 27
retail centers were 100% leased as of March 31, 2013, the same as
at securitization. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
Baa1 and 1.97X, compared to Baa1 and 1.93X at securitization.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 30% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Miami Center Loan ($170 million -- 11% of
the pool). The loan is secured by a 786,836 square foot office
building in Miami, Florida. The three largest tenants include
Citigroup, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP and Shutts & Bowen. The office
occupancy was 82% in March 2013 compared to 84% at last review.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 1.31X, compared
to 108% and 1.29X at securitization.

The second largest loan is the 222 Broadway Loan ($135 million --
10% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 31-story, Class A
office tower in downtown Manhattan. The property contains 786,552
square feet of net rentable area, including 23,764 square feet of
ground floor retail. The property was built in 1961, and was
renovated several times between 2008 and 2011. The top three
tenants include Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase and Peltz &
Walker. The property was 85% leased as of March 2013 compared to
79% at securitization. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are
103% and 1.73X, compared to 102% and 1.97X at securitization.

The third largest loan is the 17 Battery Place South Loan ($105
million -- 9% of the pool). The loan is secured by the lower 13
stories of a 31-story, mixed use office and residential building
located in the financial district of Manhattan. The loan sponsor
is Joseph Moinian. The property's occupancy decreased from 81% at
securitization to 80% as of March 2013. The top three largest
tenants are the New York Film Academy, Continental Stock Transfer
and Wall Street Access. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are
109% and, 1.44X, compared to 104% and 1.47X at last review.


COMM 2012-CCRE2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eighteen classes
of COMM 2012-CCRE2 Mortgage Trust as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M-PEZ, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-PEZ, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. C-PEZ, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. PEZ, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the principal and interest classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on our current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Classes, Class X-A and X-B are consistent
with the expected credit performance of its referenced classes and
thus are affirmed.

This is Moody's first full review of COMM 2012-CCRE2. Moody's
rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the current
balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from troubled loans, the credit enhancement
level for rated classes could decline below the current levels. If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 23, the same as at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.30 billion
from $1.32 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 65 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 58% of
the pool. The pool contains one loan with an investment grade
credit assessment, representing 8% of the pool.

One loan representing less than 1% of the pool is on the Master
Servicer's Watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated and there are no loans in special
servicing at this time.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and full or partial year
2013 operating results for 88% and 46% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV is 97% compared to 98% at
securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 4% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 1.03X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the 520 Eighth Avenue loan
($103.1 million -- 7.9% of the pool). The loan is secured by three
adjacent and interconnected office buildings with one main
entrance that has been combined into a single office property. The
properties are located at 520 8th Avenue, 266 West 37th Street and
261 West 36th Street, totaling 758,490 square feet (SF). The
properties are located in the Penn Plaza/Garment District
submarket. The buildings are occupied by a diverse mix of tenants
including not-for-profit associations, professional services
firms, media and entertainment services companies. The largest
tenants are APSCA, The Mason Tenders and the Selfhelp Community
Services. Inc. As of March 2013, the properties had a combined
occupancy of 98%, compared to 99% at securitization. The loan is
amortizing over a 30 year schedule and matures in June 2022.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.30X at securitization.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 25% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the 1055 West 7th Street Loan ($116.4
million -- 8.9% of the pool).The loan is secured by a 615,950 SF
office Class A- property located in downtown Los Angeles,
California. The property was built in 1987 and is 33 stories high.
The largest tenants are LA Care Health Plan (26% of the Net
Rentable Area (NRA); lease expiration November, 2021), Morris
Polich and Purdy (7% of the NRA; lease expiration April 2016) and
the Los Angeles County Bar Association (7% of the NRA; lease
expiration April 2021). As of March 2013, the property was 87%
leased, compared to 85% at securitization. The loan is amortizing
over a 30 year schedule and matures in July 2022. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 108% and 0.93X, respectively, compared to 109%
and 0.91X at securitization.

The second largest conduit loan is the 77 K Street Loan ($110.0
million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 326,900 SF
Class A office building located in the NoMa neighborhood of
Washington, D.C. The property is used as a headquarters location
for the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (51% of the
NRA; lease expiration December 2020) and CQ Roll Call, Inc. (22%
of the NRA; lease expiration March 2023). The property was 93%
leased as of March 2013, the same as at securitization. The loan
has an initial five-year interest only period, and matures in June
2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.01X,
respectively, the same as at securitization.

The third largest loan is 260 and 261 Madison Avenue Loan ($105.0
million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is secured by two Class B+
office towers totaling 923,277 SF, located in midtown Manhattan.
The cross streets are Madison Avenue between 36th and 37th Street.
This loan represents a pari passu interest in a $231.0 million
loan. The largest tenants include McLaughlin & Stern (12% of the
NRA; lease expiration December 2021) and Primedia (8% of the NRA;
lease expiration November 2017). As of March 2013, the properties
had a combined occupancy of approximately 92% compared to 90% at
securitization. The loan is interest only and matures in June
2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 0.98X at securitization.


COMM 2013-300P: Fitch Rates $28MM Class E Certificates 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to COMM 2013-300P Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates:

-- $222,000,000 class A1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,000,000 class A1P 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $297,000,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61,000,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57,000,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,000,000 class E 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Interest-only and notional amount.

The certificates represent the beneficial interests in the
mortgage loan securing the 300 Park Avenue property located in New
York, NY. Proceeds of the loan were used to refinance existing
debt, pay closing costs, and return equity to the sponsor. The
certificates will follow a sequential-pay structure.

Key Rating Drivers

Low Trust Leverage: Fitch's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for the trust component of the debt is 1.32x, and the
stressed loan to value (LTV) is 67.2%. Additionally, the 'AAAsf'
rated debt is only $385 per square foot (psf), which implies the
property could sustain a 70% decline in value from its current $1
billion appraised value and still repay 'AAAsf' debt.

Credit Tenancy: As of July 2013, the property was 91.6% leased by
13 tenants and serves as the global headquarters for Colgate-
Palmolive ('AA-'; Stable Outlook by Fitch), which leases 65.3% of
the net rentable area (NRA) through June 2023.

Tenant Concentration and Rollover Risk: During the 10-year loan
term 98.8% of the leased NRA rolls, including the largest tenant,
Colgate-Palmolive, whose lease expires two months before the loan
matures. Colgate-Palmolive has demonstrated a commitment to the
property through long-term occupancy of 59 years, a 2008 early
lease renewal for 15 years, and recent and ongoing investments in
their space.

Limited Structural Features: The loan has no upfront reserves
other than real estate taxes, no structure in place to mitigate
the Colgate-Palmolive lease expiration, springing cash management,
and there is no carve-out guarantor.

Excellent Location: The property is located in the Grand Central
submarket (just south of the Plaza submarket) between 49th and
50th streets on the west side of Park Avenue. The location is four
blocks north of Grand Central Terminal and offers excellent
accessibility and proximity to public transportation.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch found that the pool could withstand a 70.3% decline in value
and an approximately 56.3% decrease in the most recent actual cash
flow prior to experiencing $1 of loss to any 'AAAsf' rated class.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings of class A (rated
'AAAsf') and found that an 8% decline in Fitch net cash flow would
result in a one-category downgrade, while a 35% decline would
result in a downgrade to below investment grade.


CREDIT SUISSE 2000-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2000-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to stable performance since Fitch's last
rating action. Fitch modeled losses of 3.4% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 4.6%, including
$50.3 million (4.5% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date. Fitch has designated five loans (20.4%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which does not include any specially serviced
loans.

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98% to $22.3 million from
$1.11 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, four loans
(7.7% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through M.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Timber Ridge
Apartments loan (9.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
multifamily property consisting of 136 units located in Arlington,
TX. The master servicer reports the decline in performance is a
result of decreased rents, lower occupancy, and competition in the
area. As of May 2013, the property is 92% occupied with average
rents at $ 444 per unit. According to REIS as of the 2nd quarter
2013, the Fort Worth Central Arlington multifamily submarket has a
vacancy rate of 5.2% with average asking rent $620 per unit.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on class G remains Stable. Although credit
enhancement has increased from scheduled paydown, the pool remains
highly concentrated.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $5.8 million class G at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.5 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $4 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class N certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class A-X certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP3: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class L Certs to CCC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed two classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP3.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade is a result of expected losses from the specially
serviced loans, which will be greater than their respective loan
balances.

Fitch modeled losses of 92.8% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 3.5%, including $6.8
million (0.8% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated two loans (90.9%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which are also the two specially serviced assets within
the pool.

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97% to $26.7 million from
$895.7 million at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes M through O.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-serviced
loan (48.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 266,825 square
foot (sf) retail power center located in Elyria, OH. The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2012 due to monetary
default after the borrower was unable to refinance the loan. The
property's anchor tenant, Walmart, vacated the property prior to
its lease expiration of August 2012. The special servicer reports
that the property's current occupancy is 36%.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 91,917 sf
office building located in Troy, MI (42.7% of the pool). The loan
transferred to special servicing in November 2010 and became real
estate owned (REO) in October 2011. The special servicer has
appointed a property manager to manage and lease the property. The
special servicer reports that the property's occupancy is
currently at 75%, which has improved from 22.6% as of September
2012.

Rating Sensitivity

The rating on class L may see a further downgrade if losses from
the specially serviced loans affect this class.

Fitch downgrades the following class and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $2.2 million class L to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf', RE 85%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $11.2 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $4.5 million class N at 'Csf', RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-SP, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J and K have
been paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class O certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class A-
X certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-TFL1: Moody's Keeps Ratings over Rights Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that LibreMax Master Fund,
Ltd., in its capacity as the Directing Holder, intends to remove
Brookfield Real Estate Financial Partners, LLC as the existing
Special Servicer for the Renaissance Aruba Beach Resort & Casino
Mortgage Loan and to appoint Wells Fargo Bank, NA as the successor
Special Servicer. The Proposed Special Servicer Transfer and
Replacement will become effective upon satisfaction of the
conditions precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement.
Moody's has determined that this proposed special servicing
replacement will not, in and of itself, and at this time, result
in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any class
of certificates rated by Moody's for Credit Suisse First Boston
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-TFL1 (the Certificates).

Moody's opinion only addresses the credit impact associated with
the proposed designation and transfer of special servicing rights.
Moody's is not expressing any opinion as to whether this change
has, or could have, other non-credit related effects that may have
a detrimental impact on the interests of note holders and/or
counterparties.

The last rating action for CSFB 2007-TFL1 was taken on February
21, 2013. The principal methodology used in this rating was
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

On February 21, 2013, Moody's affirmed 13 CMBS classes of Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2007-TFL1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Confirmed at B1
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)


CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED 2002-18: Moody's Cuts Rating on 5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by CSFB Mortgage-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-18.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-18

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-PP, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating
performance and/or structural features resulting in higher
expected losses for the bonds than previously anticipated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


DRYDEN XI-LEVERAGED 2006: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006:

$25,300,000 Class A-3 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due April 12, 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
August 10, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$47,200,000 Class B Third Priority Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on August 10, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$24,800,000 Class C-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on August 10, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

$12,700,000 Class C-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
Fixed Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on August 10, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

$23,600,000 Class D Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
Fixed Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020 (current outstanding balance
of $20,143,416), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on August 10,
2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$325,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due April 12, 2020 (current outstanding balance of
$262,686,634), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 10, 2011
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$225,000,000 Class A-2A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020 (current outstanding balance of
$177,066,642), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2006
Assigned Aaa (sf)

$25,000,000 Class A-2B First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due April 12, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August
10, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the end of its reinvestment period in April 2013. Moody's notes
that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 17%,
or $53.7 million, and the A-2A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 19%, or $41.3 million since April 2013. Based on
Moody's calculations the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are currently 129.18%, 117.83%,
110.15% and 106.42%, respectively.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the benefit of the end of the deal's reinvestment period
in April 2013. In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions
applicable during the amortization period, and therefore limited
ability to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from a higher weighed
average spread compared to the level assumed before the end of the
reinvestment period.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $632.3 million, defaulted par of $2.8 million,
a weighted average default probability of 18.59% (implying a WARF
of 2600), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.01%,
and a diversity score of 77. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006, issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2080)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: +3

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3120)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class A-3: -1

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the bond and loan
markets and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


DRYDEN XVIII: Supplemental Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by Dryden
XVIII Leveraged Loan 2007 Limited (the "Issuer"), a CLO, into a
supplemental indenture dated as of August 22, 2013 (the "Fifth
Supplemental Indenture") among the Issuer and Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas, as Trustee, and performance of the activities
contemplated therein, will not in and of themselves and at this
time cause the qualification, downgrade or withdrawal of the
current Moody's rating of any Class of Secured Notes issued by the
Issuer. Moody's does not express an opinion as to whether the
Fifth Supplemental Indenture could have non-credit-related
effects.

The Fifth Supplemental Indenture amends the Concentration
Limitations in order to increase the permitted amount of "Covenant
Lite Loans" to 30% of the collateral portfolio from the previous
level of 15% of the collateral portfolio. Moody's was informed
that requisite noteholder consent has been obtained with respect
to the Fifth Supplemental Indenture.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations", published in May 2013.

On August 30, 2011, Moody's upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Dryden XVIII Leveraged Loan 2007 Limited:

$14,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2019, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.


FIRST UNION 2001-C4: Moody's Takes Action on Three CMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class,
downgraded one class and affirmed one class of First Union
National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-C4 as follows:

Cl. O, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. IO-I, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Class O is upgraded due to an increase in credit support from loan
amortization and payoffs. The deal balance has paid down by 61%
since Moody's last review.

Class P is affirmed as the current rating reflects Moody's
expected loss for this class.

The rating of the interest-only (IO) class, Class IO-I, is
downgraded to align its rating with the expected credit
performance of its referenced classes.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 42.9% of
the current pooled balance compared to 31.8% at last review. The
deal balance has paid down by 61% since Moody's last review, but
realized losses have not materially increased. Moody's based
expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the original
pooled balance compared to 2.9% at last review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Since 96% of the pool is in special servicing, Moody's utilized a
loss and recovery approach in rating this deal. In this approach,
Moody's determines a probability of default for each specially
serviced loan and determines a most probable loss given default
based information from the special servicer and available market
data. The loss given default for each loan also takes into
consideration servicer advances to date and estimated future
advances and closing costs. Translating the probability of default
and loss given default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's
then applies the aggregate loss from specially serviced loans to
the most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of
principal to the most senior class.

The other methodology used in rating Class IO-I was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in February 2012.

The IO calculator v.1.1 uses the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original
and current bond ratings and credit assessments; original and
current bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the
IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type as defined
in the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3
(sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating
committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5 compared to 4 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's typically also
employs the large loan/single borrower methodology. Since 96% of
the pool was in special servicing Moody's employed the loss and
recovery analysis in lieu of the large loan/single borrower
methodology.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 14, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $25
million from $979 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from 4% to
26% of the pool. No remaining loans are defeased and no remaining
loans have investment grade credit assessments.

No loans are currently on the servicer's watchlist.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated at a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $8.8 million (11%
average loss severity). Currently five loans, representing 96% of
the pool, are in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Talon Court Office Loan ($6.5 million - 26.3% of the
pool), which is secured by a 55,000 square foot (SF) suburban
office located in Federal Way, Washington. The loan transferred to
special servicing in 2011 and became real estate owned in March
2012. The property was 33% leased as of June 2013. The property
was sold for $3.225 million in a late July 2013 auction. The loan
remained part of the pool as of the August 14, 2013 distribution
date as sale proceeds had not yet been dispersed.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
office, retail and industrial properties. The servicer has
recognized a $5 million aggregate appraisal reduction for three of
the specially serviced loans. Moody's estimates an $11 million
aggregate loss for all specially serviced loans.

Excluding specially serviced loans, there is one performing loan,
representing 4% of the pool balance. The Walgreens - Moreno
Valley, CA Loan ($990 thousand), which is secured by a 15,000 SF
single tenant retail building leased to Walgreens located in
Moreno Valley, California. The loan is fully amortizing over a 20
year term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 36% and 2.89X,
respectively, compared to 39% and 2.65X at last review.


FLATIRON CLO 2007-1: Supp. Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by Flatiron
CLO 2007-1 Ltd., into a supplemental indenture dated as of August
23, 2013 among the Issuer, Flatiron CLO 2007-1 Inc., as Co-Issuer
and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee (the "Second
Supplemental Indenture") and performance of the obligations
contemplated therein, will not in and of itself and at this time
cause an immediate withdrawal or reduction of the current Moody's
ratings of any Class of Rated Notes issued by the Issuer.

The Second Supplemental Indenture changes the defined term
"Weighted Average Life Test" by replacing the existing
calculation, "10 years", with "11.75 years". By measuring
satisfaction of the Test against a hurdle date occurring 1.75
years later, one likely effect of the change is to permit the
Issuer to satisfy the Weighted Average Life Test (which it failed
as of the measurement date occurring on 8 April 2013) in the
immediate future.

Moody's analyzed the proposed change to the Weighted Average Life
Test by looking at modeling scenarios involving hypothetical
collateral portfolios with various weighted average lives and
amortization profiles that conform to the contemplated
modification of the Weighted Average Life Test. The result of this
analysis indicates that changing the Weighted Average Life Test by
the designated time period at this time has no impact on the
current ratings assigned to the rated notes issued by the Issuer.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations", published in May 2013.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.

On September 8, 2011, Moody's upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Flatiron CLO 2007-1:

$25,400,000 Class A-1b Senior Term Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

$14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$15,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$11,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Term Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

Moody's also confirmed the following rating:

$29,000,000 Class B Senior Term Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at A2
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade


G STREET FINANCE: Supplemental Deal No Impact on Moody's Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by G Street
Finance Ltd., an SF CDO, into a supplement dated as of August 23,
2013 (the "First Supplemental Indenture") to the Indenture dated
as of October 20, 2005 entered into by the Issuer, G Street
Finance (Delaware) Corp, as Co-Issuer and U.S. Bank, National
Association, as Trustee and performance of the activities
contemplated therein will not in and of themselves and at this
time result in the immediate withdrawal, reduction, or other
adverse action with respect to any current long-term rating by
Moody's (including any private or confidential rating) of the
Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes and
Class E Notes issued by the Issuer. Moody's does not express an
opinion as to whether the First Supplemental Indenture could have
non-credit-related effects.

The Issuer and the Collateral Manager seek to restructure the
transaction, and in order to implement the restructuring certain
provisions of the Indenture require modification. Also, new
language needs to be inserted in the Indenture by execution of the
First Supplemental Indenture. The First Supplemental Indenture
amends certain existing Indenture provisions, including provisions
governing the payment of "Deposited Amounts" to one or more
Classes of Notes. In addition, the First Supplemental Indenture
amends the Indenture to permit holders of certain Classes of Notes
to fund a payment of the purchase price for Collateral Assets held
by the Issuer by accepting a reduction to the principal balance of
such Notes, a "Specified Reduction", rather than fund the payment
in cash. It has been represented to Moody's that the First
Supplemental Indenture will have no material adverse effect on any
of the Noteholders.

Also, as part of the restructuring, the existing interest rate
hedge agreement in effect between the Issuer and Barclays Bank
plc. as hedge counterparty will be terminated. Moody's has also
determined that the termination of the hedge agreement will not at
this time result in the immediate withdrawal, reduction, or other
adverse action with respect to any current long-term rating by
Moody's (including any private or confidential rating) of the
Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes and
Class E Notes issued by the Issuer. Moody's does not express an
opinion as to whether the termination of the hedge agreement could
have non-credit-related effects.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs", published in May 2012.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website. Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into
account a third-party due diligence report on the underlying asset
or financial instruments related to the monitoring of the
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's carries these ratings for G Street Finance Ltd.

  $266,000,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
  Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 10, 2009 Downgraded to
  Caa1;

  $0 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to
  Ca; previously on Feb 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1.


