TCR_Public/130414.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 14, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 102

                            Headlines

A10 SECURITIZATION: DBRS Assigns 'BB(sf)' Rating to Class E Certs
AMERICREDIT AUTO: Fitch Puts 'BB' Rating on $27.29MM Class E Notes
AMMC VII: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
AMMC CLO XII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
ARES XXIV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $31.20MM Class E Notes

AVENUE CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on $10MM Cl. B-2L Notes to Caa2
BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2013-WBRK: Moody's Rates Class E CMBS '(P)Ba1'
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-4: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to 'B-'
BXG RECEIVABLES 2005-A: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 5 Note Classes

CAPITALSOURCE 2006-A: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 12 Note Classes
CBA COMMERCIAL 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 4 CMBS Classes
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C1: Moody Keeps Ratings on 12 CMBS Classes
CGRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-VNO5TH: S&P Gives BB Rating to Class E Notes
CITIGROUP 2013-GCJ11: Fitch Expects to Rate Class F Certs 'B'

COMM 2001-J2: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Ten CMBS Classes
CORIOLANUS LIMITED: Moody's Lowers Series 41 Notes' Rating to 'C'
CREDIT SUISSE 1997-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class J CMBS
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKP1: S&P Cuts Rating on Class K-Z Notes to B-
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Notes to 'B+'

CREDIT SUISSE 2003-C3: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating to Class H Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C2: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class A-M Notes
DEL CORONADO 2013-DEL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class E Notes
DENALI CAPITAL VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class B-2L Notes
FIRST UNION 1999-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on IO-1 Notes to 'Caa1'

FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2013-1: S&P Gives Prelim 'BB' Rating on D Notes
GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Six CMBS Classes
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2005-GG5: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 CMBS Deals
GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 Note Classes
GS MORTGAGE 2013-PEMB: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating to Cl. E Notes

JER CRE 2005-1: Moody's Keeps 'C' Ratings on Eight Note Classes
JP MORGAN 2002-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC8: S&P Cuts Rating on Class K Notes to 'D(sf)'
JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC13: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class C Certs to 'C'
JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class H Certs

KKR FINANCIAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class F Notes
LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2005-MF1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on A Notes
LB-UBS 2000-C4: S&P Raises Rating on Class G Notes to 'B+'
LB-UBS 2004-C2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class H Notes to 'BB-(sf)'
MASTR ADJUSTABLE 2003-7: Moody's Cuts Class B-1 Secs. Rating to B2

MORGAN STANLEY 1998-WF2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class M Certs. to D
RIDGEFIELD APARTMENTS: S&P Lowers Rating on 2007 Bonds to 'B-'
OCTAGON INVESTMENT XIV: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
RESTRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Cuts Rating on Series 2006-6-E Certs
SNAAC 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

SPRINGLEAF 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B-1 Notes
SYMPHONY CLO X: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $16.5MM Class E Notes
SYNERGY BELLA: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
TAR HEEL: S&P Assigns B+(sf) Rating to $500MM Series 2013-1 Notes
TIMBERSTAR TRUST: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class F Certs

TRAPEZA CDO III: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Four Note Classes
TRAPEZA CDO IX: Moody's Ups Ratings on $180MM of TruPS CDO Notes
TRAPEZA X: Moody's Lifts Rating on $268MM Class A Notes to 'Ba1'
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Fitch to Rate $19.43-Mil. Class F Certs 'B'
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Moody's Takes Actions on 15 CMBS Classes

UBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on $23.2MM Certs
US AIRWAYS: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' Rating on $199.518MM Certs
WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C4: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class O Certs
WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C9: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class F Certs. to C
WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C11: Moody's Takes Actions on 17 CMBS Classes

WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 18 CMBS Classes
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C19: Fitch Affirms C Rating on Class O Certs
WELLS FARGO 2011-C3: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
WELLS FARGO 2013-BTC: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes

* Fitch Releases 1st Quarter Economic Risk Factors for US RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $2 Billion of 2005-2007 Alt-A RMBS
* Moody's Takes Actions on $1.5BB Alt-A Loans From Six Issuers
* Moody's Takes Actions on 157 Tranches of $1.29BB Alt-A RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on 45 Tranches of $1.5BB Subprime RMBS

* Moody's Takes Actions on 16 Tranches of $107MM Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Takes Actions on $10.1MM of AMRESCO Subprime RMBS Deals
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes From 3 U.S. CMBS Transactions

                            *********

A10 SECURITIZATION: DBRS Assigns 'BB(sf)' Rating to Class E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned final ratings to the following Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-1 (the Notes)
issued by A10 Securitization 2013-1, LLC.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at A (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

Class E and Class F are non-offered classes.

The collateral consists of 21 loans secured by commercial real
estate, all originated by A10 Capital, LLC (A10 Capital).  A10
Capital specializes in mini-perm loans, which typically have two-
to five-year terms and are used to finance properties until they
are fully stabilized.  The borrowers are often new equity sponsors
of fairly well-positioned assets within their respective markets.
A10 Capital's initial advance is the senior debt component
typically for the purchase of a real estate owned acquisition or
discounted payoff.  Most loans are structured with three-year
terms and include built-in extensions at the lender's sole
discretion.

The pool consists of 16 floating-rate loans and five fixed-rate
loans secured by 24 commercial properties.  The pool was analyzed
to determine the indicative ratings, reflecting the probability of
loan default within the term, including the lender extension
options, and its liquidity at maturity.

The ratings assigned by DBRS contemplate timely payments of
distributable interest and, in the case of Offered Notes other
than the Class A Notes, ultimate recovery of Deferred
Collateralized Note Interest Amounts (inclusive of interest
payable thereon at the applicable rate, to the extent permitted by
law).  Accordingly, DBRS will assign its Interest in Arrears
designation to any class of Offered Notes (other than the Class A
Notes) during any Interest Accrual Period when such class accrues
Deferred Collateralized Note Interest Amounts.

The ratings assigned to the Notes by DBRS are based exclusively on
the support provided by the transaction structure and the credit
underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by
DBRS.


AMERICREDIT AUTO: Fitch Puts 'BB' Rating on $27.29MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
Rate AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-2 as follows:

-- $214,700,000 class A-1 notes 'F1+sf';
-- $382,800,000 class A-2 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $183,800,000 class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84,170,000 class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $104,490,000 class C notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102,750,000 class D notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,290,000 class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

Consistent Credit Quality: The credit quality of 2013-2 is
consistent with 2013-1 and 2012 transactions. The weighted average
(WA) Fair Isaac Corp. (FICO) score is 565, and WA internal credit
score is 240. Used cars total 56.7% and WA loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio is 110%, all consistent with recent pools.

Consistent Credit Enhancement Structure: The cash flow
distribution is a sequential-pay structure. Initial hard credit
enhancement (CE) is consistent with the last four transactions.
The reserve is 2.00% (non-declining) and initial
overcollateralization (OC) is 5.25% (both of the initial pool
balance), growing to a target of 14.25% of the current pool
balance, less the reserve.

Stronger Portfolio/Securitization Performance: Losses on GM
Financial's portfolio and 2009 - 2012 AMCAR securitizations have
declined to some of the lowest levels ever seen, supported by the
gradual economic recovery and strong used vehicle values
supporting higher recovery rates.

Stable Corporate Health: Fitch rates GM 'BB+' with a Stable
Outlook, and GM Financial 'BB' with a Positive Watch. GM Financial
recorded positive corporate financial results since 2010, and the
overall health of GM has also improved.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: AFSI demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter, and servicer, as
evidenced by historical portfolio delinquency and loss experience
and securitization performance. Fitch deems AFSI capable of
adequately servicing this series.

Rating Sensitivity

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce CNL levels higher
than the base case and would likely result in declines of CE and
remaining loss coverage levels available to the notes. Decreased
CE may make certain note ratings susceptible to potential negative
rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage. Hence, Fitch conducts sensitivity analysis by stressing
a transaction's initial base case CNL assumption by 1.5x and 2.5x
and examining the rating implications on all classes of issued
notes. The 1.5x and 2.5x increases of the base case CNL represent
moderate and severe stresses, respectively, and are intended to
provide an indication of the rating sensitivity of notes to
unexpected deterioration of a trust's performance.


AMMC VII: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the Class
A, B, and C notes from AMMC VII Ltd., a U.S. cash-flow
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by American
Money Management Corp.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings
on the Class D and E notes and removed all of the ratings from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on
Jan. 4, 2013.

Following the end of its reinvestment period in January 2013, the
transaction entered into its amortization period.  As per the
terms of the transaction, the notes are sequential in terms of
priority, and so the Class A notes should receive all paydowns
until they are paid off in full.

The transaction is in stable condition, and all coverage tests are
above the minimum requirements.  As per the March 2013 monthly
trustee report, defaults remain low: $3.9 million par.  This is
down from $6.6 million in the November 2010 monthly trustee
report, which S&P used for its last rating action in February
2011, when it upgraded the Class B, C, D and E notes.  In
addition, the March 2013 monthly trustee report indicates that the
transaction currently has $17.37 million of collateral rated
'CCC+' and below, which is down from $26.7 million in November
2010.

The upgrades are the result of the expected paydowns and
improvement in the credit support at their prior ratings.  The
affirmations of the Class D and E note ratings reflect the
availability of adequate credit support at their current rating
levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings on
the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions as it
deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

AMMC VII Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To            From
A             AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA- (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E             BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos


AMMC CLO XII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to AMMC
CLO XII Ltd./AMMC CLO XII Corp.'s $377.3 million notes.

The note issuance is a cash-flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated, speculative-grade, senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash-flow analysis
      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
      various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.3361%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50% of excess interest proceeds that are available prior to
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees, collateral
      manager incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1411.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

AMMC CLO XII Ltd./AMMC CLO XII Corp.


Class               Rating       Amount (mil. $)

A                   AAA (sf)               248.0
B                   AA (sf)                 61.7
C (deferrable)      A (sf)                  22.0
D-1 (deferrable)    BBB (sf)                10.9
D-2 (deferrable)    BBB (sf)                10.9
E (deferrable)      BB (sf)                 16.8
F (deferrable)      B+ (sf)                  7.0
Subordinated notes  NR                      40.0

NR-Not rated.


ARES XXIV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $31.20MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Ares
XXIV CLO Ltd./Ares XXIV CLO LLC's $643.60 million fixed- and
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of Oct. 25, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
them by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with
the transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, it perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with its criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  S&P's analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
S&P's supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discuss its analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to publish an
effective date report each time it issues an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ares XXIV CLO Ltd./Ares XXIV CLO LLC
Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     433.70
B-1                        AA (sf)                       66.60
B-2                        AA (sf)                       13.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        63.10
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      36.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       31.20


AVENUE CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on $10MM Cl. B-2L Notes to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.:

  $10,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15,
  2017 (current outstanding balance of $8,542,414.75), Downgraded
  to Caa2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2011 Upgraded to B1
  (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  $286,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15,
  2017 (current outstanding balance of $28,527,168), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on November 24, 2010 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  $34,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15,
  2017, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 10, 2011 Upgraded
  to Aaa (sf);

  $19,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15,
  2017, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on June 6, 2012 Upgraded to
  Aa3 (sf);

  $9,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15,
  2017, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on August 10, 2011 Upgraded
  to Ba1 (sf);

  $10,000,000 Class B-1F Fixed Rate Notes Due February 15, 2017,
  Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on August 10, 2011 Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the Class B-2L
Notes is primarily a result of a decrease in the transaction's
Class B-2L overcollateralization ratio and deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating action
in June 2012. Based on the trustee report dated February 6, 2013,
defaulted assets in the portfolio have increased to $28.3 million
from $17 million in May 2012. As a result, the trustee-reported
Class B-2L overcollateralization ratio has decreased to 102.28%
versus the May 2012 level of 104.2%. In addition, based on the
same trustee reports, the weighted average rating factor
deteriorated to 2843 from 2768 in May 2012.

The rating action taken on the Class B-2L Notes also takes into
account a correction to Moody's modeling of the Class B-2L
interest rate. Due to an input error, the interest rate on the
Class B-2L notes was modeled at a lower rate than it should have
been in previous rating actions. The modeling has been corrected,
and this rating action reflects this change.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $101.7 million,
defaulted par of $37 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.74% (implying a WARF of 2978), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 46.62%, and a diversity
score of 20. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd., issued in December 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans, with exposure to non-senior secured loans
and bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability adjustments. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) as
described in Moody's Ratings Implementation Guidance "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions",
October 2009. Moody's applied this adjustment to 7% of the
portfolio.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2382)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +1

Class B-1L: +1

Class B-1F: +1

Class B-2L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3573)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-1F: -1

Class B-2L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a number
of securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not provided the
necessary information to update the credit estimates in a timely
fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any default
probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.

4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2013-WBRK: Moody's Rates Class E CMBS '(P)Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of commercial mortgage backed securities, issued by BAMLL
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013 - WBRK.

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to one regional mall. The
borrower underlying the mortgage is a special-purpose entity,
Willowbrook Mall, LLC.

The ratings are based on the collateral and the structure of the
transaction.

Moody's rating approach for securities backed by a single loan
compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying properties
with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also considers a range
of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The loan is collateralized by fee simple interest in 492,649 SF
within the Willowbrook Mall, a 1,522,709 SF super regional mall in
Wayne Township, New Jersey. The mall was originally constructed in
1969, and renovated in 1998 and 2003. The property is anchored by
four tenant owned department stores, Macy's, Lord & Taylor,
Bloomingdale's and Sears, which are not included in the
collateral.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two
factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely
driven by the LTV of the underlying loan.

Moody's Trust LTV Ratio of 79.4% is in-line with other fixed-rate
standalone-property loans that have previously been assigned an
underlying rating of Ba1.

The Moody's Trust Actual DSCR of 2.66X and Moody's Stressed Trust
DSCR of 1.02X is considered to be in-line with other Moody's rated
loans of similar respective leverages.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-A
and X-B was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. Moody's analysis
also uses the CMBS IO calculator v 1.1 which references the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Single Borrower CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5.0%, 15.6%, or 25.0%, the model-indicated rating for the
currently rated Aaa classes would be Aa1, A2, or Baa2,
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather
they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-
indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into
consideration in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that
would be assigned in each case could vary from the information
presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-4: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
Class H and Class J commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-4, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D
(sf)' because of interest shortfalls.

S&P lowered these ratings to 'D (sf)' because it expects the
accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.  The trust experienced monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $162,785, according to the March 11, 2013,
trustee remittance report.  The interest shortfalls were primarily
due to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
of $148,338 from seven ($61.7 million, 3.3%) of the nine assets
($187.5 million, 10.0%) with the special servicer and special
servicing and workout fees of $37,292.  The interest shortfalls
this month were partially offset by an ASER recovery of $10,314 on
one of the specially serviced assets.  The interest shortfalls
affected classes subordinated to and including Class F. Classes H
and J have accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for eight
and 10 consecutive months, respectively.

As of the March 11, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $1.9 billion,
down from $2.2 billion at issuance.  The pool has 122 loans, down
from 143 loans at issuance.  To date, the transaction has
experienced losses totaling $75.3 million (3.4% of the
transaction's original certificate balance).  Nine assets
($187.5 million, 10.0%) are with the special servicer; eight
($65.0 million, 3.5%) of the nine assets have appraisal reduction
amounts totaling $34.9 million.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                              Credit        Reported
       Rating     Rating   enhancement Interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To         From         (%)     Current   Accumulated
H      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   2.53     135,288       760,358
J      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   1.34     108,228     1,036,438


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on one class
of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight other classes from
the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust (for more information on the
transaction's key credit characteristics, see "Transaction Update:
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. (Series 2004-1),"
published April 9, 2013).

The downgrade of class F reflects S&P's expectation of liquidity
that will be available to this class and the potential for this
class to experience interest shortfalls in the future.  As of the
March 11, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls totaling $302,536, of which $128,262
was related to the nonrecoverable determination made on the SBC
Center (FKA Ameritech Center) asset, $160,289 was related to a
one-time workout fee for the disposition of the Tracy Pavilion
asset, and $15,052 was related to special servicing fees.  The
interest shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and
including class F.  According to the March 2013 remittance report,
approximately $2.0 million in advances is outstanding against the
aforementioned SBC Center asset.  Should the master servicer
decide to recover this outstanding advance amount, the trust may
experience additional interest shortfalls.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
rating.  S&P affirmed its ratings on these classes to also reflect
the credit characteristics and performance of the remaining
assets, as well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on these classes, S&P affirmed its ratings on
these classes because its analysis also considered its view on
available liquidity support and risks associated with potential
interest shortfalls in the future.  S&P believes these increased
interest shortfalls may result from the five ($79.7 million, 8.9%)
assets that are with the special servicer, and the 40
($379.5 million, 42.6%) performing nondefeased loans scheduled to
mature in 2013.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class XC interest-only (IO)
certificate reflects its current criteria for rating IO
securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING LOWERED

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-1

                    Rating
Class          To          From      Credit enhancement (%)
F              B- (sf)     B+ (sf)                     7.18

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-1

Class          Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
A-1A           AAA (sf)                            19.09
A-4            AAA (sf)                            19.09
B              AA+ (sf)                            15.56
C              AA (sf)                             14.07
D              A-(sf)                              10.72
E              BBB- (sf)                            9.23
G              CCC (sf)                             5.88
XC             AAA (sf)                              N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


BXG RECEIVABLES 2005-A: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 5 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's placed the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F
Notes of BXG Receivables Note Trust 2005-A on review for possible
upgrade. The underlying collateral consists of timeshare loans
serviced by Bluegreen Corporation, with Concord Servicing
Corporation as the back-up servicer.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: BXG Receivables Note Trust 2005-A

Cl. B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. E, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. F, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The action reflects Moody's anticipated decreased gross charge-off
projection for the transaction's collateral pool, coupled with
increased credit enhancement for these tranches. The collateral
pool is benefiting from steadily declining charge-offs and
delinquencies over the past few years, as well as seasoning of the
collateral. Rolling twelve-month charge-offs as a percentage of
pool reduction has steadily declined over the years from its peak
level of 50% as of December 2009, to 26% as of March 2012, and to
18% as of March 2013. Credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization and cash reserves for Class B, Class C,
Class D, Class E and Class F is 65%, 51%, 35%, 27% and 23%,
respectively.

