TCR_Public/130331.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 31, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 88

                            Headlines

7 WTC: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2 CBMS Classes
ACAS BUSINESS 2006-1: Moody's Lifts Class C Notes' Rating to Ba1
A10 SECURITIZATION: DBRS Assigns Bsf Rating to Cl. F Certificates
ACAS CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
ACCESS GROUP: 6 Securities Classes on Moody's Downgrade Watch

ADIRONDACK PARK: S&P Gives Prelim. 'BB-' Rating to Class E Notes
ANTHRACITE CDO III: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 4 Note Classes
BEAR STEARNS 2005-AC3: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 10 RMBS Tranches
BEAR STEARNS 2006-BBA: Moody's Keeps Ba3 Rating on X-1B Secs.
CEDAR FUNDING II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

CHASE COMMERCIAL 2000-2: Moody's Lifts Cl. X Secs. Rating to Caa3
COMM 2013-GAM: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class F Certs.
CONNECTICUT VALLEY III: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 8 Note Classes
CPS AUTO: Moody's Hikes Ratings on Five Senior Securities
CPS AUTO 2013-A: Moody's Rates $6.02 Million Class E Notes 'B2'

CREDIT SUISSE 1997-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on A-X Certs to 'Caa2'
CS FIRST 2001-CK1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class J CMBS to Caa1
CSMC TRUST 2013-IVR1: DBRS Assigns BBsf Rating to $5.3-Mil. Certs
DEL CORONADO: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
DRYDEN XVI: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $17.5MM Class D Notes

EIRLES TWO 216: Moody's Hikes Rating on $25MM Notes From Ba1(sf)
FIRST UNION-LEHMAN 1998-C2: Moody's Cuts Class IO's Rating to B3
FRASER SULLIVAN I: Deal Amendment No Impact on Moody's Ratings
FRASER SULLIVAN II: Deal Amendment No Impact on Moody's Ratings
GOLDENTREE LOAN VII: Moody's Rates US$32MM Cl. E Notes '(P)Ba2'

GSC PARTNERS VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
HARCH CLO II: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on $10MM Class E Notes
IMPAC: Moody's Takes Actions on 18 Tranches of Alt-A Backed Loans
ING IM CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating to Class D Notes
JMP CREDIT I: Moody's Lifts Rating on $30MM Class E Notes to Ba1

JP MORGAN 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class P Certs
JP MORGAN 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on Class H Certs.
JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 CMBS Classes
JP MORGAN 2013-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class B-4 Certs.

LANDMARK III: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B-1L Notes to 'Ba1'
LB-UBS 2004-C4: Moody's Takes Actions on 19 CMBS Classes
LB-UBS 2007-C6: Fitch Puts 'Bsf' Rating on Watch Negative
LEHMAN XS 2007-18N: Fitch Corrects Rating on Class 1A1 Certs.
LNR CDO III: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Seven Note Classes

LNR CDO 2002-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ba2'
KATONAH IX: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1(sf)' Rating on $15-Mil. Notes
MAGNETITE V: Moody's Affirms 'B3(sf)' Rating on $11-Mil. Notes
MBIA INSURANCE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 148 Securities Classes
MCF CLO II: Moody's Assigns Definitive B2 Rating to Class F Notes

MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 CMBS Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-XLF: Moody's Cuts Rating on N-HRO Certs to C
NXT CAPITAL 2013-1: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to Class E Notes
OCP CLO 2013-3: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Hikes Rating on Class A & B Notes to BB

R.E. REPACK 2002-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A Notes From 'Ba1'
RFC CDO 2006-1: Swap Termination No Impact on Moody's Ratings
SALOMON BROTHERS 2000-C3: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 4 CMBS Classes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2013-4: Fitch Rates $3.17MM Class B-4 Certs 'BB'
SILVERADO CLO 2005-1: Deal Amendment No Impact on Moody's Ratings

TRAPEZA CDO I: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on Three TruPS CDO Notes
TRICADIA CDO 2003-1: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class A-4L Notes
VENTURE XIII: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to $39.5MM Class E Notes
WACHOVIA 2005-C21: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes to 'C'
WELLS FARGO 2012-C6: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. F Certs

ZOHAR CDO 2003-1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2 Securities Classes

* Fitch Lowers 52 Bonds in 42 U.S. CMBS Transactions to 'D'
* Fitch Lowers 704 Distressed Bond Ratings to 'Dsf'
* Moody's Reviews $600-Mil. of Subprime RMBS Issues for Downgrade
* Moody's Takes Actions on $122-Mil. of 16 Subprime RMBS Tranches
* S&P Withdraws 'B-' Rating on 2 Note Classes from 2 U.S. CDO

* S&P Lowers 280 Ratings on 210 US RMBS Deals to 'D(sf)'

                            *********


7 WTC: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2 CBMS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of three
classes of Liberty Revenue Refunding Bonds issued by New York
Liberty Development Corporation and two classes of CMBS
securities, issued by 7 WTC Depositor, LLC Trust 2012-WTC as
follows:

Cl. 1 (Liberty Revenue Refunding Bonds), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Apr 6, 2012 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2 (Liberty Revenue Refunding Bonds), Affirmed A2 (sf);
previously on Apr 6, 2012 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. 3 (Liberty Revenue Refunding Bonds), Affirmed Baa2 (sf);
previously on Apr 6, 2012 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A (CMBS), Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B (CMBS), Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) remaining within acceptable ranges. The loan is
collateralized by 7 World Trade Center, a trophy office building
located in lower Manhattan. The Property is currently eligible to
receive financing via tax-exempt bonds issued through the Liberty
Development Corporation, which was created by the New York Jobs
Development Authority and the Empire State Development
Corporation. This eligibility generally allows the Property to
benefit from a lower cost of borrowing, potentially benefitting
property value.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

**Key Methodology Difference from Most Tax-Exempt Bonds**: Unlike
most Moody's ratings for tax-exempt bonds, Moody's methodology for
CMBS Large Loan / Single Borrower transactions addresses timely
payment of interest on the bonds, and ultimate repayment of
principal on the bonds not later than a Rated Final Date (March
2051). Scheduled dates for payments on the Liberty Bonds are
subject to adjustment in connection with corresponding adjustments
by the Servicer of amounts due on the underlying Liberty Bond
Loan.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's assigned definitive ratings for this
transaction in a press release dated April 6, 2012.

Deal Performance:

The debt is structured as two loans totaling approximately $575.3
million secured by a leasehold mortgage on the Property. The
senior debt is comprised of $450.3 million of tax-exempt Liberty
Bonds (the "Liberty Loan"). The subordinate debt is comprised of
$125 million of taxable CMBS debt (the "CMBS Loan", and together
with the Liberty Loan, the "Loans"). The Liberty Bonds are
collateralized by the Liberty Loan only and the CMBS securities
are collateralized by the CMBS Loan only. The Loans self-amortize,
eliminating refinancing risk. The Liberty Loan is interest only
for 15.5 years followed by a 16.5-year self-amortizing schedule.
The CMBS Loan is interest only for one year followed by a 6-year
self-amortizing schedule.

The Loans are secured by the Leasehold Interest in floors 10-52,
along with the building lobby and loading dock (collectively, the
"Property"), of 7 World Trade Center. The Property is indirectly
wholly owned by special purpose entities in turn owned by
Silverstein Properties. 7 World Trade Center is a 52-story
1,728,846 square foot Class A office tower located in downtown
Manhattan. The building was constructed in 2006, and was the first
LEED gold certified office building in NYC under the new
Environmental Standards Act. The building is located at 250
Greenwich Street, directly north of the World Trade Center site.
The Property is subject to a ground lease with the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey (the "Port Authority"). The ground
lease expires in 2026 and has three 20-year renewal options
remaining. As of September 2012, the Property was 97% leased to 29
tenants. Additionally, the Property sits atop a Con Edison
substation that provides power to downtown Manhattan. The
substation is subject to a separate ground lease with the Port
Authority, and Con Edison and the Sponsor entered into a
reciprocal easement agreement to address common elements.

The New York City property market is one of the strongest markets
in the country. The Property is situated in the World Trade Center
submarket, where approximately 10 million square feet of new
office space is currently under construction or planned for
development. According to CBRE Economic Advisors, the submarket TW
Rent Index is $53.59 per square foot and expected to increase
annually. Vacancy is 2.9% currently; however it is expected to
increase to 18% when the first phase of the World Trade Center
comes on line which is likely in the next 12-18 months.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value (LTV) ratio is 86%
and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 1.07X.
Both LTV and DSCR are the same as at securitization.


ACAS BUSINESS 2006-1: Moody's Lifts Class C Notes' Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1:

  US$72,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
  Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of $17,651,568),
  Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$35,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
  Notes Due 2019, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on August 29, 2011
  Upgraded to B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class C Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization of the rated
notes since the rating action in May 2012. Moody's notes that the
Class A Notes and Class B Notes were paid down in full, and the
Class C Notes have been paid down by approximately 76% or $54.8
million since the last rating action. There is currently $88.5
million of performing assets and principal proceeds supporting the
Class C Notes and Class D Notes aggregate outstanding balance of
$53.2 million.

In addition, the par collateralization shortfall in the deal, as
reflected in the Additional Principal Amount, has decreased since
the last rating action. The Additional Principal Amount is the
excess of the aggregate outstanding principal balance of the
liabilities over the sum of (1) aggregate outstanding loan balance
of the assets plus (2) principal collections on deposit. This
amount decreases as diversion of excess interest and proceeds from
sales of the defaulted assets are used to amortize the Notes.
Since the last rating action, the Additional Principal Amount of
the transaction has decreased from $62 million to $23.1 million.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $88.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 38.25% (implying a WARF of
6673), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 31.00%,
and a diversity score of 6. The default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1, issued in July 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
non-senior secured middle-market loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011. Moody's also supplemented its
modeling with individual scenario analysis to assess the ratings
impact of jump-to-default by certain large obligors.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability adjustments. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) as
described in Moody's Ratings Implementation Guidance "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions",
October 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (5338)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (8008)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Deleveraging may also slow down if any
loans in the portfolio are extended beyond their current
maturities.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the servicer and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially when they experience jump to default.


A10 SECURITIZATION: DBRS Assigns Bsf Rating to Cl. F Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to the following Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-1 (the Notes)
issued by A10 Securitization 2013-1, LLC.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at A (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

Class E and Class F are non-offered classes.

The collateral consists of 21 loans secured by commercial real
estate, all originated by A10 Capital, LLC (A10 Capital).  A10
Capital specializes in mini-perm loans, which typically have two-
to five-year terms and are used to finance properties until they
are fully stabilized.  The borrowers are often new equity sponsors
of fairly well-positioned assets within their respective markets.
A10 Capital's initial advance is the senior debt component
typically for the purchase of a real estate owned acquisition or
discounted payoff.  Most loans are structured with three-year
terms and include built-in extensions at the lender's sole
discretion.

The pool consists of 16 floating-rate loans and five fixed-rate
loans secured by 24 commercial properties.  The pool was analyzed
to determine the indicative ratings, reflecting the probability of
loan default within the term, including the lender extension
options, and its liquidity at maturity.

The ratings assigned by DBRS contemplate timely payments of
distributable interest and, in the case of Offered Notes other
than the Class A Notes, ultimate recovery of Deferred
Collateralized Note Interest Amounts (inclusive of interest
payable thereon at the applicable rate, to the extent permitted by
law).  Accordingly, DBRS will assign its Interest in Arrears
designation to any class of Offered Notes (other than the Class A
Notes) during any Interest Accrual Period when such class accrues
Deferred Collateralized Note Interest Amounts.

The ratings assigned to the Notes by DBRS are based exclusively on
the support provided by the transaction structure and the credit
underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


ACAS CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to ACAS
CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-1 LLC's $378.00 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure,
      which can withstand the default rate projected by Standard
      & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard &
      Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined in its
      corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.30%-11.36%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1376.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

ACAS CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                Rating         Amount (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)                246.50
B-1                  AA (sf)                  33.00
B-2                  AA (sf)                  20.00
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                   27.00
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                 22.00
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                  18.50
F (deferrable)       B (sf)                   11.00
Subordinated notes   NR                       36.30

NR-Not rated.


ACCESS GROUP: 6 Securities Classes on Moody's Downgrade Watch
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed twelve senior classes from
six Access Group private student loan securitizations on review
for upgrade, and six subordinated classes from five private
student loan securitizations on review for downgrade.

Securitizations' collateral is primarily private student loans to
graduate students.

Ratings Rationale:

The reviews for upgrade of the senior classes are primarily a
result of Access Group taking steps to mitigate operational risk
in the transactions. Moody's downgraded these classes on October
7, 2011, due to the inherent operational risk, which is the risk
of loan servicing or payment disruption in the event that Access
Group is not able to service or administrator these
securitizations. Since the downgrade Access Group has transferred
the loan servicing function to Xerox Education Services, formally
known as ACS Education Services, and added ACS Asset Management as
a back-up administrator for these transactions.

The reviews for downgrade of the subordinated classes are a result
of deterioration in the collateral performance. Following the
transfer of the servicing functions, delinquencies and defaults
have increased. The average 30+ delinquencies increased from 4% to
5% over a one year period ending December 2012, and the average
monthly default rate increased from 0.17% to 0.24% during the same
one-year period.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Private Student Loan-Backed Securities
published in January 2010.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of uncertainty with
regard to expected losses are the weak economic environment and
the high unemployment rate, which adversely impacts the income-
generating ability of the borrowers.

Complete rating actions as follow:

Issuer: Access Group Inc. Private Student Loan asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2005-B

2005-B Cl. A-2, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

2005-B Cl. A-3, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

2005-B Cl. B-2, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Access Group, Inc. Private Student Loan Asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2007-A

2007-A-A-2, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

2007-A-A-3, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

2007-A-B, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Access Group, Inc. Series 2001-1 (2001 Indenture)

Cl. II A-1 Group II, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Private Student Loan Asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2005-A

2005-A-B-1, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Feb 24, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

2005-A-A-2, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

2005-A-A-3, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Private Student Loan Asset-Backed
Notes, Series 2004-A

A-2, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

A-3, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

A-4, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

B-1, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

B-2, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Series 2003-A

Senior Ser. 2003-A Cl. A-2, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1
(sf)

Senior Ser. 2003-A Cl A-3, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1
(sf)


ADIRONDACK PARK: S&P Gives Prelim. 'BB-' Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Adirondack Park CLO Ltd./Adirondack Park CLO Corp.'s
$466.5 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 25,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (not counting excess spread), and cash flow
      structure, which can withstand the default rate projected
      by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods
      outlined in its corporate collateralized debt obligation
      (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which it assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.2801%-12.5967%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees; collateral manager
      incentive fees; and subordinated note payments into
      principal proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets
      during the reinvestment period.

   -- The weighted average spread in the identified portfolio is
      below the minimum weighted average spread covenanted to in
      the transaction documents.  However, the target pool
      presented to Standard & Poor's for its analysis represents
      that the portfolio will satisfy the minimum covenanted
      weighted average spread.  If the collateral manager is
      unable to acquire portfolio collateral during the ramp-up
      period with characteristics similar to the unidentified
      collateral in the target portfolio, the break-even default
      rates (BDRs) may decrease and the cushion outlined in the
      preliminary ratings table--the difference between the BDRs
      and the scenario default rates-- could be diminished.  If
      this difference becomes negative, S&P may not affirm the
      ratings on the effective date.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1418.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Adirondack Park CLO Ltd./Adirondack Park CLO Corp.

Class                        Rating               Amount
                                                (mil. $)
X                            AAA (sf)               3.00
A                            AAA (sf)             322.50
B                            AA (sf)               45.00
C (deferrable)               A (sf)                46.00
D (deferrable)               BBB (sf)              25.00
E (deferrable)               BB- (sf)              25.00
Subordinated notes           NR                    53.50

NR-Not rated.


