TCR_Public/130721.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 21, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 200

                            Headlines

ACAS BUSINESS: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'B'
ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Confirms #22-Mil. Facility at 'BB'
APIDOS CLO XIV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-MIB1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class K Certs to C
BANC OF AMERICA 2008-1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 23 Classes

BEAR STEARNS 1999-C1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. H Certs to Ba2
BEAR STEARNS 2001-TOP2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class G Certs.
BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR6: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. P Certs to 'C'
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP26: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to 'D'
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: DBRS Cuts Rating on 2 Secs. to 'D(sf)'

BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
C-BASS CBO X: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Class C & D Certs.
CASTLE TRUST 2003-2: Aircraft Sale No Impact on Moody's Ratings
CGBAM COMMERCIAL 2013-BREH: DBRS Rates Class E Certs 'BB(low)'
CGBAM COMMERCIAL 2013-BREH: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba3'

COMM 2001-J2: S&P Affirms 'B-(sf)' Rating on Class G Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 1999-C1: Fitch Affirms C Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
CREDIT SUISSE 2001-CK3: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP5: Fitch Cuts $5.9MM Class K Certs to 'C'
CWCAPITAL COBALT: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 7 Note Classes

DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Securities
DLJ COMMERCIAL 2000-CKP1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
FLAGSHIP CLO IV: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on $13.2MM Cl. D Notes
FLATIRON CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
FORTRESS CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

GALLATIN CLO V: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
GENERAL ELECTRIC 2003-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. H Certs
GLOBAL LEVERAGED: S&P Raises Rating on Class E-1 Notes to 'B+'
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class O Certs
GOLDMAN SACHS 2006-GG8: Moody's Keeps Rating Over Rights Transfer

GS MORTGAGE 2007-EOP: Fitch Keeps B- Rating on $534MM Cl. L Certs
HALCYON LOAN 2013-2: Moody's Rates $22.25MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
HEWETT'S ISLAND III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. D Notes to B2
JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC9: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class F Certs.
JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC4: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class E Certs.

JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class K Notes
JP MORGAN 2007-FL1: Rights Transfer No Impact on Moody's Ratings
JP MORGAN 2012-HSBC: DBRS Rates Class E Securities 'BB(high)(sf)'
JP MORGAN 2013-C13: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
JUBILEE CLO 2013-X: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2000-C3: Moody's Takes Action on 3 CMBS Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. L Certs
LEHMAN 2006-LLF: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. X-FLP Certs
METROCAT RE: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Class A Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2007-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class G Certs.

MINCS-CENTURION V: Fitch Cuts Rating on $7MM Secured Notes to 'D'
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C3: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 Classes
NACM CLO I: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
NATIXIS 2007-HE2: Moody's Retains Ratings on Computershare Appt.
NEWCASTLE CDO V: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class V Notes

NRP MORTGAGE 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B4 Notes
OFSI FUND III: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'Ba2'
OHA LOAN 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
OMI TRUST 2001-D: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Certs to 'D'
PACIFICA CDO VI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba3'

PASADENA CDO: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class C Notes
PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER 1997: Loan Sale No Impact on Moody's Ratings
PHOENIX CLO III: Moody's Affirms Ba2, B1 Rating on 2 Note Classes
RACE POINT VIII: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
RAIT CRE: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'CC'

RFC CDO 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 10 Cert. Classes
RFC CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 9 Note Classes
RFMSI 2005-SA1: Moody's Takes Action on Three RMBS Classes
SALOMON BROTHERS VII: Moody's Keeps 'C' Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
SARGAS CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+'

SDART 2013-4: Moody's Assigns 'Ba'2 Rating to Class E Notes
SDART 2013-4: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class E Notes
SIERRA TIMESHARE 2011-2: Fitch Rates Class C Notes 'BBsf'
SIERRA TIMESHARE 2013-2: Fitch to Rate $28MM Class C Notes at 'BB'
SIERRA TIMESHARE 2013-2: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. C Notes

SLM STUDENT 2004-1: Fitch Hikes Subordinate Notes Rating From 'BB'
SLM STUDENT 2004-5: Fitch Hikes Subordinate Note Rating From 'BB'
TELOS CLO 2013-3: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
THORNBURG MORTGAGE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on $397MM of RMBS
TRADEWYND RE 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating on $125MM Notes

US EDUCATION III: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Student Loans to Ba1
US EDUCATION IV: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Student Loan Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C18: Moody's Keeps C Rating on 5 Cert. Classes
WELLS FARGO 2008-AR2: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 RMBS Deals to B2
WELLS FARGO 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class G Certs

WHITE KNIGHT: DBRS Hikes Floating Rate Notes From 'BB'

* Fitch Says REO Sales Drive U.S. CMBS Delinquency Rate Lower
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 106 U.S. RMBS Deals
* Moody's Takes Action on $919MM of Subprime RMBS Issued by RFC
* Moody's Hikes Ratings on $1.3 Billion of 40 Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $917MM Subprime RMBS of Various Issuers

* Moody's Takes Action on $144 Million of Resecuritized RMBS
* Moody's Lifts Ratings on $384MM of Subprime RMBS from 2005-2006
* Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 192 CLO Tranches After Prepayments
* Moody's Takes Action on 21 RMBS Tranches from Various Issuers
* Moody's Lowers Ratings on 16 Manufactured Housing RMBS Tranches

* S&P Puts 59 Ratings on First Marblehead Trusts on Watch Negative
* S&P Lowers 7 Ratings from 3 U.S. CMBS Transactions to 'D'


                            *********

ACAS BUSINESS: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class of notes issued by ACAS
Business Loan Trust 2006-1 (ACAS BLT 2006-1) as follows:

-- $26,938,722 class D notes to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf', assigned
   Stable Outlook.

The upgrade reflects the increased credit enhancement for the
class D notes. Approximately $105 million of the rated notes have
paid down since July 2012. As of the May 2013 payment date,
approximately 24.0% of the original class D note balance have paid
down, driven by loan prepayments and the excess spread used to pay
down the additional payment amount (APA).

According to the May 2013 trustee report, the portfolio is highly
concentrated with four obligors, composed entirely of low-rated
second-lien loans or subordinated loans, which indicate low
recovery prospects upon default. Approximately $22 million of
interest and principal proceeds has been received since May, which
will be used towards the payment of senior expenses, class D
interest and principal redemption on the next payment date in
August. As a result, three obligors, totaling approximately $37.75
million, remain in the current performing portfolio.

The class D notes of ACAS BLT 2006-1 benefit from credit
enhancement in the form of collateral coverage, note
subordination, and the application of excess spread via the APA.
Upon the occurrence of a default in the portfolio, the APA feature
directs part or all of the excess interest otherwise available to
the equity to pay down the senior-most notes in an amount equal to
the aggregate balance of defaulted assets in the portfolio. Since
Fitch's review in July 2012, approximately $45.3 million of excess
spread has been used to pay down the rated notes. The APA stands
at approximately $22.5 million after the May 2013 payment date,
compared to $53.1 million in May 2012.

Because of the few obligors remaining in the portfolio, the
Portfolio Credit Model was not used to project future default and
recovery levels for the portfolio as described in the report
'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs.' Instead, a
deterministic analysis showed that the class D notes can withstand
the default and the total loss of all three performing obligors
under 'Bsf' and 'BBsf' stresses since Fitch expects recoveries
from defaulted collateral to provide sufficient credit support to
the notes. The deterministic analysis also excludes the benefit
provided by excess spread. The upgrade, however, was capped at
'Bsf' due to the notes' reliance on low-rated ('B' and below) and
defaulted collateral.

ACAS BLT 2006-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on July 28, 2006 and is managed and serviced by American
Capital Strategies, Ltd (ACAS). ACAS BLT 2006-1 is secured by a
portfolio of middle-market loans, which are not publicly rated.
Fitch establishes model-based credit opinions for the performing
loans, based on information gathered from financial statements
provided to Fitch by ACAS.


ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Confirms #22-Mil. Facility at 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has confirmed the rating of R-1 (high) (sf) for the
Commercial Paper ("CP") issued by Alpine Securitization Corp.
("Alpine"), an asset-backed commercial paper ("ABCP") vehicle
administered by Credit Suisse, New York branch.  In addition, DBRS
has confirmed the ratings and revised the tranche sizes of the
aggregate liquidity facilities ("the Liquidity") based on the
October 31, 2012, reported portfolio provided by Credit Suisse,
the administrator of Alpine.

The $10,440,704,460 aggregate liquidity facilities as of October
31, 2012, are tranched as follows:

* $10,130,626,455 rated AAA (sf)
* $61,955,428 rated AA (sf)
* $67,675,624 rated A (sf)
* $58,498,946 rated BBB (sf)
* $22,670,189 rated BB (sf)
* $75,884,066 rated B (sf)
* $23,393,752 unrated (sf)

The CP rating reflects the AAA credit quality of Alpine's asset
portfolio.  The updated credit quality aspect of the CP rating is
based on both the portfolio of assets and the available program-
wide credit enhancement ("PWCE").  The rationale for the CP rating
is based on the updated AAA credit quality assessment as well as
DBRS's prior and ongoing review of legal, operational and
liquidity risks associated with Alpine's overall risk profile.

The ratings assigned to the Liquidity reflect the credit quality
of Alpine's asset portfolio based on an analysis that assesses
each transaction to a term standard.  The tranche sizes are
expected to vary each month based on reported changes in portfolio
composition.

For Alpine, both the CP and the Liquidity ratings use DBRS's
simulation methodology, which was developed to analyze diverse
ABCP conduit portfolios.  This analysis uses the DBRS Diversity
Model, with adjustments to reflect the unique structure of an ABCP
conduit and its underlying assets.  DBRS determines attachment
points for risk based on an analysis of the portfolio and models
the portfolio based on key inputs such as asset ratings, asset
tenors and recovery rates.  The attachment points determine the
portion of the exposure rated AAA, AA, A through B, as well as
unrated.

DBRS models the prior (lagged) month(s) portfolio on an ongoing
basis to reflect changes in Alpine's portfolio composition and
credit quality.  The rating results are updated and posted on the
DBRS website.

The principal methodology is the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
Criteria Report: U.S. & European ABCP Conduits, which can be found
on our website under Methodologies and private Rating Methodology
for Liquidity and Program Wide Enhancement Ratings.

This credit rating has been issued outside the European Union (EU)
and may be used for regulatory purposes by financial institutions
in the EU.


APIDOS CLO XIV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Apidos
CLO XIV/Apidos CLO XIV LLC's $565.00 million floating- and fixed-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.27%-13.84%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of up to 50% of
      excess interest proceeds during the reinvestment period that
      are available before paying uncapped administrative expenses
      and fees; subordinated collateral management fees; deposits
      to the supplemental reserve account; collateral manager
      incentive fees; and subordinated note payments into
      principal proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets
      during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1644.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Apidos CLO XIV/Apidos CLO XIV LLC

Class                      Rating          Amount
                                         (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)        375.00
B-1                        AA (sf)          80.00
B-2                        AA (sf)          10.00
C-1 (deferrable)           A (sf)           11.00
C-2 (deferrable)           A (sf)           20.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)         32.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)          27.00
F (deferrable)             B (sf)           10.00
Subordinated notes         NR               52.36

NR-Not rated.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-MIB1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class K Certs to C
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class of Banc of America Large
Loan 2005-MIB1 (BALL 2005-MIB1) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects Fitch's concerns regarding the
underperformance of the remaining asset in the pool, which is
real-estate owned (REO). In addition, the most junior class, class
L, has already incurred principal losses and interest shortfalls
are affecting both outstanding classes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings on the outstanding classes are distressed and both
classes could ultimately experience losses upon disposition of the
remaining REO asset.

The transaction is collateralized by one property: The Shops at
Grand Avenue, an approximately 293,000 square foot (sf) regional
mall located in Milwaukee, WI. The collateral consists of 168,364
sf of in-line space. The property includes major tenants such as
TJ Maxx (lease expiration in March 2014) and Office Max (lease
expiration in March 2016). As of April 2013, the property reported
an overall occupancy of 80.3%, which includes temporary tenants.
The asset became REO in October 2012.

Fitch downgrades the following class:

-- $5.6 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 85%.

The $15.5 million class L remains at 'Dsf', RE 0% due to realized
losses.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J and interest-only classes
X-1A and X-4 have paid in full. Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings of interest-only classes X-1B, X-2, X-3 and X-5.


BANC OF AMERICA 2008-1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 23 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 23 classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2008-1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XW, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below investment grade P&I classes are consistent
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The rating of the IO class is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.0% of
the current balance compared to 9.2% at last review. Base expected
losses and realized losses have increased to 10.5% of the original
balance from 9.7% at last review. Moody's analysis reflects a
forward-looking view of the likely range of collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may indicate
that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker than
Moody's had anticipated during the current review. Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action. There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as
increased subordination levels due to amortization and loan
payoffs or a decline in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29 compared to 30 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated July 26, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the June 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to $1.21 billion
from $1.27 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 101 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 48%
of the pool. There is one defeased loan representing 0.1% of the
pool.

Nineteen loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $11.8 million (27% loss severity on average).
There are currently 11 loans, representing 19% of the pool. The
largest specially serviced exposure is the IBP Loan ($74.5 million
-- 6% of the pool). The loan is secured by seven office buildings
located in Carrollton and Plano, Texas. The loan represents a 73%
pari-passu interest in a $101.9 million loan. The property was 92%
leased as of March 2013 compared to 96% leased at Moody's prior
review. The loan was transferred to special servicing in February
2013 with the borrower expressing interest in a modification. The
loan is performing at this time.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Pecos I-215 II -
Sansone Pecos Loan ($23.4 million -- 2% of the pool). The loan is
secured by an office complex located 10 miles north of Las Vegas
in Henderson, Nevada. The property became real estate owned (REO)
in July 2012 and the special servicer indicated it intends to
stabilize prior to marketing it for sale.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Commonwealth
Storage Facility Loan ($22.3 million -- 2% of the pool). The loan
is secured by a 692,000 square foot (SF) industrial storage
facility located in Suffolk, Virginia. The property was
transferred to special servicing in December 2012 for imminent
default. The occupancy sharply declined in 2010 due to the largest
tenant vacating the majority of its space. The special servicer
had indicated it intends to foreclose on the property.

Moody's has estimated an aggregate $85.1 million loss (57%
expected loss overall) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated an
$7.6 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating
results for 85% and 94% of the pool respectively. Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 107% compared to 110% at last full review. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.03X, respectively,
compared to 1.29X and 0.99X, respectively, at last full review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Apple Hotel Portfolio Loan
($109.3 million -- 9.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of 27 limited service and extended stay hotels located
across 14 states. The loan represents a 32% pari-passu interest in
a $341.6 million loan. Performance has improved since last review
due to an approximate 5.4% increase in RevPAR. In 2012, the pool's
revenue per available room (RevPAR) was $82.77 compared to $78.53
in 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 123% and 0.99X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 550 West Jackson Loan ($97.5
million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 402,000 SF
office building located in Chicago, Illinois. The property was 84%
leased as of December 2012 compared to 97% in December 2011. The
property's performance has declined since last review due to a
major tenant vacating 8% of the net rentable area. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.73X, respectively, compared to 109%
and 0.87X at last review.

The third-largest loan is the Village at Cascade Station Loan ($69
million -- 5.7% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 393,000 SF
retail center located in Portland, Oregon. The property was 96%
leased as of December 2012 compared to 94% in December 2011. The
property's performance improved in 2012 due to an increase in
rental revenue. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and
1.1X respectively, compared to 97% and 1.06X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS 1999-C1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. H Certs to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed five classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Inc., Depositor Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-C1 as follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2005 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. I, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to increased credit support resulting from
amortization and pay downs and anticipated pay downs from defeased
loans.

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current deal balance compared to 1.2% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized loss is 1.6% of the
original securitized deal balance compared to 1.7% at Moody's last
review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13 compared to a Herf of 16 at Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated July 25, 2012.

Deal Performance:

The transaction's aggregate certificate balance has decreased by
85% to $70 million from $478 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 27 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
(excluding defeasance) representing 47% of the pool. Eleven loans,
representing approximately 42% of the pool, are defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Five loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

There are no loans currently in special servicing. Moody's has not
identified any troubled loans in this transaction.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 93% and 35% of the performing pool,
respectively. Moody's weighted average LTV is 48% compared to 48%
at last full review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 2.29X and 3.74X,
respectively, compared to 2.23X and 3.30X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Stone Ridge Corporate Park Loan ($5
million -- 6% of the pool). The loan is secured by a three
building class B office complex totaling 107,437 square feet in
suburban Philadelphia. The performance of the building continues
to improve; property was 82% leased as of year-end 2012 compared
to 74% at last review. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are
62% and 1.66X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.40X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Eden Center Loan ($5 million -- 6%
of the pool). The loan is secured by a 206,000 square-foot
shopping center in suburban Washington, D.C. Major tenants include
Planet Fitness, Ngon Restaurant and Eden Supermarket. The shopping
center's occupancy was 99% as of year-end 2012 -- 1% better than
at last review. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 13% and
3.35X, respectively, compared to 15% and 3.31X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Simi Commerce Center Loan ($4
million -- 5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 104,000
square foot industrial property in Simi Valley, California. The
property was 96% leased as of June 21, 2013 compared to 94% at
last review. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and,
1.26X respectively, compared to 74% and 1.29X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2001-TOP2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class G Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Inc., (BSCMS) series 2001-Top2.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect Fitch expected losses across the pool, as
well as the pool concentration and adverse selection among
remaining loans.

Fitch modeled losses of 39.9% of the remaining pool; expected
losses of the original pool total 6.66%, including losses of $51.5
million (5.12% of the original pool balance) already incurred.
Fitch has designated seven loans (79.9%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, including two loans (31.5%) currently in special
servicing.

As of the July 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.1% to $38.9 million from
$1.0 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, one loan
(1.37%) is defeased. Interest shortfalls are affecting classes E
through N.

Rating Sensitivities

Although the transaction has experienced significant paydowns, the
remaining pool is highly concentrated with only 13 of the original
141 loans remaining. Current risk exposure of the remaining pool
includes vacant buildings, single tenant properties, as well as
retail properties located in secondary markets.

The largest contributor to Fitch expected losses, and the largest
loan in the pool (24.1% of pool balance), was originally secured
by six mobile home parks containing a total of 706 pads in the
Grand Rapids, MI market. The loan transferred to special servicing
in February 2009 for payment default. The properties had converted
to bank real estate owned (REO) via foreclosure in January 2011.
In April 2012, the servicer had deemed the asset as non-
recoverable. Three properties were sold in 2012. The remaining
three properties containing 381 pads, were 67% occupied as of June
2013. The servicer continues to work on stabilizing the remaining
three properties and market them for sale.

The second largest contributor to Fitch expected losses, and the
second largest loan in the pool (19.7%), is secured by a 53,404
square foot (sf) office and research & development building in
Sunnyvale, CA. The property was 100% leased to a single tenant
until its lease expiration in April 2011; the building remains
100% vacant as of July 2013. The asset previously transferred to
special servicing in June 2011 for imminent default; debt service
payments remained current and the asset was returned to the master
servicer in November 2011. The loan remains current as of the July
2013 remittance date.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $6.1 million class D at 'B-sf'; Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $23.9 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 55%;
-- $8.8 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $84 thousand class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes H, J, K, L, M, and the unrated class N have been reduced
to zero due to realized losses. Classes A-1, A-2, B, C and X-2
have paid in full. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only classes X-1.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR6: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. P Certs to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 12 classes,
downgraded one class and upgraded four classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-PWR6 as follows:

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The upgrades of four principal classes are due to increased credit
support from paydowns and amortization as well as increased
defeasance.

The downgrade of one principal class is due to higher realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X1, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.1% of the current balance, compared to 2.4% at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GPD
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24 compared to 27 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated July 26, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the June 11, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to $731.9
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 82 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 43% of
the pool. Seven loans, representing 16% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by U.S. Government securities. Defeasance at last
review represented 13% of the pool. The pool contains two loans
with investment grade credit assessments, representing 8% of the
pool.

Fifteen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization resulting in an aggregate $11.2 million loss (52%
loss severity on average). One loan, representing 0.4% of the
pool, is in special servicing. Moody's has assumed a high default
probability for two poorly performing loans representing 3% of the
pool and has estimated an aggregate $5.7 million loss (25%
expected loss overall) from the specially serviced and troubled
loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 99% and 96%, respectively, of the performing
pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 76% compared to 81% at last review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.55X and 1.46X, respectively, compared to
1.47X and 1.33X, respectively, at last review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Hilton Sandestin
Beach Golf Resort & Spa Loan ($43.5 million -- 6% of the pool),
which is secured by a 598-room, full service hotel located in
Destin, Florida. The hotel's performance improved since the last
review due to higher revenues from increased occupancy at the
property. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and
2.82X, respectively, compared to A2 and 2.24X at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Berry
Plastics Portfolio Loan ($14.9 million -- 2% of the pool), which
is secured by a portfolio of four industrial buildings containing
a total of 862,866 square feet (SF). The properties are located in
New York (3) and Arizona. The properties are 100% net leased to
Berry Plastics (Moody's LT Corporate Family Rating B3; stable
outlook) through November 2023. Moody's credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.85X, respectively, compared to A3 and
1.71X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 21% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Highland Village Loan
($77.3 million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured by a 331,000
(SF) retail center located in Houston, Texas. The property was 89%
leased as of December 2011 compared to 85% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.50X, respectively, compared to
76% and 1.28X at last review.

The second largest loan is Eton Collection Loan ($49.2 million --
7% of the pool), which is secured by a 287,000 SF retail center
located in Woodmere, Ohio. The property was 92% leased as of
December 2011 compared to 88% at last review. Overall, performance
is below securitization levels but has steadily improved since
2009. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 108% and 0.90X at last review.