GLACIER FUNDING II: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and assigned an Outlook to one and
affirmed four classes of notes issued by Glacier Funding CDO II,
Ltd. (Glacier Funding II), as follows:

-- $48,290,985 class A-1 notes upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf';
   assigned Outlook Positive;

-- $70,000,000 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'Dsf';

-- $65,750,000 class B notes affirmed at 'Dsf';

-- $23,255,230 class C notes affirmed at 'Csf';

-- $6,461,649 class D notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs' for
the class A-1 notes. Fitch also considered additional qualitative
factors in its analysis, as described below, to conclude the
rating affirmations for the rated notes.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade of the class A-1 notes is due to significant paydowns
to the notes from both principal amortization of the underlying
portfolio and excess spread as a result of acceleration. Since the
last review, the class A-1 notes received approximately $19.2
million, or 28.4% of their previous balance, with $2.9 million of
that amount coming from excess spread. The upgrade is further
supported by the improved cash flow modeling results, which now
indicate that the notes are passing at higher breakevens than the
'Bsf' rating category. Additionally, the interest rate swap has
expired in this transaction as of February 2013, increasing the
amount of excess spread available to pay down the notes. These
notes were not upgraded higher than 'Bsf' due to concerns of
potential negative migration and concentration risk as the
portfolio continues to amortize.

The Positive Outlook on the class A-1 notes reflects Fitch's view
that the transaction will continue to delever and that the class
has sufficient credit enhancement to offset potential
deterioration of the underlying collateral going forward and may
be upgraded in the next one to two years. Fitch does not assign
Outlooks to classes rated 'CCCsf' or below.

The non-deferrable class A-2 and class B notes have not received
their accrued interest since June 2011, when the transaction
accelerated. Since then all proceeds have been diverted to redeem
the class A-1 notes. These missed interest payments constitute a
payment default; therefore, these two classes are affirmed at
'Dsf'.

The class C and class D notes remain significantly
undercollateralized, indicating that default continues to appear
inevitable at or prior to maturity.

Rating Sensitivities

Further negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by
SF PCM as well as increasing concentration in assets of a weaker
credit quality could lead to downgrades.

Glacier Funding II is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on Oct. 12, 2004 and is now
monitored by Aventine Hill Capital, LLC., as a successor
collateral manager. The portfolio is comprised of residential
mortgage-backed securities (69.4%), commercial mortgage-backed
securities (24.2%), structured finance collateralized debt
obligations (4.3%), consumer and commercial asset-backed
securities (1.4%), and real estate investment trusts (.7%) from
2004 vintage transactions.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1997-C1: S&P Hikes Rating on Cl. G Notes From B+sf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
G commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 1997-C1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating action follows its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the transaction
structure, historical and current performance of the remaining
loans, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The raised rating on the class G certificates reflects S&P's
expected available credit enhancement for this class, which it
believes is greater than its most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the most recent rating levels.  The upgrade
also reflects S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the collateral supporting the transaction, as well
as the reduced pool trust balance.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movement on the class G certificates, S&P's
analysis also considered the number of loans on the master
servicers' watchlist ($21.0 million, 28.8%), as well as the
liquidity support available to the remaining classes.  The class G
certificates, which experienced interest shortfalls for eight
consecutive months, were fully repaid in November 2010.

As of the Aug. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $72.8 million, down from
$1.7 billion at issuance.  The pool comprises 18 loans, down from
355 loans at issuance.  Two loans ($24.1 million, 33.0%),
including the largest loan in the pool (the Circuit City HQ (Deep
Run III) loan), are defeased.  Five loans ($21.0 million, 28.8%),
including the second-largest loan in the pool (discussed below),
are on the master servicer's watchlist.  To date, the transaction
has experienced losses totaling $63.7 million, or 3.8% of the
original pool balance.

The largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist, the Central
Valley Plaza Shopping Center loan ($11.3 million, 15.4%), is
secured by a 299,328-sq.-ft. retail property in Modesto, Calif.
It is on the master servicer's watchlist because of a low reported
debt service coverage (DSC) of 0.84x for the three months ended
March 31, 2013.  Occupancy was 91% according to the April 2013
rent roll.  According to Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, the
master servicer, the borrower is actively marketing the property's
vacant space.

Based on the most recent data from the master servicer and using
Standard & Poor's adjusted net cash flow and cap rates, it
calculated a weighted average DSC and a weighted average loan-to-
value of 1.23x and 48.0%, respectively, for 16 of the 17 remaining
nondefeased performing loans.

As of the Aug. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, one loan, the
New Jersey Multifamily Portfolio loan ($3.9 million, 5.4%) was
with the special servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital Markets
Inc. (KeyBank).  It is secured by seven multifamily buildings
(totaling 125 units) in Jersey City, N.J. and 37 condo units in
North Bergen, N.J.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicing in February 2013 due to the borrower's bankruptcy
filing.  The loan is currently in its grace period and, according
to KeyBank, continues to amortize per the interim cash collateral
agreement.  The reported occupancy and DSC were 96.8% and 2.51x,
respectively, for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-C1

            Rating
Class   To           From           Credit enhancement (%)
G       BBB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)                         64.03


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Rights Transfer No Impact on Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that the Military Circle B
Note Holder intends to replace Midland Loan Services as the
Special Servicer and to appoint Torchlight Loan Services, LLC as
the successor Special Servicer (the "Proposed Special Servicer
Replacement") for the Military Circle Mall Loan. The Proposed
Special Servicer Replacement will become effective upon
satisfaction of the conditions precedent set forth in the
governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement. At
this time, the proposed transfer will not, in and of itself,
result in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any
class of certificates rated by Moody's for GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc., Series 2004-C2. Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the proposed transfer of
special servicing rights. Other non-credit risks have not been
addressed, but may have significant effect on yield and/or other
payments to investors. This action should not be taken to imply
that there will be no adverse consequence for investors since in
some cases such consequences will not impact the rating.

The last rating action for GMACC 2004-C2 was taken on May 2, 2013.
The methodologies used in the last rating action were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005 and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

On May 2, 2013, Moody's affirmed the ratings of five classes and
downgraded three classes of GMAC Commercial 2004-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)


GOLDMAN SACHS 2010-C2: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Goldman Sachs Mortgage
Securities Corp. II commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2010-C2.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch's affirmations are based on generally stable performance of
the underlying collateral pool since issuance. There are currently
no delinquent or specially serviced loans. Fitch reviewed
servicer-provided year-end (YE) 2012 financial performance for the
collateral pool in addition to updated rent rolls for the top 15
loans, which represent 65.3% of the transaction.

Rating Sensitivities

The Rating Outlooks for all of the classes are Stable. No rating
actions are expected in the near future as the majority of the
pool has maintained performance consistent with that at issuance.
As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 2.6% to $853.5 million from $876.5 million
at issuance. There are currently 43 loans collateralized by 108
properties. One loan (2.2%) has defeased.

Fitch has identified two loans (2.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern.
Both loans remain current on debt service payments.

The first Fitch Loan of Concern (1.6% of the pool balance) is
secured by a 136,423 square foot (SF) retail property in
Warrington Township, PA. The occupancy dropped significantly after
a former major tenant, Bed, Bath and Beyond, which occupied 18% of
the net rentable area, vacated when its lease expired at the end
of January 2012. The borrower is still working to find a permanent
replacement tenant. As of March 2013, the property was 81.7%
occupied, compared to 100% at issuance. The servicer report YE
2012 net cash flow (NCF) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
1.82x, compared to 1.95x at issuance.

The second Fitch Loan of Concern (0.9%) is secured by a 112,862 SF
retail property in Columbus, OH. Occupancy decreased significantly
after Borders Books, the former largest tenant that occupied 26%
of the property, rejected their lease in association with their
bankruptcy filing. As of March 2013, the property was 70%
occupied, compared to 89% at issuance. The servicer reported YE
2012 NCF DSCR was 1.50x, compared to 2.02x at issuance.

The largest loan in the pool (10.3%) is secured by a 399,935 SF
class B office property in the Financial District of Manhattan,
NY. The property is 100% occupied by the United Federation of
Teachers (UFT) under a long term lease which expires in August
2034. UFT also holds a 9.9% ownership interest in the building.
The loan is structured with a letter of credit (LOC) which can be
drawn upon to cover debt service shortfalls. The loan is
structured with a four year interest only term followed by a 30-
year amortization schedule. The servicer reported YE 2012 NCF DSCR
was 2.24x, compared to 1.71x at issuance.

The second largest loan in the pool (7.4%) is secured by two class
B office properties totaling 1.15 million SF in Cleveland, OH. As
of 1Q13, the combined occupancy of the two properties was 76.7%,
compared to 76% at YE2012 and 78.8% at issuance. The servicer
reported YE 2012 NCF DSCR was 1.41x, compared to 1.49x at
issuance.

The third largest loan in the pool (7.0%) is secured by a 669,682
SF mixed-use office retail property in Pittsburgh, PA. The
property is considered an area landmark and tourist destination.
It consists of five buildings that house office space, retail
shops, restaurants, commuter parking, and night clubs, in addition
to river docks, marina slips, and an outdoor amphitheater. As of
YE 2012, the property was 85.3% occupied, compared to 84.6% at
issuance. The servicer reported YE 2012 NCF DSCR was 1.41x,
compared to 1.49x at issuance.

Fitch affirms and maintains the Stable Outlook for the following
classes:

-- $324.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf';
-- $376.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf';
-- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAAsf';
-- $26.3 million class B at 'AAsf';
-- $29.6 million class C at 'Asf';
-- $47.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf';
-- $12 million class E at 'BBsf';
-- $9.9 million class F at 'Bsf'.

Fitch does not rate the IO class X-B and the $28.5 million class
G.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C1: Moody's Cuts XC Certs Rating to 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes,
affirmed four classes, and downgrade one class of Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-C1 as follows:

Cl. J, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 24, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 24, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on December 14, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on December 14, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on December 14, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on December 15, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on February 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of three P&I classes are due to increased credit
enhancement from paydowns and amortization since last review and
overall stable performance. The pool has paid down by 87% since
Moody's last review. The ratings of Classes M, N and O are
consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class XC, is due to the paydowns of
its highly rated reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 19.8% of
the current balance. At last full review, Moody's base expected
loss was 4.4%. Moody's base expected loss plus cumulative realized
losses now represents 4.0% of the original securitized balance
compared to 4.2% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Since over half of the pool is in special servicing, Moody's
utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating this deal. In this
approach, Moody's determines a probability of default for each
specially serviced loan and determines a most probable loss given
default based information from the special servicer and available
market data. The loss given default for each loan also takes into
consideration servicer advances to date and estimated future
advances and closing costs. Translating the probability of default
and loss given default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's
then applies the aggregate loss from specially serviced loans to
the most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of
principal to the most senior class.

The methodology used in rating class XC was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

The IO calculator uses the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original
and current bond ratings and credit assessments; original and
current bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the
IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type as defined
in the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3
(sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating
committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 23 at Moody's prior review. In
cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's typically also
employs the large loan/single borrower methodology. Since the
remaining pool was in special servicing Moody's employed the loss
and recovery analysis in lieu of the large loan/single borrower
methodology.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated December 14, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 7, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 95% to $57.8 million
from $1.22 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 41% of the pool. There no defeased loans in the deal
and no loans with an investment grade credit assessment.

Currently only one loan, representing 41% of the pool, is on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $36.6 million loss (30%
loss severity on average). Currently five loans, representing 59%
of the pool, are in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Gateway Plaza Shopping Center Loan ($11.2
million -- 19.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 143,520
square foot (SF) unanchored retail center located in Overland
Park, Kansas. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
August 2011 due to imminent monetary default. The borrower has
indicated that falling rents and declining occupancy destabilized
the property. A loan modification closed in July 2013 and the loan
will remain in special servicing while being monitored for three
months.

The remaining four specially serviced properties are secured by a
mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $10.4
million loss for the specially serviced loans (31% expected loss
on average).

There is only one performing conduit loan remaining representing,
41% of the pool balance. The 122 South Michigan Avenue Loan ($23.7
million) is secured by a 350,638 SF office building located in
Chicago, Illinois. The office building is architecturally
significant and was designed by Daniel Burnham in 1911. Financial
performance decreased in 2012 compared to 2011. The loan was
previously in a 60-day forbearance period but is now expected to
payoff in full. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.2X,
respectively, compared to 76% and 1.38X at last review.


GREYWOLF CLO II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Greywolf CLO II Ltd./Greywolf CLO II LLC's $375.40 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date
as of July 12, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Greywolf CLO II Ltd./Greywolf CLO II LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     250.00
A-2                        AA (sf)                       44.10
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                        34.50
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      19.70
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       17.00
E (deferrable)             B (sf)                        10.10


GS MORTGAGE 2010-C1: DBRS Confirms BB rating on Class E Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has confirmed the ratings of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2010-C1 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The collateral for this transaction consists of 23 fixed-rate
loans secured by 48 commercial properties.  Overall, the loans in
the pool have a reported stable performance since issuance, with a
weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.85x and a
weighted-average debt yield of 14.22%.  As of the August 2013
remittance report, the pool has a balance of $748 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 5.1% since issuance.

Due to the limited number of loans, the pool is highly
concentrated, with the five largest loans representing 50.4% of
the current pool balance and the ten largest loans representing
76.8% of the current pool balance.  Additionally, the transaction
is concentrated by loans secured by retail properties,
representing 79.3% of the current pool balance.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated 11 loans investment grade,
representing 57.7% of the current balance.  DBRS has confirmed
that the performance of the loans remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics.

As of the August 2013 remittance report, Pros ID #15 Canyon Point
Marketplace, representing 1.93% of the current pool balance, is
the only loan on the servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by
a grocery-anchored shopping center in Rowland Heights, California,
approximately 25 miles east of Los Angeles.  The loan was added to
the watchlist when the grocery store anchor vacated the property
late in 2012, decreasing occupancy to 68.3% as of the June 2013
rent roll.  As agreed per the terms of the lease agreement, the
tenant will continue to pay rent until its lease expiration in
March 2015.  According to the servicer, the borrower is currently
in close negotiations with two supermarkets to occupy the space.
Despite the low occupancy, DSCR as at YE2012 remains strong at
1.55x.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Cl. F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned final ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-GCJ14
(the Certificates), to be issued by GS Mortgage Securities Trust
2013-GCJ14.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

Classes X-C, A-S, B, PEZ, C, D, E, F, G and H have been privately
placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The X-A and X-C balances are notional.  DBRS ratings on interest-
only certificates address the likelihood of receiving interest
based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers the
interest-only certificate's position within the transaction
payment waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

Up to the full certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and
Class C certificates may be exchanged for Class PEZ certificates.
Class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for up to the full
certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and Class C
certificates.

The collateral consists of 84 fixed-rate loans secured by 132
commercial, multifamily and manufactured housing properties.  The
transaction has a balance of $1,242,664,619.  The pool consists of
relatively low-leverage financing, with a DBRS weighted-average
term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.54
times (x) and 9.5%, respectively.  The DBRS sample included 30
loans, representing 69.7% of the pool.  The pool has a high
concentration of properties located in urban markets (29.4% of the
pool), which benefit from a larger investor, consumer, and tenant
base even in times of stress.  The pool is also concentrated in
terms loan size with the largest two loans representing 20.9% of
the transaction.  Ultimately, the pool has an overall
concentration level similar to a pool of 15 equal-sized loans.

A relatively high percentage of loans within the pool (15.9%) have
sponsorship associated with a prior loan default, a previous
voluntary bankruptcy filing, an ongoing bankruptcy filing, or a
known felony conviction.  This concentration is greater than the
comparative level of other recently rated DBRS conduit
transactions and DBRS increased the POD significantly for loans
with identified sponsorship concerns.  Loans secured by hotels
represent 18.8% of the pool, including four of the largest fifteen
loans.  Hotel properties have higher cash flow volatility than
traditional property types because their income, which is derived
from daily contracts rather than multi-year leases, and their
expenses, which are often mostly fixed, are quite high as a
percentage of revenue.  These two factors cause revenue to fall
swiftly during a downturn and cash flow to fall even faster
because of the high operating leverage.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure
and underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to
ongoing surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades
by DBRS after the date of issuance.


GULF STREAM-COMPASS 2005-II: Moody's Confirms Cl. D's Ba2 Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2005-II, Ltd.:

$35,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$10,000,000 Type II Composite Notes due 2020 (current Rated
Balance of $3,091,853), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July
15, 2013 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$35,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Variable Funding Floating
Rate Notes due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $6,258,735),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 31, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

$350,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020
(current outstanding balance of $62,587,353), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on January 31, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$15,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 31, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

$5,000,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2020 (current Rated Balance
of $2,679,052), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 31, 2013
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Additionally, Moody's confirmed the rating of the following notes:

$25,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2020, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in January 2013. Moody's notes that the Class A-
1 and Class A-2 Notes have been collectively paid down by
approximately 58% or $93 million since January 2013. Based on the
latest trustee report dated July 17, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C,
and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 167.7%,
128.9% and 110.6%, respectively, versus January 2013 levels of
135.1%, 117.2% and 107.0%, respectively.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of the rating on the issuer's Class C,
Class D and Type II composite notes announced on July 15, 2013. At
that time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of
the issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of
substantial deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC
ratios resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments
during the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $157.3 million, defaulted par of $3.6 million,
a weighted average default probability of 18.45% (implying a WARF
of 2887), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.3%,
and a diversity score of 43. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2005-II, Ltd., issued in January 2006, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Type I and Type II
Composite Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate
CDO Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3464)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +1

Type I: 0

Type II: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2310)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: 0

Type I: 0

Type II: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


HERTZ CORP ABS: Series 2009-1 Amendments No Impact on Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has reviewed the amendments to the Series Supplement, Note
Purchase Agreement, and interest rate cap agreements (the
Amendments) for the Hertz Vehicle Financing LLC (Issuer), Series
2009-1 Variable Funding Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes executed on
August 26, 2013 (the Amendments). The execution of the Amendments,
in and of themselves and at this time, will not cause a downgrade
to or withdrawal of the ratings currently assigned to any
outstanding series of notes issued by Hertz Vehicle Financing LLC
(the Outstanding Notes). Hertz Vehicle Financing LLC is a special
purpose entity wholly owned by The Hertz Corporation (B1 stable),
which is the master servicer for the transaction.

The Amendments extend the maturity of the Series 2009-1 Variable
Funding Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes by three months, change the
minimum credit rating threshold for the Letter of Credit provider
to the transaction to A2 from A1, and extend the existing interest
rate cap agreements between Hertz Vehicle Financing LLC and the
cap counterparties, Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank
(A2 stable, D-/ba3 stable) and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A (Aa3
stable, C/a3 stable). (The ratings shown are the banks' long-term
deposit ratings, their bank financial strength ratings/baseline
credit assessments, and the ratings' corresponding outlooks.) The
three month extension of the Series 2009-1 maturity is credit-
neutral given the short-term nature of the extension. Similarly,
the reduction in the minimum rating threshold of the Letter of
Credit provider to A2 from A1 has no credit impact given the A2
rating on the Series 2009-1 VFN.

As a result, Moody's believed that the execution of the Amendments
did not have an adverse effect on the credit quality of the
Outstanding Notes such that their Moody's ratings were impacted.
Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but
may have significant effect on yield and/or other payments to
investors. This press release should not be taken to imply that
there will be no adverse consequence for investors since in some
cases such consequences will not impact the rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Rental Car ABS and Rental Truck ABS," published
in July 2011.



HEWETT'S ISLAND: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, D-1, D-2, and E notes from Hewett'sIsland CLO IV Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by LCM Asset
Management LLC, and removed the class B and C notes from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where S&P placed them on
July 9, 2013.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)'
rating on the class A notes.