ANTHRACITE CDO III: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 4 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed the ratings of five classes of Notes and
downgraded the ratings of four classes of Notes issued by
Anthracite CDO III, Ltd. The affirmations are due to the key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels, while the downgrades are due to
deterioration in the underlying collateral as evidenced by Moody's
weighted average rating factor (WARF). The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-FL, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-FX, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 11, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E-FX, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 11, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Anthracite CDO III, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (84.8%
of the pool balance), real estate investment trust (REIT) debt
(9.7%) and a credit tenant lease (CTL) loan (5.5%). As of the
February 21, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of
the transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to
$313.4 million from $435.3 million at issuance, with the paydown
directed to the Class A Notes, as a result of amortization of the
underlying collateral.

There are twenty-two assets with a par balance of $71.6 million
(28.9% of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the February 21, 2013 Trustee report. All of
these assets (100% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,420
compared to 3,977 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (18.2% compared to 8.9% at last
review), A1-A3 (4.0% compared to 9.4% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(12.5% compared to 14.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (5.3% compared
to 8.3% at last review), B1-B3 (17.4% compared to 23.3% at last
review), and Caa1-C (42.6% compared to 33.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.5 years compared to 4 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the assumption of extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 16.4% compared to 17.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 4.5% compared to 8.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
16.4% to 11.4% or up to 21.4% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notches downward and 0 to
2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-AC3: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 10 RMBS Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 10 tranches
and affirmed the ratings of 21 tranches from four RMBS
transactions backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Bear AC.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC3

Cl. II-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-X, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC5

Cl. II-A-1, Current Rating A3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Downgraded to A3,
Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

Cl. II-A-2, Current Rating A3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Downgraded to A3,
Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-X-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC8

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-7, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-8, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-9, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-AC1

Cl. II-1A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-1A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-1X, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-2A-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-2A-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. II-2X, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-1PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-2PO, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions on the bonds are a result of the recent performance of
Alt-A pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The actions on the PO bonds reflect the correction of an error in
the payment structure of the bonds. In prior ratings action, it
was assumed that the PO bonds and outstanding senior bonds in Bear
AC transactions would receive principal payment pro rata. However,
according to the pooling and servicing agreements, the senior
bonds and PO bonds receive principal payments sequentially, in
that order, from available funds. This could expose the PO bonds
to a risk of principal payment shortfall if an interest shortfall
occurs, since principal payments would be used to cover interest
first. The waterfall has now been corrected and Moody's current
rating action reflects the change.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a transaction
has a specific structural feature, such as a credit enhancement
floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size, Moody's can
choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for current
delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater than 50%
respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate of new
delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the remaining
life of the pool under the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.8% in December 2012. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-BBA: Moody's Keeps Ba3 Rating on X-1B Secs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Securities Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-BBA7 as follows:

Cl. X-1B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations for the pooled classes are based on the
performance of one floating-rate loan, the CPI Hilton Portfolio
Loan that is the collateral for the certificates. The rating of
the interest-only class is consistent with the expected credit
performance of the referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-1B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3
(sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating
committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements.

Deal Performance

As of the March 15, 2013 Payment Date the transaction's
certificate balance has decreased 96% to $29.7 million from $700.0
million at securitization due to the payoff of four loans
originally in the pool and scheduled amortization and a partial
collateral release associated with the CPI Hilton Portfolio Loan,
the one remaining loan in the pool.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date. As of the March
15, 2013 Payment Date, Class K has experienced interest shortfalls
totaling $1,190. Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust
expenses.

The CPI Hilton Portfolio Loan is secured by four limited service
hotels located in four states (California, Colorado, Florida and
Georgia) with a total of 760 rooms. Three of the hotels are
branded Hilton Garden Inn and one is branded Homewood Suites. At
securitization the loan was secured by five hotels with a total of
944 rooms. The Hilton Garden Inn Chicago was released from the
loan collateral in June 2011. The CPI Hilton Portfolio Loan was
modified in October 2010. Significant terms of the modification
include extension options that extended the final loan maturity
date to March 12, 2014, new preferred equity in the amount of $2.3
million and provisions for the borrower to contribute an
additional $1.5 million in preferred equity during the term if
extended. Special servicing fees and workout fees were paid by the
borrower and these costs were not incurred by the trust. Revenue
per available room (RevPAR) for the portfolio for the year-to-date
period ending September 2012 was $80, representing about a 10%
increase over full-year 2011 RevPAR. Total debt of $57.4 million
includes $27.7 million in mezzanine debt. Moody's credit
assessment is B2 compared to B3 at last review.


CEDAR FUNDING II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Cedar Funding II CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding II CLO LLC's
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by a revolving
pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 22,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure,
      which can withstand the default rate projected by Standard
      & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard &
      Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined in its
      corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash-flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.29% to 11.57%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1415.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cedar Funding II CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding II CLO LLC

                     Preliminary         Preliminary
Class                rating              amount (Mil. $)

A-1                  AAA (sf)                 228.00
A-X                  AAA (sf)                   6.50
B-1                  AA (sf)                   25.00
B-2                  AA (sf)                   10.00
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                    20.00
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                  17.00
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                   24.00
Subordinated notes   NR                        34.75


CHASE COMMERCIAL 2000-2: Moody's Lifts Cl. X Secs. Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed one class of Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
2000-2 as follows:

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of Class J is based on realized losses this class
has experienced from liquidated loans.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, was upgraded to reflect that
the notional class has not experienced a loss and is receiving all
of the interest it is due.

This transaction was a conduit/fusion transaction at origination.
The pool only has one loan remaining, which is a credit tenant
lease (CTL) loan. The sole remaining loan represented 0.3% of the
total deal balance at securitization.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Commercial Real
Estate Finance: Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease
Financings" published in November 2011. The methodology used in
rating Class X was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based IO
calculator v1.1, which uses the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original
and current bond ratings and credit assessments; original and
current bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the
IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type as defined
in the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3
(sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating
committee.

No model was used for the CTL loan.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 5, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $1
million from $739 million at securitization. The pool has
experienced a cumulative realized loss of $30M. Class J, the one
remaining principal bond, has experienced a $6 million (78% of
original class balance) realized loss.

The remaining loan in the pool is the CVS Pharmacy Loan ($1
million -100% of the deal), which is a CTL loan. The loan is
secured by a 10,200 square foot (SF) retail property located in
Columbia, South Carolina. The property is fully leased to CVS
(Moody's senior unsecured rating of Baa2; positive outlook). At
securitization, a lease enhancement insurance policy was issued by
Chubb Custom Insurance Company (Moody's insurance financial
strength rating -- Aa2; stable outlook) to mitigate condemnation
and casualty risk. The lease is not cancelable and payments are
sufficient to fully amortize the loan during the lease term. The
lease and loan term are coterminous and the final principal
distribution date is January 1, 2020.


COMM 2013-GAM: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class F Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
the COMM 2013-GAM Mortgage Trust transaction:

-- $55,145,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $154,855,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $210,000,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26,000,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,000,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,754,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,024,000 class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,642,482 class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Interest-only class; notional balance of classes A-1 and A-2.

Note: Class X-B is no longer offered, thus Fitch's expected rating
for this class has been withdrawn.


CONNECTICUT VALLEY III: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 8 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Connecticut Valley Structured Credit CDO III,
Ltd.:

US$225,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
balance of $122,471,159), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
December 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

US$35,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded
to A1 (sf); previously on December 22, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2
(sf);

US$48,000,000 Class A-3A Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf); previously on December 22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf);

US$11,500,000 Class A-3B Fixed Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf); previously on December 22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

US$30,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
balance of $26,63,449), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
December 22, 2011 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf);

US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
balance of $8,835,334), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
December 22, 2011 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf);

US$14,500,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
balance of $11,976,902), Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
December 22, 2011 Confirmed at Ca (sf);

US$2,500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
balance of $2,064,983), Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
December 22, 2011 Confirmed at Ca (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following class of notes:

US$10,000,000 Class P-2 Notes Due 2023, Affirmed Baa2 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2012 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating upgrade is the result of
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit improvement is observed primarily through an increase
in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios due to note
paydowns. Based on the latest trustee report dated February 2013,
the Class AOC, Class B OC, and Class C OC test ratios are reported
at 123.94%, 106.56% and 100.20%, respectively, versus December
2012 levels of 112.03%, 96.75% and 92.19%, respectively.
Furthermore, the Class A-1 Notes have amortized by $60mm or 48.9%
since the last review.

Connecticut Valley Structured Credit CDO III, Ltd. is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
CLOs originated between 2004 and 2006.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Using the Structured
Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February
2004.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.

Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model. The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs backed by
CLOs, there exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating
both on a transaction-specific and on a macroeconomic level. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss, assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa1 and below rated assets notched down by 2 rating
notches (WARF = 1214):

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3A: 0

Class A-3B: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Moody's Caa1 and below rated assets notched up by 2 rating notches
(WARF = 1591):

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3A: 0

Class A-3B: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0


CPS AUTO: Moody's Hikes Ratings on Five Senior Securities
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded five senior securities from the
CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2011 and 2012 securitizations. In
addition, all junior securities were affirmed. The transactions
are serviced by Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2011-C

Class A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class B, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Class D, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-A

Class A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class B., Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2012 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Class C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Class D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-B

Class A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Class C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Class D, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-C

Class A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class C, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Class D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Class E, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-D

Class A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Class C, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class D, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Class E, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of the 2011-C and 2012 transactions were driven by
the change in highest achievable rating on the senior notes from
A2 (sf) to A1 (sf). The change was driven by the continued
profitability of CPS over the last several quarters, the company's
20 years of operational history, including managing through a
severe economic down cycle, consistent underwriting capabilities
in the face of growth and increased competition, and the long
history of experience and capabilities as a securitization
sponsor.

The collateral pools in these securitizations are performing
within expectations established at closing and the lifetime loss
expectations remain unchanged.

Key performance metrics (as of the February 2013 distribution
date) and credit assumptions for the affected transactions. The
credit assumption is Moody's expected lifetime CNL which is
expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance. The
performance metric is pool factor which is the ratio of the
current collateral balance to the original collateral balance at
closing.

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2011-C

Lifetime CNL expected loss 12.0%; prior expectation - 12.0%

Pool factor 72.35 %

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-A

Lifetime CNL expected loss 13.0%; prior expectation - 13.0 %

Pool factor 66.38 %

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-B

Lifetime CNL expected loss 14.0%; prior expectation - 14.0%

Pool factor 88.74%

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-C

Lifetime CNL expected loss 13.5 %; prior expectation - 13.5%

Pool factor 91.51%

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-D

Lifetime CNL expected loss 13.0%; prior expectation - 13.0%

Pool factor 97.01%

Ratings on the affected junior securities may be downgraded if the
lifetime CNL is higher by 10%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan Backed Securities published in
May 2011.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment continues to
remain at elevated levels, and strength in the used vehicle
market. Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as much
stronger now than it was at the end of 2008 when the uncertainty
relating to the economy as well as the future of the U.S auto
manufacturers was significantly greater. Overall, Moody's expects
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.


CPS AUTO 2013-A: Moody's Rates $6.02 Million Class E Notes 'B2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to the notes
issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A. This is the first
senior/subordinated transaction of the year for Consumer Portfolio
Services, Inc.

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A

$141,980,000, 1.31% Class A, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)
$16,650,000, 1.89% Class B, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
$11,100,000, 2.79% Class C, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)
$9,250,000, 4.41% Class D, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)
$6,020,000, 6.41% Class E, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, the experience and expertise of CPS as
servicer, and the backup servicing arrangement with Aa3-rated
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the underlying
pool is 13.5%. The loss expectation was based on an analysis of
CPS' portfolio vintage performance as well as performance of past
securitizations, and current expectations for future economic
conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is
Medium/High versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the
Medium/High assessment for Governance due to the unrated
sponsor/servicer.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities published in May 2011.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 21.5%, 25.0% or
29.5%, the initial model output for the Class A notes might change
from A1 to A2, Baa2, and Ba2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.0%, 17.0% or
20.0%, the initial model output for the Class B notes might change
from A2 to A3, Baa3, and Ba3, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.0%, 17.0%, or
21.5%, the initial model output for the Class C notes might change
from Baa2 to Baa3, Ba3, and B3, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.0%,16.0% or
17.5%, the initial model output for the Class D notes might change
from Ba2 to B1, B3 and output for the Class E notes might change from B2 to B3,
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


CREDIT SUISSE 1997-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on A-X Certs to 'Caa2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed two classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1997-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2005 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. I, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2005 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The ratings of Classes H and I are consistent with Moody's base
expected loss and thus are affirmed.

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class A-X, is due to a decline in
the credit quality of its referenced classes due to the paydown of
highly rated classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 18.5% of
the current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 10.8%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
currently represents 4.0% of the original pooled balance compared
to 3.7% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class A-X was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7 compared to 15 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

In rating this transaction, Moody's also used its credit-tenant
lease (CTL) financing methodology approach (CTL approach) . Under
Moody's CTL approach, the rating of the CTL component is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds. This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease. The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan. The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default. Moody's also considers the overall
structure and legal integrity of the transaction. For deals that
include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's currently uses a
Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public CDO rating model
CDOROMv2.8-8 to generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess
the ratings.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 29, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $80.1
million from $1.465 billion at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 41 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
92% of the pool. The pool includes a credit tenant lease (CTL)
component, representing 65% of the pool. Seven loans, representing
8% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.

Four loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $43.8 million realized loss (25% loss severity on
average). Currently there are three loans, representing 15% of the
pool, in special servicing. The largest loan in special servicing
is the Union Camp Loan ($4.4 million --5.5% of the pool), which is
secured by a 127,200 square foot (SF) office building located in
Valley View, Ohio. The property is under a bondable triple net
lease to Union Camp Corp. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in March 2009 for a non-monetary default due to the
borrower transferring its 100% interest in the property without
lender consent. The credit tenant continues to wire loan payments
to the lockbox and the payments are current as of the March 2013
payment. Moody's does not expect a loss from this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Autumn Run
Apartments Loan ($4.0 million -- 5.0% share of the pool), which is
secured by a 204 unit multifamily property located in Louisville,
Kentucky. The loan was transferred to special servicing in August
2010 and became real estate owned (REO) in February 2012. As of
December 2012, the property was 56% leased.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Southern Slope
Apartments Loan ($3.6 million -- 4.5% share of the pool), which is
secured by a 142 unit multifamily property located in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. The loan was transferred to special servicing in April
2011 for a non-monetary default. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$4.8 million loss for the specially serviced loans (63% expected
loss on average).

There are two conduit loans in the pool, representing 17% of the
pool balance. Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial
year 2012 operating results for both of these loans. Moody's
conduit LTV is 66%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 6% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 10.0%. Moody's actual and stressed DSCR are 1.38X and
1.65X, respectively. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest conduit loan is the Kendig Square Shopping Center Loan
($11.7 million -- 14.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
260,200 SF anchored retail center located in West Lampeter
Township (Lancaster County), Pennsylvania. The two largest tenants
are K-Mart (33% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration
September 2016) and Weis Market (23% of the NRA; lease expiration
August 2016). The loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to being
past its anticipated repayment date (ARD) date of November 11,
2012. The property was 98% leased as of September 2012 compared
97% at last review. Overall performance has been stable since last
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.73X,
respectively, compared to 70% and 1.51X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Brandywine -- Clear Point Plaza
Loan ($2.0 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
124,000 SF retail center located in Gautier, Mississippi. The
property was 66% leased as of September 2012. The loan is on the
servicer's watchlist due to being past its ARD date of January 11,
2007. Overall performance has been stable since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.23X, respectively,
compared to 87% and 1.24X at last review.

