TCR_Public/130512.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

               Sunday, May 12, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 130

                            Headlines
AIR CANADA 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B Certs
AIR CANADA 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to 6.625% Class C Certs
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2 RMBS Deals
ARMOR RE LTD: S&P Gives Prelim 'BB+' Rating on Series 2013-1 Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2006-2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCC'

BEAR STEARNS 2000-WF1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to 'C'
BEAR STEARNS 2000-WF2: Fitch Affirms D Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes
BEAR STEARNS 2006-1: Moody's Reviews $336MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS
BRAVO MORTGAGE 2006-1: Moody's Reviews Ba3 Rating on Cl. M-1 Debt
BRIDGEPORT CLO: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Five Note Classes

C-BASS 2002-CB1: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating on Class B-1 RMBS
CENTEX HOME: Moody's Reviews Ratings on $160MM of Subprime RMBS
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: S&P Cuts on Class N Note Rating to D
COMM MORTGAGE 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 Classes
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1999-C1: S&P Cuts Class E Notes Rating to B-

CREDIT SUISSE 2001-CF2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to CC
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-5: Moody's Reviews Rating on Cl. IV-B-1 Certs
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C4: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to C
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C6: Moody's Lowers Ratings on Two CMBS Classes
CREST G-STAR 2001-1: Moody's Takes Action on Four Note Classes

EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2013-1: S&P Rates $32.99MM Class D Notes 'BBsf'
FIRST FRANKLIN 2005-FF6: Moody's Lifts Rating on $101MM of RMBS
FBR SECURITIZATION: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 RMBS Tranches
GALAXY XIV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
GE BUSINESS: Fitch Cuts Rating on Series 2006-2 Class D Certs 'B'

GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class M Certs
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Takes Action on 8 CMBS Classes
GOLDENTREE LOAN VII: Moody's Assigns Ratings to 7 Note Classes
HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE 2006-8: Moody's Reviews Cl. 2A-1A Debt Rating
HEDGED MUTUAL 2005-3: S&P Withdraws BB Rating on Cl. 2005-3 Debt

HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Keeps Ba1, Ba3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
JFIN CLO 2007: Moody's Lifts Rating on $26.5MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
JP MORGAN 2002-C2: Moody's Reviews Ratings for Downgrade
JP MORGAN 2002-C2: S&P Cuts Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Keeps 'C' Ratings on 5 CMBS Classes

JP MORGAN 2006-LDP6: Moody's Takes Action on 10 CMBS Classes
JP MORGAN 2013-FL3: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
JP MORGAN 2013-FL3: Fitch Rates $33-Mil. Class E Certs at 'BB-'
KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Fitch Cuts Class B Certs Rating to 'Bsf'
LB-UBS 2005-C5: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Two Cert. Classes

LB-UBS 2007-C6: Moody's Takes Action on 19 RMBS Classes
LEHMAN BROTHERS-UBS: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class G Certs to 'BB'
LONG BEACH: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Ratings on Two RMBS Deals
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-B: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 3 RMBS Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-WMC2: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 RMBS Tranches

ML-CFC 2007-8: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
MMCAPS FUNDING XVII: Moody's Keeps 'Ca' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 1999-RM1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class N Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Class J Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ6: DBRS Cuts Rating on 5 Sec Classes to 'D'

MORGAN STANLEY 2006-XLF: Fitch Keeps D Rating on Cl. N-ROK Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: Moody's Rates Class H Debt 'B3(sf)'
NACM CLO I: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $9.5MM Class D Notes
NYLIM STRATFORD: Fitch Keeps 'C' Rating on $16MM Preferred Shares
PROTECTIVE FINANCE 2007-PL: Moody's Takes Action on 22 CMBS

PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 2000-C1: S&P Keeps CCC- Rating on L Certs
RACE POINT III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on $560 Million Notes
RIVERBANK REDEVELOPMENT: S&P Puts 'CC' Rating on 2 Bonds
SANDERS RE 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class A Notes
SANTANDER 2013-3: S&P Assigns Prelim 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes

SAXON ASSET 2000-4: Moody's Lowers Class MF-1's Rating to 'B1'
STONE TOWER III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Ratings on Two Note Classes
SYMPHONY CLO II: Suppl. Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings
SYMPHONY CLO III: Suppl. Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings
SYMPHONY CLO V: Suppl. Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings

TALMAGE STRUCTURED 2005-2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 5 Classes
TELOS CLO 2007-2: Moody's Hikes Ratings on $89.5 Million Notes
TIAA CMBS: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Moody's Rates 15 Tranches of $1.25BB CMBS
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-WHALE: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on 9 Certs

WELLS FARGO 2005-AR16: Moody's Reviews Ratings on $983MM of RMBS
WESTCHESTER CLO: Moody's Hikes Ratings on Five Note Classes
WFRBS 2013-C13: Fitch Rates $16.43 Million Class F Certs 'Bsf'

* Fitch Takes Actions on 12,804 Classes in 904 Prime RMBS
* Fitch Affirms Ratings on 28 Classes From 5 CMBS Deals
* Fitch: Guarantor Stress Could Pressure US FFELP Student Loan ABS
* Moody's Reviews Ratings on $236-Mil. of Subprime RMBS Issues
* Moody's Lifts Ratings on $260-Mil. of Subprime RMBS Tranches

* Moody's Hikes Action on $381 Million RMBS Deals From 2 Issuers
* Moody's Takes Action on $252MM of Lehman, Greenpoint RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $54.5-Mil. of Alt-A RMBS from 2 Issuers
* Moody's Lowers Ratings on Two Morgan Stanley CSO Notes to 'C'
* Moody's Says Credit Performance of Auto ABS Sector Still Strong


                            *********

AIR CANADA 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'A-'(sf) rating to Air Canada's 4.125% series 2013-1 class A pass-
through certificates with an expected maturity of May 15, 2025,
and its 'BB'(sf) rating to the company's 5.375% series 2013-1
class B pass-through certificates with an expected maturity of May
15, 2021.  The pass-through certificates will be issued by pass-
through trusts that will hold equipment notes issued by Loxley
Aviation Ltd.  Loxley Aviation is a newly formed company whose
assets will consist of the aircraft to be financed, in part, with
the proceeds of this offering and contract rights under its
conditional sale agreements for the aircraft with Air Canada.  The
final legal maturities will be 18 months after the expected
maturity.

S&P base the 'A-'(sf) and 'BB'(sf) ratings on the credit quality
of Air Canada (B-/Stable/--); substantial collateral coverage by
good-quality aircraft; the legal and structural protections
available to the pass-through certificates; and by liquidity
facilities provided by Natixis S.A. (A/Negative/A-1).  The company
will use proceeds of the offering to finance 2013 and 2014
deliveries of five Boeing B777-300ER aircraft to be acquired by
Loxley Aviation and conditionally sold to Air Canada.  Each
aircraft's equipment notes are cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted under the indentures, and also cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted to the conditional sale agreements, which S&P
believes increases the likelihood that Air Canada would cure any
defaults and agree to perform its future obligations, including
its payment obligations, under the conditional sale agreements in
an insolvency-related event of the airline.  Any cash collateral
held as a result of the cross-collateralization of the equipment
notes would not be entitled to the benefits of the Cape Town
Convention.

The pass-through certificates benefit from legal protections
afforded by Article XI, Alternative A, of the Protocol to the Cape
Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, as
adopted in Canada and by liquidity facilities provided by Natixis.
The liquidity facilities would cover up to three semi-annual
interest payments, a period in which interest payments on the
certificates could be maintained while the collateral could be
repossessed and remarketed by certificateholders if Air Canada
does not cure defaults and agrees to peform its future obligations
under the conditional sale agreements or while the
certificateholders negotiate with Air Canada during an insolvency-
related event.  Alternative A is similar to Section 1110 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  In summary, Alternative A and Canada's
corresponding declarations to the Cape Town Convention provide
that, within 60 calendar days after the commencement of an
insolvency-related event in Canada with respect to Air Canada or
Loxley Aviation, as applicable, Air Canada, Loxley Aviation, or
its insolvency administrator, would be required either to give
possession of the airframe and engines securing the equipment
notes to the relevant loan trustee or Loxley Aviation (as
applicable), or to cure all defaults (other than those based on
the commencement of the insolvency-related event) and agree to
perform all future obligations under the conditional sale
agreements or the equipment notes and the security agreements
securing the equipment notes (as applicable).

The Cape Town Convention went into effect in Canada April 1, 2013,
and has yet to be applied by Canadian courts.  Accordingly, there
is no precedent determining how the Cape Town Convention would be
enforced by the courts of Canada.  However, consistent with S&P's
generally positive view of the Canadian legal system, S&P's
analysis assumes that Canadian courts will interpret the statutory
provisions that implement the Cape Town Convention in a manner
that will give effect to the protections afforded by the Cape Town
Convention and the related protocol.  S&P's analysis, therefore,
anticipates that in a scenario where the loan trustee seeks to
exercise its remedies under the conditional sale agreements or the
equipment notes, as applicable, that in the case of an insolvency-
related event of Air Canada or Loxley Aviation, the legal
protections afforded by Article XI, Alternative A of the Protocol
to the Cape Town Convention will be available.

The ratings apply to a unit consisting of certificates
representing the trust property and escrow receipts representing
interests in deposits that are the proceeds of the offerings.  The
proceeds will be deposited, with Natixis acting through its New
York branch pending delivery of the new aircraft.  Amounts
deposited under the escrow agreements are not property of Air
Canada or Loxley Aviation and are not entitled to the benefits of
the Cape Town Convention.  S&P's rating on Natixis is sufficiently
high that, under its counterparty criteria, this does not
represent a constraint on S&P's ratings on the certificates.
Neither the certificates nor the escrow receipts may be separately
assigned or transferred.

S&P believes that Air Canada would view the aircraft being
financed by the pass-through certificates as important and, given
the cross-collateralization and cross-default provisions, would
likely cure defaults and agree to perform its future obligations
under the conditional sale agreements.  In S&P's view, the cross-
default and cross-collateralization provisions make it less likely
that Air Canada would seek to perform under less than all of the
conditional sale agreements (cherry-picking), which historically
has been used to the detriment of certificateholders in airline
insolvencies.  Furthermore, S&P's expectation of Air Canada's
continued performance under the conditional sale agreements is
supported by S&P's belief that, should Air Canada become subject
to insolvency proceedings, it is very likely the company will be
reorganized.  This expectation is supported by the following: the
company was reorganized after its last bankruptcy filing in 2003;
it is the largest airline in Canada and is the flag carrier for
the country; and Air Canada provided 55% of domestic traffic, 35%
of transborder traffic, and 37% of international traffic from
Canada in 2012.

The collateral pool consists of five B777-300ER (extended range)
aircraft, the first of which will be delivered later this year.
Boeing Co. introduced this model into service in 2004, expanding
and increasing the range of the successful predecessor B777-200ER.
The two-engine B777-300ER, in S&P's view, is currently the best
widebody plane available, and its capabilities make it a good
replacement for the four-engine (and thus less fuel-efficient)
B747-400.  S&P believes that Airbus' planned A350 will pose a more
serious competitive challenge to the smaller B777-200ER than to
the B777-300ER.  American Airlines Inc.'s 2013-1 enhanced
equipment trust certificates (EETC) issued earlier this year
included B777-300ERs as collateral.  The B777-300ER will be the
largest plane in Air Canada's fleet and operate on high-density
international routes.  S&P believes that if Air Canada needed to
shrink its fleet during insolvency reorganization proceedings it
would first retire other, older widebodies.  S&P expects also that
the financing costs on these B777-300ERs (through the issuance of
the pass-through certificates) will be low relative to those on
most of Air Canada's other aircraft, further supporting S&P's view
of the likelihood that Air Canada would seek to continue to
operate the B777-300 ERs through any insolvency reorganization.

S&P is applying a depreciation rate of 6.5% annually of the
preceding year's value for the 777-300ER, which equals the lowest
depreciation rate S&P currently uses for a widebody plane.

Using the appraised base values and depreciation assumptions in
the offering memorandum, the initial loan-to-value (LTV) is 48.9%
for the class A certificates and 69.5% for the class B
certificates.  When S&P evaluates an EETC, it compares the values
provided by appraisers that the airline hired with its own
sources.  Overall, the values that S&P uses approximate those set
out in the offering memorandum for the pass-through certificates.
However, S&P applies more conservative (faster) depreciation rates
than those used in the offering memorandum, and though its LTVs
start out at the same level as those in the offering memorandum,
they gradually diverge from those shown in the offering
memorandum, reaching 52.0% maximum for the class A certificates
and 70.9% for the class B certificates.  S&P's analysis also
considered that a full draw of the liquidity facility, plus
interest on those draws, represents a claim senior to the
certificates.  This amount is somewhat less than levels typical of
an EETC, equal to about 5% of collateral value.  S&P factored that
added priority claim into its analysis.

RATINGS LIST

Air Canada

Corporate credit rating                        B-/Stable/--

Ratings Assigned

Equipment trust certificates
Series 2013-1 class A pass-thru certificates   A- (sf)
Series 2013-1 Class B pass-thru certificates   BB (sf)


AIR CANADA 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to 6.625% Class C Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'B'(sf)
rating to Air Canada's 6.625% series 2013-1 class C pass-through
certificates with an expected maturity of May 15, 2018.  The pass-
through certificates will be issued by pass-through trusts that
will hold equipment notes issued by Loxley Aviation Ltd.  Loxley
Aviation is a newly formed company whose assets will consist of
the aircraft to be financed, in part, with the proceeds of this
offering and contract rights under its conditional sale agreements
for the aircraft with Air Canada.  S&P base the 'B'(sf) rating on
the credit quality of Air Canada (B-/Stable/--); substantial
collateral coverage by good-quality aircraft; and the legal and
structural protections available to the pass-through certificates.
The company will use proceeds of this offering and those of the
2013-1 class A and class B series to finance 2013 and 2014
deliveries of five Boeing B777-300ER aircraft to be acquired by
Loxley Aviation and conditionally sold to Air Canada.  Each
aircraft's equipment notes are cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted under the indentures, and cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted to the conditional sale agreements, which S&P
believes increases the likelihood that Air Canada would cure any
defaults and agree to perform its future obligations, including
its payment obligations, under the conditional sale agreements in
an insolvency-related event of the airline.

The pass-through certificates benefit from legal protections
afforded by Article XI, Alternative A, of the Protocol to the Cape
Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, as
adopted in Canada.  Alternative A is similar to Section 1110 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  In summary, Alternative A and Canada's
corresponding declarations to the Cape Town Convention provide
that within 60 calendar days after the commencement of an
insolvency-related event in Canada with respect to Air Canada or
Loxley Aviation, as applicable, Air Canada, Loxley Aviation, or
its insolvency administrator would be required either to give
possession of the airframe and engines securing the equipment
notes to the relevant loan trustee or Loxley Aviation (as
applicable), or to cure all defaults (other than those based on
the commencement of the insolvency related event) and agree to
perform all future obligations under the conditional sale
agreements or the equipment notes and the security agreements
securing the equipment notes (as applicable).

The Cape Town Convention went into effect in Canada April 1, 2013,
and has not yet been applied by the Canadian courts.  Accordingly,
there is no precedent determining how the Cape Town Convention
would be enforced by the courts of Canada.  However, consistent
with S&P's generally positive view of the Canadian legal system,
S&P's analysis assumes that Canadian courts will interpret the
statutory provisions that implement the Cape Town Convention in a
manner that will give effect to the protections afforded by Cape
Town Convention and the related protocol.  S&P's analysis,
therefore, anticipates that in a scenario where the loan trustee
seeks to exercise its remedies under the conditional sale
agreements or the equipment notes, as applicable, in the case of
an insolvency-related event of Air Canada or Loxley Aviation, that
the legal protections afforded by Article XI, Alternative A of the
Protocol to the Cape Town Convention will be available.

The ratings apply to a unit consisting of certificates
representing the trust property and escrow receipts representing
interests in deposits that are the proceeds of the offerings.  The
proceeds will be deposited with Natixis S.A. (A/Negative/A-1),
acting through its New York branch, pending delivery of the new
aircraft.  Amounts deposited under the escrow agreements are not
property of Air Canada or Loxley Aviation and are not entitled to
the benefits of the Cape Town Convention.  S&P's rating on Natixis
is sufficiently high that, under its counterparty criteria, this
does not represent a constraint on its ratings on the
certificates.  Neither the certificates nor the escrow receipts
may be separately assigned or transferred.  Any cash collateral
held as a result of the cross-collateralization of the equipment
notes would not be entitled to the benefits of the Cape Town
Convention.

S&P believes that Air Canada would view the aircraft being
financed by the pass-through certificates as important and, given
the cross-collateralization and cross-default provisions, would
likely cure defaults and agree to perform its future obligations
under the conditional sale agreements.  In S&P's view, the cross-
default and cross-collateralization provisions make it less likely
that Air Canada would seek to perform under less than all of the
conditional sale agreements (cherry-picking), which historically
has been used to the detriment of certificateholders in airline
insolvencies.  Furthermore, S&P's expectation of Air Canada's
continued performance under the conditional sale agreements is
supported by S&P's belief that, should Air Canada become subject
to insolvency proceedings, it is very likely the company will be
reorganized.  This expectation is supported by the following: the
company was reorganized after its last bankruptcy filing in 2003;
it is the largest airline in Canada and is the flag carrier for
the country; and Air Canada provided 55% of domestic traffic, 35%
of transborder traffic, and 37% of international traffic from
Canada in 2012.

The collateral pool consists of five B777-300ER (extended range)
aircraft, the first of which will be delivered later this year.
Boeing Co. introduced this model into service in 2004, expanding
and increasing the range of the successful predecessor B777-200ER.
The two-engine B777-300ER, in S&P's view, is currently the best
widebody plane available, and its capabilities make it a good
replacement for the four-engine (and thus less fuel efficient)
B747-400.  S&P believes that Airbus' planned A350 will pose a more
serious competitive challenge to the smaller B777-200ER than to
the B777-300ER. American Airlines Inc.'s 2013-1 enhanced equipment
trust certificates (EETC) issued earlier this year included B777-
300ER as collateral.  The B777-300ER will be the largest plane in
Air Canada's fleet and operate on high-density international
routes.  S&P believes if Air Canada needed to shrink its fleet
during insolvency reorganization proceedings that it would first
retire other, older widebodies.  S&P expects also that the
financing costs on these B777-300ERs (through the issuance of the
pass-through certificates) will be low relative to those on most
of Air Canada's other aircraft, further supporting S&P's view of
the likelihood that Air Canada would seek to continue to operate
the B777-300ERs through any insolvency reorganization.

S&P is applying a depreciation rate of 6.5% annually of the
preceding year's value for the B777-300ER, which equals the lowest
depreciation rate S&P currently uses for a widebody plane. Using
the appraised base values and depreciation assumptions in the
offering memorandum, the initial loan-to-value (LTV) of the class
C certificates is 82.3%.  When S&P evaluates an EETC, it compares
the values provided by appraisers that the airline hired with
S&P's own sources.  Overall, the values that S&P uses approximate
those set out in the offering memorandum for the pass-through
certificates.  However, S&P applies more conservative (faster)
depreciation rates than those used in the offering memorandum, and
although its LTVs start out at the same level as those in the
offering memorandum, they gradually diverge, reaching 86.9%
maximum for the class C certificates.  S&P's rating on the class C
certificates is lower than its ratings on the class A and class B
certificates because of a higher LTV, the fact that the class C
certificates are subordinated to the more senior certificates, and
because the class C certificates do not have a dedicated liquidity
facility (which would cover up to three semi-annual interest
payments, during an insolvency related event).  Still, the class C
certificates benefit from the fact that the notes that secure all
the certificates are cross-defaulted and cross-collateralized,
which, S&P believes, increases the likelihood that Air Canada
would cure defaults and agree to perform its future obligations
under the conditional sale agreements.

RATINGS LIST

Air Canada
Corporate credit rating                        B-/Stable/--

Ratings Assigned
Equipment trust certificates
Series 2013-1 class C pass-thru certificates   B(sf)


AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2 RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review twelve tranches
from two Ameriquest RMBS transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-13

Cl. AF-5, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. AV-1, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R9

Cl. A-1, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. AF-3, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Apr 14, 2010 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Apr 14, 2010 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect errors in the Structured Finance
Workstation (SFW) cash flow models previously used by Moody's in
rating these transactions, specifically in the principal
distribution amount calculation in Ameriquest 2003-13 and in the
excess spread calculation in Ameriquest 2005-R9 .