The upgrades reflect increased credit support following paydowns
to the class A notes since S&P's January 2013 rating actions.  The
affirmation reflects S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating level.

Principal amortization has resulted in $194.60 million in paydowns
to the class A notes since S&P's January 2013 rating actions based
on the Jan. 3, 2013, trustee report.  The transaction's overall
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio tests have benefited from the
principal paydowns; for example, the class A/B O/C test has
increased to 220.04% from 123.08%.

The underlying portfolio's credit quality has improved over the
same period.  According to the August 2013 trustee report, the
amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's asset
portfolio fell since the January 2013 rating actions.  The
transaction held $3.17 million of 'CCC' rated collateral in August
2013, down from $7.56 million back in January 2013.

The ratings on the class D-1, D-2, and E notes are currently
driven by the largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress
test S&P introduced as part of its 2009 corporate criteria update.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Hewett's Island CLO IV Ltd.

Class          Rating
          To            From
A         AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B         AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C         AAA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D-1       A+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)
D-2       A+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)
E         B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)


INDEPENDENCE II CDO: Fitch Hikes Rating on $73.61MM Notes to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating action on one note
issued by Independence II CDO, Ltd. (Independence II):

-- $73,614,368 class B notes upgraded to 'Csf' from 'Dsf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. Since
the expected losses from distressed and defaulted assets in the
portfolio (rated 'CCsf' and lower) exceed the credit enhancement
(CE) level of the class B notes, Fitch believes that the
probability of default can be evaluated without factoring
potential further losses from the remaining portion of the
portfolios. Therefore, this transaction was not modeled using the
Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) or Fitch's
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) cash flow model.

Key Rating Drivers

Independence II entered an event of default in February 2006 and
subsequently accelerated its maturity in October 2012. On the
August 7, 2013 payment date, the class A notes were paid in full,
and the class B notes became the senior most class.

As a result, since then the class B notes have been repaid all
cumulative defaulted interest amounts and are now current on their
interest payments. Fitch expects the notes to continue receiving
their accrued interest in the foreseeable future.

In this review, Fitch compared the credit enhancement level of
this class to the expected losses from the distressed and
defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). This
comparison indicates that default continues to appear inevitable
for the class B notes at or prior to maturity.

Independence II is a cash flow CDO that closed on July 26, 2001
and is managed by Declaration Management & Research LLC. As of the
March 31, 2013 trustee report, the portfolio is composed of
residential mortgage-backed securities (49.2%), commercial and
consumer asset-backed securities (24.4%), structured finance CDOs
(12.3%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (11.5%), and
corporate CDOs (2.6%), from 1999 through 2004 vintage
transactions.


JP MORGAN 2003-ML1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. N Certs to Caa2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of five classes,
downgraded two classes and affirmed two CMBS classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-ML1 as follows:

Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. N, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due primarily increased credit report resulting
from amortization, loan paydowns and recoveries from liquidated
loans.

The downgrade of the P&I class is due to higher expected losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans. The downgrade of the
IO Class, Class X-1, is due to a decline in the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) of its referenced classes.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on our current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient
to maintain their current ratings.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 16% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 4%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the original,
securitized deal balance, compared to 1.7% at Moody's last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8 compared to 19 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $72 million
from $930 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 23% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 94% of the pool. The pool contains no
loans with investment-grade credit assessments. Two loans,
representing approximately 3% of the pool, are defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Four loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirteen loans have liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss to the trust of $7 million. Loans that
were liquidated from the pool averaged a 14% loss severity.
Currently, three loans, representing 37% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the High
Ridge Center Loan ($11 million -- 16% of the pool), which is
secured by a 261,000 square foot retail center in Racine,
Wisconsin. The largest tenants are Home Depot, Kmart, and Office
Max. The Office Max store is located less than a mile from a
competing Office Depot location. The property was 89% leased as of
September 2012. The loan passed its Anticipated Repayment Date in
December 2011. As a result, an additional 2% in interest is
accruing on the loan, resulting in a total interest rate of 8.9%.
The loan transferred to the special servicer on December 18, 2012,
after the borrower requested a loan modification. The servicer is
now pursuing foreclosure as the primary resolution strategy for
this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Dearborn
Shopping Center Loan ($9 million -- 12% of the pool), which is
secured by a 200,000 square foot shopping center in Dearborn,
Michigan. The loan transferred to special servicing in November
2012 for delinquent payments. National retailers at the center
include the low-price woman's apparel retailer Dots and Radio
Shack. The largest tenant, occupying 15% of the property's net
rentable area (NRA) is a dental center. The property faces
substantial lease rollover risk heading into 2014. The servicer is
currently pursuing foreclosure.

The third loan in special servicing is the Crosspointe Plaza Loan
($6 million -- 9% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 94,000
square foot former grocery-anchored retail center in Naugatuck,
Connecticut. The loan transferred to special servicing in October
2012 for imminent default. The property was 98% leased as of June
2012. The grocery anchor space (52,600 square feet; 56% of
property NRA) is leased to Big Y Foods through February 2015,
though the space is currently dark. Big Y, a New England grocery
chain, acquired the Crosspointe anchor space as part of a
portfolio acquisition from A&P, but chose not to operate a store
at this location. A nearby Wal-Mart was recently expanded to
include the discount chain's grocery store concept.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $9 million loss (34% expected loss)
for all specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly-
performing loan, which represents a small share of the overall
pool.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial-year 2013
operating results for 89% and 56% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding troubled and specially serviced loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 80% compared to 71% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 26% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.6%.

Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.16X and 1.44X, respectively, compared to
1.44X and 1.54X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 41% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Overland Storage Campus Loan ($17 million
-- 23% of the pool), which is secured by a two-story 159,000
square foot, Class A office building and single-story R&D facility
in Kearny Mesa, California, approximately 10 miles north of
downtown San Diego. The property NRA is currently 58% leased to
Overland Data through February 2014. The remainder of the space is
leased to Northrup Grumman through October 2015. The upcoming
lease rollover of 100% of the space together with loan maturity
scheduled for August 2014 poses considerable credit risk for the
loan. Nevertheless, the loan currently benefits from amortization
and strong loan metrics. The loan sponsor is W.P. Carey & Company.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 71% and 1.48X at last review.

The second largest loan is the McLearen Shopping Center Loan ($7
million -- 10% of the pool), which is secured by a 74,000 square-
foot grocery-anchored retail center in Herndon, Virginia, a suburb
of Washington, D.C. The anchor is Food Lion (Delhaize America,
LLC), which occupies the space under a lease set to expire in
September 2017. The property was 98% leased as of Q2 2013
reporting. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and
1.48X, respectively, compared to 72% and 1.46X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Retreat Village Shopping Center Loan
($5 million -- 8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 108,000
square foot retail center in St. Simons Island, Georgia. The
anchor tenant Winn-Dixie recently renewed its lease through June
2018. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and, 1.41X
respectively, compared to 70% and 1.51X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-FL1: S&P Withdraws D Ratings on 4 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class H and J commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2006-FL1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction, to 'D (sf)' and subsequently withdrew them.  In
addition, S&P withdrew its ratings on the class G, K, and L
certificates from the same transaction.

The downgrade to 'D (sf)' on the class H and J certificates
reflects principal losses on these two classes because of the
liquidation of the sole remaining specially serviced loan, the
Independence Mall loan.  The Independence Mall loan's liquidation
resulted in a $55.0 million realized loss, or 79.7% of the loan's
$69.0 million current outstanding principal balance.  According to
the Aug. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, class H incurred
principal losses totaling $15.1 million, or 62.3% of the class'
original principal balance, and class J incurred principal losses
totaling $14.7 million, or 72.1% of the class' original principal
balance.

Following the downgrades on classes H and J, S&P immediately
withdrew its ratings on these two classes because their principal
balances were reduced to zero.  In addition, S&P withdrew its
'D (sf)' ratings on classes K and L because the principal balances
on both classes were reduced to zero after incurring 100%
principal losses on their opening principal balances from the
Independence Mall loan liquidation, as detailed in the Aug. 15,
2013, trustee remittance report.

In addition, S&P withdrew its 'BB+ (sf)' rating on the class G
certificates following the full repayment of the class' principal
balance, as detailed in the same trustee remittance report.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND WITHDRAWN

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-FL1

                           Rating
Class          To          Interim          From
H              NR          D (sf)           B- (sf)
J              NR          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-FL1

Class          To          From
G              NR          BB+ (sf)
K              NR          D (sf)
L              NR          D (sf)

NR-Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP7: Moody's Cuts Rating on 3 Securities to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine classes
affirmed eight classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp. Series 2006-LDP7 as follows:

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to greater realized and expected losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans. One & Two Prudential
Plaza, the second largest loan in the deal, was recently modified
with a hope note and interest rate reduction.

The affirmations of the investment-grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
rating of Class J is consistent with Moody's expected loss and
thus is affirmed. The ratings of the IO Class, Class X, is
consistent with the expected credit performance of its referenced
classes and thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.3% of the
current balance, compared to 7.7% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.9% of the
original pooled balance compared to 8.7% at the prior review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 38, compared to 42 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 19, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to $3.15
billion from $3.94 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 213 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 44%
of the pool. Four loans have defeased, representing approximately
1% of the pool, and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Forty-eight loans are on the master servicer's watchlist,
representing 24% of the pool. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirty-three loans have been liquidated since securitization which
have generated a loss of $133.7 million (43% average loss
severity). Currently, there are 17 loans in special servicing,
representing 14% of the pool. The largest specially serviced loan
is the One and Two Prudential Plaza Loan ($205.0 million -- 6.5%
of the pool), which is secured by two cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted Class A office buildings located in the East Loop
sub-market of Chicago. The loan represents a 50% pari-passu
interest in a $410.0 million first mortgage. Effective June 6,
2013 the loan was split into an A/B Note structure. The Restated
Promissory Notes A-1 and A-2 are $168 million each and Promissory
Notes B-1 and B-2 are $37.0 million each. The loan modification
included a 300 bp interest rate reduction on the A-Note for 36
months and deferred interest on the B-Note. The borrower
contributed $60.0 million in additional equity to fund a combined
tenant improvements, leasing commissions and capital expenditure
reserve. The loan remains locked out to prepayment until July 1,
2015. This loan modification will generate monthly interest
shortfalls totaling approximately $420,000 for each of the two A
notes and $187,000 for each of the two B notes.

The second largest loan is the Shoreview Corporate Center Loan
($52.2million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 553,000
square foot (SF) office building located in the St. Paul submarket
in Shoreview, Minnesota. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in October 2009 for imminent default and is now real
estate owned (REO). The remaining specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of property types. The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $92.1 million appraisal reduction for 16
of the specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated a $163.6
million aggregate loss (39% expected loss) for all specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 19 poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated a
$37.3 million loss (19% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Excluding defeased and specially serviced loans, Moody's was
provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating results for 98%
and 100% of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 105%, down from
108% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available
net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.28X and 1.01X, respectively,
compared to 1.25X and 0.97X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Westfield Centro Portfolio ($240.0 million
- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by five regional malls
located in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Missouri and Ohio.
The properties range in size from 327,000 to 589,000 square feet.
The Midway and the West park properties continue to underperform
the rest of the portfolio due to tenant bankruptcies and
subsequent occupancy declines. As of March 2013, the portfolio was
83% leased compared to 86% at last review. It is reported that the
Borrower is in discussions with several large national retail
tenants and is close to finalizing lease negotiations. The loan is
interest-only for its entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 150% and 0.7X, compared to 147% and 0.7X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Bella Terra Retail Loan ($183.1
million - 5.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 664,000 square
foot retail property located in Huntington Beach, California. The
outstanding balance is comprised of two pari-passu notes included
in the trust; a $155.8 million note and a $27.3 million note. At
securitization the property was encumbered with an additional
$17.0 million of mezzanine financing, which was paid off in June
2011. Since 2005, the mall underwent a significant renovation into
an open-air retail center from an enclosed mall. The total
property is now comprised of approximately 840,000 SF. As of June
2013, the property was 96% leased compared to 97% at last review.
Comparable inline sales were $372 PSF as of year-end 2012 and
total sales were $462 PSF compared $439 PSF as of year-end 2011.
The loan's initial interest-only period expired in September 2011
and both notes are now amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 111% and 0.80X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.77X at
last review.

The third largest loan is the 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue Loan
($165.0 million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
284,000 square foot single tenant office building in Washington,
DC. The space is 100% leased to Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP through 2023. WilmerHale is listed as one of the AMLaw
top 100 law firms in the country and has been ranked in the Top 20
since 2010. The loan is interest only for its entire term and is
expected to mature in September 2015. The property's 2012 cashflow
increased year-over-year due to increased rent steps and expense
reimbursements. Moody's stressed the cash flow with a lit/dark
analysis given the single tenant occupancy of the property.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 0.90X, respectively,
compared to 111% and 0.83X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on $17MM Class G Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2012-C8 (JPMCC 2012-C8).

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to stable pool performance since
issuance. There have been no delinquent or specially serviced
loans since issuance. As of the July 2013 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 0.9% to
$1.13 billion from $1.14 billion at issuance. One loan was on the
servicer watchlist as of the July distribution date, but has since
been removed. No loans have defeased since issuance.

Rating Sensitivity

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks. Due to the recent issuance
of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
ratings migration until a material economic or asset level event
changes the transaction's overall portfolio-level metrics.
Additional information on rating sensitivity is available in the
report 'JPMCC 2012-C8' (Nov. 28, 2012), available at
www.fitchratings.com.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $66.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $189.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $426.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $103.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $898 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $102.3 million class A-S** at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $56.8 million class B** at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $44 million class C** at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $203 million class EC** at 'Asf', Outlook Stable.
-- $35.5 million class D at 'BBB+sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $32.7 million class E at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15.6 million class F at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $17 million class G at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest only.
** Class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged
    for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
    exchanged for Class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the $36,938,989 class NR certificates or the
$238,681,989 interest only class X-B.

A comparison of the transaction's Representations, Warranties, and
Enforcement (RW&E) mechanisms to those of typical RW&Es for the
asset class is available in the following report:

-- 'JPMCC 2012-C8 --Appendix' (Nov. 28, 2012).


LANDMARK VIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on $20MM Class E Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.:

$34,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
October 19, 2020, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 15,
2013 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

$26,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
October 19, 2020, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 15,
2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$20,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
October 19, 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 12,
2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$317,875,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
October 19, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $ 155,765,190),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on November 6, 2006 Assigned Aaa
(sf);

$35,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
October 19, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 12, 2011
Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$36,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due October
19, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
January 2013. Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been
paid down by approximately 49% or $151.7 million since the
beginning of this year. Based on the latest trustee report dated
July 31, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
overcollateralization (OC) ratios are reported at 146.7%, 127.6%,
116.0%, and 108.5%, respectively, versus January 2013 levels of
130.8%, 118.9%, 111.2%, and 105.9% respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the start of the year. Based on the July 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2735
compared to 2485 in January 2013.

Moody's also announced that it has concluded its review of its
ratings on the issuer's Class C Notes and Class D Notes announced
on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's said that it had upgraded
and placed certain of the issuer's ratings on review primarily as
a result of substantial deleveraging of the senior notes and
increases in OC ratios resulting from high rates of loan
collateral prepayments during the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $325.9 million, defaulted par of $13.6
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.52%
(implying a WARF of 2784), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.25%, and a diversity score of 69. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Landmark VIII CLO Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2228)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3341)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


LB-UBS 2005-C2: Fitch Lowers Rating on $29.2MM Cl. C Certs to Bsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed 12 classes
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust (LB-UBS) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2005-C2.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in actual and expected losses
across the pool since last review. Fitch modeled losses of 16% of
the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 10.9%, including $47.5 million (2.4% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 24 loans
(36.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes eight specially
serviced assets (4.2%).

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 47.1% to $1.03 billion from
$1.94 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, four loans
(6.6% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes C through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Woodbury Office
Portfolio II (14.4% of the pool) which is secured by 22 office
properties totaling 1.1 million square feet (sf) located in Long
Island, NY. The original $163.6 million loan had transferred to
special servicing in January 2010 for imminent default. The loan
was modified in August 2011 while in special servicing. Terms of
the modification included an extension to the original loan term
and bifurcation of the loan into a senior ($104.5 million) and
junior ($51.4 million) interest-only component; the senior A-note
has since paid down to $96.5 million. Although losses are not
expected imminently, any recovery to the subject B-note is
contingent upon full recovery to the A-note proceeds at the loan's
maturity in December 2015. Unless collateral performance improves,
recovery to the B-note component is unlikely.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Woodbury
Office Portfolio I (6.18%) which is secured by 10 office
properties containing approximately 480,000sf, located in Long
Island, NY. The original $63.5 million loan had transferred to
special servicing in January 2010 when the borrower had requested
a modification of the loan terms, including an extension of the
April 2010 maturity date; the loan matured in April 2010 without
repayment. The loan was modified in August 2011 while in special
servicing. Terms of the modification included an extension to the
original loan term and bifurcation of the loan into a senior
($35.5 million) and junior ($28 million) component. Although
losses are not expected imminently, any recovery to the subject B-
note is contingent upon full recovery to the A-note proceeds at
the loan's maturity in December 2015. Unless collateral
performance improves, recovery to the B-note component is
unlikely.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is Park 80 West
(9.75%) which is secured by a two-building, 505,000sf office
complex located in Saddle Brook, NJ. The original $100 million
loan transferred to special servicing in December 2009 due to
imminent default. The loan was modified in March 2012 while in
special servicing. Terms of the modification included a
bifurcation of the loan into a senior ($72 million) and junior
($28 million) component. Although losses are not expected
imminently, any recovery to the subject B-note is contingent upon
full recovery to the A-note proceeds at the loan's maturity in
February 2015. Unless collateral performance improves, recovery to
the B-note component is unlikely.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-4, A-AB, and A-5 remain Stable due to
sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown. The Negative
Outlook on classes A-J, B, and C reflect Fitch's concern over the
modified loans Classes A-J, B, and C may be subject to negative
rating actions should realized losses be greater than Fitch's
expectations. The distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected to be subject to further downgrades as losses are
realized.

Fitch downgrades the following classes:

-- $121.7 million class A-J to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
   Negative;

-- $13.9 million class B to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Negative;

-- $29.2 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $193 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.8 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $470.7 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.9 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%.
-- $41.4 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $17 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $17 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $17 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.2 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $15.8 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class N, P, Q and S certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP
and X-CL certificates.


