TCR_Public/130609.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, June 9, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 158

                            Headlines

ACA ABS 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
AMERICAN AIRLINES: S&P Prelim. Rates Class C Certificates 'CCC+'
AMMC CLO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2013-1: Moody's Rates Cl. D Notes '(P)Ba3(sf)'

ASSET SECURITIZATION 1995-D1: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on B-1 Certs
ATRIUM V: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes From 'BB+'
ATRIUM X: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
BABSON 2005-III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
BABSON 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

BANC OF AMERICA 2003-1: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class J Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-5: S&P Cuts Rating on 4 Note Classes to D
BAYVIEW COMMERCIAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class A-3 Notes
C-BASS VII: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on $14.57MM Class D Notes
CALIBRE 2004-XI: S&P Raises Debt Rating From 'CCC-p(sf)'

CARFINANCE CAPITAL: Moody's Gives 'Ba3' Rating to $11.3MM Notes
CARLYLE DAYTONA: Moody's Raises Rating on $105.7MM Notes
CARNOW AUTO 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CENT CLO 18: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $37MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS

CITIGROUP 2013-375P: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Certs
COMM 2006-FL12: S&P Lowers Rating on Class AN4 Notes to 'D'
COMM 2007-C9: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M Certificate to 'D'
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class F Notes
CSMC TRUST 2013-IVR: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B-3 Notes

DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class B-7 Notes
DRYDEN XVII: Moody's Reinstates 'B1(sf)' Rating on One Tranche
DUANE STREET III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
EVERBANK MORTGAGE: Fitch to Rate $3.33MM Class B-4 Certs 'BB'
FINN SQUARE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

GE CAPITAL 2001-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certs
GOLDMAN SACHS 1998-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class H Certs
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class M Notes to 'D'
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ12: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Cl. E(i) Notes
HELLER FINANCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes

HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Places $31MM Notes on Review for Upgrade
JP MORGAN 2000-C10: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. G Certificates
JP MORGAN 2003-C1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
JP MORGAN 2013-2: Fitch Rates $4.86MM Class B-4 Certs at 'BB'
JP MORGAN 2013-C12: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes

JP MORGAN 2013-JWRZ: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-LLF: S&P Lifts Rating on Class F Notes to BB+
MAPS CLO II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
MARYLEBONE ROAD 3: S&P Withdraws CC Ratings on 3 Note Classes
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-KEY2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certs

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Take Action on $229.7MM 2004 Alt-A RMBS
MORGAN STANLEY 1999-LIFE1: S&P Raises Rating on Class H Notes to B
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-RR6: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class G Notes to 'D'
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ13: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Notes Classes to D
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: S&P Retains 'BB+' Rating on Class B-2L Notes

NEUBERGER BERMAN: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
NOMURA ASSET 1998-D6: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes From BB-
PACIFIC COAST: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on $41.45MM Class B Notes
PACIFICA CDO V: S&P Retains 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
PALISADES MEDICAL: S&P Raises Bond Rating From 'BB+'

PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 9 Note Classes to 'B'
PNC MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on $7.9MM Class H Notes
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class J Certs
RESI FINANCE: Moody's Takes Action on $433MM of 2003 Prime RMBS
RESIDENTIAL REINSURANCE 2013: S&P Rates Class 3 Notes 'B-(sf)'

ROCKWALL CDO: Moody's Hikes Ratings on $239MM of CLO Notes
SAPPHIRE VALLEY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2(sf)' Rating on $18MM Notes
SC STUDENT LOAN: S&P Lowers Rating on 4 Note Classes to 'CC'
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2005-1: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 5 Tranches
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2013-8: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certificates 'BB'

SOUTHPORT CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $12.3MM Cl. D Notes
TIERS 1997-5: S&P Raises Rating on 3 Note Classes From 'BB+'
TRIMARAN CLO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'BB+'
VENTURE II: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $112.25MM Class C Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C31: S&P Cuts Rating on 3 Note Classes to D

WAMU 2003-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class O Certificates
WELLS FARGO 2005-AR8: Moody's Raises Rating on Three Tranches
WELLS FARGO 2011-BXR: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2012-C7: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class G Notes
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Fitch Rates $16.53MM Class F Certs 'B'

* Fitch Says U.S. Consumer Continues to Anchor Credit Card ABS
* Moody's Concludes Review of Collegiate Loan Securitizations
* Moody's: Only Slight Changes in CMBS Loss Severities in 2013 Q1
* Moody's Takes Action on $150MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2005
* S&P Puts Ratings on 321 Classes From 89 US RMBS on Watch Neg.


                            *********

ACA ABS 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ratings on four classes and revised
Rating Outlook on one class of notes issued by ACA ABS 2004-1,
Ltd. (ACA ABS 2004-1) as follows:

-- $0 class A-1 notes marked 'PIF' on April 10, 2013;
-- $40,213,958 class A-2 notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to
   Positive from Stable;
-- $47,250,000 class B notes at 'Csf';
-- $15,002,866 class C-1 notes at 'Csf';
-- $2,449,447 class C-2 notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis'. Fitch also
considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis to
conclude the rating actions for the rated notes.

Key Rating Drivers

The rating affirmation are attributed to improved credit
enhancement (CE) available to all rated notes as a result of the
ongoing deleveraging of the capital structure since Fitch's last
review in June 2012, offsetting modest deterioration of the
underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2012, the credit quality
of the underlying collateral has remained relatively stable with
11.5% of the portfolio downgraded a weighted average of three
notches and 5% upgraded a weighted average of three notches.
Approximately 79.1% of the current portfolio has a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade and 59.2% has a rating in the
'CCCsf' rating category or lower, compared to 68.7% and 52.1%
respectively, at last review.

The class A-2 note has started to amortize as the class A-1 was
paid-in-full on April 10th, 2013. The class A-2 notes have
received $9.3 million, or 18.8% of its previous balance, on the
last payment date from the principal amortization. As the result,
the CE level for the notes has increased and the breakeven results
for the class have improved slightly compare to last review. The
revision of Outlook to Positive for the class A-2 notes reflects
the available cushion to the current rating in the breakeven
levels from the cash flow model.

Breakeven levels for the class B, class C-1 and C-2 (together,
class C) notes were below SF PCM's 'CCCsf' default level, the
lowest level of defaults projected by SF PCM. For these classes,
Fitch compared their respective credit enhancement levels to the
expected losses from the distressed and defaulted assets in the
portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). This comparison indicates that
default continues to appear inevitable for the class B and class C
notes at or prior to maturity.

Rating Sensitivities

Further negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by
SF PCM as well as increasing concentration in assets of a weaker
credit quality could lead to downgrades.

ACA ABS 2004-1 is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on May 27, 2004 and is monitored
by Solidus Capital, LLC. The portfolio is composed of residential
mortgage-backed securities (59.3%), SF CDOs (17.2%), real estate
investment trusts (8.3%), corporate collateralized debt
obligations (6.9%), and asset-backed securities (8.3%), from 2002
through 2004 vintage transactions.


AMERICAN AIRLINES: S&P Prelim. Rates Class C Certificates 'CCC+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
preliminary 'CCC+ (sf)' rating to American Airlines Inc.'s series
2013-1 Class C pass-through certificates due July 15, 2018.  The
certificates are subordinated to the 2013-1 Class A and Class B
certificates that S&P rated March 11, 2013.

The ratings are based on:

   -- The consolidated credit quality of American and its parent,
      AMR Corp. (both rated 'D');

   -- S&P's expectations regarding AMR's and American's likelihood
      of emerging from bankruptcy;

   -- S&P's expectations regarding American's likelihood of
      continuing to service the aircraft notes that secure the
      various 2013-1 certificates;

   -- Collateral coverage by good-quality aircraft; and

   -- The legal and structural protections available to the pass-
      through certificates.

The company will use proceeds of the Class A, B, and C
certificates to finance 2013 deliveries of four Boeing B777-300ER
(extended range) aircraft and to finance or refinance eight B737-
800s and one B777-200ER aircraft delivered in 2000-2001.  Each
aircraft's secured notes are cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted--a provision S&P believes increases the likelihood that
American would cure any defaults and agree to perform its future
obligations, including its payment obligations, under the
indentures (and thus continue to pay on the certificates) in any
future bankruptcy.  American is highly incented to pay debt
service on the certificates while in the current Chapter 11
proceedings because they are a post-petition obligation.

The 2013-1 Class C certificates do not have a dedicated liquidity
facility, as do the Class A and B certificates, and accordingly
any interruption in payment on the secured aircraft notes would
cause a default on the Class C certificates.  S&P usually rates
such non-enhanced Class C equipment trust certificates one notch
above the corporate credit rating on the airline.  For equipment
trust certificates that are not in payment default and for which a
bankrupt airline has agreed to perform, as in this case, S&P would
notch the rating from 'CCC', which is the lowest rating that does
not imply that a default is virtually inevitable, under S&P's
criteria.  Accordingly, S&P assigned a 'CCC+' rating.

S&P currently do not believe that the proposed merger of AMR and
US Airways Group Inc. would affect our ratings on the 2013-1
certificates, but S&P will review all ratings of each entity if
and when that combination occurs.

RATINGS LIST

American Airlines Inc.
AMR Corp.
Corporate credit rating                        D/--/--

New Ratings

American Airlines Inc.
Equipment trust certificates
  Series 2013-1 Class C pass-thru certs         prelim CCC+(sf)


AMMC CLO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the A-1,
A-3, B, C, and D notes from AMMC CLO IV Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
American Money Management Corp., and removed them from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive implications on
May 17, 2013.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA' rating on
the class A-2 note.

The transaction is in its amortization phase, and continues to pay
down the notes in the manner specified in the transaction
documents.  Although the class A notes are pari-passu in terms of
interest payments, the class A-2 receives principal payments ahead
of class A-3, and therefore can be paid in full ahead of the other
classes, thus supporting a higher rating.

The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the class A-1 and A-2
notes and a subsequent improvement in the credit support available
to the notes since May 2011, when S&P last raised its ratings on
most of the notes.  The transaction since has paid down the class
A-1 and A-2 notes by approximately $108 million, leaving the class
A-1 and A-2 notes at 70.19% and 62.74% of their original balances,
respectively, down from 97.76% and 97.20%, respectively, in May
2011.

The paydowns improved the overcollateralization (O/C) available to
support the notes.  According to the May 2013 monthly report, the
senior O/C ratio (measured at the class B) level was at 123.55%,
up from 116.71% in April 2011, which S&P used for its May 2011
rating actions.

The transaction continues to display stable performance, with a
low level of defaults; it also enjoys a structural feature whereby
net principal losses on the portfolio incurred from trading and
defaults are offset by diverting interest proceeds available after
payment of class C interest as principal proceeds.

The upgrades were a result of the increase in the credit support.
The rating on the class D note continues to be affected by the top
obligor test.  The affirmation of the 'AAA' rating on the class A-
2 note reflects the availability of sufficient credit support at
the current rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings assigned to the
notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to
support them, and will take rating actions as necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

AMMC CLO IV Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1           AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2           AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-3           AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA  (sf)     A (sf/Watch Pos)
D             BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf) /Watch Pos

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             AMMC CLO IV Limited
Coissuer:           AMMC CLO IV Corp
Collateral manager: American Money Management Corp
Underwriter:        Lehman Brothers Inc.
Trustee:            Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd./Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1
LLC's $460.00 million floating-rate notes following the
transaction's effective date as of March 5, 2013.  The rating
actions follows S&P's review of the transaction's performance
using data from the most recent trustee report dated May 2, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd./Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1 LLC

Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)               311.60
A-2                     AA (sf)                 63.00
B (deferrable)          A (sf)                  37.10
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                25.70
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)                 22.60


ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2013-1: Moody's Rates Cl. D Notes '(P)Ba3(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Anchorage
Capital CLO 2013-1, Ltd. (the "Issuer"):

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the "Class
A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf);

Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the "Class
A-2a Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf);

Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2025 (the "Class A-
2b Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf);

Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf);

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P) Baa3 (sf);

Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned (P) Ba3 (sf);

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Class A-1, Class A-2a, Class A-
2b, Class B, Class C, and Class D Notes (the "Notes") address the
expected losses posed to the noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
loans, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

Anchorage 2013-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first-lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
be invested in senior secured loans or eligible investments and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured loans, senior
secured floating rate notes, second lien loans and bonds. The
underlying portfolio is expected to be approximately 60% ramped as
of the closing date and 100% ramped up to five months thereafter.

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. ("Anchorage") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. After the reinvestment period, Anchorage may
purchase additional collateral using principal proceeds from
prepayments and sales of credit risk obligations, subject to
certain conditions.

In addition to the Notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash-flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013. Moody's
used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 48

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3000

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.35%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

The Notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The Notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. Anchorage 's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the Notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the rating assigned to the
Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on the Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch
difference versus the current model output, whereby a negative
difference corresponds to higher expected losses), holding all
other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3000 to 3450)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches --

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2a Notes: -2

Class A-2b Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3000 to 3900)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches --

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2a Notes: -3

Class A-2b Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash-flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009, available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.


ASSET SECURITIZATION 1995-D1: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on B-1 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its rating on the B-1
class of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Asset
Securitization Corp. 1995-D1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmation follows S&P's analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class B-1 principal and
interest certificates reflects its expectation that the available
credit enhancement for this class will be within its estimated
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
rating.  The affirmation also reflects the remaining assets'
credit characteristics and performance, as well as the
transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on class B-1, S&P's analysis also considered the
historical interest shortfalls experienced by the class.  In
addition, S&P considered in its analysis the limited liquidity
support available to the class.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.29x
and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 36.5% for
five of the 10 remaining assets in the pool.  The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude four defeased loans ($9.5 million, 55.4%) and
one nonreporting loan ($0.8 million, 4.9%).  To date, the
transaction has experienced losses totaling $11.4 million, or 5.4%
of the transaction's original pooled certificate balance.

As of the May 13, 2013 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate pooled trust balance of $17.2 million, down
from $210.9 million at issuance.  The pool includes 10 loans, down
from 61 loans at issuance.  Four ($9.5 million, 55.4%) of the
loans are defeased.  The master servicer, Midland Loan Services,
Inc., provided full-year 2012 financial information for 87.5% of
the nondefeased loans in the pool.  Two loans ($2.4 million,
13.8%) in the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Details of these loans on the master servicer's watchlist are as
follows:

   -- The SREE-Comfort Inn-Hendersonville loan ($1.4 million,
      8.0%) is the largest loan on the master servicer's
      watchlist.  The loan is secured by an 85-room lodging
      property in Hendersonville, N.C.  The loan is on the master
      servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC of 0.60x for
      December 2012.

   -- The Lakeview Mobile Home Park loan ($1.0 million, 5.8%) is
      the smallest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
      loan is secured by a 281-pad manufactured housing property
      in Wichita, Kan.  The loan appears on the watchlist because
      of a decline in occupancy.  As of December 2012, the
      reported DSC and occupancy were 1.56x and 57.8%,
      respectively, down from 1.51x and 95% at issuance.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AFFIRMED

Asset Securitization Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1995-D1

Class      Rating                  Credit enhancement (%)
B-1        CCC- (sf)                         7.42


ATRIUM V: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes From 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2b, A-3a, A-3b, A-4, B, and C notes from Atrium V, a
collateralized loan obligation transaction currently managed by
CSFB Alternative Capital Inc.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A-2a and D notes.

The rating actions follows S&P's performance review of Atrium V
and reflects an improvement in credit support, primarily because
of an increase in overcollateralization since it raised its
ratings on seven classes and affirmed its ratings on two classes
in June 2011.  Since June 2011, S&P has observed an approximately
1.84% absolute average increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios, as well as a 46.7% average increase
in its interest coverage ratios.  S&P also observed that assets
from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were reported at
$35.5 million in the May 2013 trustee report, compared with
$66.8 million in the May 2011 report.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-2a and D notes to reflect
its belief that the credit support available is commensurate with
the current ratings.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest-rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results
demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated outstanding
classes have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating
levels associated with this rating action.

The transaction is still in its reinvestment phase, which is
scheduled to end on the August 2013 payment date.  Subsequent to
the May 2013 payment date, the transaction held $42.2 million in
principal cash.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in its view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Atrium V
                             Rating
Class                   To            From
A-1                     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
A-2b                    AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
A-3a                    AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
A-3b                    AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
A-4                     AA (sf)       A+ (sf)
B                       A (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
C                       BBB (sf)      BB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Atrium V
Class                   Rating
A-2a                    AAA (sf)
D                       BB (sf)


ATRIUM X: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Atrium
X/Atrium X LLC's $596.00 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.29%-11.83%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1506.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Atrium X/Atrium X LLC

Class                  Rating          Amount (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)                 409.00
B-1                    AA (sf)                   48.50
B-2                    AA (sf)                   25.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                    53.25
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                  32.75
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                   27.50
Subordinated notes     NR                        68.45

NR - Not rated.


BABSON 2005-III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the Class
B, C, and E notes from Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-III, a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Babson
Capital Management LLC.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's
affirmed its ratings on the transaction's Class A and D notes.

The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the Class A notes and a
subsequent improvement in the credit support available to the
notes since June 2011, when S&P raised its ratings on most of the
notes.  Since that time, the transaction has paid down the Class A
notes by approximately $99.4 million.  These paydowns have left
the Class A notes at 73.32% of their original balance, after
taking into account the May 2013 distribution date.  S&P expects
to see continued paydowns to the Class A notes, as the transaction
exited its reinvestment period in November of last year.

The upgrades also reflect a slight improvement in the asset
performance of the underlying portfolio since S&P's June 2011
actions.  As of the April 2013 monthly report, the amount of 'CCC'
rated assets decreased to $14.33 million from $34.86 million in
the April 2011 report.

Furthermore, the upgrades reflect the slight improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the notes,
primarily due to the aforementioned paydowns.  The trustee
reported the following O/C ratios in the April 2013 monthly
report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 125.17% compared with a reported
      ratio of 123.79% in April 2011.

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 114.31% compared with a reported
      ratio of 113.68% in April 2011.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 108.92% compared with a reported
      ratio of 108.62% in April 2011.

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 106.52% compared with a reported
      ratio of 106.36% in April 2011.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the Class A and D notes to reflect the
availability of credit support at the current rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Babson CLO Ltd 2005-III
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A             AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)
B             AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)
C             A  (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D             BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)
E             BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Babson CLO Ltd 2005-III
Coissuer:           Babson CLO Inc. 2005-III
Collateral manager: Babson Capital Management LLC
Underwriter:        Wachovia Securities Inc.
Trustee:            U.S. Bank National Association
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


BABSON 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Babson
CLO Ltd. 2013-1/Babson CLO 2013-1 LLC's $449.25 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2761% to 12.8133%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which would lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which would lead to the reclassification of
      excess interest proceeds that are available prior to paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees; collateral
      manager subordinated and incentive management fees; and
      subordinated note payments to principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period and to reduce the balance of the rated
      notes outstanding, sequentially, after the reinvestment
      period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1580.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Babson CLO Ltd. 2013-1/Babson CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                      Rating           Amount
                                          (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)         292.25
B                          AA (sf)           64.75
C (deferrable)             A (sf)            37.50
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)          24.25
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)           21.50
F (deferrable)             B (sf)             9.00
Subordinated notes         NR                41.50

NR - Not rated.


BANC OF AMERICA 2003-1: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class J Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s Series 2003-1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other classes from the
same transaction.

The rating actions follows S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrades reflect S&P's expected available credit enhancement
for the affected tranche, which S&P believes is greater than its
most recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the
rating level.  The upgrades also reflects S&P's views regarding
the current and future performance of the transaction's collateral
as well as the deleveraging of the trust balance.

The affirmations reflect S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate
of the necessary credit enhancement required for the current
outstanding ratings.  The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's
review of the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining assets as well as the transaction-level changes.

Although available credit enhancement levels might suggest
positive rating movements for Classes J and K, S&P's analysis also
considered potential additional interest shortfalls because five
($60.5 million, 83.1%) of the remaining six loans ($72.9 million)
are with the special servicer.

As of the May 13, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $146,463,
primarily related to $115,338 in other interest losses, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amount of $17,190 and
special servicing fees of $13,753.  According to the master
servicer, the $115,338 in other interest losses are related to
recouping from expenses incurred on the five specially serviced
assets this month.  The interest shortfalls affected classes
subordinate to and including Class J.

As of the May 13, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate pooled trust balance of $72.9 million, down
from $1.03 billion at issuance.  The pool includes five loans and
one real estate owned (REO) asset, down from 112 loans at
issuance.  To date, the transaction experienced losses totaling
$14.1 million (1.4% of the transaction's original pooled
certificate balance).  One loan ($12.3 million, 16.9%), which
matures on Sept. 1, 2013, is defeased, and the remaining five
assets are with the special servicer--KeyBank Real Estate Capital
(KeyBank).

According to the special servicer, the IKON Office/Distribution
Buildings loan ($5.6 million, 7.6%), the third-largest asset with
the current special servicer, Keybank, paid off in full on May 9,
2013, subsequent to the May 2013 trustee remittance report.  The
loan was secured by a 98,961-sq.-ft. office building in Macon, Ga.
The loan was transferred to special servicing on Dec. 7, 2012, due
to maturity default.  The loan matured on Dec. 11, 2012.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

As of the May 13, 2013, trustee remittance report, one REO and
four loans ($60.5 million, 83.1%) were with the special servicer,
one of which S&P discussed above.  Details on the remaining four
specially serviced assets are as follows:

The 1020 Holcombe Boulevard loan ($27.2 million, 37.3%), the
largest asset with Keybank, is secured by a 270,227-sq.-ft.
medical office building in Houston, Tex. The reported total
exposure was $27.9 million.  The loan was transferred to Keybank
on April 30, 2012, due to maturity default.  The loan matured on
Nov. 1, 2012.  According to KeyBank, it is pursuing foreclosure
and receivership.  The reported occupancy and debt service
coverage (DSC) were 72.0% and 1.16x, respectively, for the two
months ended Feb. 28, 2013.  The largest tenant at the property,
M.D. Anderson, has approximately 72.0% of the net rentable area.
According to Keybank, this tenant indicated to the borrower that
it will vacate upon its lease expiration in December 2014.  In
addition, KeyBank stated that the property has potential
environmental hazards.  KeyBank plans to order a Phase II report
upon the appointment of a receiver in June 2013.  Using the
information that Keybank provided to S&P, it anticipates a minimal
loss upon its eventual resolution.  S&P may revise its expected
loss if the Phase II report indicates costly remediation is needed
on site.  If the trust experience additional interest shortfalls
from remediating these environmental issues, S&P may re-evaluate
the ongoing liquidity in the trust and take further rating action,
as warranted.

The Ashby Crossing Apartments loan ($22.5 million, 31.0%), the
second-largest asset with Keybank, is secured by a 288-unit
multifamily apartment building in Harrisonburg, Va.  The reported
total exposure was $23.7 million.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing on Sept. 14, 2010.  The reported occupancy and
DSC were 55.0% and 0.86x, respectively, at year-end Dec. 31, 2012.
The current special servicer, Keybank, stated that it is currently
evaluating various workout strategies on this loan, and S&P
expects a minimal loss upon its eventual resolution.

The Collegiate Courtyard asset ($2.8 million, 3.9%), the fourth-
largest asset with Keybank, is secured by a 48-unit multi-family
apartment building in Greensboro, N.C.  The reported total
exposure was $3.4 million.  The loan was transferred to Keybank on
May 14, 2010, and the property became REO on Feb. 11, 2011.  No
updated financial data were available.  Keybank stated that it is
currently marketing the property for sale.  S&P expects a moderate
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Walgreens-Jacksonville FL loan ($2.4 million, 3.3%), the
smallest asset with Keybank, is secured by a 15,070-sq.-ft. retail
building in Jacksonville, Fla.  The reported total exposure was
$2.6 million.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
July 6, 2012, due to maturity default.  The loan matured on
July 1, 2012.  The reported occupancy and DSC were 100% and 1.26x,
respectively, for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012.  Keybank
stated that the borrower is in bankruptcy and is in the process of
selling the property.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the
eventual resolution of the loan.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1

                 Rating
Class     To             From        Credit enhancement(%)
G         AA+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                   90.47
H         AA (sf)        BB+ (sf)                    76.30

Ratings Affirmed

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
J          CCC                               46.17
K          CCC-                              35.54


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-5: S&P Cuts Rating on 4 Note Classes to D
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-5, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.