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012, and "2005 - 2008 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in July 2011.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


ARMOR RE LTD: S&P Gives Prelim 'BB+' Rating on Series 2013-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'BB+(sf)' preliminary rating to the Series 2013-1 notes to be
issued by Armor Re Ltd. (Armor Re).  The notes cover losses in
Florida from named storms on an aggregate basis during a one-year
risk period.

The preliminary rating is based on the lower of the rating on the
catastrophe risk ('BB+') and the rating on the assets in the
collateral account ('AAAm').  S&P do not maintain an interactive
rating on American Coastal Insurance Co.  However, credit exposure
to American Coastal will be mitigated because it will prepay the
quarterly insurance premium for the entire risk period at closing.
In addition, if there is a potential covered event, American
Coastal will pay servicer fees in advance.

When rating catastrophe bonds linked to hurricanes, S&P will look
at the sensitivity analysis.  This is the warm-sea surface
temperature-conditioned (WSST) catalogue, which incorporates the
impact on hurricane activity of elevated sea-surface temperatures
in the North Atlantic, as has generally been the case since 1995,
to generate the stochastic event set and compare it with the long-
term base-case analysis, and would likely use the more onservative
results.  The WSST probability of attachments is 0.50%.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating
Armor Re Ltd.
Series 2013-1 Notes                         BB+(sf)(prelim)


BANC OF AMERICA 2006-2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the Class
A-M commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 2006-2, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'AA- (sf)' from
'A (sf)'.  At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings on two other
classes from the same transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on 11 other classes from the same transaction, including
the Class XW interest-only (IO) certificates.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrade of the Class A-M certificates reflects S&P's expected
available credit enhancement for the class, which it believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the prior rating as well as S&P's views regarding
the current and future performance of the collateral supporting
the transaction.

The downgrades of the Class F and G certificates reflect current
interest shortfalls affecting these classes.  As of the April 10,
2013, trustee remittance report, the trust experienced monthly
interest shortfalls totaling $525,081, primarily related to
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts of $194,996 on
11 ($143.0 million, 6.0%) of the 16 specially serviced assets
($180.0 million, 7.6%) and shortfalls due to interest rate
modification of $185,017, interest not advanced of $42,897,
special servicing fees of $37,950, and workout fees of $10,055.
The interest shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and
including Class F.  In addition, two loans have transferred to the
special servicer after the April remittance report, resulting in
18 assets (187.2 million, 7.9%) in the pool being with the special
servicer. Classes F and G have accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for one month.  S&P may lower the ratings on these
classes to 'D (sf)' if these classes continues to experience
interest shortfalls.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings.
The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's analysis of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets, liquidity
support, and transaction-level changes.

The affirmation of S&P's 'AAA (sf)' rating on the Class XW
interest-only (IO) certificates reflects its current criteria for
rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Rating Raised

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

               Rating      Rating
Class          To          From     Credit enhancement (%)
A-M            AA- (sf)    A (sf)                    20.32

Ratings Lowered

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

               Rating      Rating
Class          To          From     Credit enhancement (%)
F              CCC (sf)    B- (sf)                    3.80
G              CCC- (sf)   CCC (sf)                   2.67

Ratings Affirmed

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

Class          Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
A-2            AAA (sf)                              31.72
A-3            AAA (sf)                              31.72
A-AB           AAA (sf)                              31.72
A-4            AAA (sf)                              31.72
A-1A           AAA (sf)                              31.72
A-J            BBB- (sf)                             11.21
B              BB+ (sf)                               9.07
C              BB (sf)                                7.93
D              B+ (sf)                                6.23
E              B (sf)                                 5.09
XW             AAA (sf)                                N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS 2000-WF1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed five classes
of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF1.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade is the result of the high concentration of the pool
and the thinning of classes at the bottom of the deal structure.

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
in light of significant pool concentration as only 22 loans
remain.

Fitch modeled losses of 3.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 3.8%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $33.3 million (3.8% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated two loans (18.3%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which does
not include any specially serviced loans.

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.4% to $14.3 million from
$888.3 million at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 10 loans
(48.7% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through M.

The largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a 85,813
square foot (sf) single-tenant building in Old Bridge, New Jersey
(3.9% of the pool). The building is currently 100% occupied by a
single tenant, Sears Auto Center, though this tenant's lease
expires in less than one year on April 20, 2014. Due to the
potential for distress following the upcoming lease expiration,
Fitch severely handicapped this property's cash flow for analysis.
The servicer reported a September 2012 Debt Service Coverage Ratio
of 1.42x.

Rating Sensitivities

The rating on the class G note is expected to be stable as the
credit enhancement remains high. Classes I through L will remain
at 'Dsf' as losses have been realized.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $13.3 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 100%.

Fitch affirms the following class as indicated:

-- $934,300 class G at 'A+sf', Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E and F certificates have paid in
full. Fitch maintains the rating of 'Dsf, RE 0%' on classes I, J,
K and L. Fitch does not rate the class M certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2000-WF2: Fitch Affirms D Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the four remaining classes of Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2000-WF2.

Key Rating Drivers

Affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
despite significant pool concentration as only 26 loans remain.
The overall pool performance has been stable since Fitch's last
rating action.

Fitch modeled losses of 2.1% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 2.1%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $17.1 million (2% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated six loans (13.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes one specially serviced loan (2.8%).

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95.1% to $41.1 million from
$838.5 million at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, six loans
(38.3% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes J through N.

The specially-serviced loan is secured by a 50,237 sf retail
property (2.8%) located in Las Vegas, NV. The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2012 due to imminent payment default
and the guarantor filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in November 2012.
Occupancy at the property has dropped significantly and the
servicer-reported occupancy as of third quarter 2011 was 35%. The
special servicer is currently working to put a receiver in place.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on classes E and F are expected to remain stable, as
credit enhancement remains high, which offsets the increasing
concentrations and continued risk of adverse selection. In
addition, there is adequate defeased collateral to pay down these
bonds in full at these loans' maturity dates in 2014, 2015 and
2020. Classes L and M will remain at 'Dsf' as losses have been
realized.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $5.9 million class E at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $7.3 million class F at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C and D certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class G, H, I, J, K and N certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-1: Moody's Reviews $336MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of four tranches
on review direction uncertain, from one RMBS transaction issued by
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2006-1. The collateral backing this deal
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed-rate prime Jumbo
residential mortgages. The actions impact approximately $336
million of RMBS issued in 2006.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-1, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Feb 24, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Feb 24, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Feb 24, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Feb 24, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the prime
jumbo pools originated from 2005 to 2007 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools. In addition, the rating
actions reflect an error in the Structured Finance Workstation
(SFW) cash flow model used by Moody's in rating this transaction.
In prior rating actions, the cash flow model incorrectly assumed
that realized losses would be reimbursed to the Senior bonds after
interest payment to Class X.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 - 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.



BRAVO MORTGAGE 2006-1: Moody's Reviews Ba3 Rating on Cl. M-1 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade three
tranches from Bravo Mortgage Asset Trust 2006-1, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bravo Mortgage Asset Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-2, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect discovery of an error in the Structured
Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow model used by Moody's in
rating this transaction. In prior rating actions, the aggregate
Class A-2 bond balance was modeled incorrectly, which overstated
the relative size of credit enhancement to losses on these bonds.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 - 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


BRIDGEPORT CLO: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Five Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Bridgeport CLO Ltd.:

$387,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due July 21,
2020 (current outstanding balance of $372,534,590), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on August 5, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

$24,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due July 21,
2020, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 5, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July 21,
2020, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 5, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July 21,
2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on August 5, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

$17,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July 21,
2020 (current outstanding balance of $14,292,793), Upgraded to Ba3
(sf); previously on August 5, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in July 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher spread levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in August
2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2480 compared to 2626 and a WAS of
3.46% compared to 3.20% at the time of the last rating action.

Moody's also notes that the transaction benefited from an
improvement in the weighted average recovery rate since the last
rating action, which increased to 49.51% from 47.43% based on
Moody's calculations. Further, based on Moody's calculations the
transaction's exposure to long dated assets has declined to 0.08%
of performing par from 3.53% at the time of the last rating
action, which lowered the potential market value risk for the
rated notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $473.6 million,
defaulted par of $7.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.56% (implying a WARF of 2480), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.51%, and a diversity
score of 82. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Bridgeport CLO Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1984)

Class A1: 0

Class A2: +1

Class B: +2

Class C: +1

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2976)

Class A1: 0

Class B2: -2

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the bond/loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


C-BASS 2002-CB1: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating on Class B-1 RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review Class B-1 from C-BASS
2002-CB1, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2002-CB1

Cl. B-1, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on May 31, 2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects discovery of an error in the Structured
Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow model used by Moody's in
rating this transaction. In prior rating actions, the calculation
of the cumulative losses trigger was coded incorrectly, resulting
in incorrect principal allocation to the bonds outstanding.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


CENTEX HOME: Moody's Reviews Ratings on $160MM of Subprime RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review fourteen tranches from
two Centex RMBS transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-D

Cl. AF-4, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. MV-1, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MF-1, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jun 8, 2012 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jun 8, 2012 Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jun 8, 2012 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CHEC Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. A-3, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 3, 2012 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 3, 2012 Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 3, 2012 Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 3, 2012 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect errors in the Structured Finance
Workstation (SFW) cash flow models previously used by Moody's in
rating these transactions, specifically in the cumulative loss
trigger and overcollateralization targets in Centex 2004-1 and in
the calculation of senior enhancement percentage in Centex 2004-D.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: S&P Cuts on Class N Note Rating to D
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P
lowered its ratings on two classes from the same transaction and
affirmed its ratings on 11 classes.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction structure,
interest shortfalls, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrades reflect S&P's expected available credit enhancement
for the affected tranches, which it believes is greater than its
most recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for each
rating level.  The upgrades also reflect S&P's views regarding the
current and future performance of the transaction's collateral.

The downgrades reflects S&P's expectation that the accumulated and
ongoing interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.  S&P lowered its rating on the class M
certificates to 'CCC- (sf)' due to the class' susceptibility to
interest shortfalls from the specially serviced assets (once a
loan becomes real estate owned, it is no longer a loan, but rather
an asset).  S&P lowered its rating on the class N certificates to
'D (sf)' due to accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 15
months.  The trust experienced monthly interest recoveries
totaling $31,622 due to special servicing fee recoveries on one
loan, which was recently returned to the master servicer,
according to the April 17, 2013, trustee remittance report.
S&P expects interest shortfalls to resume in the next reporting
period primarily due to special servicing fees of $12,000 and
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts of $19,287
from two ($21.2 million, 2.9%) of the three specially serviced
assets ($30.3 million, 4.1%).  The interest adjustments affected
classes subordinated to and including class M. Classes N and O
have accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 15 and 18
consecutive months, respectively.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmations also reflect the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans as well as the transaction-
level changes.

Although available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on several classes, S&P affirmed its ratings on
these classes because its analysis also considered its view of
available liquidity support and the risks associated with
potential future interest shortfalls.  S&P believes these
increased interest shortfalls could potentially result from any of
the following:

   -- Work-out fees associated with the two previously specially
      serviced loans ($11.9 million, 1.6%) (details below);

   -- Interest shortfalls from any of the 16 loans that are on the
      master servicer's watchlist ($125.5 million, 17.0%) that
      have the potential to transfer to the special servicer; or

   -- Interest shortfalls from any of the 24 performing loans
      ($124.7 million, 16.9%), two of which are also on the master
      servicer's watchlist ($19.6 million, 2.6%), that have
      scheduled maturities through June 30, 2014.

The Gulf Plaza ($7.4 million, 1.0%) and Wenatchee Top Foods ($4.5
million, 0.6%) loans were previously with the special servicer,
but have been returned to the master servicer.  According to the
transaction documents, the special servicer is entitled to a work-
out fee equal to 1.00% of all future principal and interest
payments on the corrected loans, provided they continue to
perform and remain with the master servicer.

The affirmation of the class XC interest-only (IO) certificate
reflects S&P's current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     To        From       Credit enhancement (%)
B         AA+ (sf)  AA- (sf)                    14.81
C         AA (sf)   A+ (sf)                     13.41
D         A+ (sf)   A- (sf)                     10.97
E         A- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)                    9.23

RATINGS LOWERED

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     To        From         Credit enhancement (%)
M         CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)                    1.03
N         D (sf)    CCC- (sf)                    0.51

R
ATINGS AFFIRMED
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating                 Credit enhancement (%)
A-4        AAA (sf)                          25.62
A-5        AAA (sf)                          25.62
A-1A       AAA (sf)                          25.62
A-J        AAA (sf)                          19.51
F          BBB (sf)                           7.48
G          BB+ (sf)                           6.09
H          BB- (sf)                           4.17
J          B+ (sf)                            3.30
K          B (sf)                             2.43
L          B- (sf)                            1.73
XC         AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


COMM MORTGAGE 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
COMM Mortgage Trust 2012-CCRE1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-CCRE1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The rating of the IO
Classes, Class X-A and X-B, are consistent with the expected
credit performance of their referenced classes and thus are
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.0% of the
current balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments..

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Classes X-A and X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24, the same at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's review at
securitization can be found in the Pre-Sale Report dated May 15,
2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the April 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $923.8
million from $932.8 billion at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 54 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
51% of the pool. The pool does not contain any investment grade
credit assessments or defeased loans.

There have been no realized losses to the trust. Currently, no
loans are on the watchlist or in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 45%
of the pool's loans. Moody's weighted average LTV is 95%, the same
as at securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 7% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.62%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.52X and 1.11X,
respectively, the same at securitization. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Crossgates Mall Loan ($118.6 million -- 12.8%
of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a $296.5
million loan. The loan is secured by a two-story, 1.3 million
square foot (SF) super regional mall located in Albany, New York.
The mall is anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting
Goods, Best Buy and Regal Crossgates. The property was 83% leased
as of December 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and
0.92X, respectively, compared to 94% and 0.95X at securitization.

The second largest conduit loan is the Creekside Plaza Loan ($55
million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by 228,000 SF Class
A three-building office complex and an above-ground parking
structure located in San Leandro, California. As of December 2012,
the property was 100% leased. The property has been historically
100% leased since each building was developed in 2002, 2004 and
2010. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.06X,
respectively, the same as at securitization.

The third largest conduit loan is the RiverTown Crossings Mall
Loan ($54.6 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $152.2 million loan. The loan is secured by a
636,000 SF (1.3 million SF total) super regional mall located in
Grandville, Michigan. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Younkers,
Sears, Kohl's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting Goods and Celebration
Cinemas. The property was 92% leased as of December 2012. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to
82% and 1.16X at securitization.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1999-C1: S&P Cuts Class E Notes Rating to B-
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust's series 1999-C1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on three other
classes from the same transaction.  In addition, S&P withdrew its
'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-4 certificates from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follows its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades on classes D, E, and F considered the monthly
interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust and reflect
current and potential interest shortfalls.  S&P lowered its rating
to 'D (sf)' on class F because it expects interest shortfalls to
continue and S&P believes the accumulated interest shortfalls will
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Class F has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 10 months.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes D and E because of lower
liquidity available to these classes resulting from continued
interest shortfalls from the four specially serviced assets
($174.3 million, 30.6%) and the classes' susceptibility to
interest shortfalls, particularly since three ($50.3 million,
8.8%) of the four specially serviced assets have exposure-to-
appraisal value ratios between 31.8% and 74.6%, and the master
servicer has indicated that no specially serviced assets are
deemed nonrecoverable at this time.  S&P believes interest
shortfalls have the potential to increase if one or more of the
specially serviced assets is deemed non-recoverable.  Class E has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for one month.  If
class E continues to experience interest shortfalls, S&P may
further lower the rating on this class.

According to the April 17, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $939,236,
primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
amounts of $919,660 and special servicing fees of $36,343.  Total
interest shortfalls were offset by interest recoveries of $26,350
this period.  The interest shortfalls affected all classes
subordinate to and including class E.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflects S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's review of the credit
characteristics, performance of the remaining assets, liquidity
support, and transaction-level changes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates, based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

In addition, S&P withdrew its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-4
principal and interest certificates following the full repayment
of the class' principal balance as detailed in the April 17, 2013,
trustee remittance report.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

              Rating                        Credit
Class      To          From        enhancement (%)
D          AA (sf)     AAA (sf)              37.17
E          B- (sf)     BB- (sf)              30.91
F          D (sf)      CCC- (sf)             21.53

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1
Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)

B          AAA (sf)                          84.11
C          AAA (sf)                          61.16
X          AAA (sf)                            N/A

RATING WITHDRAWN

Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

              Rating
Class      To          From
A-4        NR          AAA (sf)

N/A--Not applicable.
NR-- Not rated.


CREDIT SUISSE 2001-CF2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to CC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed eight classes
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CF2.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect large Fitch-modeled losses across the pool
due to deterioration of loan performance, most of which involves
increased losses on the specially serviced loans.

Fitch modeled losses of 30.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 7%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $57.9 million (5.1% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Four loans
are currently in special servicing (51.13%).

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 93.7% to $70.9 million from
$1.13 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, one loan
(10.6% of the pool) has defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through O.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-serviced
loan secured by an 184,000 square foot (sf) office property
located in Oak Brook, IL (37.8%). The loan transferred to special
servicing in January 2011 due to a potential maturity default (the
loan was scheduled to mature in October 2011). A receiver was
appointed in October 2011. Foreclosure judgment was obtained in
April 2012, and the Trust took title on August 28th, 2012. The
property is 100% occupied and under contract for sale.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a
200 room Best Western Hotel located in Colorado Springs, CO
(7.1%). The loan entered Special Servicing in September of 2010
due to the borrower due advising that property operations could no
longer support debt service. It was modified in November 2012,
which included the creation of a Hope Note and a maturity date
extension to January 2014. The loan returned to the Master
Servicer in December 2012, and no current property operating
information is available.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on the classes E and F notes are expected to be stable
as the credit enhancement remains high. Classes H and G could
potentially see future downgrades as their lower position in the
class structure puts them at risk regarding the adverse effects of
increasing pool concentration. Classes K through N will remain at
'Dsf' as losses have been realized.

Fitch downgrades the following classes:

-- $16.4 million class H to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 10%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $5.5 million class E at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18.9 million class F at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14 million class G at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $15.1 million class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-CP, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C and D certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class O, NM-1, NM-2 and RA
certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class A-X certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-5: Moody's Reviews Rating on Cl. IV-B-1 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of four tranches
on review from one RMBS transaction issued by Credit Suisse. The
collateral backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed-rate prime Jumbo residential mortgages. The actions impact
approximately $16.3 million of RMBS issued in 2002.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-5

Cl. P-P, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 18, 2011 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IV-B-1, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 24, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. IV-P, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Prime jumbo
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. In addition, the rating actions
reflect discovery of errors in the Structured Finance Workstation
(SFW) cash flow model used by Moody's in rating this transaction.
In prior rating actions, the calculation of principal paid to
senior bonds and the allocation of losses to the subordinate bonds
were coded incorrectly.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are its central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C4: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes and
downgraded one class of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C4 as follows:

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the ten principal and interest classes are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the
current ratings.

The IO Class, Class A-X, is affirmed due to the credit stability
of its reference classes.

The downgrade of one principal and interest class is due to higher
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.2% of the
current balance compared to 4.8% at last review. Base expected
loss plus realized losses now totals 7.3% compared to 6.9% at last
review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement levels could decline below the current levels. If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Class A-X was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 49 compared to 48 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 10, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the April 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $893.1
million from $1.33 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 131 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 33%
of the pool.

