TCR_Public/130310.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, March 10, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 68

                            Headlines

ALESCO I: S&P Puts 'CCC' Rating on A-2 Notes on Watch Positive
AMERICREDIT AUTO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Certs.
ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 7 Note Classes
APHEX CAPITAL 2007-4: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt to 'C'
APHEX CAPITAL 2007-7SR: Moody's Lowers Two Note Classes to 'Ca'

ATRIUM III: Moody's Retains 'Ba3' Ratings on Two Note Classes
BANC OF AMERICA 2002-PB2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 7 CMBS Classes
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class G Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-MIB1: Moody's Cuts X-1B Cert Rating to Caa2
BANC OF AMERICA 2006-BIX1: Fitch Keeps 'D' Rating on Cl. L Certs

BANC OF AMERICA 2007-3: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Five Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2001-TOP2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'D'
BEAR STEARNS 1999-CLF1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. C Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2004-TOP: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR8: Fitch Cuts Rating on K Certs. to 'D'

BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR10: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Class G Certs to C
BWAY 2013-1515: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class G Notes
CABELA'S CREDIT: DBRS Rates Series 2013-1 Class D Notes 'BB(sf)'
CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Cl. D Certificates
CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

CAPMARK VII-CRE: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Certs. Classes
CD 2006-CD2: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
CENTURION CDO VII: Moody's Ups Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'Ba2'
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Moody's Affirms X Certs' Ba3 Rating
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2007-FL3: S&P Affirms BB Rating on E Notes

COMM COMMERCIAL 2004-LNB4: Moody's Cuts A-1A Certs Rating to Ba1
COMM 2006-C7: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'
COMM 2013-GAM: Fitch Rates $27.6MM Class F Certificates 'BB-'
CMBSPOKE 2006-I: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 CMBS Classes

CREDIT SUISSE 2006-TFL2: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Cl. J Notes
CRYSTAL RIVER 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 8 Notes Classes to 'D'
CTX CDO I: S&P Withdraws 'D' Rating on 11 Note Classes
CWABS 2004-13: Moody's Takes Action on $367MM of Subprime RMBS
DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG2: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on Cl. S CMBS

EMPORIA PREFERRED I: Moody's Hikes Ratings on Two Notes to 'Ba1'
FORTRESS CREDIT: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
GALAXY IV: Moody's Raises Rating on US$14MM Notes to 'Baa1'
GALAXY V: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on 2 Note Classes
GE COMMERCIAL 2003-C2: Fitch Puts 7 Certs Rating on Watch Negative

GOLDEN KNIGHT II: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class E Notes
GOLDMAN SACHS 1999-C1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class H CMBS
GSC PARTNERS VI: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class D Notes to Baa2
HARBOR SERIES 2006-2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A Notes to Caa3
HARBOR SERIES 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A Notes to Caa2

HARCH CLO III: Moody's Keeps Ba3 Rating on US$15MM Cl. E Notes
HELLER FINANCIAL 1999-PH1: Moody's Keeps 'Caa3' Rating on X Certs
JER CRE 2005-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 5 Note Classes to 'D'
JP MORGAN 2001-CIBC2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class F Certs. to 'CCC'
JP MORGAN 2000-C9: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on H Certificates

JP MORGAN 2003-PM1: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class G Notes
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class M Certs.
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B Certs to 'CCC'
JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Moody's Lowers Rating on 3 CMBS Classes to Ba1
KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Moody's Cuts Class E Note Rating to 'C'

KODIAK CDO II: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on 2 Note Classes
LANDMARK IX: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $18.5MM Class E Notes
LB-UBS 2000-C5: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
LB-UBS 2002-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X-CL Certs to Caa3
LB-UBS 2005-C3: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes

LB-UBS 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 6 Cert. Classes
LB-UBS 2006-C7: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 2 Certificate Classes
LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-1: Moody's Review 7 Tranches for Downgrade
MARATHON CLO V: S&P Corrects Feb. 21 Ratings Release
MARLBOROUGH STREET: Moody's Upgrades Class E Notes' Rating to Ba3

MASTR 2005-OPT1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class M-3 RMBS to 'B3'
MBIA INSURANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on 11 Note Classes to 'CCC'
MERRILL LYNCH 2001-CA: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-BPC1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on Cl. N Certs
MMCAPS FUNDING I: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on US$77MM Notes

MORGAN STANLEY 2007-12: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 5 Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-ALTM: S&P Gives Prelim BB+ Rating to E Notes
MSC 2007-SRR4: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Cl. B and C Notes
NEW YORK LIBERTY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class B Certs.
NOMAD CLO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

NXT CAPITAL 2013-1: Moody's Rates $31MM Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
PACIFICA CDO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Two Note Classes
PPLUS TRUST LMG-3: Moody's Raises Rating on A Certs. to 'B2'
PPLUS TRUST LMG-4: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Cert Classes to B2
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST LMG-1: Moody's Ups 8.75% Certs.' Rating to B2

PREFERREDPLUS TRUST LMG-2: Moody's Ups 8.50% Certs.' Rating to B2
PRIMA CAPITAL 2005-1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class H Debt
PRUDENTIAL 2000-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X Secs to Caa3
REALT 2006-2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 18 CMBS Classes
SARGAS CLO II: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes

SDART 2013-2: Moody's Rates New Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
SDART 2013-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Fitch Assigns BB Ratings to Cl. B-4 Certificates
SOUND POINT I: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
SOUND POINT II: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' Rating to Class B-3L Notes

UBS-BB 2013-C5: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F CMBS
VENTURE IV: Moody's Lifts Rating on $11MM Class D Notes to 'Ba3'
VENTURE XI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2002-C1: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class N Certs
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C20: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 14 CMBS Classes

WASHINGTON MUTUAL 2007-SL2: Moody's Cuts Rating on G Certs to 'C'
WASHINGTON MUTUAL 2007-SL3: Moody's Affirms Rating on 16 CMBS
WATERFRONT CLO 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
WEST COAST FUNDING I: Moody's Lifts A-1a Notes' Rating to 'Caa3'

* Moody's Takes Ratings Action on $340 Million of TRUPS CDO Notes
* Moody's Takes Rating Action on US$104 Million RMBS
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 92 Subprime RMBS Issues
* Moody's Takes Rating Action on $802-Mil. of Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Takes Various Action on $2.1 Billion Subprime RMBS

* Moody's Takes Action on $1BB of Subprime RMBS by RASC
* Moody's Takes Action on $1.7BB of Alt-A RMBS for 2006-2007
* Moody's Takes Action on US$940MM of Subprime RMBS Issues
* Moody's Takes Action on 32 Scratch & Dent-Backed Loan Tranches
* S&P Withdraws Rating on 66 Note Classes From 25 CDO Deals

* S&P Lowers Ratings on 13 U.S. Manufactured Housing ABS to 'CCC'
* S&P Lowers Rating on 4 Note Classes From 6 U.S. RMBS to 'CCC'
* S&P Puts 43 Ratings on 10 US CLO Transactions on CreditWatch
* U.S. Auto ABS to Avoid Potholes in 2013, Fitch Says

                            *********

ALESCO I: S&P Puts 'CCC' Rating on A-2 Notes on Watch Positive
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on the class
A-1 and A-2 notes from ALESCO Preferred Funding I Ltd., and the
class A-1 notes from Trapeza CDO VII Ltd., on CreditWatch with
positive implications following an improvement in the classes'
credit enhancement.

Both transactions are U.S. collateralized bond obligation (CBO)
transactions, backed by trust preferred securities (TruPs) issued
by financial institutions.  The class A-1 notes from both
transactions have continued to receive paydowns that reduced their
respective outstanding balances and improved their credit support.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after it completes a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review for each of
the affected transactions.  S&P expects to resolve these
CreditWatch placements within 90 days.  S&P will continue to
monitor the CDO transactions we rate and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as it deems appropriate.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

ALESCO Preferred Funding I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1                 BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)
A-2                 CCC (sf)/Watch Pos    CCC (sf)

Trapeza CDO VII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1                 BB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BB- (sf)


AMERICREDIT AUTO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
As part of its ongoing surveillance, Fitch Ratings affirms six
classes of the AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-2
transaction as follows:

-- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The rating affirmations are based on available credit enhancement
and loss performance. The collateral pool continues to perform
within Fitch's expectations. Under the credit enhancement
structure, the securities are able to withstand stress scenarios
consistent with the current rating and make full payments to
investors in accordance with the terms of the documents.