The CTL component includes 11 loans ($52.1 million -- 65.0% of the
pool) secured by properties leased to six credit tenants under
bondable leases. The largest exposures are Sears Holdings Corp.
(33% of the CTL component; Moody's LT Corporate rating B3 -
negative outlook) and CVS/Caremark Corp. (29% of the CTL
component; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 - positive
outlook). The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF)
for this pool is 2,865 compared to 3,086 at last review. WARF is a
measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The
bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within
the pool.


CS FIRST 2001-CK1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class J CMBS to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed three classes of CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp
2001-CK1 as follows:

Cl. H, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of Class H and Class J are due to the significant
increase in subordination due to loan payoffs and amortization as
well as Moody's lower expected loss at this review. The pool has
paid down by 33% since Moody's last review.

The ratings of Classes K and L are affirmed as Moody's expected
loss is commensurate with their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class A-X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.0% of
the current balance. At last full review, Moody's base expected
loss was 22.8%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 4.0% of the original pooled balance, down from 4.8% at last
review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Class A-X was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes the IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4 compared to 5 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $40.5
million from $997.1 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from 3%
to 40% of the pool.

Two loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $34.3 million (33% loss severity
overall). Two loans, representing 22% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $3.2
million loss (36% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.

As of the most recent remittance date, the pool has experienced
cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $3.78 million affecting
Classes O through J. Moody's anticipates that the pool will
continue to experience interest shortfalls caused by specially
serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs), extraordinary trust
expenses and non-advancing by the master servicer based on a
determination of non-recoverability.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 37% and 100%, respectively, of the pool's
non-defeased and non-specially serviced loans. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 92%
compared to 81% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.29X and 1.18X, respectively, compared to
1.14X and 1.31X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 69% of the pool balance.
All three of these loans were previously in specially servicing
and have recently returned to the Master Servicer. The largest
loan is the One Renaissance Center Loan ($16.5 million -- 40.7% of
the pool), which is secured by a 160,509 square foot (SF) office
building located in Raleigh, North Carolina. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in January 2011 due to a maturity
default. The loan was moved back to the Master Servicer in
February 2013. The property is currently 75% leased as of December
2012, with leases representing 8% of the net rentable area (NRA)
expiring during 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and
1.05X, respectively, compared to 108% and 0.99X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Park Creek Manor Apartments Loan
($6.0 million -- 15.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 322
garden-style apartment complex in Dallas, Texas. The loan
initially transferred to special servicing in May 2009 due to
payment default, was returned to the Master Servicer and
subsequently moved back to into special servicing in May 2010 for
payment default. The borrower filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on
the eve of foreclosure, which was set for December 2010. The court
ordered plan extended the maturity date by 2.5 years and increased
the interest rate to 8.5%. The loan was transferred back to the
Master Servicer in November 2012. The loan's scheduled maturity
date is in April 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and
1.47X, respectively, compared to 73% and 1.40X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Sunrise Pointe Apartments Loan
($5.5million -- 13.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 39
building 360 unit garden-style apartment complex in Birmingham,
Alabama built in 1978. The loan initially transferred to special
servicing in June 2010 due to immanent maturity default and was
modified in March 2011. The modification provided three one-year
options to extend to June 2013, 2014 and 2015. The Master Servicer
expects the borrower to exercise the second maturity extension
option and not pay off the loan in June 2013. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.98X, respectively, compared to 101%
and 1.02X at last review.


CSMC TRUST 2013-IVR1: DBRS Assigns BBsf Rating to $5.3-Mil. Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has assigned the following ratings to the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-IVR1 issued by CSMC Trust
2013-IVR1 (the Trust).

-- $ 252.0 million Class A-5 rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 109.4 million Class A-8 rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 252.0 million Class A-5-X-1* rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 252.0 million Class A-5-X-2* rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 109.4 million Class A-8-X-1* rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 109.4 million Class A-8-X-2* rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 361.4 million Class A-1e rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 361.4 million Class A-2e rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 252.0 million Class A-3e rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 109.4 million Class A-4e rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 361.4 million Class A-6e rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 252.0 million Class A-7e rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 109.4 million Class A-9e rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 361.4 million Class A-X-1*e rated at AAA (sf)
-- $ 5.8 million Class B-1 rated at AA (sf)
-- $ 5.8 million Class B-2 rated at 'A' (sf)
-- $ 5.8 million Class B-3 rated at BBB (sf)
-- $ 5.3 million Class B-4 rated at BB (sf)

* Denotes interest-only certificates.
   The class balances represent notional amounts.
e Denotes Exchangeable Certificates.
   These certificates can be exchanged for combinations of initial
   exchangeable certificates as specified in offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings in this transaction reflect the 7.30% of
credit enhancement provided by subordination.  The AA (sf), "A"
(sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect 5.80%, 4.30%, 2.80% and
1.45% of credit enhancement, respectively.  Other than the
specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any other classes in
this transaction.

The Trust contains a portfolio of prime residential mortgage
loans. The Originators for the mortgage pool are First Republic
Bank (25.5%), Quicken Loans, Inc. (17.7%), Skyline Financial Corp.
(10.6%), First Savings Mortgage Corporation (10.4%), PHH Mortgage
Corporation (6.2%), Caliber Funding LLC (6.1%), BofI Federal Bank
(5.4%) and various others originators (18.1%).  The loans will be
serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing Inc. (68.3%), First
Republic Bank (25.5%) and PHH Mortgage Corporation (6.2%). Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") will act as the Master Servicer
and Securities Administrator and Christiana Trust, a division of
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will serve as trustee.  The
transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a traditional one.

The Originators provide traditional life-time representations and
warranties to the Trust.  The enforcement mechanism for breaches
of representations includes automatic breach reviews by a third-
party reviewer for any seriously delinquent loans and resolution
of disputes are ultimately subject to determination in arbitration
proceeding.  The loans (except for First Republic) also benefit
from representations and warranties back-stopped by the seller,
DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit
Suisse (USA), Inc., in the event of an originator's bankruptcy or
insolvency proceeding and if the originator fails to cure,
repurchase or substitute such breach or loans.  However, such a
backstop is subject to certain sunset provisions that give
consideration to prior loan performance.

DBRS views the representation and warranties features for this
transaction to be stronger than those included in the two most
recent Credit Suisse prime jumbo transactions (CSMC 2012-CIM3 &
CSMC 2013-TH1).  However, the relatively weak financial strength
of certain originators coupled with the sunset provisions on the
backstop by DLJMC still demand additional penalties and credit
enhancement protections.  The full description of the
representations and warranties standard, the mitigating factors
and the DBRS analysis are detailed in the related rating report.


DEL CORONADO: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Del Coronado Trust 2013-DEL's $285.0 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-DEL.

The note issuance is a CMBS securitization backed by one two-year,
floating-rate commercial mortgage loan totaling $285.0 million,
secured by a first lien mortgage on the borrower's fee interest in
the Hotel del Coronado in Coronado, Calif., a first-lien mortgage
encumbering all of the operating lessee's rights in the property,
and an assignment of the borrower's and the operating lessee's
contract rights related to the property and intellectual property.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 26,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning and ending loan-to-value ratio of 65.9%, based on its
value of the property backing the transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1422.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Del Coronado Trust 2013-DEL

Class       Rating            Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)         127,600,000
X-CP        BB+ (sf)         285,000,000(i)
X-EXT       BB+ (sf)         285,000,000(i)
B           AA- (sf)          48,800,000
C           A- (sf)           36,400,000
D           BBB- (sf)         48,000,000
E           BB+ (sf)          24,200,000

(i) Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP
     and X-EXT certificates will be reduced by the aggregate
     amount of principal distributions and realized losses
     allocated to the class A, B, C, D, and E certificates.


DRYDEN XVI: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $17.5MM Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Dryden XVI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006:

  US$20,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  October 20, 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August
  29, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  US$32,500,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes Due October 20, 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf);
  previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$375,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  October 20, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $358,219,141),
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf);

  US$16,250,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes Due October 20, 2020, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously
  on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

  US$17,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes Due October 20, 2020, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously
  on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the deal's exiting its reinvestment period
in January 2013. In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions
applicable during the amortization period, and therefore limited
ability to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from higher spread
levels compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
August 2011. Moody's modeled a spread of 3.56% compared to 2.81%
at the time of the last rating action. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios reported are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $456.4 million,
defaulted par of $6.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.99% (implying a WARF of 2535), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.18%, and a diversity
score of 77. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Dryden XVI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006, issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2028)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3042)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


EIRLES TWO 216: Moody's Hikes Rating on $25MM Notes From Ba1(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Eirles Two - Series 216:

US$25,000,000 Class C Notes due September 22, 2043, Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

Ratings Rationale:

The rating upgrade is the result of improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio and amortization of the
reference portfolio by approximately 34% since the last rating
action in June 2011. As a secondary factor, the novation of
Custodian, Deposit Bank, and Principal Paying Agent
responsibilities from Deutsche Bank to Bank Of New York Mellon
executed last year also had a mitigation effect to the
transaction.

Eirles Two - Series 216 is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of US Dollar-denominated RMBS
reference obligations which originated between 2004 and 2005.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.

The capital structure is incorporated into CDOROM by specifying
the attachment point and the thickness of the tranche. The
Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted average of
losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where the weight
is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's defines the
loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash flows to the
tranche relative to the present value of the promised cash flows.
The discount rate used to present value is the current swap rate
plus the promised spread on the tranche based on its remaining
maturity. Solely for the purpose of discounting losses, Moody's
assumes that losses on the tranche occur 60% of the way through
the maturity of the tranche. The final EL of the synthetic SF CDO
tranche is the discounted average of the tranche loss across all
the scenarios simulated in CDOROM. Since the EL is based on a
simulation process, the convergence of the simulation will depend,
in part, on the number of iterations chosen for the simulation.
Moody's applies a 99% confidence interval to the EL result using a
Standard Error equal to the square root of the EL Variance divided
by the number of Monte Carlo simulations. If this confidence
interval adjustment is significant, a larger number of iterations
may be used to reduce the standard error.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. Among the uncertainties in the residential
real estate property market are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.


FIRST UNION-LEHMAN 1998-C2: Moody's Cuts Class IO's Rating to B3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes
and downgraded one class of First Union-Lehman Brothers-Bank of
America Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 1998-C2 as follows:

Cl. E, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2008 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2008 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2003 Confirmed at
B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class IO, is due to the decline in
credit quality of its referenced classes due to the payoff of
highly rated classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.8% of the
current pooled balance, which is the same as at last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses are now 2.3% of
the original pooled balance compared to 2.8% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for the classes could decline below the current
levels. If future performance materially declines, the expected
level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow
waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of these
classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class IO was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012..

In rating this transaction, Moody's also used its credit-tenant
lease (CTL) financing methodology approach (CTL approach) . Under
Moody's CTL approach, the rating of the CTL component is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds. This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease. The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan. The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default. Moody's also considers the overall
structure and legal integrity of the transaction. For deals that
include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's currently uses a
Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public CDO rating model
CDOROMv2.8-8 to generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess
the ratings.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 20 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $295
million from $3.4 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 105 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
41% of the pool. Thirteen loans, representing 9% of the pool, have
been defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
Securities. One loan, representing 4% of the pool, has an
investment grade credit assessment.

Eight loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $56 million (47% average loss
severity). Seven loans, representing 8% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Stallings Portfolio Loan, which was originally secured by 11
office properties located in Missouri. The loan transferred to
special servicing in July 2003 due to imminent default. The
borrower has been able to sell seven of the 11 properties at an
average price of $72 per square foot (SF). The servicer has
recognized a $2 million appraisal reduction for this loan.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $9 million appraisal
reduction for six of the seven specially serviced loans. Moody's
has estimated a $10 million loss (50% average loss severity) for
five of the seven specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 1% of the pool and has estimated a
$2 million aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial or full year
2012 operating results for 94% and 95% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 58%
compared to 62% at Moody's prior review. The conduit portion of
the pool excludes specially serviced, troubled and defeased loans,
as well as CTL loans and the loan with a credit assessment.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.75X and 2.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.29X and 2.11X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance. Moody's
stressed DSCR is greater than Moody's actual DSCR for this
transaction because the actual debt constant for the pool is
greater than Moody's 9.25% stressed rate.

The loan with a credit assessment is the IBM Corporate Office
Complex Loan ($11 million -- 3.6%), which is secured by a five-
building, 1.1 million square foot (SF) office complex located in
Somers, New York. The property is 100% leased to IBM under a
triple net lease that is coterminous with the loan maturity in
October 2013. The loan fully amortizes during the term and has
amortized by approximately 94% since securitization. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and >4.0X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The top three performing loans represent 25% of the pool balance.
The largest conduit loan is the Broadmoor Austin Loan ($59 million
-- 20.0%), which is secured by a seven-building, 1.1 million SF
office complex located in Austin, Texas. The property is 100%
leased to International Business Machines Corporation under leases
that expire in 2014 (13% of the NRA), 2016 (30% NRA) and 2017 (57%
NRA). The loan transferred to special servicing in January 2011
and it was unable to refinance by its April 2011 anticipated
repayment date (ARD). The loan was modified in special servicing
and returned to the master servicer in March 2012. The borrower
made a 10% principal paydown as part of the modification. A
lockbox is in place and approximately $600 thousand of monthly
excess cash flow is being used to pay down the principal balance.
The loan has paid down 62% since securitization. The loan's hard
maturity date is in April 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR is
59% and 1.73X, respectively, compared to 68% and 1.51X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the River Reach Loan ($8
million -- 2.6%), which is secured by a 300 unit apartment complex
located in Orlando, Florida. The property was 96% leased as of
December 2012. The loan has amortized 22% since securitization.
The fully amortizing loan matures in March 2028. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.42X, respectively, compared to 75% and
1.13X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Cineplex Odeon Movie Theater
Loan ($8 million -- 2.6%), which is secured by a movie theater
located in Hodgkins, Illinois. The property is 100% leased to
Plitt Theaters (AMC Entertainment) through February 2023. The
fully amortizing loan matures in February 2023. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.17X, respectively, compared to 88% and
1.19X at last review.

The CTL component includes 50 loans ($92 million -- 31%) secured
by properties leased to 12 tenants under bondable leases. The
largest exposures are Brinker International, Inc. (23% of the CTL
component; Moody's senior unsecured rating Ba2 - stable outlook),
CVS Corp. (19%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 - positive
outlook) and Walgreen Co. (15%; Moody's senior unsecured rating
Baa1 -- negative outlook). The bottom-dollar weighted average
rating factor (WARF) for the CTL pool is 2,660, which is similar
as at last review. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a
pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within the pool.


FRASER SULLIVAN I: Deal Amendment No Impact on Moody's Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by Fraser
Sullivan CLO I Ltd., (the "Issuer") into an assignment and
amendment agreement (the "Assignment and Amendment") dated as of
March 27, 2013 among Fraser Sullivan Investment Management, LLC
("FSIM"), as assignor and existing Collateral Manager to the
Issuer, and 3i Debt Management US LLC ("3i DM US"), as assignee
and replacement Collateral Manager to the Issuer, under the
provisions of a Collateral Management Agreement between the Issuer
and FSIM dated as of March 10, 2006 (the "Amendment"), and
performance of the activities contemplated therein will not in and
of themselves and at this time result in the immediate withdrawal
or reduction with respect to Moody's current rating of any Class
of Secured Notes issued by the Issuer. Moody's does not express an
opinion as to whether the Assignment and Amendment could have non-
credit-related effects.