Twenty-five loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $50.7 million (60.8% average loan loss
severity). Currently, four loans, representing 5% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The servicer has recognized an aggregate
$9.95 million appraisal reduction on one of the four specially
serviced loans. Moody's estimates an aggregate $21.8 million loss
(overall 51% expected loss) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $3.9 million loss
(17.4% expected loss severity based on a 50% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full and partial year 2011 and 2012
operating results, respectively, for 98% and 29% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average LTV is 92% compared to 95% at last
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 10.8% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 1.10X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Mansion at Coyote Ridge loan ($44.6
million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 528-unit
luxury garden-style multi-family complex located in Carrollton,
Texas. As of December 2012, the property was 92% leased compared
to 94% at last review. Financial performance improved since last
review despite the 2% decline in leasing. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 89% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 98% and 0.93X at
last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Mansions at Ridgeview Ranch
loan ($43.4 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
548-unit luxury garden-style multi-family complex located in
Plano, Texas. As of December 2012, the property was 93% leased
compared to 92% at last review. Financial performance improved
since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and
0.96X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.81X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Exchange at Gainesville
Apartments loan ($33.9 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 396-unit luxury garden-style multi-family complex
located in Plano, Texas. As of December 2012, the property was 99%
leased compared to 95% at last review. Financial performance
improved since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88%
and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 102% and 0.9X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C6: Moody's Lowers Ratings on Two CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes and
downgraded two classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades of the two principal bonds are due to higher than
expected realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans. The affirmations of the principal and interest
bonds are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable
ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class A-X, is consistent with the
credit profile of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.0% of the
current balance compared to 6.7% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.3% of the original
pooled balance, up from 6.8% at last review. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions", published on
April 19, 2005. The methodology used in rating the interest only
Class A-X was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 81 compared to 63 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 24, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the April 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $1.7 billion
from $2.50 billion at securitization. The previously largest loan
in the pool, Fashion Place Mall in Murray, Utah Loan ($136.6
million), paid off in November 2012. The Certificates are
collateralized by 202 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 24%
of the pool. Six loans, representing 3% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by U.S. Government securities. The pool contains
one loan with an investment grade credit assessment, representing
4% of the pool.

Sixty-one loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $46.8 million (18.5% loss severity).
Currently nine loans, representing 9% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Thistle
Landing- Phoenix Loan ($34.6 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which
is secured by three single story office buildings located 15 miles
southeast of Phoenix, Arizona. Performance suffered as occupancy
decreased from 85% at year-end 2010 to 62% in year-end 2011.
Occupancy has since improved to 91% as of year-end 2012. The loan
transferred to special servicing in November 2012 due to imminent
default. The special servicer is working on a strategy for this
loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Highland
Industrial Loan ($33.9 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is
secured by 18 single-story office/industrial buildings built
between 1993 and 2001 and located in the Ann Arbor Commerce Park
of Ann Arbor, Michigan. The buildings contain approximately 60%
office space and 40% warehouse/flex space. Performance suffered as
occupancy decreased from 86% in 2008 to 70% in 2009 and was at 66%
as of December 2012. The loan transferred to special servicing in
March 2012 due to imminent default. The special servicer indicated
that the borrower is cooperating with a proposed receivership that
will grant the receiver the right to lease, market and sell the
property.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the McKinley
Crossroads Loan ($26.1 million -- 1.5% of the pool), which is
secured by a 201,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in
Corona, California. The borrower is a TIC structure. Performance
at the property began to deteriorate in 2008 as occupancy and
rents decreased. The property eventually transferred to special
servicing in March 2012 and a receiver was appointed in May 2012.
The property was 65% leased as of March 2013. The special servicer
is proceeding with foreclosure and marketing the property for
sale.

The remaining six specially serviced properties are secured by a
mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $65.9
million loss for the specially serviced loans (45% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 28 poorly
performing loans representing 14% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $46.5 million loss (19% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 99%
of the pool and full year or partial year 2012 operating results
for 99% of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 93% compared to 99%
at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.09X, respectively,
compared to 1.25X and 1.01X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with the credit assessment is the One Madison Avenue Loan
($68.1 million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 13-
story office tower located on Park Avenue along Madison Square
Park. Credit Suisse (USA) Inc. is the anchor tenant, leasing
approximately 97% of the net rentable area (NRA) through December
31, 2020. Performance remains stable and the loan is benefitting
from amortization. The loan fully amortizes during its term.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 7.15X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 5.66X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 9.8% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the HGA Alliance - Portfolio Loan ($78.9
million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by four multifamily
properties. The properties are located in Las Vegas, Nevada (1)
and Florida (two in Melbourne and one in Palm Bay) and total 1,030
units. The three Florida properties are performing well with
occupancy ranging between 94% and 98%. However, revenue decreases
combined with expense increases at the Las Vegas property has hurt
the portfolio performance and the loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The Las Vegas property is the largest property
containing 480 units. The loan is interest only for its entire
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 182% and 0.5X,
respectively, compared to 170% and 0.54X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Crestview Hills Town Center Loan
($52.2 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 283,000
SF lifestyle shopping center located in Crestview Hills, Kentucky.
The property was 96% leased as of November 2012 compared to 95% as
of December 2011. Anchor tenant Dillard's (203,000 SF) is not part
of the collateral. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and
1.14X, respectively, compared to 82% and 1.12X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Ashbrook Commons Loan ($34.8 million
-- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 198,000 SF grocery
anchored retail center located in Ashburn, Virginia. The property
was 99% leased as of the September 2012. The property contains a
mix of tenants including services, retail, restaurants and
recreation.


CREST G-STAR 2001-1: Moody's Takes Action on Four Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's upgraded the ratings of two and affirmed the ratings of
two classes of Notes issued by Crest G-Star 2001-1, LP. The
upgrades are due to greater than expected recoveries on defaulted
assets and a lower average credit risk of the remaining asset
pool. The affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$60,000,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due
2035, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

$15,000,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Floating Rate Term Notes,
Due 2035, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$20,000,000 Class C Third Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due
2034, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

$15,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due
2035, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Crest G-Star 2001-1, LP is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (99.5%
of the pool balance) and one whole loan (0.5%). As of the February
28, 2013 Note Valuation report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $99.46
million from $500.4 million at issuance, with the paydown
currently directed to the Class B-1 and Class B-2 Notes, as a
result of amortization of the underlying collateral and failure of
certain par value tests.

There are 13 assets with a par balance of $65.9 million (87.8% of
the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted securities
as of the March 28, 2013 Trustee report. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,230
compared to 5,034 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (11.7% compared to 17.5% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (10.7% compared to 7.7% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (16.9% compared to 7.1% at last review), B1-B3 (14.1% compared
to 11.3% at last review), and Caa1-C (46.6% compared to 56.3% at
last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.5 years compared to 2.2 years at last
review. The greater WAL incorporates Moody's view on the current
pool composition and extension risk.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 13.1% compared to
13.8% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 17.3% compared to 16.0% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes within the collateral pool. Holding
all other key parameters static, changing the current ratings and
credit assessments of the collateral by one notch downward or by
one notch upward would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 1 notch downward and 1 to 2
notches upward respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2013-1: S&P Rates $32.99MM Class D Notes 'BBsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Exeter
Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-1's $400 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2013-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 47.1%, 40.8%, 32.1%, and
      24.6% credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 2.55x, 2.10x, 1.60x, and 1.30x S&P's 17.0%-18.0%
      expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity dates under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that S&P believes is
      appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      and B notes would remain within one rating category of its
      'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively, during the
      first year; and S&P's ratings on the class C and D notes
      would remain within two rating categories of S&P's 'BBB
      (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively.  These potential
      rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit stability
      criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration as a one-category downgrade within the first
      year for 'AA' rated securities and a two-category downgrade
      within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities
      under the moderate stress conditions.

   -- The servicer's experienced management team, which has an
      average of more than 16 years' experience in the auto
      finance industry.

   -- S&P's analysis of five years of static pool data on Exeter
      Finance Corp.'s (Exeter's) lending programs.

   -- The fact that Exeter is not yet profitable, has a
      relatively short, five-year performance history compared to
      its peers, and has been growing its portfolio very rapidly.

   -- The transaction's payment/credit enhancement and legal
      structures.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1498.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-1

Class     Rating        Type            Interest        Amount
                                        rate           (mil. $)
A         AA (sf)       Senior          Fixed           272.16
B         A (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed            44.33
C         BBB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed            50.52
D         BB (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed            32.99


FIRST FRANKLIN 2005-FF6: Moody's Lifts Rating on $101MM of RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three tranches
from First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-FF6, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-FF6

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are a result of a recent performance review of the
transaction and reflects Moody's updated expected losses on those
pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" published in November 2009, and "2005 --
2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology published in July 2011.

Moody's also adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on
loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels into 2014.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


FBR SECURITIZATION: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 RMBS Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of 12 tranches
issued by four FBR Securitization Trust deals on further review,
direction uncertain. The collateral backing these deals primarily
consist of first-lien, subprime residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-2

Cl. AV1, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. AV2-3A, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Sep 14, 2012 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. AV2-3B2, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Sep 14, 2012 Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Sep 14, 2012 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-3

Cl. AV1, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. AV2-4, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-4

Cl. AV1, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Sep 14, 2012 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AV2-4, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-5

Cl. AV1, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Sep 14, 2012 Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Cl. AV2-3, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. AV2-4, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Sep 14, 2012 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects discovery of errors in the Structured
Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by Moody's in
rating these transactions.

In prior rating actions for FBR Securitization Trust 2005-2, 2005-
3, 2005-4, and 2005-5, the principal payments to the senior bonds
did not change from sequential to pro-rata after credit support
depletion as noted in the deal documents. In addition, the cash
flow model used in prior rating actions for FBR Securitization
Trust 2005-3 allocated losses to the subordinate bonds even though
the governing deal documents do not contain a provision allocating
losses to these bonds.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's also adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on
loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels into 2014.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


GALAXY XIV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Galaxy
XIV CLO Ltd./Galaxy XIV CLO LLC's $462.0 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of March 15,
2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, it perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with its criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  S&P's analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
S&P's supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Galaxy XIV CLO Ltd./Galaxy XIV CLO LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     318.75
B                          AA (sf)                       53.25
C-1 (deferrable)           A (sf)                        19.50
C-2 (deferrable)           A (sf)                        21.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      27.50
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       22.00


GE BUSINESS: Fitch Cuts Rating on Series 2006-2 Class D Certs 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on seven
GE Business Loan Trusts:

Series 2003-1

-- Class A downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook remains
    Negative;

-- Class B downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook remains
    Negative.

Series 2003-2

-- Class A downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook remains
    Negative;

-- Class B downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook remains
    Negative;

-- Class C downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook remains
    Negative.

Series 2004-2

-- Class A downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;

-- Class C downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;

-- Class D downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to
    Negative from Stable.

Series 2005-1

-- Class A-3 downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook revised to
    Negative from Stable;

-- Class C downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to
    Negative from Stable;

-- Class D downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to
    Negative from Stable.

Series 2005-2

-- Class A downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;

-- Class C downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;

-- Class D downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable.

Series 2006-1

-- Class A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative from
    Stable;

-- Class B affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative from
    Stable;

-- Class C affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to Negative from
    Stable;

-- Class D affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Negative from
    Stable.

Series 2006-2

-- Class A downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook remains
    Negative;

-- Class B downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook remains
    Negative;

-- Class C downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook remains
    Negative;

-- Class D downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook remains
    Negative.

Key Rating Drivers

The rating downgrades for 2003-1, 2003-2, 2004-2, 2005-1, 2005-2,
and 2006-2 are primarily driven by decreasing loss coverage
available to the notes and growing obligor concentrations. Since
Fitch's last review, the transactions have seen increases in
losses due to charge-offs of late-stage delinquencies in recent
months. Prior to the charge-offs, late-stage delinquencies
remained part of the collateral pool and were accounted for via
the trapping of additional funds in the reserve accounts.

Following a review of the transaction documents by the servicer,
it was found that the charge-off methodology on these late-stage
delinquencies was not as prescribed. As a result of these charge-
offs, several of the trusts have experienced significant draws on
the available reserve account.

Furthermore, given the number of loans charged off within the
pools, prepayment performance, and amortization, the remaining
obligor concentrations have increased resulting in limited obligor
coverage via credit enhancement and loss coverage levels. The
2003-1 and 2003-2 have experienced notable increases in obligor
concentrations that are expected to increase as the transactions
continue to amortize. The 2004-2, 2005-1, 2005-2, and 2006-2 have
also experienced increasing obligor concentrations but as severe
given the much larger number of loans within these pools.

The rating affirmations in 2006-1 reflect stable performance
within the transaction. Though there has been some negative impact
on obligor coverage for the pool following the aforementioned
charge-offs, loss coverage levels have remained relatively stable
since last review and credit enhancement is nominally short of
target levels, as of the most recent reporting period. However,
given the increasing obligor concentrations within the pool, Fitch
believes obligor coverage could decline as the transaction
amortizes. As such, Fitch has revised its Outlook on the notes to
Negative.

The Negative Outlook designation on the remaining trusts reflects
Fitch's concern with growing obligor concentrations as the
transactions continue to amortize. As the number of obligors
decline, the risk exposure increases for a single obligor default
within the pools further limiting the outstanding credit support's
ability to sustain the default of a large obligor. Given current
amortization and current concentrations, Fitch believes the trusts
have an increased risk exposure in the near term to additional
obligor defaults. As such, Fitch will continue to diligently
monitor these transactions and may take potential rating action.

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria', issued June 6, 2012, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis focused on concentration risks within the pool,
by evaluating the impact of the default of the largest performing
obligors. The obligor concentration analysis is consistent with
Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating US Equipment Lease and Loan ABS',
dated Dec 28, 2012. The analysis compares expected loss coverage
relative to the default of a certain number of the largest
obligors. The required net obligor coverage varies by rating
category. The required number of obligors covered ranges from 20
at 'AAA' to five at 'B'. Fitch applied loss and recovery
expectations based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance to the largest performing obligors commensurate with
the individual rating category. The expected loss assumption was
then compared to the modeled loss coverage available to the
outstanding notes given Fitch's expected losses on the currently
delinquent loans. This approach was Fitch's primary analysis.

Additionally, Fitch's analysis incorporated a review of collateral
characteristics, in particular, focusing on delinquent and
defaulted loans within the pool. All loans over 60 days delinquent
were deemed defaulted loans. The defaulted loans were applied loss
and recovery expectations based on collateral type and historical
recovery performance to establish an expected net loss assumption
for the transaction. Fitch stressed the cashflow generated by the
underlying assets by applying its expected net loss assumption.
Furthermore, Fitch applied a loss multiplier to evaluate break-
even cash flow runs to determine the level of expected cumulative
losses the structure can withstand at a given rating level. The
loss multiplier scale utilized is consistent with that of other
commercial ABS transactions.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions and may
take additional rating action in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.

Rating Sensitivity

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected losses and impact available loss coverage and obligor
coverage. Lower loss coverage could impact ratings and rating
outlooks, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.
Should performance materially deteriorate, the decline in loss
coverage could negatively impact current ratings. Additionally,
Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis regarding the application of
expected recoveries to the trusts from previously charged off
loans, and found ratings to be insensitive, for the most part.


GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class M Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation (GECMC) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2005-C2.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 5.6% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.1%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $40.3 million (2.2% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 16 loans (16%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes five specially serviced assets (7.3%).

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 47.1% to $986 million from
$1.86 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, seven loans
(7% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest shortfalls
are currently affecting classes J through M, and unrated classes P
and Q.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings of the investment grade classes are expected to remain
stable. Classes F and G may be subject to negative rating actions
should realized losses be greater than Fitch's expectations. The
distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are expected to be
subject to further downgrades as losses are realized.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Chatsworth Business Park loan (3.1% of the pool), which
is secured by a 231,770 square foot (sf) office property in
Chatsworth, CA. The property is 100% leased by two tenants -
County of LA (71% NRA) through March 2016 and Sanyo North America
Corp. (29% NRA) through February 2017. The loan, which matured in
April 2010, had transferred to special servicing in March 2010 for
imminent maturity default, followed shortly thereafter by the
maturity of the loan in April 2010. The lender foreclosed on the
property and the asset has been real estate owned (REO) since
August 2012. The special servicer has hired a third party property
manager and leasing agent, as well as a sales broker to assist in
the marketing of the property.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a
portfolio of two New Jersey properties (1.4%) totaling 125,560 sf.
The collateral includes a 74,400 sf industrial property in
Lakewood, NJ and a 51,160sf office property in Montvale, NJ. The
portfolio had experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy
declines at both properties in 2011. The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2012 for payment default. The
special servicer reported the properties are under receivership as
of March 2013.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a
64,849 sf suburban office property in Newport Beach, CA. The
property is 100% leased to single tenant that the servicer has
reported is under financial distress and has defaulted on its
lease payments since December 2012. The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2013 for payment default, and is 60
days delinquent as of the April 2013 payment date. The servicer is
dual tracking workout negotiations as well as pursing foreclosure.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Rating Outlook
on class B as indicated:

-- $3.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $445.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $173.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $149.1 million class A-J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Positive;
-- $30.3 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.3 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.6 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.3 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.3 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 90%;
-- $21 million class J at 'CCsf; RE 0%.
-- $9.3 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $7 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.3 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class N, O, P and Q certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-C and X-P
certificates.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Takes Action on 8 CMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes and
downgraded three classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., Series 2004-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
credit profile of its referenced classes and was affirmed.

The downgrades are due to higher than expected realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.6% of the
current balance compared to 10.5% at last review. The base
expected loss at last review reflected the anticipated losses from
the Parmatown Mall Loan which has since been liquidated.
Accordingly, the base expected loss plus realized losses to date
now totals 11.8% of the original balance compared to 11.3% at last
review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class X-1 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, the same as at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the excel-
based Large Loan Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 27, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the April 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to $612.1
million from $933.7 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 57 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans, excluding
defeasance, representing 42% of the pool. Eleven loans,
representing 37% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. government securities. There are two loans, representing 18%
of the pool, with investment grade credit assessments.

There are 17 loans, representing 19% of the pool, on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization
resulting in an aggregate realized loss totaling $88.4 million
(average loss severity of 61%). There are currently three loans,
representing 4% of the pool, in special servicing. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $1.3 million loss (5% overall expected
loss) for the three specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 2% of the pool and has estimated a
$5.4 million aggregate loss (37.5% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 94% and 88% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 90%, the same as at last
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11.4% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.3X and 1.2X, respectively, the
same as at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Jersey Gardens
Loan ($71.7 million -- 11.7% of the pool), which represents a 52%
participation interest in a $139 million first mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.3 million square
foot (SF) outlet mall located in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The
largest tenants are Loews Theatres, Burlington Coat Factory and
Forever 21. The property was 98% leased as of September 2012
versus 96% as of March 2012 and 100% as of December 2011. Property
performance has been stable over the past three years. The loan
sponsor is Glimcher Realty Trust. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR for the senior loan are Aa3 and
2.24X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the 731
Lexington Avenue Loan ($37.7 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which
represents a 16% participation interest in the senior portion of a
first mortgage loan totaling $237.0 million. The loan is secured
by a 694,000 SF office condominium situated within a 1.4 million
SF complex located in midtown Manhattan. The property is also
encumbered by an $86 million B-note that is held outside of the
trust. The property is 100% leased to Bloomberg, LP through 2028.
Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and
2.39X, respectively, compared to A3 and 2.18X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Military Circle Mall Loan
($53.6 million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 740,788
SF enclosed regional shopping mall located in Norfolk, Virginia.
Anchor tenants include JC Penney, Macy's and Cinemark Theater.
Sears closed its store at this location in May 2012. The mall was
76% leased as of year-end 2012 compared to 92% as of December
2011. Financial performance for full year 2012 declined since last
review in concert with lower occupancy. Moody's stressed the
property cash flow to reflect the loss of Sears as an anchor
tenant and to capture the potential negative impact on the mall's
ongoing leasing and financial performance. The loan is also on the
master servicer's watchlist due to the loss of Sears. The loan has
amortized 12% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 130% and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 119% and 0.86X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Escondido Village Shopping Center
Loan ($16.6 million -- 2.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
191,629 SF retail center located north of San Diego in Escondido,
California. Financial performance has declined slightly since last
review. The center was 88% leased as of September 2012, the same
as at last review. The loan has amortized 13% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.1X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.25X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Shoppes at St. Lucie West Loan
($14.3 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 200,457
SF retail center located in Port St. Lucie, Florida. Financial
performance has steadily declined in recent years. The Sears
Essentials store closed as of May 2012. The property was only 34%
leased as of September 2012 compared to 92% as of March 2012. This
loan has amortized 15% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 159% and 0.58X, respectively, compared to 140%
and 0.58X at last review. Moody's considers this a troubled loan.


GOLDENTREE LOAN VII: Moody's Assigns Ratings to 7 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following ratings to notes
issued by GoldenTree Loan Opportunities VII, Limited (the "Issuer"
or "GoldenTree VII"):

$400,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$78,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$7,000,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$30,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$45,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$32,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

$15,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

GoldenTree VII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
be invested in senior secured loans, senior secured notes and
eligible investments and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
DIP collateral obligations, second lien loans, senior unsecured
loans and bonds. The underlying collateral pool will be
approximately 50% ramped as of the closing date.