During the review period Moody's will revise future expected gross
charge-offs as a percent of the remaining pool balance, and
compare the revised gross charge-off forecast to credit
enhancement to determine the appropriate ratings.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Vacation Timeshare Loan Securitizations",
published in September 2011.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of uncertainty with
regard to expected gross charge-offs are the economic environment,
unemployment rate and other factors, which impact the income-
generating ability of the borrowers.


CAPITALSOURCE 2006-A: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 12 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed the ratings of twelve classes of Notes issued by
CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A. The affirmations are
due to the key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-1R, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A is a currently static
(reinvestment period ended 2012, January) transaction backed by a
portfolio of whole loans (90.6% of the pool), B-note debt (4.1%),
commercial mortgage backed securities (3.1%) and small business
loans (2.3%).The current aggregate collateral balance of the pool
is $861.1 million.

As of the February 22, 2012 trustee report, two whole loans
totaling approximately $3.7 million (0.4% of the collateral pool)
were listed as defaulted. Moody's expects moderate to high loss
severities on these assets.

The Issuer had its Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) status
revoked on June 18, 2009, therefore federal and state income taxes
became payable pursuant to the transaction's Indenture. However,
NorthStar Realty Finance Corp. ("Northstar") stated that in July
2010 it purchased classes J, K and Equity and became the
collateral manager delegate as well as special servicer delegate.
Northstar subsequently was approved as the replacement special
servicer for the transaction. Northstar is a qualified REIT and
holder of the transaction's equity, and has decided to no longer
escrow for the payment of such taxes as of October 2011. However,
based on documentation received to date, Moody's modeling
continues to assume income taxes are deducted in the cash flow
waterfall. Since all interest coverage tests are passing, the
income taxes are primarily absorbed by the non-rated equity
classes.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF, excluding
defaulted assets, of 5,976 compared to 5,487 at last review
(excluding defaulted securities). The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (3.2% compared to 3.4% at last
review), A1-A3 (3.1% compared to 3.5% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(3.7% compared to 3.4% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (2.1% compared to
22.7% at last review), B1-B3 (18.9% compared to 3.6% at last
review), and Caa1-C (69.0% compared to 63.5% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.1 years compared to 4.7 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR, excluding defaulted assets, of
45.7%, the same as at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 17.2% compared to 14.3% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
45.7% to 35.7% or up to 55.7% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 7 notches downward and 0 to
8 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


CBA COMMERCIAL 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 4 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of four
classes of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-1 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of Classes A, M-1 and M-2 are consistent with
Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO
Class, Class X-2, is consistent with the credit profile of its
referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.6% of
the current balance compared to 15.5% at last review. Moody's base
expected base loss plus realized losses is now 15.7% of the
original pooled balance compared to 16.3% at last review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating the interest only
Class X-2 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 96 compared to 109 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 18, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 25, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 76% to $50.9
million from $214.9 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 167 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 22%
of the pool. The pool is characterized by both geographic and
property type concentrations. Approximately 75% of the pool is
secured by multi-family properties; a combined 60% of the pool is
located in California, Texas, New York and Ohio.

There are no loans currently on the watchlist. Ninety-nine loans
have been liquidated from the pool since securitization, resulting
in an aggregate $26.2 million loss (70% loss severity on average).
Currently, there are 12 loans, representing 5% of the pool in
special servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $1.5 million
loss (65% expected loss on average) for all of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 28 poorly
performing loans, representing 20% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $3.7 million loss (36.8% expected loss based on a
61.3% probability default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 32%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 109% compared to 102% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10.2% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 10.2%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.14X and 1.12X, respectively, compared to
1.41X and 1.34X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C1: Moody Keeps Ratings on 12 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 12 classes CFCRE
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal and interest classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. This is Moody's second review since
securitization.

The two IO Classes, Classes X-A and X-B, are affirmed based on
credit quality of their reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.0% of the
current balance, the same as at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement levels could decline below the current levels. If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Classes X-A and X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, the same as at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 19, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $624.3
million from $634.5 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 38 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool. The pool does not contain any defeased
loans and or loans with investment grade credit assessments.

Two loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization.
Two loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The specially serviced loans are secured by multi-
family properties. The loans were transferred to special servicing
in February 2012 due to a technical default. Both loans have the
same sponsor. Moody's did not recognize losses against these
specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 97%
of the pool and partial year 2012 results for 46% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average LTV is 94% compared to 93% at Moody's
last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10.6% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.3X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.4X and 1.07X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 29% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the GSA -- NGP Portfolio I Loan ($66.5 million
-- 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by three single-tenant
office buildings that are 100% leased to the General Services
Administration (GSA) of the US Government and total 299,378 square
feet (SF). Each building was a build-to-suit for the particular
government agency in occupancy. The principals of the sponsor, NGP
V Fund, have the largest multi-state, GSA-leased, real estate
portfolio in the U.S. The loan has a five year term with a three-
year interest-only period. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92%
and 1.03X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the GSA -- NGP Portfolio II Loan ($63.4
million -- 10.2% of the pool), which is secured by 11 single-
tenant office buildings that are 100% leased to the GSA and total
331,832 SF. The properties were built between 2007 and 2009 and
are located across seven states. All 11 properties were build-to-
suits for a specific government agency. The principals of the
sponsor, NGP V Fund, have the largest multi-state, GSA-leased,
real estate portfolio in the U.S. The loan has a five year term
with a three-year interest-only period. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 93% and 1.02X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Hudson Valley Mall Loan ($51.3
million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 765,465 SF
regional mall located in Kingston, New York - approximately 100
miles north of New York City. This is the only regional mall
within a 25 mile radius of Kingston. Occupancy as of September
2012 was 75% compared to 95% at last review. Financial performance
through September 2012 was stable and consistent with year-end
2011 results. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.1X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.09X at securitization.


CGRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-VNO5TH: S&P Gives BB Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to CGRBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-VNO5TH's $390.0 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-VNO5TH.  At the
same time, S&P withdrew its preliminary rating on the class X-B
certificates because the arranger removed them from the
transaction structure.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $390.0 million commercial mortgage loan
secured by the borrower's fee interest in a 38,814-sq.-ft. retail
condominium at 666 Fifth Avenue, a 1.2 million-sq.-ft. class A
high-rise office building located in midtown Manhattan, N.Y.  The
collateral also includes a leasehold interest on 73,846 sq. ft. of
space that the borrower leases from the adjacent office
condominium owner.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning and ending loan-to-value ratio of 76.2% based on
Standard & Poor's value.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1375.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CGRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-VNO5TH

Class    Rating         Amount ($)
A        AAA (sf)      230,700,000
X-A      AAA (sf)   230,700,000(i)
B        AA (sf)        38,460,000
C        A (sf)         38,450,000
D        BBB- (sf)      59,980,000
E        BB (sf)        22,410,000

RATING WITHDRAWN

CGRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-VNO5TH

Class     Rating
       To        From
X-B    NR        AA (sf)

(i)Notional balance.
NR--Not rated.


CITIGROUP 2013-GCJ11: Fitch Expects to Rate Class F Certs 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on CGCMT 2013-GCJ11
Commercial Mortgage Trust Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $75,176,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $290,426,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $236,220,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $92,911,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $104,083,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $948,816,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $117,659,000a* class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,423,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,236,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,830,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,118,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,102,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest-only.
a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of April 9, 2013. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$42,236,945 class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 72 loans secured by 137 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.207 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp., Jefferies
LoanCore LLC, Archetype Mortgage Capital LLC, and Goldman Sachs
Mortgage Company.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 73.5% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis and asset summary reviews on
83.2% of the pool.

Key Rating Drivers

Loan Diversity: The loan concentration index (LCI) and sponsor
concentration index (SCI) are 302 and 343, respectively,
representing one of the most diverse conduit pools by loan size
and exposure since 2008. The top 10 loans represent 46.1% of the
pool, lower than the 2012 average concentration of 54.2%.

High Hotel Concentration: The pool has a lower concentration of
retail and office properties, compared to recent transactions. In
addition, hotels consist of 21.4% of the pool, plus one mixed-use
property (5.8%) with a significant hotel component. Five of the
top 15 loans are secured by hotels or mixed-use with hotel.

Fitch Leverage: This transaction has coverage in line with and
higher leverage than rated 2012 deals. The pool's Fitch DSCR and
LTV are 1.25x and 103.2%, respectively, compared to the 2012
average of 1.24x and 97.1%.

Amortization: Full interest-only loans account for 4.6% of the
pool, and partial interest-only loans account for 30.2% of the
pool, which is in line with the average sum in 2012 deals of
33.1%. The pool pays down 15.1% from cutoff date to maturity,
based on loans' scheduled maturity balances.

Rating Sensitivities

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.8% below
the most recent trailing 12 month (TTM) period net operating
income (NOI) (for properties that a recent TTM NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period).
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and Loss Severity on defaulted loans, and could
result in potential rating actions on the certificates. Fitch
evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT 2013-
GCJ11 certificates and found that the transaction displays average
sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in which NCF
declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result. In a more severe
scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf' could
result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities in the Rating Sensitivity
and Rating Stresses sections of the presale.

The Master Servicers will be Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rated 'CMS2'
by Fitch. The special servicers will be LNR Partners, LLC, rated
'CSS1-' by Fitch.


COMM 2001-J2: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Ten CMBS Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class, placed
under review for possible upgrade the ratings of five classes and
affirmed the ratings of four classes of COMM 2001-J2 Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 1, 2011 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. E, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 1, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-CS, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 1, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-IO, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 1, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 1, 2011 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2011 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of Class C is based on the credit quality of the one
remaining loan in the pool, the AT&T loan, which has defeased and
is secured by U.S. Government Securities. Classes, D, E, E-CS, E-
IO and F are placed under review for possible upgrade due to the
likelihood that current accumulated interest shortfalls will be
recovered in the near future and these classes also benefit from
the credit quality of the defeased loan. Classes G and H are
affirmed due to loss expectations commensurate with Moody's
existing methodology. The ratings of interest-only Class X and
Class XC are consistent with the expected credit performance of
the referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X,
Class XC, and Class E-IO was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS IO
calculator ver1.1, which uses the following inputs to calculate
the proposed IO rating based on the published methodology:
original and current bond ratings and credit assessments; original
and current bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the
IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type
corresponding to an IO type as defined in the published
methodology. The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating
based on both a target and mid-point. For example, a target rating
basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint
rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple
average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating
factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the
CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO
indication for consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated June 28, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 19, 2013 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $189.6 million from
$1.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by one loan, the AT&T Building loan ($189.6
million) that is fully defeased and is secured by U.S. Government
securities.

As of the March 19, 2013 Payment date, cumulative bond losses
totaled $770,443 affecting Class H. Accumulated interest
shortfalls totaled $3,218,512, affecting Classes D, E, ECS, EIO,
F, G, and H. Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing
fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Interest shortfalls will continue to accrue due to the workout fee
of 1% of principal and interest payments assessed on the AT&T
loan. The March 19, 2013 remittance statement included interest
shortfalls and bond losses associated with the workout fee of 1%
of principal and interest payments on the Willowbrook Mall loan,
which paid off in full on March 1, 2013. For this period interest
shortfalls increased by $718,201 and principal losses increased by
$769,875.

The defeased AT&T loan matures in August 2016 and is closed to
prepayment until three months prior to the maturity date.


CORIOLANUS LIMITED: Moody's Lowers Series 41 Notes' Rating to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Coriolanus Limited:

$10,000,000 Series 41 Pass-Through Secured Notes (current rated
balance $ 8,826,503), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9,
2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's notes that the Notes are secured by $6,250,000 of Class D
Notes which are rated C (sf) and $3,750,000 of Subordinated Notes
which are not rated by Moody's, both issued by Hamilton Gardens
CDO Ltd. Moody's also notes that the rating addresses the ultimate
return of the rated balance by the final maturity date.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Using the Structured
Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February
2004.


CREDIT SUISSE 1997-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class J CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 1997-
C1 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. I, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2005 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Class H is affirmed based on increased credit support due to
paydowns and amortization and defeasance. Classes I and J are
consistent with Moody's base expected loss and are affirmed. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class A-X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.6% of the
current pooled balance compared to 3.0% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 1.9% of the original
pool balance, compared to 1.6% at last review. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class A-X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in February 2012.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's used
its credit-tenant lease ("CTL") financing methodological approach
("CTL" approach). Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a
transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds. This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease. The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan. The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust. The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property, is vacant or "dark", is
then examined to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.
Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal integrity
of the transaction. For deals that include a pool of credit tenant
loans, Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model,
incorporated in its public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-9 to
generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess the ratings

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 4 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

The Large Loan Model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 5, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 20, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $69.8
million from $1.36 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 18% of the pool. Three loans, representing 57% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains a CTL component which represents 41%
of the pool. The conduit component consists of one loan which
represents 2% of the pool.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $19.7 million loss (20%
loss severity on average). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

The only conduit loan is the Glastonbury Country Club Loan ($1.2
million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by an 18-hole golf
course located in an upscale neighborhood near Hartford,
Connecticut. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to
low DSCR; however, property performance has been stable with
September 2012 DSCR of 0.96X, the same as of the year-end 2011.
The loan fully amortizes over the loan term and has amortized by
approximately 63% since securitization. The loan matures in
September 2016. Moody's was provided with full year 2011 financial
reporting for this loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 38% and
2.78X, respectively, compared to 46% and 2.3X at last review.

The CTL component includes four loans secured by properties leased
to four tenants under bondable leases. The CTL exposures are Bank
of America Corporation ($12.2 million -- 17.6% of the pool;
Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 -- negative outlook),
RadioShack Corporation ($10.1 million -- 14.4%; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Caa2- negative outlook), Kohl's Corporation ($4.8
million -- 6.9%) and Bon-Ton Stores Inc. ($1.4 million -- 2.0%;
Moody's senior unsecured rating Caa3 -- negative outlook).

The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for the
CTL component has declined to 3,939 compared to 1,889 at last
review. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of
diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within the pool.


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKP1: S&P Cuts Rating on Class K-Z Notes to B-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the Class
G commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s Series 2002-CKP1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  S&P
also lowered its rating on the Class K-Z certificates.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its rating the Class H certificates from
the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the transaction
structure, historical performance of the remaining assets, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrade reflects Standard & Poor's expected available credit
enhancement for the affected tranche, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the rating level.  The upgrade also reflects S&P's
views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral.

S&P lowered its rating on Class K-Z to reflect reduced liquidity
resulting from the interest shortfalls that are affecting the
trust.  The interest shortfalls stemmed primarily from appraisal
subordination entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts ($20,338)
related to three ($13.1 million, 27.2%) of the six assets
($18.4 million, 38.3%) that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc. (LNR), and special servicing fees
($3,588).  As of the March 15, 2013, remittance report, appraisal
reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $3.6 million were in effect for
three assets.  The current reported interest shortfalls totaled
$23,926 and have affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including Class L.

As of the March 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $48.0 million,
down from $992.9 million at issuance.  The pool consists of 12
loans and two real estate owned (REO) assets, down from 156 loans
at issuance.  One loan, the Best Buy Store #422-Richmond
($3.8 million, 7.9%), is defeased.  To date, the transaction has
experienced losses totaling $59.3 million (6.0% of the
transaction's original certificate balance).  There were three
loans ($15.4 million, 32.1%) on the master servicer's watchlist.
The largest of these is the Raytheon Building loan ($13.9 million,
29.0%), which is also the largest asset in the pool.  The loan is
secured by a 12,695-sq.-ft. office building in El Segundo, Calif.
According to the master servicer, the single tenant vacated the
building following its Jan. 31, 2013, lease expiration, and the
building is currently 100% vacant.  The loan remains current, and
the borrower is attempting to market the building for sale of
lease.  As part of S&P's analysis, it assumed a lease-up to market
occupancy and rent to obtain a sustainable stabilized net cash-
flow and valuation.

Based on the most recent data from the master servicer (Midland
Loan Services), using Standard & Poor's adjusted net cash flow
(NCF) and cap rates, it has calculated a weighted-average debt
service coverage (DSC) for the remaining loans that are not in
special servicing and are not defeased (excluding the Raytheon
Building loan, discussed above) of 1.26x and a weighted-average
loan-to-value (LTV) of 59.4%.

As of the March 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, six assets
($18.4 million, 38.3%) are with the special servicer, LNR.  The
reported payment status of the specially serviced assets is as
follows: four are nonperforming matured balloon loans
($12.0 million, 25.0%), and two are REO ($6.4 million, 13.4%).
One of the REO assets, Landmark Apartments, is not reported in the
trustee report as REO, but LNR confirmed its REO status.  ARAs
totaling $3.6 million were in effect against three of the six
specially serviced assets.

The Tower Office Plaza 1 loan ($6.6 million, 13.8%) is the largest
specially serviced asset and the second-largest asset in the pool.
It is secured by a 72,514-sq.-ft. office building in Temecula,
Calif.  The asset has a total reported exposure of $7.5 million.
Due to maturity default, the loan transferred to the special
servicer on Jan. 11, 2012.  An ARA of $1.5 million is in effect
for this asset.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The North Port Shopping Center REO asset ($3.8 million, 8.0%) is
the second-largest specially serviced asset and the fourth-largest
asset in the pool.  The property is a 67,181-sq.-ft. retail
shopping center in Port Washington, Wis.  It became REO on Aug. 8,
2012.  According to LNR, the property is now 77.8% leased, but the
anchor tenant is unwinding its business and will vacate.
Negotiations are underway for a new anchor tenant.  An ARA of
$1.8 million is in effect for this asset.  S&P expects a moderate
loss upon the disposition of this asset.

The remaining four specially serviced assets have individual
balances that account for less than 7.0% of the total pool
balance.  An ARA in the amount of $208,887 was in effect against
one of the four remaining specially serviced assets.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, a minimal loss is
considered to be less than 25%, a moderate loss is between 26% and
59%, and a significant loss is 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKP1
            Rating
Class   To           From           Credit enhancement (%)
G       AA (sf)      A+(sf)         88.53

RATING LOWERED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKP1
            Rating
Class   To           From           Credit enhancement (%)
K-Z     B- (sf)      BB+ (sf)       16.14

RATING AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKP1
Class   Rating                      Credit enhancement (%)
H       BBB+ (sf)                   57.51


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Notes to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-CP5, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on three
other classes from the same transaction, including the rating on
the interest-only (IO) class.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The lowered ratings on classes E, F, and G reflect the reduced
liquidity support available to the trust, as well as the magnitude
of assets with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).
Twenty-one ($118.7 million, 98.6%) of the remaining 23 assets
($120.4 million) in the pool are currently in special servicing.
In addition, S&P considered the potential for additional interest
shortfalls in the event that any of the 21 assets currently with
LNR were to receive updated appraised values that are materially
lower than the current reported valuations or if a
nonrecoverability determination is made by the master servicer,
Midland Loan Services, on any of these assets.  S&P estimated
losses on 20 ($108.5 million, 90.1%) of the 21 specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 25.9%.  To
date, the trust has incurred losses totaling $31.5 million, or
2.7% of the original outstanding trust balance.