"We lowered our ratings on the class G and H certificates because
of reduced liquidity support available to these classes resulting
from the three specially serviced assets' ($66.2 million, 12.6%)
current ongoing interest shortfalls.  We also believe there is the
potential for additional interest shortfalls from the specially
serviced assets should nonrecoverable determinations be made, and
from the master servicer's watchlist loans transferring to special
servicing due to low-reported debt service coverage or near term
maturities," S&P said.

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J and K certificates to 'CCC-
(sf)' due to accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for five
consecutive months.  If the interest shortfalls on these classes
continue for an extended period of time, S&P may further lower its
ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.

"We lowered our ratings on the class L, M, N, and O certificates
to 'D (sf)' because we believe the accumulated interest shortfalls
will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future, and we also
expect these classes to incur principal losses upon the eventual
resolution of the $52.3 million specially serviced Simon
Cheltenham Square Mall loan.  Class L has accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for five months, and classes M, N, and O
have accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for six
consecutive months," S&P noted.

According to the May 10, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls resulting from an
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amount of $126,612
from the $52.3 million (9.9%) Simon-Cheltenham Square Mall loan,
one of the three loans ($66.2 million, 12.6%) with the special
servicer, and special servicing fees of $14,868.  Based on a
revised September 2012 appraisal value, the master servicer
calculated a $26.0 million appraisal reduction amount on this
loan.  According to the special servicer, Torchlight Loan Services
LLC, it has filed for foreclosure and a receiver appointment.
Based on the revised appraisal value, S&P expects a significant
loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.  The current reported
interest shortfalls totaled $141,480, affecting all classes
subordinate to and including class J.

As of the May 10, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had a $527.0 million aggregate trust balance, down from
$1.4 billion at issuance, and currently has 66 loans, down from
107 loans at issuance.  To date, the transaction has experienced
losses totaling $5.8 million (0.4% of the transaction's original
trust balance).

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-5

                             Credit     Reported interest
       Rating    Rating   enhancement        shortfalls
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated($)
G      BB (sf)   BBB- (sf)    11.49         0               0
H      CCC (sf)  BB (sf)       7.29         0               0
J      CCC- (sf) BB- (sf)      6.00    17,112          91,418
K      CCC- (sf) B+ (sf)       4.71    26,779         133,893
L      D (sf)    B (sf)        4.06    13,387          66,937
M      D (sf)    B- (sf)       3.09    20,083         115,453
N      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)     2.45    13,387          80,324
O      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      1.80    13,391          80,348


BAYVIEW COMMERCIAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class A-3 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes from three U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions issued by Bayview Commercial Asset Trust and
removed nine of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.
S&P also affirmed its ratings on 15 classes from three Bayview
Commercial Asset Trust transactions, four Impac CMB Trust
transactions, and four Impac Secured Assets Trust transactions,
and removed six of them from CreditWatch negative and two from
CreditWatch developing.  Additionally, S&P withdrew its rating on
one class from Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-1 pursuant to
the application of its interest-only (IO) criteria.  The 11
transactions in this review are backed by adjustable and fixed-
rate first-lien mortgage loans secured by small-balance commercial
properties, including, but not limited to, multifamily, office,
motel, restaurant, warehouse, and retail.

In accordance with S&P's published criteria, these rating actions
reflect its view of the recent performance of the collateral
backing these transactions, its current projected losses, the
timing of the projected defaults and losses, the projected credit
support to cover those losses, historical shortfalls, projected
shortfalls, and recent principal write-downs.  The actions also
reflect S&P's view of structural features, such as payment
allocations, excess spread, swap and cap agreements, prioritized
interest-only bearing classes, reserve funds to cover principal
losses, and the definition of interest losses.

S&P determined that the interest shortfalls on the classes within
this review were due to credit and/or liquidity events that are
subject to the interest shortfall rating caps outlined in its
interest shortfall criteria.  Examples of such events include:

   -- The reimbursement to servicers of prior advances deemed
      nonrecoverable;

   -- The cessation of servicer advances on delinquent loans;

   -- Reimbursements for prior advances when loans are modified
      and amounts are capitalized on the loan balance; and

   -- Significant deterioration in credit quality of the mortgage
      pool and the resulting impact on structures that become
      undercollateralized and cannot generate sufficient interest
      to make the applicable security payments.

Along with the aforementioned factors that affect cash flows,
certain classes in the Bayview deals have also incurred interest
shortfalls due to periods of high "interest losses" resulting from
liquidations having loss severities greater than 100%.  For these
deals, any loss on a liquidated loan in excess of the principal
balance is considered an "interest loss" and is, therefore, not
covered by principal collections.  These interest losses reduced
the interest funds available to pay the outstanding classes
resulting in interest shortfalls.  Although the Bayview
transactions were structured with reserve funds, Bayview
Commercial Asset Trust 2004-1 is the only transaction with an
outstanding reserve fund balance (currently $8.2 million).
However, reserve funds can only be used to cover principal losses
and are not available for interest losses.  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
is the Master Servicer on the Bayview transactions included in
this review.

"We lowered our ratings on 10 classes from three Bayview
Commercial Asset Trust transactions to their rating caps based on
our interest shortfall criteria.  Included in these downgrades are
ratings on six classes from Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-4,
which we lowered to 'D(sf)' because of interest shortfalls that
have occurred periodically since March 2011.  While the earlier
shortfalls were paid back, this deal has continued to incur
shortfalls for 10 of the last 12 months.  According to our
interest shortfall criteria, based on the size and duration of the
lifetime observed interest shortfalls, the maximum rating on these
classes is 'D(sf)'.  The M4, M5, M6, and B-1 classes from this
transaction have ratings of 'CCC(sf)' or 'CC(sf)', even though
they are more subordinate to the senior and mezzanine classes on
which ratings are being lowered to 'D(sf)'.  These classes can
sustain these higher ratings since they are principal-only classes
that are not affected by interest shortfalls," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on three additional classes with
historical shortfalls from two of the Bayview transactions below
their rating caps because of our belief that these classes may
incur additional shortfalls in the near term, as well as specific
factors that can negatively affect future deal performance.  We
lowered our rating on class B from Bayview 2004-1 to 'BB+(sf)'
from 'BBB(sf)' due to the level of delinquencies and projected
losses versus the amount of hard credit support available from the
transaction's reserve fund.  This deal has had a significant
number of liquidations compared to the other structures in this
review.  We lowered our rating on class A3 from Bayview 2008-1 to
'BB+(sf)' from 'AA+(sf)', and on class A4 from the same deal to
'B+(sf)' from 'AA(sf).  While approximately 65% of the pool
remains outstanding, these downgrades are due to the high amount
of cumulative losses that have already occurred, indicating a weak
credit profile for the borrowers in this pool, in our view.  In
addition, these classes are in a lower-priority position for
receiving principal, leaving them more exposed to tail-end losses.
Also, if additional shortfalls occur, our rating cap will continue
to decline according to our interest shortfall criteria," S&P
added.

S&P also downgraded its ratings on three additional classes due to
its belief that projected credit enhancement will be insufficient
to cover projected losses at the previous rating levels.  Finally,
S&P lowered its rating to 'D(sf)' on class B-2 from Bayview 2008-4
due to recent principal write-downs to this class.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that projected credit
enhancement available for the affected classes will be sufficient
to cover its projected losses at the current rating levels.

S&P withdrew its rating on class IO from Bayview 2008-1 to reflect
the application of its IO criteria.

When projecting losses for these transactions, S&P applied its
methodology and assumptions as outlined in "Surveillance
Methodology And Assumptions For U.S. Small-Balance Commercial
Transactions," published March 1, 2010, on RatingsDirect.
Generally, S&P applied its monthly default rates (MDR) that are
obtained from both the existing delinquency pipeline and the
change in performance over the prior six-month period.  These MDRs
were then applied on a period-by-period basis over a certain time
frame in order to identify if each class could survive the
applicable stress scenario.  The MDR assumption is typically
applied for 120 months from the transaction's origination, with a
minimum application of 25 months.

"When stressing losses, we will generally increase our MDR and
loss severity stresses proportionately as we stress different
rating scenarios.  For example, we apply our base-case MDR and
loss severity assumptions in a 'B' scenario, while in a 'AAA'
scenario we stress both the base-case MDR and loss severity
assumptions by a factor of 1.225x.  Rating category stresses
between 'B' and 'AAA' are applied linearly based on the 1.225x
factors.  By applying the stressed MDR and loss severity
assumptions, the 'AAA' loss would generally be close to 1.5x that
of the base-case loss assumption, and will vary depending on the
default and CPR assumptions we apply in our analysis," S&P noted.

In addition, some of the reviewed transactions or respective
structures within a transaction are backed by a small remaining
population of mortgage loans.  Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-
10/structure 4, Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-2/structure 2, and
Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-6/structure 2 are all backed by pools
which contain less than 100 loans remaining.  According to S&P's
criteria, the liquidation of one or more of the loans in
transactions with a small number of remaining loans may have an
adverse effect on credit.  In cases where a structure contained
fewer than 100 loans or is approaching 100 loans remaining, S&P
addressed tail risk by conducting additional loan-level analysis
that stresses the loan concentration risk within the specific
pool.  The final rating assigned to each class is the lower of the
rating derived by applying S&P's small balance commercial
surveillance criteria and the rating derived by applying its tail
risk criteria.  However the tail risk analysis did not affect
any of the ratings in this review.

Subordination, overcollateralization, excess interest, and reserve
accounts used to cover principal losses provide credit support for
the classes within these small balance commercial transactions.
The 2A classes from Impac Secured Assets Trust 2006-5 and Impac
Secured Assets Trust 2007-2 also benefit from bond insurance
provided by Ambac Assurance Corp. (not rated).

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When analyzing U.S. RMBS collateral pools to form S&P's opinion of
their relative credit quality and the potential impact on rated
securities, the degree of remaining losses stems, to a certain
extent, from S&P's outlook regarding the behavior of such loans in
conjunction with expected economic conditions.  Overall, Standard
& Poor's Ratings Services' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that S&P believes could affect
residential mortgage performance are as follows:

   -- S&P's unemployment rate forecast is 7.4% for 2013 and 6.7%
      for 2014, compared with the actual 8.1% rate in 2012.

   -- Home prices will increase 8% in 2013, using the S&P Case-
      Shiller 20-city index.

   -- Real GDP growth will be 2.5% in 2013 and 3.2% in 2014.

   -- The 30-year mortgage rate will average 3.4% for 2013 and
      reach slightly higher levels in 2014.

   -- Inflation will be 1.4% in 2013 and 1.8% in 2014.

Recent RMBS collateral performance has shown signs of improvement.
Overall, total delinquencies for seasoned pools, as a percentage
of the outstanding balance, have been declining over the last
several years.  Although S&P has been tracking this behavior for
some time, volatility in housing prices has limited its ability to
discern a prevailing trend.  The increase in home prices
nationally over the past 12-16 months, however, has provided a
positive outlook for housing fundamentals, which can soften
delinquency levels.  Under S&P's expected-case outlook, it is
forecasting the average price of existing home sales to move to
$232,000 in 2013 and 2014, from roughly $226,000.  In terms of
softening delinquency levels, however, S&P also notes that such
percentage declines can be largely supported by loan
modifications, a number of which may be repeat modifications.  As
a result, loans that return to a current pay status could mask a
portion of the delinquency declines, depending on the re-default
rates of such loans.  Contrary to the extent of loans that
potentially default, the data does show an overall decline in loss
severity over the last year.  This overall decline is largely a
function of home-price changes, but can be influenced by other
factors as well.  Loss severity levels, however, are still highly
elevated compared with historical norms.

Overall, S&P's forward outlook for RMBS is stable.  While S&P
views housing fundamentals overall as positive, it believes the
fundamentals of RMBS still hinge on additional factors such as the
ultimate fate of modified loans, the propensity of servicers to
advance on delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.  These
factors can affect the degree of cash flow that is allocated to
RMBS and, as such, S&P applies various methodologies and
assumptions when evaluating most RMBS.

While the above-mentioned factors affect the integrity of RMBS
cash flows, a number of macroeconomic factors influence the
collateral performance of the mortgage loans backing such
securities.  The chief variables include home prices (willingness
to pay) and unemployment (capacity to pay).  Because S&P expects a
gradual decline in unemployment rates and positive annual home-
price appreciation, it believes these variables could improve
collateral performance.  Other macroeconomic factors, such as
inflation, GDP, and mortgage rates, can also influence collateral
performance, whether directly or indirectly, based on overall
economic conditions.

However, while S&P expects the U.S. economic recovery to continue,
its economists believes there is a 10%-15% chance that the U.S.
will enter another recession.  If there is another recession,
owever, S&P don't expect it to be as severe as the Great Recession
of 2008-2009.  Overall, under S&P's baseline economic assumptions,
it expects RMBS collateral quality to improve mildly.  However, if
a downside scenario were to occur in the U.S. in line with
Standard & Poor's forecast, it believes that the credit quality of
U.S. RMBS would weaken.  S&P's downside scenario incorporates the
following key assumptions:

   -- Home prices once again decline as a result of higher
      defaults, additional shadow inventory, and less purchase
      activity.

   -- Total unemployment increases modestly in 2013 to 8.6%, but
      rises to 9% in 2014; job growth would slow to almost zero in
      2013 and 2014.

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth of less than 1% in 2013
      and 2014, fueled by increased unemployment levels.

   -- Thirty-year fixed mortgage rates fall below 3% in 2013, but
      capitalizing on such lower rates could be hampered by
      limited access to credit and pressure on home prices.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          07324SAL6   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
IO         07324SAK8   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
B          07324SAP7   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)

Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-1
Series 2008-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
IO         07324AAA9   NR                   AA+ (sf)
A-2A       07324AAC5   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2B       07324AAD3   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        07324AAE1   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        07324AAF8   B+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        07324AAK7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-4
Series 2008-4
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        07326KAC1   D (sf)               BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        07326KAD9   D (sf)               BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        07326KAE7   D (sf)               BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        07326KAF4   D (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        07326KAG2   D (sf)               CCC (sf)
M-3        07326KAH0   D (sf)               CCC (sf)
M-6        07326KAL1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-1        07326KAM9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-2        07326KAN7   D (sf)               CCC (sf)

Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-10
Series 2004-10
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
4-A-1      45254NLP0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-2
Series 2005-2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      45254NNJ2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-6
Series 2005-6
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      45254NQQ3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-8
Series 2005-8
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A        45254NRT6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Impac Secured Assets Trust 2006-1
Series 2006-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      45254TTN4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Impac Secured Assets Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      45256VAQ0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Impac Secured Assets Trust 2006-5
Series 2006-5
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A        45257EAE4   BB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Dev

Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-2
Series 2007-2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A        452570AE4   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Dev

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        07324SAM4   AA (sf)
M-2        07324SAN2   A (sf)

Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-1
Series 2008-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        07324AAG6   CCC (sf)
M-2        07324AAH4   CCC (sf)
M-3        07324AAJ0   CCC (sf)

Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-4
Series 2008-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        07326KAJ6   CCC (sf)
M-5        07326KAK3   CCC (sf)


C-BASS VII: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on $14.57MM Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes of notes issued by C-BASS
CBO VII, Ltd./Corp. (C-BASS VII) as follows:

-- $10,598,240 class C notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,575,580 class D notes at 'CCCsf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch
also considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis,
as described below, to conclude the rating affirmations for the
rated notes.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2012, the credit quality
of the collateral has deteriorated with approximately 36% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 4.4 notches.
Approximately 83.7% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 65.4% rated in the 'CCC' category or
lower, compared to 71% and 57.5%, respectively, at last review.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of the class C notes is due to the amortization of
the notes increasing credit enhancement that offsets the
deterioration of the underlying portfolio. Since the last review,
the notes have received approximately $9.4 million of principal
repayment, or 47% of its previous outstanding balance. Although
the notes are currently passing at higher ratings than 'BBBsf' in
cash flow modeling results, concentration risk remains a concern
as the portfolio continues to amortize. Only 34.6% of the
portfolio is considered performing (rated above 'CCCsf'), with the
five largest assets representing more than 30.9% of the performing
portfolio.

The Outlook remains Stable for the class C notes due to the
expected stable future performance of the class, with the cash
flow modeling results displaying a cushion above its current
rating in all scenarios. Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks to
classes rated 'CCC' or below.

The class D notes remain supported by 'CCC' assets and will not
begin receiving principal paydowns until the class C notes are
fully repaid. The notes are likely to remain outstanding beyond a
two year horizon, exposing them to potential future negative
migration in the portfolio.

Rating Sensitivities

Further negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by
SF PCM as well as increasing concentration in assets of a weaker
credit quality could lead to downgrades.

C-BASS VII is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on July 30, 2003. The portfolio is
currently monitored by NIC Management LLC, an affiliate of
Newcastle Investment Corp. The portfolio is comprised of 73.3%
residential mortgage-backed securities, 18.6% commercial and
consumer asset-backed securities, and 8.1% SF CDOs from 1998
through 2003 vintage transactions.


CALIBRE 2004-XI: S&P Raises Debt Rating From 'CCC-p(sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its principal-only
rating on the fixed-rate notes from Calibre 2004-XI Ltd., a
synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of corporate
CDO transaction.

S&P raised the rating on the notes based on a May 31, 2013,
amendment that eliminated payments under the transaction's credit
default swap.  Subsequent to the amendment, noteholders receive
all interest payments passed through from the underlying
collateral held in the transaction's guaranteed investment
contract (GIC).  S&P's 'AA-p (sf)' principal-only rating addresses
the final principal payment on the note and is weak-linked to the
rating on Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp., which is the guarantor
of the GIC provider.

S&P will continue to review its rating on the notes and assess
whether, in its view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTION

Calibre 2004-XI Ltd.

Class                   To            From
Notes                   AA-p (sf)     CCC-p (sf)


CARFINANCE CAPITAL: Moody's Gives 'Ba3' Rating to $11.3MM Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings of A3
(sf) to the Class A notes, Baa1 (sf) to the Class B notes, Baa3
(sf) to the Class C notes, and Ba3 (sf) to the Class D notes
issued by CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-1 (CFCAT 2013-1).
This transaction is a securitization of subprime auto loans
originated and serviced by CarFinance Capital LLC (NR). The
complete rating action is as follows:

$152,420,000, 1.65%, Class A Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned A3 (sf)

$60,720,000, 2.75%, Class B Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Baa1 (sf)

$13,910,000, 3.45%, Class C Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$11,380,000, 4.68%, Class D Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of CarFinance
Capital LLC as the servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation is 12.00% for the
CFCAT 2013-1 pool. Moody's net loss expectation for the CFCAT
2013-1 transaction is based on an analysis of the credit quality
of the underlying collateral, comparable issuer historical
performance trends, the ability of CarFinance Capital LLC to
perform the servicing functions, the backup servicing arrangement
with Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (Aa3), and current
expectations for future economic conditions.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is weaker
than the Medium V score assigned for the U.S. Prime Retail Auto
Loan ABS sector. The V Score indicates "Medium/High" uncertainty
about critical assumptions.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS, published in May 2013.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed from 12% to 28.0%,
30.0% or 32.0%, the initial model-indicated output might change
from A3 to Baa1, Ba1, and B1, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.0%, 20.0%, or
23.5%, the initial model-indicated output for the Class B notes
might change from Baa1 to Baa2, Ba2, and B2, respectively. If the
net loss used in determining the initial rating were changed to
12.5%, 15.5%, or 18.5%, the initial model-indicated output for the
Class C notes might change from Baa3 to Ba1, B1, and respectively, and the initial model-indicated output for the Class
D notes might change from Ba3 to B1,
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


CARLYLE DAYTONA: Moody's Raises Rating on $105.7MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by Carlyle Daytona CLO,
Ltd.:

U.S. $33,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 27,
2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf);

U.S. $33,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 27,
2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded
to A3 (sf);

U.S. $20,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 27,
2021, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

U.S.$21,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 27, 2021
(current outstanding balance of $19,692,754.04), Upgraded to Ba2
(sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S. $358,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 27,
2021 (current outstanding balance of $352,942,979.76), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

U.S. $50,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
April 27, 2021 (current outstanding balance of $49,293,712.26),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the end of the deal's reinvestment period
in April 2013. In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions
applicable during the amortization period, and therefore limited
ability to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from higher spread
levels compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
August 2011. Moody's modeled a spread of 3.60% compared to 2.80%
at the time of the last rating action. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported collateral quality and
overcollateralization ratio are stable since the last rating
action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized
Loan Obligations" published in May 2013, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $522.1 million,
defaulted par of $16.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.08% (implying a WARF of 2596), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.27%, and a diversity
score of 69. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Carlyle Daytona CLO, Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2077)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: +1

Class A-3L: +2

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3115)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: -2

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


CARNOW AUTO 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to CarNow
Auto Receivables Trust 2013-1's $121.4 million asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 48.5%, 40.1%, 32.7%,
      29.5%, and 26.4% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed break-even cash
      flow scenarios (including excess spread).

   -- These credit support levels provide coverage of slightly
      more than 2.15x, 1.75x, 1.40x, 1.25x, and 1.10x S&P's
      expected net loss range of 21.75%-22.25% for the class A, B,
      C, D, and E notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments by S&P's assumed
      legal final maturity dates made under stressed cash flow
      modeling scenarios that are appropriate to the assigned
      ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate, or 'BBB', stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes would not
      decline by more than one rating category within the first
      year, and the ratings on the C, D, and E notes would not
      decline by more than two categories (all else being equal)
      within the first year.  These potential rating movements are
      consistent with our credit stability criteria, which outline
      the outer bound of credit deterioration equal to a one-
      category downgrade within the first year for 'AAA' and 'AA'
      rated securities, and a two-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under
      moderate stress conditions

   -- Under the 'BBB' moderate stress, all else equal, the class D
      and E notes ultimately default.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
      securitized: the pool is 8.5 months seasoned and all of the
      loans have an original term of 50 months or less (with the
      exception of four loans that have a term of greater than 50,
      but no more than 53, months), which S&P expects will result
      in a faster pay down on the pool relative to many other
      subprime pools with longer loan terms and less seasoning.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1560.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CarNow Auto Receivables Trust 2013-1

Class  Rating   Type        Interest   Amount   Legal final
                                rate  (mil. $)  maturity
A      AA (sf)  Senior          1.16   81.873   Oct. 16, 2017
B      A (sf)   Subordinate     1.97   15.050   Nov. 15, 2017
C      BBB (sf) Subordinate     2.98   13.244   Nov. 15, 2017
D      BB (sf)  Subordinate     4.33    5.217   Nov. 15, 2017
E      B (sf)   Subordinate     6.41    6.021   Sept. 17, 2018


CENT CLO 18: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Cent
CLO 18 Ltd./Cent CLO 18 Corp.'s $473.75 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.27%-11.67%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1553.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cent CLO 18 Ltd./Cent CLO 18 Corp.

Class                Rating                   Amount
                                             (mil. $)
X                    AAA (sf)                   3.75
A                    AAA (sf)                 315.00
B-1                  AA (sf)                   55.50
B-2                  AA (sf)                   10.00
C-1 (deferrable)     A (sf)                    31.25
C-2 (deferrable)     A (sf)                     2.00
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                  25.00
E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)                  26.25
P(i)                 AA+ (sf)NRi(ii)            5.00
Subordinated notes   NR                        53.75

  (i) The class P notes are secured by a U.S. Treasury Strip, with
      a $5 million face value.

(ii) 'NRi' indicates that the interest is not rated.

  NR - Not rated.


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $37MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded two tranches and upgraded
four tranches from two RMBS transactions issued by CHL Mortgage
Pass-Through Trust. The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed-rate prime Jumbo residential
mortgages. The actions impact approximately $37 million of RMBS
issued in 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-4

Cl. A-26, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-27, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-5

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-9, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-10, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-17, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the prime
jumbo pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools. The downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance and structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for certain bonds than previously
anticipated. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of HAMP and increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF331414

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


CITIGROUP 2013-375P: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
CMBS securities, issued by Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-375P:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to a Class A office
building in New York City. The loan is secured by a fee simple
interest in 375 Park Ave, New York City also known as the Seagram
Building. The property is indirectly wholly owned by special
purpose entities in turn owned by RFR Realty. Constructed in 1958
to house the world headquarters of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, the
property is a 38-story Class A office building located in midtown
Manhattan, encompassing the eastern block of Park Avenue between
East 52nd and East 53rd Streets.