GoldenTree Asset Management LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk and credit improved
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes sequentially.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $650,000,000

Diversity of 48

WARF of 2820

Weighted Average Spread of 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon of 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 43.0%

Weighted Average Life of 8.5 years

The notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF Impact in Rating Notches

WARF + 15% (2820 to 3243) Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C-1 Notes: -2

Class C-2 Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: 0

WARF + 30% (2820 to 3666) Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C-1 Notes: -4

Class C-2 Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -2

Class F Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector" dated July 6, 2009.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

Further details regarding Moody's analysis of this transaction may
be found in the related pre-sale report at Moodys.com.

The principal methodology used in rating the Notes was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in
June 2011.


HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE 2006-8: Moody's Reviews Cl. 2A-1A Debt Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the rating of Class 1A-1A from
Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-8 on review. The transaction
is backed by Option Arm residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-8

Cl. 2A-1A, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Dec 5, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The review action is due to discovery of an error in the
Structured Finance (SFW) cash flow model used by Moody's in rating
this transaction. The SFW model used in previous rating actions
incorrectly assumed that when group 2 is over- collateralized
after the credit support depletion date, realized losses from
group 2 collateral are not allocated to group 2 senior tranches.
However, the pooling and servicing agreement for this transaction
dictates that realized losses from group 2 collateral after the
credit support depletion date should be allocated to group 2
senior tranches at the time of the loss regardless of whether
group 2 is over collateralized or under collateralized.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications.

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in March 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


HEDGED MUTUAL 2005-3: S&P Withdraws BB Rating on Cl. 2005-3 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on Hedged
Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2005-3, a transaction collateralized by
mutual fund 12b-1 fees and contingent deferred sales charges.

The rating withdrawal follows the complete principal paydown of
the notes on May 8, 2013.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING WITHDRAWN

Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2005-3

                  Rating    Rating
Class             To        From
2005-3            NR (sf)   BB (sf)


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Keeps Ba1, Ba3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO VI, Ltd.:

$27,500,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on August 25,
2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$15,500,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$255,500,000 Class A-T First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Term Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of $231,262,519),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

$50,000,000 Class A-R First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Revolving Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of
$45,256,853), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 25, 2011
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$15,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on
August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$16,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of
$13,414,792), Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on August 25, 2011
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in June 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread levels compared to the
levels assumed at the last rating action in August 2011. Moody's
modeled a weighted average spread (WAS) level of 3.3% compared to
2.8% at the time of the last rating action. Moody's also notes
that the transaction's reported collateral quality and
overcollateralization ratios are stable since the last rating
action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $348 million,
defaulted par of $14.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.6% (implying a WARF of 2426), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 49.3%, and a diversity score of 67.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Hewett's Island CLO VI, Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1941)

Class AR: 0

Class AT: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2911)

Class AR: 0

Class AT: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence in the amortization period and at what
pace. Deleveraging may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in
the loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may
have significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


JFIN CLO 2007: Moody's Lifts Rating on $26.5MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by JFIN CLO 2007 Ltd.:

$23,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on October 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$33,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021, Upgraded
to A1 (sf); previously on October 19, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

$26,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021, Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf); previously on October 19, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$180,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding
balance of $161,077,620), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July
26, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

$60,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 3, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

$46,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding
balance of $42,373,210), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 26,
2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the improvement in the credit quality of
the portfolio and the short period of time remaining before the
end of the deal's reinvestment period in July 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher diversity levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
October 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF and Diversity of 2887 and 69,
respectively, compared to 3271 and 60, respectively, at the time
of the last rating action. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $386 million,
defaulted par of $0.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.54% (implying a WARF of 2887), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.29%, and a diversity
score of 69. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

JFIN CLO 2007 Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2310)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +3

Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3464)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a number
of securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not provided the
necessary information to update the credit estimates in a timely
fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any default
probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.


JP MORGAN 2002-C2: Moody's Reviews Ratings for Downgrade
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed five classes of J.P. Morgan
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-C2 under review for possible
downgrade as follows:

Cl. D, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 25, 2009 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. E, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 26, 2007 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. F, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The principal classes were placed under review for possible
downgrade due to interest shortfalls as well as concerns about
potential losses to the pool from specially serviced loans. Class
X-1, the interest-only tranche, was placed under review for
possible downgrade due to a potential decline in the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of its referenced tranches.

Four loans, representing 67% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. Moody's is in discussions with the special servicer
relative to potential workout strategies for the specially
serviced loans. In addition, Moody's is concerned about the high
level of interest shortfalls affecting the deal. Based on the most
recent remittance statement, Classes E through SP-3 have
experienced $2.29 million in cumulative interest shortfalls.
Moody's is concerned that the pool may continue to experience
interest shortfalls because of the exposure to specially serviced
loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential workout strategies for the
specially serviced loans as well as the performance of the
remaining pool.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Class X-1 was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 13, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the April 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate pooled balance has decreased by 91% to $95.6
million from $1.03 billion at securitization. The trust also
includes two rake bonds, Classes SP-1 and SP-2, with an
outstanding balance of $4.7 million which are secured by a B-note
on the Century III Mall Loan. The Certificates are collateralized
by ten mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1% to 38% of
the pool.

Two loans, representing approximately 17% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a realized loss of $43.6 million (47%
loss severity on average). There are currently four loans,
representing approximately 67% of the pool, in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Century III Mall Loan
($36.4 million -- 38% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
559,000 square foot (SF) mall located in West Mifflin,
Pennsylvania. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
January 2011 due to imminent default and is now real estate owned
(REO). In January 2013 the Master Servicer deemed the loan non-
recoverable and began to claw back previously made advances.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the West Valley
Business Park ($14.6 million - 15% of the pool), which is secured
by a 205,000 SF industrial property located in Kent, Washington.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in December 2012 for
maturity default. The property was 76% leased as of March 2013.


JP MORGAN 2002-C2: S&P Cuts Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
pooled classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other
pooled classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P lowered its ratings on the class F, G, and H certificates to
'D (sf)' because of ongoing outstanding interest shortfalls and
expected losses to these classes upon the eventual liquidation of
the Simon Portfolio II real estate owned (REO) asset.  Simon
Portfolio II is the largest asset with the special servicer, C-III
Asset Management LLC (C-III).

The Simon Portfolio II asset, the largest in the pool, comprises
558,616 sq. ft. of a 1.2 million-sq.-ft. enclosed regional mall in
West Mifflin, Pa.  The loan was transferred to C-III on Jan. 13,
2011, due to imminent default and the property became REO on
Sept. 1, 2011.  The asset has a current reported trust balance of
$41.2 million (41.1% of the total trust balance), which consists
of a $34.9 million senior pooled component and a $6.3 million
subordinate nonpooled component that provides 100% of the class
SP-1, SP-2, and SP-3 raked certificates' cash flow.  S&P
previously lowered its ratings on the 'SP' raked certificates to
'D (sf)' due to accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P believes
will remain outstanding for an extended time period.

The Simon Portfolio II asset has a reported total pooled trust
exposure of $43.1 million, including $6.9 million of servicer
advances on the pooled trust balance.  The master servicer, Wells
Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), deemed this asset nonrecoverable.
C-III informed S&P that the asset is currently under sale contract
and expects to close by the end of May 2013.  Using the
information that C-III provided to S&P, it anticipates a
significant loss to the trust upon this asset's eventual
resolution.  If the asset does not liquidate as expected, S&P may
re-evaluate the ongoing liquidity in the trust and take further
rating action, as warranted.

S&P lowered its rating on class E to 'BBB- (sf)' due to reduced
liquidity support available to this class and its susceptibility
to interest shortfalls from the specially serviced assets.

As of the April 12, 2013, trustee remittance report, the pool
trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $262,330,
primarily related to $179,882 in interest not advanced,
reimbursement of the master servicer's $60,225 prior advances,
both of which are related to the Simon Portfolio II asset, and
special servicing fees of $14,891.  The interest shortfalls
affected all classes subordinate to and including class E.  The
class F, G, and H certificates have accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for four consecutive months and class E has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for one month.  If
class E continues to experience interest shortfalls for an
extended time period, S&P may further lower the rating on this
class.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class D principal and
interest certificates reflects its expectation that the available
credit enhancement for this class will be within its estimated
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
rating.  The affirmation also reflects the remaining assets'
credit characteristics and performance, as well as the
transaction-level changes.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-1 interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.04x
and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 73.1% for six
of the 10 remaining assets in the pool.  The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude four assets ($64.3 million, 67.3%) that are
with the special servicer.

As of the April 12, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate pooled trust balance of
$95.6 million, down from $1.031 billion at issuance.  The pool
includes nine loans and one REO asset, down from 108 loans at
issuance.  According to the special servicer, the Supor Industrial
Park loan ($9.1 million, 9.6%), the third-largest asset with
C-III, fully paid off on May 1, 2013, following the April 2013
trustee remittance report.  The loan was secured by a 406,200-sq.-
ft. industrial building in Harrison, N.J. and transferred to C-III
on Nov. 14, 2012, due to maturity default after maturing on
Nov. 1, 2012.  To date, the transaction has experienced losses
totaling $43.1 million, or 4.2% of the transaction's original
pooled certificate balance.  Three ($55.2 million, 57.7% of the
pooled trust balance) of the remaining nine assets are with the
special servicer.  In addition, two loans ($16.4 million, 17.2% of
the pooled trust balance) in the pool are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  Details on the largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist are as follows:

The Avon Commons loan ($13.7 million, 14.3% of the pooled trust
balance) is secured by a 172,605-sq.-ft. retail property in Avon,
Ind.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low
reported DSC of 0.59x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012.
S&P attributes the low reported DSC mainly to the property's loss
of two major tenants in 2012, Jo-Ann Stores Inc. (42,203 sq. ft.,
24.5%) and Barnes & Noble Inc. (23,000 sq. ft., 13.3%).  Wells
Fargo indicated that a new tenant, HomeGoods Inc., executed a 10-
year lease for the former Barnes & Noble space and took occupancy
in October 2012.  Wells Fargo stated that occupancy at the
property improved to 83.2% from 75.6% year-over-year March 31,
2013, and the borrower continues its leasing efforts at the
property.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

As of the April 12, 2013, trustee remittance report, one REO asset
and three loans ($64.3 million, 67.3%) are with the special
servicer.  S&P discussed the Simon Portfolio II asset and the
Supor Industrial Park loan above.  Details on the remaining two
specially serviced assets are as follows:

The West Valley Business Park loan ($14.6 million, 15.3%), the
second-largest asset with C-III, is secured by a 205,655-sq.-ft.
industrial flex building in Kent, Wash.  The reported total
exposure was $14.8 million.  The loan was transferred to C-III on
Dec. 6, 2012, due to maturity default and matured on Oct. 12,
2012.  The reported occupancy and DSC were 71.4% and 0.76x,
respectively, for the six months ended June 30, 2012.  C-III
stated that it is currently evaluating various workout strategies
on this loan, and S&P expects a minimal loss upon its eventual
resolution.

The Hartford Center loan ($4.1 million, 4.3%), the smallest asset
with C-III, is secured by a 66,657-sq.-ft. office building in
Bensenville, Ill.  The loan was transferred to C-III on Feb. 1,
2013, due to maturity default and matured on Oct. 12, 2012.  The
reported occupancy and DSC were 82.7% and 0.95x, respectively, for
the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012.  According to the Oct. 12,
2012, rent roll, the property has high rollover risk in 2013, with
approximately 22% of net rentable area expiring.  C-III indicated
that it is currently evaluating various workout strategies on this
loan, and S&P expects a minimal loss upon its eventual resolution.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2

                 Rating
Class      To             From     Credit enhancement (%)
E          BBB- (sf)      A+ (sf)                   56.08
F          D (sf)         BB- (sf)                  35.86
G          D (sf)         CCC+ (sf)                 22.37
H          D (sf)         CCC- (sf)                  6.19

RATINGS AFFIRMED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
D          AA (sf)                      70.92
X-1        AAA (sf)                       N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Keeps 'C' Ratings on 5 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes and
downgraded three classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
LDP4 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3A2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade principal classes are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. The below-investment grade classes are consistent
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed

The downgrades are due to realized and anticipated losses from
loans in special servicing and troubled loans.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.1% of
the current balance compared to 11.9% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 9.6% of the original
securitized balance, up from 9.5% at last review. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Class X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 42 compared to 46 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 3, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the April 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 40% to $1.59
billion from $2.68 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 149 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 37% of the pool. Five loans, representing 7% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains one loan with an investment grade credit
assessment, representing 5% of the pool.

Thirty-five loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $64.7 million (38% loss severity on average).
Currently five loans, representing 12% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Silver City
Galleria Loan ($119.2 million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is
secured by a 971,000 square foot (SF) regional mall located in
Taunton, Massachusetts. The collateral is 714,000 SF. The loan
became real estate owned (REO) in December 2011. Prior to
foreclosure, the loans sponsors were General Growth Properties
Inc. (GGP) and Teachers Retirement System of the State of
Illinois. Performance of the mall has declined since
securitization due to a drop in occupancy caused by several tenant
bankruptcies, including Filene's and Steve & Barry's. The mall is
anchored by Macy's, Sears and J.C. Penney. The in-line occupancy
is 71% compared to 77% at the prior review. In-line sales for
tenants less than 10,000 SF have steadily declined since 2008 and
are approximately $200 psf. Additionally, there are several
competing retail properties in the immediate vicinity.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Sterling Pointe
Shopping Center Loan ($37.3 million -- 2.3% of the pool). The loan
is secured by a 129,000 SF retail property located in Lincoln,
California. The loan transferred to special servicing in January
2010 at the request of a loan modification from the sponsor. The
loan became REO in June 2012. The property is currently 84% leased
as of December 2012.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $131.2 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (70% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 15 poorly
performing loans representing 14% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $40.2 million loss (19% expected loss based on a 44%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 98% and 81% of the pool respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 94% compared to 95% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.42X and 1.11X, respectively, compared to
1.44X and 1.10X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Plastipak Portfolio Loan
($75.2 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by 14
industrial/warehouse buildings located in eight states. The
portfolio totals 4.5 million SF and is 100% leased to Plastipak
Holdings Inc. under a lease which extends 10 years beyond the
loan's maturity date. The loan is structured with a 20-year
amortization schedule and has amortized by approximately 4% since
last review and 25% since securitization. Performance remains
stable. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3
and 1.91X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.84X at last review.

The top three non-defeased conduit loans represent 11.7% of the
pool. The largest loan is the One World Trade Center Loan ($86.6
million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 565,000 SF
office building located in Long Beach, California. The loan is on
the watchlist due to low DSCR caused by lower revenues from
occupancy loss. As of December 2012, the property was 70% leased
compared to 69% at last review. Leases representing 22% of the
premises are scheduled to expire in 2013 with a majority of the
space leased to GSA tenants who are paying above market rents. Due
to the continued decline in performance along with a large amount
of upcoming maturities, Moody's views this loan as a troubled
loan.

The second largest loan is Waterway Plaza I & II Loan ($50.5
million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by two office
properties totaling 366,000 SF located in a northern suburb of
Houston in Woodlands, Texas. As of December 2012, the properties
were 98% leased compared to 96% at last review. Performance
continues to remain stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96%
and 1.04X, respectively, compared to 95% and 1.05X at last review.

The third largest loan is Highland Landmark Building ($50.0
million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 276,500 SF
office building located in a western suburb of Chicago in Downers
Grove, Illinois. The largest tenant who occupied 57% of the
property vacated in October 2012. As of December 2012, the
property was 43% leased. Due to the decline in performance and
occupancy, Moody's views this loan as a troubled loan.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP6: Moody's Takes Action on 10 CMBS Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed seven classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2006-LDP6 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 10, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 25, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades of the principal classes are due to higher than
anticipated realized losses from liquidated loans in special
servicing.

The affirmations of the investment grade classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The rating of Class
E is consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus is affirmed.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.4% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
6.3%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.2%
of the original pool balance compared to 9.6% at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class X-1 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes the IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19 compared to 23 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 10, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the April 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $1.47
billion from $2.14 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 123 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
54% of the pool. Three loans, representing 0.7% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities. The pool
contains two loans with investment grade credit assessments,
representing 15% of the pool.

Fourteen loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a realized loss of $152.8 million (46% average loss severity).
There are three specially serviced properties which are secured by
a mix of property types. The loans are either real estate owned
(REO), in the process of foreclosure. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $8.4 million loss for the specially serviced loans (37%
expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 18 poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $26.0 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 53%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes D through P
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $5.7
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs),
extraordinary trust expenses and non-advancing by the master
servicer based on a determination of non-recoverability.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and full or partial year
2012 operating results for 94% and 73% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding defeased, credit estimates, specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 95% compared to
100% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.06%.

Excluding defeased, credit assessments, specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.31X and
1.08X, respectively, compared to 1.30X and 1.01X at last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Smith Haven Mall
Loan ($180.0 million -- 12.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
559,000 square foot (SF) portion of a 1.1M SF regional mall
located in Lake Grove, New York (Long Island). The interest-only
loan is sponsored by a joint-venture between Simon Property and
Champion Investment. Occupancy as of February 2013 was 92%, in
line with previous years and securitization. Performance has been
steadily improving since securitization. The loan is interest only
for the entire term. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR
are Aa1 and 1.95X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and 1.78X at last
review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the 215 Park Avenue
South Loan ($38.0 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured
by the borrower's interest in a 20 story 324,000 SF Class B office
building located in the Union Square neighborhood of New York
City. The property has a diverse tenant base, with no tenant
leasing over 10% of the NRA. As of January 2013, the property was
99% leased, in line with the last review and an increase from 71%
at securitization. Property performance has improved due to
increased base rent amid stable occupancy. The loan is interest
only for the entire term. Moody's credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Aa2 and 2.22X respectively, compared to Aa3 and 2.06X at
last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool. The largest
conduit exposure is the Centro Portfolio Loan ($226.4 million --
13.4% of the pool), which is secured by 12 retail properties
totaling 2.5 million SF located across five states in the Mid-
Atlantic. The loan was modified and the maturity date extended as
part of the January 2009 restructuring of Centro Properties' U.S.
portfolio. In March 2011, The Blackstone Group acquired all of
Centro's U.S. assets. Performance has remained stable since last
review and the portfolio has an occupancy of 98% as of December
2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 89% and 1.04X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Valley Mall Loan ($83.5
million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 659,000 SF
single story dominant mall located 75 miles northwest of Baltimore
in Hagerstown, Maryland. The property has a strong occupancy
history and was 96% leased in December 2012, down from 97% as at
year end 2011 and 2010. Major tenants include JC Penney (17% of
the NRA; lease expiration October 2014) and Bon-Ton (14% of the
NRA; lease expiration January 2014). Macy's and Sears shadow
anchor the property. Performance declined slightly in 2012 from
2011 due to decreases in percentage rents collected and other
income. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.85X,
respectively, compared to 117% and 0.81X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 30 Broad Street Loan ($78.8
million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 48-story,
428,000 SF Class B office building located 200 feet south of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the Financial District of New
York City. The property was originally constructed in 1937 and
renovated in 1997. Occupancy was 87% as of February 2013, compared
to 82% in 2011 and 92% at securitization. The loan is currently on
the Master Servicer's watchlist for low DSCR, due to a decrease in
base rents as a result of occupancy fluctuating between 78% to 86%
during 2012, coupled with an increase in tenant improvement costs
and leasing commissions. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 127%
and 0.77X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.83X at last
review.


JP MORGAN 2013-FL3: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-FL3's
$505.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-FL3.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by four commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $505.0 million, secured by the fee
and leasehold interests in 82 properties across 16 states and
Puerto Rico.

The ratings reflect the credit support provided by the transaction
structure, S&P's view of the underlying collateral's economics,
the trustee-provided liquidity, and S&P's overall qualitative
assessment of the transaction.  Standard & Poor's determined that
the collateral pool has, on a weighted average basis, debt service
coverage of 2.45x and beginning and ending loan-to-value ratios
of 63.3%, based on Standard & Poor's values.

          STANDARD & POOR's 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1480.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-FL3

Class         Rating(i)               Amount ($)
A-1           AAA (sf)                63,000,000
A-2           AAA (sf)               217,300,000
X-A(ii)       AAA (sf)          63,000,000 (iii)
X-CP          BB (sf)          442,000,000 (iii)
X-EXT(ii)     BB (sf)          442,000,000 (iii)
B             AA- (sf)                86,300,000
C             A- (sf)                 60,500,000
D             BBB- (sf)               44,900,000
E             BB (sf)                 33,000,000

   (i) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
       buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of
       1933.
  (ii) Non-offered certificates.
(iii) Notional balance.