The third largest loan is BAMC Building Loan ($26.7 million -- 4%
of the pool), which is secured by a 199,231 SF office building
located in San Antonio, Texas. The property is 100% leased to GSA
tenants through 2021. Performance is stable and the loan is
benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
78% and 1.32X, respectively, compared to 79% and 1.30X at last
review.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP26: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Certs to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
F commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP26, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)'.

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' following principal losses
detailed in the July 12, 2013, trustee remittance report.  The
principal loss on class F was caused by liquidations of the
$18.3 million DRA - Lake Emma Corporate Park asset and the
$16.8 million 100 Challenger loan, which were both with the
special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC.  According to the
July 2013 trustee remittance report, the loss severity for the DRA
- Lake Emma Corporate Park asset and the 100 Challenger loan were
49.1% ($9.0 million in principal losses) and 75.7% ($12.7 million
in principal losses), respectively.  Consequently, class F
reported a 4.9% loss to its $18.4 million original principal
balance, while classes G and H each lost 100% of their opening
balances.  We previously lowered our ratings on classes G and H to
'D (sf)'," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: DBRS Cuts Rating on 2 Secs. to 'D(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has downgraded the ratings for two classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-TOP28 as
follows:

-- Class M from C (sf) to D (sf)
-- Class N from C (sf) to D (sf)

As a loss has been realized for Classes M and N certificates, the
Interest in Arrears designation has been removed.

The previously outstanding interest due was repaid to Classes J,
K, and L as part of the June 2013 remittance, and as such, the
Interest in Arrears designation has been removed for those three
classes.

These rating actions reflect the most recent liquidations out of
the pool for Prospectus ID #78 (Evergreen Plaza), #80 (Holiday Inn
Express Wilkesboro), and #178 (50 Dwight Place), which were
liquidated with the June 2013 remittance report for a cumulative
loss of $10 million to the trust.

Prospectus ID #78 (Evergreen Plaza) was secured by an unanchored
retail property located in Everett, Washington.  Property
performance started to decline in 2008 after several tenants
vacated the property.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer in August 2011 for payment default and was auctioned for
sale in March 2013.  The realized loss attributed to this loan was
$5.1 million as of the June 2013 remittance report, which resulted
in a loss severity of 81% at the time of liquidation.

Prospectus ID #80 (Holiday Inn Express Wilkesboro) was secured by
a 100-key limited service hotel located in the rural city of
Wilkesboro, North Carolina.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in December 2011 for imminent default, following a steady
decline in property performance.  A bid was accepted in a March
2013 auction and was closed mid-year.  The loan was liquidated at
a loss of $4.1 million as of the June 2013 remittance, which
resulted in a loss severity of 70% at the time of liquidation.

Prospectus ID #178 (50 Dwight Place) was secured by an industrial
property located in Fairfield Borough, New Jersey.  Property
performance started to decline when the sole tenant vacated the
property in June 2011 and subsequently, the loan transferred to
the special servicer in August 2011 for payment default.  After a
sequence of legal proceedings, the property was sold in May 2013.
The loan was liquidated at a loss of $833,579 as of the June 2013
remittance, which resulted in a loss severity of 44% at the time
of liquidation.

As of the June 2013 remittance report, there have been ten loans
liquidated, with cumulative losses of $28.5 million.  There are
four loans remaining in special servicing, with a total balance of
$31.6 million, representing 2.1% of the outstanding pool balance.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
BlueMountain CLO 2013-2 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2013-2 LLC's
$394.4 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable to the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.28% to 11.57%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which would lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1611.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2013-2 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2013-2 LLC

Class                Rating                 Amount
                                          (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)              259.725
B-1                  AA (sf)                26.175
B-2                  AA (sf)                20.000
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                 35.525
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)               21.200
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                18.400
F (deferrable)       B (sf)                 13.375
Subordinated notes   NR                     34.350

NR-Not rated.


C-BASS CBO X: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Class C & D Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on four notes
issued by C-BASS CBO X, Ltd. (C-BASS X):

-- $2,615,466 class A notes upgraded to 'Asf' from 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $25,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'CCsf';

-- $20,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'Csf';

-- $15,201,519 class D notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs' for
the class A notes. For the class B, C, and D notes, Fitch compared
the credit enhancement level to the expected losses from the
distressed and defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or
lower). The agency also considered additional qualitative factors
in its analysis to conclude the rating actions for the rated
notes.

Key Rating Drivers

Since Fitch's last rating action in July 2012, the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated, with 31.5% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 3.2 notches and 0.8%
upgraded a weighted average of 1 notch. Approximately 96.4% of the
current portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment
grade and 86.5% has a rating in the 'CCCsf' rating category or
lower, compared to 88.3% and 74.7%, respectively, at previous
review.

The upgrade for the class A notes is due to the significant
deleveraging of the transaction increasing credit enhancement (CE)
levels to more than offset the negative effects of portfolio
deterioration. Since the last review, the notes have amortized by
approximately $10.5 million, or 80.1% of its previous outstanding
balance, using both principal redemptions and excess spread
diverted due a failing class A/B coverage test. This has resulted
in improved cash flow modeling breakevens compared to last review.
Approximately 65.1% of the remaining note balance of $2.6 million
is currently covered by the proceeds available in the principal
collection account. As such, these notes will likely be paid in
full within the next 3-6 months.

Although breakeven levels for the class A notes indicate that they
are able to withstand rating stresses higher than 'Asf' in the
cash flow modeling scenarios, given the high portfolio
concentration in distressed assets and continuing negative credit
migration, Fitch believes that the risk profile of these notes is
not consistent with higher rating levels.

The Outlook Stable reflects Fitch's view that the transaction will
continue to delever and that the class A noes notes have a
sufficient credit enhancement to offset potential deterioration of
the underlying collateral going forward.

While the class B notes continue to receive their timely interest
payments on each distribution date and are expected to begin
receiving some principal payments in the next 6-12 months, their
CE level continues to remain below the SF PCM projected 'CCCsf'
level of losses. The affirmation of the notes at 'CCsf' reflects
Fitch's view that default continues to appear probable for this
class.

The class C and D notes continue to defer their interest payments
with approximately $1.4 million and $2.1 million, respectively, of
such interest accrued on each class as of the June 2013 payment
date. Fitch believes that default is inevitable for these notes at
or prior to maturity due to the concentration of distressed
collateral. Therefore, both classes have been affirmed at 'Csf'.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch expects limited rating sensitivity to further negative
migration and defaults beyond those projected by SF PCM for all
rated notes.

C-BASS X is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on May 27, 2004. The portfolio is
currently monitored by NIC Management LLC, an affiliate of
Newcastle Investment Corp., who became the substitute collateral
manager for Credit-Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, LLC. in
2011. The current portfolio is composed of 96.9% residential
mortgage-backed securities and 3.1% consumer asset-backed
securities from 1995 through 2005 vintage transactions.


CASTLE TRUST 2003-2: Aircraft Sale No Impact on Moody's Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's announced that the sale of one Boeing 757-200 aircraft
(MSN 28173), resulting in certain concentration limits being
exceeded, would not, in and of itself and as of this time, result
in the downgrade, the placement on review for possible downgrade
or withdrawal of the ratings currently assigned to the notes
issued by Castle 2003-2 Trust (the Issuer). The transaction's
sponsor and servicer is International Lease Finance Corporation.

On July 15, 2013, the Issuer signed a sale agreement for one
Boeing 757-200 (MSN 28173). As a result, the concentration of the
five largest lessees will reach approximately 46.1% of the
adjusted portfolio value and exceed the 45% concentration limit.

In assessing the potential impact on the ratings of the notes,
Moody's focused on the following factors: the change to the Loan-
to-Value (LTV) ratio following the sale and; the fact that Boeing
757 aircraft are out of production which put pressure on the
demand for the aircraft and its future utilization. Moody's also
notes that the sold aircraft accounted for approximately 3.8% of
the overall average appraised base value of the aircraft pool
(based on the most recent appraisal) and that the net sale
proceeds will be used to pay down principal on the notes.

Moody's believed that the sale of the aircraft resulting in
concentration limit excesses did not have an adverse effect on the
credit quality of the notes such that the Moody's ratings were
impacted. Moody's did not express an opinion as to whether the
sale could have other, non-credit-related effects.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach To Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization", published in
March 1999.

On January 15, 2004, Moody's took these rating actions on notes
issued by Castle 2003-2 Trust:

Issuer: Castle 2003-2 Trust

$125,000,000, LIBOR + 1.22%, Class A-1 Notes maturing in November
2026, rated Aa2;

$555,000,000, 5.26%, Class A-2 Notes maturing in November 2026,
rated Aa2;

$1,500,000, LIBOR + 4.00%, Class B-1 Notes maturing in November
2026, rated A2;

$58,500,000, 8.26% Class B-2 Notes maturing in November 2026,
rated A2;

$75,000,000, 12.24%, Class D-1 Notes maturing in November 2026,
rated Ba2.


CGBAM COMMERCIAL 2013-BREH: DBRS Rates Class E Certs 'BB(low)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-BREH,
to be issued by CGBAM Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-BREH.  The
trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-ACP at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-BCP at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at AAA (sf)

All classes have been privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

Collateral for the transaction consists of a portfolio of 65
select, full and extended-stay hotels located in 18 states
throughout the United States.  In addition to the mortgage loan,
there is $175 million of subordinate mezzanine debt outside of the
trust consisting of a $100 million senior mezzanine loan and a $75
million junior mezzanine loan.  The loan sponsor acquired the
portfolio in May 2013 for $1.10 billion via its acquisition of
Apple REIT Six, Inc.  Post-acquisition, the sponsor detailed a
capital expenditures plan of $63 million, a portion of which will
be funded from an upfront $21.0 million replacement reserve fund.
Along with closing costs and other reserves, the sponsor's total
cost basis is $1.20 billion ($1.15 billion excluding one property
acquired via the merger that will not serve as collateral for the
loan).  In addition to the mortgage and mezzanine debt, the
acquisition was funded with $18.1 million of assumed debt, $184.4
million of preferred equity from the seller and $218.0 million of
cash equity from the sponsor.  The loan is sponsored by Blackstone
Real Estate Partners VII, L.P.  The properties are operated under
ten different brands all owned by either Marriott International,
Inc. or Hilton Worldwide.  The sponsor, along with its affiliated
funds, reported ownership interest in approximately 900,000 hotel
rooms as of March 31, 2013.

The portfolio overall benefits from relatively strong locations in
infill suburban markets, although there are 19 properties located
in what DBRS considers tertiary and rural markets.  These
properties typically generate significantly less cash flow than
ones in urban and suburban markets, and in total these 19 assets
represent only 19.8% of DBRS underwriting (UW) net cash flow (NCF)
(with no individual property representing more than 2.0%).  The
portfolio also benefits from concentrations in desirable coastal
markets such as Portland (Oregon), Seattle and San
Francisco/Silicon Valley.

Portfolio performance has improved significantly over the past few
years.  Revenue per available room (RevPAR) bottomed out in YE2009
at $69.59, which represented a 16.8% decrease compared to the
previous high of $83.63 in YE2008.  Through the trailing 12-month
(T-12) period ending April 30, 2013, RevPAR has fully recovered to
$84.87, representing a 22.0% increase from the cyclical low in
YE2009 and a 1.5% increase over the previous high in 2008.
Historical expense ratios have been low and relatively stable over
the past six years, ranging from 66% to 71% (inclusive of
furniture, fixtures and equipment (FF&E)).  As a result, cash flow
declines through the nadir in 2008 followed declining RevPAR, with
a YE2009 total revenue figure approximately 27.1% less than the
peak achieved in 2008.  The peak-to-trough net cash flow decline
was less severe than most hotel NCF declines over that period due
to the diversity, quality and flags of the assets.

The loan has minimal default risk during the five-year fully
extended loan term, as the DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) is high at 2.08x.  DBRS Value, a 29.3% discount to the
appraised value, results in a modest DBRS loan-to-value (LTV) of
75.7%.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure
and underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to
ongoing surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades
by DBRS after the date of issuance.


CGBAM COMMERCIAL 2013-BREH: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to nine
classes of CMBS securities, issued by CGBAM Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-
BREH:

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-ACP, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-BCP, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-NCP, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted mortgage liens on 61 fee
simple interests and 4 leasehold interests in hotel properties
located in 18 states throughout the United States. The portfolio
is comprised of nine different nationally recognized flags and are
under either the Marriott franchise (59.4%) or the Hilton
franchise (40.6%). The mortgage loan has an initial 3-year term,
and two one-year extension options (five-year fully extended term)
evidenced by a single promissory note. The total principal balance
of the mortgage loan is $600 million. Debt service is calculated
using an interest only payment.

The ratings are based on the collateral and the structure of the
transaction.

Moody's rating approach for securities backed by a single loan
compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying properties
with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also considers a range
of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two
factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely
driven by the LTV of the underlying loan.

Based on Moody's assessment of stabilized net cash flow and the
current interest rate, Moody's Trust DSCR is 3.70X and Moody's
Total Debt DSCR (inclusive of mezzanine debt) is 2.41X.

Based on Moody's assessment of stabilized net cash flow and a
stressed constant of 9.25%, the Moody's Trust Stressed DSCR is
1.41X and Moody's Total Debt Stressed DSCR (inclusive of mezzanine
debt) is 1.09X.

The first mortgage balance of $600,000,000 represents a Moody's
LTV ratio of 85.4% which is slightly higher than other single-
borrower lodging portfolios that have been assigned a bottom-
dollar credit assessment of Ba3 by Moody's. Moody's also considers
subordinate financing when assigning ratings. The loan is
structured with $175,000,000 of additional financing in the form
of mezzanine debt, raising Moody's Total LTV ratio to 110.3%.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Classes X-
ACP, X-BCP, and X-NCP was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Single Borrower CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, or 22%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa classes would be Aa1, Aa2, or A1, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


COMM 2001-J2: S&P Affirms 'B-(sf)' Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to
'AA+ (sf)' from 'AAA (sf)' on the class C, X, and XC commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM 2001-J2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on six other classes from
the same transaction.

"Our rating actions reflect the application of our U.S. defeasance
criteria.  The defeased collateral's scheduled revenue streams
derived from U.S. obligations will be the sole source of principal
and interest payments due on the remaining classes.  Our analysis
also considered the timing of interest shortfalls that affected
some of the rated certificate classes, due primarily to corrected
mortgage fees on two General Growth Properties (GGP) loans.  We
also expect potential interest shortfalls resulting from corrected
mortgage fees upon the eventual payoff of the defeased AT&T
Building loan ($188.4 million).  The sole remaining loan in the
trust, had previously been released from its respective lien and
substituted by defeasance collateral consisting of U.S. government
obligations," S&P said.

The downgrade of the class C certificates reflects S&P's applied
U.S. defeasance criteria.  S&P's current long-term credit rating
on the United States of America is AA+/Stable/A-1+.

While classes D, E, ECS, F, and G could have been upgraded to 'AA+
(sf)' reflecting S&P's U.S. defeasance criteria, S&P affirmed its
ratings on these classes because it considered the potential for
these classes to incur additional interest shortfalls from the
workout fee that will be incurred by the trust upon the final
maturity of the corrected AT&T Building loan in 2016 (details
further below), as well as interest shortfalls that had affected
these classes, primarily due to workout fees from the liquidation
of two GGP loans.

S&P affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class EIO interest-only
(IO) certificates, because this IO class is related to the class
ECS certificates.  S&P also lowered its ratings on the associated
referenced IO classes X and XC to 'AA+ (sf)'.

Prior to the AT&T building loan defeasance, the loan was secured
by a 28-story mixed-use building containing 526,446 sq. ft. of
office space, 601,880 sq. ft. of telecommunications space, and
30,985 sq. ft. of retail space in Manhattan.  This loan was
previously with the special servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage
LLC (Berkadia), and was returned as a corrected mortgage loan to
the master servicer, also Berkadia.  According to the transaction
documents, the special servicer is entitled to a workout fee equal
to 1.0% of all future and principal and interest payments on the
loan provided it continues to perform and remains with the master
servicer.  As of the June 17, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
trust shorted interest totaling $15,462 due to the workout fee on
the AT&T Building loan.  The loan matures on Aug. 11, 2016.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

COMM 2001-J2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Rating
Class    To          From
C        AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)
X        AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)
XC       AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

COMM 2001-J2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class       Rating
D           AA (sf)
E           A+ (sf)
ECS         A+ (sf)
EIO         A+ (sf)
F           A- (sf)
G           B- (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE 1999-C1: Fitch Affirms C Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. (CSFB) commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates series 1999-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations of the remaining classes, all of which are
distressed, reflect the likelihood of losses from the remaining
loans in the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 56.7% of the remaining
pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total 7.3%,
including $38.7 million (3.3% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date. Fitch has designated four loans (93.2%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes the one specially
serviced asset (52.1%).

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 93% to $82.4 million from
$1.17 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(31.9% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes H through O. Seven of the original 153
loans remain.

The largest asset remaining in the pool, representing 52.1% of the
current pool balance, and also the largest contributor to losses
is a 973,973 square foot (sf) mall located in Tallahassee, FL. The
property was foreclosed upon in January 2011 and the special
servicer had been working to stabilize and liquidate the asset.
Fitch expects significant losses upon sale of the asset based on
valuations obtained by the special servicer.

Rating Sensitivity

The rating on class G could be subject to a downgrade in the event
that expected losses increase. The ratings on classes H through K
are expected to remain at 'C'.

Fitch affirms the following classes but revises RE as indicated:

-- $23.4 million class H at 'Csf', RE 30%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $30.6 million class G at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $11.7 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $11.7 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E and F certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class L, M and O certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the class N certificates and
the interest-only class A-X certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2001-CK3: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-CK3 as follows:

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of Class J is consistent with realized and Moody's
expected loss and thus is affirmed. This class has experienced a
58% realized loss to date.

The rating of the IO Class, Class AX, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and is thus
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.8% ($1.5
million) of the current deal balance. At last review, Moody's base
expected loss was 13.1% ($8.2 million). The pool has paid down 85%
since Moody's last review. Moody's base expected loss plus
realized loss is 6.2% of the original securitized deal balance,
the same as at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrow
Transaction" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5 compared to a Herf of 2 at Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Deal Performance:

As of the June 13, 2001 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $9 million
from $1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 28% of the pool. One loan, representing approximately
2% of the pool, is defeased and is collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.

One loan, representing 20% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Currently, the only loan is special servicing is the Tualatin
Sleep Products Industrial Facility Loan ($1 million -- 12.3% of
the pool). This loan is secured by a 53,750 square foot (SF) Class
B office located in Stockton, California. The property's sole
tenant expired and the property is now 100% vacant. Moody's has
assumed a high default probability for one additional loan
representing 20% of the pool. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$1.2 million loss (39.5% expected loss overall) from the specially
serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 90% and 88% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding the troubled and specially serviced loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 54% compared to 86% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 13% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.0%.

Excluding the troubled and specially serviced loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.40X and 2.42X, respectively,
compared to 1.07X and 1.36X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 65% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Falcon Pointe Apartments Loan ($3 million
-- 28% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 112 unit multifamily
property in southwest of Houston in Rosenberg, Texas. The property
was 98% leased as of March 2013 -- compared to 93% at last review.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.39X,
respectively, compared to 65% and 1.27X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Vista Pointe Apartments Loan ($2
million -- 20% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 44-unit
multifamily property located in Reno, Nevada. The property was 93%
leased as of March 2013 compared to 86% at last review. This loan
is on the watchlist due to low DSCR and Moody's considers it a
troubled loan due to its poor performance.

The third largest loan is the Timberleaf Estates Loan ($2 million
-- 20% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 54-unit multifamily
property located in Martinsburg, West Virginia. The property was
98% leased as of March 2013. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR
are 56% and, 1.41X respectively, compared to 58% and 1.39X at last
review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP5: Fitch Cuts $5.9MM Class K Certs to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three and affirmed nine classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. (CSFB)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP5.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 42.1% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 6.3%, including
$31.5 million (2.7% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date. Fitch has designated 17 loans (98.4%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, all of which are specially serviced assets.

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 91.4% to $102.3 million from
$1.19 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes J through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a loan secured by a
241,942 square foot (sf) office property in Greenbelt, MD (22.9%
of the pool). The asset became real estate owned (REO) via
foreclosure on Feb. 13, 2013 with a takeover occupancy of
approximately 65%.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a loan secured
by an 89,751-sf office property in Bloomfield, MI (9.9%). The file
transferred to the Special Servicer on Aug. 27, 2012 due to the
borrower's inability to refinance the debt prior to the maturity
on Oct. 1. 2012. The largest tenant (81% of the GLA) has
terminated their lease effective March 31, 2012. The borrower has
indicated a desire for a maturity extension to resolve this
tenancy issue; the current occupancy is now at 9%.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a specially
serviced loan (8.6%) secured by one office building located in
Farmington Hills, MI, totaling 89,759 sf. The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2012 due to imminent default. A former
tenant terminated their lease in May 2012, leaving the property
unoccupied. After marketing the property for sale or lease, the
borrower agreed to complete a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes D through E remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown. Rating
Outlooks on classes F through H are Negative due to the highly
concentrated nature of the pool and the large number of loans in
special servicing.

Although credit enhancement remains high for some of the top
classes, all future paydown will arrive in the form of
dispositions from specially serviced loans. Given the potential
for changes in valuation on the specially serviced loans, no
upgrades are warranted at this time.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and revises Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $14.8 million class H to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $22.2 million class J to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 5%;
-- $5.9 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $8.9 million class F at 'AAsf', Outlook to Negative from
   Stable;
-- $16.3 million class G at 'BBBsf', Outlook to Negative from
   Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $449,105 class D at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $17.8 million class E at 'AA+sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $8.9 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $7 million class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-SP, B and C certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class A-X certificates.