Under the terms of the Assignment and Amendment, 3i DM US agrees
to assume all the rights, duties, responsibilities and obligations
of the Collateral Manager under the Agreement. The Assignment and
Amendment does not alter the rights, duties, responsibilities,
duties and obligations of the Collateral Manager under the
Agreement in a meaningful way other than to reflect changes to
certain provisions in the Agreement due to the replacement of the
existing Collateral Manager. In reaching its conclusion as to the
possible effects of the Assignment and Amendment on the current
Moody's ratings of the Secured Notes Moody's considered, among
other factors, the experience and capacity of 3i DM US to perform
duties of Collateral Manager to the Issuer.

Moody's Ratings on Fraser Sullivan I include:

Class E-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Ba3
(sf)

Class E-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Ba3 (sf)

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations",
published in June 2011.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.


FRASER SULLIVAN II: Deal Amendment No Impact on Moody's Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by Fraser
Sullivan CLO II Ltd., into an assignment and amendment agreement
(the "Assignment and Amendment") dated as of March 27, 2013 among
Fraser Sullivan Investment Management, LLC ("FSIM"), as assignor
and existing Collateral Manager to the Issuer, and 3i Debt
Management US LLC ("3i DM US"), as assignee and replacement
Collateral Manager to the Issuer, under the provisions of a
Collateral Management Agreement between the Issuer and FSIM dated
as of December 7, 2006 (the "Amendment"), and performance of the
activities contemplated therein will not in and of themselves and
at this time result in the immediate withdrawal or reduction with
respect to Moody's current rating of any Class of Secured Notes
issued by the Issuer. Moody's does not express an opinion as to
whether the Assignment and Amendment could have non-credit-related
effects.

Under the terms of the Assignment and Amendment, 3i DM US agrees
to assume all the rights, duties, responsibilities and obligations
of the Collateral Manager under the Agreement. The Assignment and
Amendment does not alter the rights, duties, responsibilities,
duties and obligations of the Collateral Manager under the
Agreement in a meaningful way other than to reflect changes to
certain provisions in the Agreement due to the replacement of the
existing Collateral Manager. In reaching its conclusion as to the
possible effects of the Assignment and Amendment on the current
Moody's ratings of the Secured Notes Moody's considered, among
other factors, the experience and capacity of 3i DM US to perform
duties of Collateral Manager to the Issuer.

Moody's Ratings on Fraser Sullivan II include:

US$17,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2020, B1 (sf).

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations",
published in June 2011.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.


GOLDENTREE LOAN VII: Moody's Rates US$32MM Cl. E Notes '(P)Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned these provisional ratings to
notes to be issued by GoldenTree Loan Opportunities VII, Limited:

US$400,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$78,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$7,000,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$45,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$32,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class F Notes" and together with the Class A Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes, the "Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's provisional ratings of the Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

GoldenTree VII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
be invested in senior secured loans, senior secured notes and
eligible investments and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
DIP collateral obligations, second lien loans, senior unsecured
loans and bonds. The underlying collateral pool is expected to be
at least 50% ramped as of the closing date.

GoldenTree Asset Management LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk and credit improved
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the Notes.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $650,000,000

Diversity of 48

WARF of 2820

Weighted Average Spread of 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon of 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 43.0%

Weighted Average Life of 8.5 years

The Notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The Notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the Notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF Impact in Rating Notches

WARF + 15% (2820 to 3243)

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C-1 Notes: -2

Class C-2 Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: 0

WARF + 30% (2820 to 3666)

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C-1 Notes: -4

Class C-2 Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -2

Class F Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.


GSC PARTNERS VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by GSC Partners CDO Fund VII, Limited:

  US$29,000,000 Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously
  on October 24, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

  US$21,700,000 Class D Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
  October 24, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  US$17,750,000 Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously
  on October 24, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$175,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Delayed Funding
  Notes Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $96,787,571.59),
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 13, 2006 Assigned Aaa
  (sf);

  US$77,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020
  (current outstanding balance of $42,586,531.50), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on June 13, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf);

  US$45,600,000 Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
  October 24, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  US$3,250,000 Class P Principal Protected Notes Due 2020,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 13, 2006 Assigned Aaa
  (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in October 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 28.8% or $56.4 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated January 22, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class
E overcollateralization ratios are reported at 147.4%, 127.8%,
116.3% and 108.3%, respectively, versus August 2011 levels of
135.8%, 121.3%, 112.2% and 105.8%, respectively. The January 2013
report does not reflect the most recent pay down.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action in October 2011 Based on the January 2013 Trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 3172
compared to 3281 in October 2011.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging and the improvement
in credit quality of the underlying portfolio, Moody's notes that
the Diversity Score and WAS levels have deteriorated since the
last rating action in October 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $268.1 million,
defaulted par of $27.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.50% (implying a WARF of 3157), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.93%, and a diversity
score of 31. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

GSC Partners CDO Fund VII, Limited, issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans with significant exposure to middle market
loans.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011 and
"Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes"
published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2526)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Class P: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3788)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Class P: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal is allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
has the flexibility to deteriorate some collateral quality metrics
to the covenant levels.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a
significant number of securities whose default probabilities are
assessed through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is
not provided the necessary information to update the credit
estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by
any default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.


HARCH CLO II: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on $10MM Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Harch CLO II Limited:

US$14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 11, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$248,400,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017 (current
outstanding balance $54,007,745.24), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on December 21, 2005 Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$27,600,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017 (current
outstanding balance $6,000,860.57); Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on July 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$8,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017; Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$38,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017; Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017;
Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017
(current outstanding balance $7,414,248.52); Affirmed B1 (sf);
previously on July 1, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in April 2013. Moody's notes that the Class A-1A
and the Class A-1B Notes have been paid down by approximately 33%
or $27.0 million and $3.0 million, respectively since the last
rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated February
8, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 146.44%, 129.35% and 106.32%, respectively,
versus March 2011 levels of 136.78%, 124.01% and 105.69%,
respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $146.73 million,
defaulted par of $13.63 million, a weighted average default
probability of 11.57% (implying a WARF of 2241), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.62%, and a diversity
score of 36. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Harch CLO II Ltd., issued in November 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1793)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2689)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


IMPAC: Moody's Takes Actions on 18 Tranches of Alt-A Backed Loans
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the rating of two tranches,
downgraded the rating of five tranches, and affirmed the rating of
11 tranches from three transactions, issued by Impac, backed by
Alt-A loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-6 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2005-6

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2-M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-M-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-B-1, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2005 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-B-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2005 Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-1

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-M-2, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-M-3, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-2

Cl. 2-A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2-M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2006
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2006
Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. 2-M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2006
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

CCl. 2-B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2006
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance of the deals and
reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The downgrades are primarily due to the weak interest shortfall
reimbursement mechanism on the bonds. Class 2-M-1 in Impac Secured
Asset Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1
downgraded to A3 (sf) currently does not have interest shortfall
but in the event of an interest shortfall, structural limitations
in the transaction will prevent recoupment of interest shortfall
even if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on the mezzanine tranches can only be made up from excess
interest and after the overcollateralization is built to a target
amount. In this transaction since overcollateralization is already
below target due to poor performance, any missed interest payments
to mezzanine tranches are unlikely to be paid. Moody's caps the
ratings of such tranches with weak interest shortfall
reimbursement at A3 (sf) as long as they have not experienced any
shortfall.

The ratings for Class 2-M-1 and Class 2-M-2 in Impac Secured Asset
Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-2 were
downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Ba1 (sf), respectively. These tranches
have outstanding interest shortfall ranging between 0.13% and
0.16% of their original balance. After further review of the
deal's performance and the pooling and servicing agreement,
Moody's believes that these mezzanine tranches will likely be
reimbursed the outstanding interest shortfall after the
overcollateralization is built-up to the target
overcollateralization amount.

Generally, ratings on tranches that currently have small
unrecoverable interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3 (sf). For
tranches with larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's
applies "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities
in Default" published in November 2009. These approaches take into
account only credit-related interest shortfall risks. The ratings
for Class 2-M-3 and Class 2-B in Impac Secured Asset Corp.
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-2 were downgraded
to B1 (sf). These tranches have outstanding interest shortfalls of
0.24% of their original balance and are unlikely to be reimbursed.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a transaction
has a specific structural feature, such as a credit enhancement
floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size, Moody's can
choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004, 5% for 2003
and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate by a factor ranging from 0.50 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.7% in February 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


ING IM CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to ING IM CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2013-1 LLC's
$556.5 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 25,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (not counting excess spread), and cash flow
      structure, which can withstand the default rate projected
      by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods
      outlined in its corporate collateralized debt obligation
      (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.28%-13.84%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1420.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

ING IM CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class               Rating                 Amount
                                         (mil. $)
A-1                 AAA (sf)               393.00
A-2                 AA (sf)                 66.75
B (deferrable)      A (sf)                  42.75
C (deferrable)      BBB (sf)                29.25
D (deferrable)      BB (sf)                 24.75
Income notes        NR                      61.85

NR-Not rated.


JMP CREDIT I: Moody's Lifts Rating on $30MM Class E Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by JMP Credit Advisors CLO I Ltd.:

US$35,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 13,
2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

US$34,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on September 13, 2011
Upgraded to A3 (sf);

US$30,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September 13, 2011
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$50,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Revolving
Notes due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $ 48,429,982),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 28, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf);

US$276,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021 (current outstanding balance of $ 267,333,503), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on June 28, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf);

US$30,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 13, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in May 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower weighted average rating factor
("WARF") and higher spread and diversity levels compared to the
levels assumed at the last rating action in September 2011.
Moody's modeled a WARF of 2313, a weighted average spread of
3.53%, and a diversity score of 81, compared to 2901, 3.20% and
54, respectively, at the time of the last rating action. Moody's
also notes that the transaction's reported overcollateralization
ratios are stable since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $468 million,
defaulted par of $4.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.04% (implying a WARF of 2313), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.24%, and a diversity
score of 81. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

JMP Credit Advisors CLO I Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (2776)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (1851)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +3

Class E: +2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
assets assumed to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in
the deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.


JP MORGAN 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class P Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 17 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2008 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2008 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.4% of the
current pooled balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 4.0%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is 2.9%
of the original pooled balance, the same at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments..

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-1 was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 38 compared to 40 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to $603.4
million from $1.04 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 100 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 23% of the pool. Eighteen loans, representing 37% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities. The pool does not contain any loans with investment
grade credit assessments.

Thirty loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $9.3 million (68% loss severity on
average). Six loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the 610
Broadway Loan ($11.4 million -- 1.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 152,454 square foot (SF) office complex built in 1909
and renovated in 2002 in the Jewelry District of downtown Los
Angeles, California. The loan was transferred to special servicing
in January 2010 due to monetary default. The borrower filed for
bankruptcy on May 17, 2010 and the loan is currently less than one
month delinquent. The borrower is required to make monthly
interest payments during the bankruptcy. The judge approved the
debtor's disclosure statement and set a confirmation hearing for
March 27, 2013. The remaining five specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$8.3 million loss for the specially serviced loans (30% expected
loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $6.6 million loss (18% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 94%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 84% compared to 85% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 7% to
the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.26X and 1.30X, respectively, compared to
1.28X and 1.26X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 28% of the pool. The largest loan is
the One Fordham Plaza Loan ($41.3 million -- 6.9% of the pool),
which is secured by a 414,002 SF office building located in Bronx,
New York. The largest tenant is Montefiore Hospital, which leases
approximately 117,000 SF of the net rentable area (NRA) under
various leases. Included in that total is a proprietary lease
(109,000 SF), whereby upon expiration of the initial terms in 2012
and 2013, Montefiore can extend the lease through September 2036
at a rent of $1.00 per annum plus expense reimbursements. The loan
has amortized 2% since last review and 36% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.97X, respectively,
compared to 105% and 1.03X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Plaza De Oro Loan ($13.3 million --
2.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 99,102 SF grocery and
drug-anchored retail center located in Murrieta, California. The
property was 98% leased as of March 2013 compared to 95% leased at
last review. This loan has amortized 2% since last review and 15%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and
1.09X, respectively, compared to 94% and 1.03X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Washington Village Apartments Loan
($12.1 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is secured by 18 two-
story garden style apartment buildings built in two separate
phases and located in Greenfield, Indiana. The property was 93%
leased as of September 2012 compared to 90% at last review. The
loan has amortized 14% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.07X, respectively, compared to 92% and
1.00X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on Class H Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 12 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Securities Trust 2010-C1, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The ratings of the IO Classes, Class X-A and Class X-B, are
consistent with the expected credit performance of their
referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.5% of the
current balance, the same as at prior review. There have been no
realized losses for this deal.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GPD
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X-A and X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee. The Interest-Only
Methodology was used for the rating of Classes X-A and X-B.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, the same as at prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $692 million
from $716 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 55% of
the pool. No loans have been liquidated from the pool and there
are currently no loans in special servicing or on the watchlist.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and full or partial year
2012 operating results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted
average LTV is 78% compared to 80% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.60X and 1.34X,
respectively, compared to 1.50X and 1.28X at prior review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Gateway Salt Lake Loan ($98.1 million -- 14% of the
pool), which is secured by The Gateway, a 623,972 square foot (SF)
open-air lifestyle center located in Salt Lake City, Utah. It
represents the majority of the retail segment of an overall 35
acre development known as the "Gateway Development" which is a
mixed-use development consisting of retail and entertainment
tenants, as well as office space, a state-of-art theatre, and
several restaurants. The property is currently 76% leased, down
from 93% at prior review and 96% at securitization. The sponsor is
Inland Western Retail REIT. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94%
and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.26X at prior
review.

The second largest loan is the Inland Western Retail Portfolio A
Loan ($45.9 million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by four
multi-tenanted retail properties totaling 470,000 SF located in
Virginia, California, New Jersey and Texas. The portfolio's
largest tenants are Save Mart Supermarket (12% of the gross
leasable area (GLA); lease expiration in 2026), Acme/Albertson's
(12% of the GLA; lease expiration in 2023), Gold's Gym (10% of the
GLA; lease expiration in 2013) and Office Depot (4% of the GLA;
lease expiration in 2019). As of September 2012, the portfolio was
91% leased, the same as at prior review and securitization. The
sponsor is Inland Western Retail REIT. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 88% and 1.15X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.10X at
prior review.

The third largest loan is the Cole Portfolio Loan ($41.6 million -
- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a pool of 16 single-tenant
retail properties located across ten states. The tenants include
seven Walgreens, two LA Fitness Centers, two Fed Ex distribution
centers, two Advance Autos, two Tractor Supplies, and one Academy
Sports. Investment grade tenants lease 52% of the NRA and only one
tenant lease expires during the loan term. The sponsor is Cole
Capital REIT. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.62X,
respectively, compared to 65% and 1.55X at prior review.


JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The rating of the IO Classes, Class X-A and X-B, are consistent
with the expected credit performance of their referenced classes
and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current pooled balance. This is the first full Moody's review
since securitization.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Classes X-A and X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 23, the same at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's review at
securitization can be found in the Pre-Sale Report dated April 12,
2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.125
billion from $1.133 billion at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 49 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
52% of the pool. The pool contains no loans with investment grade
credit assessments.

Three loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

There have been no realized losses to the trust. Currently no
loans are on the watchlist or in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 82%
of the pool's loans. Moody's weighted average LTV is 98%, the same
as at securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 7% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.54X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.07X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 28% of the pool. The largest loan is
the 200 Public Square Loan ($127.0 million -- 11.3% of the pool),
which is secured by a 1.2 million square foot (SF) Class A office
tower located in downtown Cleveland, Ohio. The property benefits
from its location on Public Square. As of December 2012, the
property was 81% leased compared to 82% at securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 1.00X, respectively, compared
to 95% and 1.06X at securitization.