The Seagram Building is one of the premier office buildings in
Manhattan with superior amenities, location and architecture. The
property continually achieves some of the highest rents per square
foot in the country, defining the property as a trophy asset and
differentiating it from competing market inventory. Over the last
decade, the property has operated with an average occupancy of
95.9% and has consistently outperformed the Plaza District
submarket which is a very strong market in itself. In addition,
the long-term cash flow potential and sustainability of trophy
assets through-the-cycle consistently produce a large number of
potential investors, both nationally and internationally, whenever
they trade.

The ratings are based on the collateral and the structure of the
transaction.

Moody's rating approach for securities backed by a single loan
compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying properties
with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also considers a range
of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two
factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely
driven by the LTV of the underlying loan.

Based on Moody's assessment of stabilized net cash flow and the
current interest rate, Moody's Trust DSCR is 2.30X and Moody's
Total Debt DSCR (inclusive of mezzanine debt) is 1.55X.

Based on Moody's assessment of stabilized net cash flow and a
stressed constant of 9.25%, the Moody's Trust Stressed DSCR is
0.88X and Moody's Total Debt Stressed DSCR (inclusive of mezzanine
debt) is 0.68X.

The first mortgage balance of $782,750,000 represents a Moody's
LTV ratio of 86.5% which is higher than other single-borrower
office buildings that have been assigned a bottom-dollar credit
assessment of Ba3 by Moody's. Moody's also considers subordinate
financing when assigning ratings. The loan is structured with
$217,250,000 of additional financing in the form of mezzanine
debt, raising Moody's Total LTV ratio to 110.5%.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-A
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Single Borrower CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 16%, or 25%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa classes would be Aa2, A1, or Baa2, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


COMM 2006-FL12: S&P Lowers Rating on Class AN4 Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 30
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2006-FL12, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  S&P also lowered its rating on the AN4 non-pooled
raked certificates to 'D (sf)' due to outstanding accumulated
interest shortfalls.

The affirmations follows S&P's analysis of the transaction, which
included the revaluation of the collateral securing the six
remaining assets in the trust, three of which are currently with
the special servicers.  S&P's review also considered the
transaction structure, interest shortfalls, and refinancing
risk.

S&P also lowered its rating on the AN4 non-pooled raked
certificates to 'D (sf)' due to outstanding accumulated interest
shortfalls.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the three remaining class
'AN' raked certificates based on its analysis of the Albertsons
(Newkirk) Portfolio.

As of the May 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the pooled
trust balance consisted of six pooled mortgage assets totaling
$900.5 million.  This is down from 15 loans with a pooled trust
balance totaling $2.6 billion at issuance.  The pooled mortgage
assets are indexed to one-month LIBOR.  The one-month LIBOR rate
was 0.1992% according to the May 2013 trustee remittance report.
To date, the pooled trust experienced losses totaling
$19.2 million.

The affirmed ratings on the pooled principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination and liquidity support levels
that are consistent with S&P's outstanding ratings.  Although
available credit enhancement levels might suggest positive rating
movement on several classes, S&P affirmed its ratings on these
classes because its analysis also considered the maturity
refinancing risk over the next six months associated with five of
the six remaining assets.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the KR classes of raked
certificates based on its analysis of the Kerzner International
loan.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the IP classes of raked certificates
based on its analysis of the Independence Plaza loan.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the FSH classes of raked
certificates based on its analysis of the Four Seasons Hualalai
loan.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the ES classes of raked
certificates based on its analysis of the Embassy Suites Lake
Buena Vista loan.

S&P affirmed its 'B (sf)' rating on the TC1 class of raked
certificates based on its analysis of the Avenue at Tower City
loan.

All of the raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from
a subordinate non-pooled component of the loan.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the Class X-2, X-3-BC, X-3-
DB, X-3-SG, X-5-BC, and X-5-DB interest-only (IO) certificates
based on its current criteria for rating IO securities.

S&P based its analysis for the remaining six pooled assets, in
part, on a review of the borrower's operating statements for the
available trailing 12 months ended 2012 as well as the years ended
Dec. 31, 2011, Dec. 31, 2010, and Dec. 31, 2009.  Details on the
six assets, three of which are with the special servicer, are as
follows:

The Kerzner International loan is the largest loan in the pool.
The fee interest in two full-service resort hotels totaling 3,023
rooms secures the loan.  The collateral for this loan also
includes a water park, a casino, an 18-hole golf course, vacant
land, the assignment of the borrower's 50% joint-venture interest
in timeshare units, a 50% joint-venture interest in net sale
proceeds from an on-site condo project, and a marina project, all
located on Paradise Islands, Bahamas.  To date, the whole-loan
balance has been paid down by $506.0 million to $2.27 billion,
which is bifurcated into a $1.25 billion senior participation
interest and a $1.02 billion subordinate nontrust junior
participation interest.  The senior participation interest is
split into two pari passu notes.  One of the notes is in this
transaction, which consists of a $480.9 million senior pooled
component (53.4% of the pooled trust balance) and a $144.8 million
subordinate non-pooled component raked to the KR certificates.
The other pari passu note is in the Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s Series 2006-TFL2 transaction, which
includes a $350.8 million senior pooled component and a $276.2
million subordinate non-pooled component raked to the KER
certificates.

The Kerzner International loan was assigned and assumed by
Brookfield Asset Management Inc., the current sponsor, and
modified on Dec. 31, 2011.  The modification terms include, among
other items, extending the loan's maturity date from Dec. 30,
2011, to Sept. 9, 2014.  According to the loan's master servicer,
Wells Fargo Bank NA (Wells Fargo), the borrower paid the fees
associated with the workout of the loan.  Wells Fargo reported
debt service coverage (DSC) of 7.75x on the trust balance and
overall occupancy on the property of 67.0% for year-to-date
Sept. 30, 2012.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a weighted-
average capitalization rate of 9.6%, yielded a stressed in-trust
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 117.9%.

The second-largest loan, Independence Plaza, has a whole-loan
balance of $357.9 million that is split into $197.9 million senior
participation and a $160.0 million junior participation held
outside the trust.  The senior participation is further split into
a $176.2 million senior pooled component (19.6% of the pooled
trust balance) and a $21.7 million non-pooled component that
supports the IP raked certificates.  In addition, the borrower's
equity interests in the properties secure a $150.0 million
mezzanine loan.  The loan is secured by three 39-story apartment
buildings comprising 1,332 apartment units, 123,750 sq. ft. of
parking garage space with 550 spaces, 49,730 sq. ft. of retail
space, and 17,000 sq. ft. of office space.  The loan was modified,
extended, and returned to the master servicer in December 2012.
Excess cash flow is swept and applied to principal in accordance
with the modification agreement and has resulted in a
$67.1 million paydown to the senior participation.  The loan's
final maturity is Aug. 9, 2013, and has no remaining extension
options.  According to the master servicer, the borrower is
pursuing refinancing in order to pay off the loan at maturity.
S&P's adjusted valuation, using a capitalization rate of 6.50%,
yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 44.9%.  However, the IP
raked certificates have historically experienced interest
shortfalls, and S&P consequently affirmed its ratings on those
certificates.

The Four Seasons Hualalai, the third-largest loan in the pool, is
secured by the leasehold interest in a 243-room full-service
resort hotel on the Kona-Kohala Coast of Hawaii's Big Island and
situated on over 400 acres.  In addition, the loan is partially
secured by the leasehold interest in single-family home lots and
parcels planned for condominium development.  Subsequent to
issuance, approximately 37 acres of this land was sold and
released, and the remaining land totals 83 acres.  The property
also includes two 18-hole golf courses.  The whole-loan balance of
$292.7 million consists of a $168.2 million senior participation
interest and a $124.5 million junior participation interest held
outside of the trust.  The senior participation interest is
further split into a $143.9 million senior pooled component (16.0%
of the pooled trust balance) and subordinate non-pooled components
totaling $24.3 million that are raked to the FSH certificates.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC
(LNR), on June 11, 2012, due to maturity default, and the loan
matured on June 9, 2012.  According to LNR, after previously
discussing a long-term modification, the borrower and the lender
are currently discussing a potential payoff of the loan.  S&P's
adjusted valuation, using an 8.50% capitalization rate, yielded a
stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 119.8.0%, resulting in the
affirmation of the rating on the FSH raked certificates.

The Albertsons Portfolio is the fourth-largest asset in the pool
and is secured by 45 retail stores (majority Albertson) totaling
2.1 million sq. ft. in 13 states.  The total balance of the asset
is $108.6 million, which is split into $78.9 million senior
participation and a $29.6 million junior participation held
outside the trust.  The senior participation is further split into
a $63.7 million senior pooled component (7.1% of the pooled trust
balance) and a $15.2 million non-pooled component that supports
the AN raked certificates.  The master servicer, Berkadia,
reported an in-trust DSC of 3.17x for year-to-date June 30, 2012.
The loan matured on Aug. 9, 2011, and was transferred to the
special servicer, LNR, on Aug. 10, 2011.  The loan became real
estate owned in October 2012.  According to LNR, the portfolio is
85% occupied and managed by McKinley, which has subcontracted out
leasing where necessary to manage roll and lease up vacant
locations.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a capitalization rate
of 7.50%, yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 61.1%.  The AN
classes of raked certificates have experienced interest rate
shortfalls due to special servicing fees since August 2011.  The
AN4 raked certificate has accumulated interest shortfalls, and
accordingly, S&P downgraded the AN4 raked certificates to 'D sf)'.
If the remaining AN classes of raked certificates continue to
experience interest shortfalls for an extended period of time, S&P
may take additional rating actions, including lowering some
ratings to 'D (sf)'.

The Embassy Suites Lake Buena Vista loan is the fifth-largest loan
and has a whole loan balance of $40.4 million, which is split into
$25.4 million senior participation and a $15.0 million junior
participation held outside the trust.  The senior participation is
further split into a $20.7 million senior pooled component (2.3%
of the pooled trust balance) and a $4.7 million non-pooled
component that supports the ES classes of raked certificates.  In
addition, the borrower's equity interests in the properties secure
a $12.0 million mezzanine loan.  The master servicer, Berkadia,
reported an in-trust DSC of 2.16x and occupancy of 78.7% for the
trailing 12 months ending Sept. 30, 2012.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer, CT Investment Management Co.
LLC, on Oct. 28, 2011, due to a near-term final maturity of
Nov. 9, 2011.  A forbearance agreement was executed in December
2011 and expires in November 2013.  Pursuant to the agreement, the
borrower is required to list the property for sale six months
prior to the expiration of the forbearance term (May 2013), and
according to the special servicer, the borrower is in compliance.
The special servicer expects to complete a short sale (in excess
of the trust balance) by the end of September 2013.  S&P's
adjusted valuation, using a capitalization rate of 9.25%, yielded
a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 142.7%, resulting in the
affirmation of the ES classes of raked certificates.

The Avenue at Tower City loan, the smallest loan in the pool, is
secured by a 364,229-sq.-ft. retail center in Cleveland, Ohio.
The loan has whole-loan balance of $26.8 million, which is split
into a $17.1 million senior participation and a $9.6 million
junior participation held outside the trust.  The senior
participation is further split into a $15.0 million senior pooled
component (1.7% of the pooled trust balance) and a $2.1 million
non-pooled component that supports the TC classes of raked
certificates (Standard & Poor's does not rate the TC2 raked
certificate.)  The master servicer, Berkadia, reported an in-trust
DSC of 2.99x and occupancy of 66.5% at fiscal year-end Jan. 31,
2013.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a capitalization rate of
8.25%, yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 60.6%.  The loan
is currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to low
occupancy.  The loan matures in September 2013 with no remaining
extension options.  According to the master servicer, the borrower
is pursuing refinancing for the loan.  For these reasons, S&P
affirmed the TC1 raked certificates.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Rating Lowered

COMM 2006-FL12
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
            Rating
Class   To          From
AN4     D (sf)      CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed
COMM 2006-FL12
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class         Rating
A-2           AAA (sf)
A-J           AA- (sf)
B             BBB (sf)
C             BB+ (sf)
D             BB- (sf)
E             B+ (sf)
F             B- (sf)
G             CCC+ (sf)
H             CCC (sf)
X-2           AAA (sf)
X-3-BC        AAA (sf)
X-3-DB        AAA (sf)
X-3-SG        AAA (sf)
X-5-BC        AAA (sf)
X-5-DB        AAA (sf)
KR1           CCC- (sf)
KR2           CCC- (sf)
KR3           CCC- (sf)
IP1           BBB+ (sf)
IP2           BBB- (sf)
IP3           BBB- (sf)
FSH1          CCC- (sf)
FSH2          CCC- (sf)
FSH3          CCC- (sf)
AN1           CCC+ (sf)
AN2           CCC (sf)
AN3           CCC- (sf)
ES1           CCC- (sf)
ES2           CCC- (sf)
TC1           B (sf)


COMM 2007-C9: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M Certificate to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM 2007-C9,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction,
to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'.

S&P lowered its rating because it expects the accumulated interest
shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.
Class M has accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 12
months.

According to the May 10, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $382,374.
The current interest shortfalls resulted from appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts of $252,750 from
eight ($102.8 million, 4.0%) of the nine assets ($107.5 million,
4.2%) with the special servicer, workout fees of $73,988 (of which
$71,341 was related to a loan that was paid off this month),
interest paid on outstanding servicer advances of $34,190, and
special servicing fees of $22,420.  The current reported interest
shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and including class
K.  Excluding the interest on advances and the one-time $71,341
workout fee, S&P expects class M to continue to experience
interest shortfalls.

As of the May 10, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $2.55 billion, down from
$2.89 billion at issuance.  The pool has 93 loans and one real
estate-owned asset, down from 110 loans at issuance.  To date, the
transaction has experienced losses totaling $26.9 million (0.9% of
the transaction's original trust balance).

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust's Series 1999-C2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations of the principal and interest paying certificates
follows S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily using its
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust.  The affirmations also
reflects S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmed
ratings also reflect S&P's review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans, liquidity support, and
transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movements for Classes E and F, S&P affirmed the ratings
because its analysis also considered the timing of the expected
repayments of the accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding on
these classes.  According to the May 17, 2013, trustee remittance
report, the trust experienced current interest shortfalls totaling
$354,318, related to workout fees on three loans, including a one-
time charge of $352,755 on a loan that paid-off last month.  Total
interest shortfalls this period affected all classes subordinate
to and including Class E.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the Class X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.50x
and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 49.3% for
eight of the 14 remaining loans in the pool.  The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude the six defeased loans ($55.5 million,
47.9%).

As of the May 17, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $115.9 million, down from
$775.2 million at issuance.  The pool comprises 14 loans, down
from 80 loans at issuance.  To date, the transaction has
experienced losses totaling $61.3 million (7.9% of the
transaction's original trust balance).  There are currently no
loans with the special servicer or on the master servicer's
watchlist.  No loans had a reported DSC of less than 1.10x.
Details on the two largest nondefeased loans in the pool are as
follows:

The Westin Denver Tabor Center loan ($31.7 million, 27.4%), the
largest nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by a 430-room
full-service hotel in Denver, Colo.  The master servicer reported
a 72.8% occupancy and 1.93x DSC for the trailing 12 months ended
March 31, 2013.

The Geneva Crossing loan ($10.9 million, 9.4%), the second-largest
nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by a 123,281-sq.-ft.
retail property in Carol Stream, Ill.  The master servicer
reported a DSC of 1.27x for the trailing 12 months ended Feb. 28,
2013, and occupancy was 98.8%, according to the February 2013 rent
rolls.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates Series 1999-C2

Class            Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
C                AAA (sf)                    70.86
D                AAA (sf)                    60.83
E                BBB (sf)                    35.74
F                CCC+ (sf)                   22.37
X                AAA (sf)                     N/A

N/A - Not applicable.


CSMC TRUST 2013-IVR: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B-3 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to CSMC
Trust 2013-IVR3's $336.410 million mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2013-IVR3.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The pool's high-quality collateral;.

   -- The quality of DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc.'s flow acquisition
      program;

   -- First Republic Bank's and Quicken Loans Inc.'s origination
      quality; and

   -- The credit enhancement and the associated structural deal
      mechanics.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1572.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CSMC Trust 2013-IVR3

Class    Rating                Amount (mil. $)
A-3      AAA (sf)                      217.423
A-8      AAA (sf)                       94.429
A-3-X-1  AAA (sf)                  Notional(i)
A-3-X-2  AAA (sf)                  Notional(i)
A-3-X-3  AAA (sf)                  Notional(i)
A-8-X-1  AAA (sf)                 Notional(ii)
A-8-X-2  AAA (sf)                 Notional(ii)
A-1      AAA (sf)                      311.852
A-2      AAA (sf)                      311.852
A-4      AAA (sf)                       94.429
A-5      AAA (sf)                      217.423
A-6      AAA (sf)                      311.852
A-7      AAA (sf)                      217.423
A-9      AAA (sf)                       94.429
A-10     AAA (sf)                      217.423
A-X-1    AAA (sf)                Notional(iii)
A-X-2    AAA (sf)                Notional(iii)
A-X-3    AAA (sf)                  Notional(i)
A-X-4    AAA (sf)                 Notional(ii)
A-X-5    AAA (sf)                  Notional(i)
A-X-6    AAA (sf)                  Notional(i)
A-X-7    AAA (sf)                Notional(iii)
B-1      A (sf)                          4.878
B-2      BBB (sf)                        5.046
B-3      BB (sf)                         5.382
B-4      NR                              4.542
B-5      NR                               4.71

  (i) The notional amount for the classes A-3-X-1, A-3-X-2, and
      A-3-X-3 bonds is $217.423 million.

(ii) The notional amount for the classes A-8-X-1 and A-8-X-2
      bonds is $94.429 million.

(iii)The notional amount for the classes A-X-1 and A-X-2 bonds is
      $311.852 million.

  NR - Not rated.


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class B-7 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed three classes issued
by DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp., series 1999-CG1.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade to the class B-6 reflects better than expected
recoveries on previously performing loans while taking into
account the risk of adverse selection as the portfolio continues
to amortize. The affirmation to the class B-5 reflects the
increased credit enhancement to the notes from paydowns.

Fitch modeled losses of 2.1% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 3.4%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $42.1 million (3.3% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated one loan (11.9%) as a Fitch Loan of Concern, the loan
remains current.

As of the May 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.9% to $26.2 million from
$1.2 billion at issuance. One loan (4.5%) is currently defeased.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes B-7 through C.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a 324 unit
multifamily property (30.6%) located in Bixby, OK. The property
performance has been stable over the past two years with the
property being 100% occupied. Current asking rents are in line
with the submarket.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch also performed an additional stress on the remaining
performing loans. The rating on the class B-5 notes is expected to
be stable as the credit enhancement remains high.

Fitch has upgraded and assigned a Rating Outlook to the following
class:

-- $12.4 million class B-6 notes to 'Bsf' from 'CCsf'; Outlook
   Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $5.7 million class B-5 notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.1 million class B-7 notes at 'Dsf'; RE 30%;
-- Class B-8 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-2, A-3, A-4, B-1, B-2, B-3, and B-4 are paid
in full. Fitch does not rate class C. Fitch previously withdrew
the rating of interest-only class S.


DRYDEN XVII: Moody's Reinstates 'B1(sf)' Rating on One Tranche
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it is reinstating the
rating of UBS AG, London Branch CDS Ref. #37585711 (DRYDEN XVII).

Issuer: UBS AG, London Branch CDS Ref. #37585711 (DRYDEN XVII)

  USD25,000,000 UBS AG, London Branch CDS Reference Number
  37585711 (DRYDEN XVII) Notes, Reinstated B1 (sf); previously on
  May 10, 2013 Withdrawn (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's is reinstating the rating after sufficient and adequate
information was provided on May 13, 2013 by UBS AG, the swap
counterparty and calculation agent to the transaction, to support
the maintenance of the rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized
Synthetic Obligations," key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis may be different from the manager/arranger's reported
numbers. In particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated
corporate credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted
for "Review for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible
Upgrade", or "Negative Outlook".

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model. For a description
of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the CDOROM user's
guide on Moody's website.

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality. Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities. The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee. Although the impact of these decisions is
mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of
these decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty
in our assumptions. Given the tranched nature of CSO liabilities,
rating transitions in the reference pool may have leveraged rating
implications for the ratings of the CSO liabilities, thus leading
to a high degree of volatility. All else being equal, the
volatility is likely to be higher for more junior or thinner
liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe. Should macroeconomics conditions evolve,
the CSO ratings will change to reflect the new economic
developments.


DUANE STREET III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on all seven
classes of notes from Duane Street CLO III Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation transaction now managed by Napier Park Global
Capital LLC.

S&P last took a rating action on this transaction in June 2011,
where it raised the ratings on all seven classes of notes, and
removed four of them from CreditWatch with positive implications.
This transaction has exited its reinvestment phase and made its
first principal payment of $85 million to the class A notes in
April 2013.  The senior overcollateralization test increased to
129% in April 2013 from 124% in May 2011, mainly due to the
amortization.

The balance of defaulted and 'CCC' rated assets together has
increased to $28.9 million from $27.2 million, during the same
time period, and some of the currently held 'CCC' rated assets
also have negative outlooks.  However, the effects of the class A
paydown along with the increase in the portfolio's weighted
average spread to 3.64% from 3.09% during this period have
increased the credit enhancement available to all seven classes of
notes.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Duane Street CLO III Ltd.

                         Rating
Class               To           From
A1                  AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A2a                 AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A2b                 AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)      B- (sf)


EVERBANK MORTGAGE: Fitch to Rate $3.33MM Class B-4 Certs 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate EverBank Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-2
(EBMLT 2013-2) as follows:

-- $278,879,000 class A certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $278,879,000 class A-IO notional certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;
-- $7,279,000 class B-1 certificate 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5,460,000 class B-2 certificate 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,398,000 class B-3 certificate 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,336,000 class B-4 certificate 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,943,159 class B-5 certificate not rated.

Key Rating Drivers

Low CLTVs and High FICO Scores: The pool's original weighted
average (WA) combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is 67.69%,
indicating substantial equity in the property. Taken together with
the high WA original Fair Isaac Corp. (FICO) score of 776, the
pool is of very high credit quality and has considerably low
default risk. EBMLT 2013-2 has an improved FICO distribution
compared to EBMLT 2013-1, with just 2.3% of borrowers with FICOs
below 720 vs. 5.4% previously.

15-Year FRMs: The pool consists of 15-year (13%) and 30-year (87%)
FRMs. Borrowers of 15-year mortgages are positively selected, as
they have the option to select a lower payment option with a 30-
year FRM but qualify at, and choose, a higher payment. Thus, the
default risk is significantly lower, compared with borrowers of
other products, all else being equal. However, the larger monthly
payments associated with the 15-year FRM result in a faster
paydown on the subordinate classes during the lock-out period. As
a result, more transaction-level subordination is needed to cover
losses, should they occur later in the transaction's life.

Locations with High sMVDs: Roughly one-third of the pool is
located in regions that Fitch believes to be overvalued by 18% -
33% above sustainable levels, including Los Angeles, San Jose, and
Santa Ana, CA. The high market value decline projections are key
contributors to Fitch's default and loss risk assessment of this
pool. In addition, the pool has significant regional
concentrations that resulted in an additional penalty of about7%
to the pool's lifetime default expectation. This reflects a slight
improvement from EBMLT 2013-1, in which the pool's default risk
was increased by 10% to account for the geographic concentration.

R&W Counterparty Net Negative: The mortgage loan representation
and warranty (R&W) framework is consistent with Fitch's criteria
and viewed positively by the agency. However, EverBank does not
meet the criteria financial condition threshold. As a result,
Fitch made an adjustment to its loss expectations to account for
the possibility of slightly higher defaults and losses arising
from EverBank's inability to repurchase loans due to breaches. The
adjustment considered the 100% due diligence review, as well as
the very high quality of the mortgage loans.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to
demonstrate how the ratings would react to steeper market value
declines than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating
sensitivities are only an indication of some of the potential
outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction. Three sets of sensitivity
analyses were conducted to assess the effect of higher market
value declines for the subject pool.