CWCAPITAL COBALT: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 7 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of eight classes of notes issued
by CWCapital Cobalt Vr Ltd. The affirmations are due to the key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

CWCapital Cobalt Vr Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (54.1%
of the pool balance) and CRE CDOs (45.9%). As of the June 26, 2013
Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $3.15 billion from
$3.45 billion at issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class
A-1 Notes, as a result of reclassification of interest proceeds
from impaired securities as principal.

All of the assets with a total par balance of $1.73 billion are
considered impaired securities as of the 26 June, 2013 Trustee
report. There have been significant losses on the underlying
collateral to date, and Moody's expects this to continue on the
impaired securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,740
compared to 9,679 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Baa1-Baa3 (0.1% compared to 0.04% at
last review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.6% compared to 0.7% at last review), B1-
B3 (1.1% compared to 1.4% at last review), and Caa1-C (98.3%
compared to 97.9% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 5.1 years compared to 5.6 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.1%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100%, the same as that at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption up from
0.1% to 5.1% would result in a modeled rating movement on the
rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch upward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector continues to exhibit growth albeit at a slightly
slower pace. The multifamily sector should remain stable with
moderate growth. Gradual recovery in the office sector continues
and will be assisted in the next quarter when absorption is likely
to outpace completions. However, since office demand is closely
tied to employment, Moody's expects regional employment growth to
provide market differentiation. CBD markets continue to outperform
secondary suburban markets. The retail sector exhibited a slight
reduction in vacancies in the first quarter; the largest drop
since 2005. However, consumers continue to be cautious as
evidenced by sales growth continuing below historical trends.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with robust securitization activity of
commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low
interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed all classes of DBUBS 2011-LC2 Mortgage Trust as
follows:

-- Classes A-1, A-1FL, A-1C, A-2, A-3FL, A-3C, A-4, X-A and X-B
    at AAA (sf)

-- Class B at AA (sf)

-- Class C at A (sf)

-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

-- Classes F and FX at B (low) (sf)

The trend for all classes is Stable.  The Class A-1C and Class A-
3C certificates are exchangeable with the Class A-1FL and Class A-
3FL certificates, respectively.  The Class FX certificate is
considered notional.  Its notional balance will be equal to the
principal certificate balance of Class F.

The pool comprises 67 fixed-rate loans and has experienced 2.1% of
collateral reduction since issuance.  The pool is heavily
concentrated by loan size, with over half of the pool represented
in the largest seven loans alone.  The top 15 comprises 67% of the
current pool balance.  The pool is also concentrated by property
type and location, with 44% of the current pool balance
represented by office properties and 55% of the pool being located
in three states.  Mitigating this concern is the pool's diversity
by property count.  The 67 outstanding loans are secured by 132
properties.  Four of the top 15 loans are multi-property
portfolios.  Much of the pool's office exposure is located in
urban or dense urban areas within primary or strong secondary
markets.  New York has the highest geographic exposure within the
pool, and DBRS views the strength of its market as a moderating
influence to the concentration.

There are five loans on the servicer's watchlist for performance
decline.  At this time, DBRS does not foresee any immediate danger
of default to the loans on the watchlist.  DBRS continues to
monitor these loans on a monthly basis as part of ongoing
surveillance.

One loan, Ridgeview Apartments (Prospectus ID#10) has been in
special servicing since September 2012.  The borrower was
reportedly not in compliance with a hard lockbox provision set
forth in the loan documents and, after continuing to ignore
requests for compliance, the loan was transferred to special
servicing.  This loan is secured by a 416-unit multifamily
property in Elmsford, New York, which is approximately 30 miles
north of New York City.  A modification of the loan documents has
been negotiated and is currently being finalized.  DBRS is in
communication with the 17g5 provider for more details on the
structure of the modification.  At this time, the loan is
performing well, with a YE2012 DSCR of 1.90x, up from the DBRS UW
DSCR of 1.60x.

The pool benefits from low-leverage financing, with a weighted-
average debt yield of 11.2% as of the June 2013 remittance.  At
issuance, the weighted-average debt yield, based on the issuer's
cash flows, was 10.6%, and the DBRS UW Debt Yield was 9.6%.  The
largest loans in the pool have experienced some cash flow growth
over the last two years, showing an average NCF change of 12.6%.


DLJ COMMERCIAL 2000-CKP1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed three classes
of DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp (DLJ) commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates series 2000-CKP1.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade is a result of the expected losses on the remaining
pool, including five of the seven remaining loans (68.5%) that are
in special servicing. Fitch modeled losses of 17.1% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
5.8%, including $70.7 million (5.5% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.9% to $27.2 million from
$1.29 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes B-5 through C.

The largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a 117,340
square foot (sf) industrial property in Wayne Township, NJ (17.4%
of the pool). The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
July 2010 due to its pending maturity date of in August 2010. The
special servicer has begun the foreclosure process.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a real estate
owned (REO) 106 unit retirement community in Great Falls, MT (8%).
The loan transferred to the special servicer in January 2008 due
to the borrower's failure to pay off the loan at maturity. Motion
for summary judgment for foreclosure was granted in December 2012.
Occupancy was 47% as of March 2013.

Rating Sensitivity

Class B-4 is expected to remain at a 'Csf' due to the
concentration of specially serviced loans and likelihood for
continued increases in expected losses. All other rated classes
have either paid in full or have already realized losses.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $22.1 million class B-4 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf', RE 95%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $5.1 million class B-5 at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class B-6 at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class B-7 at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1A, A-1B, A-2, A-3, A-4, B-1, B-2 and B-3 certificates
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class C certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the B-8 and B-9
certificates, as well as on the interest-only class S
certificates.


FLAGSHIP CLO IV: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on $13.2MM Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Flagship CLO IV:

$269,600,000 Class A Floating Rate Funded Notes Due June 14, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $113,503,905), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on August 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$40,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due June 14,
2017 (current outstanding balance of $17,008,745), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on August 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$27,900,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due June 14, 2017,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 9, 2011 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

$17,900,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due June 14, 2017,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 9, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

$13,200,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due June 14, 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $11,497,148), Affirmed B1 (sf); previously
on August 9, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios.
Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 58% or $179.5 million since the end of the
reinvestment period in June 2012. Based on the latest trustee
report dated May 21, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class
D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 136.6%, 119.7%,
110.9% and 105.9%, respectively, versus June 2012 levels of
123.2%, 113.0%, 107.4% and 104.0%, respectively. Moody's notes
that the overcollateralization ratios reported in the May 2013
trustee report do not include the June 3, 2013 payment
distribution, when $66.7 million of principal proceeds were used
to pay down the Class A Notes.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on the
May 2013 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 2250 compared to 2363 in June 2012.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the May 2013 trustee report, securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 9.9% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity. Notwithstanding
the increase in the overcollateralization ratio of the Class D
notes, Moody's affirmed the rating of the Class D notes due to the
market risk posed by the exposure to these long-dated assets.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $197.6 million, defaulted par of $5.1 million,
a weighted average default probability of 13.4% (implying a WARF
of 2427), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.4%,
and a diversity score of 35. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Flagship CLO IV, issued in June 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1942)

Class A Funded: 0
Class A Revolving: 0
Class B: +1
Class C: +2
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2912)

Class A Funded: 0
Class A Revolving: 0
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


FLATIRON CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Flatiron CLO 2012-1 Ltd./Flatiron CLO 2012-1 LLC's $371 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of Jan. 11, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P noted.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Flatiron CLO 2012-1 Ltd./Flatiron CLO 2012-1 LLC

Class                   Rating                 Amount
                                              (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)                267.5
A-2                     AA (sf)                  28.0
B (deferrable)          A (sf)                   36.0
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                 18.0
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)                  21.5


FORTRESS CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Fortress Credit BSL Ltd./Fortress Credit BSL LLC's $367.50 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of April 25, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P added.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P noted.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it ill periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Fortress Credit BSL Ltd./Fortress Credit BSL LLC

Class    Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A        AAA (sf)            247.00
B        AA (sf)              48.00
C        A (sf)               29.50
D        BBB (sf)             21.00
E        BB (sf)              22.0


GALLATIN CLO V: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Gallatin CLO V 2013-1 Ltd./Gallatin CLO V 2013-1 LLC's
$270.75 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2739%-12.5300%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1669.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Gallatin CLO V 2013-1 Ltd./Gallatin CLO V 2013-1 LLC

Class                  Rating          Amount (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)                 177.00
B-1                    AA (sf)                   29.25
B-2                    AA (sf)                    8.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                    23.00
D-1 (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                   8.25
D-2 (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                   7.00
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                   12.50
F (deferrable)         B (sf)                     5.75
Subordinated notes     NR                        29.50

NR--Not rated.


GENERAL ELECTRIC 2003-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. H Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes of General Electric Capital
Assurance Company (GFCM) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2003-1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are the result of stable performance since
Fitch's last rating action. Fitch modeled losses of 3% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
1.3%, including $2.9 million (0.4% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 32 loans (26.6%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes one specially serviced
asset (1.7%).

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 69.2% to $253 million from
$822.6 million at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes G through J; 96 of the
original 171 loans remain.

The two largest contributors to expected losses are cross-
collateralized. The first is secured by a 259,759 square foot (sf)
anchored retail center in Patchogue, NY (6.68% of the pool). This
property faces some potential near-term rollover issues as the
lease for its second largest tenant, Best Buy, expires in less
than a year. Fitch ran a deterministic stress test on this loan
which led to the modeling of additional losses.
The second is secured by a 79,760 sf grocery anchored retail
center in Patchogue, NY. This property also faces significant
potential near-term tenant rollover issues. The lease of its
largest tenant, which occupies over half of the property, expires
within the year. Fitch ran a deterministic stress test on this
loan, which led to the modeling of additional losses.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-4 through E remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown. Rating
Outlooks on class F remain Negative due to the large number of
loans of concern remaining in this pool.

The Rating Outlook on class C was revised to Stable from Positive
as the class is not likely to receive principal paydown for some
time due to the large size of classes A-4 through B.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $13.4 million class C at 'A+sf', Outlook to Stable from
   Positive.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $73.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $112.7 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $11.3 million class B at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $11.3 million class D at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $10.3 million class E at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $12.3 million class F at 'B-sf', Outlook Negative;
-- $7.2 million class G at 'Csf', RE 75%;
-- $1.2 million class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates have paid in full. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


GLOBAL LEVERAGED: S&P Raises Rating on Class E-1 Notes to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on all
classes of notes from Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity
Fund I, a cash flow U.S. collateralized loan obligation
transaction managed by managed by GLC Partners.  At the same time,
Standard & Poor's removed these ratings from CreditWatch with
positive implications, where they were placed on May 17, 2013.

The transaction ended its reinvestment period in October 2012 and
has commenced paying down the Class A notes.  As of the May 31,
2013, monthly trustee report, the Class A balance was
$172.7 million, which is about 65% of its original balance.  This
is down from $296.8 million (about 94% of their original balance)
in July 2011, when S&P raised the ratings on Class A, B, C and D
notes.

The paydowns increased the credit support to the notes, as the
improvement in all the principal coverage (overcollateralization;
O/C) ratios demonstrate.  As per the May 2013 monthly trustee
report:

   -- The Class A/B principal coverage ratio was 162.34%, up from
      a reported ratio of 143.60% in April 2011, which S&P used
      for its July 2011 rating actions.

   -- The Class C principal coverage ratio was 136.28% compared
      with a reported ratio of 125.93% in April 2011.

   -- The Class D principal coverage ratio was 124.55% compared
      with a reported ratio of 117.46% in April 2011.

   -- The Class E principal coverage ratio was 113.74% compared
      with a reported ratio of 109.32% in April 2011.

In addition to the paydowns, the transaction has benefitted from a
lower level of defaults: $21.8 million as of the May 31, 2013,
monthly trustee report versus $42.2 million in April 2011.
However, the portfolio continues to have a high percentage of
assets in the 'CCC' rating category; the May 31, 2013, trustee
report indicated that the transaction had 22.63% of the assets in
the 'CCC' rating category, which is above the 20% limit as per the
transaction documents.  S&P took this into consideration in its
most recent analysis.

S&P raised the ratings on the Class A, B, C, D, E-1 and E-2 notes
due to the increase in their credit support.

The Class E-1 and E-2 note ratings were affected by the
application of S&P's largest-obligor default test, one of the two
supplemental tests that S&P introduced as part of its revised
corporate CDO criteria.  S&P applies the supplemental tests to
address event risk and model risk that could be present in rated
transactions.  The largest-obligor default test assesses whether a
CDO tranche has sufficient credit enhancement (excluding excess
spread) to withstand specified combinations of underlying asset
defaults based on the ratings on the underlying assets, with a
flat recovery.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised

Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity Fund I
                  Rating
Class         To           From
A             AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             A+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E-1           B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos
E-2           B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class O Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed 14 classes of GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-C1 (GMACC 2004-
C1) commercial mortgage pass through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to increased credit enhancement from
significant paydown and defeasance as well as stable performance
of the pool. The downgrades reflect the increase in loss
expectations from the specially serviced loans.

Fitch modeled losses of 6.6% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 4.5%, including $14.9
million (2.1% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 12 loans (22.9%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, including the two specially serviced loans (8.3%).

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 30.7% to $500 million from
$721 million at issuance. Eleven loans (31.6%) are currently
defeased. Interest shortfalls are affecting classes J through P.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a specially
serviced asset; the loan was originally secured by two cross-
collateralized office properties located in Fort Washington, PA.
The borrower was unable to meet debt service obligations after the
loss of a major tenant. A foreclosure sale was held in March 2011
and the Trust was the winning bidder.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on the class A-3 through C notes are expected to be
stable as the credit enhancement remains high and they benefit
from defeasance. Classes D through G may be subject to further
downgrades if loans cannot refinance at their upcoming maturities;
98% of the pool is scheduled to refinance through 2014. In
addition, due to the thinness of the junior tranches these classes
are more susceptible as losses are realized.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

-- $10.8 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE:0%;
-- $4.5 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE:0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated below:

-- $19.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $343.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.3 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.7 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $$8.1 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.3 million class D at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
   Stable;
-- $8.1 million class E at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
   Stable;
-- $12.6 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
   Stable;
-- $8.1 million class G at 'B-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
   Stable;
-- $4.5 million class K at 'Csf'; RE:0%;
-- $4.5 million class L at 'Csf'; RE:0%;
-- $2.7 million class M at 'Csf'; RE:0%;
-- $2.7 million class N at 'Csf'; RE:0%;
-- $0.4 million class O at 'Dsf'; RE:0%.

Class A-1 and A-2 have been paid in full. Fitch does not rate
class P. The ratings on the interest-only classes X-1 and X-2 were
previously withdrawn.


GOLDMAN SACHS 2006-GG8: Moody's Keeps Rating Over Rights Transfer
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that LNR Securities
Holdings, LLC, the current Majority Controlling Class
Certificateholder under the Trust, intends to remove CWCapital
Asset Management LLC as the Special Servicer and to appoint LNR
Partners, LLC, as the successor Special Servicer. The Proposed
Special Servicer Transfer and Replacement will become effective
upon satisfaction of the conditions precedent set forth in the
governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement.
Moody's has determined that this proposed special servicing
replacement will not, in and of itself, and at this time, result
in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any class
of certificates rated by Moody's for GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-GG8 (the Certificates). Moody's opinion only addresses
the credit impact associated with the proposed designation and
transfer of special servicing rights. Moody's is not expressing
any opinion as to whether this change has, or could have, other
non-credit related effects that may have a detrimental impact on
the interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-GG8 was
taken on January 28, 2013. The methodology used in monitoring this
transaction was "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000.

Moody's will continue to monitor the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.

On January 28, 2013, Moody's downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed 15 classes of Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities
Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-GG8 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2007-EOP: Fitch Keeps B- Rating on $534MM Cl. L Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on 13 classes of GS
Mortgage Securities Corp II, series 2007-EOP.

Key Rating Drivers

Affirmations are warranted at this time as the outstanding
collateral performance has remained stable since Fitch's prior
rating action. The transaction should benefit from an increase in
credit enhancement as property releases are expected to increase
as the loan reaches maturity.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings are expected to remain stable through the extended
maturity date of February 2014. No rating actions are expected
unless there are material changes to the portfolio performance and
disruptions to the capital markets that may delay releases and
ultimate pay off of the loan at maturity.

The certificates are collateralized by a single $4.3 billion non-
recourse floating-rate loan secured by over 80 office properties,
down from 145 at issuance. Security for the loan is comprised of
mortgages, equity pledges in joint ventures and cash flow pledges.
In addition, there is approximately $1.6 billion of mezzanine debt
held outside the trust.

Initially, the loan was modified in December 2010, extending the
original maturity date to February 2012. The loan has since been
extended to February 2014, the fully extended maturity date. In
exchange for the extensions, the sponsor has agreed to certain
conditions including the payment of additional interest spread and
scheduled amortization payments of $200 million over the fully
extended term. Previously, the loan was structured as interest
only.

The largest property in the pool (15.1%) is 1095 Avenue of the
Americas located across from Bryant Park in mid-town Manhattan. As
of April 2013, the property is approximately 96.2% occupied with
the majority of tenants on long-term leases. The remainder of the
portfolio includes office properties located in top primary
markets in Boston, New York and Northern and Southern California.
The top 10 properties account for approximately 44.5% of the
allocated loan balance with no single property, other than the
Verizon Building, representing more than 5% of the collateral.
Occupancy across the portfolio as of March 2013 was approximately
88.3%, a slight increase from March 2012.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $232.8 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $584.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $606.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $370.3 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $432.3 million class C at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $220 million class D at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $237.9 million class E at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $214.7 million class F at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $142.4 million class G at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $142.4 million class H at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $395 million class J at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $213.6 million class K at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $534 million class L at 'B-sf'; Outlook to Stable from
   Negative.

Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X.


HALCYON LOAN 2013-2: Moody's Rates $22.25MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following ratings to notes issued by Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding
2013-2 Ltd.:

$3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2016
(the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$254,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$46,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$42,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$27,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

$26,750,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

$22,250,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's ratings of the notes address the expected losses posed to
noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Halcyon 2013-2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
be invested in senior secured loans and up to 10% of the portfolio
may consist of second lien loans, senior secured floating rate
notes, unsecured loans and bonds. The underlying collateral pool
is approximately 65% ramped as of the closing date. The Issuer
will acquire approximately 25% of the assets from another CLO
through a master participation agreement.

Halcyon Loan Advisors 2013-2 LLC (the "Manager"), a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Halcyon Loan Advisors LP, will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in sequential order pursuant to the
priority of payments.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $450,000,000

Diversity of 50

WARF of 2800

Weighted Average Spread of 4.10%

Weighted Average Coupon of 6.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 47%

Weighted Average Life of 8 years

The notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF Impact in Rating Notches

WARF + 15% (2800 to 3220) Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -1

Class B-2 Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

WARF + 30% (2800 to 3640) Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in
May 2013.


HEWETT'S ISLAND III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. D Notes to B2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO III, Ltd.:

$14,800,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Notes Due August,
2017, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 28, 2012
Upgraded to A1 (sf);

$14,800,000 Class C Deferrable Secured Notes Due August, 2017,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on September 28, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf);

$14,800,000 Class D Deferrable Subordinated Secured Notes Due
August, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $12,848,699),
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded to B2
(sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$321,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Notes Due August, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $12,370,178), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$14,800,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Notes Due August, 2017,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 28, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf);

$12,700,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Amortizing Senior Secured Notes
Due August, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $423,343),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 28, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in September 2012. Moody's notes that the Class
A-1 Notes and Class B-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately
91.61% or $135.1 million and 75% or $1.3 million, respectively,
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated May 31, 2013, the overcollateralization ratios relating to
the Senior Notes (Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes), Class B-2
Notes, Class C Notes, and Class D Notes are reported at 281.2%,
182.1%, 134.6% and 109.8%, respectively, versus August 2012 levels
of 131.4%, 120.4%, 111.1% and 104.1%, respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the May 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 3803
compared to 2706 in August 2012.

In upgrading its ratings on the Class B-2 Notes, Class C Notes,
and the Class D Notes, Moody's took particular consideration of
the transaction's priority of payments from interest collections.
Notably, deleveraging of the Class B-1 Notes is due to the
scheduled payment of the "Class B-1 Principal and Interest Amount"
consisting of the interest due on the notes and a fixed amount of
$423,333 on each payment date, which is required to be paid before
interest on the Class B-2 Notes, Class C Notes, or Class D Notes
is paid. The Class B-1 Principal and Interest Amount may be paid
from interest proceeds, and on the May 2013 payment date, the
entire Class B-1 Principal and Interest Amount was paid from
interest proceeds. Moody's also notes that payments to the hedge
counterparty may consume a large portion of the interest proceeds
as a result of the rapid deleveraging stemming primarily from
prepayments on the collateral. Due to the likelihood that the uses
of interest proceeds may result in the transaction having poor
interest coverage on the Class B-2 Notes, Class C Notes and Class
D Notes, the rating actions on those notes reflect concerns about
these uncertainties.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $73.5 million, defaulted par of $6.4 million,
a weighted average default probability of 15.61% (implying a WARF
of 3030), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.29%,
and a diversity score of 21. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Hewett's Island CLO III, Ltd, issued in August 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2424)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3636)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update credit estimates in a
timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by and default
probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated credit
estimates.


JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC9: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class F Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 14 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-CIBC9.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade to the non-investment class is a result of losses
incurred and the likelihood of future losses to the already
distressed class. The affirmations are due to sufficient credit
enhancements and generally stable performance of the underlying
collateral pool.