The ratings reflect the quality of AmeriCredit Financial Services,
Inc. retail auto loan originations, the strength of its servicing
capabilities, and the sound financial and legal structure of the
transaction.

Rating Sensitivity

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected base case loss proxy and impact available loss coverage
and multiples levels for the transactions. Lower loss coverage
could impact ratings and rating outlooks, depending on the extent
of the decline in coverage.

In Fitch's initial review of the transactions, the notes were
found to have limited sensitivity to a 1.5x and 2.5x increase of
Fitch's base case loss expectation. To date, the transaction has
exhibited strong performance with losses within Fitch's initial
expectations with rising loss coverage and multiple levels
consistent with the current ratings. A material deterioration in
performance would have to occur within the asset pools to have
potential negative impact on the outstanding ratings.


ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 7 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed all classes of notes issued by
Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. The affirmations are due to key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation and re-remic (CRE CDO and Re-Remic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 13, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 13, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (70.1%
of the collateral pool balance), rake bonds (17.6%), and real
estate investment trust (REIT) debt (12.3%). As of the January 28,
2013 note valuation report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction has decreased to $458.3 million from $478.1 million at
issuance. The paydown was directed to the class A notes from
regular amortization of collateral.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,156
compared to 6,242 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (1.2% compared to 1.5% at last
review), A1-A3 (8.1% compared to 6.9% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(10.9% compared to 10.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (9.6% compared
to 8.4% at last review), B1-B3 (9.1% compared to 11.8% at last
review), and Caa1-Ca/C (61.1%, the same as last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.4 years, compared to 3.4 years at
last review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 11.5% compared to 10.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 11.5% to 6.5% or up to 16.5% would result in rating
movements on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward or 0 to
2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


APHEX CAPITAL 2007-4: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded the rating of one class and affirmed the rating
of one classes of notes issued by Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-4, Ltd.
The downgrade is due to deterioration in underlying reference
obligation performance as evidenced by negative transition in
Moody's weighted average rating factor (WARF) and weighted average
recovery rate (WARR). The affirmation is due to key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

  Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2012
  Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  Cl. A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2012 Downgraded
  to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-4, Ltd. is a static synthetic transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing 100%
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS). All of the CMBS
reference obligations were securitized in 2005 (36.7%) and 2006
(63.3%). Currently, 71.7% of the reference obligations are rated
by Moody's.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
We have completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's rated
reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 6,347 compared to 4,901 at last review. The
current distribution is as follows: Baa1-Baa3 (6.6% compared to
8.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (10.0% compared to 16.7% at last
review), B1-B3 (11.7% compared to 16.7% at last review), and Caa1-
Ca/C (71.7% compared to 58.3% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.4 years, compared to 4.2 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 2.9%, compared to
4.2% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 21.8% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to credit changes within the reference obligations.
However, in light of the performance indicators, Moody's believes
that it is unlikely that the ratings are sensitive to further
change.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


APHEX CAPITAL 2007-7SR: Moody's Lowers Two Note Classes to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded the ratings of two classes and affirmed the
ratings of seven classes of notes issued by Aphex Capital NSCR
2007-7SR, Ltd. The downgrades are due to deterioration in
underlying reference obligation performance as evidenced by
negative transition in Moody's weighted average rating factor
(WARF) and weighted average recovery rate (WARR). The affirmations
are due to key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

  US$116,000,000 Class A-1A Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
  May 5, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  US$10,000,000 Class A-1B Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
  May 5, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  US$54,000,000 Class A-2 Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5,
  2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$13,500,000 Class B Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5,
  2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$15,750,000 Class C Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5,
  2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$5,000,000 Class D-A Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5,
  2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$8,500,000 Class D-B Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5,
  2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$12,150,000 Class E Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5,
  2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$10,350,000 Class F Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
  Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5,
  2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-7SR, Ltd. is a static synthetic
transaction backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps
referencing 100% commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS). All
of the CMBS reference obligations were securitized in 2006 (80.0%)
and 2007 (20.0%). Currently, 73.3% of the reference obligations
are rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
We have completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's rated
reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 8,207 compared to 6,529 at last review. The
current distribution is as follows: Ba1-Ba3 (3.3% compared to 6.7%
at last review), B1-B3 (6.7% compared to 13.3% at last review),
and Caa1-Ca/C (90.0% compared to 80.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.8 years, compared to 4.7 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 0.7%, compared to
1.3% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, the same as last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to credit changes within the reference obligations.
However, in light of the performance indicators, Moody's believes
that it is unlikely that the ratings are sensitive to further
change.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


ATRIUM III: Moody's Retains 'Ba3' Ratings on Two Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Atrium III:

  US$31,750,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
  October 27, 2016, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 13,
  2012 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

  US$16,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due October 27, 2016,
  Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded
  to Ba1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$373,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 27,
  2016 (current outstanding balance of $81,723,268), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  US$13,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due October 27,
  2016, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 13, 2012 Upgraded
  to Aaa (sf);

  US$13,500,000 Class A-2b Fixed Rate Notes Due October 27, 2016,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 13, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa
  (sf);

  US$6,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 27,
  2016, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due October 27, 2016,
  Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to
  Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in June 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes have been paid down by approximately 47.8% or $74.8 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated February 20, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 165.7%, 135.1%,
123.3% and 116.5%, respectively, versus May 2012 levels of 139.5%,
121.9%, 114.4% and 109.8%, respectively. Moody's notes the
reported February overcollateralization ratios do not reflect the
February 27, 2013 payment of $31.9 million to the Class A-1 Notes.

Moody's notes that the deal also benefited from an improvement in
the weighted average recovery rate of the underlying portfolio
since the last rating action in June 2012. Moody's modeled a
weighted average recovery rate of 50.5% versus 49.3% in June 2012.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the February 2013 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 36.8% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity. Notwithstanding
the increase in the overcollateralization ratios of the Class D-1
Notes and Class D-2 Notes, Moody's affirmed the ratings of the
Class D-1 Notes and Class D-2 Notes primarily due to the market
risk posed by the exposure to these long-dated assets.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par balance of $201.3 million, defaulted par of $16.9
million, a weighted average default probability of 16.28%
(implying a WARF of 2749), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.53%, and a diversity score of 39. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Atrium III, issued in October 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2199)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2a: 0
Class A-2b: 0
Class B: +1
Class C: +2
Class D-1: +1
Class D-2: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3299)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2a: 0
Class A-2b: 0
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D-1: -1
Class D-2: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value. In consideration of the size of the deal's exposure
to long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to the
liquidation assumptions used in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
different scenarios considering a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposure and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the extent of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long-
dated assets.


BANC OF AMERICA 2002-PB2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 7 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
and affirmed three classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-PB2 as follows:

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades of the six principal and interest bonds are due to
an increase in expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans and interest shortfalls.

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class XC, is to align its rating
with the expected credit performance of its referenced classes.

The affirmation of the three principal bonds are based on expected
losses from specially serviced loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 69.2% of
the current pooled balance compared to 39.1% at last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.7% of
the original pooled balance compared to 10.6% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
Class XC.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 7 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Since 96% of the pool is in special servicing, Moody's also
utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating this deal. In this
approach, Moody's determines a probability of default for each
specially serviced loan and determines a most probable loss given
default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer and
available market data. The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration servicer advances to date and estimated
future advances and closing costs. Translating the probability of
default and loss given default into an expected loss estimate,
Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially serviced
loans to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down
of principal to the most senior class(es).

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 5, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 11, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 87% to $142
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 4% to
50% of the pool. The pool does not contain any defeased loans,
loans with credit assessments or loans on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $33 million (22% average loss
severity). Four loans, representing 96% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Regency Square Loan ($71 million -- 49.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 455,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in
Richmond, Virginia. The property was considered the dominant mall
at securitization, but newer competing retail properties have
since entered the subject's trade area. The former sponsor,
Taubman Properties, turned the property over via a deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure in December 2011 after unsuccessfully jointly
marketing the property for sale with the servicer. The servicer
has recognized a $43 million appraisal reduction for this REO
asset and expects to dispose of it this year.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by two office
buildings and one multifamily property. The servicer has
recognized an $85 million aggregate appraisal reduction for three
of the four specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated a $98
million loss (72% expected loss based on an 100% probability of
default) for all of the specially serviced loans. Moody's has not
identified any troubled loans for this deal other than the loans
already in special servicing.