LEGG MASON II: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of five classes
of notes issued by Legg Mason Real Estate CDO II, Corp. The
affirmations are due to key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1T, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2009 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1R, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2009 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2009 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Legg Mason Real Estate CDO II, Corp. is a static cash transaction
backed by a portfolio of: i) whole loans and senior participations
(84.8% of the pool balance); ii) CRE CDO securities (5.5%); iii)
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (4.2%); iv) B-note
debt (3.4%); and v) mezzanine debt (2.1%). As of the July 25, 2013
payment date, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including income notes, has decreased to $418.9 million from
$525.0 million at issuance, as a result of the combination of
junior notes cancellation to class C notes and of the paydown
directed to the Class A1-R and A1-T Notes from principal repayment
of collateral and sales of defaulted collateral. In general,
holding all key parameters static, the junior note cancellations
results in slightly higher expected losses and longer weighted
average lives on the senior Notes, while producing slightly lower
expected losses on the mezzanine and junior Notes. However, this
does not cause, in and of itself, a downgrade or upgrade of any
outstanding classes of notes.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,211
compared to 6,335 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (1.7% compared to 3.6% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.5% compared to 6.2% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(3.8% compared to 5.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (1.1% compared to
0.9% at last review), B1-B3 (6.3% compared to 1.6% at last
review), and Caa1-Ca/C (86.6% compared to 82.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.5 years compared to 3.1 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 52.0% compared to 53.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as that at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 52.0% to 42.0% or up to 62.0% would result in rating
movements on the rated tranches of 1 to 6 notches downward or 0 to
9 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector continues to exhibit growth albeit at a slightly
slower pace. The multifamily sector should remain stable with
moderate growth. Gradual recovery in the office sector continues
and will be assisted in the next quarter when absorption is likely
to outpace completions. However, since office demand is closely
tied to employment, Moody's expects regional employment growth to
provide market differentiation. CBD markets continue to outperform
secondary suburban markets. The retail sector exhibited a slight
reduction in vacancies in the first quarter; the largest drop
since 2005. However, consumers continue to be cautious as
evidenced by sales growth continuing below historical trends.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with robust securitization activity of
commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low
interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


LIBERTY CLO: Moody's Confirms Ba2(sf) Rating on $49MM Cl. B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Liberty CLO, Ltd.:

$68,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due November 1, 2017,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$43,000,000 Class A-4 Floating Rate Notes Due November 1, 2017,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$50,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Notes Due November 1, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $19,264,338), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on December 28, 2005 Assigned Aaa (sf);

$50,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due November 1, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $19,264,338), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on December 28, 2005 Assigned Aaa (sf);

$446,000,000 Class A-1C Floating Rate Notes Due November 1, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $171,837,894), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on December 28, 2005 Assigned Aaa (sf);

$68,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due November 1, 2017,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf);

$52,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due November 1, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $30,378,081), Affirmed B2 (sf);
previously on September 10, 2012 Upgraded to B2 (sf).

Moody's also confirmed the rating of the following notes:

$49,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due November 1, 2017,
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Ba2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the last rating action in September 2012. Moody's notes that the
Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 59.0% or
$303.6 million since September 2012. Based on the latest trustee
report dated July 22, 2013, the Class A and Class B
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 122.6% and 111.0%,
respectively, versus July 2012 levels of 117.3% and 109.5%,
respectively. The overcollateralization ratios reported in the
July trustee report do not include the August 1, 2013 payment
distribution, when $78.8 million of principal proceeds were used
to pay down the Class A-1 Notes.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's announced that it had
concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-3
Notes, Class A-4 Notes and Class B Notes announced on July 15,
2013. At that time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed
certain of the issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of
substantial deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC
ratios resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments
during the first half of 2013.

Notwithstanding the improved overcollateralization ratios, Moody's
notes that the issuer has significant exposure to defaulted
securities. Based on the trustee report dated July 22, 2013,
defaulted securities totaled $53.7 million or approximately 9.8%
of total par. A high proportion of these defaulted collateral may
be illiquid, which could create significant uncertainties in their
ultimate recoveries. In addition, Moody's assumed that another
$11.0 million of securities with low speculative grade ratings and
representing 2% of total par are defaulted in its analysis.

Moody's also notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number
of investments in securities that mature after the maturity date
of the notes. Based on Moody's calculations, securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 12.5% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $481 million, defaulted par of $65 million, a
weighted average default probability of 16.38% (implying a WARF of
2774), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.47%,
and a diversity score of 32. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Liberty CLO, Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans with significant exposure to CLO tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2219)

Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-1c: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class A-3: 0
Class A-4: +2
Class B: +1
Class C: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3329)

Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-1c: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class A-3: -1
Class A-4: -2
Class B: -1
Class C: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


LIBERTY CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A-2, A-3, and A-4 notes from Liberty CLO Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Highland Capital Management L.P.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its ratings on the class B and C notes.

S&P's upgrades of the class A notes reflect increased credit
support following paydowns to the class A-1 notes (the class A-1A,
A-1B, and A-1C are pari passu) since its October 2011 rating
actions, when S&P upgraded the class C rating and affirmed the
remaining ratings.

The transaction ended its reinvestment period in November 2012 and
commenced paying down the class A-1 notes.  Following the most
recent payment on Aug. 1, 2013, the class A-1 notes are about 39%
of their original balance (down from 94% in August 2011, the level
S&P used for its October 2011 rating actions).  These paydowns
increased the credit support available to the notes.

The class C notes balance is about 58% of the original balance,
reflecting prior paydowns resulting from class C coverage test
failures in the past.  The transaction's structure allows that as
long as the class A and B coverage tests are passing, any class C
coverage tests' failure on a payment date will divert all
available interest proceeds--after the class C notes' interest
payment -- to pay the class C deferred interest (if any) first,
and then pay down the class C notes.

All coverage tests are currently passing, and the class C notes
balance has not changed since the October 2011 rating action.

According to the July 22, 2013 monthly report, the transaction's
exposure to the long-dated securities is 9.27%.  However, this
percentage is based on the total portfolio balance, which includes
defaults and principal cash.  When calculated based on the
performing assets as reported by the trustee, the percentage
increases to 11.77%.  S&P considered this exposure during its
analysis.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class B and C notes to reflect the
credit support available at the current rating level.

"Our rating on the class C notes was affected by the application
of our largest-obligor default test, one of two supplemental tests
we introduced as part of our revised corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria.  We apply the supplemental tests to
address event and model risks that might be present in rated
transactions.  The largest-obligor default test assesses whether a
CDO tranche has sufficient credit enhancement (excluding excess
spread) to withstand specified combinations of underlying asset
defaults based on the ratings on the underlying assets, with a
flat recovery," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Liberty CLO Ltd.
               Rating
Class     To           From
A-1A      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-1B      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-1C      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-2       AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-3       AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
A-4       AA (sf)      A- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Liberty CLO Ltd.
Class       Rating
B           BB+ (sf)
C           B+ (sf)


MAGNETITE V: Moody's Hikes Rating on $11MM Class D Notes to Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Magnetite V CLO, Limited:

$19,000,000 Class C Third Priority Floating Rate Deferrable Notes
Due 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$11,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Floating Rate Deferrable Notes
Due 2015 (current outstanding balance of $10,296,898), Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$20,000,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Deferrable Notes
Due 2015 (current outstanding balance of 11,873,214), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on March 21, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in March 2013. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been fully paid down and the Class B Notes have been
paid down by approximately 41% or $8.1 million since March 2013.
Based on the latest trustee report dated June 28, 2013, the Class
A/B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 436.98%, 168.05% and 126.02%, respectively, versus January 2013
levels of 172.93%, 128.58% and 112.89%, respectively.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on Moody's calculation, securities that mature
after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 47% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity. Moody's also notes
that the Class D interest coverage test has been failing since
April 2013 and is currently reported at 68.63% versus a trigger of
108.0%. Notwithstanding the increase in the overcollateralization
ratio of the Class D notes, the magnitude of the upgrade on these
notes is tempered by considerations of the large exposure to
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes and
the poor interest coverage.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its rating on the issuer's Class C
Notes and Class D Notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that time,
Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC ratios
resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments during
the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $47.5 million, defaulted par of $5.7 million,
a weighted average default probability of 9.58% (implying a WARF
of 2481), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.1%,
and a diversity score of 13. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Magnetite V CLO, Limited, issued in September 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1985)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2977)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value. In consideration of the size of the deal's exposure
to long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to the
liquidation assumptions used in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
different scenarios considering a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposure and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the extent of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long-
dated assets.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially when they experience jump to default.


MASTR ARM 2005-4: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Rating on Class A-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of two bonds
issued by MASTR ARM Trust 2005-4.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects the recent performance of the pools of
mortgages backing the underlying bonds and the updated loss
expectations on the resecuritization bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities" published in February 2011.

The methodology used in determining the ratings of the underlying
bonds was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in June
2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions

As part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
loss on the underlying bonds backing the resecuritization by an
additional 10% and found that the implied ratings of the
resecuritization bonds remain unchanged.


MORGAN STANLEY 1998-WF2: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class K Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 1998-WF2, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its 'BB- (sf)' rating on the class K certificates from
the same transaction.

The rating actions follows S&P's analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The raised ratings reflects S&P's expected available credit
enhancement for the affected tranches, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The upgrades also
reflect S&P's view of the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral, and the deleveraging of the trust
balance.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movement for the class G, H, and J certificates,
S&P's analysis also considered the two loans on the master
servicer's watchlist ($33.6 million, 63.7%), and the liquidity
support available to the remaining classes.  The class G, H, and J
certificates experienced one month of interest shortfalls, which
were fully repaid in February 2010.

The affirmed rating on class K reflects S&P's expectation that the
available credit enhancement for this class will be within its
estimate of necessary credit enhancement required for the current
outstanding rating.  The affirmation also reflects the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans, as well as
the transaction level changes.

As of the Aug. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool consisted of 13 loans with an aggregate principal balance of
$52.7 million, down from 219 loans with an aggregate balance of
$1.06 billion at issuance.  There are currently no loans with the
special servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and two loans on the
master servicer's watchlist ($33.6 million, 63.7%), also Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo).  The average debt service coverage
(DSC) ratio for the remaining loans in the pool is 2.11x.  Details
of the two loans on the master servicer's watchlist are:

The 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue loan ($33.0 million, 62.6%) is the
largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 431,961-sq.-ft. office
property in Washington, D.C.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist because of its low DSC ratio.  According to
Wells Fargo, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey previously occupied
69,903-sq. ft. or 16.0% of the net rentable space at the property
and vacated in October 2011.  The DSC and occupancy as of Dec. 31,
2012 were 0.79x and 80.2%, respectively.  According to Wells
Fargo, the borrower is actively marketing the vacant space.

The Glen Arbor Apartments loan ($581,879, 1.1%) is the tenth-
largest loan in the pool, secured by a 49-unit multifamily
property in Glendale, Calif.  The loan appears on Wells Fargo's
watchlist because of a life safety issue reported in the most
recent property inspection report.  Wells Fargo is currently
monitoring the situation.  The most recent reported DSC and
occupancy for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012 were 2.39x and 100%,
respectively.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 1998-WF2

              Rating                      Credit enhancement (%)
Class      To          From
G          AA+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)             88.40
H          AA- (sf)    BBB  (sf)             68.26
J          BBB (sf)    BB+  (sf)             53.16

RATING AFFIRMED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 1998-WF2

Class          Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
K              BB- (sf)                      38.05


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: S&P Cuts 2 Note Class Ratings to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
Class M and N commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-TOP15, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC (sf)' and 'CCC- (sf)', respectively.

S&P lowered these ratings following principal losses detailed in
the Aug. 13, 2013, trustee remittance report.  The principal
losses were attributable to the liquidation of the $9.9 million
Chesterbrook Village SC loan, which was with the special servicer,
C-III Asset Management LLC.  According to the August 2013 trustee
remittance report, the loss severity for the Chesterbrook Village
SC loan was 32.8% ($3.2 million in principal losses).
Consequently, Class M reported a 13.9% loss to its $2.2 million
original principal balance, while Class N lost 100% of its
original principal balance.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-TOP15

Class          To                From
M              D (sf)            CCC (sf)
N              D (sf)            CCC- (sf)


MORTGAGE FINANCE 2005-S2: Moody's Ups Rating on 2 Secs. to Ba2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches and downgraded the rating of one tranche from two RMBS
transactions issued by Chase. The actions impact approximately
$61.8 million of RMBS issued from 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2005-S2

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on September 11, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-25, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2005-S3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on September 11, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of faster pay-down of the
bonds due to high prepayments. The downgrade rating action on Cl.
A-1 from Chase 2005-S3 transaction reflects the updated expected
loss on the tranche.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL IV: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO IV, Ltd.:

$15,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2018,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$13,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2018,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on February 15, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$134,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2018
(current outstanding balance of $35,007,528.43), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on February 15, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$75,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due March 2018
(current outstanding balance of $12,945,017.81), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on February 15, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$9,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due March 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 15, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf);

$21,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf);

$12,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2018 (current
outstanding balance of $11,280,993.57), Affirmed Ba2 (sf);
previously on February 15, 2013 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
February 2013. Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been
paid down by approximately 58.9% or $81.4 million since February
2013. Based on the latest trustee report dated July 2, 2013, the
Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1L and Class B-2L
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 165.3%, 138.6%,
121.0% and 109.4%, respectively, versus February 2013 levels of
133.4%, 121.9%, 113.2% and 106.7%, respectively.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-3L
Notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's said that
it had upgraded and placed certain of the issuer's ratings on
review primarily as a result of substantial deleveraging of the
senior notes and increases in OC ratios resulting from high rates
of loan collateral prepayments during the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the July 2013 trustee report, securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 8.7% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity. Notwithstanding
the increase in the overcollateralization ratio of the Class B-2L
notes, Moody's affirmed the rating of the Class B-2L notes due to
the market risk posed by the exposure to these long-dated assets.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $124.0 million, defaulted par of $7.4 million,
a weighted average default probability of 17.5% (implying a WARF
of 2822), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.9%,
and a diversity score of 36. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Mountain Capital CLO IV, Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2258)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LA: 0

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3387)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LA: 0

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -1

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


N-STAR REAL VIII: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 3 Debt Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of fifteen classes of Notes
issued by N-Star Real Estate CDO VIII, Ltd. The affirmations are
due to the key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2011 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. A-R, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

N-Star Real Estate CDO VIII, Ltd. is a static cash transaction
backed by a portfolio of: i) A-Notes and whole loans (54.9% of the
pool balance); ii) B-Notes (2.7%); iii) Mezzanine Loans (32.65);
iv) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (0.2%); and v)
CRE CDOs (9.6%). As of the August 1, 2013 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including income notes,
has decreased to $836.3 million from $900 million at issuance,
with the paydown directed to the Class A1 and AR Notes, as a
result of amortization of the underlying collateral. The decrease
in the Note balance is also due to the prior partial junior note
cancellation of Classes G and J. In general, holding all key
parameters static, the junior note cancellations results in
slightly higher expected losses and longer weighted average lives
on the senior Notes, while producing slightly lower expected
losses on the mezzanine and junior Notes. However, this does not
cause, in and of itself, a downgrade or upgrade of any outstanding
classes of notes.

There are two assets with a par balance of $29.5 million (3.2% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
as of the August 1, 2013 Trustee report. All of these assets (100%
of the defaulted balance) are CMBS. While there have been limited
realized losses to date, Moody's does expect moderate implied
losses to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,971
compared to 7,929 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (0.1% the same as at last
review), A1-A3 (0.2% compared to 0.9% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(0% the same as at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.8% the same as at last
review), B1-B3 (1.0% compared to 3.3% at last review), and Caa1-C
(98.0% compared to 94.9% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4 years compared to 5.5 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 28.2% compared to 27.6% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100% the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, which was released on May
16, 2013, was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its
effect on the capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
28.2% to 23.2% or up to 33.2% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward and 0 to
7 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector continues to exhibit growth albeit at a slightly
slower pace. The multifamily sector should remain stable with
moderate growth. Gradual recovery in the office sector continues
and will be assisted in the next quarter when absorption is likely
to outpace completions. However, since office demand is closely
tied to employment, Moody's expects regional employment growth to
provide market differentiation. CBD markets continue to outperform
secondary suburban markets. The retail sector exhibited a slight
reduction in vacancies in the first quarter; the largest drop
since 2005. However, consumers continue to be cautious as
evidenced by sales growth continuing below historical trends.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with robust securitization activity of
commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low
interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact is unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


NELNET STUDENT 2008-1: Fitch Raises Sub. Notes Rating From 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior notes at 'AAAsf' and upgrades the
subordinate note to 'Asf' from 'BBsf' issued by Nelnet Student
Loan Trust 2008-1. The Rating Outlook on the senior notes, which
is tied to the sovereign rating of the U.S. government, remains
Negative. The subordinate note is removed from Rating Watch
Positive and assigned a Stable Outlook.

Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

Key Rating Drivers

The ratings on the senior notes and subordinate notes are based on
stable trust performance and the sufficient level of credit to
cover the applicable risk factor stresses. While both the senior
and subordinate notes will benefit from future excess spread, the
senior notes also benefit from subordination provided by the class
B note.

The total parity ratio has been stable and the senior parity ratio
has been increasing. The senior parity is currently 107.67% and
total parity is 100% as of May 2013.

Rating Sensitivities

Since FFELP student loan ABS rely on the U.S. government to
reimburse defaults, 'AAA'sf FFELP ABS ratings will likely move in
tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults and basis risk account for the majority
of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.
Additional defaults and basis shock beyond Fitch's published
stresses could result in future downgrades. Likewise, a buildup of
credit enhancement driven by positive excess spread given
favorable basis factor conditions could lead to future upgrades.

Prior to today's upgrade class B of Nelnet Student Loan Trust
2008-1 was on Rating Watch Positive.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Nelnet Student Loan Trust 2008-1:

-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; removed from Rating
   Watch Positive; Outlook Stable.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2006-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of notes issued by NewStar
Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1 (NewStar 2006-1) as follows:

-- $133,128,431 class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,956,698 class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22,500,000 class B notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,000,000 class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,000,000 class D notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13,750,000 class E notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations of the notes are based on the stable performance
of the transaction since Fitch's last rating review in August
2012. Fitch has also maintained the Outlooks on all classes of
notes to reflect its expectation that the performance of the
portfolio and the outstanding liabilities will remain stable in
the near term. The credit enhancement has increased on all the
notes due to the principal repayments of the class A-1 and A-2
notes (collectively, the class A notes). According to the June
2013 report, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) remained
stable at 'B/B-'. The amount of assets that Fitch considers 'CCC'
and below has increased to 34.9% from 29% of the performing
portfolio. However, approximately 11.1% was considered at 'CCC'
due to the lack of rating information.

The notes of NewStar 2006-1 benefit from credit enhancement in the
form of collateral coverage, note subordination, and the
application of excess spread via the additional principal amount
(APA). For every dollar that is charged off of the performing
portfolio, the APA feature directs the excess interest proceeds
and recoveries from charged-off loans otherwise available to the
certificate holders to pay down the senior-most notes in an amount
equal to the charged-off amount. The APA completely paid off on
the December 2010 payment date, and as a result, the certificate
holders resumed receiving excess interest proceeds on the March
2011 payment date. On the most recent payment date, approximately
$1.2 million were charged-off from the portfolio, and excess
spread was diverted to pay down the class A notes through the APA
feature. The current APA balance is zero.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' using the
Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default and
recovery levels for the underlying portfolio. These default and
recovery levels were then utilized in Fitch's cash flow model
under various default timing and interest rate stress scenarios,
as described in the report. The default timing scenarios were also
adjusted, since the weighted average life of the portfolio was
approximately three years. As a result, Fitch assumed that a peak
of 60% of the defaults would occur in the first, second, and third
year for the front, middle, and back default timing, respectively.
All the notes passed the various stress scenarios at rating levels
in line with or above their credit ratings.

Rating Sensitivities

The performance of the portfolio may be sensitive to significant
credit deterioration or distressed recoveries of the portfolio.
The notes may also be sensitive to increasing concentration risks
as the portfolio continues to amortize. Fitch will continue to
monitor the transaction regularly and as warranted by such events.

NewStar 2006-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on June 8, 2006 and is managed by NewStar Financial, Inc.
(NewStar). The transaction's reinvestment period ended in June
2011 and its legal final maturity date is in March 2022. NewStar
2006-1 is secured by a portfolio comprised of 94% corporate loans,
primarily to middle-market issuers, 5.5% commercial real estate
loans, and 0.5% in structured finance assets, based on total
commitment amounts. The majority of these loans are not publicly
rated. Instead, Fitch's leveraged finance group provided model-
based credit opinions for approximately 81.1% of the performing
loans. Information for the model-based credit opinions was
gathered from financial statements provided to Fitch by NewStar.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2007-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of notes issued by NewStar
Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1 (NewStar 2007-1) as follows:

-- $317,888,740 class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $99,999,922 class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,000,000 class B notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,500,000 class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,000,000 class D notes at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,100,000 class E notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
transaction since Fitch's last rating action in August 2012. Fitch
has also maintained the Outlooks on all classes of notes to
reflect its expectation that the performance of the portfolio and
the outstanding liabilities will remain stable in the near term.
According to the loan tape as of July 31, 2013, the portfolio has
no charged-off loans, compared to 1.4% at last review.