JP MORGAN 2013-FL3: Fitch Rates $33-Mil. Class E Certs at 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2013-FL3 Mortgage Trust transaction:

-- $63,000,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $217,300,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,000,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $442,000,000* class X-CP 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $442,000,000* class X-EXT 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $86,300,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,500,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,900,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33,000,000 class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Interest-only class

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
the primary assets of which four loans secured by 82 commercial
properties having an aggregate pooled principal balance of
$505,000,000 as of the cutoff date. The loans were originated by
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association.

Key Rating Drivers

Low Trust-Level Leverage: The weighted average pooled Fitch's
stressed LTV and DSCR are 69.90% and 1.44x, respectively.

Concentrated by Loan and Property Type: The pool is secured by
only four loans, two of which are hotels (64.2%). The remaining
two loans are a portfolio secured by office properties and retail
bank branches and an office property. The largest loan in the pool
is the Eagle Hospitality Portfolio (52.5%).

All Loans Have Additional Debt In Place: 100% of the loans have
additional debt in the form mezzanine debt and/or a B-note (BBD1).
The Fitch LTV and DSCR on the fully leveraged debt stack are
111.4% and 0.93x, respectively. The positions are fully
subordinated and subject to standard intercreditor agreements.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch performed two model-based break-even analyses to determine
the level of cash flow and value deterioration the pool could
withstand prior to $1 of loss being experienced by the 'BBB-sf'
and 'AAAsf' rated classes. Fitch found that the JPMCC 2013-FL3
pool could withstand a 59% decline in value (based on appraised
values at issuance) and an approximately 40.6% decrease to the
most recent actual cash flow prior to experiencing a $1 of loss to
the 'BBB-sf' rated class. Additionally, Fitch found that the pool
could withstand a 71.8% decline in value and an approximately
57.9% decrease in the most recent actual cash flow prior to
experiencing $1 of loss to any 'AAAsf' rated class.


KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Fitch Cuts Class B Certs Rating to 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed eight
classes of Key Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-SL1.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase of Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 11% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 9.8%, including
losses already incurred. The pool has experienced $10 million
(4.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated 31 loans (33.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes one specially serviced asset (0.9%).

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 49.2% to $120.7 million from
$237.5 million at issuance. There are 89 loans of the original 155
remaining in the transaction. The average loan size for the
transaction is $1.4 million. No loans have defeased since
issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes D
through L.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying
cap rates ranging from 9% to 11% to determine loan values and
losses.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the 9th & Broadway
Building loan (3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 41,341
square foot (sf) office property located in Tacoma, WA. The
largest tenants are Camber Health Partners (23%); lease expiry May
31, 2015; Pinnacle Capital Mortgage Corp, (15%), lease expiry Oct.
31, 2014; Ameriprise Financial Services (12%); lease expiry March
31, 2016. The decline in performance was a result of the tenant
DaVita (17% of net rentable area (NRA) vacating at lease end in
December 2010 after filing bankruptcy. Ameriprise Financial (12%
of NRA) took occupancy in April 2011 with rent at $21 a square
foot (sf) versus DaVita ($20/sf). There are no concessions being
offered due to the parking garage which is offered to each tenant
(four spaces per square foot). As of January 2013, the property is
64% occupied with average rent of $9.84 sf. Approximately 24% of
the space rolls in 2014 and 23% in 2015.

The next largest contributor to expected losses (1%) is secured by
a 73,600 sf industrial/warehouse property located in Kent, OH. The
servicer reported the decline in performance was attributed to the
property being 100% vacant in December 2012. The servicer has
requested an updated rent roll from the borrower.

The third largest contributor to expected losses (5%) is secured
by a 72,374 sf mixed use property (retail/self-storage) located in
Kent, WA. The DSCR as of the Dec. 31, 2012 operating statement was
at 0.92 and was inline, when compared with the prior year same
period Dec. 31, 2011. The property is 100% occupied as of the
March 2013 rent roll. The loan has been operating below a 1.0
since 2010 due to market conditions.

Rating Sensitivity

The ratings of the investment grade classes A-2 and A-1A are
expected to remain on Outlook Negative due to the transaction's
geographic concentration in Washington (53%) and Ohio (24%). These
classes may be further downgraded if additional loans transfer to
special servicing and / or performance of the pool continues to
deteriorate. The distressed classes rated 'B' and below may be
subject to further downgrades as losses are realized or additional
loans default.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $57.2 million class A-2 to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
    Negative;

-- $45.3 million class A-1A to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
    Negative;

-- $5.3 million class B to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns Recovery Estimates
(RE) as indicated:

-- $5.6 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 15%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $4.8 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.1 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $348,130 class F at 'Dsf; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Class A-1 is paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class L, R and
LR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


LB-UBS 2005-C5: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Two Cert. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 and downgraded four classes of
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust (LBUBS) commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates series 2005-C5.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades to the four distressed classes are the result of
increased expected losses primarily due to newly transferred
specially serviced loans.

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
in light of continued amortization and overall stable performance
of the non-specially serviced loans.

Fitch modeled losses of 7.1% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.2%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $2.5 million (0.1% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 20 loans (18%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes eight specially serviced assets (10.6%).

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings of the super senior classes are expected to remain
stable. Classes E through G may be subject to negative rating
actions should realized losses be greater than Fitch's
expectations. The distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected to be subject to further downgrades as losses are
realized.

As of the March 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 28.5% to $1.68 billion from
$2.34 billion at issuance. One loan is defeased (0.6%). Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes K through T.
The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the real estate
owned (REO) TAG Portfolio (2.3% of the pool), which at issuance
consisted of two adjoining office buildings in Downers Grove, IL
and an office building in Dulles, VA totaling approximately
405,000 square feet (sf). The assets transferred to special
servicing in April 2010 for imminent default and became REO in
November 2011. The office building in Dulles was sold in Sept.
2012 and proceeds were used to pay down the outstanding loan
balance. The remaining collateral is currently being offered for
sale by auction.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a
449,443sf, four building office complex located in Germantown, MD
(4.2%). The property transferred to special servicing in January
2013 due imminent default. As of YE 2012, the property was 55%
occupied after Boeing vacated approximately 30% of the space at
their lease expiration of December 31, 2012. The special servicer
continues to pursue foreclosure and placing the property under
receivership.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Sandpiper
Apartments loan (1.9%), which is secured by a 488-unit apartment
complex built in 1987 and located just west of the strip in Las
Vegas. Over the past several years, occupancy had fallen into the
low- to mid-70% range. The borrower continues to offer concessions
to attract new tenants and occupancy improved to approximately 85%
as of October 2012 and the net operating income debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was reported above a 1.10x. The loan remains
current as of the March 2013 remittance date.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Rating Outlook
as indicated:

-- $10.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $29.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $809.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $124.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $234.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $187.5 million class A-J at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $20.5 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;

-- $32.2 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;

-- $29.3 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;

-- $23.4 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;

-- $29.3 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

-- $26.4 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;

-- $5.9 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

-- $8.8 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

In addition, Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or
revises Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $23.4 million class H to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 65%;
-- $14.7 million class J to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $20.5 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $8.8 million class L to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class P, Q, S and T certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CL and X-CP
certificates.


LB-UBS 2007-C6: Moody's Takes Action on 19 RMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed 14 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-
C6 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2007 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Rating Action

The downgrades are due primarily to higher expected losses from
troubled and specially-serviced loans, as well as the increased
risk of interest shortfalls resulting from future appraisal
reductions and the modification of specially-serviced loans. Two
of the top ten largest exposures in the pool, the PECO Portfolio
and Islandia Shopping Center Loan, are in special servicing and
continue to be a major source of risk for the pool.

The affirmations of four super-senior principal classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The ratings for the
below investment grade classes are consistent with Moody's
expected loss and thus are affirmed.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.5% of
the current balance. At last full review, Moody's base expected
loss was 8.6%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 14.4% of the original pool balance compared to 11.9% at last
review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Class X was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes the IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18 compared to 20 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 10, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the April 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to $2.51
billion from $2.98 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 160 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten exposures
representing 61% of the pool. The pool does not contain any
defeased loans or loans with investment grade credit assessments.

Twenty-five loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $15.4 million realized loss (68% loss severity on
average). One loan, the Innkeepers Portfolio, was modified,
resulting in a $75 million principal write down and the
reimbursement of $23 million of servicer advances that was
recognized as a principal loss. An additional $5.7 million of
principal write downs and reimbursement of servicer advances and
expenses from ten loans were also recognized as principal losses.

Currently there are 56 loans in special servicing representing 22%
of the pool. The largest specially serviced exposure is the PECO
Portfolio ($321.4 million -- 12.8% of the pool), which consists of
39 cross-collateralized and cross-default loans secured by 39
retail properties totaling 4.3 million square feet (SF) located
across 13 states. The average property size is 109,000 SF with no
individual asset representing more than 6% of the total SF or 7%
of the total portfolio balance. Major tenants include Tops, Bi-Lo,
Food Lion, Publix, Staples and Dollar Tree. The loan transferred
to special servicing in August 2012 due to imminent default. The
loan is currently 90+ Days delinquent. The special servicer filed
an affidavit and a temporary restraining order against the
borrower in December 2012. The order required the borrower to turn
over all funds in its possession, set up automatic sweeps into a
lender controlled lockbox and enter into a third party management
agreement, which is currently in process. The portfolio recently
received a $80.9 million appraisal reduction which was recognized
in April 2013, causing interest shortfalls to hit Class F. The
ASERs, a main driver of interest shortfalls to the trust, will
continue until the proceeds from the future sale or liquidation of
the asset are deployed to pay down these shortfalls. The last
scheduled payment on the loan was made in September 2012 and as of
the most recent remittance statement the loan has accumulated
approximately $18.2 million in cumulative advances and ASERs.

The second largest specially serviced exposure is the Islandia
Shopping Center Loan ($73.6 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a three building anchored retail center totaling
377,000 SF located in Islandia (Long Island), New York. The
property is anchored by two stores with an aggregate of 197,451 SF
of GLA, including Wal-Mart (128,755 SF) and Super Stop & Shop
(68,696 SF). The property recently transferred to special
servicing in April 2013 as vacancies due to the economic downturn,
reduced rental rates and the continued stress of chronically
delinquent payments have caused the property to struggle. In
addition, approximately $3 million capital improvements are needed
over the loan term in order to continue to maintain the property,
including $300,000 in immediate repairs caused by Hurricane Sandy.
The borrower continues to remit scheduled payments and the special
servicer indicated it is in the process of evaluating the
information provided by the borrower to determine the appropriate
strategy.

The remaining 16 specially serviced exposures are secured by a mix
of property types. The loans are either real estate owned (REO),
in the process of foreclosure or delinquent. Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $184 million loss for the specially serviced loans
(33% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for an additional
12 poorly performing loans representing 18% of the pool and has
estimated an aggregate $66 million loss (18% expected loss based
on a 50% probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes F through T
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $22.3
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls due to the exposure to specially
serviced loans and other troubled loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and full or partial year
2012 operating results for 99% and 98% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 112% compared to 111% at last review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.20%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.22X and 0.93X, respectively, compared to
1.27X and 0.91X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing exposures represent 28% of the pool
balance. The largest exposure is the Innkeepers Portfolio ($329.6
million -- 13.1%), which represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a
$659 million first mortgage loan. The portfolio entered special
servicing in April 2010 and emerged from bankruptcy in October
2011 with Cerberus Capital Management and Chatham Lodging as the
new sponsors. The bankruptcy reorganization plan included, among
other things, a principal reduction from the original balance of
$825 million to $675 million. Reserves were also put in place to
renovate the hotels which occurred in late 2010 and 2011. Since
then, performance across the portfolio has improved dramatically,
with RevPAR and occupancy increasing across the portfolio in 2012.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 1.13X, respectively,
compared to 114% and 1.04X at last review.

The second largest exposure is the Potomac Mills Loan ($246.0
million -- 9.8%), which represents a 60% pari-passu interest in a
$410 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.5
million SF retail center located in Woodbridge, Virginia. Anchor
tenants include Costco (10% of the NRA; lease expiration -- May
2032) and JC Penney (7% of the NRA; lease expiration -- December
2021). The property has strong sponsorship from the Simon Property
Group. The property was 92% leased as of March 2013. Performance
has continued to improve since securitization. The loan is
interest only for the full term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
112% and 0.82X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.81X at last
review.

The third largest exposure is the Och-Ziff Retail Portfolio
($122.4 million -- 4.9%), which represents a 46.6% pari-passu
interest in a $262.4 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by eleven anchored retail centers totaling 1.9 million SF
across four states. Wal-Mart is largest anchor tenant across the
portfolio, with roughly 9% of the GLA. The weighted average
portfolio occupancy is 85%, the same as at last review.
Performance has continued to increase year-over-year. The loan is
interest only for the full term and is expected to mature in
August 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.81X,
respectively, compared to 122% and 0.74X at last review.


LEHMAN BROTHERS-UBS: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class G Certs to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed two
classes of Lehman Brothers-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust (LB-UBS)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-C3 due
to an increase in expected losses as well as concerns with
significant concentration.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 34.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.54%. The pool has
experienced $23.6 million (1.7% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date. Fitch has designated seven loans (98.1%
of the current pool balance) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes five specially serviced assets (48.2%).

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 88.9% to $153.2 million from
$1.38 billion at issuance. The pool has become extremely
concentrated with only eight of the original 169 loans remaining
in the transaction, one of which (1.9%) is defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through Q.

Rating Sensitivities

The Negative Outlooks reflects the extreme concentration and
adverse selection of the remaining pool, with five out of the
eight remaining loans currently in special servicing. In addition,
the Negative Outlook reflects performance concerns for the largest
loan in the pool, Vista Ridge Mall (48%).

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Shoppingtown Mall loan (24.5% of the pool), which is
secured by 697,000 square feet (sf) of a 774,000sf mall located in
DeWitt, NY. Major collateral tenants include JC Penney, (22% net
rentable area [NRA]), Regal Cinemas (9.8% NRA), and Dicks Sporting
Goods (7.2% NRA). Non-collateral anchors include Sears and Macy's.
The property has experienced occupancy declines due to a borrower
decision in 2007 to vacate tenants in a corridor of the subject
property for future development. Due to the economic downturn the
planned development was halted. In December 2011, the lender had
obtained title to the property via a deed-in-lieu. The servicer
continues to evaluate disposition strategies, and has hired Jones
Lang Lasalle as the property manager and leasing agent.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Park Central loan (18.3%), which is secured by a
331,866sf office property comprised of seven, one-story buildings
in Phoenix, AZ. The March 2013 rent roll reported occupancy at
71%. The subject loan has been in and out of special servicing
since 2010 for payment default, with its most recent transfer in
July 2011. A receiver was appointed in February 2012 and the
property became lender REO in May 2012.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Vista
Ridge Mall loan (47.6%), the largest loan in the pool, which is
secured by a 1.1 million sf mall located in Lewisville, TX. Anchor
tenants include Dillards, Macy's, Sears, JCPenney, and Cinemark
Theaters. Despite occupancy reporting at 97% for December 2012,
the net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
reported low at 1.12x. The property has experienced NOI declines
since 2009 due to a decrease in base rents and revenues stemming
from unfavorable conversion to percentage rents from base rents
for several tenants. The loan remains current as of the April 2013
remittance date.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks as indicated:

-- $18 million class E to 'Asf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook to Negative
    from Stable;

-- $18 million class F to 'BBBsf' from 'A+sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;

-- $12.1 million class G to 'BBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

-- $28.3 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;

-- $16 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable.

The class A-1, A-2 and B certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class H, J, K, L, M, N, P and Q certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.



LONG BEACH: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Ratings on Two RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review four tranches from two
Long Beach RMBS transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4, Asset Backed
Certificates, Series 2001-4

Cl. II-A1, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 25, 2012 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A3, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 25, 2012 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. II-M1, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Mar 8, 2011 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

Cl. II-M1, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 25, 2012 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect discovery of errors in the Structured
Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by Moody's in
rating these transactions. In prior rating actions for Long Beach
Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4 and Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust
2002-1, the excess cash flow waterfall was calculated incorrectly.
In prior rating actions for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4,
the overcollateralization target was also coded incorrectly.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-B: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 3 RMBS Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of three tranches on
review direction uncertain, from one RMBS transaction issued by
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-B. The collateral
backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable-
rate prime Jumbo residential mortgages. The actions impact
approximately $45 million of RMBS issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-B

Cl. A-1, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 30, 2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 30, 2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 30, 2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the prime
jumbo pools originated from 2005 to 2007 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools. In addition, the rating
actions reflect discovery of an error in the Structured Finance
Workstation (SFW) cash flow model used by Moody's in rating this
transaction. In prior rating actions, the cash flow model
underestimated the amount of interest paid to Classes X-A and X-B.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 - 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 3.5% for 2005, 6.5%
for 2006 and 7.5% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 3.54%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-WMC2: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 RMBS Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two tranches
from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-WMC2, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-WMC2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are a result of a recent performance review of the
transaction and reflects Moody's updated expected losses on those
pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" published in November 2009, and "2005 --
2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2011.

Ratings on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3 (sf). For tranches with
larger outstanding interest shortfalls such as classes M-4 and M-5
issued by Merrill 2005-WMC2, Moody's applies "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in
November 2009.

Moody's also adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on
loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels into 2014.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


ML-CFC 2007-8: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from ML-
CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-8, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on five other classes from the same
transaction, including the rating on the interest-only (IO) class.

S&P's rating actions follows its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades on classes AM, AM-A, AJ, and AJ-A reflect credit
erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the 13 ($492.2 million, 25.3%) assets that are
currently with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC, as well as
reduced liquidity support available to these classes because of
interest shortfalls.  S&P estimated losses on the specially
serviced assets based primarily on revised appraisals dated in
late 2012 or early 2013, arriving at a weighted-average loss
severity of 47.8%.  To date, the trust has incurred losses
totaling $97.6 million, or 4.0% of the original outstanding
trust principal balance.

S&P's rating actions also considered the monthly interest
shortfalls affecting the trust.  S&P lowered its rating on class B
to 'D (sf)' because it expects interest shortfalls to continue and
S&P believes the accumulated interest shortfalls will remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.

As of the April 12, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced net monthly interest shortfalls totaling $839,636.
These shortfalls were primarily related to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts of $1.15 million, special
servicing fees of $105,566 and interest paid on servicer advances
of $53,142.  The interest shortfalls this period were offset by
ASER recoveries of $488,256.  The interest shortfalls affected all
classes subordinate to and including class B, which has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for eight consecutive
months.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflects S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement for the current outstanding ratings.  The
ratings on these classes also reflects S&P's review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets, as well
as the transaction-level changes.

The affirmation of the class X IO certificate reflects S&P's
current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-8
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Rating                        Credit
Class      To          From        enhancement (%)
AM         BB (sf)     BBB- (sf)             20.00
AM-A       BB (sf)     BBB- (sf)             20.00
AJ         CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)              9.21
AJ-A       CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)              9.21
B          D (sf)      CCC (sf)               8.59

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-8
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-2        AAA (sf)                          32.51
A-SB       AAA (sf)                          32.51
A-1A       AA (sf)                           32.51
A-3        AA (sf)                           32.51
X          AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


MMCAPS FUNDING XVII: Moody's Keeps 'Ca' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by MMCaps Funding XVII, Ltd.

$162,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current
outstanding balance of $ 94,644,676.61), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
previously on March 20, 2012 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

$19,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current
outstanding balance of $19,500,000), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
previously on March 20, 2012 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

$33,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current
outstanding balance of $33,000,000), Upgraded to A3 (sf);
previously on March 20, 2012 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$35,475,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current
outstanding balance of $35,475,000), Affirmed to Ca (sf);
previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

$35,475,000 Class C-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current
outstanding balance of $35,475,000), Affirmed to Ca (sf);
previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of the deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the last rating action in March 2012.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 notes have been paid down by
approximately 27.2% or $35.36 million since the last rating
action, due to diversion of excess interest proceeds and
disbursement of principal proceeds from redemptions and sales of
underlying assets. As a result of this deleveraging, the Class A-1
notes' par coverage improved to 213.43% from 174.47% since the
last rating action, as calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest
trustee note valuation report dated March 1, 2013, the Class A/B
Principal Coverage Ratio and the Class C Principal Coverage Ratio
are reported at 136.62% (limit 125.0%) and 93.61% (limit 102.10%),
respectively, versus February 24, 2012 levels of 129.81% and
93.47%, respectively. Going forward, the senior notes will
continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the
proceeds from future redemptions of any assets in the collateral
pool.