The conduit portion only represents 4% of the deal and consists of
one loan, the Robertson Business Park Loan ($6 million). The
property is secured by an 85,000 SF industrial property in Culver
City, California. The loan has amortized 23% since securitization
and matures in December 2016. The current loan exposure is $68 per
square foot. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and 1.60X,
respectively, compared to 60% and 1.62X at last review. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance. Moody's stressed DSCR is greater than
Moody's actual DSCR for this deal because the actual debt constant
is greater than Moody's stressed 9.25% rate.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes E through Q
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $8.9
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs),
extraordinary trust expenses, loan modifications that include
either an interest rate reduction or a non-accruing note
component, and non-recoverability determinations by the servicer
that involve either a clawback of previously made advances or a
decision to stop making future advances.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class G Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-4, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's review of the
credit characteristics and performance of the remaining assets as
well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement may suggest positive rating
movement on the certificate classes, S&P affirmed its ratings
because its analysis also took into consideration its view on
available liquidity support and risks associate with potential
interest shortfalls in the future.  Specifically, S&P considered
that eight ($91.6 million, 15.7%) of the remaining 67 assets
($583.5 million) are with the special servicer and 42 performing,
nondefeased loans ($355.4 million, 60.9%) have maturities through
Dec. 31, 2014, could lead to additional interest shortfalls and
decreased liquidity support available to the trust.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class XC interest-only
(IO) certificate based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-4

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-5        AAA (sf)                  28.18
A-6        AAA (sf)                  28.18
A-1A       AAA (sf)                  28.18
B          AA (sf)                   22.07
C          AA- (sf)                  20.13
D          A (sf)                    16.52
E          BBB- (sf)                 14.85
F          B (sf)                    12.08
G          CCC- (sf)                 10.13
XC         AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-MIB1: Moody's Cuts X-1B Cert Rating to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded one class, upgraded one and
affirmed the rating of one interest-only class of Banc of America
Large Loan, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-MIB1 as follows:

Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade of the Interest-Only Class X-1B, is due to the
decline in credit performance of its reference classes as a result
of principal pay downs of higher quality referenced classes and
pool losses of lower referenced classes. The upgrade of the
Interest-Only Class X-5, is due to the improvement in credit
performance of its reference loans. The ratings of the Interest-
Only Class X-2 is consistent with the expected credit performance
of the referenced classes or loans, and thus are affirmed.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GPD
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

Methodologies used in this rating this transaction were "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the ratings of Classes X-
1B, Class X-2 and Class X-5.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3
(sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating
committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated April 26, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 96% to $53.4
million from $1.26 billion at securitization due to loan payoffs,
principal pay-downs, and one loan liquidation. The Certificates
are collateralized by two mortgage loans, 39% and 61% of the
pooled balance.

The pool has experienced $14,519,655 of losses to date affecting
Class L. In addition, Class L has experienced interest shortfalls
totaling $449,039 as of the February 2013 distribution date.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust expenses.

Currently, both remaining loans are in special servicing.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. Large
loan transactions generally have a Herf of less than 20. The pool
has a Herf of 2, the same as last review.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value (LTV) ratio is over
100% compared to 95% at last review. Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) is 0.85X compared to 1.43X at last review.

The largest loan in the pool is the Liberty Properties loan ($32.4
million; 61% of the pooled balance) which is a portfolio of
industrial and office properties located in Worcester and Dedham,
MA. As of December 2012, the property was 28% occupied. The loan
transferred into special servicing March 2009 and matured without
repayment in March 2010. A foreclosure complaint was filed in
January 2013 with an auction expected shortly. The loan is
current. A cash flow sweep is in effect and currently the lender
retains $11.7MM in reserves. Moody's current credit assessment is
B2.

The second largest loan in the pool, the Shops at Grand Avenue
loan ($21.1 million; 39% of the pooled balance) which is secured
by a 298,109 square foot retail property in Milwaukee. As of
December 2012, the property was 84% occupied, however, 52% of the
NRA is leased to specialty leasing that rolls within the year. The
loan transferred to special servicing in September 2009 when it
matured without repayment. A September 2012 appraisal valued the
property at $8.5 million. Foreclosure was completed in October
2012. A resolution strategy is currently being evaluated. Moody's
current credit assessment is C.


BANC OF AMERICA 2006-BIX1: Fitch Keeps 'D' Rating on Cl. L Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banc of America Large Loan, Inc.
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2006-BIX1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
in light of the transaction's significant concentration. Two of
the original 16 loans remain. One loan continues to perform
according to its modified terms, and one asset is real estate
owned (REO).

RATING SENSITIVITY

The Rating Outlook of class K has been revised to Negative from
Stable to reflect the possibility of a future downgrade if
expected or incurred losses on the REO Ballantyne Village are
higher than currently anticipated.

The ratings of classes G through J are stable and expected to be
affirmed in any future rating action. Fitch believes full
principal recovery on these classes is likely; however, upgrades
are not warranted due to potential future interest shortfalls as
well as uncertainty surrounding the final resolution of the
remaining assets.

The transaction's largest loan, a portion of the CarrAmerica
National Pool (63.5%), continues to perform according its modified
terms. The loan was originally secured by fee, leasehold, and cash
flow interests in a portfolio of 73 office properties located
throughout the U.S. Following releases of collateral, the
portfolio currently consists of 13 properties totaling
approximately 4 million square feet (sf).

The loan transferred to special servicing in February 2011 for
imminent maturity default, with the borrower seeking an extension.
The loan was modified with terms that include an extension to
August 2013, $40 million in paydown to the A notes, additional
paydown after the release of one property, scheduled amortization
during the extended maturity period, additional payodwn with
continued property releases and all fees paid by the borrower. The
servicer reported overall occupancy as of year-end 2012 was 91.9%.
Due to the significant delivering of the loan since issuance, a
full payoff of the loan is likely.

The Ballantyne Village is a 166,041 sf REO retail center located
in Charlotte, NC, approximately 14 miles south of downtown
Charlotte, in the neighborhood known as Ballantyne. The property
was built in 2005 and the subject loan refinanced a construction
loan. The collateral does not include a 480-space parking deck;
however, an easement agreement provides access and use of the
parking deck.

The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2009 due to
imminent default. The special servicer and the borrower completed
negotiations and executed a forbearance agreement in March 2011.
The agreement included several conditions, one of which was the
full payoff of the loan by October 2012 or the loan would be
foreclosed via deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. The borrower did not
repay the loan and it became REO as of November 2012. The special
servicer has engaged management and brokerage firms, and the
property is listed for sale.

Fitch affirms the ratings and revises the Outlooks of the
following pooled certificates as indicated:

-- $9.5 million class G at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28.3 million class H at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.3 million class J at 'BBBsf' Outlook Stable;
-- $11.8 million class K at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable.

Fitch affirms the rating and Recovery Estimate (RE) of following
pooled certificate:

-- $18.9 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the ratings and Outlooks the following nonpooled
certificates:

-- $4 million class J-CP at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.9 million class K-CP at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.5 million class L-CP at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Classes X-1B, X-2, X-3, X-4 and X-5 were previously withdrawn.
Classes A-1 through F, X-1A, J-CA, K-CA, L-CA, M-MC and L-SC have
paid in full.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-3: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Five Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 21 classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-MF, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. XW, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on our
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The rating of the IO Class, Class XW, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.6% of
the current pooled balance compared to 11.7% at last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses have decreased to
10.6% of the original pooled balance from 11.3% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class XW.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26 compared to 30 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 7, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 11, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to $2.94
billion from $3.52 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 134 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool. There are no investment grade credit
assessments or defeased loans in the pool.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of our ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $60.3 million (12.4% loss severity on
average). Twelve loans, representing 7% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Metropolis Shopping Center Loan ($86.0 million -- 2.9% of the
pool), which is secured by Phase I of a suburban power center
located in Plainfield, Indiana. The property is currently real
estate owned (REO) and the servicer has recognized a $63 million
appraisal reduction for this loan.