In its analysis, Fitch considered placing a greater emphasis on
recent economic performance in determining market value declines
for the pool. While Fitch's current loan loss model looks to three
years of historical data and one year of projections, this does
not incorporate recent notable economic improvement. To reflect
the more recent economic environment, a sensitivity analysis was
performed using two years historical economic data and two years
of projections. The result of this sensitivity analysis was
included in the consideration of the loss expectations for this
transaction. The sensitivity analysis resulted in a base sMVD
decline of 15.4% from 16.3%.

Roughly half of the pool is located in California, both in areas
with high and low market value decline projections. The market
value decline projections are key contributors to Fitch's default
and loss risk assessment of this pool. Fitch conducted sensitivity
analysis assuming sMVDs of 15%, 20%, and 25% for all the
California regions. The sensitivity analysis indicated no impact
on ratings for all bonds in each scenario.

The third sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the ratings would
react to steeper market value declines at the national level. The
analysis assumes market value declines of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in
addition to the model projected 16.3% for this pool. The analysis
indicates there will be no rating impact with a further 10% market
value decline from the current model projection. However, there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.


FINN SQUARE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Finn
Square CLO Ltd./Finn Square CLO Corp.'s $664.7 million in fixed-
and floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date
as of March 15, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


RATINGS AFFIRMED

Finn Square CLO Ltd./Finn Square CLO Corp.

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     319.30
A-2                        AA (sf)                       56.10
B-1 (deferrable)           A (sf)                        19.50
B-2 (deferrable)           A (sf)                        20.00
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      24.60
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       25.20


GE CAPITAL 2001-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed two classes of
GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corporation (GECC) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-1.

Key Rating Drivers

Currently all three remaining classes have distressed ratings. The
downgrade of class I to 'Csf' from 'CCsf' indicates that losses to
the class are inevitable.

The transaction has become highly concentrated with only six loans
remaining in the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 41.1% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
6.2%, including losses already incurred. The pool has experienced
$52.7 million (4.7% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date. Fitch has designated three loans (65.7%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which includes the two specially serviced assets
(53.4%).

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings of classes I and H are subject to further downgrades
as losses are realized. Class J will remain at 'Dsf' as losses
have been realized.

As of the May 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.2% to $42.4 million from
$1.13 billion at issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through N.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is secured by a
280-key hotel located in Atlanta, GA (35.5% of the pool). The loan
was transferred to the special servicer in April 2009 due to
imminent default. The loan was foreclosed in December 2012 and
became a REO asset. As of March 2013, the servicer reported
trailing 12-month (TTM) occupancy, ADR and RevPar were 33.0%,
$67.05 and $22.12, respectively.

The second largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is secured
by a 115,436 sf office in Portland, OR (17.9%) , which consists of
a 110,000 sf multi-tenant office building and two small retail
buildings. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
September 2009 due to payment default. Loan was foreclosed and the
property became REO In September 2012. The current overall
occupancy rate is at 62%.

Fitch downgrades the following class as indicated:
-- $18.3 million class I to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 5%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:
-- $21.7 million class H at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $2.3 million class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, and X-2 have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class K, L, M and N certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1
certificates.


GOLDMAN SACHS 1998-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class H Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of Goldman Sachs Mortgage
Securities Corporation II 1998-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of class G is due to sufficient credit enhancement
to the remaining investment grade class. The pool has become
concentrated, with 37 loans of the original 323 at issuance.

Fitch modeled losses of 21.8% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $72 million (3.9% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 16 loans (63.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes two specially serviced assets (26.4%).

As of the May 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95% to $92.7 million from
$1.86 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 12 loans
(22.5% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes H through K.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-serviced
asset (11.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 296,735 square
foot (SF) shopping center in Queensbury, NY. The loan transferred
to special servicing in May 2008 due to imminent default and
became real estate owned (REO) in March 2012 via a deed-in-lieu.
The special servicer declared their advances non-recoverable in
2010. The special servicer also reports that the property is under
contract to be sold by the end of June 2013. Fitch modeled
significant losses on the asset.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-
serviced loan (14.7%) secured by a 211,089 SF office building
located in San Juan, PR. The loan transferred to special servicing
in February 2011 for imminent default. The special servicer
reports that it is pursuing foreclosure.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Hermanos
Melendez Hospital loan (17.6%), which is secured by a 206-unit
hospital in Bayamon, PR. The property has suffered from poor
performance and the net operating income declined approximately
28% from year-end 2010 to year-end 2011. The last servicer
reported property occupancy and DSCR was 70% and 1.03 times (x),
respectively, at year-end 2011.

Rating Sensitivities

The Rating Outlook for class G remains Negative due to the
remaining 23 non-defeased and non-specially serviced loans (48.2%)
of the pool that have maturities beyond 2015. In addition, Fitch
is concerned that the majority of these loans are located within
tertiary markets.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $23.3 million class G at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $44.3 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 55%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D and E certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class F and K certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class M Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on one class
and lowered its rating on one class of commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates from Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding
Corp. 2003-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.  Concurrently, Standard & Poor's affirmed its
ratings on 11 other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrade reflects Standard & Poor's expected available credit
enhancement for the affected tranche, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the rating level.  The upgrade also reflects S&P's
views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral.

The downgrade of Class M took into consideration the monthly
interest shortfalls affecting the trust and reflects the current
and potential interest shortfalls.  S&P lowered its rating on this
class to 'D (sf)' because it expects the interest shortfalls to
continue and S&P believes the accumulated interest shortfalls will
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Class M has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for one month and has
experienced interest shortfalls for 15 months.

According to the May, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $141,777
primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
amounts of $131,423 and special servicing fees of $11,192.  The
interest shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and
including Class L.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings also reflects S&P's review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets and
liquidity support as well as S&P's consideration of the volume of
nondefeased loans that are scheduled to mature through Dec. 1,
2013 (34 loans, $518.7 million, 65.5% of the portfolio).

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the Class XC interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on Classes E thru K, S&P affirmed its ratings on
these classes because its analysis also considered its view on
available liquidity support and risks associated with potential
interest shortfalls.  S&P believes these increased interest
shortfalls could likely result from two ($6.2 million, 0.8%) of
the remaining six assets ($179.8 million, 22.7%) that are with the
special servicer as well as from any of the nine loans that are on
the master servicer's watchlist ($203.0 million, 25.6%), all of
which have maturities between June and December 2013.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Rating Raised

Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates Series 2003-C2

              Rating                        Credit
Class      To          From             enhancement (%)
D          AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)              21.98

Rating Lowered

Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates Series 2003-C2

                Rating                      Credit
Class      To          From            enhancement (%)
M          D (sf)     CCC- (sf)               2.53

Ratings Affirmed

Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates Series 2003-C2

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-4        AAA (sf)                          36.77
B          AAA (sf)                          30.20
C          AAA (sf)                          27.46
E          AA (sf)                           20.06
F          A+ (sf)                           17.05
G          A- (sf)                           13.76
H          BBB (sf)                          10.47
J          BB (sf)                            7.46
K          B (sf)                             5.27
L          CCC (sf)                           3.90
XC         AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ12: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Cl. E(i) Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to GS
Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-GCJ12's $1.2 billion commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-GCJ12.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by 78 commercial mortgage loans with
an aggregate principal balance of $1.2 billion, secured by the fee
and leasehold interests in 106 properties across 29 states and the
District of Columbia.

The ratings reflect the credit support provided by the transaction
structure, S&P's view of the underlying collateral's economics,
the trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's relative
diversity, and S&P's overall qualitative assessment of the
transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1527.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-GCJ12

Class       Rating                    Amount ($)
A-1         AAA (sf)                  84,631,000
A-2         AAA (sf)                 134,221,000
A-3         AAA (sf)                 200,000,000
A-4         AAA (sf)                 313,849,000
A-AB        AAA (sf)                 105,525,000
X-A         AAA (sf)             919,055,000(ii)
X-B         A- (sf)              142,200,000(ii)
A-S         AAA (sf)                  80,829,000
B           AA- (sf)                  86,817,000
C           A- (sf)                   55,383,000
X-C(i)      NR                    86,817,027(ii)
D(i)        BBB- (sf)                 49,395,000
E(i)        BB (sf)                   32,931,000
F(i)        BB- (sf)                  11,974,000
G(i)        NR                        41,912,027

(i) Non-offered certificates.
(ii) Notional balance.
  NR - Not rated.


HELLER FINANCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the remaining rated classes of Heller
Financial Commercial Mortgage Asset Corp (HFCMAC 2000-PH1)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2000-PH1.

Key Ratings Drivers

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement due to
amortization and loan pay offs which mitigates the highly
concentrated pool with 15 loans remaining. The pool has had stable
performance since Fitch's last rating action.

Fitch modeled losses of 1.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses of the original pool are at 6.7% including losses already
incurred to date.

As of the May 2013 remittance report, the transaction has paid
down 97% to $28.3 million from $956.9 million at issuance. Fifteen
of the original 235 loans remain outstanding. There are no
specially serviced loans, and six loans (27.3%) are fully
defeased.

Ratings Sensitivity

The Negative Rating Outlook on class G is the result of interest
shortfalls currently affecting class H. The shortfalls are due to
the recovery of prior advances on the disposed Key Bank Tower by
the master servicer that are expected to continue over the next
six months. If interest shortfalls increase and impact class G, a
downgrade is likely.

The largest loan, Centre 71 (15%), is secured by an 81,360 sf
retail center in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The center resides east of
Woodland Hills Mall and is situated along East 71st street along
the commercial and retail corridor. The most recent servicer-
reported debt servicing coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.21x as of
year-end 2012. The Centre has experienced significant traction in
it leasing strategy over the past 12 months with year-end 2012
occupancy listed at 74%, an increase of 900 basis points versus
December 2011 reported occupancy.

The second largest loan, B & A Self Storage (12.6%), is secured by
a 110,728 sf self-storage facility in Los Angeles, California. The
center resides east of Woodland Hills Mall and is situated along
East 71st street along the commercial and retail corridor. The
most recent servicer-reported debt servicing coverage ratio (DSCR)
was at 1.82x as of June 2012.

The third largest loan, The Sports Authority (12.6%), is a 43,176
sf anchored retail center located in Boca Raton, Florida. The
center is 100% leased to HH Gregg, Sports Authority, and Petsmart
with no anticipated lease expirations for the next four years. The
center benefits from being situated in a residential area and the
servicer reported the year-end 2012 DSCR at 1.96x.

Fitch affirms the following class:

-- $26.3 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative.

Classes K, L, and M remain at 'Dsf/ 0%' due to realized losses.
Fitch does not rate class H, J, or N.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F have all paid in full.

Lastly, Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only
class X.


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Places $31MM Notes on Review for Upgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed the ratings
of the following notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO II, Ltd. on
review for possible upgrade:

U.S.$11,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Notes Due
December 15, 2016, Aa3 (sf) Placed under review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on July 12, 2012 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

U.S.$11,000,000 Class C Secured Notes Due December 15, 2016, Baa3
(sf) Placed under review for Possible Upgrade; previously on July
12, 2012 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$12,000,000 Class D Subordinated Secured Notes Due December
15, 2016 (current outstanding balance of $9,219,371.10), B3 (sf)
Placed under review for Possible Upgrade; previously on September
14, 2011 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S. $8,000,000 Class A-2A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
December 15, 2016 (current outstanding balance of 6,372,911.44),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 12, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

U.S. $7,000,000 Class A-2B Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
December 15, 2016 (current outstanding balance of 5,576,297.50),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 12, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of improvement in the overcollateralization
ratios, and a correction to Moody's modeling of the administrative
expenses cap.

According to a notice issued by the trustee on May 13, 2013, the
transaction is scheduled to be optionally redeemed in June 2013.
As of the April 30, 2013 trustee report, the underlying portfolio
has been entirely liquidated and the proceeds from the sale of the
collateral are expected to fully redeem the notes on the June 2013
payment date. The aggregate of all principal proceeds held as cash
and eligible investments is $47,937,641 and the aggregate
principal balance of collateral debt obligations is $0. The Senior
Notes, B-2 Notes, C Notes and D Notes OC ratios are 401.2%,
208.9%, 141.1%, 111.0% respectively.

Additionally, Moody's expects the correction of the modeling of
the senior administrative expenses cap to have a minor positive
impact on the ratings of the Class C and D Notes. At the time of
the last rating action in July 2012, the annual senior
administrative expenses cap was mistakenly modeled at a level
higher than stipulated by the Indenture. Today's rating actions
reflect correction of the modeling of the senior administrative
expenses cap to a level consistent with the provisions of the
Indenture.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.


JP MORGAN 2000-C10: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. G Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of JP Morgan Commercial
Mortgage Finance Corp. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2000-C10.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
to offset concentration risk and adverse selection with only nine
loans remaining in the pool.
Fitch modeled losses of 1.8% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 8.6%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $63.1 million (8.6% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated one loan (14.4%) as a Fitch Loan of Concern; none of
the loans are specially serviced.

As of the May 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97% to $22.2 million from
$738.5 million at issuance. There is one defeased loan (12.7% of
the pool). Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes G
through NR.

Rating Sensitivities

The Rating Outlook for class E is expected to remain Stable. Class
F remains on Negative Outlook due to the high concentration and
several loans with single tenant exposure within the pool.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns recovery estimates
(RE) as indicated:

-- $6.9 million class E at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $10.2 million class F at 'Asf', Outlook Negative.
-- $5.2 million class G at 'Dsf', RE 100%.

Classes A1, A2, B, C and D have paid in full. Due to realized
losses classes H, J, K, L and M have been reduced to zero and
remain at 'Dsf/RE 0%'.

Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.



JP MORGAN 2003-C1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s Series
2003-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follows its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of all of the remaining assets in
the pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available
to the trust.

The upgrades reflect Standard & Poor's expected available credit
enhancement for the affected tranches, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The upgrades also
reflect S&P's views regarding the current and future performance
of the transaction's collateral as well as the deleveraging of the
trust balance.

The affirmations reflect S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for these classes will be within S&P's estimate
of the necessary credit enhancement required for the current
outstanding ratings.  The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's
review of the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining assets as well as the transaction-level changes.

While the available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movements on the rated classes, S&P's analysis
also considered the current and potential additional interest
shortfalls related to the six ($49.5 million, 56.6%) of the
remaining 13 assets ($87.5 million) that are with the special
servicers.

As of the May 13, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $79,783,
primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
(ASER) amounts of $57,157 and special servicing fees of $10,335.
The interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including Class H.

As of the May 13, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate pooled trust balance of $87.5 million, down
from $1.07 billion at issuance.  The pool includes 12 loans and
one real estate owned (REO) asset, down from 104 loans at
issuance.  There are currently two defeased loans ($4.1 million,
4.7%), one REO asset, and five loans with the special servicers
LNR Partners LLC (LNR) and CWCapital Asset Management Inc.
(CWCapital) ($49.5 million, 56.6%).  There are also two loans on
the master servicer's watchlist ($24.7 million, 28.2%).

Details on the three largest specially serviced assets and two
loans on the master servicer's watchlist are as follows:

                    SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

The Prince Georges Metro Center IV loan ($23.2 million, 26.5%),
the largest asset with LNR, is secured by a 178,450-sq.-ft. office
building in Hyattsville, Md.  The reported total exposure was
$23.7 million, which includes servicer advances.  The loan was
transferred to LNR on March 11, 2013, due to maturity default.
The loan matured on March 1, 2013.  The reported occupancy and
debt service coverage (DSC) were 100% and 1.37x, respectively, for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2012.  According to LNR, the property is
100% leased to a General Services Administration (GSA)-based
tenant: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  The
lease had expired in December 2012, but the borrower negotiated a
two-year extension (the tenant has a 60-day termination right
after 18 months) at approximately the same base rental rate of
$27.87 per sq. ft.  According to the special servicer, the
borrower is seeking to refinance the loan.  S&P expects a minimal
loss upon the eventual resolution of the loan.

200-220 West Germantown Pike ($13.8 million, 15.8%) is REO and is
specially serviced by CWCapital.  The property consists of a
114,968-sq.-ft. office building in Plymouth Meeting, Pa.  The
reported total exposure was $17.7 million, which includes servicer
advances.  The loan was transferred to CWCapital on Jan. 26, 2010,
due to monetary default, and the property became REO on March 30,
2011.  The reported occupancy for the property was 70.0% as of
March 29, 2013.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the eventual
resolution of the asset.

The Granville Corners Shopping Center loan ($5.8 million, 6.7%) is
secured by a 138,349-sq.-ft. retail center in Oxford, N.C.  The
reported total exposure was $6.5 million.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer, LNR, on June 14, 2012, due to
payment default.  LNR reported that the property was 87.9%
occupied as of Nov. 19, 2012, and the reported net operating
income for year-end 2012 was $244,636.  LNR stated that it is
pursuing foreclosure.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the
eventual resolution of the loan.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

                          WATCHLIST LOANS

The larger of the two loans that appear on the master servicer's
watchlist, the Mark IV Las Vegas loan ($15.8 million, 18.1%), is
secured by a 451,088-sq.-ft. industrial building in Las Vegas,
Nev.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low
reported DSC.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells
Fargo), reported a DSC of 0.95x for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012.
According to Wells Fargo, the low reported DSC was a result of
reduced revenue due to lower occupancy combined with increased
expenses.  The reported occupancy was 78.5% as of Dec. 31, 2012.

The Old Saybrook Shopping Center loan ($8.9 million, 10.1%) is
secured by a 301,944-sq.-ft. retail center in Old Saybrook, Conn.
The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low
reported DSC.  The most recent DSC reported by the master servicer
was 0.96x as of Dec. 31, 2011.  The reported occupancy was 90.7%
for the same reporting period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1

                 Rating
Class      To             From     Credit enhancement (%)
D          A (sf)         BBB- (sf)                 74.25
E          BBB (sf)       BB (sf)                   57.47

Ratings Affirmed

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates Series 2003-C1

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
F          B (sf)                            37.64
G          CCC- (sf)                         17.80


JP MORGAN 2013-2: Fitch Rates $4.86MM Class B-4 Certs at 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Trust 2013-2 (JPMMT 2013-2):

-- $398,288,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $398,288,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $338,545,000 class A-3 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $59,743,000 class A-4 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $338,545,000 class A-5 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $59,743,000 class A-6 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $338,545,000 class A-IO1 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $59,743,000 class A-IO2 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $398,288,000 class A-IO3 exchangeable notional certificate
   'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $398,288,000 class A-IO4 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;

-- $398,288,000 class A-IO5 exchangeable notional certificate
   'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $4,647,000 class B-1 certificate 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $8,851,000 class B-2 certificate 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $6,417,000 class B-3 certificate 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $4,868,000 class B-4 certificate 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the senior certificates reflects the 10.00%
subordination provided by the 3.10% class A-M, 1.05% class B-1,
2.00% class B-2, 1.45% class B-3, 1.10% class B-4 and 1.30% class
B-5. The $13,719,000 class A-M and $5,753,300 class B-5
certificate will not be rated by Fitch.

Fitch's ratings reflect the high quality of the underlying
collateral, the clear capital structure and the high percentage of
loans reviewed by third party underwriters. In addition, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as the master servicer and U.S. Bank
Trust N.A. will act as the trustee for the transaction. For
federal income tax purposes, elections will be made to treat the
trust as one or more real estate mortgage investment conduits
(REMICs).

This transaction includes the use of Pentalpha Surveillance LLC as
representation & warranties (R&W) breach reviewer for the benefit
of the trust. The securities administrator will instruct Pentalpha
to review any loan that satisfies the review trigger. Pentalpha
will review the loan using the breach determination review
procedures outlined in the transaction documents to identify
failures with respect to one or more of the breach determination
procedures. If a failure exists, Pentalpha will determine whether
or not the failure is material, based on materiality conditions
outlined in the transaction documents. Pentalpha will then provide
the final results of its review and determination to the
securities administrator.

JPMMT 2013-2 will be J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp.'s
second transaction of prime residential mortgages in 2013. The
certificates are supported by a pool of prime fixed-rate mortgage
loans. The loans are all fully amortizing. The aggregate pool
included loans originated from J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (19.7%),
Guaranteed Rate, Inc. (16.6%), Residential Pacific Mortgage
(15.4%), Cobalt Mortgage, Inc. (10.2%), PrimeLending, a
PlainsCapital Company (7.4%), Opes Advisors, Inc. (7.1%), Bank of
Manhattan (5.7%) and other various mortgage lending institutions,
each of which contributed less than 5% to the transaction.

As of the cut-off date, the aggregate pool consisted of 544 loans
with a total balance of $442,543,301; an average balance of
$813,499; a weighted average original combined loan-to-value ratio
(CLTV) of 69.4%, and a weighted average coupon (WAC) of 4%.
Rate/Term and cash out refinances account for 63.5% and 8% of the
loans, respectively. The weighted average original FICO credit
score of the pool is 773. Owner-occupied properties comprise 98%
of the loans. The states that represent the largest geographic
concentration are California (46.5%), Illinois (13%), and
Washington (12.4%).

Key Rating Drivers

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists entirely
of 30-year fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) to borrowers with strong
credit profiles, full documentation, low leverage, and significant
liquid reserves. A 69.4% CLTV provides a significant buffer
against potential home price declines. Strong borrower quality is
reflected in the 773 weighted average (WA) original FICO, $372,144
WA household income and $419,575 WA liquid reserves. In addition,
third-party due diligence was conducted on 100% of the pool and
the results indicated strong underwriting controls.

Weak Representations and Warranties Framework: While the
transaction benefits from JPMCB and J.P. Morgan Mortgage
Acquisition Corp. (JPMMAC; rated 'A+/F1') as rep providers for
more than 92% of the pool, Fitch believes the value of the R&W
framework is significantly diluted by the presence of qualifying
and conditional language that substantially reduces lender loan
breach liability and the inclusion of sunsets on three provisions.
The sunset trigger has been simplified and strengthened in this
transaction. While the agency believes that the high credit
quality pool and clean diligence results mitigate the R&W risks to
some degree, Fitch considered the weaker framework in its
analysis.

Originators With Limited Performance History: The majority of the
pool was originated by lenders with limited non-agency performance
history. Although the significant contribution of loans from these
originators is a concern, Fitch believes the lack of performance
history is partially mitigated by the 100% third-party diligence
conducted on these loans that resulted in immaterial findings.
Fitch also considers the credit enhancement (CE) on this
transaction sufficient to mitigate the originator risk.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) and national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become
exposed to or be considered in the surveillance of the
transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis on areas where the model
projected lower home price declines than that of the overall
collateral pool. The model currently projects sustainable MVDs
(sMVDs) at the MSA level. For one of the top 10 regions in the
mortgage pool, Chicago-Joliet-Naperville in Illinois (11.7%),
Fitch's SHP model does not project a decline in home prices. Fitch
conducted sensitivity analyses assuming sMVDs of 10%, 15%, and 20%
for this identified metropolitan area. The sensitivity analyses
indicated no impact on ratings for all bonds in each scenario.

In its analysis, Fitch considered placing a greater emphasis on
recent economic performance in determining market value declines.
While Fitch's current loan loss model looks to three years of
historical data and one year of projections, this does not
incorporate recent notable economic improvement. To reflect the
more recent economic environment, a sensitivity analysis was
performed using two years of historical economic data and two
years of projections. The result of this sensitivity analysis was
included in the consideration of the loss expectations for this
transaction. This sensitivity analysis resulted in a base sMVD of
13.2%, down from 14%.

Another sensitivity analysis was focused on determining how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 14% for this pool. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.


JP MORGAN 2013-C12: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C12's
$1.34 billion commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2013-C12.