Fitch modeled losses of 3.3% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 8.2%, including $71.3
million (6.5% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 12 loans (15.2%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes three specially serviced assets (4.2%).

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 42% to $639.4 million from
$1.1 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, nine loans
(8.7% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes N through NR.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Towson Overlook
loan (1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 137,600 square foot
(sf) retail center located in Towson, MD. The property struggles
with poor performance due to occupancy issues. The property is
underperforming its competition in the market with rents at nearly
half that of its competitors. The servicer reported occupancy is
at 81.1% as of the first-quarter of 2013.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Poplar
Creek Plaza loan (0.8%), which is secured by a 63,860 sf retail
center located in Schaumburg, IL, northwest of Chicago. As per the
property's May 2013 rent roll, the occupancy is at 93%; however,
significant lease rollover of 34.1% will occur prior to year-end
2014. In addition, the property's net operating income (NOI)
decreased 60.7% from year-end 2011 to 2012 due to reduced rental
rates.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Town
Center Colleyville loan (1%), which is secured by a 59,572 sf
retail center located in Colleyville, TX, northeast of Dallas. The
property has struggled from poor performance over the last several
years. The servicer reported occupancy and debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) as of year-end 2012 were 74.8% and 0.76 times (x),
respectively. The subject property also has 22% of leases expiring
prior to loan maturity in May 2014.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-4 through C remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancements and continued paydown. A downgrade
to class D is possible if losses are greater than expected.
Fitch downgrades the following classes and revises Recover
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $11 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 50%.

Fitch affirms the following classes, revises Rating Outlook and
REs as indicated:

-- $452.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $105.2 million class A1-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $27.5 million class B at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $13.8 million class C at 'BBsf', Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $20.7 million class D at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $8.6 million class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 have been paid in full. Fitch does not
rate class NR.

Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC4: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class E Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed nine classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2002-CIBC4 (JPMC 2002-
CIBC4).

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade of class D to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf' indicates that the
losses to this class have become more certain, primarily due to
the decline in performance and valuations of the specially
serviced assets. Fitch modeled losses of 9.7% of the remaining
pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total 12.5%,
including $95.9 million (12% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date. Fitch has designated six loans (37.6%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes three specially serviced
assets (17.6%).

Rating Sensitivity

The Negative Outlook on the 'Bsf' rated class C indicates that
further downgrades are possible if the collateral performance
deteriorates.

As of the July 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 94.6% to $42.9 million from
$798.9 million at issuance. Currently, there are only 17 loans
remaining in the pool, compared to 121 at issuance. Per the
servicer reporting, one loan (4.5% of the pool) is defeased.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes D through NR.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a loan (4.7%)
secured by a 50,964 square foot (sf) retail property in Macon, GA.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in May 2012 due to
maturity default. The borrower is not remitting cash flow and the
foreclosure process has been initiated. Fitch's stressed value
based on servicer reported property value indicates losses upon
disposition of this asset.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is loan (4.6%)
secured by a 19,400 sf retail property in Edwards, CO. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in February 2012 due to
maturity default. Legal counsel has been engaged and the Notice of
Default has been sent. Foreclosure and receivership was filed in
April 2013 and a receivership motion has now been granted by the
courts.

Fitch downgrades the following class and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $10 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf', RE 80%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $31.7 million class C at 'Bsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $1.2 million class E at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 and B certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class NR certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1 certificates.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class K Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed 21 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2005-LDP2.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to increased credit enhancement from
significant paydowns and stable performance of the pool. The
downgrades reflect the increase in losses from the specially
serviced loans.

Fitch modeled losses of 8.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 4.9%, including $126.2
million (4.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 45 loans (26.5%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes 17 specially serviced loans (15.9%).

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 42.1% to $1.7 billion from
$2.9 billion at issuance. Fifteen loans (7.3%) are currently
defeased. Interest shortfalls are affecting classes J, K and N
through NR.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is secured by an
898,564 square foot (sf) mixed-use development consisting of five
office buildings, a mixed-use building, and a retail building
located in Creve Coeur, MO (6.6%). The loan was transferred to
special servicing in April 2012 for maturity default. The special
servicer is in discussions with the borrower. Occupancy is
currently at 91%.

The second-largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is secured
by a 236,961 sf office plaza located in Piscataway, NJ (1.6%). The
special servicer is in discussions with the borrower regarding a
possible restructure, as the loan suffers from cash flow issues.

The third-largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is two
office properties located in Atlanta, GA and Southfield, MI (2%).
The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2011 for
imminent default. The Atlanta property became real-estate owned
(REO) in June 2012 and the Michigan property in January 2013.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on the class A-1A through A-J notes are expected to be
stable as the credit enhancement remains high. Classes B through E
may be subject to further downgrades should losses be greater than
expected.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

-- $26.1 million class G to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $44.7 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $207.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $115.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37.7 million class A-3A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $561.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $247.9 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50 million class A-MFL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $216 million class A-J at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18.6 million class B at 'Asf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $41 million class C at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $26.1 million class D at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $26.1 million class E at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $29.8 million class F to 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.8 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $11.6 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have repaid in full. Fitch does not rate class
NR. The ratings on classes X-1 and X-2 were previously withdrawn.


JP MORGAN 2007-FL1: Rights Transfer No Impact on Moody's Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that the Holder of
Certificates evidencing a majority of the Voting Rights allocated
to the Controlling Class, acting by and through its appointed
Operating Advisor, has designated Strategic Asset Services LLC as
the successor Special Servicer and to replace Situs Holdings, LLC,
as the Special Servicer for the Sofitel Chicago Water Tower Loan.
The Proposed Special Servicer Replacement and Transfer will become
effective upon satisfaction of the conditions precedent set forth
in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement
from Situs to SAS. Moody's has determined that this proposed
special servicing transfer will not, in and of itself, and at this
time, result in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings
to any class of certificates rated by Moody's for J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-FL1.

Moody's opinion only addresses the credit impact associated with
the proposed transfer of special servicing rights. Moody's is not
expressing any opinion as to whether the this change has, or could
have, other non-credit related effects that may have a detrimental
impact on the interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for JPMCC 2007-FL1 was taken on Sept. 27,
2012.

The primary methodology used in monitoring this transaction was
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's will continue to monitor the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.

On January 19, 2012, Moody's confirmed the ratings of seven
classes and affirmed the ratings of two pooled classes and seven
non-pooled, or rake, classes of J.P. Morgan 2007-FL1:

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. H, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. J, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. RS-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. RS-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. RS-3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. RS-4, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. RS-5, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. RS-6, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. RS-7, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. X-2, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2011 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JP MORGAN 2012-HSBC: DBRS Rates Class E Securities 'BB(high)(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the ratings of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-HSBC, as follows, all with Stable
trends:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)

The collateral consists of a $300 million first mortgage loan
secured by a 30-story, 864,000 sf Class A office tower in Midtown
Manhattan, known as HSBC Tower.  The property spans an entire
block of Fifth Avenue between 39th and 40th Streets and serves as
the North American headquarters of HSBC Bank USA (HSBC; currently
rated AA (low) by DBRS).

In addition to the first mortgage loan, there is mezzanine
financing of $100 million.  The trust loan has a ten-year term,
with an initial interest-only period of five years.  As of YE2012
reporting, the loan had DSCR of 0.99x, which was a result of low
rental income.  This outcome was expected, as two tenants,
representing 14.8% of the NRA, did not assume their respective
spaces until February 2013.  The partial reporting from Q1 2013
produced a DSCR of 1.19x.

According to the February 2013 rent roll, the subject was 93.9%
occupied, with a weighted-average rental rate of $54.87 psf.  The
largest tenant is HSBC, occupying 63.4% of the NRA across various
spaces at the property.  Among HSBC's leased space at the subject
are Class A and Class B office spaces, three trading floors, a
data center, a retail bank branch with frontage along Fifth Avenue
and a lower-level bank vault featuring drive-in and drive-out
access for armored vehicles.  HSBC's lease expires in April 2020,
approximately two years before loan maturity, representing
significant refinance risk if the tenant vacates the property.
DBRS believes that HSBC will remain at the property past its lease
expiration date.

HSBC recently spent $25 million renovating its current space and
consolidating its operations at the subject.  The tenant currently
pays an average of $39.32 psf on its office space, well below
market, with two ten-year renewal options for all of its space, at
95% of fair market rent.

Along with HSBC, there are three other investment grade-rated
tenants in occupancy at the subject.  These include Staples, Man
Group and VTB Capital.  Combined, the four investment grade-rated
tenants account for 73.0% of the NRA and 69.5% of the NRI.

The subject resides in the Grand Central submarket, located
adjacent to Bryant Park and the New York Public Library.
According to the Q2 2013 CoStar report, Class A office properties
in the Grand Central submarket had an average vacancy rate of
10.4%, with average quoted rental rates of $63.16 psf.  The
subject is outperforming the submarket in terms of vacancy, and
while the weighted-average rental rate is currently below market,
this figure is heavily weighted by the HSBC office and vault
space.  Since May 2012, the sponsor has signed seven office
tenants at base rental rates ranging from $68.00 psf to $88.00
psf, demonstrating the strength and desirability of the subject.


JP MORGAN 2013-C13: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C13's
$961.2 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-C13 (see list).  At the same time, it withdrew its
preliminary rating on the class X-B certificates after the
arranger removed the class from the transaction structure.

The series 2013-C13 issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by 45 commercial mortgage loans with
an aggregate principal balance of $961.2 million, secured by the
fee and leasehold interests in 70 properties across 27 states.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the credit support provided by
the transaction structure, its view of the underlying collateral's
economics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's
relative diversity, and its overall qualitative assessment of the
transaction.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1620.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C13


Class       Rating          Amount ($)
A-1         AAA (sf)        55,992,000
A-2         AAA (sf)       203,174,000
A-3         AAA (sf)        20,130,000
A-4         AAA (sf)       324,319,000
A-SB        AAA (sf)        69,207,000
X-A         AAA (sf)    743,709,000(i)
A-S         AAA (sf)        70,887,000
B           AA- (sf)        68,484,000
C           A- (sf)         42,051,000
D           BBB- (sf)       37,246,000
X-C         NR           69,684,664(i)
E           BB (sf)         21,626,000
F           B+ (sf)         16,820,000
NR          NR              31,238,664

(i) Notional balance.
NR - Not rated.


JUBILEE CLO 2013-X: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Jubilee
CLO 2013-X B.V.'s EUR345.2 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which comprises
      primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including EURIBOR ranging from 0.30%-13.31%

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available before paying trustee
      fees and expenses, uncapped administrative expenses, hedge
      termination and securities lending counterparty payments,
      subordinated, deferred, and incentive management fees, and
      subordinated note payments to principal proceeds to purchase
      additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1657.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Jubilee CLO 2013-X B.V.

Class                Rating          Amount (mil. EUR)
A                    AAA (sf)                  231.5
B                    AA (sf)                    42.0
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                     27.0
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                   21.0
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                    23.7
Subordinated notes   NR                         54.8

NR-Not rated.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2000-C3: Moody's Takes Action on 3 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed two classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C3 as
follows:

  Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2012 Upgraded
  to B3 (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2010 Downgraded
  to C (sf)

  Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of Class J is due primarily to enhanced credit quality
resulting from paydowns and amortization, the sizeable presence of
defeased loans and high-quality CTL loans in the pool and the
retreat of interest shortfalls down the capital stack since
Moody's last review. Class J at Moody's last review had been
impacted by interest shortfalls, which were subsequently paid down
following the liquidation of two loans in special servicing.

The affirmation of Class K is due to Moody's expected loss for
this class remaining within a range commensurate with the current
rating.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 5% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 28%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses total 3.6% of the original
securitized deal balance, which is unchanged from Moody's last
review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Since the pool consists entirely of loans which are either
defeased, specially serviced, or CTL, Moody's utilized a loss and
recovery approach in rating the P&I classes in this deal. In this
approach, Moody's determines a probability of default for each
component and determines a most probable loss given default based
on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer and available market data.
The loss given default for each loan also takes into consideration
servicer advances to date and estimated future advances and
closing costs. Translating the probability of default and loss
given default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies
the aggregate loss from specially serviced loans to the most
junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior class(es).

In rating this transaction, Moody's also used its credit-tenant
lease (CTL) financing methodology approach (CTL approach). Under
Moody's CTL approach, the rating of the CTL component is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds. This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease. The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan. The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default. Moody's also considers the overall
structure and legal integrity of the transaction. For deals that
include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's currently uses a
Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public CDO rating model
CDOROM v2.8-9 to generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess
the ratings.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2 compared to a Herf of 4 at Moody's prior
review. While Moody's typically employs the large loan/single
borrower methodology in cases where the Herf falls below 20, the
methodology was not used in this rating action due to the unusual
composition of the pool and Moody's subsequent employment of the
loss/recovery approach.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated November 8, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the June 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $17 million
from $1.31 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from 5% to
44% of the pool. Three loans, representing approximately 59% of
the pool, are defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Thirty-three loans have liquidated from the pool, contributing to
an aggregate realized loss to the trust of approximately $46
million. Liquidated loans experienced an average 23% loss
severity. Currently, one loan, representing 16% of the pool, is in
special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the Mid-America
Business Park II Loan ($3 million -- 16% of the pool), which is
secured by a 120,000 square foot industrial property in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, near the Tinker Air Force Base. The property is
occupied by a single tenant, New Breed Logistics, a third-party
logistics provider, which occupies the property under a lease
scheduled to expire in June 2014. The loan transferred to special
servicing in January 2010 for imminent default. The servicer is
currently in workout discussions with the borrower.

The pool contains a CTL component which includes three loans
secured by properties leased under bondable leases. Moody's
provides ratings for 100% of the CTL component. The corporate
exposures are CVS/Caremark (15% of the pool; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Baa2 -- stable outlook), and Walgreen Co. (10% of
the pool; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa1 -- negative
outlook). Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 operating
results for 100% of the CTL loans.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. L Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine classes and removed five classes
from Rating Watch Negative of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
(LBUBS) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-
C6.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades and removal from Rating Watch Negative for Classes
A-M through C are due to ongoing concerns and increased loss
expectations on the specially serviced loans. The classes were
placed on Rating Watch Negative following the transfer of the
Islandia Shopping Center (2.94% of the pool), in March 2013.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses on the
specially serviced loans since Fitch's rating action in November
2012, primarily attributed to the Peco Portfolio (12.8%). The
ratings of the senior classes take into account the impending loan
pay off of the Innkeepers portfolio, which is expected to occur
within the next 60 days.

Fitch modeled losses of 15.3% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 16.8%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $116 million (3.9% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 76 loans (43.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 56 specially serviced assets (22%).

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 15.9% to $2.50 billion from
$2.98 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes G through T.

Rating Sensitivities

The Negative Outlook on classes A-M and A-MFL reflect potential
for further rating actions should expected losses on the specially
serviced loans increase, primarily the Peco Portfolio. The loan
has been in default since September 2012 and no appraisals or
values have been provided to Fitch by the special servicer.

The largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is the Peco
Portfolio (12.8%), which consists of 39 crossed-collateralized
loans totaling $320.9 million secured by 39 retail properties
totaling 4.25 million SF located across 13 states. Primarily
grocery-anchored, the portfolio's major tenants include Tops
Markets, Bi-Lo Grocery, Big Lots, and Publix. The loans had
transferred to special servicing in August 2012.

In December 2012 the properties funds and management have been
turned over to a special servicer appointed management company.
The special servicer reports it is currently evaluating the
appropriate resolution strategy.

The second largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is the
McCandless Towers loan (4.6% of the pool). The property, which is
also referred to as the Santa Clara Towers, is collateralized by
two 11-story, Silicone Valley office buildings totaling 426,326
square feet (SF) located in Santa Clara, CA. The property has
experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines, as well as
softening market conditions. McAfee Associates Inc. (McAfee)
(previously 46% of the total net rentable area [NRA]), which
occupied 100% of Tower II (214,080 SF), had vacated the property
at its recent lease expiration in March 2013. The borrower has
been successful in releasing approximately 85,000SF (20% of total
NRA) of the vacated McAfee space to CA Technologies on a long term
lease from July 2013 through January 2024. The property is
currently 61% occupied. The net operating income (NOI) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) for year end (YE) December 2012
reported at 0.92 times (x) but includes the McAfee lease. As of
June 2013, the loan is current and there are more than $2.3
million in upfront and ongoing leasing cost reserves.

The third largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is the
Islandia Shopping Center loan (2.9%) which is collateralized by a
376,774 SF retail center located in Islandia, NY (Long Island).
The property's anchors are a Wal-Mart and a Stop & Shop.
Additional major tenants include Dave & Busters and TJ Maxx. The
property transferred to special servicing in March 2013 due to
imminent default and loan modification request. Although the
property is currently 97% occupied, the borrower cited previous
cash flow constraints from vacancies, reduced rental rates and
chronically delinquent payments. The YE December 2012 NOI DSCR
reported at 0.92x. The loan remains current as of the June 2013
remittance date.

Fitch removes from Rating Watch Negative and downgrades the
following classes:

-- $227.9 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Negative;

-- $70 million class A-MFL to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Negative;

-- $156.4 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'BBB-sf'; RE 60%;

-- $33.5 million class B to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 0%;

-- $37.2 million class C to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;

Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Estimates (RE) to the
following classes as indicated:

-- $33.5 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.8 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.8 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $33.5 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $216 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $169 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.4 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $910.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $360.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37.2 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $41 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.8 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $18 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class T certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class X certificates.


LEHMAN 2006-LLF: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. X-FLP Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes and
upgraded two classes of Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2006-LLF C5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-LLF C5. Moody's rating action is as
follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. X-FLP, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. WSD, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to the anticipated payoff of the largest loan
in the pool (Swan and Dolphin Loan) at maturity. The affirmations
of the P&I classes are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) remaining within acceptable ranges. The
rating of the IO Class, Class X-2, is consistent with the expected
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.
The rating of the IO Class, Class X-FLP, is affirmed as it
references the National Conference Center Loan whose credit
assessment remains unchanged from last review. Moody's does not
rate pooled classes E, F, G, H, J, K and L which provide
additional credit support for the more senior classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated August 30, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the June 17, 2013 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance decreased slightly from last review, to
approximately $427 Million. The Certificates are collateralized by
four floating rate whole loans and senior interests in whole
loans. The loans range in size from 6% to 77% of the pooled
balance. The pool's Herfindahl Index is 1.7, the same as at last
review.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by fee interest in Walt
Disney World Swan & Dolphin Loan ($320 million, or 77% of the
pooled balance plus a $10 million rake bond within the trust). The
two-hotel portfolio (2,267-guestrooms) is located in Lake Buena
Vista, Florida, near Orlando. The sponsor is Tishman Hotel &
Realty Corporation. There is no additional debt. The loan's final
maturity date is in September 2013. Due to improved loan
performance over the last two years, Moody's expects this loan to
pay off at maturity.

In 2012, the properties' combined Adjusted Net Operating Income
was approximately $41 million, up 21% from approximately $34
million achieved in 2011. In the first three months of 2013,
Adjusted Net Operating Income was approximately $16 million,
stable from the same period in 2012. Moody's stabilized net cash
flow remains at $41 million, and Moody's stabilized value of $397
million remains unchanged from last review. Moody's current credit
assessment for the pooled portion is B2, same as last review.

The second largest loan in the pool is secured by a fee interest
in the National Conference Center Loan ($37 million, or 9% of the
pooled balance plus). The 917-room property is located in
Lansdowne, Virginia, 35 miles outside of Washington, DC. The four
building complex is a conference/training center with 265,000
square feet of meeting space located on 67 acres of land (net of
45 acres sold in 1Q 2013). The net proceeds of $18.7 million from
the sale of land to the municipality where the property is located
were used to establish various reserves, reimburse fees and
advances, construct a garage necessary to replace parking lost as
a result of the land sale, and $4.3 million pay down of the trust
debt.

The loan forbearance agreement closed in March 2013. The first
forbearance period is through September 2013, and the second
forbearance period ends in June 2014. The Borrower and Mezzanine
Lender placed the property deed in escrow to facilitate a deed-in-
lieu foreclosure and agreed to deliver to the lender if the loan
is not repaid in full. Moody's stabilized value is $37 million,
down from $41 million from last review. Moody's current credit
assessment for the pooled portion is Caa3, same as last review.

The third (Continental Grand Plaza Loan) and the fourth (30
Montgomery Street Loan) loans were modified in 2010 and 2011,
respectively and returned to master servicer. Both loans appear to
be showing positive momentum. Both loans mature in the second half
of 2014.

Currently, the pool has incurred $40.2 million in cumulative bond
losses and $216,095 in interest shortfalls affecting pooled
Classes L. In addition, non-pooled rake classes PR1-1, PR1-2
suffered minimal bond losses.

Moody's weighted average pooled LTV ratio is 87% and Moody's
weighted average stressed DSCR for pooled trust debt is 1.14X,
relatively stable from last review. Moody's weighted average LTV
including a rake bond is 89% and Moody's weighted average stressed
DSCR including a rake bond is 1.11X.


METROCAT RE: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Class A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has assigned its 'BB-(sf)',
preliminary rating to the Series 2013-1 class A notes to be issued
by MetroCat Re Ltd. (MetroCat).  The notes provide parametric
coverage for storm surge measured during the named storms' event
period.

This is the first time S&P has rated a transaction using only
RMS's storm surge model, as well as the first time S&P has rated a
transaction that has storm surge as the sole metric for
determining if a triggering event has occurred.

The preliminary rating is based on the lower of the rating on the
catastrophe risk 'BB-' and the rating on the assets in the
collateral accounts ('AAAm' on the closing date and rated by
Standard & Poor's thereafter).  S&P do not maintain an interactive
rating on the ceding insurer, First Mutual Transportation
Assurance Co. (FMTAC).  However, credit exposure to FMTAC will be
mitigated because it will prepay the initial quarterly interest
spread at closing and will prepay each subsequent quarterly
interest spread 50 days before each payment date.