The portfolio credit quality has remained generally unchanged from
the last review, with a weighted average rating factor (WARF) of
'B/B-'. In addition, Fitch considers approximately 16.8% of the
total commitments of the July 2013 portfolio in the 'CCC' category
or below, compared to 17.5% in the last review. However,
approximately 5.5% were considered at 'CCC' due to the lack of
rating information. The transaction is no longer in its
reinvestment period, which ended in May 2013.

The notes of NewStar 2007-1 benefit from the credit enhancement in
the form of collateral coverage, note subordination, and the
application of excess spread via the additional principal amount
(APA). For every dollar that is charged off of the performing
portfolio, the APA feature directs the excess interest proceeds
otherwise available to the certificate holders to pay down the
senior-most notes in an amount equal to the charged-off amount.
The APA completely paid off on the February 2010 payment date, and
as a result, the certificate holders resumed receiving excess
interest proceeds on the August 2010 payment date.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' using the
Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default and
recovery levels for the underlying portfolio. These default and
recovery levels were then utilized in Fitch's cash flow model
under various default timing and interest rate stress scenarios,
as described in the report. All notes passed the various stress
scenarios at rating levels in line with or above their current
ratings.

Rating Sensitivities

The performance of the portfolio may be sensitive to significant
credit deterioration or distressed recoveries of the portfolio.
The notes may also be sensitive to increasing concentration risks
as the portfolio continues to amortize. Fitch will continue to
monitor the transaction regularly and as warranted by such events.

NewStar 2007-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on June 5, 2007 and is managed by NewStar Financial, Inc.
(NewStar). The transaction's reinvestment period is scheduled to
end in May 2013, and its maturity date is in September 2022.
NewStar 2007-1 is secured by a portfolio comprised of 98.6%
corporate loans, primarily to middle-market issuers, and 1.1%
commercial real estate loans, and 0.3% CLOs, based on the total
commitment amounts. The majority of these loans are not publicly
rated. Instead, Fitch's leveraged finance group provided model-
based credit opinions for 89.7% of the performing loans.
Information for the model-based credit opinions was gathered from
financial statements provided to Fitch by NewStar.


NEWSTAR TRUST 2005-1: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of notes and revised the
Rating Outlook on one class of notes issued by NewStar Trust
2005-1 (NewStar 2005-1) as follows:

-- $9,026,880 class B notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,233,370 class C notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable
   from Negative;
-- $24,287,324 class D notes at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $24,287,324 class E notes at 'CCsf'; RE 70%.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of the notes is due to the increased concentration
risks of the portfolio, mitigated by the increased credit
enhancement on the senior notes since the last review in August
2012. Fitch has also revised the Outlook on the class C notes to
reflect its expectation that the performance of these notes will
remain stable in the near term. The credit enhancement has
increased on the class B and the class C notes due to the
amortization of the class A and B notes. According to the trustee
report dated July 13, 2013, the class A notes have paid in full
and the class B notes received over $9.6 million through a
combination of portfolio amortization and the diversion of excess
spread to pay principal on the notes via the additional principal
amount (APA). The performing portfolio, however, has become more
concentrated due to charge-offs and portfolio amortization.

The weighted average rating of the portfolio remains constant in
the 'B-/CCC+' range. There continues to be significant exposure to
low-rated assets, as Fitch considers approximately 62.6% of the
total commitments of the performing portfolio in the 'CCC'
category or below, compared to 44.3% in the last review.

The notes of NewStar 2005-1 benefit from the credit enhancement in
the form of collateral coverage, note subordination, and the
application of excess spread via the APA. For every dollar that is
charged off of the performing portfolio, the APA feature directs
the excess interest otherwise available to the certificate holders
to pay down the senior-most notes in an amount equal to the
charged-off amount. An additional $9.7 million of loans were
charged off since the last review, while approximately $3 million
of excess spread and recoveries from charged-off loans were used
to pay the class A note principal balance. The cumulative APA
currently stands at approximately $84.5 million after the July
2013 payment date, compared to the cumulative $20.9 million of APA
redemptions made over the life of the transaction. This implies
that an additional $63.6 million of excess spread and recoveries
would have to be diverted to the senior notes in order to pay down
the remaining APA balance, assuming that no additional charge-offs
are made.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' using the
Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default and
recovery levels for the underlying portfolio. These default and
recovery levels were then utilized in Fitch's cash flow model
under various default timing and interest rate stress scenarios,
as described in the report. The default timing scenarios were also
adjusted since the weighted average life of the portfolio was less
than three years. As a result, Fitch assumed that a peak of 75% of
defaults would occur in the first and last year of the front and
back default timing scenarios, respectively, and defaults would be
evenly distributed over two years in the middle default timing
scenario. All classes of notes passed in scenarios at rating
levels above their current ratings. However, the class C, D, and E
notes were affirmed at their current rating levels, given the
increasing concentration risks and the significant portion of long
dated assets in the portfolio.

Rating Sensitivities

Given the size of the remaining performing portfolio, the notes'
performance may be sensitive to increased concentration risks and
further deterioration of the portfolio. In addition, 28.2% of the
portfolio is made up of long-dated collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs), which may expose the transaction to market value risk when
it reaches its maturity date in July 2018. As a result, the
ratings were affirmed at their current ratings due to the heavy
reliance on recoveries from lowly rated and defaulted collateral.

NewStar 2005-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on Aug. 10, 2005 and is managed by NewStar Financial, Inc.
(NewStar). The transaction's reinvestment period ended in October
2008 and its legal final maturity date is in July 2018. NewStar
2005-1 is secured by a performing portfolio comprised of 23%
corporate loans (primarily to middle-market issuers), 49%
commercial real estate loans, and 28% of structured finance
assets, based on the total performing commitment amount. The
performing portfolio consists of 14 unique obligors, with the top
three obligors totaling approximately 43.9% of the portfolio. The
majority of these loans are not publicly rated. Instead, Fitch
provided model-based credit opinions for 71.2% of the performing
loans. Information for the model-based credit opinions was
gathered from financial statements provided to Fitch by NewStar.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Octagon Investment Partners XVII Ltd./Octagon
Investment Partners XVII LLC's $376.50 million floating- and
fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 22,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which it
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.26%-12.87%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds, which are
      available before paying uncapped administrative expenses and
      fees; subordinated hedge termination payments; collateral
      manager incentive fees; and subordinated note payments to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1751.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Octagon Investment Partners XVII Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners
XVII LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                141.00
A-2                    AAA (sf)                 85.00
A-3                    AAA (sf)                 25.00
B-1                    AA (sf)                  40.00
B-2                    AA (sf)                   5.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   31.75
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 21.75
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  17.75
F (deferrable)         B (sf)                    9.25
Subordinated notes     NR                      37.277

NR-Not rated.


PRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL 2003-PWR-1: S&P Cuts Cl. G Notes Rating to D
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Prudential Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-PWR1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, because of current
and potential interest shortfalls to these classes.

S&P's rating actions follows its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all the pool's remaining assets, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P lowered its rating on the class E certificates to 'BB- (sf)'
from 'BBB- (sf)' to reflect the reduced liquidity support
available to this class.  The lowered rating also reflects the
class' susceptibility to interest shortfalls from the continued
reimbursement of prior advances on the specially serviced Holley
Mason Building asset and the potential for the specially serviced
The Landings loan to be deemed nonrecoverable.  S&P also
considered the potential transfer of the previously specially
serviced loan, the Brandywine Office Building & Garage loan, to
special servicing (currently on the master servicer's watchlist),
which could result in additional appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions (ASERs) and special servicing fees.

S&P lowered its rating on the class F certificates to 'CCC- (sf)'
from 'BB (sf)' because the class had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for three consecutive months.  S&P may
further lower the rating to 'D (sf)' if the class continues to
experience interest shortfalls.

S&P lowered its rating on the class G certificates to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' because it expects interest shortfalls to
continue, and S&P believes the accumulated interest shortfalls
will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Class G has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for five consecutive
months.

As of the Aug. 12, 2013 trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $205,903,
primarily related to reimbursement of prior advances of $91,138,
interest rate modifications of $55,357, and net ASER amounts of
$19,168 on one ($13.9 million, 27.6%) of the two ($20.6 million,
40.9%) specially serviced assets.  The interest shortfalls
affected all classes subordinate to and including class F.

As of the trustee remittance report, the collateral pool had a
$50.5 million aggregate trust balance, down from $960.0 million at
issuance.  The pool comprises two loans and one real estate owned
(REO) asset, down from 100 loans at issuance.  To date, the
transaction has experienced losses totaling $38.7 million, or 4.0%
of the transaction's original certificate balance.  The master
servicers, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and Prudential Asset Resources,
reported one loan ($29.9 million, 59.2%) on the watchlist.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

The trustee remittance report listed two assets ($20.6 million,
40.9%) with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC.
Details of the two assets are below.

The Landings loan ($13.9 million, 27.6%) is secured by a
112,861-sq.-ft. retail center in Bolingbrook, Ill.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer on March 29, 2012, and a
receiver was appointed on Sept. 27, 2012.  The special servicer
indicated that the loan will be marketed for sale.  S&P expects a
moderate loss upon this asset's eventual resolution, which is
considered to be a loss between 26% and 59% of the outstanding
principal balance.

The Holley Mason Building asset ($6.7 million, 13.3%) is secured
by a 107,259-sq.-ft. office building in Spokane, Wash.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer on June 22, 2011, because of a
payment default, and became REO on Aug. 17, 2012, via foreclosure.
The special servicer indicated that the property is currently 91%
leased and occupied.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this
asset's eventual resolution.

The remaining loan in the transaction, the Brandywine Office
Building Garage loan, is the pool's largest loan ($29.9 million,
59.2%) and is secured by an 18-story, 443,632-sq.-ft. office
building in Wilmington, Del.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist because of low occupancy.  According to a
Jan. 31, 2013 rent roll, the property was 42.8% leased and
occupied.  However, according to the master servicer, numerous
tenants have vacated since the date of the rent roll, resulting in
a 34.3% current occupancy.  Using the aforementioned rent roll and
financial statements provided by the master servicer, S&P
calculated a 0.58x debt service coverage ratio.  The loan
previously transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 22, 2009,
because of imminent default, and was returned to the master
servicer on Aug. 22, 2011 after a modification was closed that
resulted in a new final maturity date of May 1, 2020, a principal
write-off of $15.1 million, and a change in the repayment terms to
interest-only at a reduced interest rate.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Prudential Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-PWR1

                    Rating
Class          To          From     Credit enhancement (%)
E              BB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)                 82.56
F              CCC- (sf)   BB (sf)                   61.20
G              D (sf)      CCC- (sf)                 37.46


RESIDENRIAL FUNDING: Moody's Hikes Rating on $87MM Subprime RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
from five transactions issued by Residential Funding Corporation,
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RASC Series 2001-KS3 Trust

  A-II, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
  Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS12 Trust

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
  Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS4 Trust

  Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
  Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS7 Trust

  Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5,
  2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
  (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securities Corporation, Series 2002-KS2

  Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2012
  Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2012
  Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
The upgrades are due to improvement in collateral performance,
and/ or build-up in credit enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecasts and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


SALOMON BROTHERS 2002-KEY2: S&P Cuts Cl. Q Certs Rating to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
Q commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Salomon
Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2002-KEY2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, because
of potential interest shortfalls.

The downgrade follows S&P's analysis of the sole remaining
specially serviced asset in the transaction, primarily using its
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the transaction structure and the liquidity
available to the trust.

S&P lowered its rating on the class Q certificates to 'CCC- (sf)'
from 'B- (sf)' to reflect the reduced liquidity support available
to this class.  The lowered rating also reflects the class'
susceptibility to future interest shortfalls from the sole
remaining specially serviced asset in the trust.

As of the Aug. 19, 2013 trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $54,059,
primarily related to the nonrecoverable determination of the
remaining asset in the pool.  This shortfall was offset by a total
of $1.2 million, reflecting the recovery of previous servicer
advances resulting from the resolution of two specially serviced
assets.  The total reimbursement to the trust was composed of
interest on advances (in the amount of $28,226), the reimbursement
of the monthly special servicing fees ($17,658), and other
expenses related to the 35 Engel Street loan ($1.16 million).
Prior to the sale and repayment in full of the Oak Tree Plaza
Shopping Center loan ($5.3 million) and the 35 Engel Street loan
($1.5 million), class Q experienced interest shortfalls for three
consecutive months.  These cumulative interest shortfalls were
offset by the sale and full repayment of these two loans.
However, S&P expects the transaction to experience interest
shortfalls in the amount of approximately $54,059 as a result of
the nonrecoverable determination for the sole remaining asset, The
Commons at Sauk Trail Shopping Center asset, which is with the
special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III).

As of the Aug. 19, 2013 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool consisted of one asset with an aggregate principal balance of
$7.9 million, down from 66 loans with an aggregate balance of
$932.8 million at issuance.  The reported payment status of this
one remaining specially serviced asset ($7.9 million; 100.0%) is
"foreclosure in process."  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA)
totaling $6.7 million was in effect against this asset.  To date,
the transaction has experienced losses totaling $10.8 million, or
1.2% of the transaction's original pooled certificate balance.
Details of the remaining asset are as follows:

   -- The Commons at Sauk Trail Shopping Center asset
      ($7.9 million; 100%) is the only remaining asset in the
      pool, with a reported total exposure of $9.9 million.  The
      Commons, a 96,726-sq.-ft. retail property in Saline, Mich.,
      was transferred to special servicing on Aug. 10, 2010, for
      payment default.  The borrower subsequently filed for
      bankruptcy on Aug. 17, 2012.

   -- For the most recently reported period (the year ended
      Dec. 31, 2012), the property's debt service coverage and
      occupancy were 0.21x and 81.0%, respectively.

An ARA of $6.7 million is in effect on this asset, and S&P expects
a significant loss upon its eventual resolution, as the total
exposure of $9.9 million exceeds the total outstanding amount of
remaining classes of certificates ($7.97 million).  The master
servicer, KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets Inc. (KeyCorp),
deemed the advancing on this loan as nonrecoverable on April 11,
2013.

KeyCorp has indicated to S&P that funds in the amount of
$2.1 million are being held in the collection account to offset
the difference between the outstanding certificate balance and the
total exposure of the one remaining asset in the pool upon this
asset's ultimate liquidation.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


SALOMON BROTHERS VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. L Debt to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed two classes of Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities
VII, Inc. 2000-C1 as follows:

Issuer: Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc. 2000-C1

Cl. J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2013 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of three P&I classes are due to increased credit
enhancement from paydowns and amortization since last review and
overall stable performance. The pool has paid down by 56% since
Moody's last review.

The ratings of the below investment grade P&I classes are
consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The
ratings of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the expected
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
0.7% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 4.9%. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 2 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the July 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $20.0
million from $713.3 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 28% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 65% of the pool. Six loans, representing 35% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in a realized loss of $25.9 million (39% loss severity overall).
There are currently no loans in special servicing or on the
watchlist.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV is 41% compared to
67% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 18% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.36%. Moody's conduit actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.42X and 3.45X, respectively, compared to 0.98X and
1.68X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 72% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Sports Arena Village Loan ($5.7 million -- 28.4% of the pool),
which is secured by a 255,000 square foot retail and office
property located in San Diego, California. As of March 2013, the
retail portion was 92% leased while the office component was 100%
leased, same at last review. The largest tenant is Science
Applications Corp. (24% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease
expires in August 2015). The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 56% since securitization. The loan matures in June 2018.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 25% and >4.0X, respectively,
compared to 32% and 3.77X, respectively, at last review.

The second largest loan is The Sports Authority Loan ($3.7 million
-- 18.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 46,000 square foot
retail property located along the Northern Boulevard retail
corridor in the Woodside neighborhood of Queens, New York. The
property is 100% leased to The Sports Authority on a triple net
basis through February 2015. Performance has remained in line with
last review, although due to the single tenant nature of this
building, Moody's value reflects and stressed cash derived from a
dark/lit analysis. The loan matures in February 2015 and has
amortized 18% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 72% and 1.39X compared to 73% and 1.37X, respectively, at last
review.

The third largest loan is The Office Max Martinsburg Loan
($932,702 - 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 23,500 square
foot retail property located in West Virginia, between the
Maryland/Virginia border. The property is 100% leased to Office
Max on a triple net basis through February 2018. Performance has
remained in line with last review, although due to the single
tenant nature of this building, Moody's value reflects and
stressed cash derived from a dark/lit analysis. The loan matures
in January 2018 and has amortized 59% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 44% and 2.58X, respectively,
compared to 44% and 2.61X, respectively, at last review.

The remaining loans in the deal are fully amortizing and are
expected to remain outstanding until 2017 and 2019.


SDART 2013-A: Moody's Rates Class E Notes 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A
(SDART 2013-A). This is the first private and fifth overall
transaction of the year for Santander Consumer USA Inc.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A

Class A-1 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

Class A-2 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of SCUSA as
servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2013-A pool
is 16.0% and the Aaa level is 49.0%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of SCUSA's portfolio vintage performance as
well as performance of past securitizations, and current
expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the a Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the presence of the investment
grade rated parent, Banco Santander (Baa2/P-2). In addition, the
securitization documents include a provision that requires the
appointment of a back-up servicer in the event that the rating on
Banco Santander is downgraded below Baa3, or if Banco Santander
ceases to own at least 50% of the common stock of SCUSA.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS," published in May 2013.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 19.0%, 25.0% or
29.0%, the initial model output for the Class A notes might change
from Aaa to Aa1, A1, and Baa1, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 19.5% or
22.5%, the initial model output for the Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to Aa2, A2, and Baa2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 18.0% or
22.5%, the initial model output for the Class C notes might change
from A2 to A3, Baa3, and Ba3, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 18.5% or
20.5%, the initial model output for the Class D notes might change
from Baa2 to Baa3, Ba3, and B3 respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 17.5% or
18.5%, the initial model output for the Class E notes might change
from Ba2 to Ba3, B3, and
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2004-7: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 RMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches from one RMBS transaction issued by Sequoia. The actions
impact approximately $35.3 million of RMBS issued from 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-7

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 27, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 27, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The downgrades rating actions reflect deterioration of
collateral performance.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2013-11: Fitch Rates Class B-4 Certificates 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to Sequoia Mortgage
Trust 2013-11, mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2013-11
(SEMT 2013-11):

-- $318,616,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-2 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-3 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-4 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-5 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-6 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $318,616,000 class A-8 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-IO1 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-IO2 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $159,308,000 class A-IO3 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $318,616,000 class A-IO notional certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $8,658,000 class B-1 certificate 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $6,926,000 class B-2 certificate 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $4,849,000 class B-3 certificate 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $3,636,000 non-offered class B-4 certificate 'BBsf'; Outlook
   Stable.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the senior certificates reflects the 8.00%
subordination provided by the 2.50% class B-1, 2.00% class B-2,
1.40% class B-3, 1.05% non-offered class B-4 and 1.05% non-offered
class B-5. The $3,637,235 non-offered class B-5 certificates will
not be rated by Fitch.

Fitch's ratings reflect the high quality of the underlying
collateral, the clear capital structure and the high percentage of
loans reviewed by third party underwriters. In addition,
CitiMortgage, Inc. will act as the master servicer, and Wilmington
Trust will act as the Trustee for the transaction. For federal
income tax purposes, elections will be made to treat the trust as
one or more real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs).