The commercial mortgage-backed security transaction is backed by
77 commercial mortgage loans with an aggregate principal balance
of $1.34 billion, secured by the fee and leasehold interests in
107 properties across 33 states.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 5,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the underlying
collateral's economics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the
collateral pool's relative diversity, and S&P's overall
qualitative assessment of the transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1585.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C12

Class       Rating            Amount ($)
A-1         AAA (sf)         101,691,000
A-2         AAA (sf)         162,984,000
A-3         AAA (sf)          33,613,000
A-4         AAA (sf)         215,000,000
A-5         AAA (sf)         322,522,000
A-SB        AAA (sf)         103,054,000
X-A         AAA (sf)        1,064,605,000(i)
X-B         A- (sf)           129,093,000(i)
A-S         AAA (sf)         125,741,000
B           AA- (sf)          80,474,000
C           A- (sf)           48,619,000
D           BBB- (sf)         55,326,000
X-C         NR                67,061,266(i)
E           BB (sf)           25,149,000
F           B+ (sf)           23,471,000
NR          NR                43,590,266

(i) Notional balance.
  NR - Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2013-JWRZ: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of CMBS securities, issued by JP Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-JWRZ, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2013-JWRZ.

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-CP, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by first mortgage liens
related to three full-service hotel properties. The ratings are
based on the collateral and the structure of the transaction.

Moody's rating approach for securities backed by a single loan
compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying properties
with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings Moody's also considers a range
of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two
factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely
driven by the LTV of the underlying loan. Moody's Trust LTV Ratio
is 78.7%. Moody's Total LTV ratio (inclusive of mezzanine debt but
not preferred equity of $67.5 million) of 143.5% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt. The Moody's Trust Stressed DSCR of 1.40X and Moody's Total
Stressed DSCR (inclusive of mezzanine debt but not preferred
equity of $67.5 million) is 0.77X. Moody's Trust LTV Ratio and
Moody's Trust Stressed DSCR are considered to be in-line with
other single-borrower, lodging portfolios that have been assigned
a bottom-dollar credit assessment of Ba3 by Moody's.

The three full-service hotels are located in Phoenix, AZ (JW
Marriott Desert Ridge Resort and Spa) and Orlando, FL (JW Marriott
Orlando Grande Lakes and Ritz Carlton Orlando Grande Lakes).
Lodging properties are more correlated than properties of other
commercial real estate sector. In addition, this pool is
geographically concentrated as approximately 58% of the collateral
(by allocated loan balance) are located in Orlando, FL. The pool's
performance has tracked that of the lodging sector as a whole,
having deteriorated dramatically in 2009. Due to the portfolio's
focus on meeting and group business, the rebound has been slower
than those that cater mostly to transient demand. This portfolio's
recovery started to materialize in 2012 as group and meeting
business started to gain momentum.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-CP
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based Large Loan Model v.8.5
which derives credit enhancement level based on an adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratio. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity.

Moody's analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.1
which references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Single Borrower CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, or 25%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa classes would be Aa1, Aa2, or Aa3, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-LLF: S&P Lifts Rating on Class F Notes to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF
C5, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings
on the three 'NOP' raked certificate classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction, which
included a review of the credit characteristics of the remaining
seven floating-rate mortgage loans, the transaction structure, and
liquidity available to the trust.

The raised ratings on the Class C through H certificates reflect
the deleveraging of the pool trust balance as well as higher-than-
expected recoveries by the trust to date on four previously
specially serviced loans.  S&P believes its expected available
credit enhancement for these classes is greater than its most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the most
recent rating levels.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the three 'NOP' raked
certificate classes based on its analysis of the Normandy Office
Portfolio loan.  The raked certificates derive 100% of their cash
flow from a subordinate nonpooled component of the loan.

As of the May 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the pool trust
balance totaled $257.0 million and comprised seven floating-rate
loans indexed to one-month LIBOR, two of which are currently with
the special servicer.  The current pool trust balance constitutes
11.2% of the original pool trust balance at issuance.  The one-
month LIBOR rate was 0.1987% according to the May 2013 trustee
remittance report.

                        LODGING COLLATERAL

Lodging properties secure four of the seven remaining loans
totaling $86.1 million (33.5% of the pooled trust balance), one of
which is currently with the special servicer, TriMont Real Estate
Advisor Inc. (TriMont).  S&P based its analysis of the lodging
collateral, in part, on its review of the borrower's operating
statements for the available year to date (YTD) 2012; full
calendar-years 2012, 2011, and 2010; and available Smith Travel
Research (STR) reports.  Details on the four lodging loans are as
follows:

The Park Hyatt Beaver Creek loan, the largest lodging loan, is the
third-largest loan in the trust.  The loan has a trust and whole-
loan balance of $28.4 million (11.1% of the pooled trust balance).
The loan is secured by a 190-room full-service hotel, which
includes 17,017 sq. ft. of meeting space, in Avon, Colo.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on April 12, 2012, due to
imminent maturity default.  According to TriMont, the loan has
subsequently been modified and was returned to the master
servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital (KeyBank), on Feb. 4, 2013.
The major modification terms included extending the loan's
maturity to June 9, 2013, subject to a three-month extension
option; paying-down the principal balance by $2.0 million;
retiring the $52.1 million mezzanine loan balance; and the
borrower paying the workout and special servicing fees on the
loan.  According to KeyBank, the borrower is exercising the three-
month extension option to have sufficient time to obtain
refinancing proceeds.  The year ended Dec. 31, 2011, borrower's
operating statements reported 61.6% occupancy, a $317.04 average
daily rate (ADR), and $195.42 revenue per available room (RevPAR).
The master servicer, KeyBank, reported a 7.49x debt service
coverage (DSC) for the six months ended June 30, 2012.  The
Aug. 12, 2012, appraisal valued the property at $65.4 million.
S&P's adjusted valuation, using an 8.75% capitalization rate,
yielded an in-trust stressed 99.5% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.

The Sheraton Old San Juan loan, the fourth-largest loan in the
pool, has a trust balance of $24.5 million (9.5%) and a whole-loan
balance of $42.0 million.  The loan is secured by a 240-room full-
service hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico, which includes 10,000 sq.
ft. of casino space, 10,000 sq. ft. of retail space, and
9,700 sq. ft. of meeting space.  The loan was transferred to
TriMont on Nov. 30, 2011, due to imminent monetary default.
TriMont stated that the loan was modified on Feb. 15, 2013, and is
expected to be returned to the master servicer this month.  The
major modification terms included extending the loan's maturity to
June 9, 2013, subject to four additional six-month extension
options and the borrower paying the workout and special servicing
fees on the loan.  According to KeyBank, the borrower plans to
exercise the first of four six-month extension options.  The YTD
Oct. 31, 2012, borrower's operating statements reported 82.5%
occupancy, a $126.79 ADR, and $104.60 RevPAR.  KeyBank reported a
1.27x DSC for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012.  The June 1,
2012, appraisal valued the property at $24.1 million.  S&P's
adjusted valuation, using a weighted average capitalization rate
of 10.72%, yielded an in-trust stressed 200.1% LTV ratio.

The Ventana Inn and Spa loan, the second-smallest loan in the
trust, has a trust balance of $23.4 million that is divided into a
$19.0 million senior pool component that makes up 7.4% of the pool
trust balance and a $4.4 million nonpooled subordinate component
that provides 100% of the cash flow for the class VIS raked
certificates.  S&P has previously lowered the rating on the VIS
raked certificates to 'D (sf)' due to ongoing interest shortfalls.
The May 2013 trustee remittance report shows current accumulated
interest shortfalls for this class of $38,434.  The loan is
secured by a 60-room full-service hotel in Big Sur, Calif.  In
addition, the equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan
secure a mezzanine loan totaling $31.5 million.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 19, 2010, due to
payment default and was modified on Sept. 9, 2011, and returned to
the master servicer on Oct. 12, 2012.  The major modification
terms included extending the loan's final maturity to Dec. 9,
2013; paying-down the pooled trust balance by $2.6 million; and
the borrower paying the special servicing and workout fees on the
loan.  The borrower's operating statements for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2012, reported 60.9% occupancy, a $651.74 ADR, and
$397.06 RevPAR.  KeyBank reported a 9.69x DSC for the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2012.  The May 31, 2011, appraisal valued the
property at $39.0 million.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a
capitalization rate of 8.50%, yielded an in-trust stressed 107.6%
LTV ratio.

The Memphis Embassy loan, the smallest loan in the trust, has a
trust and whole-loan balance of $14.2 million (5.5%).  The equity
interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure a mezzanine
loan totaling $14.1 million.  The loan is secured by a 220-room
full-service hotel in Memphis, Tenn.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on April 17, 2012, due to imminent maturity
default.  The loan was modified on Sept. 17, 2012, and returned to
the master servicer on Dec. 14, 2012.  The major modification
terms included extending the loan's final maturity to June 7,
2013, paying down $400,000 of the principal balance, and the
borrower paying the special servicing and workout fees on the
loan.  The borrower's operating statements for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2012, reported 81.6% occupancy, a $128.96 ADR, and
$105.18 RevPAR.  KeyBank reported a 12.59x DSC for year-end 2012.
The June 1, 2012, appraisal valued the property at $27.0 million.
S&P's adjusted valuation, using a 9.00% capitalization rate,
yielded an in-trust stressed LTV ratio of 55.5%.

                         OFFICE COLLATERAL

Office properties secure the remaining three loans totaling
$170.9 million (66.5% of the pooled trust balance), one of which
is currently with the special servicer, TriMont.  S&P based its
analysis of the office collateral, in part, on its review of the
borrower's operating statements for the years ended Dec. 31, 2012,
2011, and 2010 as well as the 2012 or 2013 rent rolls.  Details
on the remaining three office loans are as follows:

The Normandy Office Portfolio loan, the largest loan in the pool,
has a trust balance of $109.9 million, which is divided into a
$97.4 million senior pool component that makes up 37.9% of the
pooled trust balance and a $12.5 million subordinate nonpooled
component that is raked to the three 'NOP' certificate classes.
In addition, the equity interests in the borrower of the whole
loan secure mezzanine debt totaling $66.1 million.  The loan is
secured by eight office and two industrial properties totaling
1.4 million sq. ft. in Massachusetts and New Jersey.  The loan was
transferred to TriMont on Oct. 28, 2011, due to imminent maturity
default.  The loan was modified on Dec. 14, 2012, and returned to
the master servicer on March 15, 2013.  The modification terms
included extending the loan's final maturity to June 9, 2014,
subject to a one-year extension option; replenishing the reserve
accounts; contributing $12.0 million of additional cash equity;
and the borrower paying the workout and special servicing fees on
the loan.  KeyBank reported a 7.06x combined DSC for year-end
2011; overall occupancy was 75.0%, according to the Dec. 31, 2012,
rent rolls.  The Dec. 27, 2011, appraisals valued the properties
at $114.4 million.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a weighted
average capitalization rate of 7.76%, yielded an in-trust stressed
LTV ratio of 109.3%.

The Interstate North Office Park loan, the second-largest loan in
the trust, has a trust and whole-loan balance of $49.8 million
(19.4% of the pooled trust balance).  In addition, the equity
interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure mezzanine debt
totaling $44.1 million.  The loan is secured by 11 office
properties totaling 959,770 sq. ft. in Atlanta, Ga.  The loan was
transferred to TriMont on June 16, 2011, due to imminent maturity
default.  The loan matured on Oct. 6, 2011.  The loan was modified
on April 24, 2012, and returned to the master servicer on July 11,
2012.  The major modification terms included extending the loan's
final maturity to Oct. 6, 2014, paying down the principal balance
by $3.5 million, replenishing the reserve accounts and the
borrower paying the special servicing and workout fees on the
loan.  KeyBank reported a 7.98x DSC for year-end 2011; overall
occupancy was 78.5%, according to the Dec. 31, 2012, rent rolls.
The Aug. 10, 2011, appraisals valued the properties at
$83.0 million.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a capitalization
rate of 7.50%, yielded an in-trust stressed LTV ratio of 65.4%.

The Liberty Square loan, the fifth-largest loan in the trust, has
a trust and whole-loan balance of $23.7 million (9.2% of the
pooled trust balance).  The loan is secured by a 422,904-sq.-ft.
suburban office property in Greenville, S.C.  The loan was
transferred to TriMont on July 14, 2011, due to maturity default.
According to TriMont, a forbearance agreement closed on May 22,
2012.  The terms of the forbearance agreement included funding
reserve accounts and the borrower paying the special servicing and
workout fees on the loan.  TriMont stated that the forbearance
agreement expires on Aug. 1, 2013.  According to TriMont, the
borrower has been marketing the property for sale, and the
borrower has indicated that the property is currently under
contract.  TriMont stated that the contract is scheduled to close
in mid-June 2013.  The Nov. 6, 2012, appraisal valued the property
at $44.3 million.  KeyBank reported a 12.89x DSC for year-end
2010; occupancy was 72.9%, according to the Feb. 28, 2013, rent
rolls.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a capitalization rate of
8.75%, yielded an in-trust stressed LTV ratio of 67.8%.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised

Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF
C5 Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

          Rating          Rating                     Credit
Class     To              From                   enhancement (%)
C         AA (sf)         BB (sf)                     88.47
D         A+ (sf)         BB- (sf)                    76.08
E         BBB+ (sf)       B+ (sf)                     64.89
F         BB+ (sf)        B- (sf)                     53.70
G         B+ (sf)         CCC+ (sf)                   42.52
H         B- (sf)         CCC (sf)                    22.38

Ratings Affirmed

Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF
C5 Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class         Rating
NOP-1         CCC- (sf)
NOP-2         CCC- (sf)
NOP-3         CCC- (sf)


MAPS CLO II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed all ratings on all
notes from MAPS CLO Fund II Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

The rating actions follows S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated May 10, 2013.

MAPS CLO Fund II Ltd. is still in its reinvestment period, which
is scheduled to end July 2014.  The transaction is currently
passing all of its coverage tests, which remain stable since S&P's
last rating actions.  It continues to pay the full interest due to
the rated liabilities on each scheduled payment date.

According to the May 2013 trustee report, the transaction held
$2.94 million of defaulted obligations.  This was a slight
increase from $2.68 million noted in the January 2012 trustee
report, which S&P used for its February 2012 rating actions.

The amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's
asset portfolio fell since the time of S&P's last rating actions.
The transaction held $16.71 million of 'CCC' rated collateral on
May 2013, down from $43.32 million back in January 2012.  When
calculating the overcollateralization (O/C) ratio, the trustee
haircuts the 'CCC' rated collateral that exceeds the threshold
(20% of the underlying collateral) specified in the transaction
document.  This threshold has not been breached as of May 2013.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AFFIRMATIONS

MAPS CLO Fund II Ltd.

Class          Rating
A-1J           AA+
A-1            AA+
A-1R           AAA
A-1S           AAA
A-2            AA
B              A
C              BBB
D              BB


MARYLEBONE ROAD 3: S&P Withdraws CC Ratings on 3 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-3 notes from Marylebone Road CBO 3 B.V. to 'D (sf)' from 'CC
(sf)'.  At the same time, S&P withdrew its ratings on the class A-
1 and A-2 notes.

The downgrade follows a default in the payment due to the class A-
3 notes on its payment date, according to the event of default
notice received.

S&P also withdrew its ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes
following their complete redemption, per confirmation received
from the trustee.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Marylebone Road CBO 3 B.V.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  CC (sf)
A-2                 NR                  CC (sf
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

NR-Not rated.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-KEY2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed 12 classes of
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2004-KEY2.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses,
primarily related to a decline in performance and valuations of
the specially serviced assets. Fitch modeled losses of 9.2% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
9.1%, including $43.2 million (3.9% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 14 loans (14.5%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes five specially serviced
assets (9.8%).

Rating Sensitivities

Ratings on the senior classes are expected to remain stable.
Approximately 81% of the pool is expected to mature in 2014,
excluding the specially serviced loans, and certain higher
leveraged loans may have difficulty refinancing. The Negative
Outlook assigned to classes B and C indicate that future
downgrades are possible to these two classes if a greater-than-
expected number of loans fail to pay off at maturity. The
distressed classes are subject to further rating actions as losses
are realized.

As of the May 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 43.4% to $631.3 million from
$1.12 billion at issuance. Nine loans (16.3% of the pool) are
defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes D
through DA.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a loan secured by a
291,333 square foot (sf) retail property located in Farmington
Hills, MI (2.7% of the pool). The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in May 2012 due to imminent default. The loan is
now over 90 days past due. A former major tenant, Kohl's, which
occupied 25% of the property, vacated in March 2012 after lease
expiration. As of April 2012, the property was 70% occupied,
compared to 95% at issuance. The special servicer is dual tracking
foreclosure as well as negotiations with the borrower.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a loan
secured by a 212,804 sf office property located in Secaucus, NJ
(3.3%). The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
February 2012 due to imminent default. The special servicer is
dual tracking foreclosure and negotiations with the borrower. As
of year-end 2012, the property was 51% occupied, compared to 91.7%
at issuance.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a 125,422 sf
retail property in Castaic, CA (2.8%). The loan was transferred to
the special servicer in October 2010 due to payment default. The
loan was foreclosed upon in March 2012 and the asset remains Real
Estate Owned (REO). Vantage Property Management Co. is the
property manager and leasing agent. As of April 30, 2013, the
property was 85% occupied.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $26.5 million class B to 'Asf' from 'AAsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $8.4 million class C to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf', Outlook to Negative
   from Stable;
-- $22.3 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf', RE 95%;
-- $12.5 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $156.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $345.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15.3 million class F at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $11.1 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $15.3 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $1.4 million class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Classes A1 and A2 have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class
Q and DA certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on
the interest-only class XC and XP certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Take Action on $229.7MM 2004 Alt-A RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 22
tranches and upgraded the ratings of two tranches from six RMBS
transactions backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Loan Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-10AR

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2AR

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5AR

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6AR

Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-8AR

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

The rating action constitute of a number of downgrades as well as
upgrades. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance, and/ or rapid build-up in credit
enhancement due to high prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004, 5% for 2003
and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.50
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.1%
in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF330755

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:
http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-LIFE1: S&P Raises Rating on Class H Notes to B
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the Class
F and H commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Inc. 1999-LIFE1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of the
two loans that remain in the pool, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust.  The upgrades also reflect
S&P's view regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral as well as the deleveraging of the trust
balance.

Although available credit enhancement levels might suggest further
positive rating movement on Class H, S&P's analysis also
considered the Sept. 1, 2013, maturity of the largest loan in the
trust--the Plaza Madison loan ($22.3 million, 96.0%)--and the
relative liquidity of the class.

As of the May 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool consisted of two loans with an aggregate principal balance of
$23.2 million, down from 97 loans with a $594.0 million balance at
issuance.

The remaining loans in the pool are as follows:

The largest loan ($22.3 million, 96.0%), the Plaza Madison loan,
is secured by a 230,062-sq.-ft. office building located at 655
Madison Avenue in midtown Manhattan in New York City.  The
servicer-reported debt service coverage (DSC) was 3.89x for the
full year ending Dec. 31, 2012.  Occupancy was 90.2% as of the
Feb. 13, 2013, rent roll.  This loan matures on Sept. 1, 2013.
The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), did not
provide an update on the borrower's intention upon maturity.

The smallest loan ($0.9 million, 4.0%) is the North Hill Centre
loan and is secured by a 39,575-sq.-ft. retail property located in
Anderson, S.C.  This loan was returned to the master servicer,
Wells Fargo, as a corrected mortgage loan on Oct. 5, 2012.  Wells
Fargo stated that the borrower resumed making full principal and
interest payments in September 2012.  The terms of the loan
modification included a partial release of collateral resulting in
a principal paydown of $1.35 million.  Wells Fargo placed this
loan on its watchlist on Feb. 8, 2013, due to a low reported DSC.
Wells Fargo did not provide an update on the current DSC.
However, the loan has a current payment status and matures
on April 1, 2019.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. 1999-LIFE1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

         Rating     Rating        Credit
Class    To         From        enhancement (%)
F        AA+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)       93.45
H        B (sf)     CCC- (sf)      42.18


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-RR6: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class G Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed 13 classes issued by
Morgan Stanley Capital I 2005-RR6 (MSCI 2005-RR6). The downgrade
is a result of additional principal losses on the underlying
portfolio. The affirmations are a result of paydowns to the senior
notes.

Key Rating Drivers

Since the last rating action in June 2012, approximately 20.2% of
the collateral has been downgraded and 5% has been upgraded.
Currently, 72% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 40.3% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and
below, compared to 51.7% and 41.2%, respectively, at the last
rating action. Over this period, the transaction has received
$98.7 million in pay downs and has experienced $14.4 million in
principal losses.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. Based on this analysis, the credit enhancements for
the class A-3 notes is consistent with the rating indicated below.

For the class A-J through F notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class A-J notes have been downgraded to 'CCsf', indicating
that default is probable. Similarly, the class B through F notes
have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.

The class G notes have experienced principal losses of
approximately 17.9% of their original balance while the class H
through N notes have experienced complete principal losses. Thus,
the class G notes have been downgraded and the class H through N
notes affirmed at 'Dsf'.

Rating Sensitivities

In addition to the sensitivities noted above, the Stable Rating
Outlook on the class A-3 notes reflects Fitch's view that the
notes will continue to delever.

MSCI 2005-RR6 is a static collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
that closed on Oct. 15, 2005. The current portfolio consists of 39
bonds from 25 CMBS transactions of which 82% were issued in 2002
and earlier and 18% were issued between 2003 and 2005.

Fitch has taken the following action as indicated:

-- $24,612,617 class A-3-FL notes affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
   revised to Stable from Negative;

-- $13,358,151 class A-3-FX notes affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
   revised to Stable from Negative;

-- $50,061,000 class A-J notes downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
-- $27,498,000 class B notes affirmed at 'Csf';
-- $14,102,000 class C notes affirmed at 'Csf';
-- $2,115,000 class D notes affirmed at 'Csf';
-- $8,461,000 class E notes affirmed at 'Csf';
-- $4,231,000 class F notes affirmed at 'Csf';
-- $5,211,921 class G notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
-- Class H notes affirmed at 'Dsf';
-- Class J notes affirmed at 'Dsf';
-- Class K notes affirmed at 'Dsf';
-- Class L notes affirmed at 'Dsf';
-- Class M notes affirmed at 'Dsf';
-- Class N notes affirmed at 'Dsf'.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ13: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Notes Classes to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, and removed from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on
March 13, 2013.

S&P's rating actions primarily reflect the interest shortfalls and
timing of anticipated repayment of the outstanding accumulated
interest shortfalls to the trust.  S&P's ratings actions also
follow its analysis of the transaction primarily using its
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS, including a review of
the credit characteristics of all of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.

"We lowered our ratings on classes A-2 and A-M on March 27, 2013,
and placed six classes on CreditWatch with negative implications
initially on March 13, 2013, because of the existing and potential
interest shortfalls.  At the time of our March 27, 2013, rating
actions, all of the outstanding classes experienced interest
shortfalls primarily because the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. (Wells Fargo), recouped its outstanding servicer advances on
The Pier at Caesars real estate owned asset following a
significant decline in value as reflected in the appraised value
reported Jan. 18, 2013.  Wells Fargo determined that future
advances on this asset to be nonrecoverable on Aug. 24, 2012.  At
that time, we expected Wells Fargo to continue recovering its
outstanding servicer advances over the next several months," S&P
said.

"We lowered our ratings on classes A-2, A-3, A-1A, and A-M because
of continued interest shortfalls, which they have been
experiencing for three consecutive months.  Wells Fargo indicated
that it will not recoup the remaining $5.8 million of outstanding
servicer advances on The Pier at Caesars asset at this time,
excluding property protection advances, until the special
servicer, Torchlight Loan Services LLC (Torchlight), finalizes its
resolution strategy for the asset.  In the event that these
classes experience continued interest shortfalls and/or have
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for an extended period
of time, we may further lower our ratings on these classes," S&P
noted.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes A-J and B to 'D (sf)' because
it expects interest shortfalls to continue and to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  These classes have
experienced accumulated interest shortfalls for 11 months.  In
addition, based on the Pier at Caesars' current appraisal, S&P
believes the trust could incur losses that potentially reach up to
the class A-J.