FMTAC was incorporated under New York State laws as a pure captive
insurance company on Dec. 5, 1997, and commenced operations on
that date.  The company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MTA and is
established to insure and reinsure the risks of the MTA.

The class A notes offer reinsurance to FMTAC for named storms that
generate an event index value that equals or exceeds 8.5 feet for
Area A (tidal gauges located in The Battery, Sandy Hook and
Rockaway Inlet) or 15.5 feet for Area B (tidal gauges in East
Creak and Kings Point).

A loss payment on the notes is based upon the event index value
meeting or exceeding a trigger level for the applicable area.  If
a trigger event occurs, the loss payment from MetroCat to FMTAC
will be 100% of the outstanding principal amount.

Ratings List

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

MetroCat Re Ltd.
Senior Unsecured
  Series 2013-1
   Class A principal at-risk var-rate nts   BB- (sf) (prelim)


MERRILL LYNCH 2007-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class G Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes, affirmed 15 classes
and removed eight classes from Rating Watch Negative of Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2007-C1 (MLMT 2007-C1).

Key Rating Drivers

Classes A-1 through A-M were placed on Rating Watch Negative on
May 20, 2013 due to continued concerns surrounding the
underperformance of the top 15 loans, as well as the possibility
that interest shortfalls could affect these classes prior to class
repayment. The downgrades are attributed to higher Fitch expected
losses, primarily due to lower performance and/or valuations on
the specially serviced assets.

Fitch modeled losses of 22.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 21.9%, including $176.2
million (4.4% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 82 loans (52.7%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes 13 specially serviced assets (7.5%).

As of the June 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 21.9% to $3.16 billion from
$4.05 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes AJ through Q.

The largest two contributors to expected losses are the Empirian
Portfolio Pool 1 (11.4% of the pool) and Pool 3 (9.8%) loans. Both
loans were transferred to the special servicer in November 2010
and returned to the master servicer in February 2013 after being
modified. The modification consisted of bifurcating both loans
into an A and a B note with a 70/30 split. Pool 1 is secured by 78
multifamily properties (7,964 units) located across eight states.
Pool 3 is secured by 79 multifamily properties (6,864 units)
located across eight states. The properties within the two
portfolios are generally class B and C complexes, many of which
were constructed in the 1980s and lack common amenities. All of
the properties suffer significant deferred maintenance. As of
March 2013, the occupancy for Pool 1 and Pool 3 were 87%,
representing a decline from the 93% and 90.9% reported at
issuance.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is Gwinnett Place,
a real estate owned (REO) asset (3.6%) consisting of 566,908
square feet (sf) of a 1.28 million sf regional mall located in
Duluth, GA. The asset was transferred to special servicing in
October 2011 for imminent payment default and became REO in August
2012. The property has suffered a significant decline in occupancy
and a reduction in tenant sales since issuance. As of March 2012,
the property was reportedly 52% occupied compared to 81% at
issuance. Occupancy is expected to be impacted further due to two
collateral tenants, Belk and Gwinnett College, vacating at the end
of their lease terms by the end of summer of 2013. The loss of
Gwinnett College could also trigger co-tenancy clauses. In
addition to poor property performance, the property's valuation,
sales pricing, and bidding activity volume have also been
negatively impacted by the significant amount of available anchor
space inventory within a one mile radius of the property. The most
recent appraisal value indicates significant losses upon
liquidation.

Rating Sensitivity

The ratings of the senior classes A-2, A-2FL, A-3, A-3FL, A-SB, A-
4, and A-1A are expected to remain stable. The distressed classes
(those rated below 'B') are expected to be subject to further
downgrades as losses are realized on the Gwinnett Mall and other
specially serviced loans.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Rating Outlooks to the following classes, as indicated:

-- $322.2 million class A-3 to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $130 million class A-3FL to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $75.1 million class A-SB to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $442.2 million class A-4 to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $1.1 billion class A-1A to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $405 million class AM to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf', RE 80%.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $134.1 million class AJ to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $200 million class AJ-FL to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes, removes from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigns Rating Outlooks to the following classes, as
indicated:

-- $40.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $27 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $86.1 million class B at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $40.5 million class C at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $45.6 million class D at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $45.6 million class E at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $50.6 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $31.5 million class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class Q certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class X certificates.


MINCS-CENTURION V: Fitch Cuts Rating on $7MM Secured Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn its rating on one class
of notes issued by MINCS-Centurion V, Ltd. (MINCS):

-- $7,009,629 third-priority secured notes downgraded to 'Dsf'
   from 'Csf', RE 55%; rating withdrawn.

Key Rating Drivers:

The actions reflect insufficient proceeds available to repay the
notes following liquidation of all remaining loan and equity
positions in July 2013. Since July 2012, approximately $8 million
in proceeds from the liquidated MINCS collateral were used to
partially repay the notes' original $57 million principal balance
following payments to the credit swap counterparty.

SEQUILS Centurion V Ltd. (SEQUILS) and MINCS were a cash flow and
synthetic collateralized loan obligation (CLO), respectively,
jointly obtaining exposure to a portfolio of high yield U.S.
senior bank loans. Proceeds from the issuance of the SEQUILS notes
were invested in senior bank loans. The SEQUILS issuer entered
into a credit swap with Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York
(MGT; ultimate parent JPMorgan Chase & Co.) that provided credit
protection to SEQUILS. MGT simultaneously entered into a credit
swap with MINCS. MINCS' obligation under that swap was
collateralized with $57 million of securities purchased with the
proceeds from the sale of the MINCS notes.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C3: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-C3 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings. If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The ratings of the IO Classes, Class X-A and X-B, are consistent
with the expected credit performance of their referenced classes
and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 2.2% of the current deal balance compared to
approximately 2.0% at last review. Moody's base expected loss plus
realized loss is 2.2% of the original securitized deal balance
compared to 2.0% at Moody's last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26, the same as at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated July 25, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the October 5, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $1.46 billion
from $1.48 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 63 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 52% of the pool. The pool includes two
loans with investment-grade credit assessments, representing 11%
of the pool.

Four loans, representing 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Currently there are no loans in special servicing and Moody's has
not identified any troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 97% and 48% of the performing pool,
respectively. Moody's weighted average LTV is 87% compared to 92%
at last full review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.65X and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.14X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Park City Center
Loan ($50 million -- 10% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
1.2 million square foot retail center located in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. Major tenants include JC Penney, Bon Ton, and Sears.
The property was 100% leased as of March 2013 compared to 97% in
July 2012. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3
and 2.11X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 2.08X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 20% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Westfield Belden Village Loan ($100
million -- 7% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 419,400
square foot regional mall located 25 miles north of Akron in
Canton, Ohio. Mall occupancy was 100% in December 2012. Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.96X, respectively,
compared to 82% and 1.87X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Oxmoor Center Loan ($92 million --
6% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 941,000 square foot
super-regional mall in the Louisville, Kentucky. The center is
anchored by Macy's, Sears, Von Maur, Dick's Sporting Goods and Old
Navy. The property was 97% leased as of December 2012 compared to
96% at last review. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 97%
and 1.34X, respectively, compared to 98% and 1.35X at last review.

The third largest loan is the One BriarLake Plaza Loan ($83
million -- 6% of the pool). The loan is secured by a Class A
office building located in Houston, Texas and includes a seven-
story parking garage. The loan sponsor is Behringer Harvard REIT
I, Inc. The property is currently 91% leased. The three largest
tenants are Apache Corporation (35% of the net rentable area
(NRA), lease expiration October 2018), Nexen Petroleum (10% NRA,
lease expiration May 2017) and Microsoft (7% NRA, lease expiration
May 2015). Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.62X
respectively, compared to 95% and 1.43X at last review.


NACM CLO I: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from NACM CLO I, a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Allianz Global Investors
Capital.  S&P also affirmed its rating on the D notes from the
same transaction.  Simultaneously, S&P removed all the ratings
from CreditWatch with positive implications.

The upgrades of the class A-1, A-2, B, and C notes reflect an
increase in credit support following paydowns to the class A-1
notes since S&P's February 2012 rating actions.

The transaction exited its reinvestment period in July 2012 and
has commenced paying down the class A-1 notes.  On April 22, 2013,
class A-1 notes received a $56.2 million principal paydown.
Currently, the class A-1 notes' outstanding balance is about 50%
of the original balance.  As a result of the paydowns, the class
A-2 overcollateralization ratio increased to 141.62% in June 2013
from the 121.45% noted in the January 2012 trustee report.

The June 2013 monthly trustee report indicated that the collateral
pool did not hold any defaulted assets.

The class D notes' affirmation reflects the availability of
adequate credit support at the 'BB' rating level.

The transaction has exposure to long-dated assets (i.e., assets
that mature after the stated maturity of the CLO).  According to
the June 2013 trustee report, the balance of collateral with a
maturity date after the stated maturity of the transaction
represented 4.41% of the portfolio (about $7.9 million in par).
S&P's analysis took into account the potential market value and/or
settlement-related risk arising from the potential liquidation of
the remaining securities on the legal final maturity date of the
transaction.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ACTIONS

NACM CLO I

                     Rating
Class           To           From

A-1             AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2             AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B               AA+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
C               A- (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D               BB (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Pos


NATIXIS 2007-HE2: Moody's Retains Ratings on Computershare Appt.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has determined that the proposed delegation by Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (Aa3, P-1), of any responsibilities it may have as
securities administrator to pursue remedies for breaches of loan
level representations and warranties to Computershare Trust
Company, as separate securities administrator, should not, if
implemented, in and of itself at this time result in a reduction
or withdrawal of the current ratings of the securities issued in
Natixis Real Estate Capital Trust 2007-HE2. Moody's does not
express an opinion as to whether the proposal may be considered to
have negative effects in any other respect.

Wells Fargo initiated this delegation based on a potential or
perceived conflict between its role as securities administrator
for the transaction, on the one hand, and its role in the market
as an RMBS originator, on the other hand. In its role as
securities administrator it may have the responsibility to pursue
remedies for breaches of representations and warranties. However,
in its role as originator, it may have to defend claims that it
breached representations and warranties.

The proposed amendment contemplates a withdrawal of Wells Fargo
from any duties it may have to pursue breaches of representations
and warranties and the appointment of Computershare to undertake
those duties. For the avoidance of doubt, Wells Fargo will
continue to perform all other duties in its securities
administrator capacity.

Moody's does not believe that the proposed amendment will have any
negative rating impact on the transaction because Computershare is
not conflicted and we believe it has the capability to do an
adequate job. Furthermore, the ratings in this transaction are Ca
(sf), which incorporates any potential volatility arising from the
delegation.

Moody's will continue to monitor the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.


NEWCASTLE CDO V: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class V Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings of two classes and affirmed the
ratings of four classes of Notes issued by Newcastle CDO V, Ltd.
The downgrades are due primarily to negative migration of the
underlying collateral credit quality as evidenced by Moody's
current weighted average rating factor (WARF) and recovery rate
(WARR). The affirmations are due to key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Class I Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep
9, 2011 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Class II Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);
previously on Sep 9, 2011 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Class III Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
previously on Sep 9, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Class IV-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf);
previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Class IV-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf);
previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Class V Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously
on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Newcastle CDO V, limited is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(53.1%), REIT debt (17.2%), asset backed securities (ABS) (15.7%)
primarily in the form of subprime RMBS, and CMBS rake bonds
(14.0%). As of the June 17, 2013 trustee report, the aggregate
Note balance of the transaction has decreased to $263.3 million
from $500.0 million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the
senior most outstanding class of notes, as a result of the
combination of regular amortization and interest proceeds
rediverted as principal due to failure of certain par value tests.

There are thirteen assets with a par balance of $41.3 million
(18.5% of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the June 17, 2013 trustee report, compared to
fifteen defaulted securities totaling $45.0 million par amount at
last review. Five of these assets (76.1% of the defaulted balance)
are CMBS and eight assets (23.9%) are ABS. Moody's does expect
significant losses to occur from these defaulted securities once
they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3,872
compared to 3,377 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (5.6% compared to 4.2% at last
review), A1-A3 (1.9% compared to 3.1% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(23.3% compared to 25.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (23.3% compared
to 25.0% at last review ), B1-B3 (10.4% compared to 10.9% at last
review), and Caa1-C (35.5% compared to 30.8% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.1 years, the same as at last review.
The current WAL is based on the assumption about extensions on the
underlying collateral assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 13.5%, compared to 17.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 7.7%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption, down
from 13.5% to 8.5% or up to 18.5% would result in a rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch downward and 0 to 1
notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector continues to exhibit growth albeit at a slightly
slower pace. The multifamily sector should remain stable with
moderate growth. Gradual recovery in the office sector continues
and will be assisted in the next quarter when absorption is likely
to outpace completions. However, since office demand is closely
tied to employment, Moody's expects regional employment growth to
provide market differentiation. CBD markets continue to outperform
secondary suburban markets. The retail sector exhibited a slight
reduction in vacancies in the first quarter; the largest drop
since 2005. However, consumers continue to be cautious as
evidenced by sales growth continuing below historical trends.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with robust securitization activity of
commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low
interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


NRP MORTGAGE 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B4 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to NRP
Mortgage Trust 2013-1's $433.479 million mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2013-1.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by residential mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The high-quality collateral included in the pool.

   -- The pool's relatively high geographic concentration compared
      to similar transactions.

   -- The quality of First Republic Bank's prime jumbo origination
      platform.

   -- The credit enhancement provided, as well as the associated
      structural deal mechanics.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1658.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

NRP Mortgage Trust 2013-1

Class  Rating     Amount  Interest rate    Class type
                (mil. $)         (%)(i)
A1     AAA (sf)  406.634           3.25    Senior/MACR
AIO    AAA (sf)     (ii)           (iv)    IO/Initial MACR
A2     AAA (sf)  284.644           2.50    Senior/Initial MACR
A2IO   AAA (sf)    (iii)            (v)    IO/MACR
A2-1   AAA (sf)  284.644           2.75    Senior/MACR
A2I1   AAA (sf)    (iii)           (vi)    IO/Initial MACR
A2-2   AAA (sf)  284.644           3.00    Senior/MACR
A2I2   AAA (sf)    (iii)          (vii)    IO/Initial MACR
A2-3   AAA (sf)  284.644           3.25    Senior/MACR
A2I3   AAA (sf)    (iii)         (viii)    IO/Initial MACR
A3     AAA (sf)   40.663           3.25    Senior/Initial MACR
A4     AAA (sf)   40.663           3.25    Senior/Initial MACR
A5     AAA (sf)   40.664           3.25    Senior/Initial MACR
A6     AAA (sf)  325.307           3.25    Senior/MACR
A7     AAA (sf)   81.327           3.25    Senior/MACR
A8     AAA (sf)  365.970           3.25    Senior/MACR
A9     AAA (sf)  121.990           3.25    Senior/MACR
A10    AAA (sf)  406.634        Net WAC    Senior/MACR
B1     AA (sf)     6.602        Net WAC    Subordinate
B2     A (sf)      7.041        Net WAC    Subordinate
B3     BBB (sf)    4.841        Net WAC    Subordinate
B4     BB (sf)     8.361        Net WAC    Subordinate
B5     NR          6.602        Net WAC    Subordinate

   (i)The certificates are subject to a net WAC cap.
  (ii)The notional amount for class AIO will equal the aggregate
      outstanding balance of the class A2, A3, A4, and A5.
(iii)The notional amount for class A2I1, A2I2, A2I3, and A2IO
      will equal the class A-2 outstanding balance.
  (iv)Equal to the excess, if any, of the net WAC that's higher
      than 3.25%.
   (v)Equal to the lesser of 0.75% or the net WAC over the class
      A1 interest rate.
  (vi)Equal to the lesser of 0.25% or the net WAC over 2.5%.
(vii)Equal to the lesser of 0.25% or the net WAC over 2.75%.
(viii)Equal to the lesser of 0.25% or the net WAC over 3.0%.
   NR-Not rated.
MACR-Modifiable and exchangeable certificate.
  WAC-Weighted average coupon.


OFSI FUND III: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by OFSI Fund III, Ltd.:

$39,500,000 Class B Notes Due September 20, 2019, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on November 22, 2011, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

$36,500,000 Class C Notes Due September 20, 2019, Upgraded to Aa3
(sf); previously on November 22, 2011, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

$28,750,000 Class D Notes Due September 20, 2019, Upgraded to Baa3
(sf); previously on November 22, 2011, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

$25,500,000 Class I Combination Notes Due September 20, 2019
(current Outstanding Balance of 4,550,587.49), Upgraded to A3
(sf); previously on November 22, 2011, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$200,000,000 Class A-1 Notes Due September 20, 2019 (current
outstanding balance of $104,786,707.31), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 22, 2011, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$140,625,000 Class A-2 Notes Due September 20, 2019 (current
outstanding balance of $73,678,153.58), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 22, 2011, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$11,500,000 Class E-1 Notes Due September 20, 2019, Affirmed Ba3
(sf); previously on November 22, 2011, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

$9,125,000 Class E-2 Notes Due September 20, 2019, Affirmed Ba3
(sf); previously on November 22, 2011, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the end of the reinvestment period in September 2012. Moody's
notes that the Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes have been paid
down by approximately 47.61% each. The Class A-1 Notes received
principal payments of $27.2 million, $41.2 million, and $26.8
million in December 2012, March 2013 and June 2013 respectively.
The Class A-2 Notes received principal payments of $19.2 million,
$28.9 million, and $18.8 million in December 2012, March 2013 and
June 2013 respectively. Based on the latest trustee report dated
June 6, 2013, the Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 142.92%, 125.54%,
114.56% and 107.80%, respectively, versus September 2012 levels of
131.04%, 119.56%, 111.85%, and 106.90%, respectively. The trustee-
reported June overcollateralization ratios do not include the
recent payment to the Class A Notes.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $325 million, defaulted par of $20.5 million,
a weighted average default probability of 21.51% (implying a WARF
of 3150), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.12%,
and a diversity score of 40. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

OFSI Fund III, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans with significant exposure to middle market loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013 The methodology used in rating the Class I Combination
Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months.
Additionally, for each CE where the related exposure constitutes
more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch
equivalent assumed downgrade.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2520)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E-1: +1

Class E-2: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3780)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E-1: -1

Class E-2: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.


OHA LOAN 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to OHA
Loan Funding 2013-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2013-1 Inc.'s
$471.9 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned  ratings under various interest rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.28%-11.57%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of up to 50% of
      excess interest proceeds that are available (before paying
      subordinated and incentive collateral management fees,
      uncapped administrative expenses and hedge amounts,
      subordinated note payments, expenses related to a
      refinancing, and the supplemental reserve amount) to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets or, after the noncall period, to pay the notes
      sequentially, at the election of the collateral manager, but
      only during the reinvestment period.  After the end of the
      reinvestment period, the excess interest proceeds are used
      only to pay the notes sequentially.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1645.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OHA Loan Funding 2013-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2013-1 Inc.

Class              Rating          Amount
                                 (mil. $)
A                   AAA (sf)        304.6
B1                  AA (sf)          41.7
B2                  AA (sf)          30.0
C (deferrable)      A (sf)           30.2
D (deferrable)      BBB (sf)         26.7
E (deferrable)      BB (sf)          23.7
F (deferrable)      B (sf)           15.0
Subordinated notes  NR               39.0

NR-Not rated.


OMI TRUST 2001-D: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Certs to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-1 certificates from OMI Trust 2001-D, an asset-backed securities
transaction backed by fixed-rate manufactured housing loans
originated by Oakwood Acceptance Corp., to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)'.  S&P subsequently withdrew the rating.

The downgrade and withdrawal reflect the nonpayment of full
principal to investors by July 2013, the stated final maturity
date.  S&P's rating reflects the probability of the default of
full principal and timely interest payments each month by the
certificate's stated final maturity or legal final maturity date.

Because cumulative net losses have been higher than initially
expected, the transaction has not generated enough collections
each month to pay the complete scheduled principal amount due to
all the outstanding class A certificates per the transaction
documents. As such, all of the class A certificates have
accumulated a current unpaid principal shortfall of approximately
$44.6 million.  According to the transaction documents, the
payment waterfall specifies that before the normal sequential
principal payment distribution, any unpaid principal shortfall
amount will be paid pro rata among all the still-outstanding class
A certificates.  Accordingly, the class A-1 certificates have been
receiving an amount equal to their pro rata share of the available
monthly collections.

As of the July 15, 2013, distribution date, the class A-1
certificates had an outstanding balance of approximately
$2.221 million and were not paid in full by the July 2013 stated
final maturity date.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


PACIFICA CDO VI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Pacifica CDO VI, Ltd.:

$10,000,000 Class A-1c Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
August 15, 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 21,
2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf))

$25,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
August 15, 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 21,
2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$32,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due August 15, 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September
21, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$18,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due August 15, 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
September 21, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

$7,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
Due August 15, 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September
21, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

$11,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
August 15, 2021, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on September 21,
2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$266,500,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
August 15, 2021 (current outstanding balance of $255,540,635.50),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 21, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

$90,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
August 15, 2021 (current outstanding balance of $85,887,668.10),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 25,
2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in August 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from a higher spread compared to the level
assumed at the last review. Moody's modeled a weighted average
spread of 3.38% compared to the covenant of 2.75% at the time of
the last review. Moody's also notes that the transaction's
reported collateral quality and overcollateralization ratio are
relatively stable.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $474.2 million, defaulted par of $0.8 million,
a weighted average default probability of 19.14% (implying a WARF
of 2687), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.04%,
and a diversity score of 68. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Pacifica CDO VI, Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2149)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1c: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +2

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3224)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1c: -1

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.