S&P lowered its rating on class H to 'D (sf)' to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls that it expects to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  As of the March 15, 2013,
trustee remittance report, the trust experienced interest
shortfalls totaling $132,059.  These were primarily related to
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts of
$147,775 related to 12 ($85.4 million, 70.9%) of the 21 assets
($118.7 million, 98.6%) that are currently with LNR, and special
servicing fees of $23,155.  The interest shortfalls this month
were partly offset by ASER recovery of $40,010 related to two
specially serviced assets.  The class H certificates have
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for eight consecutive
months.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement for the current outstanding ratings.  The
ratings on these classes also reflect S&P's review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets, as well
as the transaction-level changes.

The affirmation of the class A-X interest-only (IO) certificates
reflects S&P's current criteria for rating IO securities.

As of the March 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool consisted of eight real estate-owned (REO) assets
and 15 loans with an aggregate principal balance of
$120.4 million, down from 143 loans with an aggregate balance of
$1.19 billion at issuance.  The reported payment status of the
specially serviced assets ($118.7 million, 98.6%) is as follows:
eight are REO ($66.0 million, 54.9%); nine are non-performing
matured balloon loans ($30.0 million, 24.9%); three are in
foreclosure ($12.5 million, 10.3%); and one is a performing
matured balloon loan ($10.2 million, 8.5%).  Appraisal reduction
amounts (ARAs) totaling $36.8 million were in effect against 13 of
the 21 specially serviced assets.  Details of the four largest
specially serviced assets are as follows:

The Golden Triangle I & II REO asset ($23.5 million, 19.6%) is the
largest specially serviced asset in the pool with a reported total
exposure of $26.5 million.  The property is a 241,942-sq.-ft.
office property in Greenbelt, Md. and was transferred to special
servicing on Dec. 14, 2011 for imminent default because of the
loss of a major tenant.  According to the special servicer,
Lockheed Martin previously occupied 17,444-sq. ft. or 7.13% of the
net rentable space at the property and vacated on Sept. 30, 2011.
The most recent reported debt service coverage (DSC) and occupancy
was 0.52x and 63.9%, respectively, for the 10 months ended
Oct. 31, 2011.  An ARA of $3.6 million is in effect on this asset.
S&P expects a minimal loss upon the eventual resolution of this
asset.

The 2600 Telegraph Road loan ($10.2 million, 8.5%) is the second-
largest specially serviced asset in the pool, with a reported
total exposure of $10.2 million.  The loan has a reported
performing matured balloon payment status and is secured by an
89,751-sq.-ft. office property in Bloomfield Hills, Mich.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing on Aug. 27, 2012, for
imminent default.  The largest tenant vacated its space on
March 31, 2012 and previously occupied 81% of the gross leasable
area of the building.  The most recent reported DSC and occupancy
was 1.59x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012, and 90.3% as
of Dec. 31, 2012, respectively.  According to LNR, it is in
discussions with the borrower regarding a loan extension.
An ARA of $6.8 million is in effect on this loan.

The Gencorp Building REO asset ($9.8 million, 8.1%) is the third-
largest specially serviced asset in the pool with a reported total
exposure of $10.0 million.  The asset consists of a 74,000-sq.-ft.
office property in Farmington, Mich.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing on March 14, 2012 for imminent default.  The
sole tenant, Henniges Automotive Holdings, exercised its right to
terminate its lease as of May 31, 2012 and paid an early
termination fee of $700,000.  As of Sept. 30, 2012, the building
was vacant.  LNR stated that it is pursuing a deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure with the borrower.  An ARA of $7.0 million is in
effect against the asset.  S&P expects a significant loss upon
the eventual resolution of this asset.

The St. Tropez Apartments loan ($9.7 million, 8.0%) is the fourth-
largest specially serviced asset, with a reported total exposure
of $9.9 million.  The payment status is reported as a
nonperforming matured balloon loan.  The loan is secured by a 273-
unit multifamily property in San Antonio, Texas and was initially
transferred to special servicing on Dec. 18, 2012 for maturity
default.  The maturity date of the loan was Oct. 15, 2012.  The
most recent reported DSC and occupancy was 0.62x for year-end 2011
and 65.6% as of April 18, 2012, respectively.  An ARA of
$1.9 million is in effect on this asset.  S&P expects a minimal
loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered a
minimal loss to be less than 25%, a moderate loss to be between
26% and 59%, and a significant loss to be 60% or greater.

The remaining 17 specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 8.0% of the total pool balance.
ARAs totaling $17.5 million were in effect against nine of the 17
remaining specially serviced assets.  S&P estimated losses for the
remaining 17 loans and arrived at a weighted-average loss severity
of 24.6%.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP5

              Rating                        Credit
Class      To          From               enhancement (%)
E          A- (sf)     AA- (sf)               69.85
F          BBB-(sf)    A+ (sf)                62.47
G          B+ (sf)     BBB (sf)               48.93
H          D (sf)      CCC (sf)               36.63

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP5

Class      Rating                           Credit
                                          enhancement (%)
C          AAA (sf)                          96.92
D          AA+ (sf)                          84.61
A-X        AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE 2003-C3: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating to Class H Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
C commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2003-C3, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine other classes and
withdrew its 'AAA (sf)' rating on class A-5 from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions reflect its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrade reflects Standard & Poor's expected available credit
enhancement for the affected tranche, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the rating level.  The upgrade also reflects S&P's
views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's review of the
credit characteristics and performance of the remaining assets as
well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement may suggest positive rating
movement on the certificate classes, S&P affirmed its ratings
because its analysis also took into consideration its view on
available liquidity support and risks associated with potential
interest shortfalls in the future.  Specifically, S&P considered
the potential for the eight specially serviced assets
($29.7 million, 18.3%) and 29 performing, nondefeased loans with
2013 maturities ($97.5 million, 60.3%) to generate additional
interest shortfalls and decrease the liquidity support available
to the trust.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-X and A-Y
interest-only (IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating
IO securities.

S&P withdrew its rating on the class A-5 certificate following the
full repayment of the class's principal balance, as noted in the
transaction's March 15, 2013, trustee remittance report.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C3
            Rating
Class   To           From           Credit enhancement (%)
C       AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)                        86.11

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C3

Class      Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
B          AAA (sf)                  98.11
D          AA- (sf)                  62.12
E          A+ (sf)                   50.13
F          A- (sf)                   38.13
G          BBB+ (sf)                 30.14
H          B- (sf)                   18.14
J          CCC+ (sf)                  6.15
A-X        AAA (sf)                    N/A
A-Y        AAA (sf)                    N/A

RATING WITHDRAWN

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C3
            Rating
Class   To           From
A-5     NR           AAA (sf)

N/A-Not applicable.
NR-Not rated.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C2: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class A-M Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the five principal- and
interest-paying certificates reflect its expectation that the
available credit enhancement for these classes will be within its
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current outstanding ratings.  The affirmations also reflect S&P's
review of the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining assets as well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on class A-M, S&P affirmed its rating on this
class because its analysis also considered its view of available
liquidity support and the risks associated with potential future
interest shortfalls from the specially serviced assets.  According
to the March 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $452,742.  The
current interest shortfalls are primarily due to interest not
advanced of $310,175, appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
amount of $42,250, and special servicing and workout fees of
$57,496.  The current interest shortfalls affected classes
subordinate to and including class A-J.  If class A-J continues to
short interest and the cumulative amount remain outstanding for
an extended period of time, S&P may lower the rating on this class
to 'D (sf).'

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-X interest-only
(IO) certificate based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust (Series 2006-C2)

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-2        AAA (sf)                          29.98
A-3        AAA (sf)                          29.98
A-1A       AAA (sf)                          29.98
A-M        BB+ (sf)                          16.90
A-J        CCC- (sf)                          7.75
A-X        AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


DEL CORONADO 2013-DEL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Del
Coronado Trust 2013-DEL's $285.0 million commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates series 2013-DEL.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $285.0 million, secured by a first lien
mortgage on the borrower's fee interest in the Hotel del Coronado
in Coronado, Calif., a first-lien mortgage encumbering all of the
operating lessee's rights in the property, and an assignment of
the borrower's and the operating lessee's contract rights related
to the property and intellectual property.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning and ending loan-to-value ratio of 65.9%, based on its
value of the property backing the transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1422.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Del Coronado Trust 2013-DEL

Class       Rating          Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)       127,600,000
X-CP        BB+ (sf)    285,000,000(i)
X-EXT       BB+ (sf)    285,000,000(i)
B           AA- (sf)        48,800,000
C           A- (sf)         36,400,000
D           BBB- (sf)       48,000,000
E           BB+ (sf)        24,200,000

(i) Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP and
     X-EXT certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
     principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the
     class A, B, C, D, and E certificates.


DENALI CAPITAL VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class B-2L Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Denali Capital CLO VI, Ltd.:

$27,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 21, 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 29, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf);

$24,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 21, 2020,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf);

$19,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 21, 2020,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf);

$16,000,000 Class C-1 Combination Notes Due April 21, 2020
(current rated balance of $7,051,388), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 29, 2012 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$277,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $182,903,094.93), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$100,000,000 Class A-1LR Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $66,029,998.17), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$14,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Ba3
(sf); previously on June 29, 2012 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in June 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1L
and A-1LR Notes have been paid down by approximately 33% or $128
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated March 7, 2013, the Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-
1L and Class B-2L overcollateralization ratios are reported at
124.46%, 114.50%, 107.68% and 103.15%, respectively, versus June
2012 levels of 117.33%, 110.75%, 106.04% and 102.82%,
respectively. Moody's notes that the overcollateralization ratios
in the March 2013 trustee report do not reflect $59.98 million of
principal proceeds, which Moody's was informed will be used to pay
down the Class A-1L and Class A-1LR Notes on the next payment date
in April.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on Moody's calculation, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2871 compared to 2772
in June 2012.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $340.14 million,
defaulted par of $6.11 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.33% (implying a WARF of 2871), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 51.42%, and a diversity
score of 68. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Denali Capital CLO VI, Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans, with some exposure to middle market loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. The methodology used in rating the Class C-1
Combination Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to
Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2297)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LR: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +2

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Class C-1: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3445)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LR: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: -1

Class C-1: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.


FIRST UNION 1999-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on IO-1 Notes to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes and
downgraded one class of First Union Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1999-C1 as follows:

Cl. IO-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2008 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The downgrade of the IO Class IO-1 is due to the decline in credit
quality of its referenced classes after the paydown of highly
rated classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 16.4% of
the current balance, up from 10.7% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 4.0% of the original
securitized balance, up from 3.4% at last review. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Class IO-1 was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 8 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model to evaluate pools
of credit tenant loans (CTLs) within CMBS transactions. Moody's
public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-9 is used to generate a
portfolio loss distribution to assess the ratings. Under Moody's
CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is
primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds. This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan. The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust. The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default. Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 5, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to $155.8
million from $1.16 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 59 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 62% of
the pool. Sixteen loans, representing 30% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains a credit tenant lease (CTL) component which
represents 25% of the pool.

Thirteen loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $21.2 million loss (17%
loss severity on average). Currently three loans, representing 17%
of the pool, are in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Prince George's Metro Center Loan ($18.9
million-12.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 375,000 square
foot (SF) office property located in Hyattsville, Maryland. The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2009 at the result
of delinquent payments. As of June 2012, the property was 55%
leased. The Borrower has agreed to an appointment of a receiver
with the ability to market and sell the property. The remaining
two specially serviced loans are secured by multifamily
properties. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $10.5
million appraisal reduction for the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $12.8 million loss (68%
expected loss based on a 100% probability of default) for one of
the specially serviced loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 1% of the pool and has estimated a
$400 thousand loss (38% expected loss based on a 75% probability
default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 87% and 95% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding the specially serviced, troubled, defeased
and CTL loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 72% compared to 71%
at last full review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Excluding the two specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.18X and 1.82X, respectively,
compared to 1.26X and 1.66X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 13% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is New Brighton Manor Loan ($9.2 million
-- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 300-bed skilled
nursing home located in Staten Island, New York. As of June 2012,
the property was 92% occupied the same as at last review. The loan
is currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 116% and 1.30X, respectively,
compared to 99% and 1.53X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Kelton Towers Loan ($6.4 million --
4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 105-unit multifamily
property located in Westwood, California. The property was 87%
leased as of September 2012 compared to 96% at the last review. A
deferred maintenance issue remains at the property and the master
servicer has requested remediation plans from the borrower.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 43% and 2.19X, respectively,
compared to 45% and 2.10X at last review.

The third largest loan is The Pines at Carolina Place Apartments
Loan ($4.4 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
multifamily property located in Pineville, North Carolina. As of
December 2012, the property was 95% leased. The loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to an upcoming maturity date in
May 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 57% and 1.72X,
respectively, compared to 63% and 1.56X at last review.

The CTL component includes 22 loans secured by properties leased
to nine tenants under bondable leases. Moody's provides public
ratings for 78% of the CTL component and an internal view on the
remainder of the CTL loans. The largest exposures include Rite Aid
Corp. (41% of the CTL component, Moody's senior unsecured rating
Caa2 -- stable outlook), Walgreen Co. (15%; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Baa1 -- negative outlook), and CVS/Caremark Corp.
(3%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 -- positive outlook).


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2013-1: S&P Gives Prelim 'BB' Rating on D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2013-1's $222.16 million
auto receivables-backed notes series 2013-1.

The note issuance is asset-backed securitization backed by
subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 8,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 36.7%, 31.5%, 24.5%, and
      20.8% credit support (including excess spread) for the class
      A, B, C, and D notes respectively, based on stressed cash
      flow scenarios.  These credit support levels provide
      coverage of approximately 2.55x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.50x
      S&P's 12.80-13.30% expected cumulative net loss range for
      the class A, B, C, and D notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under stress
      cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate to the
      assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, the ratings on the class A,
      B, and C notes will remain within two rating categories of
      the assigned preliminary ratings during the first year.
      This is within the two-category rating tolerance for S&P's
     'A', and 'BBB' rated securities, as outlined in its credit
      stability criteria.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The characteristics of the collateral pool being
      securitized; and

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1450.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2013-1

Class       Rating       Type            Interest    Amount
                                         Rate(ii)  (mil. $)
A           A+ (sf)      Senior          Fixed       174.00
B           A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed        14.50
C           BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed        21.00
D           BB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed        12.66

  (i) The actual coupons of these tranches will be determined on
      the pricing date.


GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Six CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the ratings of six
classes and affirmed 17 classes of GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. PPL-A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. PPL-B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. PPL-C, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. PPL-D, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. PPL-E, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. PPL-F, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades for the six rake classes associated with the Pacific
Place Loan are due to improved property performance and principal
amortization.

The affirmations of the pooled principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.2% of the
current pooled balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 2.8%. Realized losses have remained the same at
0.1% since the prior review. Moody's base expected loss plus
realized losses is now 2.9% of the original pooled balance
compared to 2.1% at last review. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments..

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Class X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25 compared to 27 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 11, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $931.5
million from $1.38 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 93 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 40% of the pool. Nineteen loans, representing 19% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains two loans with investment grade
credit assessments, representing 17% of the pool.

Sixteen loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $1.4 million (8.3% loss severity on
average). Five loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Continental Centre Loan ($23.7 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which
is secured by a 26-story, 477,259 square foot (SF) Class B office
building located in the Central Business District (CBD) of
Columbus, Ohio. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
December 2012 due to imminent monetary default. AT&T is the
largest tenant (34% NRA) and is negotiating to terminate a portion
of its lease, keeping 36,000 SF of its current 160,262 SF. The
borrower would like to use the termination proceeds to pay down
the loan and a loan modification is being discussed. As of
November 2012, the property was 79% leased and AT&T's
restructuring would cause occupancy to drop to 53%.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $19.0 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (44% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $11.7 million loss (17% expected loss) from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 93%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 84% compared to 85% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 7% to
the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.21X, respectively, compared to
1.46X and 1.25X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Tysons Corner
Center Loan ($83.9 million -- 9.0% of the pool), which represents
a 28% pari-passu interest in a first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by the borrower's interest in a 2.0 million SF regional
mall located in McLean, Virginia. The mall is anchored by
Bloomingdale's, Macy's, Nordstrom and Lord & Taylor. The
property's financial performance has improved since securitization
due to additional rental income from a 265,000 SF
renovation/expansion that was completed in 2007. The property was
98% leased as of June 2012, same at last review. Moody's current
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.41X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.31X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Pacific Place Loan
($76.2 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a two-
building mixed use property including retail, office and leased
hotel components. The loan is divided into a senior component
which is security for the pooled classes and six subordinate
components (totaling $23.9 million) which are security for non-
pooled classes PPL-A, PPL-B, PPL-C, PPL-D, PPL-E and PPL-F. The
property is located in the Union Square submarket of San
Francisco, California. The two buildings are referred to as Pac
One and Pac Two. Pac One is an eight-story property built in 1907
and renovated in 1981 and 1999. Old Navy occupies a portion of the
ground floor and the entire basement, second and third floors.
Part of the ground floor, as well as floors five through nine, are
leased to the 200-room Palomor Hotel through June 2097. Pac Two is
a 16-story building housing the subject's office component as well
as the Container Store on the two lower levels. Pac Two was built
in 1907 and renovated in 1999. As of December 2012, the complex
was 100% leased, the same at last review. The loan was interest
only for the first two years and now amortizes on a 360-month
schedule. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR for
the pooled portion of the loan are A2 and 1.79X, respectively,
compared to Baa1 and 1.60X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 11.2% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the Princeton Office Loan ($49.8 million -
- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by six Class A office
buildings located in the 10-building College Park Research Center
in Plainsboro Township, New Jersey. The complex was built in
phases between 1976 and 1981 and is encumbered by a ground lease
through 2037. As of September 2012, the property was 85% leased
compared to 91% at last review and 85% at securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 0.97X, respectively, compared
to 98% and 1.02X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Stonebriar Plaza Loan
($27.3 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by 182,147
SF retail property located in Frisco, Texas. As of November 2012,
the property was 79% leased compared to 76% at the last review and
85% at securitization. Property cash flow significantly dropped
during the recession but has shown slight signs of improvement as
the borrower has been able to lease up some of the vacant space.
Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan. The loan matures
in 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 167% and 0.58X,
respectively, compared to 163% and 0.60X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Riverpark Shopping Center
Loan ($27.0 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by an
anchored retail center consisting of seven single-level and five
free-standing ground lease buildings. HEB Grocery and Walgreen's
anchor the property. As of September 2012, the property was 95%
leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 108% and 0.90X at last review.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2005-GG5: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 CMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed ten classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding
Corp. Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-GG5 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 17, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 17, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 17, 2006
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on April 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 17, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on April 5, 2012 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 5, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 5, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 5, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 5, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 5, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 5, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 5, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on February 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations for the six investment grade principal and
interest bonds are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The ratings for Class F, G, H and J are consistent with Moody's
expected loss for those classes and thus are affirmed.