"As of the May 17, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced net monthly interest shortfalls totaling
$1.73 million.  These interest shortfalls were primarily related
to the master servicer recouping $1.35 million of servicer
advances (an additional $448,795 was recovered from principal
distribution), interest not advanced of $403,171, special
servicing and workout fees of $36,527, an appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction (ASER) amount of $16,476, and reimbursement
for interest on advances of $28,795.  The interest shortfalls this
period were offset by ASER recoveries totaling $165,160 due to the
478 Third Avenue loan modification.  The interest shortfalls
affected all classes subordinate to and including classes A-2,
A-3, and A-1A.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

       Rating              Rating                    Credit
Class  To                  From                   enhancement(%)
A-1A   BBB- (sf)           A+ (sf)/Watch Neg           32.09
A-2    BBB- (sf)           A+ (sf)/Watch Neg           32.09
A-3    BBB- (sf)           A+ (sf)/Watch Neg           32.09
A-M    CCC- (sf)           B- (sf)/Watch Neg           18.08
A-J    D (sf)              CCC (sf)/Watch Neg           8.27
B      D (sf)              CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg          5.82


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: S&P Retains 'BB+' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on four
classes of notes from Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Carlyle
Investment Management LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch with
positive implications.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's
affirmed its ratings on three other classes of notes from the same
transaction.

The affirmation of the 'AAA' on the Class A-1LA note and the
upgrades to the other Class A notes reflect an increase in credit
support available.  S&P last took a rating action on this
transaction in April 2012, when it raised various ratings due to
improvements in the credit quality of the assets.  Since then,
this transaction has paid down the Class A notes by $125 million
and kept the 'CCC' bucket under 5% of the portfolio.  The Class A
overcollateralization test increased to 128% in May 2013 from 115%
in March 2012, mainly due to the amortization.

Despite the increased overcollateralization, S&P did not raise its
ratings on the Class B notes, primarily because these notes are
subject to potential market value risks due to the long-dated
securities.  There is currently $11 million in collateral (7.26%
of the portfolio) that matures after the legal final maturity of
the transaction.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd.

                         Rating
Class               To           From
A-1L                AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1LA               AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-1LB               AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L                AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L                AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1L                BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
B-2L                BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)


NEUBERGER BERMAN: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Neuberger Berman CLO XIV, Ltd./Neuberger Berman CLO XIV LLC's
$372.0 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
       bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.28%-11.57%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1564.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Neuberger Berman CLO XIV Ltd./Neuberger Berman CLO XIV LLC


Class                   Rating                 Amount (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                           1.0
A-1                     AAA (sf)                      217.0(i)
A-2                     AAA (sf)                      35.0(ii)
B-1                     AA (sf)                           30.0
B-2                     AA (sf)                           21.0
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                            31.0
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                          20.0
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                           17.0
Subordinated notes      NR                                41.2

(i) Excludes $35 million in aggregate of outstanding class A-2
     notes that could be converted into class A-1 notes on the
     conversion date.

(ii) This is a commitment amount.  There will be no outstanding
     class A-2 notes at closing.

  NR - Not rated.


NOMURA ASSET 1998-D6: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes From BB-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
B-2 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Nomura
Asset Securities Corp.'s series 1998-D6, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P
withdrew its rating on the class B-1 certificates from the same
transaction following the full repayment of the class' principal
balance, as noted in the transaction's respective May 2013 trustee
remittance report.

The raised rating on the class B-2 certificates reflects the
deleveraging of the pool trust balance.  As a result, S&P believes
its expected available credit enhancement for this class is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the most recent rating levels.  Additionally, the
raised rating reflects S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the collateral supporting the transaction.

The withdrawal of S&P's rating on the class B-1 certificates
reflects the full repayment of the class' principal balance, as
noted in the transaction's respective May 2013 trustee remittance
report.  The class had a beginning balance of $68.8 million and
was repaid in full from the full principal repayment of six loans.
In addition, the full principal payment of the six loans reduced
the principal balance of the B-2 class by $3.1 million, equivalent
to 8.4% of the class' original balance.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted Standard & Poor's debt service coverage (DSC) ratio of
1.01x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 52.4% for 15 of the 27
remaining loans in the pool.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude
10 defeased loans ($76.7 million, 54.0%) and two nonreporting
loans ($16.5 million, 11.6%).

As of the May 15, 2013 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $142.1 million, down from
$3.7 billion at issuance.  The pool comprises 27 loans, down from
328 loans at issuance.  To date, the transaction has experienced
losses totaling $74.5 million, or 2.0% of the transaction's
original certificate balance.  The master servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported five loans ($10.5 million, 7.4%)
on its watchlist.  No loans are currently specially serviced.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED

Nomura Asset Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-D6

                    Rating
Class          To          From     Credit enhancement (%)
B-2            BBB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)                  75.99

RATING WITHDRAWN

Nomura Asset Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-D6

                    Rating
Class          To          From
B-1            NR          BBB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


PACIFIC COAST: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on $41.45MM Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one class of notes issued by Pacific
Coast CDO, Ltd./Inc. (Pacific Coast CDO) as follows:

-- $0 class A notes marked 'PIF'; and
-- $41,458,271 class B notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. The transaction has
not been analyzed within the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit
Model (SF PCM) and the cash flow model framework, as the impact of
structural features and excess spread, or conversely, principal
proceeds being used to pay CDO liabilities and hedge payments, was
determined to be minimal in the context of these CDO ratings.
Instead, to determine appropriate rating levels for the rated
notes, Fitch compared their respective credit enhancement (CE)
levels to the amount of expected losses (EL) from the distressed
and defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower).
This comparison indicates that default continues to appear
inevitable for the class B notes at or prior to maturity.

Key Rating Drivers

The class A notes have been paid-in-full on the April 25, 2013
distribution date from the proceeds obtained as a result of a
Collateral Manager-instituted discretionary sale of defaulted,
credit risk, credit improved, and equity securities from the
portfolio. An outstanding Event of Default since 2004 was waived
by the majority of the class A noteholders on Feb. 12, 2013 to
allow for such a sale to occur. Written consent for the sale of
these assets had also been obtained from the holders of the class
B notes. Total proceeds were sufficient to fully cover the
outstanding balance of class A notes, while the remainder was used
to pay down $54.5 million of the class B notes.

The affirmation of the class B notes reflects the significant
undercollateralization of the notes when compared to the remaining
portfolio balance. As such, default continues to appear inevitable
for these notes at or prior to maturity.

Rating Sensitivities

The class B notes are a non-deferrable class and a shortfall of
interest distributions could result in a future downgrade.

Pacific Coast is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on Sept. 5, 2001 and is monitored
by Cairn Capital Limited. The portfolio is composed of residential
mortgage-backed securities (90%) and commercial asset-backed
securities (10%) from primarily 2001 through 2003 vintage
transactions.


PACIFICA CDO V: S&P Retains 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on five
classes of notes from Pacifica CDO V Ltd., a cash-flow-
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction, and removed the
classes from CreditWatch with positive implications, where S&P had
placed them on March 6, 2013.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
rating on one other class from the transaction and removed it from
CreditWatch with positive implications.

This transaction is currently in its amortization phase, as the
reinvestment period ended in July 2012.  The upgrades reflect the
partial paydown of $122.3 million to the class A-1 notes since
S&P's October 2011 rating actions.  Because of this, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios increased for each class of
notes.

The affirmation reflects the sufficient credit support available
to the notes at the current rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings currently assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Pacifica CDO V, Ltd.

Class        To         From
A-1          AAA (sf)   AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
A-2          AAA (sf)   AA(sf)/Watch Pos
B-1          AA- (sf)   A-(sf)/Watch Pos
B-2          AA- (sf)   A-(sf)/Watch Pos
C            BBB+ (sf)  BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos
D            BB- (sf)   BB-(sf)/Watch Pos


PALISADES MEDICAL: S&P Raises Bond Rating From 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term and
underlying ratings (SPUR) on the New Jersey Health Care Facilities
Financing Authority series 2002 and 1999 bonds issued for the
Palisades Medical Center (PMC) obligated group to 'BBB-' from
'BB+'.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's assigned its 'BBB-'
rating to the series 2013 bonds.  The outlook is stable.

"In fiscal 2012, PMC posted its third year of positive and
improved operating income with continued positive performance year
to date in fiscal 2013," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Jessica Goldman.  In addition, PMC's inpatient admissions and
outpatient surgeries grew from fiscal years 2011 to 2012,
contributing to increased revenue and an overall improved
financial profile.  Despite an additional$10 million in long-term
debt with the 2013 issuance, S&P believes PMC's balance sheet has
improved to the investment-gradelevel.

The 'BBB-' rating reflects S&P's assessment of PMC's improved
operating earnings generating pro forma maximum annual debt
service (MADS) coverage that is solid for the 'BBB-' rating;
revenue diversity from acute-care and long-term-care operations,
both of which are profitable; stable market share with some
potential for improvement as PMC's inpatient volumes have been
increasing; and benefit related to the clinical affiliation with
Hackensack University Medical Center, which S&P believes has
contributed to the volume growth.  In addition, S&P believes there
is potential for further benefit from the relationship as they
explore other opportunities.

In S&P's opinion, partly offsetting the positives is PMC's
reliance on New Jersey hospital subsidy funding and
disproportionate share funds due to a challenging payor mix; lower
profitability from the long-term-care operations because of
Medicare reimbursement cuts; the service area's highly competitive
nature with numerous hospitals and measurable outmigration; and
highly leveraged balance sheet featuring very high debt to
capital, an underfunded pension plan, and high average age of
plant.

"The stable outlook reflects our view of PMC's operational
improvement, growth in unrestricted reserves, and volume growth.
Given the high leverage and underfunded pension and the
organization's reliance on government reimbursement, a higher
rating is not likely in the outlook's one-to-two year period.
Though a higher rating would be possible in the longer term if
debt service coverage continued near 3x, days cash on hand reached
130, and long-term debt to capitalization was brought under 100%.
A lower rating is not likely during the one-to two-year outlook
due to the recent improvement in operations and liquidity;
however, a weakening operating trend, failure to at least maintain
unrestricted reserve levels or additional debt could lead to a
negative outlook or lower rating," S&P said.


PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 9 Note Classes to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the senior and subordinate notes for
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 1997 Trust
Indenture. The notes were removed Rating Watch Negative and
assigned a Stable Rating Outlook. Fitch used its 'Global
Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'U.S. FFFELP Student Loan
ABS Criteria' to review the transaction.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade on the senior and subordinate notes reflects
insufficient credit enhancement to support the current ratings. CE
consists of excess spread and overcollateralization. Furthermore,
senior notes benefit from additional credit enhancement provided
by the subordinate notes.

On May 17, 2013, Fitch updated its FFELP student loan ABS criteria
to include a new surveillance analytical tool. Based on its
updated criteria, Fitch has determined that the notes do not have
sufficient enhancement to support the current ratings at their
release levels of 106% for senior parity and 102% for subordinate
parity.

The main driver of the downgrades is due to interest rate risk
embedded in the tax-exempt auction rate securities which make up
approximately 5% of the outstanding notes, in addition to the
taxable auction rate securities, which are paying interest at a
contractually determined maximum rate due to failed auctions. All
notes do not benefit from a net loan rate and as such interest
rates can increase to maximum rates of 14% to 17%.

Fitch analyzed the current interest rates on the bonds in addition
to the effect on the trust if the interest rates on the bonds were
to increase to the maximum rates applying the LIBOR up interest
rate stresses. In both scenarios, the bond's coupon will increase
enough to compress excess spread and erode parity.

Rating Sensitivities

Since FFELP student loan ABS rely on the U.S. government to
reimburse defaults, 'AAAsf' FFELP ABS ratings will likely move in
tandem with the 'AAA' U.S. sovereign rating. Aside from the U.S.
sovereign rating, defaults, interest and basis risk account for
the majority of the risk embedded in FFELP student loan
transactions. Additional defaults, interest and basis shock beyond
Fitch's published stresses could result in future downgrades.
Likewise, a buildup of credit enhancement driven by positive
excess spread given favorable interest rate and basis factor
conditions could lead to future upgrades.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 1997 Trust
Indenture Senior Class Notes

-- 2000-1 Class F-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2000-2 Class H downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2000-3 Class J-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2000-3 Class J-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2001 Class L-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2001 Class L-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-1 Class N-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-1 Class N-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-3 Class R-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-4 Class T-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-4 Class T-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-4 Class T-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-4 Class T-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-4 Class T-5 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-5 Class V-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-5 Class V-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-5 Class V-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-5 Class V-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2003-1 Class W-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2003-1 Class W-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2003-2 Class Y-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2003-2 Class Y-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2003-2 Class Y-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2003-2 Class Y-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-1 Class Z-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-1 Class Z-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-1 Class Z-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-2 Class AA-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-2 Class AA-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-3 Class BB-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-3 Class BB-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-3 Class BB-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2004-3 Class BB-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-1 Class CC-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-2 Class DD-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-2 Class DD-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-3 Class EE-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-3 Class EE-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-3 Class EE-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-3 Class EE-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-4 Class GG-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-4 Class GG-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-4 Class GG-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-4 Class GG-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-4 Class GG-5 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-5 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-6 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-7 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-8 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-9 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class HH-10 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-5 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-6 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-8 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-9 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class JJ-10 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-5 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-6 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-7 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-8 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-9 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class LL-10 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class MM-1 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class MM-2 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class MM-3 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class MM-4 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class MM-5 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class MM-6 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Removed
   from Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable.

Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 1997 Trust
Indenture Subordinate Class Notes
-- 2000-1 Class G downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2000-3 Class K downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2001 Class M downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2002-4 Class U downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2003-1 Class X downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2005-3 Class FF downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-1 Class II downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2006-2 Class KK downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable;

-- 2007 Class NN downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Removed from
   Rating Watch Negative and placed on Outlook Stable.


PNC MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on $7.9MM Class H Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of PNC Mortgage
Acceptance Corp., series 2000-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to increased credit enhancement from
paydowns and stable performance of the pool.

Fitch modeled losses of 13.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 6.9%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $52.2 million (6.5% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated three loans (27.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, none of
which are with the special servicer.

As of the May 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.2% to $22.7 million from
$801 million at issuance. Four loans (16%) are currently defeased.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through O.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a 230 unit
multifamily property (12.6%) located in Dallas, TX. The property
rents and occupancy have been below its submarket over the past
two years. However, performance improved from 2011 as occupancy
increased from 58% at YE2011 to 80% as of March 2013.

The second largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a 142
unit limited service hotel property (10.6%) located in Lyndhurst,
NJ. Income to the property dropped over the past year due to
occupancy decreasing from 67% at YE2011 to 63% at YE2012.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch also performed an additional stress on the remaining
performing loans. The rating on the class F and G notes are
expected to be stable as the credit enhancement remains high.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $2.7 million class F notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12 million class G notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.9 million class H notes at 'Dsf'; RE 50%;
-- Class J notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class K notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class L notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class M notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D and E are paid in full. Fitch does not
rate class O. The ratings on class N and interest-only class X
have previously been withdrawn.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class J Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Prudential Securities Secured Financing
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1999-NRF1 as indicated:

-- $6.2 million class J at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation reflects Fitch expected losses and the
concentrated nature of the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 12.8% of
the remaining pool; expected losses of the original pool are at
3.30%, including $28.7 million (3.1%) in losses realized to date.
Fitch has identified four Loans of Concern (54.7%), including the
largest loan in the pool (24.4%). There are no loans in special
servicing and no defeased loans as of the May 2013 remittance
report.

As of the May 2013 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced by 98.4% to $14.5 million from $928.92
million at issuance. The pool has become increasingly concentrated
with seven of the original 257 loans remaining in the transaction.
Interest shortfalls are affecting the unrated classes L and M.

Rating Sensitivities

The Negative Outlook reflects the concentration and adverse
selection of the remaining pool. The class may be subject to
further downgrade if expected losses increase.

The largest contributor to Fitch-expected losses, as well as the
largest loan in the pool (24.4%) is secured by a 66,000 square
foot flex industrial/office complex in Novi, MI. The property has
experienced cash flow issues since 2008 due to occupancy declines.
The March 2013 rent roll reported occupancy at 75%. Two tenants'
(32% of the net rentable are [NRA]) leases are scheduled to expire
in 2013, with a third lease (40% NRA) scheduled to rollover in
2014. The net operating income debt service coverage ratio
reported at 0.98x for year-to-date March 2013, compared to 1.05x
for both year-end (YE) 2012 and YE 2011. The loan is current as of
the May 2013 remittance date.

The classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G and H have paid in full.

Fitch does not rate the classes K, L and M certificates. Due to
realized losses, classes L and M have been reduced to zero and
class K has been reduced to $8.38 million from $15.8 million at
issuance. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-
only class A-EC certificate.


RESI FINANCE: Moody's Takes Action on $433MM of 2003 Prime RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches backed by synthetic prime jumbo loans, issued by RESI
Finance Limited Partnership. The actions impact approximately $433
million of RMBS issued in 2003.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-D RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2003-D/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2003-D

Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The synthetic transaction provides the owner of a sizable pool of
mortgages (the "Protection Buyer") credit protection through a
credit default swap with the issuer (the "Protection Seller") of
the notes. The reference portfolio of the transaction includes
prime conforming and nonconforming fixed-rate and adjustable-rate
mortgages purchased from various originators. The actions are a
result of the recent performance of the underlying pool and
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pool. The
downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for the
bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and an increased use
of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view
that loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012.
It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at
current levels until the end of 2014.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at: http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF330862

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


RESIDENTIAL REINSURANCE 2013: S&P Rates Class 3 Notes 'B-(sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B-
(sf)' rating to the Series 2013-I Class 3 notes issued by
Residential Reinsurance 2013 Ltd. (Res Re 2013).  The notes cover
losses in the covered area from tropical cyclone/hurricane,
earthquake, severe thunderstorm, winter storm, and wildfire on a
per-occurrence basis.

The Class 3 notes cover losses between the attachment point of
$1.356 billion and the exhaustion point of $2.057 billion.  The
rating is based on the lower of the following: the rating on the
catastrophe risk ('B-'), the rating on the assets in the
reinsurance trust account ('AAAm'), and the risk of nonpayment
by the ceding insurer ('AA+').

The cedants are United Services Automobile Assn., a reciprocal
interinsurance exchange organized under the laws of Texas; USAA
Casualty Insurance Co., a Texas corporation; USAA Texas Lloyd's
Co., a Texas Lloyd's plan insurer; USAA General Indemnity Co., a
Texas-domiciled stock insurance company; Garrison Property and
Casualty Insurance Co.; and other affiliates.  These entities will
be responsible for the quarterly payment due under the reinsurance
contract with Res Re 2013.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating
Residential Reinsurance 2013 Ltd.
  Series 2013-I Class 3 notes                     B-(sf)


ROCKWALL CDO: Moody's Hikes Ratings on $239MM of CLO Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by Rockwall CDO Ltd.:

U.S.$96,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
August 1, 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 29,
2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

U.S.$76,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
August 1, 2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 29,
2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

U.S.$36,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
August 1, 2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 29,
2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

U.S.$10,000,000 Class A-4L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
August 1, 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September 29,
2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

U.S.$21,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
August 1, 2021 (current outstanding balance of $20,008,464),
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on September 29, 2011 Upgraded to
B2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S.$14,000,000 Class X Floating Rate Notes Due August 1, 2013
(current outstanding balance of $583,339), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 29, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

U.S.$538,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
August 1, 2021 (current outstanding balance of $271,577,915),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 29, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in September 2011. Moody's notes that the Class
A-1LA Notes have been paid down by approximately 44% or $210.4
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated April 22, 2013, the Class A and Class B-1L
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 116.38% and 109.23%,
respectively, versus August 2011 levels of 109.53% and 100.91%,
respectively. The trustee April 2013 ratios do not reflect the
payment of $39.2 million made to the Class A-1LA Notes on the May
1, 2013 payment date.

Moody's also notes that the Class B-1L overcollateralization ratio
has increased in part due to the diversion of excess interest to
deleverage the Class B-1L Notes. Since the rating action in
September 2011, $2.0 million of interest proceeds have reduced the
outstanding balance of the Class B-1L Notes by 9.2%. Moody's also
notes that all previously deferred interest on the Class B-1L
Notes has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized
Loan Obligations" published in May 2013, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $559.2 million,
defaulted par of $44.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.57% (implying a WARF of 2367), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 43.34%, and a diversity
score of 36. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Rockwall CDO Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans
and CLO tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1893)

Class X: 0

Class A-1LA: 0

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: +2

Class A-3L: +3

Class A-4L: +3

Class B-1L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2840)

Class X: 0

Class A-1LA: 0

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: -2

Class A-3L: -2

Class A-4L: -1

Class B-1L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Concentration risk: The portfolio includes a material
concentration in CLO securities. Moody's views CLOs as highly
correlated, and the specific CLO securities that the issuer has
invested in have longer average lives and are of relatively better
average credit quality than the loans in the portfolio. Therefore,
as the deal further seasons and deleverages, the CLO securities,
currently representing 40% of the total collateral , may comprise
an even larger proportion of the portfolio. Moody's analyzed
additional cases to stress the sensitivity of the assigned ratings
to the performance of highly correlated CLO tranches with longer
average lives.


SAPPHIRE VALLEY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2(sf)' Rating on $18MM Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has affirmed the
rating of the following notes issued by Sapphire Valley CDO I:

U.S. $418,500,000 Class A Senior Notes Due December 14, 2022
(current outstanding balance of $356,047,463.94), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

U.S.$73,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due December 14, 2022,
Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf);

U.S.$20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due December
14, 2022, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on September 30, 2011
Upgraded to A2 (sf);

U.S.$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due December
14, 2022, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on September 30, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

U.S.$18,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due December
14, 2022, (current outstanding balance $12,956,700.46) Affirmed
Ba2 (sf); previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating affirmation of the notes is
primarily a result of stable performance in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio since the last rating action in September
2011. In addition, although Moody's notes that the transaction
experienced an increase in its reported overcollateralization
ratios since the last rating action in September 2011, the
increase is primarily due to the current application of smaller
"haircuts" to the outstanding par balances of discounted and CLO
securities currently in the numerator of the overcollateralization
ratios. In Moody's analysis, the overall impact of the increased
ratios is to moderate the likelihood that excess interest will be
diverted to amortize the notes as a result of future
overcollateralization test failures.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized
Loan Obligations" published in May 2013, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $539.5 million,
defaulted par of $4.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.25% (implying a WARF of 2313), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 45.86% and a diversity score
of 66. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Sapphire Valley CDO I, issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans and CLO tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1850)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +4

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2776)

Class A: 0

Class B: -3

Class C: -3

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Concentration risk: The portfolio includes a material
concentration in CLO securities. Moody's views CLOs as highly
correlated, and the specific CLO securities that the issuer has
invested in have longer average lives and are of relatively better
average credit quality than the loans in the portfolio. Therefore,
as the deal further seasons and deleverages, the CLO securities,
currently representing 25% of the total collateral, may comprise
an even larger proportion of the portfolio.

4) Counterparty risk: The issuer has significant investments in
CLO tranches, a portion of which is referenced under a total
return swap with Bank of America, N.A. (BANA). The rating of the
notes is exposed to uncertainties over the credit quality of BANA
and any future deterioration in BANA's creditworthiness could
negatively impact the ratings of the notes.


SC STUDENT LOAN: S&P Lowers Rating on 4 Note Classes to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
auction-rate bonds issued by South Carolina Student Loan Corp.
series 2004-A and 2006-A to 'CC (sf)' from 'A (sf)' and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications, where S&P placed
them on Feb. 13, 2013.  These bonds were issued pursuant to a
general resolution dated Nov. 9, 2004.  The trust, as of March 31,
2013, is backed by a collateral pool comprising both private
student loans (95%) and Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP) student loan collateral (5%).

The lowered ratings reflect the trust's structure, specifically
the declining parity resulting from the high cost of funds
relative to the asset yield, the loan collateral pool's payment
status, and the increased likelihood that the affected classes
will not receive full and timely principal by their legal final
maturity dates.

The current coupon on the notes (LIBOR plus 2.50%) is paying at
the ratings-based maximum rate as a result of the failed auction-
rate market.  However, the majority of the assets in this pool are
yielding minimal margins over the prime rate.  As such, given that
only 81% of the collateral pool is in full repayment, the asset
yield has been insufficient to cover the notes' cost of funds plus
fees, resulting in negative excess spread for the trust.  Based on
the declining parity trend, S&P expects that the trust will become
undercollateralized over the next three to four quarters, and that
noteholders will not receive full principal payment on their legal
maturity dates.