The remaining 11 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $115 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (55% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly
performing loans representing 32% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $137 million loss (14% expected loss based on a 34%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 90%
of the pool's non-specially serviced loans. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 125%
compared to 124% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.34X and 0.85X, respectively, compared to
1.43X and 0.87X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 24% of the pool. The largest conduit
loan is the 2100 Presidential Towers Loan ($325.0 million -- 11.1%
of the pool), which is secured by four connected 50-story
apartment buildings totaling 2,346 units located in the in-town
submarket of downtown Chicago, Illinois. As of December 2012, the
multifamily units were 94% leased compared to 93% at last review.
The property's 87,000 square foot (SF) retail component completed
renovations in 2011 and was 44% leased as of December 2012, the
same at last review. At last review Moody's analysis reflected
expected improved performance in the retail component due to the
renovation, but it has yet to materialize. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 134% and 0.64X, respectively, compared to 122%
and 0.71X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Renaissance Mayflower Hotel Loan
($200 million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 657-unit
hotel located in Washington D.C. The loan was previously modified
in 2010 with the loan term being extended by 12 months to March
2013. The servicer has indicated that the loan will again be
extended an additional 12 months to March 2014 with a $10 million
principal reduction, although the loan remains current. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 152% and 0.75X, respectively, the same
as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Pacific Shores Building 9 & 10 Loan
($184 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by two Class
A office buildings located in a suburban office park in Redwood
City, California. The property serves as Facet Biotech's corporate
headquarters. Abbott Laboratories (Moody's Senior Unsecured rating
A1, Stable Outlook) acquired Facet Biotech in April 2010. The
property is 100% leased, which is the same at last review, however
the performance of the property has declined due to a negotiated
lower rent. Moody' s LTV and stressed DSCR are 171% and 0.71X,
respectively, compared to 147% and 0.71X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2001-TOP2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
on the class E commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2001-
TOP2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P lowered its rating on the class E certificates to 'D (sf)'
because it expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  As of the Feb. 15, 2013,
trustee remittance report, the trust experienced monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $162,661, primarily related to interest
reductions because of a nonrecoverability determination of
$64,890, special servicing fee of $2,788, and servicer advance
reimbursement of $95,662.  The interest shortfalls affected all
classes subordinate to and including class E.  The class E
certificates have accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for
seven consecutive months.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on these classes to also
reflect the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining assets, as well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on classes C and D, S&P affirmed its ratings on
these classes because its analysis also considered its view on
available liquidity support and risks associated with potential
interest shortfalls in the future.  S&P believes these increased
interest shortfalls may likely result from one ($9.4 million,
18.4%) of the remaining 15 assets ($51.0 million) that is with the
special servicer as well as from any of the nine loans that are on
the master servicer's watchlist ($33.9 million, 66.5%), three
($15.6 million, 30.5%) of which have maturities between March and
November of 2013.  It is S&P's understanding from the master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., that the Vista Creek Shopping
Center loan ($2.9 million, 5.7%), the eighth-largest asset loan in
the pool, is in the process of being transferred to the special
servicer because the borrower was not able to refinance the loan
by its March 1, 2013, maturity date.  The loan is secured by a
20,773-sq.-ft. retail center in Lewisville, Tex.  The loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist on a low reported occupancy.
According to the Jan. 8, 2013, rent roll, the property was 41.2%
occupied.  Wells Fargo reported a debt service coverage (DSC) of
0.55x for year-end 2011.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.  In addition, one other loan in
the pool matures within the next month, the Franklin Corporate
Center loan.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted DSC of 1.36x and a Standard & Poor's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 73.7% for 12 of the 15 remaining
assets in the pool.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude the one
asset ($9.4 million, 18.4%) that is with the special servicer, one
loan ($2.9 million, 5.7%) that is in the process of being
transferred to special servicing (details above),  and one
defeased loan ($588,519, 1.2%).

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $51.0 million, down from
$1.0 billion at issuance.  The pool has 14 loans and one real
estate owned (REO) asset, down from 128 loans at issuance.  To
date, the transaction has experienced losses totaling
$51.4 million or 5.1% of the transaction's original certificate
balance.  One ($9.4 million, 18.4%) of the remaining 15 assets is
with the special servicer (discussed below).  In addition, nine
loans ($33.9 million, 66.5%) in the pool are on the master
servicer's watchlist (discussed further below).  Excluding the
specially serviced asset, three loans ($15.8 million, 31.0%) had a
reported DSC of below 1.00x.  Details on the three largest assets
on the master servicer's watchlist are:

The 455 Deguigne loan ($7.8 million, 15.2%), the second-largest
asset in the pool, is secured by a 53,404-sq.ft. flex industrial
property in Sunnyvale, Calif.  The loan is on Wells Fargo's
watchlist because the property is currently 100% vacant.  Wells
Fargo says the borrower is working on leasing up the vacant space.

The Franklin Corporate Center loan ($7.4 million, 14.6%), the
third-largest asset in the pool, is secured by a 64,405-sq.-ft.
suburban office building in Pleasanton, Calif.  The loan is on
Wells Fargo's watchlist because the sole tenant occupying 100% of
the property did not renew its lease upon its Dec. 31, 2012, lease
expiration.  The loan matures on April 1, 2013.  Wells Fargo says
the borrower is currently working on refinancing the loan.

The Buckingham Place Apartment Complex loan ($5.2 million, 10.3%),
the fourth-largest asset in the pool, is secured by a 166-unit
garden-style multifamily apartment complex in Waukegan, Ill.  The
loan is on Wells Fargo's watchlist because of a low reported
occupancy, which was 68.7% as of Sept. 30, 2012.  Wells Fargo
reported a 1.20x DSC for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSET

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, one asset
($9.4 million, 18.4%) is with the special servicer, CWCapital
Asset Management LLC (CWCapital).  The Riverview, Gun River East,
and Gun River West asset comprises three manufactured housing
communities totaling 381 pads in Sparta and Plainwell, Michigan.
Prior to these properties becoming REO in Jan. 2011, the asset
consists of three cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans
that were transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 29, 2009.
CWCapital stated that it is in the process of replacing the septic
system at the Riverview property and installing new water walls
for the other two properties.  CWCapital indicated that it expects
the asset to be liquidated in 2014.  CWCapital reported an overall
occupancy at the properties of 68.8% as of Feb. 1, 2013.  The
master servicer deemed this asset nonrecoverable and has clawback
its prior advances.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING LOWERED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-TOP2
               Rating
Class       To            From     Credit enhancement (%)
E           D (sf)        CCC- (sf)                 17.43

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-TOP2

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
C          A- (sf)                     84.00
D          BBB- (sf)                   64.28



BEAR STEARNS 1999-CLF1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. C Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Corporate Lease-
Backed Certificates, Series 1999-CLF1 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2008
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2003 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2001 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the three principal bonds are due to key
rating parameters, including WARF and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.2% of the
current pooled balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 10.2%. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs
and the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced
loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
(CTL) financing methodological approach (CTL approach). Under
Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates
is primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds. This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan. The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust. The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default. Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction. For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans,
Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in
its public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-8 to generate a portfolio
loss distribution to assess the ratings.

The other methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012. The Interest-Only
Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

The CMBS IO calculator ver1.1 uses the following inputs to
calculate the proposed IO rating based on the published
methodology: original and current bond ratings and credit
estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up for
losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
CTL pool has a Herf of 34 compared to 36 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 29, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 22, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 57% to $164.2
million from $383.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 126 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 45%
of the pool. The entirety of the pool is backed by CTL loans. Five
loans, representing 5% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Two loans, representing 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $8.0 million loss (86%
loss severity on average). Three loans, representing 2% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. Two of these loans are
backed by the United States Postal Service and one loan is backed
by CVS. The loans are in special servicing due to a default by the
respective borrowers. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $644,000
loss for the specially serviced loans (19% expected loss on
average).

The largest credit exposures are Rite Aid Corporation ($27.0
million -- 16% of the pool; senior unsecured rating; Caa2 --
stable outlook), United State Postal Service ($16.4 million - 10%
of the pool), and CVS/Caremark Corp. ($15.3 million - 9% of the
pool; senior unsecured rating: Baa2 - positive outlook).
Approximately 79% of the credits in the pool have a Moody's public
rating.

The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this
transaction is 2,023 compared to 2,350 at last review. WARF is a
measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The
bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within
the pool.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-TOP: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP 16, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its rating on 11 other classes, including
its rating on the interest-only (IO) class.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades further reflect credit support erosion that S&P
anticipates will occur upon the resolution of the two assets
($4.3 million, 0.5%) currently with the special servicer C-III
Asset Management LLC (C-III).  To date, the trust has incurred
losses totaling $11.5 million or 1.0% of the original outstanding
trust balance.  S&P's downgrade actions also considered the
monthly interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust.  S&P
lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on the class L and M certificates
because it expects interest shortfalls to continue and because S&P
believes the accumulated interest shortfalls on these classes will
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Class L has had
cumulative interest shortfalls outstanding for 11 months and class
M has had cumulative interest shortfalls outstanding for 12
months.