Moody's also notes that the deal benefited from a slight
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) improved to 1081 compared to 1166 as of the last rating
action date. The Moody's cumulative assumed defaulted amount has
declined to $42.6 million from $49.7 million as of the last rating
action date.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in its rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par balance of $202 million, defaulted/deferring par
of $42.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 23.55%
(implying a WARF of 1081), Moody's Asset Correlation of 23.03%,
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 9.55%. In
addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

MMCAPS Funding XVII, Ltd., issued in September 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks and insurance companies that are generally not publicly
rated by Moody's. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS
without public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive their credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data received
as of Q4-2012. For insurance TruPS without public ratings, Moody's
relies on the insurance team and the underlying insurance firms'
annual financial reporting to assess their credit quality. Moody's
also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to the
volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's Rating
Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8.9 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 200 points from the
base case of 1081, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 141 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed one additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $15.8 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +1

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as Moody's outlook on the banking
sector remains negative, although there have been some recent
signs of stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues
to decline in 2013 compared to 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009, and some
of the previously deferring banks have resumed interest payment on
their trust preferred securities. Moody's outlook on the insurance
sector is stable.


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-RM1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class N Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed three classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates (MSCI) series 1999-RM1.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade is the result of the high credit enhancement due to
continued loan amortization and payoff, as well as defeasance
(31%).

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
in light of significant pool concentration as only 19 loans
remain.

Fitch modeled losses of 6.7% of the remaining pool. Expected
losses on the original pool balance total 1.9%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $14.4 million (1.7% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated seven loans (24.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
does not include any specially serviced loans.

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97% to $26.1 million from
$859.4 million at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, three
loans (31.3% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting class O.

The only contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a 20,745 square
foot (SF) retail property located in Virginia Beach, VA. The
property had become 100% vacant after the single tenant Regal
Cinemas declared Bankruptcy and rejected the lease in January
2008. The property has since signed a new lease with another movie
operator which opened May 2011. The servicer-reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) is .46x as of year-end 2012.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch expects the ratings on classes K, L, and M to remain stable
as the credit enhancement remains high.

Fitch upgrades the following class as indicated:

-- $1.8 million class K to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns/revises Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $8.6 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 90%.

Fitch also affirms the following classes:

-- $6.4 million class L at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;

-- $8.6 million class M at 'B+sf', Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and J certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class O certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Class J Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed five classes of
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust (MSDW) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-TOP1. A detailed
list of rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade is a result of increased credit enhancement (CE) to
the senior classes due to pay-down. The class's CE is sufficient
to offset Fitch expected losses from specially serviced loans and
performing loans that do not pass Fitch's refinance test. Fitch
modeled losses of 11.6% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 2.8%, including losses already
incurred. The pool has experienced $27.5 million (2.4% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated six loans (31.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes two specially serviced assets (9.2%).

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.7% to $37.8 million from
$1.16 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(3.4% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes K through N.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a loan secured by an
83,013 square foot (sf) office property (16.31%) located in Eden
Prairie, MN. In April 2012, the property became vacant after the
single tenant terminated its lease and vacated the property. As of
August 2012, two new tenants have fully leased the property to
100% occupancy. March 2012 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
reported at 0.96x.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-
serviced asset (7%) secured by a 26,976 sf suburban office
building in Milpitas, CA. This real estate owned (REO) property
was sold by the trust in April of 2013, resulting in a loss. This
loss will be reported in the next distribution report.

Rating Sensitivities

The rating on class F is expected to be stable as the credit
enhancement remains high. Loans with upcoming November 2013
maturities are performing well and are anticipated to pay off in
full; these loans will provide enough proceeds to pay off class F
in its entirety. The ratings on classes G and H could be
downgraded further if loan losses are higher than anticipated.

Fitch upgrades the following class and assigns a Rating Outlook as
indicated:

-- $7.6 million class F to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes but assigns or revises REs as
indicated:

-- $18.8 million class G at 'CCsf', RE 100%;
-- $8.7 million class H at 'Csf', RE 90%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $2.8 million class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class X-2, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C, D and E certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class N certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the class M certificates and
the interest-only class X-1 certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ6: DBRS Cuts Rating on 5 Sec Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has downgraded eight classes of the Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2005-HQ6 as follows:

-- Class F from B (sf) to B (low) (sf)
-- Class G from B (low) (sf) to CCC (sf)
-- Class J from CCC (sf) to C (sf)
-- Class K from C (sf) to D (sf)
-- Class L from C (sf) to D (sf)
-- Class M from C (sf) to D (sf)
-- Class N from C (sf) to D (sf)
-- Class O from C (sf) to D (sf)

The following 15 classes have been confirmed as follows, all with
Stable trends:

-- Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2B at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4B at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-J at A (low) (sf)
-- Class B at BBB (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class H at CCC (sf)
-- Class X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-2 at AAA (sf)

In addition, DBRS has removed the Interest in Arrears designation
from Classes J, K, L, M, N and O.

These rating actions reflect the recent liquidation of the largest
loan in special servicing, Prospectus ID #13, Oviedo Mall, and the
current outlook for the 11 delinquent and/or specially-serviced
loans representing 4.8% of the pool and the 57 loans representing
26.3% of the pool on the servicer's watchlist as of the April 2013
remittance report.

There were 138 of the original 172 loans remaining in the pool as
of the April 2013 remittance report, with collateral reduction of
24.2% since issuance.  The weighted-average pool debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.30 times (x), as compared with 1.40x
at issuance, with a weighted-average debt yield of 9.0%, as
compared with 9.3% at issuance.  There are nine defeased loans in
the pool, representing 3.7% of the transaction balance.  The Top
15 loans are healthy performers overall, with a weighted-average
DSCR of 1.28x and a weighted-average debt yield of 8.6% for the 14
loans not in special servicing, as calculated on the whole loan
balance and the YE2011 NCF figures for each loan.

The liquidation of Prospectus ID #13, Oviedo Mall, was completed
in April 2013 at a loss of $52.44 million to the trust,
representing a loss severity of 108% as of the April 2013
remittance report, with the property's sale price reported by the
special servicer of $7.69 million (approximately $18 per square
foot (psf) on the collateral portion of the mall), with gross
expenses and shortfalls applied to the trust of $10.8 million as
of the April 2013 remittance report.  The bulk of the expenses
were attributed to the cumulative ASER balance outstanding on the
loan, the servicer's advances and interest on those advances.  In
addition, interest that accrued on the loan from the date the
asset was deemed non-recoverable to the date of disposal was due
upon liquidation, which amounted to $1.43 million, according to
the special servicer. The loss eliminated the remaining balance of
Class P, the full balance of Classes O, N, M and L and part of
Class K with the April 2013 remittance.

The loan was secured by a regional mall in Oviedo, Florida,
approximately 15 miles northeast of Orlando.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in 2010 following the
bankruptcy filing of the borrower's parent company, General Growth
Properties, Inc. (GGP).  The asset had been real estate owned
(REO) since November 2010 and was most recently appraised at $11.0
million in August 2012, down from $92.1 million at issuance.  The
asset suffered from in-line occupancy declines attributed to
competition from other malls in the vicinity with superior anchor
tenancy and in-line tenant mixes.  The special servicer reports
that the property type is difficult to liquidate given the limited
pool of prospective buyers and the related challenges in gauging
the true market value of the assets.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-XLF: Fitch Keeps D Rating on Cl. N-ROK Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2006-XLF as
the result of stable loss expectations since Fitch's last review.

Key Rating Drivers

There is one remaining loan in the transaction. The ResortQuest
Kauai, interest only loan is collateralized by a 311 room full
service hotel located on a fee-simple beach front parcel of land
in the city of Kapaa, along the east coast of Kauai, HI. The loan
transferred to the special servicer January 2009 due to imminent
default. The property was sold in October 2010 and the note
assumed for $38 million, which resulted in a $5.2 million realized
loss to the N-RQK non pooled rake bond. The loan was modified with
a 2015 maturity date and the establishment of cap ex and debt
service reserves, and the property was re-flagged as a Courtyard
Marriott. The property's performance has declined significantly
since issuance and current operations do not cover the debt
service. The current borrower has been coming out of pocket for
debt service and the loan remains current on its modified terms.

As of the trailing 12 month February 2013 STR Report, occupancy,
ADR and RevPAR were 70.4%, $102.70 and $72.29, respectively,
compared to the underwriter's stabilized estimates of 81.1%, $165
and $134. However, this represents a significant improvement from
performance as of the April 2012 STR Report, when occupancy, ADR
and RevPAR were 49.9%, $96 and $48, respectively.

The property sustained storm damage in 2012. $1 million insurance
claim was filed of which $800,000 was received. The repairs have
been completed with the borrower coming out of pocket to cover the
balance. Once the remaining funds are collected from the insurance
company, the loan is expected to transfer back to the master
servicer.

Rating Sensitivity

The rating of investment grade class J is expected to remain
stable throughout the remainder of the life of the deal. Should
performance at the remaining property not continue to improve as
expected a downgrade to class K is possible. The classes with
realized losses will remain at 'D'

Fitch affirms the ratings on the following pooled certificates:

-- $22.1 million class J at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.8 million class K at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $5.1 million class L at 'Dsf; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the following non-pooled component
certificates:

-- $4 million class N-RQK at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1 through H, N-SDF, N-LAF and O-LAF have been paid in
full. The ratings of interest only classes X-1 and X-2 were
previously withdrawn. Class M, currently rated 'Dsf'; RE 0%, has
been reduced to zero due to realized losses.



MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: Moody's Rates Class H Debt 'B3(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to eighteen classes of
CMBS securities, issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Trust 2013-C9 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. PST, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. H, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 60 fixed rate loans secured
by 77 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.60X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.01X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 106.1% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. The LTV ratio
excludes the Milford Plaza Fee Loan (12.9% of balance). Milford
Plaza Fee Loan is assigned a credit assessment of Baa3 despite
having a Moody's LTV ratio of 127.0% that reflects only the value
of the land collateral. To arrive at a Baa3 assessment, Moody's
considered the value of the non-collateral improvements that the
leased fee interest underlies when assessing the risk of the loan,
as the subject loan is senior to any debt on the improvements. The
loan is further enhanced by an ARD structure, which is a built-in
refinancing mechanism that allows for the loan to hyper-amortize
(without defaulting) if financing is not available at loan
maturity. Loans that are credit assessed Baa3 typically have a
Moody's LTV ratio near 67%. If the loan's leverage wasn't
disassociated with the loan's credit quality, the total pool LTV
ratio would be closer to 101%. Moody's excludes the loan from pool
statistics given the dislocation created between pool
leverage/coverage and pool credit quality if included.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is 19.
The transaction's loan level diversity is similar to Herfindahl
scores found in most multi-borrower transactions issued since
2009. With respect to property level diversity, the pool's
property level Herfindahl Index is 20. The transaction's property
diversity profile is similar to the indices calculated in most
multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.14, which is lower
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa class with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals.

In terms of waterfall structure, the transaction contains a unique
group of exchangeable certificates. Classes A-S (Aaa (sf)), B (Aa3
(sf)) and C (A3 (sf)) may be exchanged for Class PST (A2 (sf))
certificates and Class PST may be exchanged for the Classes A-S, B
and C. The PST certificates will be entitled to receive the sum of
interest distributable on the Classes A-S, B and C certificates
that are exchanged for such PST certificates. The initial
certificate balance of the Class PST certificates is equal to the
aggregate of the initial certificate balances of the Class A-S, B
and C and represent the maximum certificate balance of the PST
certificates that may be issued in an exchange.

Moody's considers the probability of certificate default as well
as the estimated severity of loss when assigning a rating. As a
thick vertical tranche, Class PST has the default characteristics
of the lowest rated component certificate (A3 (sf)), but a very
high estimated recovery rate if a default occurs given the
certificate's thickness. The higher estimated recovery rate
resulted in a A2 (sf) rating, a rating higher than the lowest
provisionally rated component certificate.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS
Transactions" published in April 2005. The methodology used in
rating Classes X-A and X-B was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.62
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, and 23%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1 (sf), Aa2 (sf), Aa3 (sf),
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather
they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-
indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into
consideration in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that
would be assigned in each case could vary from the information
presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


NACM CLO I: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $9.5MM Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by NACM CLO I:

$15,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$16,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 14, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

$11,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Baa1
(sf); previously on June 14, 2012 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$224,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019 (current
outstanding balance of $111,044,639.62), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$9,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Affirmed Ba2
(sf); previously on June 14, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in June 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes have been paid down by approximately 50.4% or $112.9 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest Moody's values
from April 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 140.15%, 123.98%,
115.13%, and 108.44%, respectively, versus June 2012 levels of
121.67%, 113.83%, 109.14%, and 105.39%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $175.5 million,
defaulted par of $3.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.74% (implying a WARF of 2459), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 51.48%, and a diversity
score of 41. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

NACM CLO I, issued in June 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1967)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2951)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.


NYLIM STRATFORD: Fitch Keeps 'C' Rating on $16MM Preferred Shares
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of notes issued by NYLIM
Stratford CDO 2001-1 Ltd. as follows:

-- $23,702,899 class B notes at 'CCCsf';
-- $35,160,441 class C notes at 'Csf';
-- $16,000,000 preference shares at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs', for
the class B notes. Fitch also considered additional qualitative
factors in its analysis, as described below.

Key Rating Drivers

The class B notes are affirmed due to the offsetting effect of the
continued deleveraging of the notes and increasing portfolio
concentration.

Since Fitch's last review in May 2012, the class B notes have
received approximately $9.4 million, or 28.3% of its previous
outstanding balance, increasing its credit enhancement. While the
par-based credit enhancement levels exceed 'CCCsf' SF PCM losses,
there has been significant leakage of principal to pay interest to
the class C notes. Going forward, the transaction is expected to
leak substantially less principal proceeds due to the swap
expiration last month.

While these are positive factors for the class B notes, the
portfolio continues to become more concentrated. The April 2013
trustee report shows 22 obligors with the largest five
representing 68.1% of the portfolio, compared to 25 obligors with
the top five at 58.3% at last review. As the portfolio continues
to amortize, the class B notes may be exposed to adverse
selection.

Credit quality migration in the underlying portfolio since last
review was slightly negative.

The class C notes and preference shares remain
undercollateralized, indicating that default in principal
repayment appears inevitable for these classes. Therefore, the
class C notes and preference shares are affirmed at 'Csf'.

Rating Sensitivities

Further negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by
SF PCM as well as increasing concentration in assets of a weaker
credit quality could lead to downgrades.

NYLIM 2001-1 is a SF CDO that closed on April 12, 2001 and is
monitored by New York Life Investment Management, LLC. The
portfolio is comprised of commercial asset-backed securities
(34.3%), residential mortgage-backed securities (30.6%), corporate
bonds (21.7%), and real estate investment trusts (13.3%) from 1996
through 2004 vintage transactions.


PROTECTIVE FINANCE 2007-PL: Moody's Takes Action on 22 CMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 22
classes of Protective Finance Corporation Commercial Mortgage
2007-PL as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The rating of the IO
Class, Class IO, is consistent with the expected credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.8% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
3.0%. Realized losses have increased from 0% to 0.3% of the
original balance since the prior review. Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 2.2% of the original pooled
balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments..

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Class IO was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 77 compared to 85 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 18, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the April 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to $672.6
million from $1.0 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 165 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 27%
of the pool.

One loan has liquidated from the pool, resulting in a realized
loss of $3.0 million (93% loss severity). There are currently no
loans are on the master servicer's watchlist. Two loans,
representing 1% of the pool, are currently in special servicing
and Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three
poorly performing loans representing 3% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $7.4 million loss from these troubled loans
and loans in special servicing (19.5% expected loss overall).

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and 2011 operating
results for 97% and 50% of the pool's non-specially serviced
loans. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 67% compared to 71% at Moody's prior
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 12% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.73X, respectively, compared to
1.34X and 1.60X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three exposures represent 11% of the pool balance. The
largest exposure consists of two cross collateralized loans ($26.5
million -- 3.9% of the pool), which are secured by adjacent
shopping centers located in Beckley, West Virginia. Overall
performance has been stable. The loans have amortized 19% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.41X,
respectively, compared to 78% and 1.32X at last review.

The second largest exposure ($23.7 million -- 3.5% of the pool)
consists of one loan which is secured by a multi-tenanted office
building located in Birmingham, Alabama. The building is 100%
leased, the same as last review. The largest tenant leases 31% of
the net rentable area (NRA) through June 2014 and the second
largest tenant leases 28% of the NRA through August 2017. Property
performance has increased due to an increase in rental revenue,
however, the property faces significant rollover risk in 2014. The
loan has amortized 10% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.58X, respectively, compared to 60% and
1.68X at last review.

The third largest exposure ($22.4 million -- 3.3% of the pool)
consists of one loan which is secured by a retail center located
in Monroe, North Carolina. As of December 2012, the property was
97% leased, the same as at last review. The largest tenants
include TJ Maxx, Ross Dress for Less and Best Buy, all of which
have lease expirations by 2016. The loan has amortized 13% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 89% and 1.09X at last review.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 2000-C1: S&P Keeps CCC- Rating on L Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its rating of 'CCC-
(sf)' on the class L commercial mortgage pass-through certificate
from Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp. KEY 2000-C1, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating action follows its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmation reflects Standard & Poor's expectation that
available credit enhancement for this class will be within its
estimated requirements for the current outstanding rating.  The
affirmed rating also reflects S&P's review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans.  In
addition, it also considers the transaction-level changes, S&P's
views regarding the current and future performance of the
collateral supporting the transaction, and uncertainty surrounding
the six remaining loans due to specific issues, along with near-
term maturities of loans and leases.

As of the April 17, 2013 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool consisted of six loans with an aggregate principal balance of
$9.1 million, down from 166 loans with an aggregate balance of
$816.3 million at issuance.  There are no defeased or specially
serviced loans.  Based on the most recent data from the master
servicer (KeyBank Real Estate Capital), using Standard & Poor's
adjusted net cash flow (NCF) and cap rates, S&P has calculated a
weighted average DSC for those remaining loans of 1.19x and a
weighted average loan-to-value ratio of 73.9%.

The Random House Distribution Warehouse loan ($3.1 million, 34.6%)
is the largest loan in the pool.  The loan is secured by a
295,932-sq.-ft. industrial property located in Jackson, Tenn.  As
of December 2012, reported debt service coverage (DSC) and
occupancy were 1.30x and 100%, respectively.  Perseus Distribution
is the sole tenant and their lease expires October 2014 and the
loan matures December 2024.

The Eagles Run Apartments Phase II loan ($1.9 million, 20.8%) is
secured by a 78-unit apartment complex located in Atlanta, Ga.  As
of December 2012, reported DSC and occupancy were 0.20x and 71.6%,
respectively.  Occupancy decreased from 75.6% in 2009 to 57.7% in
2010 and to 50.0% in 2011, which caused DSC to fall below 1.10x.

The K-Mart Store loan ($1.8 million, 19.9%) is secured by 86,600-
sq.-ft. retail property in Menomonie, Wisc.  As of September 2012,
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.35x and 100%, respectively.  K-
Mart is the sole tenant and their lease expires December 2014 and
the loan matures at the same time.

The Cochituate Village Shopping Center loan ($1.2 million, 13.6%)
is secured by a 44,055-sq.-ft. retail property located in Wayland,
Mass.  Largest tenants consist of Donelan's Supermarket and Rite
Aid.  As of December 2012, reported DSC and occupancy were 1.62x
and 98.2%, respectively.