The total parity percentage has declined steadily.  (The total
parity percentage is the total pool balance plus all amounts on
deposit in the accounts plus accrued interest, interest subsidy
payments, special allowance payments, and investment income [the
accrued assets] divided by the sum of the principal and unpaid
interest on all outstanding senior bonds plus all accrued program
expenses [the accrued liabilities].)  As of March 2013, total
parity was 101.8%, an almost seven-percentage-point drop over the
past two years.  Based on the current cost of funds relative to
the yield on the assets, S&P expects total parity to continue
falling.

As of March 31, 2013, approximately 81% of the borrowers were in
repayment, while loans that were more than 30-plus-days past due
were 7.1% of the balance of loans in repayment.  The percentages
of the total portfolio in deferment or forbearance stood at 0.5%
and 15%, respectively.  The note factor (or current note balance
as a percentage of the initial note balance) is currently 74%.

S&P rans a midstream cash flow for this trust, holding the
defaults of the FFELP loans constant at 15% to reflect S&P's 'B'
default assumption for the FFELP portion of the trust collateral,
and ran break-even defaults on the private portion of the
collateral pool.  This cash flow run provided private loan break-
even percentages (private break-evens) that represent the maximum
amount of remaining cumulative net losses on the private loan that
the trust can absorb (as a percent of the private pool balance as
of the cash flow cutoff date) before failing to pay full and
timely interest and ultimate principal on the notes.  The
following are some of the major assumptions S&P modeled:

   -- Slightly front-loaded default curve of differing speeds that
      covered a period of five years;

   -- Recovery rates of 25% for private loans in the pool;

   -- Recovery rates of at least 97% for the FFELP loans in the
      pool;

   -- A servicer reject rate of 1.00% for the FFELP loans in the
      pool;

   -- Prepayment speeds starting at approximately 3 CPR (constant
      prepayment rate, an annualized prepayment speed stated as a
      percentage of the current loan balance) and ramping up 1%
      per year to a maximum rate of 5 CPR.  S&P held the
      applicable maximum rate constant for the deal's remaining
      life;

   -- The speculative-grade interest rate vector for the various
      indices, which tends to be a rolling up/down movement; and

   -- Auctions failed for the life of each transaction.  S&P
      determined the coupons for the auction-rate notes based on
      the applicable "maximum rate" definition in the transaction
      documents.

Based on the 'B' break-even cash flow run, which resulted in no
additional remaining defaults on the private loan pool, the notes
would experience principal shortfalls of 10%-11% of their current
balance at maturity.

"In addition to the cash flow scenario already discussed, we
devised a collateral performance scenario wherein the trust would
be able to pay principal at its legal final maturity dates in 2034
and 2046 (for further information, see "Criteria For Assigning
'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012).
Under this scenario, virtually all of the loans would have to
enter repayment status (currently only 81%) before the trust
becomes undercollateralized (which we estimate will be within
three to four quarters).  Furthermore, if this scenario were to
occur, the trust would only be able to sustain a negligible level
of cash flow interruption (in the form of loan defaults,
delinquencies, deferments, or forbearance).  We deem this scenario
as extremely unlikely, given the nature of the student loan asset
class, and we have taken the rating action highlighted herein,"
S&P said.

S&P will continue to monitor the trust's performance and update
the market accordingly.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.


If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

South Carolina Student Loan Corp.
US$180 million student loan-backed notes 2004-A series

                                    Rating
Class/series     CUSIP        To           From
A-1              83715AAA7    CC (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2              83715AAB5    CC (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg

South Carolina Student Loan Corp.
US$182 million student loan-backed notes 2006-A series

                                    Rating
Class/series     CUSIP        To           From
A-1              83715AAC3    CC (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2              83715AAD1    CC (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2005-1: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 5 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded five tranches issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2005-1. The collateral backing this deal
primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable-rate prime Jumbo
residential mortgages. The actions impact approximately $53.6
million of RMBS issued from 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2005-1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. X-B, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Prime jumbo
pools originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The upgrades are due to improvement in collateral performance.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005-2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction. Please
refer further to Moody's Investors Service's Withdrawal Policy.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 3.5% for 2005, 6.5%
for 2006 and 7.5% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 3.54%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

"The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications," Moody's said.
The unemployment rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in
April 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to
continue to rise in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer activity such as modification-related
principal forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change
resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory
change can also impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF331439

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF196023


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2013-8: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certificates 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2013-8 (SEMT
2013-8) as follows:

-- $427,487,000 class A certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $427,487,000 class A-IO notional certificates 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable;
-- $9,663,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,593,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,902,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,681,000 non-offered class B-4 certificates 'BBsf';
   Outlook Stable.

The $4,832,464 non-offered class B-5 certificates will not be
rated by Fitch.

Key Rating Drivers

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists primarily
of 30-year fixed-rate fully documented loans to borrowers with
strong credit profiles, low leverage, and substantial liquid
reserves. All of the loans are fully amortizing. Third-party loan-
level due diligence was conducted on 99.5% of the overall pool,
and Fitch believes the results of the review generally indicate
strong underwriting controls.

Originators with Limited Performance History: The majority of the
pool was originated by lenders with limited non-agency performance
history. While the significant contribution of loans from these
originators is a concern, Fitch believes the lack of performance
history is partially mitigated by the 100% third-party diligence
conducted on these loans that resulted in immaterial findings.
Fitch also considers the credit enhancement (CE) on this
transaction sufficient to mitigate the originator risk.

Geographically Diverse Pool: The collateral pool is geographically
diverse. The percentage in the top three metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) is 22.2% and concentration in California is 41.7%
which is similar compared to recent SEMT transactions. The agency
did not apply a default penalty to the pool due to the low
geographic concentration risk.

Transaction Provisions Enhance Performance: As in other recent
SEMT transactions rated by Fitch, SEMT 2013-8 contains binding
arbitration provisions that may serve to provide timely resolution
to representation and warranty disputes. In addition, all loans
that become 120 days or more delinquent will be reviewed for
breaches of representations and warranties.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) and national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become
exposed to or be considered in the surveillance of the
transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis on areas where the model
projected lower home price declines than that of the overall
collateral pool. The model currently projects sustainable MVDs
(sMVDs) at the MSA level. For one of the top 10 regions, Fitch's
SHP model does not project declines in home prices. This region is
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville in Illinois (3.5%). Fitch conducted
sensitivity analysis assuming sMVDs of 10%, 15%, and 20% compared
with those projected by Fitch's SHP model for this region. The
sensitivity analysis indicated no impact on ratings for all bonds
in each scenario.

In its analysis, Fitch considered placing a greater emphasis on
recent economic performance in determining market value declines.
While Fitch's current loan loss model looks to three years of
historical data and one year of projections, this does not
incorporate recent notable economic improvement. To reflect the
more recent economic environment, a sensitivity analysis was
performed using two years of historical economic data and two
years of projections. The result of this sensitivity analysis was
included in the consideration of the loss expectations for this
transaction. This sensitivity analysis resulted in a base sMVD of
13.8%, slightly less than the 14.6% base sMVD projected in the
current model.

Another sensitivity analysis was focused on determining how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 14.6% for this pool. The analysis indicates there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.


SOUTHPORT CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $12.3MM Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by Southport CLO, Ltd.:

U.S. $20,500,000 Class C Notes Due October 15, 2016, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on July 18, 2012 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

U.S. $68,650,000 Class 2 Combination Notes Due October 15, 2016
(current rated balance of $18,541,325.07), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on July 18, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S. $30,750,000 Class B Notes Due October 15, 2016 (current
outstanding balance of $7,989,582.37), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on July 18, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

U.S. $12,300,000 Class D Notes Due October 15, 2016 (current
outstanding balance of $9,738,560.54), Affirmed Ba2 (sf);
previously on July 18, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes and Class A-3 Notes have been fully paid down, and the Class
B Notes have been paid down by approximately 74.0% or $22.8
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated May 7, 2013, the Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 574.4%, 161.1% and
120.1%, respectively, versus July 2012 levels of 139.4%, 117.2%
and 108.9%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized
Loan Obligations" published in May 2013, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $35.6 million,
defaulted par of $16.0 million, a weighted average default
probability of 9.43% (implying a WARF of 2391), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 42.83%, and a diversity score of 11.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Southport CLO, Ltd., issued in November 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with some exposure to corporate bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Class 2 Combination
Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1912)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +1

Class 2 Combination Notes: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2869)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -1

Class 2 Combination Notes: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


TIERS 1997-5: S&P Raises Rating on 3 Note Classes From 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the
certificates from TIERS Bond-Backed Certs Trust BSP 1997-5 to
'BBB-(sf)' from 'BB+(sf)'.

S&P's rating on the certificates is dependent on the rating on the
underlying security, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' 8.60% debentures
due June 15, 2027 'BBB-'.

The rating action reflects the May 2, 2013 raising of S&P's rating
on the underlying security to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.  S&P may take
subsequent rating actions on the transaction due to changes in its
rating assigned to the underlying security.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept.
26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

TIERS Bond-Backed Certs Trust BSP 1997-5

Class                        Rating       Rating
                             To           From
ZTF-A                        BBB-(sf)     BB+(sf)
ZTF-B                        BBB-(sf)     BB+(sf)


TRIMARAN CLO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2L, A-3L, and B-2L notes from Trimaran CLO IV Ltd, a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Trimaran Advisors LLC.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings
on the class A-1L and B-1L notes.  Additionally, S&P removed its
ratings on the class A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L from CreditWatch with
positive implications.

The upgrades mainly reflect pay-downs to the class A-1L notes and
a subsequent increase in the overcollateralization (O/C) available
to support the notes since May 2012, when S&P last raised its
ratings on the notes.  Since that time, the transaction has paid
down the class A-1L notes by approximately $156.3 million, leaving
the class A-1L notes at 37.04% of their original balance after
taking into account the June 3, 2013 distribution date.  S&P
expects to see the class A-1L notes to continue to see pay-downs
going forward, as the transaction has been out of its reinvestment
period since December 2011.

The upgrades also reflect an improvement in the O/C available to
support the notes, primarily due to the aforementioned pay-downs.
The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the May 2013
monthly report:

   -- The senior class A O/C ratio was 138.20%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 124.58% in April 2012;

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 126.77%, compared with a reported
      ratio of 117.78% in April 2012;

   -- The class B-1L O/C ratio was 117.65%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 112.04% in April 2012; and

   -- The class B-2L O/C ratio was 109.26%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 106.50% in April 2012.

Furthermore, the upgrades also reflect a slight improvement in the
asset performance of the underlying portfolio since S&P's May 2012
actions.  As of the May 2013 monthly report, the amount of
defaulted assets decreased to $1.5 million, from $3.4 million in
the April 2012 report.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1L and B-1L notes to
reflect the availability of credit support at the current rating
levels.

More specifically, the affirmation of S&P's rating on the class B-
1L notes is due to the application of its largest-obligor default
test--one of the two supplemental tests that S&P introduced as
part of its revised corporate CDO criteria.

S&P applies the supplemental tests to address event risk and model
risk that may be present in rated transactions.  The largest
obligor default test assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement (excluding excess spread) to withstand
specified combinations of underlying asset defaults based on the
ratings on the underlying assets, with a flat recovery.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them, and will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDIT WATCH ACTIONS

Trimaran CLO IV Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1L          AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-2L          AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-3L          AA+  (sf)    AA-/Watch Pos (sf)
B-1L          BBB+ (sf)    BBB+/Watch Pos (sf)
B-2L          BB+ (sf)     B-/Watch Pos (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Trimaran CLO IV Ltd.
Co-issuer:          Trimaran CLO IV (Delaware) Corp.
Collateral manager: Trimaran Advisors LLC
Underwriter:        Bear Stearns Cos. LLC
Trustee:            Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO
Amortizing                   BBB-(sf)     BB+(sf)


VENTURE II: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $112.25MM Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has affirmed the
ratings of the following notes issued by Venture II CDO 2002 Ltd:

U.S.$9,000,000 Class B Notes Due 2014 (current outstanding balance
of $4,711,667, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 3, 2012
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

U.S.$12,250,000 Class C Notes Due 2014, Affirmed Ba2 (sf);
previously on August 3, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of two factors: deleveraging of the senior notes and
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the rating action in August 2012. These two factors offset
each other and their combined effect is credit neutral to the
rated notes.

Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been fully paid down and
the Class B Notes have been paid down by approximately 48% or $4.3
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated May 7, 2013, the Class B and Class C
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 431.5% and 119.9%,
respectively, versus July 2012 levels of 140.1% and 109.3%,
respectively.

Notwithstanding the benefits of deleveraging, the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated since the last rating
action. Moody's modeled a weighted average rating factor (WARF)
and weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of 4264 and 47.8%,
compared to 3462 and 49.0% at the time of the last rating action,
respectively.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the May 2013 trustee report, securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 21.2% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $15.3 million,
defaulted par of $12.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.1% (implying a WARF of 4264), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 47.9%, and a diversity score of 18.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Venture II CDO 2002, Limited, issued in November 2002, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months, which
represent approximately 12% of the collateral pool. Additionally,
for each CE where the related exposure constitutes more than 3% of
the collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch equivalent assumed
downgrade. This adjustment was applied to approximately 5.8% of
the pool.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3411)

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5117)

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates. Moody's also conducted tests to assess
the collateral pool's concentration risk in obligors bearing a
credit estimate that constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.



WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C31: S&P Cuts Rating on 3 Note Classes to D
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C31, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 11 other classes from
the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follows its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

"We lowered our rating on the Class C certificates due to our
expectations of reduced liquidity support available to that class.
We lowered our ratings on the Class D, E, and F certificates to 'D
(sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
between six and 11 months, which we expect to continue.  The
interest shortfalls resulted primarily from interest rate
reductions ($1,434,251) due to modifications on four loans;
appraisal subordination entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
related to 16 ($526.0 million, 10.2%) of the 23 loans
($626.1 million, 12.2%) that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC; special servicing fees ($191,166); and
interest not advanced ($164,979) due to a nonrecoverability
determination for the Hawthorne Suites - Austin, Tex., loan.  As
of the May 15, 2013, remittance report, appraisal reduction
amounts (ARAs) totaling $169,246,601 were in effect for 19 loans,
of which 16 loans generated ASER amounts totaling $681,103.  The
current reported interest shortfalls totaled $2,095,789 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including the D
class," S&P said.

The affirmation of the principal and interest certificates reflect
S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for this
class will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.  The
affirmed ratings on these classes also reflects the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans as
well as the transaction-level changes.

The affirmation of the interest-only (IO) certificates reflects
S&P's current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Lowered

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C31

           Rating
Class   To         From       Credit enhancement (%)
C       CCC (sf)   B- (sf)                      9.74
D       D (sf)     B- (sf)                      8.31
E       D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)                    7.75
F       D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                    6.75

Ratings Affirmed

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C31

Class   Rating            Credit enhancement (%)
A-2     AAA (sf)                           32.19
A-3      AAA (sf)                          32.19
A-PB     AAA (sf)                          32.19
A-4      BBB- (sf)                         32.19
A-5      BBB- (sf)                         32.19
A-5FL    BBB- (sf)                         32.19
A-1A     BBB- (sf)                         32.19
A-M      B (sf)                            20.82
A-J      B- (sf)                           11.87
B        B- (sf)                           11.16
IO       AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


WAMU 2003-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class O Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four classes and affirmed one class of
Washington Mutual Asset Securities Corporation (WAMU) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades are due to the pool's stable performance, lower
leverage loans, increased credit enhancement from scheduled
principal paydown, and low future expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction. The pool has experienced $388,059 (0.1% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has not
designated any loans as Fitch Loans of Concern, and no loans are
in special servicing.

As of the May 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.3% to $15.3 million from
$574.8 million at issuance. The pool has become extremely
concentrated with only seven of the original 213 loans remaining
in the transaction. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
class P. There are no defeased loans.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on the investment-grade classes are expected to remain
stable, as credit enhancement remains high, which offsets the
increasing concentration and risks of adverse selection. Three
loans (83.15% of the pool) scheduled to mature over the next 12
months and pay in full at their respective maturity dates would
completely repay the outstanding Fitch rated classes. Fitch
expects minimal losses to the remaining pool balance. Any incurred
losses are expected to be absorbed by the non-rated class P.

The largest loan in the pool, Center Pointe Plaza (71.6% of the
pool) is secured by a 252,393 square foot retail center in
Christiana, DE. The March 2013 rent roll reports occupancy at
100%, with debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) at 1.57x as of year-
end December 2012. The property's major tenants include Home Depot
(43.5% of the net rentable area [NRA]), Babies R' Us (16.6% NRA),
and TJ Maxx (11.8% NRA), all three of which recently extended
their leases from January 2013 to 2018 (Home Depot) and 2023
(Babies R' Us and TJ Maxx). The loan has a scheduled maturity date
of January 2014.

Fitch upgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $1.4 million class K to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $1.4 million class L to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $2.9 million class M to 'Asf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $2.9 million class N to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following class as indicated:

-- $1.4 million class O at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

The classes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and J certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the classes P, HM and HS certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-
1 certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2005-AR8: Moody's Raises Rating on Three Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded three tranches issued by
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR8 Trust. The
collateral backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien,
adjustable-rate prime Jumbo residential mortgages. The actions
impact approximately $161.4 million of RMBS issued from 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR8 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Prime jumbo
pools originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The upgrades are due to improvement in collateral performance.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005-2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF331407

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF196023


WELLS FARGO 2011-BXR: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of WFDB 2011-BXR commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2011-BXR issued by
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. The Rating
Outlook for all classes is Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations and Stable Outlooks are the result of stable
portfolio performance. As of year-end 2012 the amortizing NCF DSCR
was 1.73 times (x) compared to 1.65x underwritten at issuance.
Portfolio occupancy was stable at 93%, the same as issuance.

Rating Sensitivity

Future rating upgrades are unlikely given the sponsor and property
type concentration and relatively short loan term. Downgrades are
possible should portfolio performance deteriorate materially from
issuance levels.

This transaction is secured by the mortgage interest in 107 retail
properties located in 27 states across the U.S. The properties,
totaling 16,196,205 sf, are located in 27 states with the largest
concentrations (by allocated balance) in Texas (15%), Pennsylvania
(8.2%), Ohio (7.6%), California (7.5%), and Illinois (7.5%).
Additionally, while all properties are retail, there is a mix of
grocery-anchored (47.8%), non-grocery-anchored (35.1%), and
grocery shadow-anchored (16.7%) properties. Only one property
(0.4%) is unanchored.

The portfolio is occupied by more than 1,100 distinct tenants with
no single entity accounting for more than approximately 5% of net
rentable area. Tenants include a mix of local and regional
retailers.

The notes are secured by a $1 billion mortgage loan with $400
million of mezzanine loans held outside the trust. The loan is
interest only for the first two years. The sponsor is Blackstone
Real Estate Advisors (BREA) through their real estate funding
vehicle Blackstone Real Estate Partners VI (BREP). BREA is one of
the largest real estate investors in the world, with approximately
$26.5 billion of assets under management. The financing is
associated with the purchase of the entire Centro Properties Group
U.S. retail portfolio by Blackstone Real Estate Advisors. The
certificates will follow a sequential-pay structure.

The loan matures in July 2016. The Fitch stressed loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio is approximately 70% based on capitalization of the
Fitch-adjusted net cash flow at a rate of 8.5%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $695,000,000 class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61,350,000 class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,490,000 class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,890,000 class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,590,000 class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $90,680,000 class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $695,000,000 interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $305,000,000 interest-only class X-B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,000,000,000 interest-only class X-C at 'BBsf'; Outlook
   Stable.


WELLS FARGO 2012-C7: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class G Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
WFRBS 2012-C7 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

Affirmations are due to stable pool performance since issuance.
There have been no delinquent or specially serviced loans since
issuance. As of the May 2013 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 1.0% to $1.092
billion from $1.104 billion at issuance. The servicer has placed
three loans (8.9% of the pool) on the watchlist, including two of
the top 15 loans.

The largest loan on the watchlist (6.1% of the pool) is the
Hutchinson Metro Center - Tower I, a 284,979 square foot (sf)
office property located in Bronx, NY. The building consists of
traditional office space, medical office space, and a bank branch
in the lobby. According to the servicer, the 2012 financials
included non-budgeted marketing and valet parking expenses. The
parking expenses are expected to be ongoing while the marketing
will not as the property is 99.1% occupied as of YE2012.

The second largest loan on the watchlist (2.5%) is 270 Peachtree
Street, a 318,566 sf office building located in downtown Atlanta,
GA. According to the servicer, the low debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) is due to rents not commencing for two tenants until late
2012, one of which commenced in August and the other in September.
Fourth quarter performance improved due to the new rents, as was
contemplated at issuance. The property is 86.7% occupied as of
YE2012.

There is one loan in the top 15 located in Oklahoma City, OK
(3.1%) which does not appear to have experienced damage from
recent tornado. Fitch is currently confirming that information
with the master servicer.

Ratings Sensitivity

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $178.4 million class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $418.0 million class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $165.3 million class A-FL notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class A-FX notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82.8 million class A-S notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58.0 million class B notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.4 million class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.6 million class D notes at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48.3 million class E notes at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.3 million class F notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.3 million class G notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $844.5 million* class X-A notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $248.4 million class X-B or the $34.5
million class H. The aggregate balance of class A-FL may be
adjusted as a result of the exchange of all or a portion of the
class A-FL certificates for the non-offered class A-FX
certificates.

* Notional amount and interest only.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Fitch Rates $16.53MM Class F Certs 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C14 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates:

-- $61,588,000 Class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,158,000 Class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55,000,000 Class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160,000,000 Class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $437,741,000 Class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55,000,000#a Class A-3FL 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 Class A-3FXa 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $95,000,000#a Class A-4FL 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 Class A-4FXa 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $116,194,000 Class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $108,379,000b Class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,137,060,000* Class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102,868,000* Class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102,868,000b Class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,271,000b Class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $264,518,000b Class PEX 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $77,151,000a Class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,717,000a Class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16,532,000a Class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

# Floating rate.
* Notional amount and interest-only.
a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be exchanged
   for Class PEX certificates; and Class PEX certificates may be
   exchanged for Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the $99,194,239 interest-only Class X-C or the
$56,945,239 Class G. Two classes have been added to the deal
structure (A-3FL and A-3FX), and several class balances have been
updated since Fitch issued its expected ratings. In addition, the
rating of class X-B has been updated based on the notional balance
it now references.

The classes above reflect the final ratings and deal structure.
The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 73 loans secured by 99 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.470 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association; The Royal
Bank of Scotland plc; RBS Financial Products Inc.; Liberty Island
Group I LLC; Basis Real Estate Capital II, LLC; and C-III
Commercial Mortgage LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 92.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 84.3%, and asset summary reviews
on 90.2% of the pool.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch Leverage: This transaction has slightly higher leverage than
other recent fixed-rate deals. The pool's Fitch debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan-to-value (LTV) are 1.37x and
101.7%, respectively, compared to the first quarter 2013 (1Q'13)
and 2012 averages of 1.34x and 99.6%, and 1.24x and 97.2%,
respectively.

Pool Concentration: The pool is more concentrated by loan size and
sponsor than average transactions in 2012 and 2013. The top 10
loans represent 60.8% of the pool, higher than the 1Q'13 and 2012
average concentrations of 55.4% and 54.2%, respectively. The loan
concentration index (LCI) and sponsor concentration index (SCI)
are 449 and 698, respectively, representing one of the more
concentrated conduit pools by loan size and sponsor exposure since
2008.

Less Amortization and More Interest-Only Loans: This transaction
has five full-term interest-only loans accounting for 29.9% of the
pool. Partial interest-only loans account for an additional 39.2%
of the pool, which is higher than the average in 1Q'13 deals of
30.3%. The pool is scheduled to pay down 11.6% from cutoff date to
maturity, based on loans' scheduled maturity balances.

Rating Sensitivities

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.1% below
the full-year 2012 net operating income (NOI; for properties for
which 2012 NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severity on defaulted loans, and could result in potential rating
actions on the certificates. Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of
the ratings assigned to WFRBS 2013-C14 certificates and found that
the transaction displays average sensitivity to further declines
in NCF. In a scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'AA-sf' could result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF
declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. The presale report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities in the Rating Sensitivity section.