As of the Feb. 13, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
received a net recovery of accumulated interest shortfalls
totaling $14,755, primarily related to the reimbursement of
special servicing fees in the amount of $25,819 due to the
modification of the largest loan in the pool and the reimbursement
of interest on advances in the amount of $11,064.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmations further reflect S&P's consideration of the volume
of nondefeased performing loans that are scheduled to mature
through Dec. 31, 2014 (80 loans, $747.4 million, 93.6% of the
trust balance).

The affirmations of the class X-1 IO certificates reflect S&P's
current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP16
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Rating
Class     To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
K         CCC- (sf)    CCC+ (sf)                     0.91
L         D (sf)       CCC (sf)                      0.18
M         D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                     0.00

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP16
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-5        AAA (sf)                          13.57
A-6        AAA (sf)                          13.57
B          AA+ (sf)                          11.03
C          AA- (sf)                           9.41
D          A (sf)                             7.78
E          A- (sf)                            5.79
F          BBB+ (sf)                          4.52
G          BBB (sf)                           3.08
H          BB (sf)                            1.81
J          B+ (sf)                            1.45
X-1        AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR8: Fitch Cuts Rating on K Certs. to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 16 classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-PWR8.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade to class K is the result of the class incurring a
principal loss.

The affirmations of the remaining Fitch-rated classes reflect
sufficient credit enhancement after consideration for expected
losses. Fitch modeled losses of 5.1% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 6.3%, including
losses already incurred. The pool has experienced $38.7 million
(2.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated 40 loans (15.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes seven specially serviced assets (4.8%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating outlook of class C has been revised to Stable from
Negative due to Fitch's lower modeled loss estimate. The Stable
Outlooks on classes A-AB through B are due to stable performance
and indicate that rating actions to those classes are not
expected.

The Negative Outlook on class D is attributable to the class's
position in the capital structure and its high susceptibility to
downgrades should pool performance or recovery prospects
deteriorate.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 19.8% to $1.42 billion from
$1.77 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 10 loans
(11.9% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes G through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the real estate
owned (REO) Roseville Corporate Center (1.4% of the pool), an
approximately 230,000-sf office property located between
Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN. The asset was foreclosed upon on
Dec. 30, 2011, and following a required six-month right-of-
redemption period, the property has been on the market for sale.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the REO Union
Centre Pavilion (1%), an approximately 146,000-square foot (sf)
anchored retail center built in 2001, located in a northern suburb
of Cincinnati, OH. The asset transferred to special servicing in
February 2009 for imminent default and became REO in January 2012.
Based on recent valuations, Fitch expects significant losses upon
disposition.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the REO La
Borgata at Serrano (0.9%), a 59,000-sf mixed use (office/retail)
property built in 2003, located about 30 miles east of Sacramento,
CA. The loan transferred to special servicing on March 9, 2012 for
imminent default due to high rollover and resulting low occupancy.
The property became REO in September 2012 and the special servicer
is working to stabilize the asset before marketing for sale.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $3.3 million class K to 'Dsf' from 'Csf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns or revises Rating
Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $30.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50 million class A-4FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150 million class A-J at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37.5 million class B at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17.7 million class C at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $26.5 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $17.7 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $19.9 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 10%.
-- $15.4 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $17.7 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $8.8 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class Q certificates. Fitch previously withdrew
the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR10: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Class G Certs to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades five classes, removing one from Rating
Watch Negative, and affirms 13 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2005-PWR10 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates. A detailed list of rating actions
follows at the end of this release.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool most of which is due to higher loss expectations on the
specially serviced loans. Fitch modeled losses of 12.9% for the
remaining pool; expected losses as a percentage of the original
pool balance are at 13.5%, including losses already incurred to
date (3%). Fitch has designated 49 loans (29.8%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes the five specially serviced loans (7.4%).
Fitch expects that classes B through S may be fully depleted from
realized and expected losses.

Ratings Sensitivity

The Negative Outlook on class A-M reflects the possibility of
continued downward ratings migration. An increase in expected
losses on the specially serviced loans or deterioration in
performance of the top 15 loans, several of which have high
leverage, would lead to additional downgrades.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 18.6% to $2.1
billion from $2.6 billion at issuance. Interest shortfalls total
$14.3 million and are affecting classes C through S.
The largest contributor to modeled losses is the World Market
Center loan (8.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 10-story,
approximately 1.1 million-square foot (sf) furniture mart
approximately five miles north of the center of the Las Vegas
Strip. The loan was modified in 2011 into A/B note structure after
the recapitalization by a joint venture between Bain & Oaktree
Capital. The modification included writing down the loan by $10.7
million, splitting the loan into a $94.3 million interest-only A
note and a $105.9 million B note with no payment. The property was
returned to the master servicer in March 2012 and continues to
perform according the terms of the modification.

The second-largest contributor, Oasis Net Leased Portfolio (4.9%),
is the largest specially serviced loan and second largest loan in
the pool. The portfolio consists of eight suburban office
properties and two research and development/flex properties
totaling 769,507 sf. The majority of the buildings are clustered
surrounding Boston, MA and one located directly north of Las
Vegas, NV along Interstate 15. Nine of the buildings were
originally occupied by single tenants, three of which were
investment grade-rated. The portfolio's occupancy rate has dropped
to 23% as of Feb. 28, 2012 from 100% at securitization; six
properties are vacant. Wells Fargo recently downsized their
presence at the Las Vegas property and a number of tenants in the
Boston market consolidated into nearby facilities.

The third-largest contributor to modeled losses is a 1.6 million
sf regional mall (12.9%) located in Overland Park, KS,
approximately 15 miles south of Kansas City's central business
district. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Dillards, and Nordstrom.
The collateral includes approximately 543,000 sf of retail space
that includes a diverse mix of national retailers such as Banana
Republic, Buckle, Ann Taylor, and Lush. Although performance of
the collateral has been stable and occupancy remains high at 98%,
Fitch assumed minor losses compared to the total debt based on the
loan's leverage.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes as indicated:

-- $263.3 million class A-M to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Negative;
-- $210.7 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 90%;
-- $19.8 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE O%;
-- $29.6 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $26.3 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Prior to today's downgrades class A-M was on Rating Watch Negative
and the Rating Outlook for class A-J was Negative.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised
Recovery Estimates as indicated:

-- $17.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $96.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.05 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $258.3 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.8 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0% from RE 90%;
-- $29.6 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $26.3 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.6 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $26.3 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $36.2 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $3.3 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $9.9 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $1.1 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes O, P, and Q remain at 'Dsf'; RE0%; due to realized losses.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have repaid in full. Fitch does not rate $0
million class S.


BWAY 2013-1515: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class G Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to BWAY
2013-1515's $900.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2013-1515.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $900.0 million commercial mortgage loan
secured by the fee interest in 1515 Broadway, a 1.66 million-sq.-
ft. class A high-rise office building located in Midtown
Manhattan, N.Y.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 82.1% and an ending LTV
ratio of 66.6% based on Standard & Poor's value.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1329.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

BWAY 2013-1515

Class       Rating(i)               Amount
                                       ($)
A-1         AAA (sf)           164,512,000
A-2         AAA (sf)           298,592,000
X-A         AAA (sf)       463,104,000(ii)
X-B         BBB- (sf)      336,496,000(ii)
B           AA- (sf)           126,056,000
C           A- (sf)            109,600,000
D           BBB (sf)            54,810,000
E           BBB- (sf)           46,030,000
F           BB (sf)             90,986,000
G           BB- (sf)             9,414,000

  (i) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
      buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of
      1933.

(ii) Notional balance.


CABELA'S CREDIT: DBRS Rates Series 2013-1 Class D Notes 'BB(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following notes
issued by Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2013-I:

- Series 2013-1, Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
- Series 2013-1, Class B Notes rated 'A' (high) (sf)
- Series 2013-1, Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
- Series 2013-1, Class D Notes rated BB (sf)


CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Cl. D Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to Cabela's Credit
Card Master Note Trust's asset-backed notes, series 2013-I, as
follows:

-- $327,250,000 class A fixed-rate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,800,000 class B fixed-rate 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16,362,000 class C fixed-rate 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,588,000 class D fixed-rate 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers:

Fitch's ratings are based on the underlying receivables pool,
available credit enhancement, World's Foremost Bank's underwriting
and servicing capabilities, and the transaction's legal and cash
flow structures, which employ early redemption triggers.