PASADENA CDO: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on three
notes issued by Pasadena CDO, Ltd.:

-- $5,779,818 class A notes upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'BBBsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $66,500,000 class B notes affirmed at 'CCsf';

-- $26,500,000 class C notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs' for
the class A notes. For the class B and C notes, Fitch compared the
credit enhancement level to the expected losses from the
distressed and defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or
lower). The agency also considered additional qualitative factors
in its analysis to conclude the rating actions for the rated
notes.

Key Rating Drivers

Since Fitch's last ratings action in July 2012, there has been a
modest deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
collateral, with 11.4% of the portfolio downgraded a weighted
average of 2.3 notches and 6.3% upgraded a weighted average of 2.7
notches. Approximately 53.9% of the current portfolio has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade and 41.5% has a rating in
the 'CCCsf' rating category or lower, compared to 53.5% and 36.6%,
respectively, at previous review.

The upgrade of the class A notes is attributed to improved credit
enhancement (CE) available to these notes as a result of the
ongoing deleveraging of the capital structure, which in Fitch's
view offsets the modest deterioration in the underlying portfolio.
Over the last four payment dates, the class A notes have received
approximately $27.7 million, or 82.7% of its previous outstanding
balance, in principal redemptions from principal amortizations and
approximately $1.9 million of excess interest. As a result, the
par-based CE level for the class A notes has increased and the
breakeven results have improved compared to the last review. The
remaining balance of $5.8 million represents 1.5% of the original
issued amount.

Although, the breakeven levels for the class A notes indicate it
is able to withstand higher rating stresses than 'AAsf' in all
scenarios, given the continuing negative migration in the
portfolio, Fitch believes that the risk profile of these notes is
not consistent with the 'AAAsf' level.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that the transaction will
continue to delever and that these notes have a sufficient CE to
offset potential deterioration of the underlying collateral going
forward. In the agency's opinion, there is a high likelihood that
the class A notes will be paid in full within the next 6-12
months.

While the class B notes continue to receive their timely interest
payments and are expected to begin receiving principal payments in
the next 12 months, their par-based CE continues to remain below
the amount of expected losses from distressed assets. As such, an
affirmation of the notes at 'CCsf' reflects Fitch's view that
default continues to appear probable for the class B notes.

The class C notes continue to defer their interest payments with
approximately $3.6 million of such interest accrued as of the June
2013 payment date. Fitch believes that default is inevitable for
this class at or prior to maturity due to the concentration of
distressed collateral. Therefore, these classes have been affirmed
at 'Csf'.

Rating Sensitivities

Further negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by
SF PCM as well as increasing concentration in assets of a weaker
credit quality could lead to downgrades.

Pasadena CDO is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on June 21, 2002 and is monitored
by Western Asset Management Company. As of the June 2013 Trustee
report, the portfolio is composed of residential mortgage-backed
securities (69.6%), commercial asset-backed securities (19.4%),
consumer asset-backed securities (3.7%), commercial real estate
loan credit tenant leases (5.5%), SF CDOs (1.1%), and of corporate
assets (0.7%), from primarily 1997 through 2009 vintage
transactions.


PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER 1997: Loan Sale No Impact on Moody's Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's announced that the sale and release of approximately $38
million loans from the lien of the Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency (1997 Indenture) would not, in and of itself and
as of this time, result in the downgrade or withdrawal of the
outstanding ratings assigned to bonds issued from the PHEAA (1997
Indenture).

Moody's believes that the sale and release of loans will not have
an adverse effect on the credit quality of the rated securities
such that the Moody's ratings were impacted. However, Moody's
opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with the
proposed amendment, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion as
to whether the amendment has, or could have, other non-credit
related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the
interests of holders of rated obligations and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for PHEAA (1997 Indenture) was taken on
October 1, 2012.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans"
published in April, 2012.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.

On October 1, 2012, Moody's downgraded 10 classes of student loan
bonds and confirmed 86 classes of student loan bonds issued by
Pennsylvania Higher:

Sr. Ser. 1998C, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2000F-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2000F-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2000H, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2000J-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2000J-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2000J-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2001L-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2001L-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002N-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002N-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002R-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002R-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002T-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002T-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002T-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002T-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002T-5, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2002U, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002V-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002V-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002V-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2002V-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2003W-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2003W-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2003X, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2003Y-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2003Y-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2003Y-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2003Y-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004Z-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004Z-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004Z-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004AA-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004AA-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004BB-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004BB-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004BB-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2004BB-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005CC-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005CC-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005DD-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005DD-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005EE-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005EE-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005EE-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005EE-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005GG-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005GG-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005GG-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005GG-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2005GG-5, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-5, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-6, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-7, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-8, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-9, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006HH-10, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-5, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-6, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-7, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-8, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-9, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2006JJ-10, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-5, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-6, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-7, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-8, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-9, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007LL-10, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007MM-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007MM-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007MM-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007MM-4, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007MM-5, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr. Ser. 2007MM-6, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2000G, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2000K, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2001M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2002O, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2005FF, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2006II, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2006KK, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2007NN, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PHOENIX CLO III: Moody's Affirms Ba2, B1 Rating on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Phoenix CLO III, Ltd.:

$37,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due July 17, 2019, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$33,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due July 17, 2019, Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

$24,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due July 17, 2019,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$336,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Notes Due July 17, 2019 (current
outstanding balance of $320,905,338), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on March 23, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due July 17, 2019,
Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf);

$13,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due July 17, 2019,
Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to B1
(sf);

$3,000,000 Class F Combination Notes Due July 17, 2019 (current
Rated Balance of $1,368,640), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
August 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in July 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from a higher WAS of 3.53% compared to the
level assumed in the prior rating review.

Moody's notes that the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
has deteriorated since the last rating action. Based on the June
2013 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 2769 compared to 2584 in January 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $450.2 million, defaulted par of $21.2
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.46%
(implying a WARF of 2782), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.47%, and a diversity score of 68. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Phoenix CLO III, Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Class F Combination
Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2226)

Class A1: 0
Class A2: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +2
Class D: +1
Class E: +1
Class F: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3339)

Class A1: 0
Class A2: -1
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -1
Class F: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


RACE POINT VIII: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Race
Point VIII CLO Ltd./Race Point VIII CLO Corp.'s $468.50 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of May 6, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P noted.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Race Point VIII CLO Ltd./Race Point VIII CLO Corp.

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
X                          AAA (sf)                       4.00
A                          AAA (sf)                     310.00
B                          AA (sf)                       58.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        43.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      26.50
E (deferrable)             BB- (sf)                      27.00


RAIT CRE: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight and downgraded three classes of
RAIT CRE CDO I Ltd. (RAIT CRE CDO I) reflecting Fitch's base case
loss expectation of 51.9%. Fitch's performance expectation
incorporates prospective views regarding commercial real estate
market value and cash flow declines.

Key Rating Drivers

Since the last rating action, the senior classes, A-1A and A-1B,
have received only $18.3 million in pay down from the removal of
approximately 12 loan interests and scheduled amortization.
Realized losses on the removed assets total $12.6 million. The CDO
is currently over collateralized by close to $21 million.

As of the June 2013 trustee report, and per Fitch categorization,
the CDO is substantially invested as follows: whole loans/A-notes
(66.1%), B-notes (2.2%), mezzanine debt (12%), preferred equity
(18.7%), and REIT debt (1%). There are interests in approximately
110 different assets contributed to the CDO. The current
percentage of defaulted assets and loans of concern is 1.3% and
43.5%, respectively. Fitch expects significant losses upon default
for many of the subordinate positions, since they are generally
highly leveraged. As of the June 2013 trustee report, all over-
collateralization and interest coverage tests were in compliance.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 86% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 8% from, generally, year-end 2012 or trailing 12 months
first quarter 2013. Modeled recoveries are average at 39.7%.

The largest contributor to Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
preferred equity position (3.3% of the pool) on an office complex
located in Boca Raton, FL. After a period of vacancy, the property
was 100% leased to a new tenant in 2011. However, the property
remains overleveraged, and Fitch modeled a substantial loss in its
base case scenario on this position.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (3.1%) secured by a poorly performing regional
mall located in South Carolina. Cash flow does not support debt
service. Fitch modeled a substantial loss in its base case
scenario on this loan.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates. The default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various defaults
timing and interest rate stress scenarios as described in the
report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. The
breakeven rates for classes A-1 through A-2 pass the cash flow
model at the ratings listed below.

The 'CCC' and below ratings for classes B through J are based on a
deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets and Fitch Assets of Concern, factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each class's credit enhancement.

RAIT CRE CDO I is managed by RAIT Partnership, L.P. Fitch notes
that RAIT affiliates have ownership interests in over 30 of the
CDO assets totaling approximately $480 million.

Rating Sensitivities

The Negative Outlooks for classes A-1 through A-2 reflect the
potential for further negative credit migration of the underlying
collateral. The junior classes are subject to further downgrade
should realized losses begin to increase.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $187.3 million class A-1A notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $257.6 million class A-1B notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $90 million class A-2 notes at 'Bsf' from; Outlook Negative;
-- $110 million class B notes at 'CCCsf'; RE 25%;
-- $41.5 million class C notes at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $22.5 million class D notes at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $17.5 million class H notes at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $35 million class J notes at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $16 million class E notes to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $500,000 class F notes to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $12.5 million class G notes to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.


RFC CDO 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 10 Cert. Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of RFC CDO 2007-1 (RFC 2007-
1), reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 67.1%.
Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective views
regarding commercial real estate market values and cash flow
declines.

Key Rating Drivers

The performance of the transaction has been in line with
expectations over the last year. Per Fitch categorizations,
commercial real estate loans (CREL) comprise approximately 50.2%
of the collateral of the CDO. Approximately 22.1% of the CREL
assets are whole loans and the remainder are B-note. Commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) represents 49.8% of the total
collateral.

Since the last rating action in July 2012, approximately 4.9% of
the underlying CMBS collateral has been downgraded. As of the June
2013 trustee report, 35% of the CMBS collateral had a Fitch
derived rating in the 'CCC' category and below, compared to 29.1%
at the last rating action. Over this period, the class A-1 notes
have received approximately $126 million in principal paydowns.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 80.1% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be
16.3% reflecting the low recovery expectations upon default of the
CMBS tranches and real estate loans.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss is the expected
losses on the CMBS bond collateral. The second largest contributor
to loss is a B-note (6.5%) on a 314,074 square foot (sf) office
tower located in San Diego, CA. The loan is highly leveraged and
current income is insufficient to cover the debt service.

The third largest contributor to loss is a subordinate mortgage
participation (5.1%) originally collateralized by four
casino/hotel properties located in Atlantic City, NJ, East
Chicago, IN, Robinsonville, MS and Tunica, MS. Two of the original
properties were released and the remaining two properties are
currently real estate owned (REO) assets. The estimated value of
the collateral is less than the senior debt amount. Fitch modeled
a term default and a full loss on the position.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) tests to project future default
levels for the underlying CREL collateral in the portfolio and
uses the Portfolio Credit Model for the CMBS collateral.
Recoveries for the CREL collateral are based on stressed cash
flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on all notes may be subject to further downgrades as
losses are realized.

Over the past two years, interest proceeds have consistently been
insufficient to pay the interest due on the timely classes; the
interest due on these classes has been paid from principal
proceeds. Fitch continues to be concerned about the CDO's ability
to continue to make timely interest payments to class A-1 given
the diminished amount of interest proceeds and significant swap
counterparty payments. The affirmation at 'CCC' reflects the
possibility going forward that interest and/or principal proceeds
will not be available to pay the timely interest class, especially
if there are further defaults or delinquencies on the underlying
collateral. Ultimate recoveries to the class, however, should be
substantial.

The ratings for classes A-2 through L are based on a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
the credit enhancement of each class.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $51,675,211 class A-1 at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $5,741,690 class A-1R at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $125,000,000 class A-2 at 'CCsf'; RE 20%;
-- $25,000,000 class A-2R at 'CCsf'; RE 20%;
-- $86,500,000 class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $50,468,727 class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $20,063,304 class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $15,873,540 class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24,167,264 class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $16,184,907 class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $26,310,866 class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $19,678,900 class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $18,353,020 class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $11,636,229 class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%.


RFC CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 9 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed 14 classes of notes issued
by RFC CDO 2007-1 Ltd. (f/k/a CBRE Realty Finance CDO 2007-1,
LTD.). The affirmations are due to key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation and collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO CLO)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-1R, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2R, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

RFC CDO 2007-1, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (47.9% of
the pool balance), B-note debt (28.1%), whole loan debt (22.1%),
and asset backed securities (ABS) (1.9%). As of the July 8, 2013
payment date, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction,
including income notes and deferred interest, has decreased to
$574.7 million from $1 billion at issuance, with the paydown
directed to the Class A-1 and A-1R notes, as a result of the
combination of principal repayment of collateral, resolution and
sales of defaulted collateral and credit risk collateral, and the
failing of certain par value tests. Currently, the transaction has
implied under-collateralization of $327.1 million (32.7% of
original aggregate note balance, compared to 23.2% at last review)
primarily due to realized losses on the collateral.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,048
compared to 7,392 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (3.9% compared to 3.0% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.9% compared to 0.5% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(3.6% compared to 1.5% at last review), B1-B3 (11.8% compared to
8.2% at last review), and Caa1-Ca/C (79.8% compared to 86.8% at
last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.0 years compared to 3.3 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 18.4% compared to 24.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 18.4% to 8.4% or up to 28.4% would result in rating
movements on the rated tranches of 0 to 6 notches downward or 0 to
5 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector continues to exhibit growth albeit at a slightly
slower pace. The multifamily sector should remain stable with
moderate growth. Gradual recovery in the office sector continues
and will be assisted in the next quarter when absorption is likely
to outpace completions. However, since office demand is closely
tied to employment, Moody's expects regional employment growth to
provide market differentiation. CBD markets continue to outperform
secondary suburban markets. The retail sector exhibited a slight
reduction in vacancies in the first quarter; the largest drop
since 2005. However, consumers continue to be cautious as
evidenced by sales growth continuing below historical trends.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with robust securitization activity of
commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low
interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


RFMSI 2005-SA1: Moody's Takes Action on Three RMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche, backed by Prime Jumbo
loans, issued by RFMSI.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2005-SA1 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, these actions reflect correction of errors
in the cash flow model used by Moody's in rating this transaction.
In prior rating actions, loss estimates resulting from loan
modifications were not allocated to senior bonds and the cross-
collateralization mechanism was coded incorrectly. These errors
have now been corrected, and these ratings actions reflect this
change.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.2%
in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


SALOMON BROTHERS VII: Moody's Keeps 'C' Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes of
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C2 as follows:

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation for Classes D, E and F are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR
and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable
ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the classes are sufficient to maintain
their current ratings. Depending on the timing of the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The ratings of Classes G, J and K are consistent with Moody's base
expected loss and thus are affirmed.

The ratings of Class X are consistent with the expected credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 40.3% of
the current balance compared to 40.7% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 8.6% of the original deal
balance compared to 8.7% at last review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's also utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating the
P&I classes in this deal since 86% of the pool is in special
servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan and determines a most
probable loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions
of value (if available), other information from the special
servicer and available market data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration servicer advances to date
and estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).
The analyst may have also identified troubled loans which are
blown up in addition to specially serviced loans.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4 compared to 5 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the June 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $75
million from $782 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 20 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 34% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 90% of
the pool. Three loans, representing 8% of the pool, have been
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government Securities.

Four loans, representing less than 1% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

As of the June 18, 2013 distribution date 18 loans have been
liquidated at a loss from the pool, resulting in an aggregate
realized loss of $37 million (63% loss severity on average). Eight
loans, representing 86% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the 1615 Poydras
Street Loan ($26 million -- 34.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 502,000 square foot (SF) office building located in downtown
New Orleans, Louisiana. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in April 2010 due to the borrower's request to waive the
anticipated repayment date (ARD) interest after the loan failed to
repay by its ARD date. The loan has been modified twice. In May
2011 a modification waived the accrued ARD interest and changed
the loan's final maturity date to 2020 to 2030. The borrower
funded a $1 million reserve account as part of the first
modification. A second modification was executed in March 2012
that changed loan repayment to interest only through January 2014.
The property was 78% leased as of January 2013 compared to 74% as
of April 2012. The loan is less than one month delinquent and
Moody's included this loan in the conduit portion of the pool.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.97X, respectively,
compared to 104% and 1.10X at last review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Diamond Point
Plaza Loan ($14 million -- 18.9% of the pool). The loan has been
in special servicing since 2002. The trust initiated a suit
against the borrower for fraud. In December 2005 the trust was
awarded a $21 million judgment against the borrower and its
affiliates. The special servicer, ORIX Capital Markets LLC, is
still pursuing legal action against the borrower to collect the
settlement. The servicer is being reimbursed by the trust for
advances and expenses associated with this loan. A reimbursement
of $150,000 was made in May and June 2013, which caused a
temporary spike in interest shortfalls up to Class E. Moody's
expects interest shortfalls at Class E to be repaid within a few
months. The master servicer declared this loan non-recoverable in
March 2012. The loan was secured by a 251,000 SF retail center
located in suburban Baltimore, Maryland, however, the collateral
was sold for $5 million in December 2012. Sale proceeds were used
to partially recover outstanding expenses.

Five of the six remaining specially serviced loans, 250 Plaza
Office Building ($13 million -- 17.0%), SunTrust Centre ($3
million - 7.1%), One Centennial Drive ($2 million - 2.3%),
CountryHouse Residences ($2 million -- 2.1%) and St. James
Apartments ($1 million -- 1.2%) were sold as part of a bulk sale
after the June 18, 2013 distribution date. The average loss
severity for the five loans was 69% after accounting for allocated
selling, closing and legal costs. Moody's analysis incorporates
the losses from the resolution of these loans.

Moody's has estimated a $12.3 million loss (38% average loss
severity) for the three outstanding specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial or full year
2012 operating results for 74% and 72% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101%
compared to 90% at Moody's prior review. The conduit excludes
defeased loans and all of the specially serviced loans except for
the 1615 Poydras Street Loan. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 3.2% to the most recently available
net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.11X and 1.71X, respectively, compared to
1.03X and 1.87X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance. The deal's stressed DSCR is
greater than the actual DSCR because the average loan constant is
greater than Moody's 9.25% stressed rate.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes E through P
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $20
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs),
extraordinary trust expenses, loan modifications that include
either an interest rate reduction or a non-accruing note
component, and non-recoverability determinations by the servicer
that involve either a clawback of previously made advances or a
decision to stop making future advances.


SARGAS CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2A, A-2B, and B notes, lowered its rating on the class D
notes, and affirmed its rating on the class C notes, from Sargas
CLO I Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
currently managed by Fortress Investment Group LLC.  At the same
time, S&P removed its ratings on these six classes from
CreditWatch with positive implications.

The rating actions follows S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the June 17, 2013, trustee report.

The upgrades primarily reflect $191.7 million in paydowns to the
class A-1 notes since S&P's May 2012 rating actions, when it
raised its ratings on two classes of notes.  The class A-1 notes
have paid down to 17.0% of their original balance, leading to an
increase in overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the
notes.  The June 2013 trustee report noted that the class A, B, C,
and D O/C ratios improved to 220.6%, 155.5%, 125.6%, and 108.4%,
respectively, from 128.3%, 118.6%, 111.4%, and 106.1% since April
2012.  In addition, the weighted average spread increased over the
same time period to 4.79% from 4.41%.

The affirmed rating reflects S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating level.

The downgrade of the class D notes reflects S&P's view
concentration risk has increased in the transaction since May
2012.  S&P observed that the transaction's total number of
obligors has decreased to 36 from 98 and that the percentage of
'CCC' rated assets has increased to 29.1% from 11.2%.  As of June
2013, the largest two obligors, together accounting for
$13.0 million, or 12.6% of the transaction's pool, are rated 'CCC'
and 'B-', respectively.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in its view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take
further rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Sargas CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                   To           From
A-1                     AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2A                    AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2B                    AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B                       AA+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
C                       BBB (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D                       B+ (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Pos


SDART 2013-4: Moody's Assigns 'Ba'2 Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes to be issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-
4 (SDART 2013-4). This is the fourth transaction of the year for
Santander Consumer USA Inc.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-4

Class A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

Class A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Class D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of SCUSA as
servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2013-4 pool
is 16.0% and the Aaa level is 49.0%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of SCUSA's portfolio vintage performance as
well as performance of past securitizations, and current
expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the a Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the presence of the investment
grade rated parent, Banco Santander (Baa2/P-2). In addition, the
securitization documents include a provision that requires the
appointment of a back-up servicer in the event that the rating on
Banco Santander is downgraded below Baa3, or if Banco Santander
ceases to own at least 50% of the common stock of SCUSA.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS," published in May 2013.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 19.0%, 25.5% or
29.0%, the initial model output for the Class A notes might change
from Aaa to Aa1, A1, and Baa1, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 19.5% or
22.5%, the initial model output for the Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to Aa2, A2, and Baa2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 17.5% or
21.5%, the initial model output for the Class C notes might change
from A1 to A2, Baa2, and Ba2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 18.5% or
21.0%, the initial model output for the Class D notes might change
from Baa2 to Baa3, Ba3, and B3 respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 18.0% or
19.0%, the initial model output for the Class E notes might change
from Ba2 to Ba3, B3, and
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


SDART 2013-4: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-4's $891.14 million
automobile receivables-backed notes series 2013-4.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securitization backed by
subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of 49.77%, 43.65%, 35.02%, 30.97%, and
      26.41% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E
      notes, respectively, based on stress cash flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.93x, and 1.60x S&P's 13.50%-
      14.50% cumulative net loss expectation.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the
      assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, with all else being equal, its ratings on the
      class A, B, and C notes will remain within one rating
      category of the assigned ratings during the first year.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, with all else being equal, its ratings on the
      class D and E notes will remain within two rating categories
      of the assigned ratings, which is within the outer bounds of
      S&P's credit stability criteria.