The second largest loan is the Arbor Place Mall Loan ($120.8
million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured by 1.2 million
(546,374 is collateral) SF super regional mall located in
Douglasville, Georgia. Anchors include Dillard's Belk, Macy's
Sears and JCPenney. Overall occupancy for the past five years has
ranged between 94% to 100%. As of December 2012, the property was
99% leased compared to 92% at securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 101% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to 104%
and 0.98X at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Northwoods Mall Loan ($72.2 million
-- 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by 791,598 (403,671 is
collateral) SF regional mall located in North Charleston, South
Carolina. Anchors include Dillard's, JCPenney and Belk. As of
December 2012, property was 97% leased compared to 96% at
securitization. For the past three years, overall occupancy has
varied between 96% to 99%. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103%
and 1.02X, respectively, compared to 102% and 1.04X at
securitization.


JP MORGAN 2013-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class B-4 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns these ratings to J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust
2013-1:

-- $244,401,000 class 1-A-1 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $244,401,000 class 1-A-2 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $244,401,000 class 1-A-3 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $244,401,000 class 1-A-4 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $244,401,000 class 1-AX-1 exchangeable notional certificate
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $244,401,000 class 1-AX-2 exchangeable notional certificate
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $244,401,000 class 1-AX-3 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $244,401,000 class 1-AX-4 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $244,401,000 class 1-AX-5 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-A-1 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-A-2 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-A-3 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-A-4 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-AX-1 exchangeable notional certificate
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-AX-2 exchangeable notional certificate
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-AX-3 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-AX-4 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $326,256,000 class 2-AX-5 notional certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $15,406,000 class B-1 certificate 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,244,000 class B-2 certificate 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,703,000 class B-3 certificate 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5,238,000 class B-4 certificate 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

The 'AAAsf' rating on the senior certificates reflects the 7.40%
subordination provided by the 2.50% class B-1, 1.50% class B-2,
1.25% class B-3, 0.85% class B-4 and 1.30% class B-5. The
$8,012,381 class B-5 certificate will not be rated by Fitch.

Fitch's ratings reflect the high quality of the underlying
collateral, the clear capital structure and the high percentage of
loans reviewed by third party underwriters. In addition, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as the master servicer and U.S. Bank
Trust N.A. will act as the Trustee for the transaction. For
federal income tax purposes, elections will be made to treat the
trust as one or more real estate mortgage investment conduits
(REMICs).

This transaction includes the use of Pentalpha Capital Group LLC
(Pentalpha) as representation & warranties (R&W) breach reviewer
for the benefit of the trust. The securities administrator will
instruct Pentalpha to review any loan that satisfies the review
trigger. Pentalpha will review the loan using the breach
determination review procedures outlined in the transaction
documents to identify failures with respect to one or more of the
breach determination procedures. If a failure exists, Pentalpha
will determine whether or not the failure is material, based on
materiality conditions outlined in the transaction documents.
Pentalpha will then provide the final results of its review and
determination to the securities administrator.

JPMMT 2013-1 will be J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp.'s
first transaction of prime residential mortgages since 2007. The
certificates are supported by a pool of prime fixed- and
adjustable-rate mortgage loans. The loans are predominantly fully
amortizing; however, 8.9% have a 10-year interest-only (IO)
period. The aggregate pool included loans originated from J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank (48.1%), First Republic Bank (40.7%), BMI
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2010 (4.0%), Bank of Manhattan
(3.9%), Johnson Bank (1.7%) and Dubuque Bank (1.6%).

As of the cut-off date, the aggregate pool consisted of 752 loans
with a total balance of $616,260,382; an average balance of
$819,495; a weighted average original combined loan-to-value ratio
(CLTV) of 65.1%, and a weighted average coupon (WAC) of 3.9%.
Rate/Term and cash out refinances account for 53.8% and 11.6% of
the loans, respectively. The weighted average original FICO credit
score of the pool is 768. Owner-occupied properties comprise 88.8%
of the loans. The states that represent the largest geographic
concentration are California (51.6%), New York (9.4%), and
Massachusetts (7.1%)

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists of a
mixture of 15-, 20-, and 30-year fixed rate mortgages (77%) and
seven- and 10-year hybrid ARMs (23%) to borrowers with strong
credit profiles, full documentation, low leverage, and significant
liquid reserves. A 65.1% CLTV provides a significant buffer
against potential home price declines. Strong borrower quality is
reflected in the 768 weighted average (WA) FICO and $633,428 WA
household income. In addition, third-party due diligence was
conducted on 100% of the pool and the results indicated strong
underwriting controls.

Weak Representations and Warranties (R&Ws) Framework: While the
transaction benefits from strong rep providers, Fitch believes the
value of the R&W framework is significantly diluted by qualifying
and conditional language that substantially reduces lender loan
breach liability and the inclusion of sunsets for a number of
provisions including fraud. While the agency believes that the
high credit quality pool and clean diligence results mitigate the
R&W risks to some degree, Fitch considered the weaker framework in
its expected loss estimation and credit enhancement analysis.

Strong Counterparties: The transaction benefits from strong
counterparties with 88.8% originated by JPMCB and FRB, two
entities with 'above average' origination platforms and strong
financial capacities to meet potential repurchase obligations.
With respect to servicing, Fitch maintains a 'RPS2+' servicer
rating on JPMCB and views FRB as an acceptable servicer. The
transaction also benefits from the participation of an experienced
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated 'RMS1').

Limited Alignment of Interests: While JPMCB will be providing R&Ws
into the transaction as the originator of 48.1% of the collateral
pool, the sponsor, J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp., does
not anticipate retaining any portion of the capital structure or
associated credit risk. The lack of shared risk between the issuer
and investors is a divergence from recent transactions that Fitch
has rated.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) and national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become
exposed to or be considered in the surveillance of the
transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis on areas where the model
projected lower home price declines than that of the overall
collateral pool. The model currently projects sustainable MVDs
(sMVDs) at the MSA level. For three of the top 15 regions in the
mortgage pool, Fitch's SHP model does not project declines in home
prices, and for another region in the top 15, the projected
decline is less than 5.00%. These regions include Chicago-Joliet-
Naperville in Illinois (5.6%), Boston-Quincy in Massachusetts
(4.1%), Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale in Arizona (2.3%), and Houston-Sugar
Land-Baytown in Texas (1.7%). The sensitivity analyses indicated
no impact on ratings for all bonds in each scenario.

Another sensitivity analysis was focused on determining how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 14% for this pool. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.

Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity analysis are discussed in
the presale report titled ' J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust, Series
2013-1', dated Mar. 20, 2013, which is available on Fitch's web
site, www.fitchratings.com.


LANDMARK III: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B-1L Notes to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Landmark III CDO Ltd.:

  US$19,700,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due January 15,
  2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 2, 2012
  Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

  US$14,150,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due January 15,
  2016 (current outstanding balance of $14,472,463.40), Upgraded
  to Ba1 (sf); previously on December 21, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
  (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$16,500,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due January 15,
  2016, (current outstanding balance of $1,081,395.11), Affirmed
  Aaa (sf); previously on December 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  US$7,750,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due January 15,
  2016 (current outstanding balance of $8,345,768.68), Affirmed
  Caa3 (sf); previously on December 21, 2011 Upgraded to Caa3
  (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in August 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-
1L Notes and Class A-1LB Notes were paid down completely since the
last action. In addition Moody's notes that the Class A-2L Notes
have been paid down by 93.5% or $15.4 million since the last
rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated March 7,
2013, the Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1 and Class B-2
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 4218.2%, 219.5%,
129.4% and 98.5%, respectively, versus August 2012 levels of
204.5%, 137.0%, 110.3% and 94.0%, respectively.

Notwithstanding the positive effect of delevering and improved
overcollateralization coverage for the Class A-2L Notes, Class A-
3L Notes, and Class B-1L Notes, Moody's notes that the amount of
interest proceeds was insufficient to cover the entire portion of
the Class B-2L Notes interest amount on the January 2013 payment
date. As a result, principal was used to pay the scheduled Class
B-2L Notes interest. These rating actions reflect concerns about
the potential for interest deferral on the Class B-2L Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par balance of $34.9 million, defaulted par of $15.2
million, a weighted average default probability of 15.68%
(implying a WARF of 3620), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.17%, and a diversity score of 21. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Landmark III CDO Ltd., issued in December 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability adjustments. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) as
described in Moody's Ratings Implementation Guidance "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions",
October 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2896)

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4344)

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: 0

Class B-2L: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors that are rated Caa1 or lower, especially when they
experience jump to default.


LB-UBS 2004-C4: Moody's Takes Actions on 19 CMBS Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed 17 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C4 as follows:

Cl. A-1b, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Confirmed at
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Confirmed at
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
quality of its referenced classes and is thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.3% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
5.1%. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class X was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5 compared to 6 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated July 12, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the March 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 53% to $663.2
million from $1.41 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 71 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 39% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 60% of
the pool. Eight loans, representing 13% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by U.S. Government securities. The pool contains
one loan with an investment grade credit assessment, representing
39% of the pool.

Thirteen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $12.7 million (19% loss severity on average).
Currently two loans, representing 5% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Enterprise
Technology Center Loan ($30.2 million -- 5% of the pool), which is
secured by a 343,600 square foot office park located in Scotts
Valley, California. The property was originally developed in 1993
as headquarters for Borland International, a computer software
company, and was converted into a multi-tenant building in 2010
when Borland vacated its space. Shortly thereafter, the loan was
transferred to special servicing and became real estate owned
(REO) in November 2011. Amenities at the property include an
auditorium, dining hall facilities, fitness center, basketball
courts, tennis courts, an Olympic pool, as well as a land
component for additional development. As of December 2012, the
property was 7% leased compared to 12% at last review.

The other specially serviced loan is secured by an unanchored
retail property located in Georgia. The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $26.0 million appraisal reduction for the
specially serviced loans. Moody's estimates an aggregate $29
million loss for the specially serviced loans (93% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$3 million aggregate loss (16% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the most recent remittance date, the pool has experienced
cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $5.9 million and affecting
Classes H through T. Moody's anticipates that the pool will
continue to experience interest shortfalls caused by specially
serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications,
extraordinary trust expenses and non-advancing by the master
servicer based on a determination of non-recoverability.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 97% and 87% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced loans, troubled loans and the loan
with a credit assessment, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is
84%, the same as at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding special serviced loans, troubled loans and the loan with
a credit assessment, Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are
1.35X and 1.28X, respectively, compared to 1.36X and 1.24X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Westfield Shoppingtown
Garden State Plaza Loan ($260 million -- 39% of the pool), which
represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a first mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by the borrower's interest in an enclosed 2.0
million square foot (SF) super-regional shopping mall located in
Paramus, New Jersey. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom,
J.C. Penney, Neiman Marcus and Lord & Taylor. As of December 2011,
the property was 97% leased. Westfield is the loan sponsor. The
loan is interest-only for its entire 10-year term. Moody's current
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 1.61X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 1.58X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 8.3% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Park Parthenia Apartments Loan
($20.9 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 399-
unit apartment property located in Northridge, California. The
property's financial performance has remained stable as the
property is subject to rent controlled units. While all units are
not at market levels, tax abatements are in place so long as 20%
of the property is considered affordable housing. As of September
2012, the property was 96% leased compared to 93% at the prior
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 75% and 1.30X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Rivercrest Village Loan ($19.7
million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 328-unit
apartment property located in Sacramento, California. Located
about a quarter mile east of Sacramento State University, the
property historically was about 40% leased to students. Recently
student occupancy has been declining due marketing strategies
geared towards more professionals and families. As of December
2012, the property was 93% leased compared to 91% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.86X, respectively,
compared to 116% and 0.84X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 325-329 North Rodeo Drive Loan
($14.4 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 7,100
SF retail property on Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills, California. As
of September 2012, the property was 100% leased to two tenants,
Coach and the Swatch Group. Each tenant has lease expirations in
March 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 1.12X at last review.


LB-UBS 2007-C6: Fitch Puts 'Bsf' Rating on Watch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed five classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series [2007-C6] on Rating Watch Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The placement on Rating Watch Negative reflects concerns
surrounding the $73.6 million Islandia Shopping Center loan (2.92%
of the pool). The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
informed Fitch that the subject loan was transferred to the
special servicer due to imminent default. According to the
servicer, the borrower has indicated property cash flow
constraints from tenant vacancies, reduced rental rates, increased
expenses and chronically delinquent rental payments from various
tenants. As a result, the borrower has requested the transfer to
special servicing in order to be considered for a loan
modification. Additionally the property's roof was damaged by
Hurricane Sandy for which the insurance company has denied the
claim, leaving the borrower to spend approximately $300,000 to
make the repairs.

The loan was not on the master servicer's watchlist prior to
transfer. The most recently reported NOI DSCR and occupancy were
1.25x and 97% as of year to date (YTD) September 2012. The
September 2012 NOI, however, reflects a greater portion of the
property's yearly reimbursement income. The year end (YE) 2012 NOI
DSCR is expected to report in-line or below YE 2011, which
reported at 1.05x.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The classes placed on Rating Watch Negative may be downgraded by
one or more rating categories. Fitch expects to resolve the Rating
Watch Negative status within the next several months following a
complete review of the transaction including an in depth review of
the Islandia Shopping Center, and valuation details and
collateral/workout discussions with the loan servicers.

Fitch places these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

-- $227.9 million class A-M 'AAAsf';
-- $70.0 million class A-MFL 'AAAsf';
-- $156.4 million class A-J 'BBB-sf';
-- $33.5 million class B 'BBsf';
-- $37.2 million class C 'Bsf'.


LEHMAN XS 2007-18N: Fitch Corrects Rating on Class 1A1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a correction to the release dated March 22,
2013.  Fitch has revised the rating on the class 1A1 (52525DAA6)
in Lehman XS Trust 2007-18N.  As part of the rating revisions on
March 22, 2013, this class was incorrectly identified as an
exchangeable certificate with a class that had defaulted.  The
correct rating of the class 1A1 is 'Csf'.

Fitch Ratings has downgraded 703 distressed bonds in 285 U.S. RMBS
transactions to 'Dsf'. The downgrades indicate that the bonds have
incurred a principal write-down or are interest-only classes that
have a notional balance off of a class that incurred a principal
write-down. Of the bonds downgraded to 'Dsf', all classes were
previously rated 'Csf' or 'CCsf'. All ratings below 'Bsf' indicate
a default is expected.

As part of this review, the Recovery Estimates of the defaulted
bonds were not revised. Additionally, the review only focused on
the bonds which defaulted and did not include any other bonds in
the affected transactions.

Of the 703 classes affected by these downgrades, 427 are Alt-A,
249 are Prime, and 15 are Subprime. The remaining transaction
types are other sectors. Approximately, 36% of the bonds have a
Recovery Estimate of 50%-100%, which indicates that the bonds will
recover 50%-100% of the current outstanding balance, while 53%
have a Recovery Estimate of 0%.

Almost half of the affected classes are interest-only classes that
have a notional balance off of a class that has incurred a
principal write-down. All of these classes were previously rated
'Csf'.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions can be found at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'Fitch
Downgrades 703 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf' in 285 U.S. RMBS
Transactions'. These actions were reviewed by a committee of Fitch
analysts. The spreadsheet provides the contact information for the
performance analyst.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's assignment of Recovery
Estimates (REs) to the transactions. The Recovery Estimate scale
is based upon the expected relative recovery characteristics of an
obligation. For structured finance, Recovery Estimates are
designed to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis.