The downgrades of the five principal and interest bonds are due to
an increase in expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class XC, is to align the rating
with the expected credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.6% of
the current pooled compared with 10.4% at last review. Moody's
based expected plus realized losses is now 12.0% of the original
pooled balance compared to 11.2% at last review. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated
classes could decline below current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Class XC was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 27 compared to 31 at Moody's prior review.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 5, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the March 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 29% to $3.1
billion from $4.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 137 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
48% of the pool. Three loans, representing less than 1% of the
pool, have been defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government Securities. Two loans, representing 4% of the pool,
have investment grade credit assessments.

Twenty-nine loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated at a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $158 million (35%
average loss severity). Twenty-two loans, representing 22% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan was originally referred to as the Schron Industrial
Portfolio Loan, which was originally secured by 36 industrial-flex
properties located in 14 states. The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2010 and the portfolio is real estate owned
(REO). Eight of the properties were sold in a November 2012
auction. Each asset sold at a discount to its allocated loan
amount at securitization. The average discount to the allocated
loan amount was 14%. Sale proceeds were used to bring loan
payments current, recover outstanding advances and reduce the
principal loan balance by approximately $29 million. The servicer
has recognized a $135 million appraisal reduction for this loan.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $264 million appraisal
reduction for 13 of the 22 specially serviced loans and two
previously specially serviced loans that have transferred back to
the master servicer. Moody's has estimated a $263 million loss
(43% average loss severity) for 21 of the 22 specially serviced
loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes D through P
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $21
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs),
extraordinary trust expenses, loan modifications that include
either an interest rate reduction or a non-accruing note
component, and non-recoverability determinations by the servicer
that involve either a clawback of previously made advances or a
decision to stop making future advances.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 19 poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated a
$39 million aggregate loss (27% expected loss based on a 53%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial or full year
2012 operating results for 90% and 86% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97%
compared to 99% at Moody's prior review. The conduit portion of
the pool excludes specially serviced, troubled, defeased loans as
well as the two loans with credit assessments. Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.44X and 1.03X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Westfield San
Francisco Centre Loan ($60 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which
represents a participation interest in a $120 million mortgage
loan. The loan is secured by the borrower's leasehold interest a
498,000 square foot (SF), multi-story regional mall located in
downtown San Francisco, California. The mall anchors are Nordstrom
and Bloomingdale's. The property was 98% leased as of September
2012, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.27X, respectively, the
same as at Moody's last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Imperial Valley
Loan ($52 million - 1.7%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 765,000 SF regional mall located in El Centro,
California. The center is anchored by Sears, Dillard's, JC Penney
and Macy's. The mall was 99% leased as of September 2012 compared
to 98% as of September 2011. Property performance has improved due
primarily to an increase in rental and expense reimbursement
income. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
Baa2 and 1.50X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.33X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 24% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the 731 Lexington Avenue Loan
($320 million -- 10.5%), which is secured by a 148,000 SF multi-
level retail condominium located on Lexington Avenue between East
58th and East 59th Street in New York City. The property is 100%
leased, the same as last review. Major tenants include Home Depot,
which leases 53% of the premises through January 2025, H&M and the
Container Store. The complex also contains 105 luxury condominium
units and an office component that are not part of the collateral.
The office component serves as the headquarters for Bloomberg LP.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 0.86X, respectively, the
same as at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Lynnhaven Mall Loan ($219
million -- 7.2%), which is secured by the borrower's interest in a
1.3 million SF regional mall located in Virginia Beach, Virginia.
The mall is anchored by JC Penney, Macy's and Dillard's. The loan
sponsor is General Growth Properties. The total mall was 90%
leased as of September 2012, compared to 89% as of September 2011.
The in-line space was 98% leased as of September 2012. Total mall
occupancy is lower than the in-line space because a 120,000 SF
anchor space has been vacant since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 102% and 0.87X, respectively, compared to 96%
and 0.93X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the JQH Hotel Portfolio A Loan
($185 million -- 6.0%), which is secured by eight full-service
hotels located in eight separate states. In addition the
geographic diversity, the portfolio benefits from hotel flag
diversity as the portfolio operates under six separate hotel
flags. Revenue per available room (RevPAR) increased at each
property in 2012. On average portfolio RevPAR grew 5.6% in 2012 to
$78.81 compared to $74.62 in 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 119% and 1.0X, respectively, compared to 129% and 0.92X at
last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed the rating of eleven classes of Notes issued by
GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Series 2006-RR2 due to the
key transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate
with the existing ratings levels. While the WARF increased over
the last review period, this was offset primarily by greater than
expected recoveries on defaulted collateral. The rating action is
the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic)
transactions.

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Series 2006-RR2 is a static
pooled re-remic transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the pool balance). As
of the March 25, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance
of the transaction has decreased to $662.6 million from $771.0
million at issuance, due to full losses applied to classes L and
subordinated classes, and partial losses applied to class K. The
Class A-1 notes had partial principal reduction due to recoveries
and amortization.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,465
compared to 6,708 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 1.6% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.2% compared to 0.7% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(4.2% compared to 4.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (10.2% compared to
12.3% at last review), B1-B3 (5.4% compared to 5.9% at last
review), and Caa1-C (80.0% compared to 74.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.6 years compared to 4.3 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 4.0% compared to 5.2% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0% compared to 100.0% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 4.0% to 14.0% or down to 0.0% would not result in any
further movement on the rated tranches

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-PEMB: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating to Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2013-PEMB
$260.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-PEMB.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one 12-year, $260 million commercial
mortgage loan secured by the fee interest in Pembroke Lakes Mall
and the accompanying leases, rent, and other income.  Pembroke
Lakes Mall is a 1.13 million-sq.-ft regional mall located in
Pembroke Pines, Fla. Of the total mall square footage, 743,096 sq.
ft. will serve as the loan's collateral.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 3,
2013.

The  preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1444.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2013-PEMB

Class         Rating(i)            Amount (mil. $)
A             AAA (sf)                     152.196
B             AA- (sf)                      33.822
C             A- (sf)                       25.366
D             BBB- (sf)                     31.116
E             BB (sf)                       17.500

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
     institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities
     Act of 1933.


JER CRE 2005-1: Moody's Keeps 'C' Ratings on Eight Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed the rating of eight classes of Notes issued by
JER CRE CDO 2005-1, Ltd. due to the key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic) transactions.

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

JER CRE CDO 2005-1, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (95.2%)
and CRE CDOs (4.8%). As of the March 20, 2013 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction has decreased to $298.2
million from $416.0 million at issuance. This was primarily due to
(i) losses allocable to the preferred shares, (ii) recoveries on
defaulted assets, (iii) interest re-classification on defaulted
assets, and (iv) interest re-classification as a result of failing
the senior par value trigger.

The transaction entered into an event of default on June 25, 2010
due to an interest shortfall to the B-1 and B-2 non-PIKable notes.
As such, an event of default resulted and the controlling party
delivered an acceleration notice on April 10, 2012. However on
October 9, 2012, the trustee filed a court petition seeking to
rescind the notice of acceleration. Since November, 2012, all
interest and principal proceeds received from the collateral are
being escrowed by the trustee pending resolution of the litigation
between the controlling party and the trustee.

Thirty-four assets with a par balance of $156.6 million (95.9% of
the pool balance) were listed as defaulted securities as of the
March 20, 2013 Trustee Report. Thirty-one of these assets (90.8%
of the defaulted balance) are CMBS and three assets are CRE CDOs
(9.2%). Moody's expects significant losses to occur on these
assets once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,453
compared to 9,512 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Baa1-Baa3 (4.1% compared to 2.8% at last
review) and Caa1-C (95.9% compared to 97.2% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.2 years compared to 4.5 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 1.4% compared to 1.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, same as last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 1.4% to 11.4% would not result in any further movement on
the rated tranches

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


JP MORGAN 2002-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H and J certificates to 'D
(sf)' because it expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  As of the
March 12, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls totaling $106,777, primarily related
to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts of
$99,070 and special servicing fees of $7,581.  The interest
shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and including class
H. The class H and J certificates have accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for 10 consecutive months.

S&P lowered its rating on class G because of reduced liquidity
support available to this class and the susceptibility of this
class to interest shortfalls from the specially serviced loans.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on these classes to also
reflect the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining loans, as well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on classes E and F, S&P affirmed its ratings on
these classes because its analysis also considered its view on
available liquidity support and risks associated with potential
interest shortfalls in the future.  S&P believes these increased
interest shortfalls may result from three ($19.2 million, 24.6%)
of the five loans ($38.9 million, 50.0%) that are with the special
servicer, and from any of the four loans on the master servicer's
watchlist ($4.3 million, 5.6%).

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
its adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.05x and a its loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio of 73.1% for nine of the 17 remaining loans
($77.9 million) in the pool.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude
four ($23.5 million, 30.2%) of the five loans ($38.9 million,
50.0%) that are with the special servicer (details below) and four
defeased loans ($9.2 million, 11.8%).

As of the March 12, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $77.9 million,
down from $816.7 million at issuance.  The pool has 17 loans, down
from 129 loans at issuance.  To date, the transaction has
experienced losses totaling $22.7 million or 2.8% of the
transaction's original certificate balance.  Five ($38.9 million,
50.0%) of the remaining 17 loans are with the special servicer
(discussed below).  In addition, four loans ($4.3 million, 5.6%)
in the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Excluding the
specially serviced loans, two loans ($3.5 million, 4.5%) had a
reported DSC below 1.00x.  Details on the largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist are as follows:

The Newbury Park Village loan ($2.6 million, 3.3%), the largest
loan on the master servicer's watchlist, is secured by a 23,112-
sq.-ft. retail property in Thousand Oaks, Calif.  The loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC and
occupancy.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells
Fargo), reported a DSC of 0.71x for year-end 2012 and occupancy
was 77.6%, according to the Dec. 27, 2012, rent roll.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED LOANS

As of the March 12, 2013, trustee remittance report, five loans
($38.9 million, 50.0%) were with the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC (LNR).  The payment status of all of the loans was
reported as nonperforming matured balloon loans.  Appraisal
reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $17.2 million were in effect
against four of the five specially serviced loans.  Details on the
specially serviced loans are as follows:

The Akron Centre Plaza loan ($15.4 million, 19.8%), the largest
loan with the special servicer, is secured by a 195,623-sq.-ft.
office building in Akron, Ohio.  The reported total exposure was
$15.6 million.  The loan was transferred to LNR on July 27, 2012,
because of maturity default.  The loan matured on July 1, 2012.
LNR reported an 87.0% occupancy as of March 1, 2013 and a 0.57x
DSC for year-end 2011.  LNR indicated to S&P that it is pursuing
various workout strategies including a loan modification.  An ARA
of $5.4 million is in effect against this loan.

The Park 42 loan ($11.4 million, 14.6%), the second-largest loan
with LNR, is secured by a 283,315-sq.-ft. flex office/warehouse
building in Cincinnati, Ohio.  The reported total exposure was
$12.5 million.  The loan was transferred to LNR on Jan. 5, 2012,
because of imminent default.  LNR stated that it is currently
pursuing foreclosure.  Occupancy was 72.1%, according to the March
2013 rent roll and the reported net cash flow at the property is
insufficient to cover debt service.  An ARA of $9.3 million is in
effect against this loan.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

The Cedarstone loan ($5.0 million, 6.5%), the third-largest loan
with LNR, is secured by a 217-unit garden-styled apartment complex
in Jackson, Miss.  The reported total exposure was $5.7 million.
The loan was transferred to LNR on April 10, 2012, because of
delinquent payments.  Occupancy was 91.2%, according to the
Jan. 31, 2013, rent roll and reported DSC was 1.12x for year-end
2011.  LNR stated that it is currently evaluating various workout
strategies, including foreclosure for this loan.  An ARA of
$1.9 million is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a
moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

The Lotus Building loan ($4.3 million, 5.5%), the second-smallest
loan with LNR, is secured by a 50,057-sq.-ft. suburban office
building in Southfield, Mich.  The reported total exposure was
$4.3 million.  The loan was transferred to LNR on May 10, 2012,
because of maturity default.  The loan matured on May 12, 2012.
The reported occupancy and DSC were 100% and 1.04x, respectively,
for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012.  LNR stated that the
loan paid off in full on March 21, 2013.

The Park Villa Apartments loan ($2.8 million, 3.6%), the smallest
loan with LNR, is secured by a 92-unit garden-styled apartment
complex in Atlanta, Ga.  The reported total exposure was
$3.2 million.  The loan was transferred to LNR on Dec. 14, 2011,
because of delinquent payments.  LNR indicated that recent
operating performance data is not available for this loan.  LNR
stated that it is currently evaluating various workout strategies,
including foreclosure.  An ARA of $601,246 is in effect against
this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1
                 Rating
Class      To             From     Credit enhancement (%)
G          B- (sf)        BB (sf)                   39.00
H          D (sf)         CCC (sf)                  23.27
J          D (sf)         CCC- (sf)                 15.41

RATINGS AFFIRMED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
E          A- (sf)                      75.69
F          BBB+ (sf)                    59.97


JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC8: S&P Cuts Rating on Class K Notes to 'D(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2004-CIBC8, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 10 other
classes from the same transaction, including the rating on the
class X-1 interest-only (IO) certificates.  In addition, S&P
withdrew its 'AAA (sf)' rating on class A-3 certificates from the
same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrade on class J reflects the reduced liquidity support
available to this class due to ongoing interest shortfalls and the
susceptibility of this class to interest shortfalls from the
specially serviced assets.  S&P lowered its rating on the class K
certificates to 'D (sf)' because it expects interest shortfalls to
continue, and S&P believes the accumulated interest shortfalls
will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Class K has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 15 consecutive
months.

As of the March 12, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $65,589, of which
$45,161 was related to interest not advanced on one of the
specially serviced assets, and $21,596 was related to special
servicing fees.  The interest shortfalls affected all classes
subordinate to and including class K.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's analysis of the
credit characteristics and performance of the remaining loans and
transaction-level changes.

The affirmation of S&P's 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-1 IO
certificates reflects its current criteria for rating IO
securities.

S&P withdrew its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-3 certificates
following the full repayment of the class' principal balance, as
noted in the March 12, 2013, trustee remittance report.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
(Series 2004-CIBC8)

                    Rating
Class          To          From      Credit enhancement (%)
J              CCC (sf)    B- (sf)                     2.68
K              D (sf)      CCC- (sf)                   1.80

RATINGS AFFIRMED
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
(Series 2004-CIBC8)

Class          Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
A-1A           AAA (sf)                              22.37
A-4            AAA (sf)                              22.37
B              AA+ (sf)                              18.00
C              AA (sf)                               16.03
D              A (sf)                                12.09
E              A- (sf)                               10.12
F              BBB+ (sf)                              7.93
G              BB+ (sf)                               6.18
H              B+ (sf)                                3.55
X-1            AAA (sf)                                N/A

N/A -Not applicable.

RATING WITHDRAWN

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
(Series 2004-CIBC8)

                   Rating
Class          To          From
A-3            NR          AAA (sf)

NR-Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC13: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class C Certs to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed 21 classes
of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series
2005-CIBC13 (JPMCC 2005-CIBC13) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 15.9% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 15.8%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $122.2 million (4.5% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 64 loans (38%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 13 specially serviced assets (19.9%). The downgrade to
class AM is due to continued uncertainty related to the
disposition of the specially serviced assets.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings of the super senior classes are expected to remain
stable as these classes are expected to continue to receive
paydown. The rating on the class AM may be subject to future
downgrade if losses are greater than expected. Distressed classes
(those rated 'CCC' and below) are expected to be subject to
further downgrades as losses are realized.

As of the March 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 28.7% to $1.94 billion from
$2.72 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, one loan
(0.3% of the pool) has defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes C through NR.
The largest contributor to expected losses is the real estate
owned (REO) DRA-CRT Portfolio (6.9% of the pool). The portfolio,
which was originally secured by 16 office properties, now consists
of only two Rockville, MD located properties. While the 14 other
properties were sold in the last quarter of 2012, the special
servicer is working to stabilize the remaining two properties
before marketing them for sale. Recent valuations of these
properties were significantly below the remaining loan balance.

The next largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a
defaulted loan (5.4%) secured by The Shore Club, a 322-room luxury
hotel property located in the South Beach area of Miami, FL. The
loan transferred to special servicing in September 2009 due to
imminent default. Property performance has been well below
expectations at issuance. The special servicer is currently
pursuing foreclosure; however, ongoing litigation has delayed the
process.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Investcorp
Portfolio (2.9%). While three properties are owned by the trust;
one property is still going through the foreclosure process. The
portfolio is currently comprised of one industrial and three
office properties located in suburban Philadelphia, PA. The
special servicer is working to stabilize the four properties
before marketing them for sale. A fifth property was recently sold
at auction with proceeds applied to paydown outstanding advances
and expenses.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $272.1 million class AM to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
   Negative;
-- $23.8 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes but assigns or revises REs as
indicated:

-- $187 million class AJ at 'CCCsf'; RE 65%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $188.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.5 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $206.4 million class A-3A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25 million class A-3A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $751.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.7 million class A-2FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54.4 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $44.2 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $34 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $37.4 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $30.6 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $10.5 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2
certificates.


JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class H Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C6, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C6.

Key Rating Drivers

Affirmations are due to stable pool performance since issuance.
There have been no delinquent or specially serviced loans since
issuance and the pool has experienced no realized losses to date.
As of the March 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 0.8% to $1.125 billion from
$1.134 billion at issuance. No loans have defeased since issuance.
The servicer has placed three loans (7.6% of the pool) on the
watchlist, including one of the top 15 loans.

The largest loan on the watchlist (4.9% of the pool) is the 8080 &
9400 North Central Expressway loan, a two-building office
portfolio with total combined 673,188 square feet (sf) located in
suburban Dallas, TX. The largest tenants are Healthtexas Provider
Network (92,167 sf, expires 11/2022) and Compass Bank (53,938 sf,
expires 9/2023). According to the servicer, total occupancy
declined to 77% as of December 2012, from 85% at issuance. At
issuance Fitch's cash flow analysis adjusted vacancy to 22.8%,
which is in-line with current performance. Additionally, the
subject vacancy is currently in-line with market vacancy, which is
evident per the REIS fourth quarter (4Q'12) office report showing
vacancy in the market and the NC Expy/NE Dallas submarket of 23.4%
and 19.5%, respectively.

Ratings Sensitivity

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks. Additional information on
rating sensitivity is available in the report 'JPMCC 2012-C6'
(April 11, 2012), available at www.fitchratings.com.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated, with a Stable
Outlook:

-- $45.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $145.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $491.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $102.9 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $99.2 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $56.7 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $25.5 million class C at 'A+sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $28.3 million class D at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $55.3 million class E at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $1.4 million class F at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15.6 million class G at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $18.4 million class H at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $884.2 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $241 million interest-only class X-B or
the $39.7 million class NR.


KKR FINANCIAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the Class
A notes from KKR Financial CLO 2007-A Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) managed by KKR Financial Advisors.  At the
same time, Standard & Poor's removed this rating from CreditWatch,
where it had been placed with positive implications on Jan. 4,
2013.  In addition, Standard & Poor's affirmed its ratings on the
Class B, C, D, E, and F notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Feb. 15,
2013.  The upgrade reflects a $235.70 million principal paydown to
the Class A notes since S&P's May 2012 rating actions.

The balance of defaulted collateral has declined since S&P's May
2012.  According to the February 2013 trustee report, the
transaction held no defaulted assets, a decrease from
$24.38 million noted in the April 2012 trustee report, which
S&P used for its last rating actions.

Post-reinvestment period principal amortization has resulted in
paydowns to the Class A notes since S&P's last rating action.
Consequently, the transaction's senior, C, D, and E
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio tests have improved.

The transaction has exposure to long-dated assets (assets maturing
after the stated maturity of the CLO).  According to the February
2013 trustee report, the balance of collateral with a maturity
date after the stated maturity of the transaction totaled
$96.47 million, accounting for 11.11% of the portfolio.  S&P's
analysis took into account the potential market value and
settlement-related risk that would arise if the remaining
securities were liquidated on the legal final maturity date of the
transaction.

The Class B, C, and D notes ratings were driven by the largest
obligor default test, a supplemental stress test S&P introduced as
part of its 2009 corporate criteria update.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings on
the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them, and we will take further rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

                           Feb. 2013            April 2012
Class                      Notional (Mil. $)    Notional (Mil. $)
A                          456.17               691.87
B                           30.00                30.00
C                           70.00                70.00
D                           57.00                57.00
E                           45.00                45.00
F                           17.00                17.00

Senior  O/C                171.32%              148.19%
Class B O/C                149.76%              135.09%
Class C O/C                135.84%              126.02%
Class D O/C                126.55%              119.68%

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

KKR Financial CLO 2007-A Ltd.

                   Rating       Rating
Class              To           From
A                  AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)
C                  A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
D                  BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
E                  BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)
F                  BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)


LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2005-MF1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on A Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class of
LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-MF1 as
follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on September 16, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of Class C is consistent with Moody's expected loss and
is thus affirmed.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.3% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
7.9%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 16.7%
of the original pooled balance compared to 16.2% at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit support
for the principal classes could decline below their current
levels. If future performance materially declines, credit support
may be insufficient to support the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 108 compared to 126 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 11, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 20, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 64% to $138.6
million from $387.3 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 155 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 2% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
approximately 17% of the pool.

Forty-six loans, representing approximately 31% of the pool, are
on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As
part of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Sixty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a realized loss of $51.8 million (67%
loss severity on average). Currently, 11 loans, representing 6% of
the pool, are in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$5.53 million loss (67% expected loss on average) for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 24 poorly
performing loans representing approximately 15% of the pool and
has estimated an aggregate $5.1 million loss (25% expected loss
based on a 50% probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's was provided with full
year 2011 operating results for 82% of the pool. Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 92% compared to 94% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.21X compared to 1.36X and 1.17X
at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.


LB-UBS 2000-C4: S&P Raises Rating on Class G Notes to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
F commercial mortgage pass-through certificates to 'BBB- (sf)'
from 'BB- (sf)' and the class G certificates to 'B+ (sf)' from
'CCC+ (sf)' from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C4, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrades reflect S&P's expected available credit enhancement
for the classes, which it believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the most recent
rating level, as well as S&P's reviews regarding the current and
future performance of the collateral supporting the transaction.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest even further
positive rating movement on classes F and G, S&P's analysis also
considered its view on available liquidity support and risks
associated with potential interest shortfalls in the future.  S&P
believes the potential for increased interest shortfalls may
result from the largest asset in the pool, the 111 Franklin Plaza
asset ($10.3 million, 18.1%), which is with the special servicer,
and from any of the four loans on the master servicer's watchlist
($16.6 million, 29.1%).

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated its
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.16x and a its loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio of 64.3% for 12 ($39.4 million, 68.9%) of the 17
remaining assets in the pool.  The DSC and LTV calculations
exclude the one specially serviced asset ($10.3 million, 18.1%)
detailed below, two non-reporting loans ($4.9 million, 8.7%), and
two defeased loans ($2.5 million, 4.3%).

As of the March 15, 2013 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $57.1 million, down from
$999.1 million at issuance.  The pool has 16 loans and one real
estate owned (REO) asset, down from 167 loans at issuance.  To
date, the transaction has experienced losses totaling
$43.9 million, or 4.4% of the transaction's original pool balance.
One ($10.3 million, 18.1%) of the remaining 17 assets is with the
special servicer.  In addition, four loans ($16.6 million, 29.1%)
in the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Excluding the
specially serviced asset, eight loans ($23.9 million, 41.9%) had
a Standard & Poor's adjusted DSC below 1.00x.

The largest asset in the pool is 111 Franklin Plaza, with a trust
balance of $10.3 million (18.1% of the trust balance) and is the
sole asset with the special servicer.  The 111 Franklin Plaza
asset has a reported total exposure of $12.5 million, which
includes approximately $2.2 million in servicing advances.  The
asset consists of a 140,459-square-foot office building in
downtown Roanoke, Va.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC, on Sept. 12, 2011 for
imminent monetary default, and the property became REO on
March 30, 2012.  A $3.9 million appraisal reduction amount is in
effect for this asset.  According to the special servicer, the
asset is currently 54.0% occupied and the strategy is to stabilize
the asset.  S&P expects the trust to experience a moderate loss
upon the resolution of this asset.

Details on the four loans on the master servicer's watchlist are
as follows:

The largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist is the
Towneplace Suites Sterling loan ($5.0 million, 8.7%), secured by a
95-room extended-stay hotel in Sterling, Va.  The loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC.  According
to the master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital (KeyBank), the
decreased DSC is due to increased operating expenses, poor market
conditions, and concessions.  The reported DSC and occupancy were
0.59x and 74.3%, respectively, as of year-end 2012.

The second-largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist is the
Dulles North - Phase I loan, a $4.2 million loan (7.4%) secured by
a 59,886 square foot office building in Sterling, Va.  The loan is
on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC.
According to KeyBank, the decreased DSC is due to several tenants
vacating upon lease expiration.  The reported DSC and occupancy
were 0.27x and 9.3%, respectively, as of year-end 2012.

The third-largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist is the
1000 Circle 75 loan ($4.2 million,7.4%), secured by a
89,412-square-foot office building in Atlanta, Ga.  The loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC.
Keybank attributed the decreased DSC to increased vacancy and
rental concessions.  The reported DSC and occupancy were 0.74x and
78.2%, respectively, as of year-end 2012.

The smallest loan on the master servicer's watchlist is the
Commerce Center loan, a $3.2 million loan (5.6%), secured by a
61,149-square-foot industrial building in Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low
reported DSC.  KeyBank stated that the decreased DSC is due to
current market conditions and rental concessions.  The reported
DSC and occupancy were 0.47x and 66.7%, respectively, as of year-
end 2012.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept.
26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C4
                            To           From
Class F                     BBB-(sf)     BB-(sf)
Class G                     B+(sf)       CCC+(sf)


LB-UBS 2004-C2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class H Notes to 'BB-(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time, the
ratings on nine other classes from the same transaction were
affirmed.

The downgrades reflect reduced liquidity support to the classes as
a result of interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust.  The
affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades on classes G and H reflect reduced liquidity
support to the classes as a result of interest shortfalls that are
affecting the trust.  According to the March 15, 2013 trustee
remittance report, the current interest shortfalls resulted
primarily from appraisal subordination entitlement reduction
(ASER) amounts ($65,303) related to nine ($41.9 million, 5.6%) of
the 10 assets ($51.6 million, 6.9%) that are currently with the
special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR), and special servicing
and workout fees ($12,033).  S&P also considered the risks
associated with additional interest shortfalls in the future.
Specifically, S&P considered the potential for the 10 specially
serviced assets and 38 performing, nondefeased loans with 2013 and
2014 maturities ($571.0 million, 76.7%) to generate additional
interest shortfalls and decrease the liquidity support available
to the classes.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the nine principal and
interest paying certificates reflect its expectation that the
available credit enhancement for these classes will be within
S&P's estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for
the current outstanding ratings.  While available credit
enhancement levels may suggest positive rating movement on the
affirmed classes, S&P affirmed its ratings because its analysis
also considered the volume of nondefeased, performing loans that
are scheduled to mature through Dec. 31, 2014 (38 loans,
$571.0 million, 76.7% of the trust balance).  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's view of available liquidity support and the
risks associated with potential future interest shortfalls from
the upcoming maturing loans and specially serviced assets.

In addition, the rating actions are based on S&P's review of the
credit characteristics and performance of the remaining assets, as
well as the transaction-level changes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-CL interest-only
(IO) certificate based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
           Rating
Class      To            From             Credit enhancement (%)
G          BBB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)        6.78
H          BB- (sf)      BB (sf)          5.12

RATINGS AFFIRMED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-3        AAA (sf)         19.42
A-4        AAA (sf)         19.42
B          AA+ (sf)         17.3
C          AA (sf)          15.48
D          AA- (sf)         13.83
E          A+ (sf)          11.55
F          A (sf)           9.68
J          B- (sf)          3.67
X-CL       AAA (sf)         N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


MASTR ADJUSTABLE 2003-7: Moody's Cuts Class B-1 Secs. Rating to B2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded five tranches from MASTR
Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2003-7 transaction backed by Alt-A
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2003-7

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

These actions reflect recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to Rating
US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in December
2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in
January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a transaction
has a specific structural feature, such as a credit enhancement
floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size, Moody's can
choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004, 5% for 2003
and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.50
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.6% in March 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


MORGAN STANLEY 1998-WF2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class M Certs. to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed five classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-WF2.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. As of the March 2013 distribution
date, the pool's certificate balance has been reduced by 94.73%
(including 0.86% in realized losses) to $55.9 million from $1.1
billion at issuance. One loan (14.3%) is defeased. There are
currently no specially serviced loans in the pool. Interest
shortfalls are affecting classes M and N.

Ratings Sensitivity

The Rating Outlook for classes G through M remain Stable as they
benefit from high credit enhancement. The pool is concentrated,
with the largest loan, 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington DC,
representing 61% of the pool, although Fitch does expect this loan
to be able to refinance a maturity.

Fitch downgrades the following class:

-- $5.3 million class M to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 95%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $23.9 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.6 million class H at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8 million class J at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8 million class K at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.9 million class L at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Classes A-1, A-2 and B through F have paid in full. Fitch does not
rate class N. The rating on class X has previously been withdrawn.


RIDGEFIELD APARTMENTS: S&P Lowers Rating on 2007 Bonds to 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating on
Louisiana Housing Finance Agency's (Ridgefield Apartments Project)
series 2007 multifamily housing revenue bonds by one notch to 'B-'
from 'B'.  This rating action is based Standard & Poor's view of
the project's reliance on short-term market-rate investments.  The
outlook is negative.

The lowering of the rating reflects Standard & Poor's view of:

   -- The revenues from mortgage debt service payments and
      investment earnings, which are considered insufficient to
      pay full and timely debt service on the bonds plus fees
      until maturity;

   -- The debt service coverage is projected to fall below
      investment-grade in the near-to-medium term; and

   -- The asset-to-liability parity is projected to fall below
      100% by the bond maturity date.

Credit strengths include Standard & Poor's view of:

   -- The investments held in JPMorgan money market fund (AAAm);

   -- The 100.61% asset-to-liability ratio as of March 29, 2013;
      and

   -- The high credit quality of the Ginnie Mae pass-through
      certificate; which Standard & Poor's considers 'AA+'
      eligible under its rating criteria.

"The negative outlook reflects our anticipation that the revenue
fund deficits may hinder debt service payments in the short term,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Renee Berson, "thus further
deteriorating the issue's debt service ratios."

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as stated in Standard & Poor's revised criteria for
certain federal government-enhanced housing transactions.
Standard & Poor's believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond
costs from transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these
reinvestment earnings.

If the security prepays, Standard & Poor's believes there are
insufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the
30-day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XIV: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Octagon
Investment Partners XIV Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners XIV LLC's
$569.25 million floating-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of Feb. 27, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Octagon Investment Partners XIV Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners
XIV LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                    377.625
A-2a                       AA (sf)                      48.000
A-2b                       AA (sf)                      15.000
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                       51.375
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                     30.000
D (deferrable)             BB- (sf)                     33.750
E (deferrable)             B (sf)                       13.500



RESTRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Cuts Rating on Series 2006-6-E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of the following
certificates issued by Restructured Asset Certificates with
Enhanced Returns, Series 2006-6-E Trust:

$7,500,000 RACERS Series 2006-6-E Certificates Notes, Downgraded
to C (sf); previously on April 2, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's notes that the Certificates are secured by $7,500,000 of
Class B Notes issued by Galleria CDO V, Ltd., which are currently
rated C (sf), and $4,000,000 of Class C-2 Notes issued by
Independence III CDO, Ltd., which has liquidated with no recovery
value. Moody's also notes that the rating is based primarily upon
the transaction's structure and the credit quality of the
underlying securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the ratings are a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


SNAAC 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to SNAAC
Auto Receivables Trust 2013-1's $185 million notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 36.43%, 28.96%, 22.10%,
      and 18.98% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively, based on stress cash-flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of
       slightly more than 3.10x, 2.40x, 1.75x, and 1.50x S&P's
      10.5%-11.5% expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under stress
      cash-flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the assigned
      ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      and B notes would remain within one rating category of S&P's
      'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively, within the
      first year and S&P's ratings on the class C and D notes
      would remain within two rating categories of S&P's 'BBB
      (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively, within the first
      year.  These potential rating movements are consistent with
      S&P's credit stability criteria, which outline the outer
      bound of credit deterioration equal to a one-category
      downgrade within the first year for 'AA' rated securities
      and a two-category downgrade within the first year for 'A'
      through 'BB' rated securities under moderate stress
      conditions.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The favorable track record of the management team, which has
      many years of experience individually in the industry and
      together at the company.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool, with
      8.5 months of seasoning and 53.1 months of remaining term.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1439.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

SNAAC Auto Receivables Trust 2013-1

Class         Rating                Amount
                                   (mil. $)
A             AA (sf)               141.70
B             A (sf)                 18.00
C             BBB (sf)               16.90
D             BB (sf)                 8.40


SPRINGLEAF 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class B-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Springleaf Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-1's $835.114 million mortgage-
backed notes series 2013-1.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by residential mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The loan's characteristics that are, from a credit
      perspective, significantly more risky than its archetypical
      pool.

   -- The operations and counterparty risks, including Springleaf
      Finance Corp. and its decision to exit the origination
      business.

   -- The financial ability of the representation and warranty
      provider to meet potential repurchase claims in a 'AAA' or
      'AA' rating scenario.

   -- The credit enhancement provided by an excess interest cash
      flow structure with no step-down and an interest rate
      reserve fund.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1440.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Springleaf Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-1

Class       Rating           Amount
                           (mil. $)
A(i)        AAA (sf)        500.704
M-1(i)      AA (sf)          83.792
M-2(i)      A+ (sf)          49.048
M-3(i)      A- (sf)          58.000
M-4         BBB (sf)         36.276
M-5(ii)     A- (sf)         691.544
M-6(ii)     A- (sf)         190.840
M-7(ii)     AA (sf)         584.496
M-8(ii)     A- (sf)         107.048
M-9(ii)     A+ (sf)         633.544
B-1         BB (sf)          54.669
B-2         B (sf)           52.625
B-3(i)      NR              184.177
B-3-A(ii)   NR               46.044
B-3-B(ii)   NR               46.044
B-3-C(ii)   NR               46.044
B-3-D(ii)   NR               46.044
B-3-E(ii)   NR               92.089
B-3-F(ii)   NR              138.133
X-A(iii)    NR              500.704
X-M1(iii)   NR               83.792
X-M2(iii)   NR               49.048
X-M3(iii)   NR               58.000
X-M4(iii)   NR               36.276
X-B1(iii)   NR               54.669
C           NR                2.555
R           NR                  N/A

  (i) Modifiable and exchangeable class issued on closing date.
(ii) Modifiable and exchangeable class.
(iii) Component of the class X notes.
NR - Not rated.
N/A - Not applicable.