   -- The originator/servicer's history in the subprime/specialty
      auto finance business.

   -- S&P's analysis of eight years of static pool data on
      Santander Consumer USA Inc.'s lending programs.

   -- The transaction's payment/credit enhancement and legal
      structures.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-4


Class    Rating      Type          Interest         Amount
                                   rate            (Mil. $)

A-1      A-1+ (sf)   Senior        Fixed            128.00
A-2      AAA (sf)    Senior        Fixed            265.70
A-3      AAA (sf)    Senior        Fixed            182.49
B        AA (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed             95.22
C        A (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed            117.19
D        BBB+ (sf)   Subordinate   Fixed             53.71
E        BB+ (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed             48.83


SIERRA TIMESHARE 2011-2: Fitch Rates Class C Notes 'BBsf'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on the notes issued by
various Sierra Timeshare Receivables transactions as follows:

Sierra Timeshare 2008-1 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2010-3 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2011-2 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers:

The rating affirmations reflect the ability of each transaction's
credit enhancement to provide loss coverage consistent with the
current ratings. The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation
that the notes will remain sufficiently enhanced to cover stressed
loss levels for the next 12 to 18 months.

Fitch will continue to monitor economic conditions and their
impact as they relate to timeshare asset-backed securities and the
trust level performance variables and update the ratings
accordingly.

Rating Sensitivity:

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults could produce
loss levels higher than the current expectations and impact
available loss coverage. Lower loss coverage could affect ratings
and Rating Outlooks, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.

To date, the transactions have exhibited minimal losses (due to
repurchases) and default performance is consistent with Fitch's
initial expectations. Default coverage and multiple levels are
consistent with the current ratings. A material deterioration in
performance would have to occur within the asset pools to have
potential negative impact on the outstanding ratings.

Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity analyses are discussed in
the presale reports titled 'Sierra Timeshare 2008-1 Receivables
Funding, LLC (US ABS)', dated April 23, 2008, 'Sierra Timeshare
2010-3 Receivables Funding, LLC (US ABS)', dated Oct. 12, 2010,
and 'Sierra Timeshare 2011-2 Receivables Funding, LLC (US ABS)',
dated Aug. 22, 2011, which is available on Fitch's web site.


SIERRA TIMESHARE 2013-2: Fitch to Rate $28MM Class C Notes at 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the notes issued by Sierra Timeshare 2013-2
Receivables Funding LLC:

-- $174,100,000 Class A asset-backed notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,830,000 Class B asset-backed notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
-- $28,070,000 Class C asset-backed notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers:

Improved Brand Concentration: Approximately 62.6% of Sierra 2013-2
consists of WVRI-originated loans (down from 67.3% in 2013-1), and
the remaining 37.4% are WRDC loans. On a like-for-like FICO basis,
excluding sub-600 FICO score obligors, WRDC's receivables perform
better than WVRI's. Offsetting the improved brand concentration is
a slightly negative shift toward borrowers with lower FICO scores.

Continued Weak WVRI Performance: Similar to other timeshare
originators and other consumer asset types, Wyndham Worldwide
delinquency and default performance exhibited notable increases in
the 2007-2008 vintages. While more recent vintages are displaying
improved performance under the WRDC platform, the improvement is
not evident under the WVRI platform.

Sufficient CE Structure: Initial hard credit enhancement (CE) is
expected to be 34.25%, 15.50%, and 4.50% for the class A, B, and C
notes, respectively. Hard CE is composed of overcollateralization,
a letter of credit reserve account, and subordination. Soft CE is
also provided by excess spread and is expected to be 9.29% per
annum.

Quality of Origination/Servicing: Wyndham Worldwide has
demonstrated sufficient abilities as an originator and servicer of
timeshare loans. This is evidenced by the historical delinquency
and loss performance of securitized trusts and of the managed
portfolio.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of Wyndham Worldwide and Wyndham
Consumer Finance, Inc. (WCF) would not impair the timeliness of
payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITY:

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults could produce
cumulative gross default (CGD) levels higher than the base case
and would likely result in declines of credit enhancement and
remaining default coverage levels available to the notes.
Additionally, unanticipated increases in prepayment activity could
also result in a decline in coverage. Decreased default coverage
may make certain note ratings susceptible to potential negative
rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.

Thus, Fitch conducts sensitivity analysis stressing both a
transaction's initial base case CGD and prepayment assumptions by
1.5x and 2.0x and examining the rating implications on all classes
of issued notes. The 1.5x and 2.0x increases of the base case CGD
and prepayment assumptions represent moderate and severe stresses,
respectively, and are intended to provide an indication of the
rating sensitivity of notes to unexpected deterioration of a
trust's performance.


SIERRA TIMESHARE 2013-2: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. C Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Sierra Timeshare 2013-2 Receivables Funding LLC's
$250 million vacation timeshare loan-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by vacation ownership interval (timeshare) loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 15,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the credit
enhancement available in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and available excess
spread.  S&P's preliminary ratings also reflect its view of
Wyndham Consumer Finance Inc.'s servicing ability and experience
in the timeshare market.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1663.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Sierra Timeshare 2013-2 Receivables Funding LLC

Class       Rating              Amount
                              (mil. $)
A           A (sf)              174.10
B           BBB (sf)             47.93
C           BB (sf)              28.07


SLM STUDENT 2004-1: Fitch Hikes Subordinate Notes Rating From 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior notes at 'AAAsf' and upgrades the
subordinate notes to 'Asf' from 'BBsf' issued by SLM Student Loan
Trust 2004-1, SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-2, SLM Student Loan
Trust 2004-3.

The Rating Outlook on the senior notes, which is tied to the
sovereign rating of the U.S. government, remains Negative, while
the subordinate note has been removed from Rating Watch Positive
and assigned a Stable Outlook.

Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

Key Rating Drivers

The ratings on the senior notes are affirmed and the ratings on
the subordinate notes are upgraded based on stable trust
performance and the sufficient level of credit to cover the
applicable risk factor stresses. Additionally, both trusts are
approaching 40% pool factor, at which time the reserve account
will be excluded from SLM's parity calculation, resulting in
trapped excess cash in the trust. While both the senior and
subordinate notes will benefit from future excess spread, the
senior notes also benefit from subordination provided by the class
B note. The senior and total parities for SLM Student Loan Trust
2004-1 have remained stable at 104.52% and 100% respectively since
the stepdown date in July 2009. The senior and total parities for
SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-2 have remained stable at 104.74% and
100% respectively since the stepdown date in April 2009. The
senior and total parities for SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-3 have
remained stable at 104.78% and 100% respectively since the
stepdown date in April 2009.

Rating Sensitivities

Since FFELP student loan ABS rely on the U.S. government to
reimburse defaults, 'AAAsf' FFELP ABS ratings will likely move in
tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults and basis risk account for the majority
of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.
Additional defaults and basis shock beyond Fitch's published
stresses could result in future downgrades. Likewise, a buildup of
credit enhancement driven by positive excess spread given
favorable basis factor conditions could lead to future upgrades.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-1:
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; removed from Rating
   Watch Positive; Outlook Stable assigned.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-2:
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; removed from Rating
   Watch Positive; Outlook Stable assigned.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-3:
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; removed from Rating
   Watch Positive; Outlook Stable assigned.


SLM STUDENT 2004-5: Fitch Hikes Subordinate Note Rating From 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior notes at 'AAAsf' and upgrades the
subordinate note to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf' issued by SLM Student Loan
Trust 2004-5, SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-8, SLM Student Loan
Trust 2004-10. The Rating Outlook on the senior notes, which is
tied to the sovereign rating of the U.S. government, remains
Negative, while the Rating Watch Positive on the subordinate note
is removed and assigned a Stable Outlook. Fitch used its 'Global
Structured Finance Rating Criteria', and 'Rating U.S. Federal
Family Education Loan Program Student Loan ABS' to review the
ratings.

Key Rating Drivers

The ratings on the senior notes are affirmed and the ratings on
the subordinate notes are upgraded based on stable trust
performance and the sufficient level of credit to cover the
applicable risk factor stresses. Additionally, both trusts are
approaching 40% pool factor, at which time the reserve account
will be excluded from SLM's parity calculation, resulting in
trapped excess cash in the trust. While both the senior and
subordinate notes will benefit from future excess spread, the
senior notes also benefit from subordination provided by the class
B note. The senior and total parities for SLM Student Loan Trust
2004-5 have remained stable at 104.83% and 100% respectively since
the stepdown date in July 2009, total parities for SLM Student
Loan Trust 2004-8 have remained stable at 105.15% and 100%
respectively since the stepdown date in July 2010, and total
parities for SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-10 have remained stable
at 104.60% and 100% respectively since the stepdown date in April
2010.

Rating Sensititivities

Since FFELP student loan ABS rely on the U.S. government to
reimburse defaults, 'AAAsf' FFELP ABS ratings will likely move in
tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults and basis risk account for the majority
of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.
Additional defaults and basis shock beyond Fitch's published
stresses could result in future downgrades. Likewise, a buildup of
credit enhancement driven by positive excess spread given
favorable basis factor conditions could lead to future upgrades.


Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-5:

-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; removed from Rating
   Watch Positive; Stable Outlook assigned.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-8:

-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; removed from Rating
   Watch Positive; Stable Outlook assigned.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-10:

-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-7A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-7B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-8 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; removed from Rating
   Watch Positive; Stable Outlook assigned;



TELOS CLO 2013-3: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on TELOS
CLO 2013-3 Ltd./ TELOS CLO 2013-3 LLC's $327 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of June 5,
2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

TELOS CLO 2013-3 Ltd./TELOS CLO 2013-3 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                       (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     225.00
B                          AA (sf)                       36.50
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        26.50
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      18.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       15.00
F (deferrable)             B (sf)                         6.00


THORNBURG MORTGAGE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on $397MM of RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of seven
tranches, backed by Prime Jumbo loans, issued by Thornburg.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, these actions reflect correction of errors
in the cash flow model used by Moody's in rating this transaction.
In prior rating actions, undercollateralized amounts were applied
as realized losses to senior bonds and the cross-collateralization
mechanism was coded incorrectly. These errors have now been
corrected, and these ratings actions reflect this change.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.2%
in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.



TRADEWYND RE 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating on $125MM Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'B+(sf)' rating to the notes to be issued by Tradewynd Re Ltd.
The notes cover losses from named storms, earthquakes, and ensuing
damage caused by related earth shake, fire following and sprinkler
leakage, liquefaction, tsunami, and ensuing flood that result in
claims or liability in the covered area on a per-occurrence basis.

The rating is based on the lower of the rating on the catastrophe
risk ('B+'), the rating on the assets in the collateral account
('AAAm'), and the rating on the AIG entities responsible for
premium payments ('A+').

Some coverages are not included in the AIR modeling.  These
include damages to airplanes, marine and inland marine cargo,
onshore oil rigs, and clean-up costs from pollution caused by
covered perils.

However, the unmodeled coverages are small relative to the rest of
the book.  In catastrophe events during the past decade, they
generally accounted for less than 1% of losses on the subject
business.  Even the largest catastrophes such as Katrina had
unmodeled losses less than 2% of total losses.  Premiums for this
business account for 7% of the premiums for the subject business.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating
Tradewynd Re Ltd.
Senior Secured
$125 mil. Series 2013-1 notes due 2018         B+(sf)


US EDUCATION III: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Student Loans to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
subordinate class of the U.S. Education Loan Trust III, LLC
student loan notes and left it under review for further upgrade.
The underlying collateral consists of the Federal Family Education
Loan Program (FFELP), which are guaranteed by the U.S. government
for a minimum of 98% of defaulted principal and accrued interest.

Ratings Rationale:

The primary rationale for the upgrade is the continued build-up in
credit enhancement supporting the notes. The total parity (the
ratio of total assets to total liabilities) has increased from
102.4% as of March 2012 to 103.7% as of the latest reporting date
of March 2013. The increase in the total parity resulted primarily
from the continued buy back of auction rate securities at a
discount as well as from a pay-down of the notes with excess
spread generated in the transaction. Moody's will continue
reviewing the notes for further upgrade. The final resolution of
the review is pending a detailed cash flow analysis.

The methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans", published in
April 2012.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Issuer: U.S. Education Loan Trust III, LLC (2004 Indenture)

  2004B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains on Review for Possible
  Upgrade; previously on Apr 10, 2013 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review
  for Possible Upgrade


US EDUCATION IV: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Student Loan Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior and subordinate student loan
notes issued by U.S. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC - March 1, 2006
Indenture of Trust at 'AAAsf' and 'Bsf' respectively. The Rating
Outlook on the senior notes, which is tied to the sovereign rating
of the U.S. government, remains Negative, while the Rating Outlook
on the subordinate note remains Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of the senior and subordinate notes is based on
trust's performance and the sufficient level of credit enhancement
to cover the applicable risk factor stresses. Credit enhancement
for the senior and subordinate notes consists of
overcollateralization and future excess spread. The senior notes
also benefit from subordination provided by the class B note. The
senior and total parities have been increasing to 110.08% and
101.29% respectively as of March 2013, due to proceeds from loans
sold out of the trust and discounted repurchases of notes.

Rating Sensitivities

Since FFELP student loan ABS rely on the U.S. government to
reimburse defaults, 'AAAsf' FFELP ABS ratings will likely move in
tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults and basis risk account for the majority
of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.
Additional defaults and basis shock beyond Fitch's published
stresses could result in future downgrades. Likewise, a buildup of
credit enhancement driven by positive excess spread given
favorable basis factor conditions could lead to future upgrades.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

U.S. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC - March 1, 2006 Indenture of
Trust:

-- Class 2006-1 A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-1 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-1 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-1 A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-1 A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-1 A-7 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-1 A-8 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative.
-- Class 2006-2 A-1 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-2 A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-2 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-2 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-2 A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-2 A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2006-2 A-7 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2007-1 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class 2007-1 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative.
-- Class 2006-1 B-1 affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class 2006-1 B-2 affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class 2006-2 B-1 affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class 2007-1 B-1 affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C18: Moody's Keeps C Rating on 5 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 19 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-C18 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2011 Upgraded to Ca
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes A-3 through H are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. The ratings of Classes J through N are consistent
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. Depending on the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-C, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.9% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
7.6%. Realized losses have increased from 1.3% of the original
balance to 2.1% since the prior review. Moody's base expected loss
plus realized losses is now 8.7% of the original pooled balance
compared to 7.3% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic outlook indicates the global
economy has lost momentum over the past quarter as it tries to
recover. US GDP growth for 2013 is likely to remain close to 2%,
however US sequestration cuts that came into effect in March may
create a drag on the positive growth in the US private sector.
While the broad economic impact in unclear, the direct effect is
likely to shave 0.4% off US GDP growth in 2013. Continuing from
the previous quarter, Moody's believes that the three most
immediate risks are: i) the risk of an even deeper than currently
expected recession in the euro area, accompanied by deeper credit
contraction, potentially triggered by a further intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis; ii) slower-than-expected recovery in
major emerging markets following the recent slowdown; and iii) an
escalation of geopolitical tensions, resulting in adverse economic
developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 11 compared to 12 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated July 20, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the June 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to $1.03
billion from $1.41 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 50 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 55% of the pool. Four loans, representing 18% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains one loan with an investment grade credit
assessment, representing 2.7% of the pool.

Eleven loans, representing 36% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $30 million (18% loss severity on
average). Three loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Mercantile Bank & Trust Building Loan ($36.9 million -- 3.6% of
the pool), which is secured by 404,000 square foot (SF) office
tower located in Baltimore, Maryland. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in December 2011 due to imminent maturity
default with the loan maturing in January 2012. A major decline in
occupancy occurred when Venable LLC, which occupied 140,000 SF or
35% of the NRA, moved out in 2009. As of December 2011, the
property was 61% leased, however leasing could decline to 5% in
December 2014 as PNC, which leases 56% of the NRA, is expected to
move out the building into another building when its lease
expires.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $31.6 million loss for specially
serviced loans (57% expected loss on average). Moody's has assumed
a high default probability for ten poorly performing loans
representing 20% of the pool and has estimated an aggregate $41.9
million loss (20% expected loss based on a 52% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 97%
of the pool's non-specially serviced loans. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 88%
compared to 93% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 4% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.19X, respectively, compared to
1.37X and 1.12X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the 2700 Broadway Loan ($27.5
million -- 2.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 25,000 SF
condominium interest in the retail portion of a mixed-use building
located in New York City. The condo unit is 100% leased to the
Trustees of Columbia University through October 2054. Moody's
current credit assessment is A2, the same as at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 37% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the One & Two International Place
Loan ($194.4 million -- 18.8% of the pool), which represents a 50%
pari-passu interest in a $388.8 million first mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by two Class A office towers, totaling 1.8 million
SF located in the Financial District office submarket of Boston,
Massachusetts. The property was 79% leased as of December 2012,
compared to 72% at last review. The loan is currently on the
watchlist. Property performance declined after Ropes and Gray,
which formerly occupied 19% of the NRA, vacated when its lease
expired in December 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84%
and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.09X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Kadima Medical Office Pool Loan
($103.9 million -- 10.1% of the pool), which is secured by 16
medical office buildings totaling 797,000 SF. The properties are
located in eight states with the largest concentration in Florida
(8 properties). The portfolio was 94.8% leased as of March 2013
compared to 95.4% at last review. Property performance has been
stable and the loan has amortized 19% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 1.07X, respectively,
compared to 108% and 1.03X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Park Place II - A Note Loan ($80.4
million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 275,000 SF
mixed use office and retail property located in Irvine,
California. The loan was originally $100 million, with an interest
only period ending on June 2008, at which time the loan began to
amortize. The loan was transferred to special servicing in October
2009 due to imminent default, related to a decline in market
conditions as the property was 83% leased and there was
insufficient cash flow to service the debt. The loan was then
modified in July 2010 into an $84 million A-Note, and a $10.2
million B-Note. Prior to the modification the loan balance was
$98.2 million. The borrower made a $4 million principal pay down
to the A-Note, which brought the A-Note to $84 million. In
December 2011 and June 2013, there were principal pay downs of
$1.07 million and $2.5 million, respectively, bringing the A-Note
to $80.4 million. As of March 2013, the overall property was 91%
with the office space 96% leased and the retail space 86% leased.
Moody's has classified this as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 154% and 0.70X, respectively, compared to 164%
and 0.66X at last review.


WELLS FARGO 2008-AR2: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 RMBS Deals to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two
tranches, backed by Prime Jumbo loans, issued by Wells Fargo.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2008-AR2 Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-IO, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, these actions reflect correction of an
error in the cash flow model used by Moody's in rating this
transaction. In prior rating actions, recoveries were not
allocated as payments to the bonds. This error has now been
corrected, and these ratings actions reflect this change.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.2%
in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


WELLS FARGO 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C8
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates (WFRBS 2012 - C8).

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations of WFRBS 2012 - C8 are based on the stable
performance of the underlying collateral pool. As of the June 2013
remittance the pool's aggregate principal balance has been paid
down by 0.8% to $1.3 billion from $1.31 billion at issuance.
Approximately 86% of the pool has reported YE 2012 financials. For
those loans without updated financials, Fitch applied a haircut to
the issuance cash flow for modeling purposes. Fitch modeled YE
2012 net operating income (NOI) was approximately 1% higher than
the issuance NOI.

Ratings Sensitivity

The Rating Outlook remains Stable for all classes. No rating
actions are expected unless there are material changes to property
occupancies or cash flows, increased delinquencies, or additional
loans transferred to special servicing. The pool has maintained
performance consistent with issuance. Additional information on
rating sensitivity is available in the report 'WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-C8' (Aug. 31, 2012), available at
www.fitchratings.com.

The largest loan of the pool (11.6%) is collateralized by 100
Church Street, a 1.1 million-sf office building located two blocks
from City Hall and the World Trade Center site in downtown
Manhattan. The property was constructed in 1958 and has undergone
approximately $22 million in renovations and updates since 2005.
The sponsor, SL Green, acquired the property in early 2010 via a
consensual conveyance of ownership interest from the prior owner
in consideration of a mezzanine loan interest previously retained
by SL Green. At the time of acquisition, the property was only 41%
occupied. As of YE 2012 the property was 80% occupied.

The second largest loan (8%), the Brennan Industrial Portfolio, is
collateralized by a mix of 20 industrial and office properties
located in 12 different states. The portfolio consists of 17
industrial properties and two flex/lab buildings occupied by 12
unique tenants, eight of which are headquartered at their
respective facilities. The portfolio consists of single-tenant
properties that were all 100% occupied as of YE 2012. The loan is
sponsored by BIG Acquisitions, LLC, a joint venture between
Brennan Investment Group and Arch Street Capital Advisors.

The third largest loan (6.8%) is secured by Northridge Fashion
Center, a 1.52 million-sf regional mall located in Northridge, CA,
approximately 25 miles northwest of downtown Los Angeles. The mall
is anchored by JC Penney, Macy's, Macy's Men's & Home, and Sears,
none of which are part of the collateral. The property was 90.4%
leased at year-end 2012. The loan, which is sponsored by GGP, was
used to refinance debt of $122.3 million, returning cash of $120.4
million to the borrower.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $86.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $187.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $414.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $96.9 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $115 million class A-FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class A-FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $113.87 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1 billion interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.7 million class X-B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66.7 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43.9 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.5 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.8 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate class H.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the swap counterparty for the floating
rate class A-FL. In the event that any swap breakage costs are due
to the swap counterparty from the trust, any breakage costs will
only be paid after all payments on the class A-FL certificates
have been paid in full. The aggregate balance of the class A-FL
may be adjusted as a result of the exchange of all or a portion of
the class A-FL certificates for the fixed rate class A-FX.