LNR CDO III: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Seven Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed nine classes of notes
issued by LNR CDO III Ltd. The affirmations are due to key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation and re-remic (CRE CDO and Re-Remic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. F-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. G-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

LNR CDO III Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of 100.0% commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS).
As of the February 28, 2013 note valuation report, the aggregate
note balance of the transaction, excluding preferred shares, has
decreased to $751.4 million from $986.3 million at issuance. The
paydown was directed to the senior notes primarily due to regular
amortization of underlying loan related and certain CMBS
collateral.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,755
compared to 7,484 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (2.7% compared to 2.1% at last
review), A1-A3 (3.4% compared to 0.7% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(1.4% compared to 5.1% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (5.0% compared to
8.3% at last review), B1-B3 (6.9% compared to 8.6% at last
review), and Caa1-Ca/C (80.6% compared to 75.2% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.4 years, compared to 4.0 years at
last review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 3.5% compared to 3.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 3.5% to 2% or up to 8.5% would result in rating
movements on the rated tranches of 0 notch downward or 0 to 1
notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


LNR CDO 2002-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded the rating of two classes and downgraded the
rating of five classes of Notes issued by LNR CDO 2002-1, Ltd. The
upgrades are due to greater than expected amortization of the
notes. The downgrades are due to the current level of losses
attributable to the collateral assets and a deterioration in
certain par value and interest coverage tests. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. E-FX, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. E-FXD, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

LNR CDO 2002-1, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS); 100% of
the collateral balance. As of the February 25, 2013 Trustee
report, the aggregate collateral balance of the transaction is
$264.9 million compared to $800.6 million at issuance,
representing $448.4 million of realized losses and $87.3 million
of paydowns to the underlying collateral. The full amortization of
Class A Notes and partial amortization of Class B Notes is a
result of both amortization from the underlying collateral and the
failure of certain par value and interest coverage tests.

Forty-seven assets with a par balance of $211.7 million (79.9% of
the pool balance) were listed as defaulted or impaired securities
as of the February 25, 2013 Trustee Report; primarily due to a
combination of rating changes and/or interest shortfalls. Moody's
expects significant losses to occur on these assets once they are
realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,122
compared to 6,870 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 0.4% at last
review), A1-A3 (8.0% compared to 5.1% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(3.5% compared to 3.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (6.0% compared to
12.0% at last review), B1-B3 (12.0% compared to 11.4% at last
review), and Caa1-C (70.6% compared to 68.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.4 years compared to 2.8 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 5.6% compared to 5.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 99.9% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 5.6% to 15.6% or down to 0.6% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notch upward and 0
to 2 notches downward respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


KATONAH IX: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1(sf)' Rating on $15-Mil. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Katonah IX CLO Ltd.:

  US$23,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
  to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

  US$26,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
  to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3
  (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$221,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2019 (current
  outstanding balance of $215,883,475), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  US$100,000,000 Class A-1LV Revolving Floating Rate Notes Due
  2019 (current outstanding balance of $97,684,830), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  US$15,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Affirmed
  Ba2 (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  US$15,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Affirmed
  Caa1 (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action in August 2011. In particular, the deal is assumed
to benefit from a lower WARF, higher weighted average recovery
rate (WARR), and higher spread levels compared to the levels
assumed at the last rating action in August 2011. Moody's modeled
a WARF of 2303, WARR of 52.16%, and WAS of 3.12% compared to 2602,
50.80%, and 2.81%, respectively, at the time of the last rating
action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $394.8 million,
defaulted par of $21.1 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.74% (implying a WARF of 2303), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 52.16%, and a diversity
score of 58. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Katonah IX CLO Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with a material exposure to structured finance securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1842)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: +1

Class A-3L: +2

Class B-1L: +1

Class B-2L: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2769)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: -2

Class A-3L: -1

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value. However, actual long-dated asset exposure and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the extent of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long-
dated assets.


MAGNETITE V: Moody's Affirms 'B3(sf)' Rating on $11-Mil. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Magnetite V CLO, Limited:

US$19,000,000 Class C Third Priority Floating Rate Deferrable
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 4, 2012
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$270,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2015
(current outstanding balance of $35,084,914), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$20,000,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 4, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf);

US$11,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Floating Rate Notes Due 2015
(current outstanding balance of $10,296,898), Affirmed B3 (sf);
previously on June 4, 2012 Upgraded to B3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in June 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately $29.8 million or 46%
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated January 31, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 271.51%, 172.93,
128.58% and 112.89%, respectively, versus March 2012 levels of
157.06%, 132.01%, 114.63% and 107.00%, respectively.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on Moody's calculation, securities that mature
after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 40.13% of the underlying portfolio. These
investments potentially expose the notes to market risk in the
event of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.
Notwithstanding the increase in the overcollateralization ratio of
the Class D notes, Moody's affirmed the rating of the Class D
notes due to the market risk posed by the exposure to these long-
dated assets.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $91 million,
defaulted par of $6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 11.73% (implying a WARF of 2576), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.85%, and a diversity
score of 24. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Magnetite V CLO, Limited., issued in September 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans, with exposure to corporate bonds, non-senior
secured loans and structured finance securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2061)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3091)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


MBIA INSURANCE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 148 Securities Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade the
ratings of 148 classes of US structured finance securities wrapped
by MBIA Insurance Corporation and its affiliated insurance
companies. The securities impacted include certain RMBS, ABS and
CDOs.

A list of the affected credit ratings is available at:

                       http://is.gd/i9lLiS

Ratings Rationale

This action is solely driven by Moody's announcement on March 21,
2013 that it has placed on review for downgrade the Caa2 Insurance
Financial Strength ratings of MBIA Insurance Corporation.

Moody's ratings on structured finance securities that are
guaranteed or "wrapped" by a financial guarantor are generally
maintained at a level equal to the higher of the following: a) the
rating of the guarantor; or b) the published or unpublished
underlying rating.

The principal methodology used in determining the underlying
rating is the same methodology for rating securities that do not
have a financial guaranty.

This action is driven solely by the rating action on MBIA and is
not a result of change in key assumptions, expected losses, cash
flows and stress scenarios on the underlying assets.


MCF CLO II: Moody's Assigns Definitive B2 Rating to Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following ratings to notes
issued by MCF CLO II LLC:

US$172,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf).

US$24,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf).

US$33,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf).

US$13,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf).

US$25,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf).

US$9,000,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's ratings of the Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C
Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes
(collectively, the "Notes") address the expected losses posed to
noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

MCF CLO II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized substantially by small to medium enterprise ("SME")
first-lien senior secured corporate loans. 100% of the portfolio
must be invested in first-lien senior secured loans, cash and
eligible investments. The portfolio is approximately 63% ramped as
of the closing date and is expected to be 100% ramped within six
months thereafter.

MCF Capital Management LLC (the "Manager") will manage the CLO.
The Manager will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition
of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's three-year reinvestment period. After the
reinvestment period, no investing is permitted.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011. Moody's used the
following base-case modeling assumptions:

Target Par Amount: $300,000,000

Diversity Score: 35

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3350

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.5 years.

The Notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The Notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the Notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- WARF + 15% (from 3350 to 3852)

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- WARF + 30% (from 3350 to 4355)

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C Notes: -3

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class F Notes: -3.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," (the "CLO V Score Report") dated
July 6, 2009. The underlying assets for this transaction are SME
corporate loans, which receive Moody's credit estimates, rather
than publicly rated corporate loans. This distinction is an
important factor in the determination of this transaction's V
Score, since loans publicly rated by Moody's are the basis for the
CLO V Score Report.

Moody's has assessed the sub-category, "Experience of,
Arrangements Among and Oversight of Transaction Parties," as
Medium for this transaction, instead of Low/Medium for the
benchmark CLO. The score of Medium reflects that this transaction
will be MCF Capital's second CLO transaction. This higher score
for "Experience of, Arrangements Among and Oversight of the
Transaction Parties" does not, however, cause this transaction's
overall composite V Score of Medium/High to differ from that of
the CLO sector benchmark.

In addition, several scores for sub-categories of the V Score
differ from the CLO sector benchmark scores because this is an SME
transaction. The scores for the quality of historical data for
U.S. SME loans and for disclosure of collateral pool
characteristics and collateral performance reflect higher
volatility. This results from lack of a centralized default
database for SME loans, as well as obligor-level information for
SME loans being more limited and less frequently provided to
Moody's than that for publicly rated companies.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the rating. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded six and affirmed the ratings
of nine classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-TOP15 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Confirmed at
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to higher than expected realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index
(Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The affirmation of
Class X-1, the interest-only tranche, is due to the weighted
average rating factor of the referenced tranches.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.8% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
2.4%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.8%
of the original pooled balance compared to 1.8% at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit support
for the principal classes could decline below their current
levels. If future performance materially declines, credit support
may be insufficient to support the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class X-1 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15 compared to 17 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 13, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $557.3
million from $889.8 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 91 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
approximately 50% of the pool. There are two loans with
investment-grade credit assessments, representing 30% of the pool.
There are eight loans, representing 8% of the pool, that have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Thirty-five loans, representing approximately 20% of the pool, are
on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As
part of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in a realized loss of $3.74 million (30% loss severity
on average). Currently three loans, representing approximately 4%
of the pool, are in special servicing. The specially serviced
loans are secured by retail properties. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $13.1 million loss for the specially serviced loans (53%
expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing approximately 2% of the pool and has
estimated an aggregate $1.62 million loss (15% expected loss based
on a 50% probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 92% of the pool's loans,
respectively. Excluding defeased, specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 68% compared to 67% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding defeased, specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.72X and 1.73X compared to 1.73X
and 1.66X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is The Grace Building
Loan ($107.5 million -- 19% of the pool), which is secured by a
1.5 million square foot (SF) office building located in the
Midtown submarket of New York City. The loan represents a 33%
pari-passu interest in a $322.5 million loan. A $27.6 million B
note, which is held outside the trust, also encumbers the
property. As of December 2012, the property was 96% leased, which
is the same as last review. Brookfield Office Properties and Swig
Equities are the loan sponsors. The loan matures in 16 months.
Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and
1.47X, essentially the same as at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the GIC Office
Portfolio Loan ($61.5 million -- 11% of the pool), which is
secured by a portfolio of 12 office buildings located in seven
states and totaling 6.4 million SF. The loan represents a 9.3%
pari-passu interest in a $662.2 million loan. A $118.9 million B
note, which is held outside the trust, also encumbers the
property. As of September 2012, the portfolio was 87% leased,
which is the same as at last review. Prime Plus Investments, which
is wholly owned by the Government of Singapore, is the sponsor.
The loan matures in 10 months. Moody's current credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.46X, essentially the same as at
last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 9% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Village at Newtown Loan ($24.6
million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 177,000 SF
retail center located in Newtown Township, Pennsylvania. As of
January 2013, the property was 92% leased compared to 89% at last
review. Property performance has been relatively stable. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.33X, respectively, compared to
73% and 1.29X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Third & Main Portfolio Loan ($13.8
million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by four separate
retail buildings built in the 1920's and located in Santa Monica,
California. The portfolio is 100% leased which is the same as at
the prior review. Overall, the property is stable and the loan is
benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
45% and 2.05X, respectively, compared to 47% and 1.95X at last
full review.

The third largest loan is the Freeport Crossing Loan ($13.6
million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 95,000 SF
grocery-anchored retail property in Freeport, Maine. Shaw's
Supermarket occupies 67% of the net rentable area (NRA) through
February 2025. As of January 2013, the property was 79% leased
compared to 80% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
89% and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.1X at last full
review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-XLF: Moody's Cuts Rating on N-HRO Certs to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes,
affirmed two classes and downgraded two classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-XLF as follows:

Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 3, 2012
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. B Certificate, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-HRO Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May
12, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. N-HRO Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 12,
2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to build-up of credit support due to loan
payoffs. The affirmations are due to key parameters, including
Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) remaining within acceptable ranges.
The downgrades of the two non-pooled (rake) classes are due to the
performance of the underlying loan not meeting Moody's
expectation.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The primary methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
presale report dated May 3, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the March 15, 2013 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased to $304 million from $1.37
billion at securitization due to loan pay offs, the liquidation of
Babcock Ranch Loan and partial loan pay downs. Three loans have
paid off since last review. The pool composition includes three
loans backed by hotel properties. The two largest loans account
for 93% of the pooled balance and the pool's herf is 2.3.

Moody's rates pooled classes A-2, B, C and D, and rake classes M-
HRO and N-HRO that are tied to the HRO Hotel Portfolio Loan, the
second largest loan in the pool. Moody's does not rate pooled
classes E, F, G, H and J, and they act as additional credit
support for the more senior classes.

The transaction has had cumulative losses to date of approximately
$52 million, affecting pooled classes J ($10.2 million), K ($20.6
million) and L ($21.1 million), and non-pooled (rake) classes M-
JPM ($2,867), N-HRO ($39,483) and N-STR ($17). Pooled classes K
and L suffered 100% losses. Interest shortfalls affect pooled
classes G, ($66,396), H ($51,379), J ($71,885) and L ($13,843) and
non-pooled (rake) classes M-HRO ($19,504) and N-HRO ($39,806). In
addition, total outstanding advances made by the servicer as of
the current Payment date totals $158,857.

Moody's pooled portion of the trust loan to value (LTV) ratio is
94% compared to 85% at last review. Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) for the pooled portion of the trust is at
1.11X compared to 1.09X at last review.

The largest loan is the Crowne Plaza Times Square Loan ($138
million -- 48% of pooled balance) which is secured by a leasehold
interest in a 770-key, full service hotel located at 49th Street
and Broadway in the Times Square area of New York, NY. In addition
to the hotel rooms, loan collateral includes approximately 180,328
square feet of office space, 42,121 square feet of retail space
and a 159-car parking garage.

This loan was returned to master servicer, and as part of the
modification and extension, the final maturity has been extended
to December 9, 2013, with a one-year extension option when certain
conditions are met. The senior participation was reduced by $10
million, and will continue to receive $3 million/year amortization
during the extension period. The property's operating performance
is stable, and Moody's expects the trust debt amount to be repaid
in full at final maturity date. Moody's LTV for the pooled debt is
67% and Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.62X. Moody's current credit
assessment is Ba2, same as last review.

The HRO Hotel Portfolio Loan ($131 million -- 45% of pooled
balance plus $13 million of rakes) is secured by five full-service
hotels totaling 1,910 keys. The loan has paid down approximately
14% since securitization due to the release of two properties, the
Sheraton College Park (205 rooms) and the Sheraton Danbury (242
rooms). The $144 million whole loan includes non-pooled trust debt
of $13 million, certificate Classes M-HRO and N-HRO. The five
remaining hotels are branded as Westin, Sheraton, Hilton and
Marriott.

The loan transferred to special servicer (CWCapital Asset
Management LLC) in October 2012 due to maturity default. The
portfolio's net cash flow for 2012 was $9.3 million, up from $7.6
million achieved in 2011. Moody's had expected greater improvement
in loan performance by 2012 to support the value floors used. As
such, Moody's used a blended valuation approach that utilizes both
net cash flow derived values as well as value floors at this time.
Moody's LTV for the pooled debt is over 100% and Moody's stressed
DSCR is 0.77X. Moody's current credit assessment is Caa3, compared
to Caa1 at last review.

The last loan in the pool, La Mer Hotel (formerly known as Le
Meridian, Cancun) Loan ($22 million -- 7% of pooled balance) is
secured by fee simple interest in a 213-key resort property
located in Cancun, Mexico. The property was built in 1998, and was
managed by Starwood Hotels and Resorts at securitization. The
beachfront property was purchased by the current borrower
(Sandos), and the loan was modified and extended in March 2010
with a final maturity date of December 9, 2014. The three one-year
extension options were automatic if the borrower met certain
requirements. As part of the modification, B and C Notes (totaling
$29.9 million) held outside of the trust were extinguished, and
the amortization schedule kicked in as of February 2012.