The transaction structure is similar to series 2012-II, with
credit enhancement totaling 15% for class A, credit enhancement of
7% for the class B, credit enhancement of 2.75% plus an amount
from a spread account for the class C, and credit enhancement of
an amount from a spread account for the class D notes only.

Rating Sensitivities:

Fitch models three different scenarios when evaluating the rating
sensitivity compared to expected performance for credit card
asset-backed securities transactions: 1) increased defaults; 2) a
reduction in monthly payment rate (MPR), and 3) a combination
stress of higher defaults and lower MPR.

Increasing defaults alone has the least impact on rating migration
even in the most severe scenario of a 75% increase in defaults.
The rating sensitivity to a reduction in MPR is more pronounced
with a moderate stress, of a 25% reduction, leading to possible
downgrades across all classes. The harshest scenario assumes both
stresses occur simultaneously. Similarly, the ratings would only
be downgraded under the moderate stress of a 40% increase in
defaults and 20% reduction in MPR; however the severe stress could
lead to more drastic downgrades to all classes.

To date, the transactions have exhibited strong performance with
all performance metrics within Fitch's initial expectations. For
further discussion of our sensitivity analysis, please see the
related presale report. For a discussion of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors in
this transaction please see the related presale appendix.

The presale report is available at 'www.fitchratings.com'. For
more information about Fitch's comprehensive subscription service
FitchResearch, which includes all presale reports, surveillance,
and credit reports on more than 20 asset classes, contact product
sales at +1-212-908-0800 or at 'webmaster@fitchratings.com'.


CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on all
tranches from Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management.

The affirmed ratings on the all rated notes reflect S&P's belief
that the credit support available to the notes is commensurate
with the current rating levels.

The transaction is currently in its reinvestment period, which
ends on Nov. 10, 2013.  The transaction's portfolio has not
changed from a credit quality standpoint since the last rating
action in March 2012 when the classes were upgraded.  According to
the trustee report as of Jan. 10, 2013, the transaction held no
defaulted securities compared with $0.34 million during S&P's last
rating action for which it referenced the on Feb. 10, 2012,
trustee report.  The coverage ratios have remained stable across
the capital structure.  Based on the last review:

   -- Class A overcollateralization (O/C) increased to 125.52
      from 124.97;

   -- Class B O/C increased to 117.82 from 117.31;

   -- Class C O/C increased to 111.14 from 110.65; and

   -- Class D O/C increased to 107.30 from 106.83.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V Ltd.

Class              Rating
A-1A               AA+ (sf)
A-1B               AA+ (sf)
A-2                AA (sf)
B                  A (sf)
C                  BBB (sf)
D                  BB (sf)


CAPMARK VII-CRE: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Certs. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven and downgraded one class of
Capmark VII-CRE, Ltd./Corp. reflecting Fitch's base case loss
expectation of 24.6%. Fitch's performance expectation incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate market value
and cash flow declines.

Key Rating Drivers

Since Fitch's last rating action, the senior class, A-1, has paid
in full while class A-2 has received minimal pay down of $2.3
million. A total of $133.5 million in pay down was received from
the full payoff of six assets, the discounted payoff or sale of
five other assets, scheduled amortization, the partial pay down of
one loan, and interest diversion from the failure of coverage
tests. Realized losses since last review total $21.1 million.

The portfolio is concentrated with only 18 assets remaining, four
of which are cross collateralized. Current CDO collateral consists
entirely of whole loans and A-notes. The current percentage of
defaulted assets and loans of concern is 23.3% and 43.4%,
respectively, compared to 19.6% and 23.4% at last review. Further,
approximately 31% of the collateral, which is not currently
defaulted, is scheduled to mature by April 2013.

Capmark VII is a commercial real estate (CRE) CDO managed by
Urdang Capital Management, a real estate investment subsidiary of
BNY Mellon Asset Management. As of the February 2013 trustee
report, the transaction continues to fail all three of its
principal coverage tests resulting in diverted interest to pay
principal to A-2 and capitalized interest to classes C through K.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 94% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. Modeled recoveries are above average at 73.8%
based on the senior position of the collateral.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is
related to a defaulted whole loan (8% of the pool) secured by
undeveloped land located adjacent to the Potomac River in
Arlington, VA. Fitch modeled a significant loss on this loan in
its base case scenario.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is related to a defaulted A-note (8.2%) secured by an office
property located in Monterey, CA. The loan, which was formerly
cross collateralized with two other loans, is not performing in
line with expectations. As of September 2012, the property was 78%
occupied. Further, an additional tenant (7.1% of NRA) reportedly
vacated at year end 2012. Fitch modeled a significant loss on this
loan in its base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) tests to project future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries for the loan
assets are based on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term
capitalization rates. The default levels were then compared to the
breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO
under the various default timing and interest rate stress
scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria for Cash
Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Based on this analysis, the breakeven
rates for class A-2 are generally consistent with the rating
assigned below. A Stable Outlook was assigned based on the class's
senior position in the structure and cushion in the modeling.

The 'CCC' and below ratings for classes B through H are based on a
deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets and Fitch Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each classes credit enhancement.

Rating Sensitivities

If CDO collateral recoveries are better than expected, Fitch may
consider upgrades to the senior classes. However, upgrades will be
limited as the pool becomes more concentrated given the risk of
adverse selection and the risk of insufficient interest and
principal proceeds to pay the timely interest due. While Fitch has
modeled conservative loss expectations on the pool, unanticipated
increases in defaulted loans and/or loss severity could result in
downgrades.

Fitch affirms these classes:

-- $167.7 million class A-2 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 85%;
-- $30.9 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.8 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $34.3 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $13.3 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $10.8 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

Fitch downgrades these classes:

-- $7.8 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

Class A-1 has paid in full.


CD 2006-CD2: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from CD
2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
'AAA (sf)' ratings on seven other classes from the same
transaction, including the rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates.  S&P also affirmed its 'A- (sf)' rating on the
class A-M certificates.

S&P's rating actions follows its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, interest shortfalls, and liquidity available to the
trust.

The downgrades reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipates
will occur upon the resolution of 14 ($353.1 million, 16.4%) of
the transaction's 16 ($377.9 million, 17.6%) assets that are with
the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR), as of the Feb. 15,
2013, trustee remittance report.  Based solely on S&P's valuation
of the specially serviced assets, it expects the trust to incur
losses approximating 5.1% of the original outstanding trust
balance upon the resolution or liquidation of these assets.  To
date, the trust has incurred losses totaling $201.7 million, or
6.6% of the original trust balance.  S&P's expected losses from
the assets currently in special servicing could potentially result
in principal losses up to and including the class C certificates.

"Our rating actions also considered the monthly interest
shortfalls that are affecting the trust.  We lowered our ratings
to 'D (sf)' on the class C and D certificates because we expect
interest shortfalls to continue and we believe the accumulated
interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.  As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $733,022
primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
amounts of $604,217 and special servicing fees of $124,273.  The
interest shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and
including class C. Classes C through G have experienced cumulative
interest shortfalls between three and 35 months," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on the principal and interest
certificates to reflect our expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within our estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmed ratings on these classes also reflect the
credit characteristics and performance of the remaining loans, as
well as the transaction-level changes," S&P added.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class X IO certificates
reflects its current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
              Rating                        Credit
Class      To          From        enhancement (%)
A-J        B- (sf)     BB (sf)               8.93
B          CCC (sf)    BB- (sf)              7.86
C          D (sf)      B (sf)                6.26
D          D (sf)      CCC- (sf)             4.48


RATINGS AFFIRMED

CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-2        AAA (sf)                          33.29
A-3        AAA (sf)                          33.29
A-AB       AAA (sf)                          33.29
A-4        AAA (sf)                          33.29
A-1A       AAA (sf)                          33.29
A-1B       AAA (sf)                          33.29
A-M        A- (sf)                           19.06
X          AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


CENTURION CDO VII: Moody's Ups Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Centurion CDO VII Limited:

US$22,000,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due January 30, 2016,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due January
30, 2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 12, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

US$76,500,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due January
30, 2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 12, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

US$3,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due January 30,
2016, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

US$27,205,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due January
30, 2016, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 12, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

US$5,000,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due January 30,
2016, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

US$25,300,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due January
30, 2016, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 12, 2011
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

US$6,000,000 Class H Combination Securities Due January 30, 2016
(current rated balance of $233,377.46), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

US$8,500,000 Class K Combination Securities Due January 30, 2016
(current rated balance of $2,268,791.98), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$198,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due January 30, 2016
(current outstanding balance of $28,955,873.94), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on May 19, 2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$632,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due January 30, 2016
(current outstanding balance of $146,498,137.58), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in August 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-
1a and Class A-2 Notes have been paid down by approximately 84.2%
or $154.5 and 75.2% or $444.1 million since the last rating
action. Based on the latest trustee report dated January 23, 2013,
the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 158.3%, 126.5%, 119.2% and 112.7%,
respectively, versus July 2011 levels of 127.6%, 113.7%, 110.0%
and 106.6%, respectively. Moody's notes the reported January
overcollateralization ratios do not reflect the January 30, 2013
payments of $50.9 million to the Class A-1a Notes and $146.3
million to the A-2 Notes.