SYMPHONY CLO X: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $16.5MM Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Symphony CLO X Ltd./ Symphony CLO X LLC's $371.5 million floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
Oct. 5, 2012.  The class X notes are unrated following the paydown
of the notes.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of S&P's review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, it perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with S&P's criteria to assess
whether the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit
enhancement based on the effective date collateral portfolio.
S&P's analysis relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a
scenario default rate at each rating level based on the effective
date portfolio, full cash flow modeling to determine the
appropriate percentile break-even default rate at each rating
level, the application of S&P's supplemental tests, and the
analytical judgment of a rating committee.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discuss its analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to publish an
effective date report each time it issues an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Symphony CLO X Ltd./Symphony CLO X LLC
Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)               260.00
B                       AA (sf)                 36.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                  40.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                19.00
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                 16.50


SYNERGY BELLA: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'A- (sf)', 'BBB-
(sf)', and 'BB- (sf)' long-term ratings on Anderson, Ind.'s
(Synergy Bella Indiana LLC) series 2010A, 2010B subordinate, and
2010C junior subordinate multifamily housing bonds, respectively,
relating to the Cross Lakes/Giant Oaks Apartments Projects, on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

These rating actions follow repeated attempts by Standard & Poor's
to obtain timely information of satisfactory quality to maintain
S&P's ratings on the securities, in accordance with its applicable
criteria and policies.  Failure to receive the requested
information by April 15, 2013, will likely result in S&P's
suspension of the affected ratings, preceded, in accordance with
its policies, by any change to the ratings that it considers
appropriate given available information.


TAR HEEL: S&P Assigns B+(sf) Rating to $500MM Series 2013-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'B+(sf)' rating to the $500 million of series 2013-1 notes issued
by Tar Heel Re Ltd.  The notes cover losses in North Carolina from
hurricanes on an annual aggregate basis.

The rating is based on the lower of the rating on the catastrophe
risk ('B+'), the rating on the assets in the issuer's collateral
account ('AAAm'), and the rating on the ceding reinsurer ('AA-').

Covered losses will not be directly linked to Munich Re America's
exposure in North Carolina, but rather they will be based on the
actual losses of the North Carolina Joint Underwriters Assn.
(NCJUA) and the North Carolina Insurance Underwriters Assn.
(NCIUA).

This is the fourth catastrophe bond sponsored by the NCJUA/NCIUA
to be rated by Standard & Poor's, though the first one modeled by
Risk Management Solutions Inc. (RMS).  Due to the significant
differences between the ways AIR Worldwide Corp. and RMS model
losses, the stress rate S&P applied to the aggregate exceedance
probability curve was higher as compared with the indicative level
for indemnified transactions set forth in S&P's criteria.

RATINGS LIST
New Rating

Tar Heel Re Ltd.
$500 mil. series 2013-1 notes            B+(sf)


TIMBERSTAR TRUST: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of TimberStar Trust I,
series 2006-1, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

While the appraised value has improved since issuance,
affirmations and the Negative Outlook on classes D, E and F are
warranted due to the significant volatility recently exhibited in
commodity prices and the continued depressed demand for wood and
paper products. Additionally, collateral performance has exhibited
declining cash flow trends over the past few years, however, year-
end (YE) 2012 net cash-flow (NCF) improved by approximately 14%
over YE 2011.

RATING SENSITIVITY

Collateral performance is affected by fluctuations of supply and
demand and pricing in the wood products market. The two sectors of
the economy that most directly influence the demand for timber are
housing and pulp and paper. The decline in home construction
during the recession has adversely impacted the performance of the
portfolio but current indicators point to a recovery in that
sector. Should timber demand increase over the coming years the
Rating Outlooks on classes D, E and F could become stable.
Upgrades are unlikely given the volatility of the timber market.
Should NCF show deterioration downgrades to classes D, E and F are
possible.

The transaction is a single borrower, interest-only loan with an
expected repayment date of Oct. 15, 2016. As of the March 2013
distribution date, the transaction balance is $800 million,
unchanged since issuance.

Collateral for the loan is a first-priority mortgage lien on
timberlands located in Texas (43% of the total acreage), Louisiana
(31%), and Arkansas (26%).

At issuance total acreage was 874,490 of which 99,993 was non-
mortgage acreage considered higher and better use (HBU) land that
is expected to be sold. Timber growing on the HBU land is pledged
as security for the trust; however, any proceeds from the sale of
the land will not be pledged to the trust. As of December 2012,
HBU has been reduced by 50,928 acres to 49,065 acres, resulting in
total acreage of 823,562.

The servicer reported December 2012 trailing 12 months (TTM) debt
service ratio was 1.53 times (x) compared to issuance of 1.41x.
The total harvest volume for this same period was 3.3 million tons
compared to issuance projections of 5.2 million tons. Harvest
volume was kept intentionally low due to low demand as a result of
the economic downturn and continued weakness in home building.
Fitch reviewed the borrower prepared December 2012 TTM financial
statements, 2013 budget and harvest plan, and a December 2012
appraisal. The annual appraised value as of YE 2012 was up 12%
from YE 2011 due to higher price assumptions and anticipated
increased demand in the coming years.

Fitch has affirmed the ratings as follows:

-- $400,000,000 class A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class B at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class C at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80,000,000 class D at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
-- $30,000,000 class E at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
-- $130,000,000 class F at 'BB'; Outlook Negative.


TRAPEZA CDO III: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Four Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza CDO III, LLC:

$108,500,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes, (current balance of $12,639,308.38) Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on December 16, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

$71,500,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured Fixed Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on December 16, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

$25,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on December 16, 2011
Upgraded to B2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$31,250,000 Class C-1 Fourth Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes, (current balance of $35,433,312.96) affirmed C (sf);
previously on July 13, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf);

$31,250,000 Class C-2 Fourth Priority Senior Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes, (current balance of $35,433,312.96)
affirmed C (sf); previously on July 13, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf);

$14,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes,
(current balance of $9,834,434.39) affirmed C (sf); previously on
July 13, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf);

$8,000,000 Class E Secured Notes, (current balance of
$4,646,066.88) affirmed C (sf); previously on July 13, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A1-A notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the last rating action in December 2011.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1A notes have been paid down by
approximately $32 million (72%) since the last rating action, due
to diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying assets. As a
result of this deleveraging, the Class A/B Overcollateralization
Test has also improved to 122.54% according to the February 2013
trustee report. The trustee reported level in December 2011 was
109.35%. Going forward, the Class A1-A notes will continue to
benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the proceeds
from future redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool. One
asset is expected to mature before the end of the year.

Moody's also notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
705 compared to 934 as of the last rating action date.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $132 million, defaulted/deferring par of $84
million, a weighted average default probability of 15.48%
(implying a WARF of 705), Moody's Asset Correlation of 21.50%, and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition
to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Trapeza CDO III, Ltd, issued on June 25, 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities (the 'TruPS CDO').

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q4-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 745 points from the
base case of 705 the model-implied rating of the Class A1-A notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 85 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A1-A notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $22 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1A: +1

Class A-1B: 0

Class B: +1

Class C-1: +5

Class C-2: +5

Class D: 0

Class E: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1A: +1

Class A-1B: +1

Class B: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class D: 0

Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities.


TRAPEZA CDO IX: Moody's Ups Ratings on $180MM of TruPS CDO Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza CDO IX, Ltd.:

$162,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2040 (current balance of $129,979,061.70), Upgraded to
A3 (sf); previously on June 24, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

$27,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2040, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 24, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

$23,000,000 Class A-3 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2040, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 24, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$23,000,000 Class B-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2040 (current balance of $23,192,623.76 including deferred
interest), Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on June 24, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf);

$10,000,000 Class B-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed/Floating Rate
Notes Due 2040 (current balance of $10,083,749.46 including
deferred interest), Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on June 24, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf);

$25,000,000 Class B-3 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed/Floating Rate
Notes Due 2040 (current balance of $25,775,929.00 including
deferred interest), Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on June 24, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of the improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio and the deleveraging of the Class A-1 Notes
since the last rating action in June 2010.

Moody's notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
1513 compared to 2034 as of the last rating action date.

Moody's also notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 28% or $28.6 million since the last rating action,
due to disbursement of principal proceeds from redemptions of
underlying assets and diversion of excess interest proceeds. As a
result of this deleveraging, the Class A-1 Notes' par coverage
improved to 175.5% from 167.28% since the last rating action, as
calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest trustee report dated
February 2013, the Class A and Class B/C overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 129.08% (limit 121.51%), and 91% (limit
101.57%), respectively, versus April 2010 levels of 128.05% and
94.39%, respectively. Going forward, the Class A-1 Notes will
continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the
proceeds from future redemptions of any assets in the collateral
pool.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $228.1 million, defaulted/deferring par of
$46.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 31.07%
(implying a WARF of 1513), Moody's Asset Correlation of 16.4%, and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 8.33%. In
addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Trapeza CDO IX, Ltd., issued on January 10, 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks and insurance companies that are generally not publicly
rated by Moody's. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS
without public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive their credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data reported
as of Q4-2012. For insurance TruPS without public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of Moody's Insurance team based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual
statutory financial reports.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 175 points from the
base case of 1513, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 Notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 200 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 Notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $5 million of bank TruPS. In the second
sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-timing
profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a large spike
in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: +1

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class B-3: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class A-3: +1

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class B-3: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities. Moody's continues to have a stable outlook
in the insurance sector, other than the negative outlook on the
U.S. life insurance industry.


TRAPEZA X: Moody's Lifts Rating on $268MM Class A Notes to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza X, Ltd.:

  $268,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Floating Rate Notes due
  July 6, 2041, (current balance of $160,845,456), Upgraded to Ba1
  (sf); previously on September 8, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  $69,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Floating Rate Notes due
  July 6, 2041, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on September 8,
  2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  $31,000,000 Class B Third Priority Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rates Notes due July 6, 2041 (current balance of $32,133,476),
  Affirmed C (sf); previously on September 8, 2010 Downgraded to C
  (sf)

  $21,000,000 Class C-1 Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable
  Floating Rate Notes due July 6, 2041 (current balance of
  $23,286,850), Affirmed C (sf); previously on September 8, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

  $35,000,000 Class C-2 Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable
  Fixed/Floating Rate Notes due July 6, 2041 (current balance of
  $44,141,856), Affirmed C (sf); previously on September 8, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

Moody's also downgraded the ratings of the following notes:

  $20,000,000 Composite Notes due July 6, 2041 (current rated
  balance of $17,229,440), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
  April 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of Class A-1 Senior Notes and
an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the last rating action in September 2010.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Senior Notes have been paid down
by approximately 33% or $82.9 million since the last rating
action, due to diversion of excess interest proceeds and
disbursement of principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying
assets. As a result of this deleveraging, the Class A-1 Senior
Notes' par coverage improved to 161.76% from 122.09% since the
last rating action, as calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest
trustee report dated March 31, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C
and Class D Senior Overcollateralization Test are reported at
119.28% (limit 128.10%), 105.00% (limit 125.60%), 83.95% (limit
112.60%) and 71.14% (limit 103.20%), respectively, versus July 31,
2010 levels of 115.43% ,105.13%, 89.26% and 79.32%, respectively.
Going forward, the Class A-1 Senior Notes will continue to benefit
from the diversion of excess interest and the proceeds from future
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

Moody's also notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
1868 compared to 2255 as of the last rating action date. The total
par amount that Moody's treated as defaulted or deferring declined
to $140.9 million compared to $184.2 million as of the last rating
action date.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in its rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $269.3 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $140.9 million, a weighted average
default probability of 38.12% (implying a WARF of 1868), Moody's
Asset Correlation of 12.27%, and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 9.6%. In addition to the quantitative factors that
are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of triggering an Event of
Default, recent deal performance under current market conditions,
the legal environment, and specific documentation features. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Trapeza X, Ltd issued on December 2006, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of bank, insurance and REIT trust
preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks, insurance companies and REITs that are generally not
publicly rated by Moody's. To evaluate the credit quality of bank
TruPS without public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive their credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data reported
as of Q4-2012. For insurance TruPS without public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of Moody's Insurance team based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual
statutory financial reports. For REIT TruPS without public ratings
by Moody's, their credit quality is assessed by Moody's REIT group
using the REIT firms annual financial reporting.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 392 points from the
base case of 1868, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1
Senior Notes is one notch worse than the base case result.
Similarly, if the WARF is decreased by 166 points, the model-
implied rating of the Class A-1 Senior Notes is one notch better
than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $4 million of bank TruPS. In the second
sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-timing
profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a large spike
in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on all rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus the
current model output, where a positive difference corresponds to
lower expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +0

Class A-2: +0

Class B-1: +0

Class B-2: +0

Class B-3: +0

Combo Note: +0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +0

Class B: +0

Class C-1: +0

Class C-2: +0

Combo Note: +0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Fitch to Rate $19.43-Mil. Class F Certs 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Barclays Capital
Inc.'s UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C6 Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $65,700,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $250,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $461,130,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $250,000,000a class A-3FL 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0a class A-3FX 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $87,000,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $111,734,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,018,564,000 a,b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $140,883,000 a,b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $90,683,000a class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,200,000a class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,580,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,910,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,432,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Notional amount and interest only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of April 3, 2013. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$42,102,979 class G or $87,444,979 interest-only class X-C.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 73 loans secured by 91 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.3 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by UBS Real Estate Securities, Inc., Barclays Bank PLC,
Redwood Commercial Mortgage Corporation and Natixis Real Estate
Capital LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.1% of the properties
and cash flow analysis on 82.1% of the collateral pool by balance.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.37x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 98.2%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 11.2%. Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 10.2% to issuer cash flows.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: This transaction has slightly higher coverage and
leverage in line with rated 2012 deals, with a Fitch Ratings
stressed DSCR of 1.37x and a Fitch stressed LTV of 98.2%. The
average 2012 Fitch DSCR and LTV were 1.24x and 97.1%,
respectively. However, leverage is slightly below that of
transactions seen from fourth-quarter 2012 to date.

Concentrated Transaction: The top 10 loans account for 59.6% of
the pool; the LCI and SCI are 482 and 593, respectively. This
represents a top 10 loan concentration generally in line with most
2012 transactions, which averaged 59.9%. The top 10 concentration
for 2011 deals averaged 54.2%.

High Quality Assets in Major Markets: Four of the top 10 loans,
totaling 29.6% of the pool, are secured by high-performing assets
in major urban markets. Three of the assets are located in New
York City and one in Philadelphia.

Less Amortization and More Interest-Only Loans: The pool amortizes
by approximately 12.7% from aggregate cutoff balance to aggregate
maturity balance. Of note, 37.2% of the pool is composed of
interest-only loans, and 19.3% are partial interest-only loans,
prior to amortizing.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch performed several stress scenarios in which the Fitch NCF
was stressed. Fitch performed two model-based break-even analyses
to determine the level of cash flow and value deterioration the
pool could withstand prior to $1 of loss being experienced by the
'BBB-sf' and 'AAAsf' rated classes. Fitch found that the UBS-BB
2013-C6 pool could withstand a 43.1% decline in value (based on
appraised values at issuance) and an approximately 25.2% decrease
to the most recent actual cash flow prior to experiencing $1 of
loss to the 'BBB-sf' rated class. Additionally, Fitch found that
the pool could withstand a 50.1% decline in value and an
approximately 34.4% decrease in the most recent actual cash flow
prior to experiencing $1 of loss to any 'AAAsf' rated class.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be Midland Loan
Services, Inc. and Rialto Capital Management LLC, rated 'CMS1' and
'CSS2-' respectively, by Fitch.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Moody's Takes Actions on 15 CMBS Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to fifteen
classes of CMBS securities, issued by UBS-Barclays Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2013-C6.

CMBS Classes

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  * Class X-A and X-B are interest-only classes.

  ** All or a portion of the Class A-3FL Certificates may be
    exchanged for Class A-3FX Certificates. The aggregate
    Certificate Balance of the Class A-3FL Certificates and Class
    A-3FX Certificates will at all times equal the Certificate
    Balance of the Class A-3FL Regular Interest. The pass-through
    rate applicable to the Class A-3FL Certificates for each
    Distribution Date will be a per annum rate equal to LIBOR
    plus a specified rate. In addition, under certain
    circumstances described in the Free Writing Prospectus, the
    pass-through rate for the Class A-3FL Certificates may
    convert to a fixed rate equal to the pass-through rate of the
    Class A-3FL Regular Interest. LIBOR for the initial interest
    accrual period will be determined two LIBOR business days
    prior to the Settlement Date and LIBOR for subsequent
    interest accrual periods will be determined two LIBOR
    business days before the start of the related interest
    accrual period. The maximum combined Initial Certificate
    Balance for Class A-3 and Class A-3FL is $250,000,000.

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 73 fixed rate loans secured
by 91 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
(1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and (2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.96X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.10X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 94.2% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 94.4% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 20.7. The transaction's loan level diversity
lower than Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 26.6. The
transaction's property diversity profile is in line with the
indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued
since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.08, which is lower
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Class X-A, and X-B was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, and 24%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa3, A1, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on $23.2MM Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of UBS Commercial Trust
2012-C1 (UBS 2012-C1) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of UBS 2012-C1 are based on the stable
performance of the underlying collateral pool. As of the March
2013 remittance, the pool had no delinquent, watch list or
specially serviced loans. The pool's aggregate principal balance
has been paid down by 0.8% to $1.32 billion from $1.33 billion at
issuance. As the deal was issued in second quarter 2012, full year
reporting was due as of March 31, 2013. As such there is limited
updated performance information available for the collateral.

RATINGS SENSITIVITY

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks. Due to the recent issuance
of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic
or asset level event changes the transaction's overall portfolio-
level metrics. Additional information on rating sensitivity is
available in the report UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012 - C1'
(April 19, 2012), available at www.fitchratings.com.

The largest loan of the pool (9.1%) is collateralized by a 315-key
luxury boutique hotel located in Manhattan. The loan is secured by
the fee and leasehold interest in the property, developed as the
Dream Downtown Hotel, which is subject to net leases. The leases
have terms of 101 years and are supported by hotel operations
which run at a multiple of 1.2 times the net lease payment at
closing. In the event of a default under the net lease payments,
the sponsor may take possession of hotel operations.