The Master Servicer will be Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, rated 'CMS2' by Fitch. The special servicer will be
Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, rated 'CSS2-' by Fitch.


* Fitch Says U.S. Consumer Continues to Anchor Credit Card ABS
--------------------------------------------------------------
The sail continues to be smooth for U.S. credit card ABS thanks
largely to the improving health of U.S. consumers, according to
the latest index results from Fitch Ratings. Delinquencies plunged
to new lows while excess spread reached record highs, proving
Fitch's initial indicators from mid-April correct.

Fitch's May indices cover performance during the April collection
period.

Last week's announcement of a five-year high for consumer
confidence in May coupled with good news for home prices are
collectively supportive of Fitch's assertion that consumers may be
beginning to feel more prosperous.

Though tepid first-quarter GDP results and disappointing jobless
claims last month have since tempered the optimism somewhat, U.S.
consumers will continue to chip away at their debt, which augurs
well for credit card ABS performance through the remainder of the
year.

As such, Fitch anticipates stability in credit card ABS ratings
for the foreseeable future given the robust enhancement levels and
the structural features afforded to investors.

For the second consecutive month, Fitch's Prime 60+ Day
Delinquency Index reached a record low by declining to 1.48% in
May. This represents a 4.5% drop in the level of 60+ day
delinquencies month-over-month (MOM).

Recent declines in 60+ delinquencies have contributed to continued
positive performance of Fitch's Prime Credit Card Chargeoff Index,
which for May, declined an additional six basis points (bps) MOM
to reach 3.92%.

Gross yield softened slightly from April, when it attained a 15-
month high. The Fitch Prime Gross Yield Index declined by 79 bps
to 17.98% in May. In fact, prime gross yield has declined every
May since Fitch created its credit card ABS index back in 1991.
Additionally, the Fitch Prime Three-Month Average Excess Spread
Index increased 21 bps MOM to reach a new high of 11.73% in May.

Fitch's Prime Monthly Payment Rate (MPR) Index decreased to 23.52%
in May, a nearly 4% decline MOM. MPR, which measures how quickly
cardholders are paying down outstanding balances, remains strong
by historical standards.

Fitch's Prime Credit Card Index was established in 1991 and tracks
over $110 billion of prime credit card ABS. The index is primarily
comprised of general purpose portfolios originated by institutions
such as Bank of America, Citibank, Chase, Capital One, Discover,
etc.

While performance for prime credit card ABS remains stellar,
retail card loans did see some weakening last month. The Fitch
Retail Chargeoff Index increased nearly 15% MOM to reach 6.91%.
However, the Fitch Retail 60+ Day Delinquency Index declined by
almost 4.5% MOM to 2.45% in May. This is two bps off the index's
historical low and may be indicative of lower retail credit card
ABS chargeoffs in the coming months.

Gross yield and three-month average excess spread also declined in
May. However, those declines were from historic highs and remain
healthy in the context of their historical performance. The Fitch
Retail Gross Yield Index declined by 38 bps MOM to 27.52%. This
represents the second consecutive month of decline from the high
of 28.59% reached in March 2013. Fitch's Retail Three-Month
Average Excess Spread Index declined 44 bps in May to 17.08%.

Fitch's Retail Credit Card Index tracks more than $21 billion of
retail or private label credit card ABS. The index is primarily
comprised of private label portfolios originated and serviced by
Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., GE Money Bank and World Financial
Network National Bank. More than 165 retailers are incorporated
including Wal-Mart, Sears, Home Depot, Federated, Loews, J.C.
Penney, Limited Brands, Best Buy, Lane Bryant and Dillard's, among
others.


* Moody's Concludes Review of Collegiate Loan Securitizations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 74 classes, upgraded 9
classes, and confirmed 14 classes of notes in 15 National
Collegiate Student Loan Trusts backed by private (i.e. not
government guaranteed) student loans. The loans are primarily
serviced by the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency
(PHEAA) with U.S. Bank, N.A. acting as the special servicer. GSS
Data Services, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Goal Structured
Solutions, Inc., is the administrator for all trusts.

Ratings Rationale

The primary rationale for the downgrades is the performance
deterioration in the underlying student loan pools and the
consequent substantial erosion of total parity levels (i.e. the
ratio of total assets to total liabilities) for all transactions.
The total parity has declined to a range of approximately 75%-87%
as of March 2013 from a range of approximately 85%-92% as of April
2011. To reflect the elevated delinquencies and defaults on the
underlying loan pools Moody's increased its life time expected net
losses on all 15 transactions to a range of 25.0%-49.6% from a
range of approximately 24.0%-36.0%.

The upgrades of 9 classes of notes are due to the build-up in
subordination as a result of the principal pay-down of outstanding
notes, which more than offsets the negative impact of increased
expected net losses and decreased total parity.

The ratings of the Class A tranches also reflect Moody's view that
the probability of occurrence of an event of default (EOD) is low.
Therefore, the ratings on these tranches continue reflecting
sequential principal payments and the resulting differentiation in
their credit quality. Despite the large amount of credit
enhancement supporting the first-pay Class A tranches, the
probability of an EOD, however low, negatively affects their
credit quality and prevents them from achieving a Aaa rating.

Available credit enhancement to the transactions includes reserve
funds, subordination, and excess spread. Significant structural
features include reserve fund floors as well as subordinate note
interest triggers, which change the cash flow allocations to the
senior notes upon the breach of certain performance thresholds.

The ratings of the most junior Class A notes of 2005-2, 2006-1,
2006-2, 2006-3 and 2007-1 could be upgraded in the future if the
remaining expected net losses are 10% lower. The ratings of the
most junior Class A notes of 2004-2, 2005-1, 2005-2, 2005-3, 2006-
1, 2006-2, 2006-3, 2006-4, 2007-1 and 2007-2 could be downgraded
if the remaining expected net losses are 10% higher. The ratings
of the most junior Class A notes of 2001 Master Trust, 2003-1,
2004-1, 2007-3 and 2007-4 would not be affected if remaining
expected net losses are 10% higher or lower.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating U.S. Private Student Loan-Backed Securities published in
January 2010.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of uncertainty with
regard to expected loss are the weak economic environment and the
high unemployment rate, which adversely impacts the income-
generating ability of the borrowers.

To assess rating implications of the higher expected losses, each
individual transaction was run through a variety of stress
scenarios using the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), a
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: The National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust I (2001
Indenture)

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 25.0% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Ser. NCT-2002-AR9, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Ser. NCT-2002-AR-10, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 20,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

NCT-2003AR-11, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

NCT-2003AR-12, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

NCT-2003AR-13, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

NCT-2003AR-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

NCT-2005AR-15, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

NCT-2005AR-16, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1 (The)

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 32.8% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 30.6% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-IO-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 34.4% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 30.6% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 39.5% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 36.8% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 40.7% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 47.1% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 43.6% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 49.6% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 45.2% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 46.6% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 43.2% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-2-AR-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-2-AR-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2011
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2011
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4

Lifetime Expected Net Losses: 43.2% of original pool balance plus
any loans added subsequently

Cl. A-2-AR-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-2-AR-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2011
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2011
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-3-AR-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Cl. A-3-AR-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insurance
Financial Strength Rating Withdrawn on April 7, 2011)


* Moody's: Only Slight Changes in CMBS Loss Severities in 2013 Q1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The weighted average loss severity for all loans backing
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) in the US that
liquidated at a loss was 40.7% in the first quarter of 2013, down
from 40.8% in the previous quarter, says Moody's Investors Service
in "US CMBS Loss Severities, Q1 2013 Update."

The weighted average loss severity for all liquidated loans
excluding those with losses of less than 2% was 52.9%, down from
53.1% the previous quarter. Loans with losses of less than 2%
account for 23.5% of the sample size by balance and 19.8% by
number. For liquidated loans in the 2004 to 2007 vintages,
maturity defaults had a weighted average loss severity of 11.4%,
compared to 52.5% for term defaults. Excluding loans with losses
of less than 2%, maturity defaults had a weighted average loss
severity of 35.5%, compared to 55.5% for term defaults.

Loans backed by retail properties had the highest weighted average
loss severity, 47.2%, while loans backed by self-storage
properties had the lowest, 33.3%.

The three vintages with the highest loss severities are 2006,
49.3%; 2008, 46.8%; and 2003, 43.3%. As of March 2013, these
vintages constituted 29.2% of CMBS collateral and 32.8% of
delinquent loans.

"We expect aggregate conduit losses, inclusive of realized losses,
of 8.0% of the total balance at issuance for the 2005 vintage,
11.3% for the 2006 vintage, and 13.5% for the 2007 vintage, with
most of the losses yet to be realized," said Moody's Vice
President and Senior Credit Officer Keith Banhazl. "The aggregate
realized loss for these three vintages is currently 2.7%."

From 1 April 2012 to 15 March 2013, liquidations amounted to $15.7
billion of debt, up slightly from the $15.5 billion during the
same period the previous year. One thousand five hundred forty-
eight loans liquidated, with a weighted average loss severity of
41.2%, compared to 1,764 loans, with a weighted average loss
severity of 44.0%, over the same period the previous year.

"The balance of liquidations will continue to grow, although we
expect monthly fluctuations because of uncertainty surrounding the
outcome of certain large commercial real estate loans, which would
skew liquidation volumes," added Banhazl.

Of the 10 metropolitan statistical areas or MSAs with the highest
dollar losses, New York had the lowest percentage severity, 22.5%,
and Detroit, the highest, 61.0%.

Total cumulative realized losses for all liquidated loans rose in
first quarter 2013 to 2.6% from 2.5% in the previous quarter. For
all liquidated loans, the 2000 CMBS vintage had the highest
cumulative loss rate, 4.4%, the same as the previous quarter,
while the 2001 CMBS vintage had the second-highest cumulative loss
rate, 3.9%.

"Cumulative loss rates will continue to rise because of the
significant share of recent vintage loans currently in special
servicing," said Banhazl.

Moody's quarterly loss severities report for US CMBS tracks loan
loss severities upon liquidation and cumulative deal losses in US
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) conduit and fusion
transactions. The latest quarterly report details loss severities
for the 1998 to 2013 vintages based on liquidations that took
place between January 1, 2000 and March 15, 2013.


* Moody's Takes Action on $150MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded two tranches and upgraded
five tranches from three RMBS transactions issued by miscellaneous
issuers in 2005. The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, adjustable-rate prime Jumbo residential
mortgages. The actions impact approximately $150 million of RMBS
issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-1

Cl. I-A-9, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-AR1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-2

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the prime
jumbo pools originated from 2005 to 2007 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools. The downgrades are a
result of deteriorating performance and structural features
resulting in higher expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated. The upgrades are due to significant
improvement in collateral performance.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005-2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate. To project losses on
prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first
calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on vintage, number
of loans remaining in the pool and the level of current
delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 3.5% for 2005, 6.5% for
2006 and 7.5% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below
76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan
fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency is 3.54%. Further, to account for
the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF331564

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


* S&P Puts Ratings on 321 Classes From 89 US RMBS on Watch Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 321
classes from 89 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placements reflect the allocation of varied
amounts of losses to the related transactions during the May 2013
remittance period.  These losses were the result of modifications
made to loans in these transactions by the servicer Homeward
Residential, Inc. during the 2011-2012 time period.  However, the
losses on the loans were never applied to the respective
transactions.  Homeward Residential, Inc. is now owned by Ocwen
Loan Servicing, Inc. (Ocwen).

S&P notes that the CreditWatch placements are on transactions set
forth on a list provided to S&P by Ocwen, which recently first
notified S&P of these losses.  It is possible that other
transactions may be affected; if and when they are identified,
similar credit actions may occur.  In addition, a small number of
transactions show a de minimis loss amount being applied (less
than 0.05% of the collateral pool balance) but are being placed on
CreditWatch nonetheless until a full analysis is performed.

Standard & Poor's intends to resolve these CreditWatch listings in
the next few weeks and make any rating adjustments according to
its published criteria.

The transactions reviewed are supported by mixed collateral of
fixed and adjustable-rate mortgage loans.  A combination of
subordination, excess spread, and overcollateralization (where
applicable) provide credit enhancement for all of the transactions
in this review.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

ABFC 2002-OPT1 Trust
Series 2002-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        04542BBL5   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-2        04542BBM3   BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

ABFC 2003-OPT1 Trust
Series 2003-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        04542BDD1   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-1A       04542BDE9   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-3        04542BDG4   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-1        04542BDH2   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT1 Trust
Series 2004-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        04542BFA5   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-2        04542BFB3   B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT2 Trust
Series 2004-OPT2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        04542BFT4   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-1A       04542BFU1   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-2        04542BFV9   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        04542BFW7   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-2        04542BFX5   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT3 Trust
Series 2004-OPT3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        04542BGR7   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-4        04542BGU0   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        04542BGV8   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-2        04542BGW6   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT4 Trust
Series 2004-OPT4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        04542BHB1   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-2        04542BHC9   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        04542BHD7   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT5 Trust
Series 2004-OPT5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        04542BJY9   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
A-4        04542BKB7   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)

ABFC 2005-HE1 Trust
Series 2005-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        04542BKS0   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)

ABFC 2005-OPT 1 Trust
Series 2005-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1SS      04542BPT3   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-1MZ      04542BPX4   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-2C       04542BPZ9   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M1         04542BQA3   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)

ABFC 2006-OPT1 Trust
Series 2006-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        00075QAQ5   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
A-2        00075QAR3   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
A-3C1      00075QAS1   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
A-3C2      00075QAC6   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
A-3D       00075QAD4   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-OP1
Series 2003-OP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        004427BJ8   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-2        004427BK5   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-3        004427BL3   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        004427BM1   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
M-2        004427BN9   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-OP1
Series 2004-OP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        004421EW9   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP1
Series 2006-OP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       00442PAA8   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
A-1B       00442PAB6   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP2
Series 2006-OP2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        00441YAA0   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
A-2B       00441YAC6   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2005-1
Series 2005-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
3-A-1-1    02660VAE8   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        02660TAE3   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
II-A       02660TAJ2   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
III-A      02660TAN3   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
IV-A       02660TAR4   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
I-M-1      02660TAF0   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
II-M-1     02660TAK9   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)
III-M-1    02660TAP8   B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)
IV-M-1     02660TAS2   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
I-M-2      02660TAG8   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-A       02660TAW3   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
III-A      02660TAX1   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
IV-A-6     02660TBD4   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
V-A        02660TBE2   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4
Series 2004-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      02660TCC5   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
I-A-2      02660TCD3   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
II-A-1     02660TCE1   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
II-A-2     02660TCF8   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
III-A      02660TCG6   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
IV-A       02660TCS0   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
V-A        02660TCT8   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
VI-A-1     02660TCJ0   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
VI-A-2     02660TCK7   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1
Series 2005-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      02660TCZ4   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
I-A-2      02660TDA8   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
I-A-3      02660TEA7   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
II-A-1     02660TDB6   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
II-A-2     02660TDC4   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
IV-A-1     02660TDF7   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
IV-A-2     02660TEB5   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
V-A-1      02660TDG5   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
V-A-2      02660TEC3   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
VI-A       02660TDH3   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
VII-A-1    02660TDJ9   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
VII-A-2    02660TED1   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2
Series 2005-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-A-2     02660TFN8   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
IV-A-1     02660TEQ2   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
IV-A-2     02660TFG3   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
V-A-3      02660TET6   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-3
Series 2005-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      02660TFV0   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)
II-A-3     02660TFZ1   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
III-A-3    02660TGD9   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corporation HEL Trust, Series 2004-HE3
Series 2004-HE3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M1         04541GJT0   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-
HE6
Series 2003-HE6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         04541GFX5   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A2         04541GFY3   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A3-B       04541GGM8   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M1         04541GGB2   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust Series
2001-HE3
Series 2001-HE3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         04541GBU5   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust Series
OOMC 2005-HE6
Series 2005-HE6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M1         04541GTK8   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M2         04541GTL6   AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)
M3         04541GTM4   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M4         04541GTN2   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
M5         04541GTP7   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1
Series 2006-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        144531FL9   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
A-4        144531FM7   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
M-1        144531FN5   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-OPT1
Series 2004-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        17307GJG4   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        17307GJH2   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-2        17307GJJ8   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-3        17307GJK5   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT4
Series 2005-OPT4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        17307GUR7   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-2        17307GUS5   AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)
M-3        17307GUT3   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-4        17307GUU0   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-5        17307GUV8   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Deutsche Alt-B Secs Mtg Ln Trust Series 2006-AB4
Series 2006-AB4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-4A       251513AY3   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg   AA- (sf)
A-5        251513BB2   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg   AA- (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-FF2
Series 2001-FF2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        32027NAH4   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
M-1        32027NAK7   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF1
Series 2002-FF1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-2      32027NAP6   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2003-HE2
Series 2003-HE2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       36228FVQ6   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-1B       36228FVR4   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-2        36228FVS2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-3A       36228FVT0   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-3C       36228FWE2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-1        36228FVU7   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-OA1
Series 2006-OA1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      362631AB9   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 2004-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AV-1       437690AT7   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
AV-2C      437690AW0   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
AV-3       437690AX8   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-1        437690AY6   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-2        437690AZ3   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
M-3        437690BA7   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-4        437690BB5   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 2004-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        437690BU3   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-4        437690BX7   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        437690BY5   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-2        437690BZ2   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-3        437690CA6   BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)
M-4        437690CB4   B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)
M-5        437690CC2   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 2004-6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3A       437690CH1   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-3B       437690CJ7   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        437690CK4   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-2        437690CL2   AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)
M-3        437690CM0   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-4        437690CN8   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-5        437690CP3   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-6        437690CQ1   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)

HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-OPT1
Series 2005-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-4        40430HBZ0   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)

HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT1
Series 2006-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        40430HCZ9   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
II-A-3     40430HDC9   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
II-A-4     40430HDD7   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-1        40430HDE5   B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT2
Series 2006-OPT2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        40430HDV7   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
II-A-3     40430HDY1   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
II-A-4     40430HDZ8   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-1        40430HEA2   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
M-2        40430HEB0   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT3
Series 2006-OPT3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        40430HFG8   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
II-A       40430HFH6   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
III-A-3    40430HFL7   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
III-A-4    40430HFM5   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-1        40430HFN3   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT4
Series 2006-OPT4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        40430KAB7   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
II-A-3     40430KAE1   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
II-A-4     40430KAF8   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
II-A-5     40430KAG6   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

JPMorgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A3
Series 2006-A3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
Class1-A-3 46628UAC2   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-OPT1
Series 2002-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-3        57643LAE6   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-4        57643LAF3   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-OPT1
Series 2003-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        57643LAL0   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-3        57643LAM8   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-OPT2
Series 2003-OPT2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        57643LBG0   A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
M-3        57643LBH8   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT1
Series 2004-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        57643LCH7   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-2        57643LCJ3   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-3        57643LCK0   B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)
M-4        57643LCL8   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2
Series 2004-OPT2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        57643LFG6   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-2        57643LEV4   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        57643LEW2   A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
M-2        57643LEX0   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)
M-3        57643LEY8   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-OPT1
Series 2005-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        57643LHP4   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-2        57643LHQ2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-3        57643LHR0   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-4        57643LHS8   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-HE2
Series 2007-HE2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        57646LAA1   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2003-OPT1
Series 2003-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        5899295F1   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-2        5899295G9   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-3        5899295H7   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
S          5899295J3   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        5899295K0   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2004-OPT1
Series 2004-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       59020UKL8   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
A-1B       59020ULH6   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
A-2B       59020UKN4   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
A-2A       59020UKM6   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)

MESA Trust 2001-5
Series 2001-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          68400XAA8   A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-OP1
Series 2004-OP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        61744CJD9   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-2        61744CJE7   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-3        61744CJF4   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)
M-4        61744CJG2   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE1
Series 2005-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        65536HBD9   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-3        65536HBE7   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-4        65536HBF4   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation
Series 2005-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       68383NAA1   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-1B       68383NAB9   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-4        68383NAE3   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        68383NAF0   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-2        68383NAG8   AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)
M-3        68383NAH6   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg   AA- (sf)
M-4        68383NAJ2   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-5        68383NAK9   A- (sf)/Watch Neg    A- (sf)
M-6        68383NAL7   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
M-7        68383NAM5   BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation
Series 2005-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-I-3      68383NAT0   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-II-1     68383NAU7   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-II-2     68383NAV5   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        68383NAW3   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-2        68383NAX1   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-3        68383NAY9   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-4        68383NAZ6   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-5        68383NBA0   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-6        68383NBB8   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4
Series 2001-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          68389FBW3   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-1        68389FBX1   B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1
Series 2002-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          68389FCB8   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2
Series 2002-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          68400XAE0   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-1        68400XAG5   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3
Series 2002-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FCF9   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
A-2        68389FCG7   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-4
Series 2002-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        68389FCN2   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-2        68389FCP7   BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-5
Series 2002-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        68389FCT9   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-6
Series 2002-6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68400XAX8   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
A-2        68400XAY6   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-1        68400XAZ3   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)
M-2        68400XBA7   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1
Series 2003-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FCZ5   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-2        68389FDA9   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-1        68389FDB7   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2
Series 2003-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FDF8   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
A-2        68389FDG6   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
A-3        68389FDH4   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-1        68389FDJ0   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3
Series 2003-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68400XBH2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-2        68400XBJ8   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-4        68389FDQ4   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-1        68400XBK5   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
M-1A       68389FDR2   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-4
Series 2003-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FDS0   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-2        68389FDT8   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-1        68389FDU5   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-5
Series 2003-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68400XBR0   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-2        68400XBS8   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-3        68400XBT6   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-1        68400XBU3   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-6
Series 2003-6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FED2   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
A-2        68389FEE0   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-3        68389FEF7   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-1        68389FEG5   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-2        68389FEH3   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        68389FES9   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-2        68389FET7   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       68389FFB5   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-1B       68389FFC3   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-4        68389FFF6   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        68389FFG4   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3
Series 2004-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FFP4   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-4        68389FFS8   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        68389FFT6   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-2        68389FFU3   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-3        68389FFV1   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)
M-4        68389FFW9   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1
Series 2005-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       68389FGE8   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-1B       68389FGF5   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-4        68389FGJ7   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2
Series 2005-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1B       68389FGV0   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-6        68389FHA5   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        68389FHB3   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)
M-2        68389FHC1   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3
Series 2005-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       68389FHL1   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-1B       68389FHM9   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-5        68389FHR8   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        68389FHS6   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-2        68389FHT4   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-3        68389FHU1   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4
Series 2005-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FJD7   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-3        68389FJF2   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-4        68389FJG0   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-1        68389FJH8   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5
Series 2005-05
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FKK9   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-3        68389FJW5   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-4        68389FJX3   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-1        68389FJY1   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
Series 2006-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      68389FKL7   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
II-A-3     68389FKP8   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)
II-A-4     68389FKQ6   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)


Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-HL1
Series 2007-HL1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-A-1     68402SAB5   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2004-OP1
Series 2004-OP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        81375WAB2   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2004-OP2
Series 2004-OP2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        81375WBL9   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A-2        81375WBM7   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M-1        81375WBN5   BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP1
Series 2005-OP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        81375WCS3   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-2        81375WCT1   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2
Series 2005-OP2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        81375WHA7   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-2C       81375WGT7   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-1        81375WGU4   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)
M-2        81375WGV2   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1
Series 2006-OP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        81375WJB3   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A-2C       81375WJE7   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M-1        81375WJF4   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
M-2        81375WJG2   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M-3        81375WJH0   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)
M-4        81375WJJ6   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT1
Series 2005-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A2         81879MAB5   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
A3         81879MAC3   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
M1         81879MAD1   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
M2         81879MAE9   B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-7
Series 2004-7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A7         86358EKH8   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
A8         86358EKJ4   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
M1         86358EKL9   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
M2         86358EKM7   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
BC1
Series 2007-BC1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A2         86362PAB1   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
A3         86362PAC9   BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

RATINGS REMAINING ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4
Series 2004-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
VII-A      02660TCU5   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust
Series 2001-BC1

Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         8635725N9   BB (sf)/Watch Neg

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-FF1
Series 2001-FF1

Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        32027NAD3   AA (sf)/Watch Neg


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog, Meriam Fernandez,
Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl
Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


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