SEMT 2013-11 will be Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation's
eleventh transaction of prime residential mortgages in 2013. The
certificates are supported by a pool of prime fixed rate mortgage
loans. All of the loans are fully amortizing. The aggregate pool
included loans originated from PrimeLending (7.1%) and Plaza Home
Mortgage (6.4%). The remainder of the mortgage loans was
originated by various mortgage lending institutions, each of which
contributed less than 5% to the transaction.

As of the cut-off date, the aggregate pool consisted of 453 loans
with a total balance of $346,322,236; an average balance of
$764,508; a weighted average original combined loan-to-value ratio
(CLTV) of 70.1%, and a weighted average coupon (WAC) of 4%.
Rate/Term and cash out refinances account for 36.6% and 7.9% of
the loans, respectively. The weighted average original FICO credit
score of the pool is 773. Owner-occupied properties comprise 96.1%
of the loans. The states that represent the largest geographic
concentration are California (46.9%), Illinois (7.6%) and
Massachusetts (7.1%).

Key Rating Drivers

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists of 30-
year fully amortizing, fully documented FRMs to borrowers with
strong credit profiles, low leverage, and substantial liquid
reserves. Third-party loan-level due diligence was conducted on
98.9% of the pool, and Fitch believes the results of the review
generally indicate strong underwriting controls.

Originators With Limited Performance History: The majority of the
pool was originated by lenders with limited non-agency performance
history. The lack of performance history is partially mitigated by
the 100% third-party diligence conducted on these loans that
resulted in immaterial findings. Fitch also considers the credit
enhancement (CE) on this transaction sufficient to mitigate the
originator risk.

Geographic Concentration: Approximately 47% of the pool is
concentrated in California, similar to recent SEMT transactions.
After considering the relatively diverse distribution across MSAs,
the agency applied a modest 1.04 times (x) default penalty to the
pool to account for the geographic concentration risk.

Transaction Provisions Enhance Deal Framework: The representation,
warranty and enforcement mechanism framework is viewed positively,
as it is consistent with Fitch criteria. As in other recent Fitch-
rated SEMT transactions, SEMT 2013-11 contains binding arbitration
provisions that may serve to provide timely resolution to
representation and warranty disputes. In addition, all loans that
become 120 days or more delinquent will be automatically reviewed
for breaches of representations and warranties.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) and national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become
exposed to or be considered in the surveillance of the
transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis on areas where the model
projected lower home price declines than that of the overall
collateral pool. The model currently projects sustainable MVDs
(sMVDs) at the MSA level. For one of the top 10 regions, Fitch's
sustainable home price (SHP) model does not project declines in
home prices. This region is Chicago-Joliet-Naperville in Illinois
(5.4%). Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis assuming sMVDs of
10%, 15%, and 20% compared with those projected by Fitch's SHP
model for this region. The sensitivity analysis indicated no
impact on ratings for all bonds in each scenario.

Another sensitivity analysis was focused on determining how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 16.9% for this pool. The analysis indicates there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.

Model Usage

Fitch analyzed the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral to determine base case and rating stress loss
expectations using its prime residential mortgage loss model,
which is fully described in its August 2013 criteria report, 'U.S.
RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria.' In addition, Fitch considered the
results relative to the previous version of the mortgage loss
model, as described in its August 2012 criteria report, 'U.S. RMBS
Loan Loss Model Criteria - Effective August 10, 2012 to August 7,
2013.'

Also, Fitch simulated transaction cash flow scenarios using
various cash flow modeling assumptions, as described in its
April 2013 criteria report, 'U.S. RMBS Cash Flow Analysis
Criteria.'


SLM PRIVATE 2002-A: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class C Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the notes issued from SLM Private
Credit Student Loan Trust 2002-A (SLM 2002-A) and 2004-A (SLM
2004-A). The Rating Outlook for SLM 2002-A remains Stable and the
Outlook for SLM 2004-A remains Negative. Fitch used its 'Global SF
Criteria' and 'U.S. Private SL ABS Criteria' to review the
transaction.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation on the notes reflects sufficient loss coverage
multiples to support the existing ratings. Fitch estimates
remaining defaults to range from 5.00% to 6.00% for SLM 2002-A and
9% to 11% for SLM 2004-A.

As of the June 2013 report, SLM 2002-A has displayed senior,
subordinate and junior subordinate parity levels of 118.58%,
112.15% and 107.96%, respectively. SLM 2004-A has displayed
senior, subordinate and junior subordinate parity levels of
118.33%, 111.91% and 100.55%.

Furthermore based on updated recovery data and performance for all
trusts, a recovery rate of 10% was applied.

The Negative Outlook for SLM 2004-A is driven by an increase in
projected default levels in excess of Fitch's initial
expectations.

Fitch projected future losses and derived loss coverage multiples
based on the latest performance data. The projected net loss
amounts were compared to available credit enhancement to determine
the loss multiples appropriate for each rating category. Credit
enhancement consists of a combination of excess spread,
overcollateralization, and subordination.

Rating Sensitivities

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels
than the base case. This will result in a decline in credit
enhancement and remaining loss coverage levels available to the
notes and may make certain note ratings susceptible to potential
negative rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.
The collateral securing the notes are private student loans
originated to undergraduate, graduate, law, Med and MBA students
under the Signature and EXCEL programs. The private student loans
are intended to assist individuals in financing their
undergraduate or graduate education beyond FFELP limits.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the trusts.

Fitch takes the following actions:

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2002-A:
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2004-A:
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Negative.


SLM PRIVATE 2005-B: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class C Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the senior, subordinate and junior
subordinate notes issued from SLM Private Credit Student Loan
Trust 2005-B (SLM 2005-B) and the subordinate notes issued from
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-B (SLM 2003-B) and
2003-C (SLM 2003-C). At the same time, Fitch has affirmed the
senior and junior subordinate notes issued from SLM Private Credit
Student Loan Trust 2003-B and 2003-C. The Rating Outlook for all
trusts remains Negative. Fitch used its 'Global SF Criteria' and
'U.S. Private SL ABS Criteria' to review the transaction.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade on all outstanding notes issued from 2005-B and the
subordinate notes issued from 2003-B and 2003-C reflect
insufficient loss coverage multiples to support the existing
ratings. Fitch has revised its default projections based on
updated default curves provided by the issuer. Fitch estimates
remaining defaults to range from approximately 14%-16% for the
2005-B trust and 12%-14% for the 2003-B and 2003-C trusts.

The affirmations on the senior and junior subordinate notes
reflect sufficient loss coverage multiples to support the existing
ratings.

As of the June 30, 2013 report, senior parity levels range from
118.11% to 118.36% and subordination parity levels range from
108.95% to 111.33%. Total parity levels for SLM 2003-B and 2003-C
are currently 97.55% and 97.20%, respectively, as excess spread is
lower due to the auction rate securities. Total parity for SLM
2005-B is 102.17%.

Furthermore, based on updated recovery data and performance for
all trusts, a recovery rate of 10% was applied.

The Negative Outlook is driven by an increase in projected default
levels in excess of Fitch's initial expectations.

Fitch projected future losses and derived loss coverage multiples
based on the latest performance data. The projected net loss
amounts were compared to available credit enhancement to determine
the loss multiples appropriate for each rating category. Credit
enhancement consists of a combination of excess spread,
overcollateralization, and subordination.

Rating Sensitivities

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels
than the base case. This will result in a decline in credit
enhancement and remaining loss coverage levels available to the
notes and may make certain note ratings susceptible to potential
negative rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.

The collateral securing the notes are private student loans
originated to undergraduate, graduate, law, Med and MBA students
under the Signature and EXCEL programs. The private student loans
are intended to assist individuals in financing their
undergraduate or graduate education beyond FFELP limits.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the trusts.

Fitch takes the following actions:

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-B:
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE0%.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-C:
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE0%.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2005-B:
-- Class A-2 downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative.


SOUND POINT III: Moody's Rates $10MM Class F Notes 'B2(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to
notes issued by Sound Point CLO III, Ltd.:

$4,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$248,250,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Up to $50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

$50,000,000 Class A Loans due 2025 (the "Class A Loans"), Assigned
Aaa (sf)

$64,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

$5,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

$28,250,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

$22,750,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

$10,750,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

At closing, the Class A-2 Notes will have a zero principal
balance. However, the Class A-2 Notes' principal balance may be
increased up to $50,000,000 upon the exercise of a conversion
option, and the conversion of the Class A Loans into an equivalent
principal amount of Class A-2 Notes.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's ratings of the Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the
Class A-2 Notes, the Class A Loans, the Class B Notes, the Class
C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E
Notes and the Class F Notes (collectively, the "Debt") address the
expected losses posed to debt holders. The ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Sound Point CLO III is a managed cash flow CLO. The transaction is
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first-lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must be
invested in senior secured loans and eligible investments and up
to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of senior secured bonds,
senior secured floating rate notes, senior unsecured bonds and
second lien loans. At closing, the portfolio is approximately 70%
ramped and is expected to be 100% ramped within four months
thereafter.

Sound Point Capital Management, LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer. The Manager may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, unscheduled principal payments
and sale proceeds of credit risk assets may be used to purchase
additional collateral obligations, subject to certain conditions.

In addition to the Debt rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates coverage tests,
both par and interest, which, if triggered, divert interest and
principal proceeds to pay down the debt in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Target Par Amount of $481,000,000

Diversity: 48

WARF: 2500

Weighted Average Spread: 3.90%

Weighted Average Coupon: 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate: 48.0%

Weighted Average Life: 8 years

The performance of the Debt is subject to uncertainty. The Debt's
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the Debt's performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
additional sensitivity analysis which was an important component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Debt. This sensitivity
analysis includes increased default probability relative to the
base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Debt (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in Moody's WARF -- Moody's WARF + 15% (from 2500
to 2875)

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A Loans: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B Notes: 0

Class C-1 Notes: 0

Class C-2 Notes: 0

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in Moody's WARF -- Moody's WARF +30% (from 2500
to 3250)

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A Loans: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C-1 Notes: -2

Class C-2 Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector.

We have assessed the "Experience of, Arrangements Among and
Oversight of Transaction Parties," a sub-component of Governance
in the V Score analysis, as Medium for this transaction, instead
of Low/Medium for the benchmark CLO. The score of Medium reflects
the fact that the Manager is relatively untested in managing CLOs.
This higher score for "Experience of, Arrangements Among and
Oversight of the Transaction Parties" does not, however, cause
this transaction's overall composite V Score of Medium/High to
differ from that of the CLO sector benchmark.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.


STEERS SERIES 2004-1: Moody's Ups Rating on $19MM Certs to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service reported the following rating action on
Steers Series 2004-1, a corporate synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction (the "Collateralized Synthetic Obligation"
or "CSO"). The CSO references a portfolio of corporate senior
unsecured bonds.

STEERS Credit-Linked Trust, ML Tranche Series 2004-1 $19,000,000
Certificates, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 27, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's rating action is the result of the shortened time to
maturity of the CSO and the level of credit enhancement remaining
in the transaction. In addition to these positive factors is the
stable credit quality of the reference portfolio.

Since August 2012, the ten year weighted average rating factor
(WARF) of the portfolio has remained stable, declining marginally
from 936 to 890 currently, excluding settled credit events. There
are 12 reference entities with a negative outlook compared to six
that are positive, and three entities on watch for downgrade
compared to one on watch for upgrade.

The portfolio has experienced four credit events, equivalent to
4.0% of the portfolio based on the portfolio notional value at
closing. Since inception, the subordination of the rated tranche
has been reduced by 2.04% due to credit events on Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, Lehman Brothers, Rouse Company LP and
General Motors Corporation. In addition, the portfolio is exposed
to Harrah's Operating Company, Inc., which is not a credit event,
but nonetheless has a lowest senior unsecured rating of Ca.

The CSO has a remaining life of 0.75 years.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.8-9.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are given in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the base case, where higher notches
correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-versa:

- Market Implied Ratings ("MIRS") are modeled in place of the
   corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default
   probability of the reference entities in the portfolio. The
   gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating
   is an indicator of the extent of the divergence in credit view
   between Moody's and the market. The result of this run is one
   notch higher than the base case.

- Moody's performs a stress analysis consisting of defaulting
   all entities rated Caa1 and below. The result of this run is
   six notches lower than in the base case.

- Moody's conducts a sensitivity analysis consisting of notching
   down by one the ratings of reference entities in the Banking,
   Finance, and Real Estate sectors. The result from this run is
   comparable to the base case.

Moody's notes that key model inputs used in its analysis are based
on the published methodology and may be different from the
manager/arranger's reported numbers. In particular, rating
assumptions for all publicly rated corporate credits in the
underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review for Possible
Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or "Negative Outlook".

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model. For a description
of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the CDOROM user's
guide on Moody's website.

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality. Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities. The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee. Although the impact of these decisions is
mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of
these decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty
in Moody's assumptions. Given the tranched nature of CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility. All else
being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more junior
or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe. Should macroeconomics conditions evolve,
the CSO ratings will change to reflect the new economic
developments.


SYMPHONY CLO I: Moody's Raises $13.5MM Cl. D Notes' Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Symphony CLO I, Ltd.:

$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$21,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to A3 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

$13,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf); previously on October 17, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$60,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Revolving Notes Due 2019 (current
outstanding balance of $38,165,423), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on October 17, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$250,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding
balance of $159,022,596), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October
17, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$15,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2019, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization (OC) ratios
since the rating action in October 2012. Moody's notes that the
Class A-1A Notes and Class A-1B Notes have been paid down by
approximately 36% or $112.8 million since the rating action in
October 2012. Based on the latest trustee report dated August 7,
2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 137.3%, 124.8%,
114.8% and 109.1% respectively, versus September 2012 levels of
125.9%, 117.9%, 111.2% and 107.2%, respectively. Moody's also
notes the trustee reported OC ratios in the August 7 trustee
report do not reflect the recent payment of $6.3 million to the
Class A-1A Notes and Class A-1B Notes on August 19, 2013.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in October 2012. Based on the August 2013 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2345 compared to
2551 in September 2012.

Moody's also announced that it had concluded its review of its
ratings on the issuer's Class B Notes and Class C Notes announced
on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's said that it had upgraded
and placed certain of the issuer's ratings on review for upgrade
primarily as a result of substantial deleveraging of the senior
notes and increases in OC ratios resulting from high rates of loan
collateral prepayments during the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $293 million, defaulted par of $3.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 12.41% (implying a WARF of
2409), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.60%,
and a diversity score of 36.

The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Symphony CLO I, Ltd., issued in November 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1928)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2891)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Alternatively, however, the issuer's
significant participation in amend-to-extend activities would
result in pushing back the timing of maturities and principal
receipts for affected loan collateral.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal is allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
has the flexibility to deteriorate some collateral quality metrics
to the covenant levels.


TRAPEZA EDGE: Moody's Lifts Rating on $6MM Class 1 Notes to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Trapeza Edge CDO, Ltd.:

$6,000,000 Class 1 Combination Notes Due 2035 (current rated
balance of $2,979,702.41), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July
29, 2011 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$50,500,000 Class B-1 Forth Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2035, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on July 29, 2011
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);

$22,500,000 Class B-2 Forth Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2035, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on July 29, 2011
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Moody's also confirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$194,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $127,201,021.57), Confirmed at
A2 (sf); previously on August 5, 2013 Upgraded to A2 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$26,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2035, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on August 5,
2013 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

$32,000,000 Class A-3 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2035, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on August 5,
2013 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the upgrade on the Class 1 combo notes,
which consists of $3 million of the Class B notes and $3 million
of equity, primarily reflects a reduction in the notes' rated
balance to $2.9 million from $3.2 million in May 2012. Going
forward the combo notes' rated balance will continue to decline,
as a high fixed interest coupon of 5.89% for the Class B note
component more than offsets the 0.25% rated coupon on the combo
notes.

In taking the forgoing actions, Moody's also announced that it had
concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1,
Class A-3 and Class A-2 notes announced on August 5, 2013. At that
time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of senior notes and increases in
overcollateralization (OC) ratios.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, and
weighted average recovery rate, are based on its published
methodology and may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool to have a performing par balance of $251.9
million, defaulted/deferring par of $44 million, a weighted
average default probability of 31.88% (implying a WARF of 1725),
Moody's Asset Correlation of 18.34%, and a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 8.1%. In addition to the
quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment, and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

Trapeza Edge CDO, Ltd issued on August 11, 2005 is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks and insurance companies that are generally not publicly
rated by Moody's. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS
without public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive their credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data reported
as of Q1-2013. For insurance TruPS without public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of Moody's Insurance team based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual
statutory financial reports.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011. Moody's also
evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to the
volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's Cross
Sector Rating Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 175 points from the
base case of 1725, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 110 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $16 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class A-3: +1

Class B-1: +1

Class B-2: +1

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class A-3: +1

Class B-1: +1

Class B-2: +1

Moody's notes that this transaction is still subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty although Moody's outlook on the
banking sector has changed to stable from negative. The pace of
FDIC bank failures continues to decline in 2013 compared to the
last few years, and some of the previously deferring banks have
resumed interest payment on their trust preferred securities.
Moody's continues to have a stable outlook on the insurance
sector, other than the negative outlook on the U.S. life insurance
industry.


TRIMARAN CLO VI: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class B-2L Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Trimaran CLO VI, Ltd.:

$19,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2018,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$10,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2018,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$12,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2018,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 23, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$201,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2018
(current outstanding balance of $105,153,505.97), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$25,000,000 Class A-1LR Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due November
2018 (current outstanding balance of $13,078,794.27), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$16,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
July 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid
down by approximately 48% or $107.8 million since the rating
action in July 2012. Based on the latest trustee report dated July
22, 2013, the Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1L and Class B-2L
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 135.05%, 120.92%,
114.61%, and 107.86%, respectively, versus June 2012 levels of
123.85%, 114.83%, 110.60%, and 105.91%, respectively. The July 22,
2013 trustee-reported OC ratios do not reflect the August 1, 2013
payment distribution, when $28.4 million of principal proceeds
were used to pay down the Class A-1 Notes.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since July 2012. Based on the July 2013 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2,520 compared to
2,331 in June 2012.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-3L
Notes and Class B-1L Notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that
time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the
issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC ratios
resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments during
the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $189.8 million, defaulted par of $3.3 million,
a weighted average default probability of 17.34% (implying a WARF
of 2,699), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
53.40%, and a diversity score of 37. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Trimaran CLO VI, Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2159)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LR: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +2

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3239)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LR: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


VERITAS CLO II: Moody's Lifts Rating on $9.5MM Cl. E Notes to Ba2
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Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Veritas CLO II, Ltd:

$15,200,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due July 11, 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July
15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

$20,600,000 Class C Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured Floating
Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due July 11, 2021, Upgraded to Aa3
(sf); previously on July 15, 2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$10,500,000 Class D Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes Due July 11, 2021, Upgraded to Baa2
(sf); previously on May 15, 2012 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

$9,500,000 Class E Sixth Priority Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes Due July 11, 2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on September 7, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$196,600,000 Class A-1T First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $96,455,979),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 7, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

$30,000,000 Class A-1R First Priority Senior Secured Revolving
Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $14,718,613),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 7, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

$25,200,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 7, 2011
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
October 2012 levels. Moody's notes that the Class A-1T and A-1R
Notes have been paid down by approximately 48.6% or $91.1 million
and $13.9 million, respectively, since October 2012. Based on the
latest trustee report dated August 3, 2013, the Class A/B, Class
C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 129.76%, 117.03%, 111.46% and 106.85%, respectively, versus
October 2012 levels of 121.58%, 112.55%, 108.44% and 104.97%,
respectively.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of the rating on the issuer's Class B and
Class C notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's
said that it had upgraded and placed certain of the issuer's
ratings on review primarily as a result of substantial
deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC ratios
resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments during
the first half of 2013.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the August 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2427
compared to 2335 in October 2012.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $207.9 million, defaulted par of $0.6 million,
a weighted average default probability of 18.70% (implying a WARF
of 2655), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.60%,
and a diversity score of 53. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Veritas CLO II, Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2124)

Class A-1T: 0

Class A-1R: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +3

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3186)

Class A-1T: 0

Class A-1R: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded 1 class and affirmed 16 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2005-C17.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade is due to an increase in credit enhancement as a
result of paydown and defeasance. Additionally the pool has
experienced stable to improved cash flow performance.