The loan is currently in special servicing (Midland Loan
Services), due to a technical default, and the special servicer is
in discussions with the borrower. The property has been
struggling, and since the acquisition in 2012, the borrower has
been covering all operating deficits. Moody's LTV for the pooled
debt is over 100% and Moody's current credit assessment is Caa3,
same as last review.


NXT CAPITAL 2013-1: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following ratings to notes
issued by NXT Capital CLO 2013-1, LLC:

US$200,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$29,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$30,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2024 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$16,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2024 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

US$31,250,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2024 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's ratings of the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

NXT 2013-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized substantially by small to medium enterprise first-
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 97% of the portfolio
must be invested in senior secured loans, cash and eligible
investments and up to 3% of the portfolio may consist of second-
lien loans. The underlying portfolio is approximately 70% ramped
as of the closing date and is expected to be 100% ramped within
six months thereafter.

NXT Capital Investment Advisers, LLC (the "Manager"), an affiliate
of NXT Capital, LLC, will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage
in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's three-year reinvestment period.

In addition to the Notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
membership interests in the Issuer.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par of $350,000,000

Diversity of 31

WARF of 3350

Weighted Average Spread of 4.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 45.0%

Weighted Average Life of 7.5 years.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
additional sensitivity analyses which were an important component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Notes. These
sensitivity analyses include increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3350 to 3853):

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3350 to 4355):

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C Notes: -3

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: -2.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," (the "CLO V Score Report") dated
July 6, 2009. A significant portion of the underlying assets for
this transaction are SME corporate loans, which receive Moody's
credit estimates, rather than publicly rated corporate loans. This
distinction is an important factor in the determination of this
transaction's V Score, since loans publicly rated by Moody's are
the basis for the CLO V Score Report.

Several scores for sub-categories of the V Score differ from the
CLO sector benchmark scores. The scores for the quality of
historical data for U.S. SME loans and for disclosure of
collateral pool characteristics and securitization performance
reflect higher volatility. This results from lack of a centralized
default database for SME loans, as well as obligor-level
information for SME loans being more limited and less frequently
provided to Moody's than that for publicly rated companies. In
addition, the score for alignment of interests reflects lower
volatility since the transaction is a financing vehicle.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the rating. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in
June 2011.


OCP CLO 2013-3: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to OCP CLO
2013-3 Ltd./OCP CLO 2013-3 Corp.'s $459 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      preference shares.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (not including excess spread).

   -- The cash flow structure, which can withstand the default
      rate projected by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as
      assessed by Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and
      methods outlined in its corporate collateralized debt
      obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections of the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2600%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which during the reinvestment period will lead to the
      reclassification of up to 50% of available excess interest
      proceeds (before paying uncapped administrative expenses,
      incentive management fees, and preference share payments)
      to principal proceeds for the purchase of additional
      collateral assets.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1413.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OCP CLO 2013-3 Ltd./OCP CLO 2013-3 Corp.

Class                   Rating                Amount
                                             (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)             311.500
A-2                     AA (sf)               56.500
B                       A (sf)                39.500
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)              26.000
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)               25.500
Preference shares       NR                    53.100

NR-Not rated.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Hikes Rating on Class A & B Notes to BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's raised the ratings on PreferredPLUS Trust Series
ALL-1 Class A and B to 'BB' from 'BB-'.

S&P's ratings on the class A and B notes are based on its rating
on the underlying security, The Hanover Insurance Group Inc.'s
US$165.712 million 8.207% junior subordinated deferrable interest
debt series B due Feb. 3, 2027 ('BB').

The rating action reflects the March 12, 2013, correcting and
raising of S&P's rating on the underlying security to 'BB' from
'BB-'.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions on the notes due to
changes in its rating assigned to the underlying security.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement  mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


R.E. REPACK 2002-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A Notes From 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded the Class A certificate issued by R.E. Repack
Trust 2002-1. The Class A certificate is a tranched repack of the
Class B notes issued by LNR CDO 2002-1, Ltd. transaction, which
was upgraded on March 19, 2013. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

R.E. Repack Trust 2002-1 is a direct pass-through of the Class B
notes issued by the LNR CDO 2002-1, Ltd. transaction (the
"Underlying Bond"). As of the February 25, 2013 Trustee Report,
the aggregate balance of the rated certificate is $39.9 million,
the same as at securitization. The Underlying Bond was upgraded on
March 20, 2013. Since the rating of the certificate is linked to
the rating of the Underlying Bond, any credit action on the
Underlying Bond may trigger a review of the ratings of the
certificates.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
underlying deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
in the underlying deal up from 5.6% to 15.6% or down to 0.6% would
result in average rating movement on the underlying bond of 2
notch upward and 2 notch downward respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating
Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011, and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


RFC CDO 2006-1: Swap Termination No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service reviewed the proposed swap termination
between RFC CDO 2006-1, Ltd. (the "Issuer") and Deutsche Bank AG
(the "Hedge Counterparty"). Moody's has determined that the
proposed swap termination should not, if implemented, in and of
itself and at this time, result in a downgrade or withdrawal of
the current ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer. Moody's
opinion addresses only the credit impact of the proposed
appointments, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion as to
whether the action has, or could have, other non-credit related
effects that may have a detrimental impact on the interests of
holders and/or counterparties.

The proposed swap termination may be summarized as follows: the
collateral manager for the Issuer may fully terminate two fixed-
to-floating interest rate swaps in the transaction. The early
termination fee to the Hedge Counterparty is expected to be
satisfied with the disposition of an identified impaired
collateral asset.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.

On September 28, 2011, Moody's took these ratings actions on the
notes issued by RFC CDO 2006-1, Ltd:

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)


SALOMON BROTHERS 2000-C3: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 4 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C3 as follows:

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2011 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The ratings of the principal bonds are consistent with Moody's
base expected loss and are thus affirmed.

The rating of the IO, Class X, is consistent with the expected
credit performance of its referenced classes and is thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 59.3% of
the current balance compared to 50.5% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 6.5% of the original
securitized balance, down from 7.0% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Class X was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 6 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 19, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $42.9
million from $914.7 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 47% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
99% of the pool.

One loan, representing 2% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a realized loss of $33.6 million (20% loss severity). Currently
three loans, representing 90% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Jorie Plaza
Loan ($19.9 million -- 46.5% of the pool), which is secured by two
office buildings totaling 191,700 square feet (SF) located in Oak
Brook, Illinois. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
September 2008 due to imminent default and is currently real
estate owned (REO). The properties were 66% leased as of February
2013.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Granite State
Marketplace Loan ($16.3 million -- 38.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 250,000 SF anchored retail center located in
Hooksett, New Hampshire. The loan transferred to special servicing
in September 2008 for maturity default. The loan was modified and
has reached the maturity date of the modification. Terms of the
modification included extending the maturity date to November 2012
and restructuring the loan with a $13.0 million A Note and a $3.3
million B Note. The loan is currently in maturity default.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the RPS Warehouse
Loan ($2.3 million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
63,600 SF industrial property located in Colonies, New York (north
of Albany). The loan was transferred to special servicing in
August 2010 for maturity default. The loan matured on August 1,
2010. Negotiations with the borrower are dual-tracked with a
foreclosure action until a resolution is achieved.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $24.2 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (95% expected loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 80% of the pool respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 88% compared to 89% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.01X and 1.57X, respectively, compared to
1.10X and 1.34X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 7.0% of the pool. All of
these loans are fully amortizing. The largest loan is the K-Mart
Shopping Center Loan ($1.5 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a single tenant retail center located in Murray, Utah.
The property is 100% leased to the Kmart Corporation until May
2020. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 49% and 2.11X,
respectively, compared to 59% and 1.74X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Weatherbridge Center Buildings II
and II Loan ($831,950 -- 1.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
mixed use office and retail property located in Cary, North
Carolina. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 46% and 2.37X,
respectively, compared to 65% and 1.65X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Quality Suites Albuquerque Loan
($708,920 -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 69 room
limited service hotel in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 38% and 3.25X, respectively, compared to 42% and
2.96X at last review.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2013-4: Fitch Rates $3.17MM Class B-4 Certs 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to Sequoia Mortgage
Trust 2013-4, mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2013-4:

-- $170,408,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $170,000,000 class A-2 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $157,795,000 class A-3 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,205,000 class A-4 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $540,408,000 notional class A-IO1 certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $170,408,000 notional class A-IO2 certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $157,795,000 notional class A-IO3 certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $10,952,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,511,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,340,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,170,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the senior certificates reflects the 6.25%
subordination provided by the 1.90% class B-1, 1.65% class B-2,
1.10% class B-3, 0.55% non-offered class B-4 and 1.05% non-offered
class B-5. The $6,054,465 non-offered class B-5 certificates will
not be rated by Fitch.

Fitch's ratings reflect the high quality of the underlying
collateral, the clear capital structure and the high percentage of
loans reviewed by third party underwriters. In addition, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as the master servicer and Christiana
Trust will act as the Trustee for the transaction. For federal
income tax purposes, elections will be made to treat the trust as
one or more real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs).

SEMT 2013-4 will be Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation's
fourth transaction of prime residential mortgages in 2013. The
certificates are supported by a pool of prime fixed rate mortgage
loans. The loans are predominantly fully amortizing; however, 2.2%
have a 10-year interest-only (IO) period. The aggregate pool
included loans originated from First Republic Bank (11.3%), Cole
Taylor Bank (8.5%), PrimeLending (7.9%), United Shore Financial
Services (6.2%) and Fremont Bank (5.3%). The remainder of the
mortgage loans was originated by various mortgage lending
institutions, each of which contributed less than 5% to the
transaction.

As of the cut-off date, the aggregate pool consisted of 716 loans
with a total balance of $576,435,465; an average balance of
$805,077; a weighted average original combined loan-to-value ratio
(CLTV) of 64.9%, and a weighted average coupon (WAC) of 3.8%.
Rate/Term and cash out refinances account for 68.2% and 9% of the
loans, respectively. The weighted average original FICO credit
score of the pool is 773. Owner-occupied properties comprise 96%
of the loans. The states that represent the largest geographic
concentration are California (42.1%), Massachusetts (9.7%), and
Washington (7.2%)

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists primarily
of 30-year fixed-rate fully documented loans to borrowers with
strong credit profiles, low leverage, and substantial liquid
reserves. The majority of the loans are fully amortizing, with
only nine loans (2.2% of the pool) having a 10-year interest-only
(IO) period. Third-party loan-level due diligence was conducted on
approximately 92% of the overall pool, and Fitch believes the
results of the review generally indicate strong underwriting
controls.

Originators with Limited Performance History: Approximately 89% of
the pool was originated by lenders with limited non-agency
performance history. While the significant contribution of loans
from these originators is a concern, Fitch believes the lack of
performance history is partially mitigated by the 100% third-party
diligence conducted on these loans that resulted in immaterial
findings. Fitch also considers the credit enhancement (CE) on this
transaction sufficient to mitigate the originator risk.

Geographically Diverse Pool: The overall geographic diversity is
in line with other SEMT transactions. The percentage of the top
three metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) is 25%, the second
lowest concentration to date. Fitch applied a 1.05x default
penalty to the pool to account for the geographic concentration
risk.

Transaction Provisions Enhance Performance: As in other recent
SEMT transactions rated by Fitch, SEMT 2013-4 contains binding
arbitration provisions that may serve to provide timely resolution
to representation and warranty disputes. In addition, all loans
that become 120 days or more delinquent will be reviewed for
breaches of representations and warranties.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) and national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become
exposed to or be considered in the surveillance of the
transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis on areas where the model
projected lower home price declines than that of the overall
collateral pool. The model currently projects sustainable MVDs
(sMVDs) at the MSA level. For one of the top 10 regions, Fitch's
sustainable home price (SHP) model does not project declines in
home prices and for another, the projected decline is less than
2.00%. These regions are Chicago-Joliet-Naperville in Illinois
(4.2%) and Cambridge-Newton-Framingham in Massachusetts (4.6%).
Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis assuming sMVDs of 10%, 15%,
and 20% compared with those projected by Fitch's SHP model for
these regions. The sensitivity analysis indicated no impact on
ratings for all bonds in each scenario.

Another sensitivity analysis was focused on determining how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 13% for this pool. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.


SILVERADO CLO 2005-1: Deal Amendment No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by Silverado
CLO 2006-1, Ltd. (the "Issuer") into a proposed amendment
effective as of March 27, 2013 (the "Amendment") to the existing
portfolio management agreement dated as of April 11, 2006 (the
"Agreement") in effect between the Issuer and Wells Capital
Management Incorporated (the "Manager") and performance of the
obligations therein will not result in the withdrawal, reduction
of other adverse action with respect to the current Moody's
ratings of any Class of Notes issued by the Issuer.

Moody's opinion does not address whether the Amendment could have
non-credit effects for the Issuer.

The Amendment permits the holders of at least 50% of the aggregate
outstanding amount of the Subordinated Notes issued by the Issuer
to remove the Manager in the event that the Secured Notes issued
by the Issuer have been redeemed in full.

Moody's Rates Silverado CLO 2005-1's Class D Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes at Ba3 (sf).

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations",
published in June 2011.


TRAPEZA CDO I: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on Three TruPS CDO Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza CDO I, LLC:

US$54,600,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2032 (current balance of $ 33,531,018.67), Upgraded
to A3 (sf); previously on February 16, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

US$2,000,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2032 (current balance of $1,228,242.44 ), Upgraded
to A3 (sf); previously on February 16, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

US$16,000,000 Class B-3 Second Priority Senior Secured Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2032 (current balance of $9,825,939.54), Upgraded to A3
(sf); previously on February 16, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$29,600,000 Class C-1 Third Priority Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2032 Notes (current balance of $33,031,285.22), Affirmed C
(sf); previously on June 24, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf);

US$10,000,000 Class C-2 Third Priority Secured Fixed Rate Notes
Due 2032 Notes (current balance of $12,904,520.08), Affirmed C
(sf); previously on June 24, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf);

US$16,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2032 Notes (current balance of $16,327,035.98), Affirmed C (sf);
previously on June 24, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf).

Rating Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily the result of redemptions of the Class A notes as well
as the deleveraging of the Class B notes. Since the last rating
action which occurred in February 2012, the Class A notes fully
redeemed (in November 2012) and the Class B notes have paid down
by approximately $28 million (39%). According to the latest
trustee report, dated as February 2013, the Class A/B
Overcollateralization Test has also increased to 155.57% as
compared to trustee reported levels of 106.08% in January 2012.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in its rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $68 million,
defaulted par of $59 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.53% (implying a WARF of 881), Moody's Asset
Correlation of 32%, and a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors that are
explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of triggering an Event of
Default, recent deal performance under current market conditions,
the legal environment, and specific documentation features. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Trapeza CDO I, Ltd., issued on November 19, 2002, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (the "TruPS CDO").

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q4-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 219 points from the
base case of 881, the model-implied rating of the Class B notes is
one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the WARF
is decreased by 131 points, the model-implied rating of the Class
B notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed one additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. Moody's ran alternative default-timing
profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a large spike
in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal. Currently there
are no banks that are deferring interest on their TRUPs in the
portfolio.

Sensitivity Analysis:

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class B-3: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities.


TRICADIA CDO 2003-1: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class A-4L Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-3L and A-4L notes from Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction of mainly
mezzanine tranches of corporate backed CDOs; Tricadia CDO
Management LLC manages the transaction.  At the same time, S&P
removed the ratings on the A-3L and A-4L notes from CreditWatch,
where it had placed them with positive implications on Jan. 4,
2013.