The remaining two loans in aggregate are approximately 11.1% of
the pool, with a balance of $1.0 million.  These two loans have
exhibited stable historical performance.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011. If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7
Disclosure Reports included in this credit rating report are
available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AFFIRMED

Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp.
KEY 2000-C1

Class L               CCC-(sf)


RACE POINT III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on $560 Million Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Race Point III CLO:

$451,200,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

$25,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

$42,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on November 21, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

$31,200,000 Class D Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

$10,800,000 Class E Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the end of the deal's reinvestment period
in April 2013. In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions
applicable during the amortization period, and therefore limited
ability to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and
higher spread levels compared to the levels assumed at the last
rating action in November 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2594
compared to 3020, and weighted average spread (WAS) level of 3.5%
compared to 2.9% at the time of the last rating action.
Additionally, Moody's notes that the deal benefited from the
expiration of an out of the money interest rate swap, which
terminated at the end of the reinvestment period.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $498 million,
EUR78.7 million, and GBP12.7 million, defaulted par of $3.6
million and EUR4.9 million, a weighted average default probability
of approximately 17.5% (implying a WARF of 2594), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.1%, and a diversity score
of 66. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Race Point III CLO, issued in April 2006, is a multi-currency
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans denominated in US Dollars, Euros, and Pounds
Sterling.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2075)

Class A: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +2
Class D: +1
Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3113)

Class A: -1
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence in the amortization period and at what
pace. Deleveraging may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in
the loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may
have significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to European obligors: As the Euro area crisis
continues, the rating of the structured finance notes remain
exposed to the uncertainties of credit conditions in the general
economy. The deteriorating creditworthiness of euro area
sovereigns as well as the weakening credit profile of the global
banking sector could negatively impact the ratings of the notes.
Furthermore, as discussed in Moody's special report "Rating Euro
Area Governments Through Extraordinary Times -- An Updated
Summary," published in October 2011, Moody's is considering
reintroducing individual country ceilings for some or all euro
area members, which could affect further the maximum structured
finance ratings achievable in those countries.

4) Foreign currency exposure: The deal has significant exposure to
non-USD denominated assets. Although the foreign currency exposure
is partly hedged through a macro foreign currency swap,
volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct impact on
interest and principal proceeds available to the transaction,
which may affect the expected loss of rated tranches.


RIVERBANK REDEVELOPMENT: S&P Puts 'CC' Rating on 2 Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'CC' long-term
rating on Riverbank Redevelopment Agency (RDA), Calif.'s series
2007A (nonhousing) and 2007B (housing) tax allocation bonds on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The CreditWatch action reflects our view of the successor
agency's projection that it will fall short on its Aug. 1, 2013
debt service payment," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Alda
Mostofi.

Both series of bonds have a final maturity of Aug. 1, 2037.

The rating reflects S&P's view of the project area's:

   -- Severely depressed property market, particularly in
      Riverbank's residential sector, which constitutes 70% of
      the project area;

   -- Five consecutive years of assessed valuation (AV) declines
      that, because of a high volatility ratio (base-year to
      total AV), resulted in a 96% decline in tax increment
      revenue in fiscal 2013; and

   -- Debt service coverage ratio of 0.04x for fiscal 2013, which
      necessitates continuing to drawon the bond's debt service
      reserve funds.


SANDERS RE 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class A Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'BB+(sf)' rating to the Series 2013-1 class A notes and its
'BB(sf)' rating to the Series 2013-1 class B notes issued by
Sanders Re Ltd.  The notes cover losses in the covered area
(defined below) from hurricanes, earthquakes, including fire
following on a per occurrence basis.

The ratings are based on the lowest of the ratings on the
catastrophe risk, 'BB+' for the class A notes and 'BB' for the
class B notes, the rating on the assets in the collateral account
('AAAm'), and the rating of the ceding company, Allstate Insurance
Co. and various affiliates ('AA-').

The class A notes will cover 66.67% of losses between the initial
attachment point of $3.25 billion and the initial exhaustion point
of $3.55 billion, and the class B notes will cover 30% of losses
between the initial attachment point of $2.75 billion and the
initial exhaustion point of $3.25 billion.

RATING LIST

Sanders Re Ltd.
Series 2013-1 class A notes            'BB+(sf)
Series 2013-1 class B notes            'BB(sf)


SANTANDER 2013-3: S&P Assigns Prelim 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-3's
$846.38 million automobile receivables-backed notes series 2013-3.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securitization backed by
subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 6,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflects S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of 50.01%, 44.09%, 35.77%, 31.99%, and
      27.14% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E
      notes, respectively, based on stress cash flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.93x, and 1.60x its 13.50%-
      14.50% expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the
      assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A,
      B, and C notes will remain within one rating category of the
      assigned preliminary ratings during the first year, and its
      ratings on the class D and E notes will remain within two
      rating categories of the assigned preliminary ratings, which
      is within the outer bounds of our credit stability criteria.

   -- The originator/servicer's history in the subprime/specialty
      auto finance business.

   -- S&P's analysis of six years of static pool data on Santander
      Consumer USA Inc.'s lending programs.

   -- The transaction's payment/credit enhancement and legal
      structures.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1511.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-3


Class   Rating      Type         Interest           Amount
                                 rate(i)       (mil. $)(i)
A-1     A-1+ (sf)   Senior       Fixed              126.00
A-2     AAA (sf)    Senior       Fixed              270.00
A-3     AAA (sf)    Senior       Fixed              151.23
B       AA (sf)     Subordinate  Fixed               90.44
C       A (sf)      Subordinate  Fixed              111.31
D       BBB+ (sf)   Subordinate  Fixed               51.02
E       BB+ (sf)    Subordinate  Fixed               46.38


SAXON ASSET 2000-4: Moody's Lowers Class MF-1's Rating to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class MF-1
from Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2000-4, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2000-4

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade is due to the presence of actual interest
shortfalls, and reflects recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated expected losses on those pools. Ratings
on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable interest
shortfalls are capped at Baa3 (sf). For tranches with larger
outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in
November 2009. These rating actions take into account only credit-
related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in November
2009.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages 2004 and
prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25
for current delinquencies ranging from less than 10% to greater
than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years and
ultimate expected losses are projected using the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

Moody's also adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on
loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels into 2014.

These methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and
a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


STONE TOWER III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Ratings on Two Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Stone Tower CLO III Ltd.:

$36,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due May 26,
2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 19, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf);

$18,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due May 26, 2017,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on September 21, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf);

$11,500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due May 26, 2017, Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf); previously on September 21, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3
(sf);

$9,250,000 Class G Blended Securities Due May 26, 2017 (current
Rated Balance of $155,569), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
July 19, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$450,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due May 26, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $123,903,815.04), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on September 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$75,000,000 Class A-2 Delayed Draw Notes Due May 26, 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $20,627,716.15), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$33,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due May 26, 2017,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 21, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf);

$9,250,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due May 26, 2017,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on September 21, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf);

$10,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due May 26, 2017, Affirmed
Ba3 (sf); previously on September 21, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
and Class A-2 Notes have been paid down by approximately 48.1% or
$134.2 million since the last rating action. Based on the latest
trustee report dated March 25, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class D
and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 161.4%,
134.3%, 118.0% and 109.4%, respectively, versus June 2012 levels
of 136.7%, 122.6%, 113.0% and 107.5%, respectively.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the March 2013 trustee report, securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 14.5% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity. Notwithstanding
the increase in the overcollateralization ratio of the Class D
notes, Moody's affirmed the rating of the Class D-1 and Class D-2
notes due to the market risk posed by the exposure to these long-
dated assets.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $270.5 million,
defaulted par of $19.2 million, a weighted average default
probability of 12.92% (implying a WARF of 2279), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.61%, and a diversity
score of 34. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Stone Tower CLO III Ltd., issued in May 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. The methodology used in rating the Class G Blended
Securities was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1823)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +3

Class D-1: +2

Class D-2: +2

Class G: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2734)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: -1

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: -1

Class G: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value. The deal continues to experience an increased
exposure resulted from Amendment and Extend to loan agreements. In
consideration of the size of the deal's exposure to long-dated
assets, which increases its sensitivity to the liquidation
assumptions used in the rating analysis, Moody's ran different
scenarios considering a range of liquidation value assumptions.
However, actual long-dated asset exposure and prevailing market
prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the extent
of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long-dated assets.


SYMPHONY CLO II: Suppl. Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service determined that entry by Symphony CLO
II, Ltd. into a supplemental indenture dated as of May 7, 2013 by
and among the Issuer, Symphony CLO II, Corp., as Co-Issuer and The
Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company National Association, as
Trustee, and performance of the activities contemplated therein,
will not in and of themselves and at this time cause the current
ratings of the rated notes to be reduced or withdrawn. Moody's
does not express an opinion as to whether the Supplemental
Indenture could have non-credit-related effects.

The Supplemental Indenture amends and restates defined terms,
Weighted Average Life Test and Collateral Quality Matrix, in the
Indenture. It is Moody's understanding that a primary consequence
of the amendment is to modify the Weighted Average Life Test by
increasing the applicable test limits that apply from time to time
by three years. Moody's analyzed various amortization profiles
that conform to the contemplated modification of the Weighted
Average Life Test covenant. Moody's also analyzed the 51 new rows
being added to the Collateral Quality Matrix. The result of these
analyses indicated that the changes in the weighted average life
test and the collateral quality matrix at this time has no
negative impact on the current ratings assigned to the notes of
this transaction.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website. Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into
account a third-party due diligence report on the underlying asset
or financial instruments related to the monitoring of the
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings of the notes issued
by the Issuer. Any change in the ratings will be publicly
disseminated by Moody's through appropriate media.

On September 9, 2011, Moody's upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Symphony CLO II:

$40,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Revolving Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

$51,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$33,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade

$16,600,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade

$14,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade


SYMPHONY CLO III: Suppl. Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by Symphony
CLO III, Ltd. into a supplemental indenture dated as of May 7,
2013 by and among the Issuer, Symphony CLO III, Corp., as Co-
Issuer and The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company National
Association, as Trustee, and performance of the activities
contemplated therein, will not in and of themselves and at this
time cause the current ratings of the rated notes to be reduced or
withdrawn. Moody's does not express an opinion as to whether the
Supplemental Indenture could have non-credit-related effects.

The Supplemental Indenture amends and restates defined term,
Weighted Average Life Test, in the Indenture. It is Moody's
understanding that a primary consequence of the amendment is to
modify the Weighted Average Life Test by increasing the applicable
test limits that apply from time to time by two years. Moody's
analyzed various amortization profiles that conform to the
contemplated modification of the Weighted Average Life Test
covenant. The result of this analysis indicated that the change in
the weighted average life test at this time has no negative impact
on the current ratings assigned to the notes of this transaction.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website. Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into
account a third-party due diligence report on the underlying asset
or financial instruments related to the monitoring of the
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings of the notes issued
by the Issuer. Any change in the ratings will be publicly
disseminated by Moody's through appropriate media.

On February 19, 2013, Moody's upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Symphony CLO III, Ltd.:

$22,700,000 Class A-1b Senior Notes Due May 15, 2019, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$75,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Revolving Notes Due May 15, 2019,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Confirmed at
Aa1 (sf)

$1,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due May 15, 2019, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

$24,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due May 15, 2019, Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

$22,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due May 15, 2019,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

$18,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due May 15, 2019,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

$11,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due May 15, 2019,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

$204,300,000 Class A-1a Senior Notes Due May 15, 2019, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)


SYMPHONY CLO V: Suppl. Indenture No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service determined that entry by Symphony CLO V,
Ltd. into a supplemental indenture dated as of May 7, 2013 by and
among the Issuer, Symphony CLO V, Corp., as Co-Issuer and The Bank
of New York Mellon Trust Company National Association, as Trustee,
and performance of the activities contemplated therein, will not
in and of themselves and at this time cause the current ratings of
the rated notes to be reduced or withdrawn. Moody's does not
express an opinion as to whether the Supplemental Indenture could
have non-credit-related effects.

The Supplemental Indenture amends and restates the defined term,
Weighted Average Life Test, in the Indenture. It is Moody's
understanding that a primary consequence of the amendment is to
modify the Weighted Average Life Test by increasing the applicable
test limits that apply from time to time to December 2020. Moody's
analyzed various amortization profiles that conform to the
contemplated modification of the Weighted Average Life Test
covenant. The result of this analysis indicated that the change in
the weighted average life test at this time has no negative impact
on the current ratings assigned to the notes of this transaction.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website. Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into
account a third-party due diligence report on the underlying asset
or financial instruments related to the monitoring of the
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings of the notes issued
by the Issuer. Any change in the ratings will be publicly
disseminated by Moody's through appropriate media.

On September 9, 2011, Moody's upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Symphony CLO V:

$311,300,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2024, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); Previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$25,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); Previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$16,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2024, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); Previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$14,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2024, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); Previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$12,240,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2024, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); Previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.


TALMAGE STRUCTURED 2005-2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 5 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed the ratings of five classes of Notes issued by
Talmage Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2, Ltd. (f/k/a
Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2, Ltd.). The
affirmations are due to key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDOCLO)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Talmage Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2, Ltd. is a currently
static (re-investment period ended in August, 2010) cash
transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (46.9% of the pool balance, including rake
bonds), whole loans (32.4%) and b-notes (20.7%). As of the April
25, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction is $132.7 million compared to $305.8 million at
issuance; due to a combination of amortization, recoveries from
defaulted collateral and principal resulting from the failure of
certain par value and interest coverage tests.

Four assets with a par balance of $59.5 million (43.7% of the pool
balance) were listed as impaired securities as of the April 25,
2013 Trustee Report. Moody's expects moderate/high losses to occur
on these assets once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,861
compared to 6,908 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 1.9% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(13.3% compared to 6.8% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.0% compared to
6.2% at last review), B1-B3 (22.0% compared to 21.4% at last
review), and Caa1-C (64.7% compared to 63.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.6 years compared to 3.0 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 26.2% compared to 23.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, same as last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 26.2% to 36.2% or down to 16.2% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 1 to 5 notches upward and
0 to 5 notches downward respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


TELOS CLO 2007-2: Moody's Hikes Ratings on $89.5 Million Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by TELOS CLO 2007-2, Ltd.:

$40,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due April 15, 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
November 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$27,500,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due April 15, 2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
November 1, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

$22,000,000 Class C Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured Floating
Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due April 15, 2022, Upgraded to A3
(sf); previously on November 1, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$241,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due April 15, 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June
28, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

$22,000,000 Class D Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes Due April 15, 2022, Affirmed Ba1 (sf);
previously on November 1, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$16,000,000 Class E Sixth Priority Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes Due April 15, 2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf);
previously on November 1, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in July 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread and diversity levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
November 2011. Moody's modeled a weighted average spread of 4.52%
compared to 3.83% and a diversity score of 55 compared to 45 at
the time of the last rating action.

However, Moody's also notes that the trustee-reported defaults
have risen since the last rating action, to $17.8 million based on
the April 4, 2013 trustee report from $10.0 million in October
2011. The increase in defaults contributed to a decrease in the
trustee-reported weighted average rating factor to 2780 from 2984
in October 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $396 million,
defaulted par of $17.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 23.37% (implying a WARF of 3366), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.20%, and a diversity
score of 55. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

TELOS CLO 2007-2, Ltd., issued in June of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans, with significant exposure to middle market
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, the default probability adjustments include (1) a 1
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months. Moody's applied the
adjustment described in (1) to 2.0% of the collateral pool and the
adjustment described in (2) to 6.5% of the collateral pool.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2693)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4039)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.


TIAA CMBS: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms TIAA CMBS I Trust's commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2001-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The rating affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement in
light of increasing concentrations in the pool and the greater
risk of adverse selection. In addition, while credit enhancement
continues to increase due to amortization and loan payoffs, timely
financial reporting is limited and loan size is below average.

Currently, there are only 64 loans remaining in the pool, compared
to 259 at issuance. Fitch modeled losses of 1.6% of the remaining
pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total 0.1%. The
pool has experienced no realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated four loans (1.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern. Currently,
there are no special serviced or delinquent loans in the remaining
pool.

Rating Sensitivities

The Stable Rating Outlooks indicate that no rating changes are
expected. The overall pool continues to perform.

As of the April 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 92.6% to $107.3 million from
$1.46 billion at issuance. Eight loans (23.2% of the pool) are
defeased, five of which are among top 15. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting class O.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by a 331,130 square foot
(sf) retail property in College Point, NY (10.1% of the pool).
Largest tenants include Target (42.3% of the property) and BJ's
(36% of the property). As of the April 2013 rent roll, the
property was 100% leased. The servicer reported third quarter (3Q)
2013 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.97x, compared to
1.88x at year-end (YE) 2011.

The second largest loan in the pool is secured by a 77,036 sf
retail in Matawan, NJ anchored by A&P, which occupies 76% of the
property with lease ending March 31, 2023 (5.9% of the pool). The
tenant filed for bankruptcy in December 2010 and emerged from
Chapter 11 protection in March 2012. 3Q'12 DSCR was 1.45x,
compared to 1.25x at YE2011. Per the April 2013 rent roll, the
property was 100% occupied.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $2 million class G at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $33 million class H at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $14.7 million class J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $11 million class K at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $14.7 million class L at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $7.3 million class M at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $7.3 million class N at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, B, C, D, E and F certificates
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class O certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Moody's Rates 15 Tranches of $1.25BB CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to fifteen classes of
CMBS securities, issued by UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust
2013-C6.

CMBS Classes

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL**, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX**, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

*Class X-A and X-B are interest-only classes.

**Exchangeable Classes are A-3FL and A-3FX.

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 73 fixed rate loans secured
by 91 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.96X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.10X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 94.2% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 94.4% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 20.7. The transaction's loan level diversity
lower than Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 26.6. The
transaction's property diversity profile is in line with the
indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued
since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.08, which is lower
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Classes X-A and X-B was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, and 24%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa3, A1, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-WHALE: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on 9 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2007-WHALE 8, reflecting Fitch's base case loss
expectation of 36% to the pooled portion and moderate de-
leveraging since Fitch's last rating action. Fitch's performance
expectation incorporates prospective views regarding commercial
real estate values and cash flow declines. A detailed list of
rating actions follows at the end of this release.

Key Rating Drivers

Under Fitch's updated analysis, the five remaining loans (100% of
pool) are all modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress. Fitch estimates that average recoveries
on the pooled loans will be approximately 64% in the base case. To
determine a sustainable Fitch cash flow and stressed value, Fitch
analyzed servicer-reported operating statements (generally year
end 2012), STR reports, and updated property valuations.

The pool is highly concentrated with the largest loan comprising
74% of the pooled balance. As of the April 2013 distribution
report, the transaction is collateralized by five loans, including
four secured by hotels (95%) and one (5%) is secured by a
portfolio of multifamily properties. One asset is real estate
owned (REO) with the remaining loans in the pool with forbearance
agreements in place or otherwise scheduled to mature in 2014. The
final rated maturity for the transaction is June, 2020.

The four hotel loans are specially serviced; three transferred due
to imminent maturity and one is REO (4.1%).

The largest loan, LXR Hospitality Pool (74%), is collateralized by
10 luxury resorts and hotels consisting of 4,278 keys located in
beachfront and waterfront locations, including Puerto Rico,
Jamaica, Florida, Arizona, and California. The portfolio includes
two golf courses, three Golden Door spas, three casinos, and one
marina. All of the properties are under management and affiliation
agreements with various Hilton brands under Blackstone's LXR
platform. Three of the hotels within the portfolio are located in
Puerto Rico and contain a casino/gaming component: El Conquistador
Golf Resort and Casino, El San Juan Hotel and Casino, and Condado
Plaza Hotel and Casino.

Performance overall is significantly below issuance expectations
and the loan transferred to the special servicer in April 2012 in
advance of its June 2012 maturity. The special servicer has
entered into a forbearance agreement which requires certain
properties to be sold by certain dates and the loan has de-levered
since Fitch's last rating action. The Fitch adjusted net operating
income (NOI) year-ended (YE) 2012 for the 10 remaining properties
has improved from YE 2011 by over 20%. The current NOI remains
significantly lower than that at issuance.

The next largest loan is the Longhouse Hospitality Portfolio
(12.9%). The loan is secured by 42 extended stay lodging
properties (approximately 5,600 keys) located throughout 11 states
and 21 distinct metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Major
markets include Atlanta, New Orleans, Orlando, Houston and Dallas.
The loan transferred to the special servicer in May 2012 in
advance of its June 2012 maturity. A forbearance agreement was
reached in December 2012. YE 2012 NOI declined 4% from YE 2011 due
to increasing expenses while revenue per available room was
relatively flat. Fitch modeled a significant loss in the base
case.

The REO property is the Four Seasons Nevis (4.6%). The collateral
consists of a 196-key hotel located in Charlestown, Nevis. The
hotel, which was built in 1991, is the largest full-service luxury
resort on the island of Nevis in the West Indies. The property
sits on 346 acres and provides amenities such as a private beach,
two swimming pools, five food and beverage outlets, 5,600 square
feet (sf) of flexible meeting and ballroom space, 10 tennis
courts, an 18-hole golf course, and 14,000 sf of health club
facilities. The property suffered hurricane damage and was
subsequently closed. The special servicer foreclosed on the
property in May 2010. The property has since been repaired and re-
opened for business and the special servicer is marketing the
property for sale. Fitch modeled a significant loss in the base
case based on a haircut to the current appraised value and
accounting for significant servicer advances.