Fitch modeled losses of 4.1% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 4%, including $31.9
million (1.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 29 loans (26.6%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes eight specially serviced assets (5.3%).

As of the August 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 30.4% to $1.9 billion from
$2.72 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 28 loans
(19.3% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes L through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 175,209 square
foot (sf) office property located in Phoenix, AZ (1.1% of the
pool). The loan transferred to special servicing in February 2010
for imminent maturity default and became real estate owned (REO)
in September 2010. The special servicer reports that the
property's occupancy was 48% as of April 2013, which has improved
from 32% as of July 2011.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 169,334 (sf)
grocery anchored retail center located in Las Vegas, NV (1.4%).
The loan transferred to special servicer in March 2010 for
monetary default and became REO in January 2011. The special
servicer reports the property's current occupancy is 84%. The
special servicer is trying to stabilize the property's occupancy
at 90% and will look to dispose of the asset late in 2014.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a 96,500 sf
office property located in Falls Church, VA (0.8%). The loan
transferred to special servicing after the property's sole tenant
vacated the property in June 2012. The property became REO in
January 2013 and the special servicer is focused on leasing the
property. The special servicer reports the current occupancy is
8.4%.

Rating Sensitivity

The majority of the pool has Stable Rating Outlooks as performance
remains stable to improving. The Positive Rating Outlook on class
C is based on a stronger credit enhancement relative to its
rating; with continued paydown and stable performance future
upgrades are possible. Although credit enhancement is increasing
to classes D and E, rating upgrades are not warranted due to
potential for eroding credit enhancement should losses be greater
than expected as the lower classes have thinner tranches.
Additionally, 20.4% of the portfolio is maturing in the next 24
months.

Fitch upgrades the following class:

-- $74.9 million class B to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable
   from Positive.

Fitch affirms the following classes, revises Outlook and assigns
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $247.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57 million class A-PB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $187.2 million class A-J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.8 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook to Positive
   from Stable;
-- $47.6 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.2 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.2 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30.6 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37.4 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 45%;
-- $6.8 million class J at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $10.2 million class K at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $13.6 million class L at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.8 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.8 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.8 million class O at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch previously withdrew
the ratings on the interest-only class X-P and X-C certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms B2 Ratings on Cl. F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes of
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2010-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on our current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The
ratings of the IO Classes, Class X-A and X-B, are consistent with
the expected credit performance of their referenced classes and
thus are affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.8% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
1.6%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 11, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the August 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $706 million
from $736 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 37 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 25% of the pool with the top ten loans representing 64% of
the pool. One loan, representing 1% of the pool, has defeased and
is secured by U.S. Government securities. The pool contains four
loans with investment grade credit assessments, representing 39%
of the pool.

Four loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization
and there are no loans in special servicing. Moody's has assumed a
high default probability for one poorly performing loan
representing 1% of the pool and has estimated a $1.6 million loss
(20% expected loss based on a 50% probability default) from this
troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 98%
of the pool. Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 80% compared to 83% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.61X and 1.36X, respectively, compared to 1.55X and 1.27X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Dividend Capital
Portfolio Loan ($177.3 million -- 25.1% of the pool), which is
secured by a fee interest in 14 single tenant properties located
across nine states. The portfolio consists of seven office
properties, five industrial distribution centers, one data center
and one research and development facility. In aggregate, the
portfolio contains approximately 3.6 million square feet (SF). As
of March 2013 the portfolio was 97% leased compared to 100% at
last review. Moody's cash flow was stressed to reflect the risk
inherent with single tenant triple net leased properties. The loan
also benefits from amortization. Moody's current credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.73X, respectively, compared to
Baa3 and 1.55X at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Salmon Run
Mall Loan ($52.7 million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by
a regional mall containing approximately 671,766 SF located in
Watertown, New York. Salmon Run Mall is the only regional mall
within the trade area and is eight miles away from Fort Drum Army
Base, which is the largest employer in Northern New York. Anchor
tenants include Sears, Burlington Coat Factory, Gander Mountain,
Dick's Sporting Goods and J.C. Penney. As of December 2011 the
property was 88% leased versus 89% at last review. Financial
performance improved in 2012. Moody's current credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.70X, respectively, compared to A3
and 1.58X at last review.

The third largest loan with a credit assessment is the 19 West
34th Street Loan ($25.0 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is
secured by a 224,093 SF mixed use property located directly across
from the Empire State Building in New York, New York. Constructed
in 1907 (renovated in 1995), the property contains both retail and
office components. The main retail tenant, Banana Republic, is
currently operating under a sublease from Martin Building Retail,
an entity of the owner. As of December 2012, the property was 99%
leased, the same as at last review. The loan is interest-only
throughout the term. Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Aa2 and 1.97X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and
1.88X at last review.

The fourth largest loan with a credit assessment is the Radisson
Reagan National Airport Loan ($19.3 million -- 2.7% of the pool),
which is secured by a 243-room full service hotel located a
quarter of a mile away from the Reagan National Airport in
Arlington, Virginia. This loan benefits from amortization. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.96X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.94X at securitization.

The top three conduit loans represent 16% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Polaris Towne Center Loan ($44.4 million -- 6.3% of
the pool), which is secured by a 443,264 SF anchored retail center
located in Columbus, Ohio. The property was 98% leased as of March
2013, the same as at last review. Anchor tenants include Kroger
and Best Buy. The property also benefits from non-collateral
shadow anchors Target and Lowes. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
64% and 1.53X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the First Tennessee Plaza and Cedar
Ridge Loan ($34.8 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured
by two crossed-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans on two
separate office properties, totaling 536,869 SF, located in
Knoxville, Tennessee. The largest property is First Tennessee
Plaza, a 447,013 SF high-rise office building located in downtown
Knoxville. The remaining collateral is represented by Cedar Ridge,
a 89,856 SF office building located in suburban Knoxville. The
loan is encumbered with a $3.6 million junior participation
interest held outside of the trust. The portfolio was 80% leased
as of March 2013 versus 76% leased as of December 2011. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.93X, respectively, compared
to 103% and 1.00X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Pepper Square I and II and Central
Forest Shopping Center Loan ($30.7 million -- 4.3% of the pool),
two crossed-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by
separate retail properties, totaling 372,753 SF, located in
Dallas, Texas. The portfolio's largest tenants include Hobby
Lobby, Stein Mart and Bally's Total Fitness. The portfolio was 81%
leased as of March 2013 compared to 86% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.22X, respectively, compared to
89% and 1.18X at last review.


WYANDANCH UNION: Moody's Raises Underlying Rating From 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Wyandanch Union Free School
District's (NY) underlying rating to Baa3 from Ba1. Concurrently,
Moody's has upgraded the district's enhanced rating to Baa2 from
Baa3. This action affects $2 million in outstanding general
obligation debt.

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade to Baa3 reflects the district's improved, but still
narrow, financial position evidenced by four years of operating
surpluses, modest tax base with value decline, and average debt
burden. The Baa2 enhanced rating is based upon the additional
security provisions offered by New York State's school debt
intercept program. The enhancement program, contained in Section
99-B of the State Finance law, authorizes the state to withhold
state aid in order to make bond payments in the event of default
by a school district. Following default, and subsequent
notification by a bondholder of a missed payment, the State
Comptroller is directed to investigate and verify the principal
and interest amounts in arrears. The Comptroller will then deduct
sufficient funds to pay these amounts from succeeding allotments
of state aid.

Strengths:

- Improving financial operations

- Reduction in cash flow borrowing

- Average debt burden

Challenges:

- Reliance on state aid

- Tax base value decline

- Limited financial flexibility and narrow liquidity

What could make the rating change - UP

- Structurally balanced financial operations and increased
   financial reserves in-line with budgetary growth

- Tax base growth and demographic profile at levels

- Reduction in cash flow borrowing

What could make the rating change - DOWN

- A return to structurally imbalanced operations

- Depletion of General Fund balance

- Deterioration of the district's tax base and demographic
   profile

The principal methodology used in the general obligation rating
was General Obligation Bonds Issued by US Local Governments
published in April 2013. The principal methodology used in the
enhanced rating was State Aid Intercept Programs and Financings:
Pre and Post Default published in July 2013.


* Fitch Says U.S. Auto ABS Losses Rise as 'Softer Fall' Approaches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Losses on both prime and subprime U.S. auto ABS rose in July
following lows seen earlier in the spring, according to Fitch
Ratings.

Despite the increase, used vehicle values have stayed strong in
the past two months. Additionally, overall asset performance
remains strong heading into the softer fall months thanks to the
healthy wholesale vehicle market and slowly improving economic
factors. That said, some leveling off of performance is in store.

Auto ABS losses are likely to increase as the seasonally weak fall
progresses. Dealers will begin discounting existing 2013 models to
make way for new 2014 models, which typically impacts loss
severity and drives loss rates higher.

In the prime sector, 60+ days delinquencies rose 10% to 0.33% in
July month-over-month (MOM). However, delinquencies are still 13%
lower compared to July 2012.

Prime annualized net losses (ANL) were at 0.31% in July up from
0.21% in June. Even with the larger than normal increase, loss
rates are still very low historically and in line with July 2012.
Prime cumulative net losses (CNL) were at a record low in July at
0.27%, and were 25% lower YOY.

The improving economy and housing market, along with increased
construction, has led to rising new and used vehicle sales
(trucks, in particular) and solid demand for automobiles
supporting asset values.

The Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index was up for the second
consecutive month in July, at 120.9 marking a 1% increase from
119.7 in June. This is the third highest level recorded in July
since 1995 (the highest was 125.9 in July 2011).

Subprime 60+ day delinquencies rose to 3.13% in July from 2.90% in
June. This represents an almost 8% MOM increase, though virtually
unchanged YOY. Subprime ANL increased to 4.45% in July, up 17%
versus June but 6% improved YOY.

The outlook for asset performance is stable in 2013 while the
rating outlook is positive. Fitch upgraded 19 outstanding classes
of prime auto ABS notes in 2013 year-to-date, compared to 23
upgrades issued in 2012 during the same period.

Fitch's prime and subprime auto ABS indices are comprised of $67.7
billion of outstanding notes issued from 125 outstanding
transactions. Of this amount, 69% comprise prime auto loan ABS and
the remaining 31% subprime ABS.


* Moody's Says US Commercial Property Market Held Steady in 2Q
--------------------------------------------------------------
The major US property markets were broadly stable in second-
quarter 2013, consistent with the generally slow pace of both
construction and absorption, the supply and demand components of
real estate, according to "CMBS: Red -- Yellow -- Green Update
Second-Quarter 2013 Assessment of US Property Markets" from
Moody's Investors Service.

"While overall levels of construction and absorption remained
modest, construction activity is becoming a concern in a few
multifamily and hotel markets," said Moody's Vice President -
Senior Credit Officer Keith Banhazl.

Moody's Red-Yellow-Green report scores commercial real estate
markets on a scale of 0 (weak) to 100 (strong) and describes them
by traffic light colors, with scores of 0-33 identified as Red,
34-66 as Yellow, and 67-100 as Green. The latest report reflects
data from the first quarter of 2013.

The overall composite score remained Green 68 for the second
consecutive quarter.

Multifamily remained at Green 81, the highest-scoring sector.
However, supply exceeded demand for the seventh consecutive
quarter and is running at pre-crisis levels. Moody's expects
supply to exceed demand in Austin by 4.9% and in Raleigh, by 3.1%,
causing Austin's score to slip to Red 15 and Raleigh's to fall to
Yellow 40. Austin is the first red multifamily market since third-
quarter 2010.

Slower revenue per available room (RevPAR) growth and a growing
supply pipeline resulted in declining scores for both full-service
hotel, which fell to Yellow 64 from Green 67, and limited-service
hotel, which slipped to Green 71 from Green 72. New York full-
service hotel's high level of construction, at 7.5% of existing
inventory, resulted in its score falling Yellow 36 from Yellow 47.

Among the other highlights in the report:

- Suburban office increased by three points to Yellow 56. The
   16.9% vacancy rate is the sector's lowest since second-quarter
   2009.

- CBD (central business district) office, at Green 68, was
   stable and still leads suburban office by a considerable
   margin.

- Retail, at Green 67, returned to green territory for the first
   time since fourth-quarter 2008. Vacancy improved for the fifth
   consecutive quarter, to 12.5% from 12.8%.

- The industrial score inched up one point to Yellow 66.
   Industrial vacancy improved 0.5% from the previous quarter to
   12.3%.

Metropolitan Market Analysis:

List of the scores of the top 10 cities found most frequently in
CMBS based on dollar volume, with the previous quarter's scores in
parentheses:

New York: 72 (73)

Los Angeles: 77 (78)

Washington, DC: 64 (61)

Chicago: 60 (62)

Miami: 74 (76)

Dallas: 60 (58)

Philadelphia: 59 (63)

Phoenix: 54 (50)

Houston: 68 (67)

Boston: 68 (66)

The five-highest scoring markets in the US:

Honolulu: 80 (81)

San Francisco: 78 (78)

Los Angeles: 77 (78)

Salt Lake City: 75 (73)

Orange County: 75 (72)

The five-lowest scoring markets in the US:

Trenton: 44 (44)

Detroit: 48 (49)

Phoenix: 54 (50)

Memphis: 54 (58 )

Las Vegas: 55 (52)


* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Belmont's Tax Allocation Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1 rating of the
Successor Agency to the City of Belmont Redevelopment Agency's
(CA) Area Senior Tax Allocation Bonds, Series 1999A and Area
Subordinate Tax Allocation Bonds, Series 1999B. The bonds are
secured by a pledge of tax increment revenues from the agency's
redevelopment project area. For purposes of this analysis, the
cash flow is consistent with the tax revenue allocation process
under AB 1x26 notwithstanding the original indenture that
prescribes the Series 1999B bonds as subordinate to both the
senior lien debt service and to pass-through payments to local
school districts.

Rating Rationale:

The confirmation at Ba1 reflects the small project area and weak
coverage ratios net of all pass-through obligations. The rating
also considers the increasing incremental AV of the project area
with only one year of decline in 2011 and the relatively diverse
taxpayers. The city also has a very strong socioeconomic profile
that was considered in the current rating. The project area is
smaller than its standard threshold of 1,000 acres at 560 acres,
though Moody's notes the diverse use of the project area. The
project area's coverage of both senior and subordinate bonds, net
of all pass-through payments, for the first payment period in
calendar year 2013 is a strong 6.1 times, though falls to a weak
1.2 times in the second payment period for the same calendar year
when principal and interest payments are made. These coverage
ratios are expected through maturity of the bonds in 2029. Moody's
holds the expectation of 2.0 times coverage in each payment period
for the rating to be Baa3 or higher. The project area's AV has
increased in value with only one 4.1% decline in 2011 and should
continue to increase in value in the near-term. Taxpayer
concentration is also somewhat diverse at 31.0% of incremental
2013 AV. The total AV to incremental AV is healthy at 87.1% in
fiscal 2013. The city's wealth indicators are very strong and
support the credit quality of the bonds. Importantly, however, is
the state legislature's willingness to modify the cash flows
available for bond debt service as a considerable source of
uncertainty and a major factor for not placing the rating in the A
category.

Under AB X1 26 and AB 1484, the statutes that dissolved all
California redevelopment agencies, tax increment revenue is placed
in trust with the County auditor, who makes semi-annual
distributions of funds sufficient to pay debt service on tax
allocation bonds, including other obligations.

Strengths:

- Strong first payment period debt service coverage

- Assessed value expected to increase

Challenges:

- Small size of the former project area

- Below 2x coverage in the second payment period

What could move the rating UP

- Significant and sustained increase in assessed valuation

- Increased debt service coverage in the second payment period

What could move the rating DOWN

- Erosion of semi-annual debt service coverage

- Protracted assessed value decline

Rating Methodology:

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Analytic
Approach To Rating California Tax Allocation Bonds published in
December 2003.


* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating for Glendale's Tax Allocation Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1 rating of the
Successor Agency to the City of Glendale Redevelopment Agency's
(CA) 2002 Tax Allocation Bonds (TABs), 2003 Tax Allocation Bonds,
and 2010 Tax Allocation Bonds. The bonds are secured by a pledge
of tax increment revenues from the agency's redevelopment project
area.

Ratings Rationale:

The confirmation at Ba1 reflects the small project area, average
city socioeconomic indicators, somewhat concentrated taxpayers of
incremental assessed valuation (AV), and very strong total project
area AV to incremental AV. The rating also incorporates the
relatively average debt service coverage level on a semiannual
basis. The project area's coverage for the first payment period in
calendar year 2013 is a strong 5.1 times, though falls to a
somewhat weak 1.4 times in the second payment period for the same
calendar year. These coverage ratios are expected through maturity
of the bonds in 2021. The project area is smaller than our
standard threshold of 1,000 acres at 263 acres, though this
weakness is offset by the tax base being the city's central
commercial and retail corridor. The project area's AV has declined
minimal amounts over the last two fiscal years and we expect AV to
increase in value in the near-term. The city's wealth indicators
are comparable to national averages. Taxpayer concentration is
also somewhat high at 59.0% of incremental 2013 AV. The total AV
to incremental AV is strong at 97.1% in fiscal 2013. Importantly,
however, is the state legislature's willingness to modify the cash
flows available for bond debt service as a considerable source of
uncertainty and a major factor for not placing the rating in the A
category.

Under AB X1 26 and AB 1484, the statutes that dissolved all
California redevelopment agencies, tax increment revenue is placed
in trust with the County auditor, who makes semi-annual
distributions of funds sufficient to pay debt service on tax
allocation bonds, including other obligations.

Strengths:

- Strong first payment period debt service coverage

- Assessed value expected to increase

Challenges:

- Small size of the former project area

- Below 2x coverage in the second payment period

- Somewhat concentrated taxpayers

What could move the rating-UP

- Significant and sustained increase in assessed valuation

- Increased debt service coverage in the second payment period

What could move the rating-DOWN

- Erosion of semi-annual debt service coverage

- Protracted assessed value decline

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Analytic
Approach To Rating California Tax Allocation Bonds published in
December 2003.


* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on La Habra's Tax Allocation Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed at Ba1 the rating of the
Successor Agency to the City of La Habra Redevelopment Agency's
(CA) Tax Allocation Bonds (TABs), Series 2000. The bonds are
secured by a pledge of tax increment revenues from the agency's
redevelopment project area.

Rating Rationale:

The confirmation at Ba1 reflects the small project area, average
city socioeconomic indicators, concentrated taxpayers of
incremental assessed valuation (AV), and weak total AV to
incremental AV. The rating also incorporates the strong debt
service coverage level on a semiannual basis. The project area's
coverage for the first payment period in calendar year 2013 is a
strong 5.3 times and 2.5 times in the second payment period for
the same calendar year. These coverage ratios are expected through
maturity of the bonds in 2032. The project area is smaller than
Moody's standard threshold of 1,000 acres at 400 acres, though
this weakness is offset by the tax base being used for mixed
commercial and residential uses and the strong historic AV growth.
Moody's expects the area's AV to increase in value in the near-
term. The city's wealth indicators are comparable to national
averages and have remained stable as of 2010 census estimates. The
area has high taxpayer concentration at 89.0% of incremental 2013
AV and this high concentration limits the credit strength of the
area. Total AV as a percentage of incremental AV is somewhat weak
at 62.3% in fiscal 2013, below Moody's threshold of 80%.
Importantly, however, is the state legislature's willingness to
modify the cash flows available for bond debt service as a
considerable source of uncertainty and a major factor for not
placing the rating in the A category.