Moody's upgraded the ratings on the Class H and K Combination
Securities as a result of the payments received to date and the
consequent reduction of the outstanding Rated Balance.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on Moody's calculations, securities that mature
after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 19.4% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $391.3 million,
defaulted par of $38.1 million, a weighted average default
probability of 8.27% (implying a WARF of 2366), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.65%, and a diversity score of 29.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Centurion CDO VII Limited, issued in May 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011,
and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-
Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1895)

Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0
Class C-1: +2
Class C-2: +2
Class D-1: +2
Class D-2: +2
Class H: 0
Class K: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2842)

Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B-1: -1
Class B-2: -1
Class C-1: -2
Class C-2: -2
Class D-1: -1
Class D-2: -2
Class H: 0
Class K: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Moody's Affirms X Certs' Ba3 Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms the ratings of eight classes of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2007
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2007 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2007 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2007
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2007
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2007 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2007
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The ratings of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.9% of
the current balance. At last full review, Moody's base expected
loss was 10.6%. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could
decline below the current levels. If future performance materially
declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and the
priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the
current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes the IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 51 compared to 58 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 28, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to $4.24
billion from $4.76 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 297 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
32% of the pool. One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

Sixty-four loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a realized loss of $60.1 million (30% loss severity on average).
Currently 42 loans, representing 14% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $330.9
million appraisal reduction for 39 of the specially serviced
loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $248 million loss (44%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 45 poorly
performing loans representing 24% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $130.1 million loss (13% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 90%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 114% compared to 117% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.6%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.33X and 0.95X, respectively, compared to
1.42X and 0.97X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the DDR Southeast Pool Loan ($441.3
million -- 10.4% of the pool), which represents a 50% pari-passu
interest in a first mortgage loan secured by 52 anchored retail
properties located in California (one property), Florida (29),
Georgia (8), Indiana (1), Maryland (2), Massachusetts (1), New
Jersey (1), North Carolina (6), Ohio (2) and Virginia (1).
Seventy-five percent of the properties are grocery anchored. The
portfolio was 90% leased as of September 2012 compared to 88% at
last review. This loan is interest-only for its entire 10 year
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.77X,
respectively, essentially the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the CGM AmeriCold Portfolio Loan
($145.0 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which represents a 46% pari-
passu interest in a first mortgage loan secured by 15 cold-storage
properties located in Alabama (one property), Arkansas (2),
Georgia (1), Missouri (1), Nebraska (1), North Carolina (2),
Oregon (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (2) and Wisconsin (2).
The portfolio was 59% leased as of September 2012 compared to 84%
at securitization. This loan is also interest-only for its entire
seven year term, which is scheduled to mature in January 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 141% and 0.82X, respectively,
compared to 144% and 0.81X at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Greensboro Corporate Center Loan
($129.1 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
439,000 square foot office building located in Tyson's Corner
outside of McLean, Virginia. The property was 91% leased as of
January 2013 compared to 100% at last review. Performance has
declined year-over-year due to drops in occupancy and increased
expenses. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 132% and 0.74X,
respectively, compared to 127% and 0.77X at last review.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2007-FL3: S&P Affirms BB Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL3, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
Standard & Poor's affirmed its ratings on six other classes from
the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, which
included a revaluation of the hotel properties securing the
remaining two floating-rate loans and an examination of the
transaction structure and liquidity available to the trust.  S&P
based its analysis for both hotel properties, in part, on a review
of the borrowers' operating statements for years-end 2012, 2011,
and 2010.

The upgrades further reflect the deleveraging the pool has
experienced to date.  As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance
report, the collateral consisted of two interest-only floating-
rate loans, both secured by lodging properties, with a combined
pool balance of $142.9 million.  This is down from 16 loans with a
combined pool balance of $796.9 million at issuance.  Both
remaining loans are indexed to one-month LIBOR.  According to the
most recent trustee remittance report, the one-month LIBOR rate
was 0.206%.

The Fairmont Scottsdale Princess loan, the larger of the two
remaining collateral loans, has a trust and whole-loan balance of
$133.0 million (93.1% of pool balance).  The loan was reported as
being current in its debt-service payments.  The loan is scheduled
to mature on Dec. 31, 2013, and has a maturity date extension
option in place.  The maturity date extension option, if
exercised, would extend the maturity date to April 9, 2015.  The
option is subject to certain performance tests.  The loan is
secured by a 651-room full-service hotel built in 1987 and
renovated in 2005 in Scottsdale, Az.  The master servicer, KeyBank
Real Estate Capital Markets Inc. (KeyBank), reported 9.25x debt-
service coverage (DSC) for the trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30,
2012.  The property was 64.7% occupied, according to the
borrower's 2012 operating statement.  S&P's adjusted valuation,
using a 9.0% capitalization rate, yielded an in-trust stressed
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 123.6%.

The Avalon Hotel Beverly Hills loan has a pooled trust balance of
$9.9 million (6.9% of pool balance) and a whole-loan balance of
$11.8 million, which includes a $1.9 million non-pooled
subordinate portion that provides 100% of the cash flow to the
class AVA raked certificates (not rated by Standard & Poor's).
The loan was reported as being current in its debt-service
payments.  The loan is scheduled to mature in January 2014 and has
a maturity date extension option in place.  The maturity date
extension option, if exercised, would extend the maturity date to
January 2015.  The option is subject to certain performance tests.
The loan is secured by an 84-room full-service hotel built in 1948
and renovated in 2006 in Beverly Hills, Calif.  According to the
master servicer, the loan was with the special servicer from
Sept. 23, 2009, to Nov. 16, 2010.  Key Bank indicated that fees
associated with the special servicing transfer were paid by the
borrower.  KeyBank reported a 0.71x DSC for the trailing 12 months
ended March 31, 2012.  The property was 85.2% occupied, according
to the borrower's 2012 operating statement.  S&P's adjusted
valuation, using a 8.75% capitalization rate, yielded an in-trust
stressed LTV ratio of 106.6%.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Rating
Class    To        From
A-2      AAA (sf)  A+ (sf)
B        AA (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
C        A (sf)    BBB- (sf)
D        BBB (sf)  BB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating
E        BB (sf)
F        BB- (sf)
G        B- (sf)
H        CCC+ (sf)
J        CCC (sf)
K        CCC- (sf)


COMM COMMERCIAL 2004-LNB4: Moody's Cuts A-1A Certs Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three classes,
downgraded five classes and confirmed one class of COMM Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-LNB4 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The downgrades are due to increased interest shortfalls and
deteriorating credit support resulting from recent loan
liquidations and anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing. Two principal classes were placed on review for
possible downgrade due to concerns about potential increases of
interest shortfalls. As of the most recent remittance statement,
the pool has experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$8.7 million impacting Classes P through F, down from $11.6
million in November 2012 impacting classes P through B. The two
principal classes that were placed on review were downgraded along
with three other principal classes for the aforementioned reasons.

The IO Class, Class X-C, is confirmed as it is consistent with the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

This review concludes the prior rating action dated November 29,
2012.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.0% of the
current balance compared to 12.0% at last review. Based expected
loss plus realized losses now totals 11.3% compared to 10.2% at
last review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement levels could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X-C.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25 compared to 28 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated November 29, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 42% to $703.8 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 90 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool. Eleven loans, representing 10% of the pool,
have defeased and are backed by U.S. Government securities. There
is one loan, representing 8% of the pool, with an investment grade
credit assessment.