Rating Sensitivities

Ratings are expected to remain stable as continued de-levering of
the LXR Loan (74% of the pool) through property releases will
offset risks from the increasing concentration. The Stable Rating
Outlook for classes A-1 and A-2 reflects the deleveraging that has
already occurred on this loan.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $395.9 million class A-1 at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $345.4 million class A-2 at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable
   from Negative;
-- $61.6 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
-- $47.5 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $71.2 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $46.6 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $46.6 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $46.6 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $30%.5 million class H at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $10%.1 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $5.2 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $12.5 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $53 million class LXR-1 at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $70.8 million class LXR-2 at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $3.8 million class LP-1 at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $9.1 million class LP-2 at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.1 million class LP-3 at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $3.3 million class FSN-1 at 'Csf'; RE 0%.


WELLS FARGO 2005-AR16: Moody's Reviews Ratings on $983MM of RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of 16 tranches on
review direction uncertain, from one RMBS transaction issued by
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR16 Trust. The
collateral backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien,
adjustable-rate prime Jumbo residential mortgages. The actions
impact approximately $983 million of RMBS issued in 2005.

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR16 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Aug 17, 2012 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-2, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Aug 17, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-3, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-2, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-3, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. IV-A-8, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-1, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-2, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. VI-A-3, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-4, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. VII-A-1, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-2, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on May 14, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the prime
jumbo pools originated from 2005 to 2007 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools. In addition, the rating
actions reflect discovery of errors in the Structured Finance
Workstation cash flow model used by Moody's in rating this
transaction. In prior rating actions, the calculation of principal
paid to senior bonds and the allocation of losses to the
subordinate bonds were coded incorrectly.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 - 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 3.5% for 2005, 6.5%
for 2006 and 7.5% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 3.54%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April 2012 to 7.5% in April 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


WESTCHESTER CLO: Moody's Hikes Ratings on Five Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Westchester CLO, Ltd.:

$142,500,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due August 1, 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
September 28, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$80,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due August 1, 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September
28, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

$53,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due August 1, 2022, Upgraded to Baa2
(sf); previously on September 28, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

$36,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due August 1, 2022, Upgraded to Ba3
(sf); previously on September 28, 2011 Upgraded to B3 (sf);

$37,700,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due August 1, 2022 (current outstanding
rated balance of $27,137,308), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
September 28, 2011 Upgraded to Ca (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$570,500,000 Class A-1-A Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due August 1, 2022 (current outstanding rated balance of
$464,450,678), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 28, 2011
Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A-1-A Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios.
Moody's notes that the Class A-1-A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 6% or $29 million, since the last rating action in
September 2011. Based on the trustee report dated March 31, 2013,
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 120.44%, 111.74%, 106.55%, and 102.96%,
respectively, versus July 2011 levels of 113.40%, 105.60%, 100.92%
and 96.46%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization
tests are currently in compliance.

Moody's also notes, the Class E overcollateralization ratio has
increased in part due to the diversion of excess interest to
deleverage the Class E Notes in the event of a Class E
overcollateralization test failure. Since the rating action in
September 2011, $10.4 million of interest proceeds have reduced
the outstanding balance of the Class E Notes by 27.6%. Moody's
also notes that the Class C Notes, Class D Notes, and Class E
Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all previously
deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $798.6 million,
defaulted par of $103.24 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.50% (implying a WARF of 2725), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.61%, and a diversity
score of 55. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Westchester CLO, Ltd., issued in May, 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans with material exposure to CLO securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2180)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +3

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3270)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: 0

Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices. Based on the Trustee report dated March 31, 2013 the
defaulted par balance was $78.6 million. Some of this defaulted
exposure is to real estate loans with lower expected recovery
values.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing buffers against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity
score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered
spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to the large
difference between the reported and covenant levels.

3) Exposure to Structured Finance: The deal has material exposure
to CLO securities in the underlying portfolio, some of which are
managed by the Collateral Manager. These tranches tend to
experience volatile returns and extension risk during periods of
market turmoil due to their leveraged nature and structural
subordination. As a result, the deal may be particularly impacted
by the uncertainty in the timing and amount of cash received as
well as the pace of deleveraging of the underlying CLO tranches.


WFRBS 2013-C13: Fitch Rates $16.43 Million Class F Certs 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C13 commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates:

-- $56,222,000 Class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $79,549,000 Class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,000,000 Class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $206,479,000 Class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $71,467,000 Class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $90,962,000 Class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,509,000 Class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,590,000 Class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $704,679,000a* Class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81,099,000a* Class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,877,000a Class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,343,000a Class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16,439,000a Class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $42,741,751 interest-only Class X-C or the
$26,302,751 Class G. Fitch has withdrawn its expected ratings from
the A-3FL and A-3FX classes, which were not issued upon the
closing of the transaction.
*Notional amount and interest-only.
aPrivately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 95 loans secured by 113 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$876.7 million as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by The Royal Bank of Scotland; Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association; Liberty Island Group I LLC; C-III Commercial
Mortgage LLC; Basis Real Estate Capital II, LLC; and NCB, FSB.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch Leverage: The Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.63x and 94.6% are
better than the average DSCR and LTV of 1.24x and 97.2% of Fitch-
rated 2012 conduit transactions. Excluding the loans
collateralized by cooperative housing (co-op) properties, which
consist of 6.9% of the pool, the Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.32x and
99.1%.

Loan Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for 44.7% of the
pool balance, which is lower than the average 2011 and 2012 top 10
loan concentrations of 59.9% and 54.2%, respectively. In addition,
no loan accounts for more than 10% of the pool's aggregate cut-off
principal balance. The average loan size of $9.2 million is much
smaller than the average loan size of $18.3 million in 2012
conduit transactions.

Property Type Diversity: The pool has a retail concentration of
20.3%, which is lower than the average of 2012 Fitch-rated deals
of 35.9%. Hotel and multifamily properties comprise 18.3% and
15.6% of the pool, respectively, representing greater percentages
than the 2012 conduit averages of 13.5% and 6.3%. The pool's
office concentration of 28.5% is in line with the 2012 average.

Rating Sensitivities

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.5% below
the full-year 2012 net operating income (NOI) (for properties that
2012 NOI was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing
during this period). Unanticipated further declines in property-
level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss severity on
defaulted loans, and could result in potential rating actions on
the certificates. Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings
assigned to WFRBS 2013-C13 certificates and found that the
transaction displays average sensitivity to further declines in
NCF. In a scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'Asf' could result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF
declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf' could result. The presale report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities in the Rating Sensitivity section.

The Master Servicers will be Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and NCB, FSB,
rated 'CMS2' and 'CMS2-', respectively by Fitch. The special
servicers will be LNR Partners, LLC and NCB, FSB rated 'CSS1-' and
'CSS3+', respectively, by Fitch. The presale report is available
at 'www.fitchratings.com'.


* Fitch Takes Actions on 12,804 Classes in 904 Prime RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various actions on 12,804 classes in 904
U.S. Prime residential mortgage backed security (RMBS)
transactions. A detailed list of rating actions and the
performance analysts' contact information is available at
'www.fitchratings.com.'

Rating Action Summary:

-- 12,159 classes affirmed;
-- 94 classes upgraded;
-- 519 classes downgraded;
-- 31 classes affirmed and subsequently withdrawn;
-- One class downgraded and subsequently withdrawn.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch downgraded less than 5% of the classes reviewed. Of all
classes that Fitch downgraded, roughly 60% previously held ratings
of 'Bsf' or lower. Of those classes Fitch downgraded that were
previously rated above 'Bsf', 90% were downgraded one rating
category and only two classes were downgraded more than two rating
categories.

The vast majority of downgrades on classes previously rated above
'Bsf' are from transactions issued prior to 2005. While the prime
sector as a whole has shown signs of improvement, the performance
of pre-2005 prime loans is still deteriorating. Serious
delinquencies among pre-2005 prime collateral have increased from
6.5% to 7.1% over the last year. In addition to negative
performance trends, another common downgrade driver (affecting
approximately 100 classes) was tail risk in transactions with loan
counts of less than 100.

Fitch affirmed at their previous rating or upgraded over 96% of
the classes reviewed. The rating upgrades reflect a decrease in
delinquencies and rising borrower prepayments due to the improving
economy, low mortgage rates, and increases in home prices. Over
the past year, home prices have increased close to 10% nationally
and unemployment has decreased to 7.5%. Additionally, serious
delinquency as a percentage of the outstanding loans has declined
to 10.82% from 11.3% in the past five months, while the three-
month average conditional prepayment rate has remained at nearly
20%.

In addition to the improvement in performance, many senior classes
have benefitted from structural features such as failing triggers
that redirect a higher percentage of unscheduled principal to the
senior classes , as well as 'IPIP' structures that insure the
senior classes are paid interest and principal prior to
subordinate classes. Over 70% of the upgrades took place in
classes that were previously rated non-investment grade and were
generally one rating category upgrades.

Upgrades have been limited by the use of a one-category rating
tolerance when considering rating changes on seasoned RMBS. As
described in its U.S. RMBS Surveillance Criteria, Fitch typically
only revises ratings when the model-indicated rating differs from
the current rating by more than one rating category. When the
model-indicated rating differs from the current rating by only a
single category, Fitch typically uses directional Outlooks to
reflect the credit risk migration. This policy is intended to
reduce the likelihood of upgraded classes subsequently
experiencing negative rating pressure due to relatively minor
changes in credit performance. The 17 classes that Fitch upgraded
to 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' were analyzed with additional sensitivity
stresses and are expected to pay off within the next twelve
months.

Fitch withdrew ratings on 32 classes. The withdrawn classes were
either in transactions that were terminated and the certificates
were cancelled by the trustee or were written off by losses and
were expected to recover no principal.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch analyzes each bond in a number of different scenarios to
determine the likelihood of full principal recovery and timely
interest. The scenario analysis incorporates various combinations
of the following stressed assumptions: mortgage loss, loss timing,
interest rates, prepayments, servicer advancing and loan
modifications.

The analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are
increasingly more stressful and less-likely outcomes. Although
many variables are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary
driver of the loss scenarios is the home price forecast
assumption. In the 'Bsf' scenario, Fitch assumes home prices
decline 10% below their long-term sustainable level. The home
price decline assumption is increased by 5% at each higher rating
category up to a 35% decline in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

25% of outstanding prime RMBS classes currently hold a distressed
rating below 'Bsf' and are likely to default at some point in the
future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds currently rated
'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and eventually
'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices
nationally to decline further before reaching a sustainable level.
While Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent
actual home price and mortgage performance trends differ from
those currently projected by Fitch.


* Fitch Affirms Ratings on 28 Classes From 5 CMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 28 classes from five distressed
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations of the notes reflect the concentration risk and
expected losses within the respective transactions. The ratings on
the remaining classes range from 'CCC', indicating losses are
probable to 'D', indicating losses have already incurred.

A rating action spreadsheet, titled 'Fitch Affirms 5 Distressed
CMBS Transactions', dated May 6, 2013, details the individual
rating actions for each rated CMBS transaction. It can be found on
Fitch's website.


* Fitch: Guarantor Stress Could Pressure US FFELP Student Loan ABS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquidity issues related to the decline in student loan guarantor
reserve ratios should be limited to a small number of guarantors
with insufficient reserves to cover liquidity shortages. Fitch
Ratings believes these liquidity issues to be manageable for most
bondholders in U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP)
student loan ABS trusts in the medium term due to the reserve
funds the trusts maintain and the federal backstop. Last week, the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) published a report showing
guarantors' reserve ratios declined in 15 states and increased in
17.

"We believe the decline is partially due to the increase in
student loan defaults. The ED reported in the fall that the 2010
two-year national cohort default rate was 9.1%. This increased
guarantor costs for default aversion and default claims. We also
believe the decline in reserve ratios is due, in part, to a
reduction in guarantors' revenues. The termination of FFELP
stopped the insurance fees guarantors had received," Fitch says.

"In our view, this could create a short-term liquidity issue for
some trusts if guarantors begin to delay payments to address their
financial issues.

"We do not expect a direct credit impact on Fitch-rated securities
because we assumed a 540-day payment lag in our cash flow
analysis. Most trusts have sufficient reserves to cover a
liquidity shortage and allow commingling of principal and interest
collections to smooth short-term liquidity needs."


* Moody's Reviews Ratings on $236-Mil. of Subprime RMBS Issues
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of 6 tranches
from 2 transactions issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition
Trust 2006-NC2 and Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-WF1
on review, direction uncertain.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC2

Cl. A-1A, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Aug 9, 2012 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Aug 9, 2012 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-WF1

Cl. A3, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Aug 20, 2012 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M1, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Aug 20, 2012 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect discovery of errors in the Structured
Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by Moody's in
rating these transactions. In prior rating actions for J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC2, the model incorrectly modeled
the principal payment priorities for senior tranches before and
after the subordination depletion date. In prior rating actions
for Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-WF1, the model
incorrectly modeled the interest payments to senior tranches.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in March 2012 to 7.6% in March 2013. Moody's
forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Lifts Ratings on $260-Mil. of Subprime RMBS Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 7 tranches
from 4 RMBS transactions issued by various financial institutions,
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-B

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-FR1

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-OPT1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Series 2005-AR1

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance review of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011, and "Rating Transactions Based on the
Credit Substitution Approach: Letter of Credit-backed, Insured and
Guaranteed Debts" published in March 2013.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.2% in March 2012 to 7.6% in March 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the
2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in
2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Hikes Action on $381 Million RMBS Deals From 2 Issuers
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of 5 tranches from 3
RMBS transactions, backed by $381 Million of Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL2

Cl. II-A3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-9

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" published in November 2009, and "2005 --
2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, Moody's
considered the volatility of the projected losses and timeline of
the expected defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's
also considered the current pipeline composition as well as any
specific loss allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

These methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and
a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in April of 2012 to 7.5% in April of 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $252MM of Lehman, Greenpoint RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of four tranches on
review for upgrade from two RMBS transactions backed by Alt-A and
Option ARM loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-AR5

Cl. I-A-1, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Feb 4, 2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-1

Cl. 1-A1, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A2, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M1, C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.

In addition, the rating actions reflect discovery of errors in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models previously
used by Moody's in rating these transactions. For Lehman XS Trust
Series 2006-1, the cash flow model used in prior rating actions
applied a larger haircut than it should have on the excess spread
available to the deal, which decreased the total cash flow
available to pay down the bonds.

For Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-AR5, the cash flow
model used in prior rating actions allocated losses to senior
certificates from related groups after depletion of the
subordinate classes without regard to any loss allocation limit.
However, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement states that losses
will not be allocated to the certificates if, by such allocation,
the balance of these certificates becomes lower than the balance
of the related loan group. This provision provides protection to
senior certificates backed by stronger performing groups.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Rating Transactions Based on the Credit
Substitution Approach: Letter of Credit backed, Insured and
Guaranteed Debts" published in March 2013, and "2005 -- 2008 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2011. The
methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications 2) small pool volatility and 3) bonds that
financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until
September 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a transaction
has a specific structural feature, such as a credit enhancement
floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size, Moody's can
choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for current
delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater than 50%
respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate of new
delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the remaining
life of the pool under the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Bonds Insured by Financial Guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflects the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a result, the rating
on the security is the higher of 1) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating, which is
what the rating of the security would be absent consideration of
the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's uses in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have financial guaranty, described
earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.6% in March 2013. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.



* Moody's Takes Action on $54.5-Mil. of Alt-A RMBS from 2 Issuers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of four
tranches and placed on upgrade review one tranche from two RMBS
transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Alt-A loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-10

Cl. D-X-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-14, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2007-2

Cl. A-1B, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The majority of the actions reflect the change in
principal payments and loss allocation to the senior bonds
subsequent to subordination depletion.

In addition, Class A-1B from Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation,
Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 is placing on upgrade review
due to miscalculation of the Class A-1B realized loss amount as
reported in the trustee remittance report. The final action on the
tranche will be resolved once clarification is obtained on the
bond realized loss amount.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for current
delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater than 50%
respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate of new
delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the remaining
life of the pool under the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.6% in March 2013. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Lowers Ratings on Two Morgan Stanley CSO Notes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of two classes of
notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC, a CSO that
references a portfolio of synthetic corporate senior unsecured
bonds:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2006-6

Class Description: $110,000,000 (current outstanding balance $0)
Class IIIA Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2013, Downgraded to C
(sf); previously on October 23, 2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2006-9

Class Description: $1,000,000 (current outstanding balance $0)
Subordinated Junior Super Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2013, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on February 12, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of three classes of notes:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2006-6

Class Description: $30,000,000 Junior Super Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes due 2013, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on
February 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2006-9

Class Description: $30,000,000 Junior Super Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes due 2013, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on
February 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);

Class Description: EUR25,000,000 Junior Super Senior B Secured
Floating Rate Notes due 2013, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on
February 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's explained that the downgrade rating action are the result
of the rated tranches experiencing 100% loss due to credit events
in the portfolio. The ratings will subsequently be withdrawn.

The affirmation is the result of the tranches continuing to
receive interest payments on payment dates. The junior super
senior notes have incurred no tranche losses, but have minimal
subordination remaining.

Since the last rating review in February 2011, the ten-year
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the portfolio declined
from 1198 to 1103, excluding settled credit events. The credit
quality of the portfolio continues to remain stable with 15% of
the portfolio rated B1 or below, compared to 17% from the last
review.

Based on the March 2013 trustee report, the current subordination
of the Junior Super Senior tranches is 1.4%. The portfolio has
experienced 11 credit events on Ambac Assurance Corporation, Ambac
Financial Group, Inc., CIT Group Inc., Glitnir Bank HF, Kaupthing
Bank HF., Landsbanki Islands hf , Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,
Residential Capital, LLC , The PMI Group, Inc., Thomson and
Washington Mutual, Inc., equivalent to 10.6% of the portfolio
based on the notional value at closing. In addition, the portfolio
is exposed to Caesars Entertainment Inc., Clear Channel
Communications, Inc. and MBIA Insurance Corporation, none of which
are credit events, but nonetheless are rated Ca, post watchlist
and outlook adjustments.

The CSO has a remaining life of 0.75 years.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.8.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers. In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model. For a description
of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the CDOROM user's
guide on Moody's website.

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality. Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities. The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee. Although the impact of these decisions is
mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of
these decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty
in Moody's assumptions. Given the tranched nature of CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility. All else
being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more junior
or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe. Should macroeconomics conditions evolve,
the CSO ratings will change to reflect the new economic
developments.


* Moody's Says Credit Performance of Auto ABS Sector Still Strong
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The strong credit performance of auto loan, lease and floorplan
asset-backed securities (ABS) in 2012 has continued into 2013,
according to Moody's Investors Service's quarterly summaries for
the three ABS sectors.

"Despite marginal deterioration in auto loan collateral credit,
primarily in the form of lower borrower credit scores and longer
loan terms, borrower credit profiles for the 2012 loan vintage
remain strong, which, together with strong but declining used
vehicle prices, will likely result in continued strong performance
for the 2012 pools, similarly to the 2011 vintage," said Sanjay
Wahi, a Moody's Vice President and senior analyst.

"Auto lease ABS also continue to perform better than our original
expectations both in terms both of both credit and market, or
residual, value," said Aron Bergman, a Moody's analyst. Almost 35%
of leases are due to mature in 2013. Residual gains on matured
leases are down to 6.4% from 8.5% as of Moody's last report, a
trend that will continue in 2013 as used vehicle prices decline
further toward historical averages.

Finally, issuance of floorplan ABS also continues to grow; Moody's
rated six transactions amounting to $4.5 billion in the first
quarter, compared to four transactions amounting to $4.7 billion
in first-quarter 2012.

"The surge in floorplan issuance could be due to a combination of
high ABS demand, the low cost of ABS funds relative to on-balance-
sheet funding and higher sales by the major auto manufacturers,
most of which have been reporting higher sales since 2010," said
Keith Van Doren, a Moody's analyst.

Moody's quarterly auto ABS sector summaries consolidate key credit
assumptions and performance data used to monitor ratings on
outstanding publicly rated auto loan-, lease-, and floorplan-
backed securitizations.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
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Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
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The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

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                           *********

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