The second largest loan (7.1%) is secured by the Civic Opera
House, a 44-story, 916,258 sf historically landmarked office
building located in the Chicago CBD. The loan proceeds, along with
an additional equity contribution from the borrower, were used for
the acquisition of the property and to fund upfront reserves and
closing costs. At issuance the property was 74.8% occupied.
Occupancy had been adversely affected by a multi-year road
construction project in front of the property which was completed
in 2011. The area is infill with proximity to interstates, trains,
and other public transportation. The surrounding area is
characterized primarily by office space.

The third largest loan (6.7%) is collateralized by Trinity Centre,
made up of two office buildings in Manhattan's Financial District,
totaling 900,744 square feet. The two prewar buildings have been
designated as New York City landmarks and have been fully restored
and renovated with updated electrical, mechanical, and
telecommunications systems. The property was 85% occupied as of
September 2012 by a diverse roster of over 100 tenants. The loan
was used to refinance the previous debt and the sponsors
contributed approximately $6.4 million of additional equity at
closing. In addition to the first mortgage loan, there is an $18
million senior mezzanine loan as well as a junior mezzanine loan
for $7 million, bringing the total debt stack to $185 million.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $61,830,028 class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $105,671,000 class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $657,155,000 class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $96,008,000 class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,044,783,000 class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $113,130,000 class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66,547,000 class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,910,000 class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $74,865,000 class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26,618,000 class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,292,000 class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-B or the $44,919,174
class G.


US AIRWAYS: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' Rating on $199.518MM Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
preliminary 'BBB (sf)' rating to US Airways Inc.'s
$620.095 million 2013-1 Class A pass-through certificates, with
an expected maturity of May 15, 2027.  At the same time, S&P
assigned its preliminary 'B+ (sf)' rating to the $199.518 million
Class B pass-through certificates, with an expected maturity of
May 15, 2023.  The final legal maturities will be 18 months after
the expected maturity.  The issues are drawdowns under a Rule 415
shelf registration.  S&P will assign final ratings upon the
completion of its legal and structural review.

S&P base the preliminary 'BBB (sf)' and 'B+ (sf)' ratings on US
Airways' credit quality, substantial collateral coverage by good-
quality aircraft, and on legal and structural protections
available to the pass-through certificates.  The company will use
the proceeds of the offering to finance 14 A321-200 aircraft and
four A330-200 aircraft to be delivered from September 2013 through
May 2014.  Each aircraft's secured notes are cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted, a provision that S&P believes increases the
likelihood that US Airways would affirm the notes (and thus
continue to pay on the certificates) in bankruptcy.

The pass-through certificates are a form of enhanced equipment
trust certificates (EETC), and benefit from legal protections
afforded under Section 1110 of the federal bankruptcy code and by
a liquidity facility provided by Natixis S.A., through its New
York branch (A/Negative/A-1).  The liquidity facility is intended
to cover up to three semiannual interest payments, a period during
which collateral could be repossessed and remarketed by
certificateholders following any default by the airline, or to
maintain continuity of interest payments as certificateholders
negotiate with US Airways in a bankruptcy with regard to
certificates.

The ratings apply to a unit consisting of certificates
representing the trust property and escrow receipts, initially
representing interests in deposits (the proceeds of the
offerings).  Through its New York branch, a depositary bank, also
Natixis S.A., holds the escrow deposits pending paying off
existing debt on the planes (which should be accomplished by
May 2014).  Amounts deposited under the escrow agreements are not
property of US Airways and are not entitled to the benefits of
Section 1110 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  Any default arising
under an indenture solely by reason of the cross-default in
such indenture may not be of a type required to be cured under
Section 1110.  Any cash collateral held as a result of the cross-
collateralization of the equipment notes also would not be
entitled to the benefits of Section 1110.  Neither the
certificates nor the escrow receipts may be separately assigned or
transferred.

S&P believes that US Airways views these planes as important and
would, given the cross-collateralization and cross-default
provisions, likely affirm the aircraft notes in a bankruptcy
scenario.  In contrast to most EETCs issued before 2009, the
cross-default would take effect immediately in a bankruptcy if US
Airways rejected any of the aircraft notes.  This should prevent
US Airways from selectively affirming some aircraft notes and
rejecting others (cherry-picking), which often harms the interests
of certificateholders in a bankruptcy.

S&P considers A321-200's and A330-200's collateral pool to be of
good quality.  The A321-200 is the largest version of Airbus'
popular A320 narrowbody family of planes.  The A321-200 has not
been as successful as the A320 or smaller A319, but nonetheless is
operated by 67 airlines worldwide, many more than Boeing's
competing B737-900ER (although the latter is a newer model and
thus has had less time to attract orders).  Airbus has announced
that it will offer a more fuel-efficient new-engine-option (NEO)
on its narrowbody planes starting in 2016.  Orders to date
indicate that this will be a popular option.  If widely adopted,
sale of NEO planes could depress somewhat residual values of
existing-technology Airbus narrowbody planes.  However, this
effect is most likely for older planes in the A320 family (e.g.
those delivered in the 1990s), rather than the A321-200s in the
2013-1 collateral pool.

The second-largest proportion of aircraft securing the
certificates is A330-200's, which is a small, long-range widebody
plane.  This model, which incorporates newer technology than
Boeing's competing B767-300ER, has been successful, and is
operated by 65 airlines worldwide.  It will face more serious
competition when large numbers of Boeing's long-delayed B787 are
delivered.  Still, it will take a while for this to occur, even
though Boeing has finally begun to make its first aircraft
deliveries, which could be delayed even further because of the
indefinite grounding of those aircraft already delivered in
January 2013.

The Class A certificates' initial loan-to-value is 54.3% and the
Class B certificates' is 72.1%, using the appraised base values
and depreciation assumptions in the offering memorandum.  However,
S&P focused on more conservative maintenance-adjusted appraised
values (not disclosed in the offering memorandum).  S&P also uses
more conservative depreciation assumptions for all of the planes
than those in the prospectus.  S&P assumed that, absent cyclical
fluctuations, values of the A321-200s and A330-200s would decline
by 6.5% of the preceding year's value-per-year.  Using these
values and assumptions, the Class A initial loan-to-value is
higher, 55.3%, and rises to over 59% at its highest point, before
declining gradually.  The Class B initial loan-to-value, using
S&P's assumptions, is about 73.1%, and peaks at close to 79%%
before declining.  S&P's analysis also considered that a full draw
of the liquidity facility, plus interest on those draws,
represents a claim senior to the certificates.  This amount is in
line (as a percent of asset value) with EETCs issued over the past
few years by other U.S. airlines, and in line with US Airways'
2012-2 EETCs.  Initially, a full draw, with interest, is
equivalent to about 5.3% of asset value, using S&P's assumptions.
The transaction is structured so that US Airways could later issue
Class C certificates without a liquidity facility.  In the past,
airlines, including US Airways, have structured follow-on
certificates of this kind in such a way as to not affect the
rating on outstanding senior certificates.

"Our ratings on US Airways Group Inc. reflect its substantial debt
and lease burden and participation in the high-risk U.S. airline
industry.  The ratings also incorporate benefits from the
company's operating costs, which are than those of other legacy
airlines.  Tempe, Ariz.-based US Airways is the fifth-largest U.S.
airline, carrying about 9% of industry traffic.  We characterize
the company's business profile as "weak," its financial profile
as "highly leveraged," and its liquidity as "adequate" under our
criteria.  On Feb. 14, 2013, US Airways and AMR Corp. (parent of
American Airlines Inc.) announced a merger agreement.  We will
evaluate the merger (which is subject to regulatory review and
other conditions) and how it fits into AMR's plan to emerge from
bankruptcy, and we could place ratings on CreditWatch with
positive implications if we believe it is likely we would rate the
merged entity 'B' (we do not foresee a likelihood of a higher
rating, nor do we believe it likely that we would lower the
corporate credit rating).  The timing of any CreditWatch placement
or rating change would depend on both availability of information
needed to judge merger effects and greater clarity around the
timing and certainty of the transaction proceeding," S&P said.

RATINGS LIST

US Airways Inc.
US Airways Group Inc.
Corporate credit rating                          B-/Positive/--

New Ratings
US Airways Inc.

Series 2013-1 class A pass-through certificates   prelim. BBB (sf)
Series 2013-1 class B pass-through certificates   prelim. B+ (sf)



WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C4: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class O Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 10 classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Series 2003-C4 (WB 2003-C4) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement to offset
Fitch expected losses from specially serviced loans. Fitch modeled
losses of 9.05% for the remaining pool; expected losses as a
percentage of the original pool balance are at 1.69%, including
losses already incurred to date (0.60%). Fitch has designated 12
loans (35.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern of which five (11.5%) are
specially serviced loans.

Ratings Sensitivity

Concerns surrounding the upcoming maturities of the collateral
pool, asset concentration, and adverse selection of the remaining
loans within the pool were a contributing factor for not upgrading
the remaining classes at this time. The pool exhibits a high Fitch
stressed loan to value (LTV) which raises refinance risk.

As of the March 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 87.95% to
$107.5 million from $891.8 billion at issuance. Interest
shortfalls total $0.24 million and affect class P. There is one
defeased loan (1.39) in the pool.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Midway Shopping
Center loan (10.46% of the pool), which is secured by a 172,642
square foot (sf) retail center, located in Wilmington, DE. The
center's occupancy has been trending down since issuance and was
listed at 80% at year-end 2012. The pad sites generate a large
amount of foot and car traffic during the day. The center is well
located in a retail trade area with several complementary centers
in close proximity. A number of capital projects have been
recently under taken to improve the appeal of the center and its
competitiveness within the area.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses, Amcap -
Mississippi & Havana (10.19% of the pool), is a 122,498 sf
anchored retail center located in Aurora, CO. The center continues
to exhibit strong stable performance with a vacancy rate of 4.8%
and a 2012 fiscal year (FY) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
1.52x. The market area is stable with a vacancy rate of 12.5% for
the Southeast submarket of Denver. The center's trade area is
noticeably stronger with its competitive set's average vacancy
rate at 9.5% as of year-end 2012. The center has 20% of the net
rentable area (NRA) rolling during the 2013-2014 calendar year but
the space supply constraints within the trade area should mitigate
significant tenant occupancy losses.

The third-largest contributor to modeled losses, Amcap - 80th &
Wadsworth (13.03% of the pool), is a 136,191 sf anchored retail
center located in Arvada, CO. The occupancy at the complex has
declined to 89.7%. The subject is located in a retail corridor
with several competing centers within a half-mile radius of the
subject. The center is outperforming the broader submarket with in
place rents at the center slightly above the market average. The
center's tenant base is stable with the grocery anchor on a long-
term lease and several national retail tenants having at least two
years remaining on their current lease term.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Outlooks as indicated:

-- $12.3 million class E at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $12.3 million class F at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $12.3 million class G at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $12.3 million class H at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $20.1 million class J at 'Asf', Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $8.9 million class K at 'BBsf', Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $6.7 million class L at 'BBsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $6.7 million class M at 'Bsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $1.1 million class N at 'B-sf', Outlook Negative;
-- $4.5 million class O at 'CCCsf', RE 100.

Class A-1, A-1A, A-2, B, C, D, and the interest-only class X-P
have repaid in full. Fitch does not rate $17 million class P.
Class X-C was previously withdrawn.


WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C9: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class F Certs. to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has removed from Rating Watch Negative and
downgraded four classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-
C9. Fitch has also affirmed 10 classes from the transaction.

Key Rating Drivers

The removal from Rating Watch Negative and downgrade of the four
classes is due to deterioration in credit enhancement following
the liquidation of the West Oaks Mall loan in December 2012 and a
review of the remaining collateral. The affirmations are due to
sufficient credit enhancements relative to modeled losses.

Fitch modeled losses of 4% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 8.2%, including losses already
incurred. The pool has experienced $70.8 million (6.2% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 17 loans (24.3%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes five specially serviced assets (3.2%). In addition, Fitch
is concerned with adverse selection of the pool as 97.8% of the
remaining loans are maturing in 2013, of which 26 loans (35%) fail
Fitch's maturity test.

As of the March 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 48.2% to $595.8 million from
$1.15 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, nine loans
(16% of the pool) are currently defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes G through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Bellamay Grand
loan (3.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 360-unit
multifamily apartment complex located in Gainesville, FL. The loan
was previously with the special servicer until it was modified in
May 2010. The modification included an interest rate reduction of
200 basis points and interest-only (IO) payments until April 2012.
After converting back to principal and interest payments, the loan
continues to struggle under its original terms. As of year-end
2012, the servicer-reported property occupancy and debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 85.6% and 1.06 times (x), respectively.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a 50,621-sf
office building located in North Castle, NY. The loan was first
transferred to the special servicer in October 2009 for monetary
default; the loan was modified, reducing the interest rate and IO
period and returned to the master servicer. In July 2011 it
returned to the special servicer for imminent default. The loan
was modified a second time, which included a loan split of $4.3
million to the A note and $3.1 million B note. In addition, there
was an interest rate reduction to the A note for 24 months with an
increase for the last three months before the new maturity of
October 2014. The A note struggles to perform under the
modification; the special servicer reports year-end 2012 occupancy
and DSCR was 97.7% and 0.52x, respectively. The borrower is
currently is contributing to the debt service shortfalls out of
pocket.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is an 84,983
square foot (SF) retail center located in Worcester, MA (1%). The
loan transferred to special servicing in February 2012 due to
imminent default after the grocery anchor vacated. The asset
became real estate owned (REO) in February 2013, and the special
servicer is working on marketing and leasing the property. In
addition, the special servicer reports that the property's
occupancy is 35.9% as of March 2013.

Ratings Sensitivity

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-4, B and C are expected to remain
Stable due to significant credit enhancement relative to expected
losses and lower leverage on the majority of loans remaining in
the pool. Classes D and below may be subject to further rating
actions should realized losses be greater than Fitch's
expectations. The Rating Outlooks on Classes D and E are Negative
due to the adverse selection of the remaining loans within the
pool and tranche thinness of classes at the bottom.

Fitch Removes from Rating Watch Negative and downgrades the
following classes:

-- $17.2 million class C to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33 million class D to 'BBB-sf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $14.4 million class E to 'BBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $15.8 million class F to 'Csf' from 'BBsf'; RE 65%.

Fitch affirms these classes:

-- $468.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34.5 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.5 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 and X-P certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-C certificates.


WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C11: Moody's Takes Actions on 17 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 17
classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C11:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2008 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2008 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-C, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.5% of the
current balance compared to 6.3% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 4.4% of the original
securitized balance, down from 4.5% at last review. Depending on
the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses
from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
rated classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class X-C was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10 compared to 12 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 5, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $694.5
million from $1.04 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 42 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 54% of the pool. Eight loans, representing 30% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains two loans with investment grade credit
assessments, representing 14% of the pool.

Ten loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has liquidated from the pool, resulting in a realized
loss of $23,881 (1.4% loss severity). Currently one loan,
representing 3.2% of the pool, is in special servicing. The
specially serviced loan is the Bay City Mall Loan ($22.2 million -
- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 361,200 square foot
(SF) mall located in Bay City, Michigan. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in April 2009 as part of General Growth
Properties (GGP) bankruptcy filing. After the borrower's loan
modification proposal was rejected, the property became Real
Estate Owned (REO) in February 2011 via a deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure. Occupancy as of February 2012 was 81%. The property
sold on March 21, 2013, after the most recent remittance
statement. Moody's estimates a $19.3 million loss for the
specially serviced loan (87% expected loss).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 11% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $9.1 million loss (12% expected loss on average) from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 95% and 91% of the pool respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 83% compared to 84% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.27X, respectively, compared to
1.39X and 1.24X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Four Seasons Town
Centre Loan ($77.8 million -- 11.2% of the pool), which is secured
by a 928,400 SF GGP sponsored mall located in Greensboro, North
Carolina. The subject property is the dominant mall in the
Greensboro market. Major tenants include JC Penney (24% of the net
rentable area (NRA); lease expiration August 2014) and Belk (23%
of the NRA; lease expiration January 2014). The mall is shadow
anchored by Dillard's (lease expiration November 2050). Total mall
and inline occupancy as of September 2012 were 91% and 73%,
respectively, compared to 93% and 75% at the last review. The
loan's maturity date was extended 3.5 years to June 2017 as part
of the restructuring of the loan as part of the GGP's bankruptcy
plan. Performance has been stable and the loan is benefiting from
amortization. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3
and 1.69X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.56X at the last
review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the University Mall
Loan ($17.2 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
653,600 SF mall located in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Major tenants
include Belk (26% of the NRA; lease expiration August 2015) and JC
Penney (15% of the NRA; lease expiration August 2015). The
property is the dominant mall in the Tuscaloosa market. The
property was 97% leased as of March 2012 compared to 98% at the
last review. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa1
and 2.26X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and 2.44X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 28% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Brass Mill Center & Commons Loan ($100.1
million -- 14.4% of the pool), which is secured by an 864,200 SF
enclosed mall and outdoor community center located in Waterbury,
Connecticut. The subject property is not the dominant mall in the
area. Major competition includes the Danbury Mall which is located
30 miles east of the subject and Westfarms Mall which is located
25 miles northeast of the subject. Major tenants include JC Penney
(15% of the NRA; lease expiration September 2017) and Burlington
Coat Factory (11% of the NRA; lease expiration January 2015).
Anchors that are not part of collateral include Macy's and Sears.
Total mall and inline occupancy as of July 2012 was 89% and 80%,
respectively, compared to 92% and 85% at last review. The loan's
maturity date was extended 2.5 years to April 2016 as part of the
restructuring of the loan as part of the GGP's bankruptcy plan.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.42X, respectively,
compared to 79% and 1.31X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Bank of America Tower Loan
($68.1 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 697,300
SF office building located in Jacksonville, Florida. The property
was 70% leased as of September 2012 compared to 48% at the last
review. Bank of America, the building's largest tenant, downsized
to 96,759 SF (14% of the NRA) from 188,032 SF (27% of the NRA)
upon extension of its lease in July 2009. The borrower continues
to market the vacant space and has had some success signing some
smaller tenants at the property. The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy. Moody's considers this
loan as a troubled loan because of its low occupancy and weak
office market. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.83X,
respectively, compared to 200% and 0.54X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Amargosa Commons Shopping
Center Loan ($26.7 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 173,300 SF retail center located in Palmdale, California.
Major tenants include TJ Maxx (16% of the NRA; lease expiration
October 2013) and Bed Bath & Beyond (12% of the NRA; lease
expiration January 2014). The property was 80% leased as of
September 2012 compared to 70% at the prior review. Circuit City
previously occupied 19% of the NRA but vacated after the company's
bankruptcy filing and subsequent liquidation. Since Circuit City
vacated their space, the borrower signed leases to Party City and
Weight Watchers totaling almost 8% of the total space at the
property. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to
low occupancy and debt service coverage but the borrower indicated
that it will continue to cover debt service payments. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.74X, respectively, the same as at
last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 18 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 18 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C17 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-C, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.4% of the
current pooled balance compared to 6.1% at last review. Moody's
based expected loss plus realized losses is 4.9% of the original
pooled balance compared to 5.1% at last review. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-C was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 31 compared to 36 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 5, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 28% to $1.97
billion from $2.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 191 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
34% of the pool. Twenty-seven loans, representing 19% of the pool,
have been defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
Securities.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 29% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $28.3 million (52% average loss
severity). Nine loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Renaissance West Retail Center Loan ($26.5 million-1.4% of the
pool). The loan is secured by a retail property located in Las
Vegas, Nevada. The loan transferred to special servicing in March
2010 due to imminent default. The loan is now Real Estate Owned
(REO).