Since the time of the last action, the transaction has paid down
the class A-1LA, A-1LB, and A-2L notes completely.  Additionally,
the class A-3L notes have been paid down to $22.25 million or
63.58% of their original balance.  These paydowns have resulted in
an increase in the overcollateralization (O/C) available to
support the notes since the April 2012 rating actions.  The
trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the February 2013
monthly report:

   -- The class senior class A O/C ratio was 210.2%, compared
      with a reported ratio of 141.7% in March 2012;

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 162.1%, compared with a reported
      ratio of 124.4% in March 2012; and

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 129.54%, compared with a reported
      ratio of 109.15% in March 2012.

At the same time, the transaction's underlying credit performance
has improved since the last action.  According to the Feb. 20,
2013 trustee report, the transaction held $35.84 million in 'CCC'
rated collateral, down from $50.36 million noted in the March 27,
2012 trustee report, which S&P used for its April 2012 rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-3L          BBB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4L          BB- (sf)      B (sf)/Watch Pos


VENTURE XIII: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to $39.5MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following ratings to notes
issued by Venture XIII CLO, Limited:

US$362,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
June 2025 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf).

US$7,000,000 Class A-X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due June
2025 (the "Class A-X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf).

US$61,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due June
2025 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf).

US$24,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due June 2025 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating
Assigned A2 (sf).

US$10,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due June 2025 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf).

US$34,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due June 2025 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating
Assigned Baa2 (sf).

US$39,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due June 2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating
Assigned Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Class A-1 Notes, Class A-X Notes, Class B
Notes, Class C-1 Notes, Class C-2 Notes, Class D Notes and Class E
Notes (collectively, the "Notes") address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Venture XIII is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, cash and eligible
investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans, unsecured loans and bonds. The portfolio is
approximately 86% ramped as of the closing date and is expected to
be 100% ramped within four months thereafter.

MJX Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will manage the CLO. The
Manager will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's four-year reinvestment period. Thereafter, up to 50%
of unscheduled principal payments and sale proceeds of credit risk
assets may be used to purchase additional collateral obligations,
subject to certain conditions.

In addition to the Notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011. Moody's used the
following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: $576,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2420

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.5 years.

The Notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The Notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the Notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- WARF + 15% (from 2420 to 2783)

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A-X Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C-1 Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C-2 Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- WARF + 30% (from 2420 to 3146)

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A-X Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C-1 Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C-2 Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: -1.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.


WACHOVIA 2005-C21: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes and affirmed six
classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C21.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in expected losses across the
pool, most of which involves higher losses due to updated property
valuations on loans which transferred to special servicing since
last review. Fitch modeled losses of 5.4% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 5.1%, including
losses already incurred. The pool has experienced $60.5 million
(1.9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated 46 loans (35.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes six specially serviced assets (12%).

Rating Sensitivities

The Negative Outlooks on classes F and G reflect property
performance concerns for several of the loans in the top15,
including major tenant vacancies and rollover risk, combined with
secondary and tertiary market exposure. The Negative Outlooks
reflect the potential for further rating actions should realized
losses be greater than Fitch's expectations. The distressed
classes (those rated below 'B') are expected to be subject to
further downgrades as losses are realized.

As of the March 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 39.9% to $1.95 billion from
$3.25 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, three loans
(2.1% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially serviced
loan(6.3% of the pool) secured by a 1.0-million sf class-A office
tower in the central business district of St. Louis, MO. The
property has experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy and
rental income declines. In addition, amortization for the subject
loan began with the February 2012 payment further impacting the
property's cash flow. The loan transferred to the special servicer
due to imminent default, and subsequently went into payment
default in September 2012. The loan was modified in November 2012
and includes an interest rate reduction and extension of the
loan's interest only payment period. The loan is current under the
modified terms, and is expected to be returned to the master
servicer by April 2013.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a specially
serviced loan (2.3%) secured by a 253,674 square foot (sf) retail
center in Sacramento, CA. The center is anchored by Kohl's, and
Marshalls. The center has experienced cash flow issues due to
occupancy declines. Borders Books, who had previously occupied
25,000 sf (10% of the net rentable area [NRA]), had vacated in
January 2009. In addition, Bed Bath & Beyond (previously 10% NRA)
terminated its lease and vacated the property in December 2011,
prior to their January 2015 lease expiration date. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2012 due to imminent
default, and subsequently went into payment default in September
2012. A receiver was appointed in February 2013, and the servicer
has projected a foreclosure sale for mid April 2013.

The third largest contributor to expected losses, which is the
second largest loan in the pool, is secured by a twenty property
portfolio mixed with office, retail, industrial, and mixed use
properties containing a total of approximately 1.7 million square
feet. All of the properties are located in California, primarily
in the Los Angeles Metro area. The portfolio had experienced cash
flow issues due to occupancy declines. Current occupancy reports
at 69%, compared to 80% at December 2011 and 94% at issuance. The
year end (YE) December 2012 net operating income (NOI) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) reported at 1.10 times (x) compared
to 1.19x at YE December 2011 and 1.61x YE December 2010. The NOI
DSCR is expected to see improvements with several newly executed
leases currently in place. The loan remains current as of the
March 2013 remittance date.

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns or revises the Rating
Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $60.9 million class D to 'Asf' from 'A+sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $36.6 million class E to 'BBBsf' from 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $40.6 million class F to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $32.5 million class G to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $40.6 million class H to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 20%;
-- $16.3 million class J to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $16.3 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $16.3 million class L to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

-- $804.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $234.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $325 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $215.3 million class A-J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $65 million class B at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $32.5 million class C at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2PFL, A-2C, A-3 and A-PB certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the classes M, N, O and P certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO
certificate.


WELLS FARGO 2012-C6: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2012-C6 due to stable performance since
issuance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. As of the March 2013 remittance, the
pool has no delinquent or specially serviced loans. The pool's
aggregate principal balance has been paid down by 1.14% to
$914.470 million from $925.008 million at issuance. 66 of the
remaining 89 loans (74% of the pool) reported at least partial
year 2012 financials.

RATINGS SENSITIVITY

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks. Due to the recent issuance
of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic
or asset level event changes the transaction's overall portfolio-
level metrics. Additional information on rating sensitivity is
available in the report ' WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C6'
(June 5, 2012), available at www.fitchratings.com.

The largest loan of the pool (8.37%) is secured by National Cancer
Institute (NCI) Center, a 341,271-square foot (sf) office and lab
facility in Frederick, MD approximately 50 miles northwest of
Washington, D.C. and 50 miles west of Baltimore. The three-story
building, which was constructed in 2011, is 100% leased to the
Science Applications International Corporation-Frederick (SAIC-F)
until the year 2021.

The second largest loan (7.23%), Windsor Hotel Portfolio II, is
secured by four full-service hotels, located in California,
Nevada, Georgia, and North Carolina, totaling 901 rooms. Patrick
Nesbitt, CEO and founder of Windsor, is the sponsor. Windsor owns
and operates 22 hotels in 11 states and is the largest private
owner and operator of Embassy Suites hotels.

The third largest loan (5.27%), WPC Self Storage Portfolio, is
secured by 26 self-storage properties, encompassing 16,101 units.
The properties, recently acquired by the borrower, are located
throughout California, Illinois, Hawaii, and Texas. Fitch
inspected 18 of the 26 assets in the portfolio and assigned
property quality grades ranging from 'B+' to 'C.' The sponsor of
the loan is WP Carey Storage.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and Outlooks as indicated:

-- $46.9 million class A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $136.8 million class A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $67.8 million class A3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $385.4 million class A4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100.6 million class AS at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.8 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $737.6* million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31.2 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.9 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes G and interest-only class X-B.

*Notional amount and interest only


ZOHAR CDO 2003-1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2 Securities Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of the following
Participation Interests under review for possible downgrade:

US$127,287,454.88 Versailles Participation Senior Participation
Interest 2009-Z1a (current outstanding balance of $108,320,741),
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously
on Mar 14, 2013 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

US$22,500,000 Versailles Participation Junior Participation
Interest 2009-Z1b, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Mar 14, 2013 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

The Participation Interests are repackaged securities whose
ratings are based on the rating of an underlying security and the
legal structure of the transaction. These rating actions are a
result of the change in the rating of the Class A-1 Notes issued
by Zohar CDO 2003-1 Limited ("the Underlying Security") which was
placed under review for possible downgrade by Moody's on March 25,
2013.

Moody's notes that it does not rate the Underlying Security
without giving effect to the benefit of the financial guarantee
insurance policy issued by MBIA Insurance Corporation ("MBIA
Corporation") guaranteeing payment of certain shortfalls in the
amounts payable to owners of the Underlying Security. Moody's
rating on the Underlying Security is solely based on the financial
guarantee insurance policy issued by MBIA Corporation, whose
insurance financial strength rating is currently Caa2, under
review for possible downgrade. Accordingly, the ratings on the
Participation Interests are likewise assumed to rely solely on the
creditworthiness of MBIA Corporation and the structural
subordination between the Participation Interests specified in the
related transaction documents. Moody's expects to withdraw the
ratings on the Participation Interests in the event MBIA
Corporation's insurance financial strength rating is withdrawn.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010, and "Rating
CDO Repacks: An Application Of The Structured Note Methodology"
published in February 2004.

Moody's says that its ratings on the Participation Interests are
subject primarily to the uncertainties embedded in its assessment
of MBIA Corporation's rating. In addition, the different
structural payment priorities of each class of Participation
Interests makes each sensitive in varying degrees to the recovery
realized on an assumed claim upon a potential MBIA Corporation
default.


* Fitch Lowers 52 Bonds in 42 U.S. CMBS Transactions to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 52 bonds in 42 U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions to 'D', as the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down. The bonds were all
previously rated 'CC' or 'C', which indicates that Fitch expected
a default.

Key Rating Drivers

Today's action is limited to just the bonds with write-downs. The
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review. Fitch has downgraded the bonds to 'D' as part
of the ongoing surveillance process and will continue to monitor
these transactions for additional defaults.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions on the affected
transactions is available at 'www.fitchratings.com' by performing
a title search for: 'Fitch Downgrades 52 Bonds in 42 U.S. CMBS
Transactions', or clicking on the link above.


* Fitch Lowers 704 Distressed Bond Ratings to 'Dsf'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 704 distressed bonds in 285 U.S. RMBS
transactions to 'Dsf'.  The downgrades indicate that the bonds
have incurred a principal write-down or are interest-only classes
that have a notional balance off of a class that incurred a
principal write-down. Of the bonds downgraded to 'Dsf', all
classes were previously rated 'Csf' or 'CCsf'. All ratings below
'Bsf' indicate a default is expected.

As part of this review, the Recovery Estimates of the defaulted
bonds were not revised. Additionally, the review only focused on
the bonds which defaulted and did not include any other bonds in
the affected transactions.

Of the 704 classes affected by these downgrades, 428 are Alt-A,
249 are Prime, and 15 are Subprime. The remaining transaction
types are other sectors. Approximately, 36% of the bonds have a
Recovery Estimate of 50%-100%, which indicates that the bonds will
recover 50%-100% of the current outstanding balance, while 53%
have a Recovery Estimate of 0%.

Almost half of the affected classes are interest-only classes that
have a notional balance off of a class that has incurred a
principal write-down. All of these classes were previously rated
'Csf'.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions can be found at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'Fitch
Downgrades 704 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf' in 285 U.S. RMBS
Transactions'. These actions were reviewed by a committee of Fitch
analysts. The spreadsheet provides the contact information for the
performance analyst.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's assignment of Recovery
Estimates (REs) to the transactions. The Recovery Estimate scale
is based upon the expected relative recovery characteristics of an
obligation. For structured finance, Recovery Estimates are
designed to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis.


* Moody's Reviews $600-Mil. of Subprime RMBS Issues for Downgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 16 tranches from nine RMBS
transactions issued by Renaissance and Delta Funding on review for
downgrade. The collateral backing these deals primarily consist of
first-lien, subprime residential mortgages.

Issuer: DFC HELTrust 2001-2

Cl. M-1, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. AF-5, Current Rating A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Downgraded
to A2, Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. AF-5, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. AF-4, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. AF-3, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. AF-2, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Sep 4, 2012 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. AF-1, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-1A, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-1Z, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-2

Cl. AF-1, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-3

Cl. AF-1, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The review actions reflect the existence of errors in the
Structured Finance Workstation cash flow models previously used by
Moody's in rating these transactions, specifically in how the
model handles principal and interest allocation in certain
Renaissance transactions. The cash flow model used in past rating
actions incorrectly used separate interest and principal
waterfalls. Other tranches of eight of these deals were placed on
review on March 19th in connection with similar errors.

In the impacted deals all collected principal and interest is
commingled into one payment waterfall to pay all promised interest
due on bonds first, then to pay scheduled principal. With
commingling of funds even principal proceeds will be used to pay
accrued interest, which could result in reduced principal recovery
for outstanding bonds.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

The methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Actions on $122-Mil. of 16 Subprime RMBS Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of seven tranches
and affirmed the rating of nine tranches from four RMBS
transactions, backed by $122 million of subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2001-
AQ1 Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
HS1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools. The downgrades on Cl M-2 from ACE 2003-HS1 and ACE
2004-HE1 are primarily due to the large outstanding interest
shortfall on the tranches ($81,894 and $205,741 respectively) and
the weak interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism. Structural
limitations in these transactions prevent recoupment of interest
shortfalls even if funds are available in subsequent periods. The
missed interest payments on these tranches can only be made up
from excess interest after the overcollateralization is built to a
target amount. In these transactions, since overcollateralization
is already below target due to poor performance, the missed
interest payments to these tranches are unlikely to be paid.
Ratings on tranches that currently have small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3 (sf). For tranches with
larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009. This rating action takes into account
only credit-related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* S&P Withdraws 'B-' Rating on 2 Note Classes from 2 U.S. CDO
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
class A notes from Aphex Capital MOTIVE Series 2004-C.  S&P also
withdrew its ratings on the notes from Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's
series 2005-8 and Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's series 2005-9.  These
transactions are U.S. corporate-backed synthetic collateralized
debt obligations.

The rating withdrawals follow the receipt of unwind notices for
the notes.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Aphex Capital MOTIVE Series 2004-C
                                Rating
Class                        To           From
A                            NR           B- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2005-8
                                 Rating
Class                        To           From
Notes                        NR           B- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2005-9
                                  Rating
Class                        To           From
Notes                        NR           BB+ (sf)

NR-Not rated.



* S&P Lowers 280 Ratings on 210 US RMBS Deals to 'D(sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' its ratings
on 280 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 210 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2009.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the impact that
principal write-downs had on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.  Prior to the rating actions, S&P rated one of
the lowered classes in this review 'BBB+ (sf)', one 'BB+ (sf)',
and all the others 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)'.

About 68.21% of the defaulted classes were from transactions
backed by Alternative-A (Alt-A) or prime jumbo mortgage loan
collateral.  The 280 defaulted classes consist of the following:

   -- 118 classes from Alt-A transactions (42.14% of all
      defaults).

   -- 73 classes from prime jumbo transactions (26.07%).

   -- 64 from subprime transactions (22.86%).

   -- 12 from RMBS negative amortization transactions (4.29%).

   -- Six from RMBS Federal Housing Administration/Veterans
      Affairs transactions.

   -- Four from reperforming transactions.

   -- One from an RMBS document deficient transaction.

   -- One from a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit (re-REMIC) transaction.

   -- One from an RMBS second-lien high-LTV (loan-to-value)
     transaction.

A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable) provide credit
enhancement for all of the transactions in this review.

S&P will continue to monitor its ratings on securities that
experience principal write-downs, and it will adjust its ratings
as it considers appropriate in accordance with its criteria.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Carmel
Paderog, Meriam Fernandez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
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not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
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are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
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