WHITE KNIGHT: DBRS Hikes Floating Rate Notes From 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has released the Monthly Structured Notes Report for the
month ending May 31, 2013.

The total amount of outstanding floating-rate notes (FRNs)
reported for May 2013 is $28.3 billion.  It is composed of $25.1
billion of FRNs issued by Master Asset Vehicle I (MAV I), Master
Asset Vehicle II (MAV II) and Master Asset Vehicle III (MAV III);
$2.2 billion issued by Apex Trust; $550 million issued by White
Knight Investment Trust; $300 million issued by Great North Trust
and $218 million issued by Superior Trust.  As of the August 2012
report, DBRS's monthly reports also include several unrated notes
in MAV I, MAV II and MAV III.

During the month of June, DBRS confirmed the ratings of the MAV I
and MAV II Class A-1 Notes and the MAV I Class A-2 Notes.  DBRS
also upgraded the ratings of the MAV II Class A-2 Notes and the
Floating Rate Notes issued by White Knight Investment Trust.

The relatively benign market environment over the past year has
led to significant improvement in the stability cushions of the
MAV Notes.  Since the last rating action in June 2012, the overall
credit quality of the underlying transactions has continued to
improve as no credit events or major downgrades have occurred in
the pool of entities referenced by the collaterized debt
obligations (CDOs) to which the MAVs are exposed.  Exposure to
leveraged super-senior CDOs in the MAVs has also fallen, as a
number of transactions have been voluntarily terminated or have
matured with no losses.  In addition, spread-loss trigger levels
have continued to rise steadily while corporate credit spreads
have tightened considerably from their June 2012 levels, with
spreads on the iTraxx falling to as low as 10% of its trigger
level (compared to 30% in June 2012).

Despite the improved credit metrics and the widening distance
between index spreads and their respective trigger levels, the
ratings of the MAV Notes remain constrained by the non-market
standard legal and structural elements of the transaction.  As a
result, DBRS confirmed the MAVI and MAVII Class A-1 Notes at AA
(low) (sf) and the MAVI Class A-2 Notes at "A" (sf), on June 6,
2013.  In addition, increasing stability cushions supported an
upgrade of the rating of the MAVII Class A-2 Notes to A (low) (sf)
from BBB (high) (sf).

DBRS also upgraded the Floating Rate Notes (the Notes) issued by
White Knight Investment Trust to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (high)
(sf).  DBRS rates the Notes at the level equivalent to the
underlying transaction with the lowest credit assessment, and that
transaction was upgraded from BB (high) (sf) to BBB (low) (sf).
The overall credit quality of the underlying reference entities in
each transaction has not changed significantly.  However, the
transactions continue to benefit from time decay, a concept
whereby a structured credit grows less risky as it nears maturity.


* Fitch Says REO Sales Drive U.S. CMBS Delinquency Rate Lower
-------------------------------------------------------------
Increased sales of real estate owned (REO) properties caused U.S.
CMBS delinquencies to fall to their lowest level in over three
years, according to the latest index results from Fitch Ratings.
CMBS late-pays declined 19 basis points (bps) in June to 7.18%
from 7.37% a month earlier, the lowest level since March 2010. The
decline was fueled by the sale of $622 million (in stated loan
balance) of REO assets across 34 Fitch-rated transactions (mostly
from 2005-2007 vintages). This compares with just $262 million in
May.

The June REO sales were led by two loans: the original $138
million Silver City Galleria (JPMCC 2005-LDP4) and the $115
million Continental Towers (COBALT 2006-C1). Both assets were sold
at significant losses. Several other large REO assets are poised
to be sold in the coming months, which figures to drive the CMBS
delinquency rate even lower. This includes a portfolio of REO
assets that ORIX Capital Markets, as special servicer, has placed
for sale. The CMBS delinquency rate is likely to improve further
in the coming months as other large REO properties are sold,
including a slew from ORIX's portfolio.

In June, resolutions of $1.2 billion outpaced new additions to the
index of $709 million. Additionally, Fitch-rated new issuance
volume of $5 billion kept ahead of $2.1 billion in portfolio
runoff, causing an increase in the index denominator. Re-defaults
of struggling properties like the Park Hyatt Aviara Resort will
continue to slow improvements on an otherwise favorable picture
for CMBS delinquencies.

Current and previous delinquency rates are:

-- Industrial: 9.77% (from 10.81% in May);
-- Hotel: 8.35% (from 7.70%);
-- Office: 8.18% (from 8.35%);
-- Multifamily: 7.59% (from 7.91%);
-- Retail: 6.74% (from 6.92%).


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 106 U.S. RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 106 U.S. RMBS
transactions. The transactions reviewed consisted of 25 Federal
Housing Administration/U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs
(FHA/VA), 66 Closed-End Second Lien (CES) and Home Equity Line of
Credit (HELOC), and 15 high loan-to-value (HLV) U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions.
Fitch reviewed 769 classes; 754 classes were affirmed, 7 were
upgraded, and 8 classes were downgraded.

A spreadsheet detailing the actions can be found on Fitch's
website by performing a title search for 'U.S. RMBS Rating Actions
for July 18, 2013'. In addition, a summary of the mortgage pool
and bond analysis can be found by performing a title search for
'RMBS Loss Metrics.'

Key Rating Drivers

Performance has remained stable for transactions in this review
and has resulted in little change in Fitch's expected loss
assumptions. A detailed list of Fitch's updated Probability of
Default (PD), Loss Severity (LS), and Expected Loss (XL) can be
found by performing a title search for 'RMBS Loss Metrics' at
www.fitchratings.com

The downgrades were limited to one rating category below their
prior rating and did not affect any 'AAAsf' rated classes. The
main drivers of the downgrades were deterioration in performance
and reduced credit enhancement.

Upgrades were limited to one rating category above their prior
rating due to concerns over future cash flow volatility.

Rating Sensitivities:

Fitch uses pool level collateral data to analyze the FHA/VA, CES,
HELOC, and HLV transactions. For FHA/VA transactions Fitch
determines the PD using the pre-2004 subprime vintage average
derived from Fitch's non-prime loss model and adjusted for pool
specific performance.

The PD for CES transactions is typically based on the subprime
vintage average derived from Fitch's non-prime loss model. A few
CES transactions use the prime or Alt-A vintage average PD, since
these product types better reflect the CES collateral
characteristics and performance of those transactions. The Alt-A
vintage average from Fitch's non-prime loss is used for HELOC and
HLV transactions. CES, HELOC, and HLV transactions do not have
their PD adjusted for pool specific performance.

To determine the LS for FHA/VA transactions, Fitch relies on the
FHA/VA sector historical average adjusted for the pool-specific
composition of FHA, VA, and RHS loans. Fitch assumes a base case
loss severity of 6% for FHA/RHS loans and an LS of 20% for VA
loans. The aggregate average base case severity was 13% for all
transactions. In cases where there is limited transparency on the
composition of FHA, VA and RHS loans, the severity average of the
FHA/VA loans is used, which is 9%. Fitch will assume 100% servicer
advancing in the 'CCCsf-AAsf' rating stresses, but will discount
the advancing in the 'AAAsf' rating stress.

For the CES, HELOC, and HLV transactions Fitch assumes 100%
severity for all rating stresses. In addition, zero servicer
advancing is used for CES, HELOC, and HLV transactions.

Once Fitch determines the base case assumptions, the stressed
assumptions are determined using Fitch's loss model PD and
severity multiples. This in turn determines Fitch's expected
losses in the 'Bsf-AAAsf' stresses.

In addition to increasing losses at each rating category to
reflect increasingly stressful economic environments, Fitch
analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the
cash flow analysis. Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

The analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are
increasingly more stressful and less-likely outcomes. Although
many variables are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary
driver of the loss scenarios is the home price forecast
assumption. In the 'Bsf' scenario, Fitch assumes home prices
decline 10% below their long-term sustainable level. The home
price decline assumption is increased by 5% at each higher rating
category up to a 35% decline in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices
nationally to decline further before reaching a sustainable level.
While Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent
actual home price and mortgage performance trends differ from
those currently projected by Fitch.


* Moody's Takes Action on $919MM of Subprime RMBS Issued by RFC
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 44 tranches
from 15 transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC1 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC2 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC3 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC4 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC5 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Confirmed
at A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC6 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS1 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS2 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012
Confirmed at C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Confirmed
at C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS4 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS5 Trust

Cl. A-I-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS6 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS7 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS8 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RZ3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools. The
upgrades are due to improvement in collateral performance, and/ or
build-up in credit enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in May 2012 to 7.6% in May 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Hikes Ratings on $1.3 Billion of 40 Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 40 tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche backed by subprime loans,
issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2006-HE4

Cl. A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A1A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
NC 2005-HE8

A6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Confirmed at
Baa2 (sf)

M1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

M2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Confirmed at
C (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CH1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CW2

Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH1

Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. AV-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AV-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. MV-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH2, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH2

Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. AV-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. AV-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-4

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or building credit enhancement on the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.2%
in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $917MM Subprime RMBS of Various Issuers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 34 tranches
from 15 transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R7

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2012
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2012
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-BC1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Ellington Loan Acquisition Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-2a1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2a2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: GE-WMC Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-FRE1

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2012 Confirmed
at A3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Speciality Underwriting and Residential Finance 2005-AB3

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB2

Cl. A-1C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-1D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Confirmed at C (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-BC4

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2005-BC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $144 Million of Resecuritized RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded five bonds, upgraded
three bonds, and placed four bonds on review for possible
downgrade.

Issuer: CSMC 2008-1R

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2005-1

Cl. I-A3A, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2012
Confirmed at A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A3B, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2012
Confirmed at A3 (sf)

Cl. I-X, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2012 Confirmed
at A3 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Structured Securities Corp. Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-GE5

Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-1, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 29, 2012 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 29, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Mellon Re-Remic Pass-Through Trust 2004-TBC1

Cl. A, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 22, 2012 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 22, 2012 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Residential Mortgage Securities Funding 2008-3, Ltd.

Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Residential Mortgage Securities Funding 2008-6, Ltd.

The Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the pools of
mortgages backing the underlying bonds and the updated loss
expectations on the resecuritization bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities" published in February 2011.

The methodology used in determining the rating of the underlying
bonds was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in June
2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in May 2012 to 7.6% in May 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.

As part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
loss on the underlying bonds by an additional 10% and found that
the implied ratings of the resecuritization bonds do not change.


* Moody's Lifts Ratings on $384MM of Subprime RMBS from 2005-2006
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 10
tranches backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by four
transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-7

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-1

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-3

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 192 CLO Tranches After Prepayments
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on 192 tranches
in 95 US collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), totaling
approximately $4.5 billion of outstanding rated balance. The
magnitude of the upgrades ranged between one to three notches. The
ratings on all of the tranches upgraded, except for those already
upgraded to Aaa (sf), remain on review for upgrade. Moody's also
placed on review for upgrade the ratings on another 95 tranches in
63 CLOs, totaling approximately $1.6 billion of outstanding rated
balance.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's explained that these rating actions are primarily a result
of the substantial deleveraging of senior notes and increases in
the overcollateralization (OC) levels in the affected CLOs, which
improved the credit enhancement levels of outstanding tranches in
these deals. The deleveraging and OC improvements primarily
resulted from high prepayment rates of leveraged loans in CLO
portfolios. Notably, Moody's estimates that all leveraged loan
repayments - most of which were unscheduled - exceeded an
annualized rate of 50% from January to June 2013, which is
significantly higher than the average historical level of
approximately 30% per annum. As described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013, Moody's may adjust its analysis when the evolution of
market and economic conditions warrants it.

Moody's noted that all of the affected CLOs have exited their
reinvestment periods, and either cannot or have only limited
capacity to reinvest loan repayment proceeds. As a result, these
deals have applied and are expected to apply most repayment
proceeds to amortize their liabilities. All else held equal, such
deleveraging is generally a positive credit driver for the
affected CLOs' rated liabilities.

To identify and analyze the affected transactions, Moody's
examined primarily the extent of OC increases for each CLO tranche
in 102 deals since the last rating actions. In addition, the
rating agency considered the following key CLO portfolio- and
tranche-level parameters:

- Amount of cash in the principal collections account

- Absolute OC level for each tranche in relation to its current
   rating

- Portfolio WARF level and migration

- Exposure to assets that mature after the legal maturity of the
   CLO notes

- Other idiosyncratic deal features if applicable

Moody's filtered US CLOs it rates for transactions that had
experienced significant deleveraging in recent periods. It
assessed 102 CLOs and examined the parameters, in particular the
change in OC and credit enhancement level for each rated tranche,
to determine 1) whether to place on review for upgrade the rating
on each tranche, 2) whether to upgrade the rating on each tranche
and 3) the magnitude of upgrade, if applicable.

All of the tranches upgraded, except for those already upgraded to
Aaa (sf), remain on review for upgrade, pending comprehensive
analysis of each affected CLO, including full cash flow modeling.
Moody's endeavors to complete its analyses of all affected deals
within 90 days. While in some cases Moody's did not place the
ratings on all tranches from the same deal on review for upgrade,
the rating agency will review the entire capital structure when it
conducts a full analysis of each deal and take rating actions when
warranted.

All deals affected are US CLOs, including both broadly syndicated
and middle market CLOs, that are collateralized primarily by
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in May 2013.

Moody's did not rely on explicit cash modeling or perform any
sensitivity analyses, because these actions result primarily from
consideration of rapid deleveraging in the transactions due to
loan prepayments, and the affected transactions will be subject to
detailed analysis in order to conclude their review.

The affected transactions, like other CLOs, are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1)
uncertainties of credit conditions in the general economy and 2)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
The notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

On April 25, 2013, Moody's upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Landmark VII CDO Ltd.:

$20,500,000.00 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due July 15, 2018,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf);

$23,000,000.00 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due July 15, 2018,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf);

$14,000,000.00 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due July 15, 2018,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf);

$14,000,000.00 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due July 15, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $12,780,861.58), Upgraded to Ba3
(sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

$229,500,000.00 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due July 15, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $127,510,955.65), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

On April 23, 2013, Moody's upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Mayport CLO Ltd.:

$26,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 22, 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class A-3L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due February
22, 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 22, 2011
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

$19,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 22, 2020,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$250,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 22, 2020
(current outstanding balance of $244,157,923), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$60,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due February
22, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $58,597,901), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$20,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 22, 2020
(current outstanding balance of $19,262,292), Affirmed Ba3 (sf);
previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)


* Moody's Takes Action on 21 RMBS Tranches from Various Issuers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 21 tranches
from 7 transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB6

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Confirmed
at C (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB7

Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-AHL1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-AHL2 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS11 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS7 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are due to improvement in collateral
performance, and/ or build-up in credit enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Lowers Ratings on 16 Manufactured Housing RMBS Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 16
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche backed by
Manufactured Housing RMBS loans, issued by Vanderbilt and Green
Tree.

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1994-03

A-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance Inc. 2001-A

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. 2002-C

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. Series 2001-B

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2009
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. Series 2001-C

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. Series 2002-A

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. Series 2002-B

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. Series 2003-A

Cl. AV, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. In addition, the downgrades reflect the exposure of the
affected bonds to tail risk due to the pro-rata pay nature of the
transactions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

Subject to the results of a stress scenario analysis, Moody's caps
the ratings of bonds exposed to tail-end risk to A3 (sf) or below,
unless the bonds are expected to pay off within a year or are
expected to pay off well before the underlying pool is expected to
be small pool (100 loans).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* S&P Puts 59 Ratings on First Marblehead Trusts on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 59
classes of notes and certificates from 20 First Marblehead-related
transactions (14 owner trust, one master trust, and five grantor
trust transactions) issued between 2002 and 2007 on CreditWatch
with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placements reflect the continued accelerated pace
of defaults and, in many cases, the precipitous decline in trust
parity levels.  The largest increase in cumulative default levels
and largest decline in parity levels since S&P's last review in
first-quarter 2012 was approximately 8.5% and 6.0%, respectively
(performance varies from trust to trust).

Standard & Poor's will continue its review of the performance of
the underlying loan products that comprise the receivables backing
these trusts in order to assess each class' available credit
enhancement relative to remaining default expectations.  S&P will
then take any further rating actions that it considers appropriate
in resolution of the CreditWatch placement.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-7         CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-2         CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3         CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-4         CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-3         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg    BB-(sf)
A-4         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg    BB-(sf)
B           CCC(sf)/Watch Neg    CCC(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-3         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-4         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
B           CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-3         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-4         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-3         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-4         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-3         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-4         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-5         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-2         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-3         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-4         B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-2         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)
A-3         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)
A-4         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)
A-5         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-2         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)
A-3         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)
A-4         BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-2         B(sf)/Watch Neg     B(sf)
A-3         B(sf)/Watch Neg     B(sf)
A-4         B(sf)/Watch Neg     B(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-2-AR-3    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-2-AR-4    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-1    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-2    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-3    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-4    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-5    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-2-AR-3    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-2-AR-4    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-1    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-2    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-3    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-4    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-3-AR-5    CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)

National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust I
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
2002-AR-9   BBB(sf)/Watch Neg   BBB(sf)
2002-AR-10  BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)
2003-AR-11  B+(sf)/Watch Neg    B+(sf)
2003-AR-12  CCC-(sf)/Watch Neg  CCC-(sf)
2003-AR-13  CCC-(sf)/Watch Neg  CCC-(sf)
2003-AR-14  CCC-(sf)/Watch Neg  CCC-(sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-GT1
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-1         CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)
A-2         CCC(sf)/Watch Neg   CCC(sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2004-2
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-5-1       BB-(sf)/Watch Neg   BB-(sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2005-1
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-5-1       B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-5-2       B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2005-2
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-5-1       B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-5-2       B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2005-3
                 Rating
Class       To                  From
A-5-1       B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)
A-5-2       B-(sf)/Watch Neg    B-(sf)


* S&P Lowers 7 Ratings from 3 U.S. CMBS Transactions to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
three U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions to 'D (sf)' due to accumulated interest shortfalls
expected to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.

S&P lowered its ratings on seven classes to 'D (sf)' because it
expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding
for the foreseeable future.  The seven downgraded classes have had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for seven to 10
months.  The recurring interest shortfalls for the respective
certificates are primarily because of one or more of the following
factors:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced assets;

   -- The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
      has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

   -- Interest rate modifications related to corrected mortgage
      loans; and

   -- Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  S&P
also considered servicer-nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each respective transaction's terms.  Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER
amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding
which classes from the affected transactions to downgrade to
'D (sf)'.  This is because ARAs based on a principal balance
haircut are highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the
special servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

Servicer-nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt-service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances being deemed nonrecoverable, or the
failure to advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations
have been determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not
limited to, property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

      Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2003-C8

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, M, N, and O
certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2003-C8 to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for seven months and S&P's expectation they will
continue for an extended period, based on its analysis.  According
to the June 17, 2013, trustee remittance report, the current
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $103,834 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $20,133; and

   -- ASER amounts totaling $83,701 from ARAs totaling
      $19.5 million related to the three assets ($59.8 million,
      17.9%) that are currently with the special servicer,
      Torchlight Investors LLC (Torchlight).

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C1

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on the class K certificates to
reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for nine
months and its expectation that they will continue for an extended
period of time.  According to the June 17, 2013, trustee
remittance report, the current interest shortfalls totaled
$371,668 and resulted primarily from:

   -- ASER amounts of $203,330 from ARAs totaling $44.3 million
      related to 12 ($78.0 million, 3.5%) of the 23 assets
      ($167.3 million, 7.3%) that are currently with the special
      servicer, Situs Holdings LLC.  The current ASER amounts were
      partially offset this period by ASER recoveries totaling
      $1,589 related to two assets ($5.3 million, 0.2%) that are
      with the special servicer;

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $35,250;

   -- Shortfalls due to interest rate modifications totaling
      $73,467; and

   -- Workout fees totaling $6,091.

       Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C4

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on the class G certificates to
reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 10 months
and its expectation that they will continue for an extended period
of time.  According to the June 17, 2013, trustee remittance
report, the current interest shortfalls totaled $756,026 and
resulted primarily from:

   -- ASER amounts totaling $426,210 from ARAs totaling
      $108.2 million related to 24 ($279.4 million, 15.2%) of the
      29 assets ($450.3 million, 24.5%) that are currently with
      the special servicers, Torchlight and NCB FSB.

   -- The current ASER amounts were partially offset this period
      by a one-time ASER recovery of $107,362 related to the
      Millennium Plaza asset disposition, and resulted primarily
      from: Special servicing fees totaling $201,099;

   -- Shortfalls due to interest rate modifications totaling
      $107,931; and

   -- Workout fees totaling $9,965.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C8

                                           Reported
       Rating  Rating     Credit      interest shortfalls
Class  To      From      enhancement  Current  Accumulated
                             (%)        ($)         ($)
K      D(sf)   CCC-(sf)      8.03     26,578      212,628
L      D(sf)   CCC-(sf)      6.57     21,262      170,095
M      D(sf)   CCC-(sf)      5.84     10,633       85,065
N      D(sf)   CCC-(sf)      4.38     21,262      170,095
O      D(sf)   CCC-(sf)      3.65     10,633       85,065

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                           Reported
       Rating  Rating     Credit      interest shortfalls
Class  To      From      enhancement  Current  Accumulated
                             (%)        ($)         ($)
K      D(sf)   CCC-(sf)      1.64     174,243    221,855

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                           Reported
       Rating  Rating     Credit      interest shortfalls
Class  To      From      enhancement  Current  Accumulated
                             (%)        ($)         ($)
G      D(sf)   CCC-(sf)     6.39      103,274    867,482


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
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related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog, Meriam Fernandez,
Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl
Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
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The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
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