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
retail, office and hotel property types. The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $39.9 million appraisal reduction for five
of the nine specially serviced loans, while Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $50.5 million loss (54% expected loss based on a 100%
probability of default) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for nine poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated an
$11.0 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 98% and 86% of the pool respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 88% compared to 86% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 8% to
the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.63X and 1.30X, respectively, compared to
1.61X and 1.30X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 20% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the One and Two International Place
Loan ($195.3 million -- 9.9% of the pool) which represents a 50%
pari passu interest in a $390.7 million first mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by two Class A office buildings totaling 1.8
million square foot (SF) located in the Financial District office
submarket of Boston, Massachusetts. The property was 79% leased as
of December 2012 compared to 72% at last review. The loan is
currently on the watchlist. Property performance declined after
Ropes & Grey, which leased 19% of the net rentable area (NRA),
vacated at its December 2011 lease expiration. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 73% and
1.26X at last full review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Digital Realty Trust
Portfolio Loan ($135.2 million -- 6.9% of the pool) which is
secured by six office properties located in five states. One of
the properties, the Comverse Office building in Wakefield,
Massachusetts is underperforming the portfolio. The Comverse
Office center was only 67% leased as of September 2012 and is on
the watchlist. The portfolio's occupancy is 87% compared to 84% at
last review. The loan sponsor is Digital Realty Trust, a publicly
traded REIT. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 43% and 2.50X,
respectively, compared to 51% and 2.11X at last full review.

The third largest conduit loan is the loan is the Olympia
Portfolio Loan ($53.3 million-2.7% of the pool). The portfolio was
originally 23 cross-defaulted and cross-collateralized loans
secured by 22 retail and two office properties located in Florida
and Georgia. Seven of the loans (25% of the original portfolio
balance) have been defeased. Twelve of the remaining 17 loans are
leased to Walgreen Co. At last review the portfolio was in special
servicing due to a delinquent payment. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 101% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 103% and 0.94X
at last full review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C19: Fitch Affirms C Rating on Class O Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 19 classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust, series 2005-C19, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 5.4% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 2.9%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $3.7 million (0.2% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 13 loans (23.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes one specially serviced asset (3.1%).

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings of the super senior and other investment grade classes
are expected to remain stable as these classes have benefited from
the paydown of 50.2% of the original pool balance. Additional
downgrades to the subordinate classes (those rated 'B-sf' or
below) are possible as losses are realized. In addition, the pool
is becoming increasingly concentrated, including a significant
number of single-tenant office and retail properties.

As of the March 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 50.4% to $800.5 million from
$1.61 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes M through P.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the specially-
serviced O'Fallon Walk loan (3.1% of the pool), which is secured
by an approximately 158,000 square feet (sf) retail property
located in O'Fallon, MO. The asset transferred to special
servicing in December 2009 for imminent default along with two
crossed loans (which have since been liquidated). The reported
appraisal value of the O'Fallon Walk asset indicates a value
significantly below the total outstanding exposure. The last
reported occupancy was 59%.

The next largest contributor to modeled losses is the Plaza
Volente loan (3.4%), which is secured by a 156,300 sf single-story
retail strip center located in Austin, TX. The property is
anchored by a 105,000 sf H-E-B grocery store with its lease
expiring in 2024. The reported occupancy as of year-end 2011 was
91% increasing to 96.9%; however, the partial interest-only loan
is now amortizing with a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
remaining around 1.0x.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $16.1 million class E at 'A-sf', Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $20.2 million class F at 'BBB-sf', Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $16.1 million class G at 'BBsf', Outlook to Stable from
   Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $4.7 million class A-PB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $237.3 million class A-6 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $77.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $80.7 million class A-FL at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $80.7 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $100.9 million class A-J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $40.4 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $20.2 million class C at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $32.3 million class D at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $20.2 million class H at 'B-sf', Outlook Negative;
-- $8.1 million class J at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $8.1 million class K at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $6.1 million class L at 'CCCsf', RE 85%;
-- $4 million class M at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $2 million class N at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $4 million class O at 'Csf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5 certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-P and
X-C certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2011-C3: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s
WFRBS 2011-C3 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch's affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. There are currently no delinquent or
specially serviced loans. Fitch reviewed servicer-provided year-
end (YE) 2011 and partial YE 2012 financial performance of the
collateral pool in addition to updated rent rolls for the top 15
loans representing 58.6% of the transaction.

Rating Sensitivities

Due to the recent issuance of the transaction and continued stable
performance, Fitch does not foresee rating changes until a
material economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's
overall portfolio-level metrics. Additional information on rating
sensitivity is available in the report 'WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2011-C3', dated Sept. 6, 2011.

As of the March 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 2.3% to $1.41 billion from
$1.45 billion at issuance. No loans have defeased since issuance.

The largest loan of the pool (12.8%) is secured by a 741,229
square foot (sf) regional mall and 116,312 sf of office space in
Coral Gables, FL, which is approximately six miles southwest of
downtown Miami. The mall is anchored by Nordstrom and Neiman
Marcus, which own their stores and are not part of the collateral.
As of third quarter 2012 (3Q'12), the occupancy was 91.6% compared
to 90.3% at issuance. The servicer-reported 3Q'12 debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.65x, compared to 1.54x at issuance.

The second largest loan of the pool (6.8%) is secured by an 821-
room full service hotel in downtown Minneapolis, MN. As of Jan.
31, 2013, the trailing-12-month (TTM) occupancy, ADR and RevPar
were 72%, $143.76 and $103.52, respectively, compared to 72.1%,
$137.17, and $98.90 at issuance. The servicer-reported YE 2011
DSCR was 1.70x, compared to 1.82x at issuance.

The third largest loan of the pool (6.8%) is secured by a 532,149
sf regional mall in Little Rock, AR. The mall is anchored by two
Dillard's stores - Men's & Children and Women's & Home, which owns
their stores and are not part of the collateral. YE 2012 occupancy
was 99.8% compared to 98.9% at issuance. Servicer-reported 3Q'12
DSCR was 1.47x, compared to 1.44x at issuance.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

-- $68.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $313.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $123.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $102 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $557 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- IO class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.6 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $47 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $79.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $21.7 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $19.9 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-B or the $40 million
class G.


WELLS FARGO 2013-BTC: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-BTC's
$300.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-BTC.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one 10-year, $300 million commercial
mortgage loan secured by the fee interest in the west parcel of
Bergen Town Center and the accompanying leases, rents, and other
income.  The collateral is a 1.00 million-sq.-ft. regional mall
and outlet center located in Paramus, N.J.  The mall's entire
square footage will serve as the loan's collateral.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 4,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.  Standard & Poor's has determined
that the loan has a beginning and ending loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
of 84.2%, based on Standard & Poor's value.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1445.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-BTC


Class       Rating         Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)      160,210,000
X-A         AAA (sf)   160,210,000(i)
X-B         AA- (sf)    31,426,000(i)
B           AA- (sf)       31,426,000
C           A- (sf)        22,834,000
D           BBB- (sf)      27,726,000
E           BB (sf)        39,143,000
F           BB- (sf)       18,661,000

(i) Notional balance.


* Fitch Releases 1st Quarter Economic Risk Factors for US RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has published the first quarter 2013 economic risk
factors (ERFs) applied in its residential mortgage loan loss
model.

This quarter, Fitch focuses on the relationship between economic
risk factors (ERF) and the sequester, a process of automatic,
largely across-the-board federal spending cuts.

Of the major metropolitan areas, Washington D.C. and its
surrounding area have the greatest dependency on federal spending,
which is partly why home prices have performed better than the
country as a whole since the financial crisis. The area has also
experienced lower ERFs than the country as a whole and currently
has a modest 1.13 ERF. However, Fitch does not believe its ERF
currently reflects the potential economic risk of a disruption to
federal spending.

The ERFs are provided for selected states and for the top 25 MSAs.
The report can be accessed by clicking on the above link or by
visiting 'www.fitchratings.com'.

Background:

The ERF is a dynamic input employed in the agency's default
probability analysis and loan loss model that accounts for
regional and local economic risk. This variable isolates regional
economic conditions from other key drivers of mortgage default
such as borrower, loan, and property characteristics. The ERF
variable is used as an input into the agency's default regression
model and scales default probability estimates along with nine
other credit dimensions/attributes in the model.


* Moody's Takes Action on $2 Billion of 2005-2007 Alt-A RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 21 tranches,
upgraded the ratings of 11 tranches and affirmed the ratings of 81
tranches from 11 RMBS transactions backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by multiple issuers.

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-2

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-6, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-7, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-3

Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-6, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-7, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-8, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-10, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-11, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-12, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-13, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-14, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 4-A-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-7, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-AR1

Cl. I-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. I-A-IO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-IO, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR27

Cl. 1-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR9

Cl. 1-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-7, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-8, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. PO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3AR

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-A

Cl. 1-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: SunTrust Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2005-1F

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-7, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 1-IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-6, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-7, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-8, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Cl. CB-IO, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-PO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wachovia Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AMN1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The majority of the actions reflect the change in
principal payments and loss allocation to the senior bonds
subsequent to subordination depletion.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications:

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility:

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.7% in February 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Actions on $1.5BB Alt-A Loans From Six Issuers
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 32 tranches,
upgraded the ratings of two tranches and affirmed the ratings of
64 tranches from six RMBS transactions backed by Alt-A loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2005-2

Cl. 1-A1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 3-A1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 3-A7, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 5-A1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AP, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AX, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. PAX, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2006-QS17 Trust

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-6, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2007-QS1 Trust

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-8, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-9, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-10, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-12, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-13, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A-P, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-V, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A11

Cl. 1-A-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-7, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-8, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A6

Cl. 1-A-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-9, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-11, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-12, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-13, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-A-14, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. PO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-6, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-11, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-12, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-13, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The majority of the actions reflect the change in
principal payments and loss allocation to the senior bonds
subsequent to subordination depletion.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.6% in March 2013. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Actions on 157 Tranches of $1.29BB Alt-A RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 43
tranches, upgraded the ratings of eight tranches and affirmed the
ratings of 108 tranches from ten RMBS transactions backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2007-3 Trust

Cl. T-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. T-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. T-A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. T-A-3A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. T-A-3B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. T-A-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. T-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. T-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. T-A-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. T-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2007-4 Trust

Cl. 4-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 8-A-1, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Cl. S-IO, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. S-PO, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. II-A1-1, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A1-2, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-XS1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-XS2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-PO1, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-PO2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-B2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. II-B3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-4

Cl. I-A-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-8, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-9, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-X, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-3, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-15, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-16, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-17, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-18, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-19, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. III-A-20, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-21, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-22, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-23, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-24, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-25, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. III-X, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C-B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-5

Cl. I-A-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C-X, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-10, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-11, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-12, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-13, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-14, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-15, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. II-A-16, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C-B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. C-B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. C-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. D-P, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. D-X, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-2

Cl. 1-A-4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-6, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-12, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-16, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-17, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2005-1

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A3, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A4, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A5, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A6, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A7, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A8, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A9, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. 6-A1, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 7-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. AX, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. PAX, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Issuer: MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2005-2

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 30-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 15-A-X, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 15-PO, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7

Cl. 1-A, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-P, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-5, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-6, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-7, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-P, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

Cl. 6-A1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 6-AX1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 6-AX2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B1-II, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B2-II, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BX-II, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools. The
downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. The upgrades are due to
significant improvement in collateral performance, and/ or rapid
build-up in credit enhancement due to high prepayments.

The actions taken on the three IO bonds, I-X, II-X, and III-X, in
CSFB 2005-4 reflect correction of an error in linkage of the bonds
to related pools. In the February 2012 rating action, the IO bonds
were erroneously analyzed as though they were linked to unrelated
pools. The error has now been corrected so that I-X, II-X, and
III-X are linked to Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3, respectively,
and this rating actions reflect that change.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.6% in March 2013. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on 45 Tranches of $1.5BB Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of 8 tranches and
affirmed the rating of 30 tranches from 7 transactions, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-CB4

Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AV-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-CB5

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-CB7

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-CB1

Cl. AF-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. AF-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-CB5

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust 2007-1

Cl. 1-A1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Confirmed at
Ca (sf)

Cl. M1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2008 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2008 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2008 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2008 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2008 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2008 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2007 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2007 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: People's Choice PFRMS 2006-1

Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1A3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. 1A4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. 2A1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2A2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The downgrades are
primarily the result of the change in principal waterfall priority
from sequential to pro-rata amongst related seniors after
mezzanine depletion.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's also adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on
loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels into 2014.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

These methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and
a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.3% in February 2012 to 7.7% in February 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Actions on 16 Tranches of $107MM Subprime RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five
tranches and affirmed the ratings of 11 tranches from three RMBS
transactions issued by various financial institutions, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Issuer: AFC Mtg Loan AB Notes 2000-1

Cl. 1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Cl. 2A, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, SPMD
2004-B

Cl. A-I, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. A-II-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: WMC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-A

Cl. A, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of this
transaction and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools.

These rating actions constitute of a number of upgrades and
affirmations. These rating actions take into account the updated
pool losses relative to the total credit enhancement available
from subordination, as well as excess spread and external
enhancement such as pool insurance policies, reserve accounts, and
guarantees. In addition, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and the timing of the expected defaults.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

These methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and
a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.3% in February 2012 to 7.7% in February 2013.
Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0%
for the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to
rise in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer activity such as modification-related
principal forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change
resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory
change can also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Actions on $10.1MM of AMRESCO Subprime RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of three tranches,
affirmed the rating of four tranches and confirmed the rating of
two tranches from two transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Issuer: Amresco Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-2

A-7, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011 Downgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

A-8, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011 Downgraded to A3
(sf)

M-1A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: AMRESCO Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-3

A-8, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at A2 (sf)

A-9, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at A1 (sf)

M-1A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-1F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

M-2F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

B-1F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of a recent performance review of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

These rating actions take into account the updated pool losses
relative to the total credit enhancement available from
subordination, excess spread, and overcollateralization. In
addition, Moody's considered the volatility of the projected
losses and the timing of the expected defaults.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages 2004 and
prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25
for current delinquencies ranging from less than 10% to greater
than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years and
ultimate expected losses are projected using the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

Moody's also adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on
loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels into 2014.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

The methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.3% in February 2012 to 7.7% in February 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes From 3 U.S. CMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
three U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions to 'D (sf)' because it expects the accumulated
interest shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.

The classes have had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
between nine and 10 months.  The recurring interest shortfalls for
the respective certificates are primarily on one or more of the
following factors: Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
(ASER) amounts in effect for specially serviced assets; and
Special servicing fees.  S&P's analysis primarily considered the
ASER amounts based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs)
calculated using recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI)
appraisals.  S&P also considered special servicing fees that it
believes is likely to cause recurring interest shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each respective transaction's terms.  Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER
amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding
which classes from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D
(sf)'.  This is because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut
are highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-C5

S&P lowered its rating on the Class L certificate from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-C5 to
'D (sf)' due to accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for
nine months.  The monthly interest shortfalls primarily resulted
from ASER amounts related to five ($25.3 million, 2.0%) of the
eight ($52.7 million, 4.1%) assets currently with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR), and special servicing fees of
$32,998.00.  As of the March 15, 2013, trustee remittance report,
ARAs totaling $9.5 million were in effect for five of the
specially serviced assets.  The total reported ASER amount was
$38,231.00.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$80,386.00 and affected all bonds subordinate to and including
Class L," S&P said.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2005- C2

S&P lowered its rating on the Class A-J certificate from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-C2 to
'D (sf)' on accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 10
months.  The monthly interest shortfalls were primarily a result
of ASER amounts related to seven ($168.0 million, 14.1%) of the
nine ($169.7 million, 14.2%) assets that are currently with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC, and special
servicing fees of $34,763.00.  As of the March 15, 2013, trustee
remittance report, ARAs totaling $146.5 million were in effect for
seven of the specially serviced assets.  The total reported ASER
amount was $622,581.00.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls
totaled $681,875 and affected all bonds subordinate to and
including Class A-J.

GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation, Series 2006-C1 Trust

S&P lowered its rating on the Class C certificate from GE
Commercial Mortgage Corporation Series 2006-C1 Trust to 'D (sf)'
because of accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for nine
months.  The monthly interest shortfalls were primarily a result
of ASER amounts related to nine ($132.5 million, 10.1%) of the 11
($149.0 million, 11.4%) assets that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR, and special servicing fees of $58,789.00.  As of
the March 11, 2013, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$79.4 million were in effect for nine of the specially serviced
assets and the reported ASERs totaled $483,659.00.  The reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $ 543,473.00 and affected all
bonds subordinate to and including class B.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C5

                                             Reported
          Rating   Rating     Credit         Interest shortfalls
Class     To       From     enhancement(%)   Current  Accumulated
L         D (sf)   CCC- (sf)      1.06        28,373     203,454

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C2

                                             Reported
          Rating    Rating    Credit         Interest shortfalls
Class     To        From     enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
A-J       D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    9.96        124,497     744,568

GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series 2006-C1 Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                             Reported
          Rating    Rating    Credit         Interest shortfalls
Class     To        From     enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
C         D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     6.49        62,089     278,756





                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Carmel
Paderog, Meriam Fernandez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


                  *** End of Transmission ***