Strengths:

- Strong debt service coverage in the first payment period

- Assessed value expected to increase

Challenges:

- Small size of the former project area

- Concentrated taxpayers

- Low total AV to incremental AV

What could move the rating-UP

- Significant and sustained increase in assessed valuation

- Increased diversity of the largest taxpayers

- Growth in the total project area AV to incremental AV

What could move the rating-DOWN

- Erosion of semi-annual debt service coverage

- Protracted assessed value decline

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Analytic
Approach To Rating California Tax Allocation Bonds published in
December 2003.


* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Lemoore's Tax Allocation Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1 rating on the
Successor Agency to the Lemoore Redevelopment Agency's 1998 Tax
Allocation Bonds.

Rating Rationale:

The Ba1 rating reflects the relatively large size of the project
area, both in acreage and assessed value (AV), strong increment to
total AV ratio that minimizes revenue volatility, average income
levels and relatively strong debt service coverage levels. The
very high tax payer concentration, in the largest tax payer and
the ten largest tax payers, weighs very heavily on the rating. The
bonds were previously on review for downgrade.

Under AB X1 26 and AB 1484, the statutes that dissolved all
California redevelopment agencies, tax increment revenue is placed
in trust with the County auditor, who makes semi-annual
distributions of funds sufficient to pay debt service on tax
allocation bonds, including other obligations. Moody's debt
service calculations generally include all of the agency's
outstanding tax allocation bonds, (TAB), which include non-housing
and housing portions.

Key Strengths:

Strong coverage on annual basis

Strong incremental AV to total AV

Large sized acreage

Average Income levels

Key Challenge:

Very high tax payer concentration

What could move the rating-UP

- Significant and sustained increase in assessed valuation

- Lower tax payer concentration

What could move the rating-DOWN

- Erosion of semi-annual debt service coverage

- Protracted assessed value decline

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Analytic
Approach To Rating California Tax Allocation Bonds published in
December 2003.


* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating for San Juan Capistrano's TABs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1 rating on the
former San Juan Capistrano Community Redevelopment Agency's 1998
Tax Allocation Bonds.

Rating Rationale:

The Ba1 rating reflects the relatively large size of the project
area, strong increment to total assessed value (AV) ratio that
minimizes revenue volatility, the moderate taxpayer concentration
and above average wealth levels. The moderate size of the
incremental AV and the relatively narrow aggregate debt service
coverage level on a semiannual basis, somewhat offset these
favorable factors. The bonds were previously on review for
downgrade.

Under AB X1 26 and AB 1484, the statutes that dissolved all
California redevelopment agencies, tax increment revenue is placed
in trust with the County auditor, who makes semi-annual
distributions of funds sufficient to pay debt service on tax
allocation bonds, including other obligations.

Key Strengths:

-- Strong coverage on annual basis

-- Strong incremental AV to total AV ratio

-- Large size of project area by acreage

-- Strong local economic indictors

Key Challenge:

-- Semi Annual Coverage of only 1.4x in the near term

What could move the rating-UP

- Significant and sustained increase in assessed valuation

What could move the rating-DOWN

- Erosion of semi-annual debt service coverage

- Protracted assessed value decline

- Sizable ongoing population decline

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Analytic
Approach To Rating California Tax Allocation Bonds published in
December 2003.


* Moody's Reviews Ratings on 18 Deals Exposed to U.S. Banks
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review the ratings of
structured finance securities directly exposed to the credit
quality of certain US banks, on which Moody's took rating actions
on August 22, 2013. These rating actions affect 32 tranches in 18
deals, including 15 structured notes, 1 CLO repack, and 2
CLOs/CDOs in the US.

Ratings Rationale:

The reason for Moody's actions is the linkage between the ratings
of the structured finance securities and those of the banks. This
linkage is due to the direct exposure of the structured finance
securities to the credit quality of certain US banks, each of
which acts as either the guarantor of the securities or the issuer
of collateral securities in the transaction. Because of the
linkage, each rating is essentially a pass-through of the bank's
rating. Each related underlying security, guarantor or reference
entity is detailed in the link at the beginning of this
announcement.

Moody's notes that these transactions are subject to a high level
of macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy.

Moody's conducted no cash flow analysis or stress scenarios
because each rating is a pass-through of the rating of the
underlying entity.

The affected ratings can be accessed at http://is.gd/W628Ki


* Moody's Takes Action on 28 RMBS Tranches Issued from 2005-2008
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 14
tranches and upgraded 14 tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS
loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers from 2005 to 2008.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-16

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-2

Cl. IIIA-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-IO, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-4

Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. IA-8, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-6

Cl. IA-9, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2008-1

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-1

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IA-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-6

Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-7

Cl. IA-7, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2006-2

Cl. IA-11, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. IA-12, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2006-3

Cl. IA-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. IA-12, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. IA-13, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. IA-17, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. IA-18, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. IIA-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The bonds that were downgraded reflect deterioration in
collateral performance. The bonds that were upgraded are a result
of improving performance of the related pools and/or faster pay-
down of the bonds due to high prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $1.5-Bil. of RMBS Issued 2004 to 2007
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
and confirmed the ratings of 18 tranches from 10 transactions
backed by Alt-A/Option ARM loans, issued by Countrywide and MASTR.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-3

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-IM1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OA14

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OA3

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OA7

Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OA8

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-OA3

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-OA8

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-7

Cl. 6-M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 6-M-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2006-OA1

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are primarily a result of the recent performance of
the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on the pools.

The actions also reflect the correction of errors in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by
Moody's in rating these transactions, specifically in how the
model handles interest allocation for these transactions. The cash
flow models used in the past rating actions had incorrectly used a
separate interest waterfall. However, the pooling and servicing
agreements for these transactions provide that all collected
principal and interest is commingled into one payment waterfall to
pay all promised interest due on bonds first, then to pay
scheduled principal. Due to the discovery of these errors, these
tranches were placed on watch on May 14, 2013. The errors have
been corrected and these rating actions reflect these changes.

The downgrade on Class 6-M-1 from MASTR adjustable rate mortgage
trust 2004-7 is due to the presence of unrecovered interest
shortfall.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $522MM of Alt-A RMBS From 5 Issuers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five
tranches and confirmed the ratings of seven tranches backed by
Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by five RMBS transactions

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2007-B Trust

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2007-D Trust

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-AC3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2012 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2004-1

Cl. I-A, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. II-A, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

These actions reflect recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. These rating
actions consist of seven confirmations, and five upgrades. The
upgrades are due to an increase in the credit enhancement
available to the bonds.

The actions also reflect the correction of an error in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by
Moody's in rating these transactions, specifically in how the
models handle principal and interest allocation. The cash flow
models used in past rating actions incorrectly used separate
interest and principal waterfalls. However, the pooling and
servicing agreements for these transactions provide that all
collected principal and interest is commingled into one payment
waterfall to pay all promised interest due on bonds first, and
then to pay scheduled principal. Due to the discovery of this
error, eleven of the tranches that are part of these rating
actions were placed on review on May 14, 2013. The errors have
been corrected, and these rating actions take into account the
correct interest and principal waterfall.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Eyes Upgrades for Ten LEAF Receivables Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed on review for upgrade ten subordinate
securities from the LEAF Receivables Funding LLC, Series 2011-2
and 2012-1. The transactions are securitizations of small-ticket
equipment leases originated and serviced by LEAF Commercial
Capital, Inc.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 7, LLC, Series 2011-2

Cl. B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Nov 2, 2011 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Nov 2, 2011 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Nov 2, 2011 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Nov 2, 2011 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E-2, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Nov 2, 2011 Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Issuer: Leaf Receivables Funding 8, LLC, Series 2012-1

Class B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 25, 2012 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 25, 2012 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 25, 2012 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class E-1, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 25, 2012 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Class E-2, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 25, 2012 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The reviews were prompted by a reduction in lifetime net loss
expectations for the underlying collateral pool as a result of
stronger performance than initially expected. Moody's expects the
collateral pools to incur lifetime cumulative net losses between
1.50% and 2.00% and between 2.00% and 2.50% of initial pool
balance for the 2011-2 and 2012-1 transactions respectively. This
is lower than the original expectation of 4.25% and 4.00% for the
2011-2 and the 2012-1 transactions respectively. The review is
also based on the buildup of credit enhancement due to the
sequential pay structure and non-declining reserve account. Credit
enhancement available to the securities includes
overcollateralization, non-declining reserve accounts and excess
spread.

Key performance metrics (as of July 2013 distribution date) and
credit assumptions for each affected transaction. The credit
assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime CNL expectation
which is expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance.
Performance metrics include pool factor which is the ratio of the
current collateral balance and the original collateral balance at
closing; total hard credit enhancement (expressed as a percentage
of the outstanding collateral pool balance) which typically
consists of subordination, overcollateralization, and reserve fund
as applicable.

Issuer - LEAF Receivables Funding 7, LLC, Series 2011-2

Lifetime CNL expectation --1.50% - 2.00%

Pool factor -- Approximately 51.38%

Total Hard credit enhancement -- Cl. A - 52.26%, Cl. B - 42.82%,
Cl. C - 30.75%, Cl. D - 25.30%, Cl. E1 -- 17.91%, Cl. E2 -- 12.07%

Issuer - Leaf Receivables Funding 8, LLC, Series 2012-1

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 2.00% - 2.50%

Pool factor -- Approximately 76.49%

Total Hard credit enhancement -- Cl. A - 32.91%, Cl. B - 27.94%,
Cl. C - 19.90%, Cl. D - 16.63%, Cl. E1 -- 12.12%, Cl. E2 -- 8.59%

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by Equipment Leases and
Loans" published in March 2007.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions.

The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on
an assessment of a range of factors including, but not
exclusively, the performance metrics. Primary sources of
assumption uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment
and health of the transportation and construction sectors which
represent the largest concentrations in this transaction. Overall,
Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's
largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated
fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.


* Moody's Takes Action on 2005-2006 RMBS Tranches From 21 Issuers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 43 tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche from 21 transactions
backed by subprime RMBS loans, issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE5

Cl. M3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Confirmed
at C (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE7

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-2

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1A2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 2A2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Confirmed
at A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-NC2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC5

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Confirmed at A3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-WMC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2012
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-CTX1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-10

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-6

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-HE1

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or building credit enhancement on the bonds.
The class M-3 of Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC5
was downgraded primarily as a result of a small existing interest
shortfall on the tranche.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.2%
in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $310MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2003-04
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 42
tranches, upgraded the ratings of six tranches and confirmed the
ratings of eight tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued
by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HYB3

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-7

Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19,
2013 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B3 on
May 21, 2013, Outlook Positive)

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-13, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-16, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-17, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-21, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-22, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-8

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-19, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-20, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-34, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-35, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-36, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-38, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-39, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-40, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-41, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-42, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-43, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-47, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-1

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-5

Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-7

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR1

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR6

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-J9

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J2

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J5

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-10

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1A8, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1A11, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1A12, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2A1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2A2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9

Cl. 5A6, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, the downgrades reflect the exposure of the
affected bonds to tail risk due to the pro-rata pay nature of the
transactions.

In addition, Moody's is correcting the rating history and
withdrawing the rating for Class III-A-2 from First Horizon
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR6. This tranche is an Interest
Only tranche with a maturity date of August 31, 2011 that was
incorrectly placed on review in the June 19, 2013 rating action
addressing tail risk in RMBS Shifting Interest/Pro-rata deals.
Moody's has now withdrawn the A1 (sf) rating as of August 31, 2011
because the obligation is not outstanding and removed from the
rating history the June 19, 2013 A1 (sf) On Watch for Possible
Downgrade and April 18, 2012 Upgrade to A1 (sf).

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

Subject to the results of a stress scenario analysis, Moody's caps
the ratings of bonds exposed to tail-end risk to A3 (sf) or below,
unless the bonds are expected to pay off within a year or are
expected to pay off well before the underlying pool is expected to
be small pool (100 loans).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Ups Rating on $152MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches backed by subprime RMBS loans, issued by Bear Stearns,
Citigroup and Fremont.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2012
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE1

Cl. A-1D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Confirmed
at A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-D

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
The upgrades are due to improvement in collateral performance,
and/ or build-up in credit enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in July 2012 to 7.4% in July 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 59 Classes from 43 US RMBS Deals to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
on 59 classes from 43 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions.  In addition, Standard & Poor's placed its
ratings on 22 classes from 18 additional U.S. RMBS transactions on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades reflects S&P's assessment of the interest
shortfalls on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.  The lowered ratings also reflect S&P's view of the
magnitude of the interest payment deficiencies (compared with the
remaining principal balance owed) that have affected the classes
to date and the likelihood that certificateholders will be
reimbursed for these deficiencies.

The CreditWatch placements reflect S&P's assessment of potential
interest shortfalls on the affected classes in recent remittance
periods being reported by the trustee that would likely negatively
affect those ratings.  Standard & Poor's is in the process of
verifying these possible interest shortfalls and, upon
confirmation of the reported data, will adjust the ratings as S&P
considers appropriate according to its criteria.

The transactions reviewed are supported by mixed collateral of
fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage loans.  A combination of
subordination, excess spread, and overcollateralization (where
applicable) provide credit enhancement for all of the transactions
in this review.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* S&P Lowers 257 Ratings on 173 U.S. RMBS to 'D(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on 257 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 173 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2009.

The downgrades reflect S&P's  assessment of the principal write-
downs' effect on these classes during recent remittance periods.
Prior to the rating actions, S&P rated all classes in this review
'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)'.

Approximately 66.54% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A (Alt-A) or prime jumbo
mortgage loan collateral.  The 257 defaulted classes consist of
the following:

   -- 96 classes from prime jumbo transactions (37.35% of all
      defaults);

   -- 75 classes from Alt-A transactions (29.18%);

   -- 58 from subprime transactions (22.57%);

   -- 12 from RMBS negative amortization transactions (4.67%);

   -- Eight from resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit (re-REMIC) transactions;

   -- Five from reperforming transactions;

   -- One from a document-deficient transaction;

   -- One from Federal Housing Administration/Veterans Affairs;
      And

   -- One from an outside-the-guidelines transaction.

A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable) provide credit
enhancement for all of the transactions in this review.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities that experience principal write-downs, and it will
adjust its ratings as it considers appropriate according to its
criteria.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* S&P Hikes Rating on 23 Classes From 20 CDO Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on 23
tranches from 20 corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions and removed them from CreditWatch
with positive implications.  S&P lowered its ratings on two
tranches from two synthetic CUSIP commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS)-backed CDO transactions and removed these
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also
placed its ratings on nine tranches from nine corporate-backed
synthetic CDO transactions on CreditWatch with positive
implications and placed two tranches from one synthetic CUSIP CMBS
CDO transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating actions follows S&P's monthly review of synthetic CDO
transactions.  The CreditWatch positive placements and upgrades
reflect the transactions' seasoning, the rating stability of the
obligors in the underlying reference portfolios over the past few
months, and the synthetic rated overcollateralization (SROC)
ratios, which had risen above 100% at the next-highest rating
level.  The CreditWatch negative placements reflect the underlying
reference portfolio's deterioration, which caused the SROC ratio
to fall below 100% at the current rating level.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Archstone Synthetic CDO II SPC
EUR7.5 million, JPY5.5 bil, US$115 million Archstone Synthetic CDO
II SPC
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
D-2                 AA (sf)               AA- (sf)/Watch Pos

Corsair (Jersey) No. 4 Ltd.
US$4 bil Corsair (Jersey) No. 4 Ltd. series 10 partial credit loss
protected
step-down portfolio US$40 million credit-linked notes due 2027
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Nts                 BBB- (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Galena CDO II (Ireland) PLC
US$20 million class A-1U10-B floating-rate secured portfolio
credit-linked
notes due 2017
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1U10-B            BB- (sf)              B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
US$100 million series 6 sub-class A1A-$LMS notes due 2014
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A1A-$LMS            AA+ (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Pos

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
US$96 million series 2
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A3-$FMS             BB+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos
A3-$LMS             BB+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos
A3A-$FMS            BB+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos
A3B-$LMS            BB+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Infiniti SPC Ltd.
US$20 million Infiniti SPC Ltd. acting on behalf of and for the
account of the
Potomac Synthetic CDO 2007-2 Segregated Portfolio series 10A-2
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
10A-2               BBB (sf)              BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Infinity SPC Ltd.
US$25 million class B floating-rate notes (CPORTS POTOMAC 2007-1)
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   BB- (sf)              B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Lorally CDO Ltd. Series 2006-2
JPY2.5 billion Lorally CDO Ltd. series 2006-2
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
2006-2              AAA (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Pos

Lorally CDO Ltd. Series 2006-4
JPY8.2 billion Lorally CDO Ltd. series 2006-4
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
2006-4              AAA (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Pos

Marvel Finance 2007-3 LLC
US$112 million Marvel Finance 2007-3 LLC
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
IA                  BB (sf)               BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
US$410 million Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2006-27
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   BB+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
US$75 million Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2006-35
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
I                   B+ (sf)               B (sf)/Watch Pos

PARCS Master Trust
US$2 million PARCS Master Trust Class 2007-6 Calvados (fixed
recovery) Units
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Trust unit          BB (sf)               B- (sf)/Watch Pos

PARCS-R Master Trust
US$228.15 million PARCS-R Master Trust series 2007-12
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Trust unit          BBB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

Repacs Trust Series 2007 Rigi Debt Units
US$25 million Repacs Trust series 2007 rigi debt units
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Debt units          BB- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
JPY200 million Maple Hill II Managed Synthetic CDO series 2007-16
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
B2-J2               B (sf)                B- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
US$10 million Maple Hill II Managed Synthetic CDO series 2007-28

              Rating
Class               To                    From
A4-D4               B (sf)                B- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
US$20 million STARTS (Cayman) Ltd. 2006-5
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A2-D2               A+ (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Pos

Strata Trust, Series 2007-5
US$3 million Strata Trust series 2007-5
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Nts                 BB- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Pos

Strata Trust, Series 2007-7
US$10 million Strata Trust series 2007-7
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Nts                 BBB- (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS LOWERED

Credit Default Swap
US$1 billion Credit Default Swap - CRA600016
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Swap                Asrp (sf)             A+srp (sf)/Watch Neg

Credit Default Swap
US$1 billion Credit Default Swap - CRA600036
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Swap                Asrp (sf)             A+srp (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Capstan Master Trust
US$150 million Capstan Master Trust series 1
                            Rating
                    To                    From
                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

Capstan Master Trust
US$150 million Capstan Master Trust series 2
                            Rating
                    To                    From
                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

Capstan Master Trust
US$150 million Capstan Master Trust series 3
                            Rating
                    To                    From
                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

Capstan Master Trust
US$150 million Capstan Master Trust series 4
                            Rating
                     To                    From
                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

Infiniti SPC Ltd.
US$31 million Infiniti SPC Ltd. acting on behalf of and for the
account of the
Potomac Synthetic CDO 2007-1 segregated portfolio 10B-1
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
10B-1               B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Mt. Kailash Series II
JPY3 billion Mt. Kailash series II
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
Cr Link Ln          B- (sf)/Watch Pos     B- (sf)

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
AUD6 million Maple Hill II Managed Synthetic CDO series 2007-18
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
B1-A1               B- (sf)/Watch Pos     B- (sf)

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
US$10 million STARTS (Cayman) Ltd. Series 2006-8
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
C1-D1               CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
US$60 million Maple Hill II Managed Synthetic CDO series 2007-29
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
B3-D3               B- (sf)/Watch Pos     B- (sf)

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Pegasus 2007-1 Ltd.
US$113.4 million Pegasus 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A1                  CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg   CCC+ (sf)
A2                  CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg   CCC+ (sf)



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


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