There are presently 16 loans, representing 17% of the pool, on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $82 million loss (68%
loss severity on average). Currently nine loans, representing 13%
of the pool, are in special servicing. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $28.7 million loss (32% expected loss overall) from the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated an
$18.5 million aggregate loss (34% expected loss based on a 71%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 81% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 87% compared to 88% at
last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10.4% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.22X, respectively,
compared to 1.33X and 1.24X, respectively, at last full review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the 731 Lexington Avenue Loan
($56.4 million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is a 23.6%
participation interest in a $235.0 million loan. The property is
also encumbered by an $86 million junior loan which is held
outside the trust. The loan is secured by a 694,634 square foot
(SF) office building located in New York City. The property is
100% leased to Bloomberg, LP until 2028. Performance has been
stable. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3
and 2.36X, respectively, compared to A3 and 2.33X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 20% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Crossings at Corona-Phase I & II
Loan ($73.4 million -- 10.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
503,037 SF retail power center located in Corona, California. The
property was 99% leased as of June 2012 versus 98% at last review.
Property performance has steadily increased over the past two
years. This loan has amortized 8% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to
96% and 0.96X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Woodyard Crossing Shopping Center
Loan ($34.7 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
483,724 SF retail power center located in Washington, DC. The
property was 100% leased compared to 99% at last review. The
largest tenants are Wal-Mart, Lowe's and Safeway. The loan has
amortized 28% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 66% and 1.47X, respectively, compared to 67% and 1.44X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the 280 Trumbull Street Loan ($30.8
million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 664,479 SF
office property located in Hartford, Connecticut. The property was
66% leased as of September 2012 compared to 70% at last review.
The loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to high vacancy and a
decline in income. Although performance has declined over the past
two years, the property generates sufficient cash flow to cover
debt service payments. Year-end 2011 DSCR was 1.36X. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.93X, respectively, the same as at
last review.


COMM 2006-C7: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2006-C7, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on
five other classes from the same transaction, including the
ratings on the class X interest-only (IO) certificates.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipates
will occur upon the resolution of 16 ($333.8 million, 16.0%) of
the 18 ($404.5 million, 19.3%) assets currently with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  Based solely on S&P's
valuation of these 16 specially serviced assets, it expects the
trust to incur losses approximating 9.2% of the original
outstanding trust balance upon the resolution and/or liquidation
of these assets.  To date, the trust has incurred losses totaling
$33.6 million, or 1.4% of the original outstanding trust balance.

"Our rating actions also considered the monthly interest
shortfalls that are affecting the trust.  We lowered our rating to
'D (sf)' on the class B certificates because we expect interest
shortfalls to continue, and because we believe the accumulated
interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.  As of the Feb. 11, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $1.7
million primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement
reduction (ASER) amounts totaling $1.4 million, a modified
interest rate reduction of $239,708, and special servicing fees
totaling $85,723.  The interest shortfalls affected all classes
subordinate to and including class A-J. If class A-J continues to
experience interest shortfalls for an extended period of time, we
may further lower the rating on this class to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the principal and interest
certificates to reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's analysis of the
performance of the remaining loans.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class X IO certificates
reflects its current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

COMM 2006-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                    Rating
Class          To          From      Credit enhancement (%)
A-M            BBB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)                 21.79
A-J            CCC- (sf)   BB- (sf)                  12.72
B              D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)                 10.24

RATINGS AFFIRMED

COMM 2006-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class          Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
A-3            AAA (sf)                             33.48
A-AB           AAA (sf)                             33.48
A-4            AAA (sf)                             33.48
A-1A           AAA (sf)                             33.48
X              AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


COMM 2013-GAM: Fitch Rates $27.6MM Class F Certificates 'BB-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on COMM 2013-GAM
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Outlooks as
follows:

-- $55,145,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $154,855,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $210,000,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26,000,000** class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26,000,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,000,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,754,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,024,000 class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,642,482 class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Interest-only class; notional balance of class A.
** Interest-only class; notional balance of class B.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Jan. 31, 2013.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
the primary asset of which is one loan having an aggregate
principal balance of approximately $324,420,482 as of the cutoff
date and primarily secured by the Green Acres Mall in Valley
Stream, New York. The loan was originated by German American
Capital Corporation.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be KeyCorp Real
Estate Capital Markets, Inc. rated 'CMS1' and 'CSS2+',
respectively, by Fitch.

Fitch reviewed the transaction's collateral, including cash flow
analysis, third party reports, loan documents, an asset summary
review and site inspections. The presale report also details how
Fitch addresses the key rating drivers for the COMM 2013-GAM.


The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.11 times, a Fitch stressed loan-to value (LTV) of
79.6%, and a Fitch debt yield of 8.6%. Fitch's net cash flow
represents a variance of approximately 5.9% to the issuer cash
flow.

RATING SENSITIVITIES:

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to COMM
2013-GAM to determine how the ratings would react to further
declines below Fitch's NCF. The implied rating sensitivities are
only indicative of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors to which the transaction is exposed.
For further discussion of Fitch's sensitivity analysis please see
the presale report titled 'COMM 2013-GAM' dated March 7, 2013.


CMBSPOKE 2006-I: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one, and downgraded the ratings of two
classes of Notes issued by CMBSpoke 2006-I Segregated Portfolio
(CMBSpoke 2006-I, Ltd.) due to deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying reference obligations as evidenced by the
weighted average rating factor and the weighted average recovery
rate. The affirmation is due to key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

CMBSpoke 2006-I, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps on commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool balance). As
of the February 24, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate issued Note
balance of the transaction, was $100.0 million, the same as that
at issuance.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 482 compared to 154 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated reference obligations and assessments for non-
Moody's rated reference obligations is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (59.4%
compared to 64.3% at last review) and A1-A3 (9.0% compared to
15.9% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (18.1% compared to 11.9% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (4.5% compared to 7.9% at last review), B1-B3
(4.5% compared to0% at last review), and Caa1-C (4.5% compared to
0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.7 years compared to 2.4 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 48.3% compared to
53.2% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 13.0% compared to 36.8% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes within the reference obligation pool.
Holding all other key parameters static, changing the current
ratings and credit assessments of the reference obligations by one
notch downward or by one notch upward affects the model results by
approximately 0 to 1 notches downward and 1 notch upward,
respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 18 classes of
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Securities
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C4 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-SP, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The ratings of the IO classes, Class A-X, Class A-SP, and Class A-
Y, are consistent with the credit performance of their referenced
classes and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 11% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 12%. Moody's base
plus realized loss metric is 13% of the original pooled balance at
securitization; the same as at Moody's prior review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
Classes A-X, A-SP, and A-Y.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 8, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $3.73
billion from $4.27 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 309 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 22% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
50% of the pool. The pool includes 47 loans with Aaa credit
assessments, representing 3% of the pool. The credit-assessed
loans are secured by 47 residential cooperatives, nearly all
located in the New York City area. Three loans, representing less
than 1% of the pool, are defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.

Ninety-five loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Forty-nine loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $156 million (43% average loan loss
severity). Currently, 30 loans, representing 14% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Babcock and Brown FX 3 Loan ($195 million -- 5% of the pool),
which is secured by a portfolio of 14 multifamily properties in
Texas, Nevada, South Carolina, Florida, Texas, Virginia, and
Maryland. The loan transferred to special servicing in February
2009 due to deteriorating market conditions. A receiver was
appointed in August 2011. The receiver subsequently listed the
properties for sale, and a sale is currently pending. Closing is
expected before the end of the first quarter 2013. Portfolio
occupancy was 94% as of November 2012.

The remaining 29 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
commercial, retail, hotel, industrial and self-storage property
types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $205 million loss (40%
expected loss) for all specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 65 poorly-
performing loans representing 20% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $120 million loss
(16% expected loss severity based on a 51% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 97% and 82% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 107% compared to 112% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average benefit
of 1% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI),
resulting primarily from reported NOI which is below Moody's
sustainable expectation for the two largest assets in the pool.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.3%.

Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.31X and 0.98X, respectively, compared to
1.35X and 0.99X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 35% of the pool.
The largest loan is the 11 Madison Avenue Loan ($806 million --
22% of the pool), which is secured by a 2.2 million square-foot
office property in the Park Avenue South / Flatiron section of New
York City. The property serves as the North American headquarters
for Credit Suisse (Moody's senior unsecured rating A1, stable
outlook), which leases approximately 1.8 million square feet of
the 30-story tower, or about 81% of property net rentable area
(NRA). The Credit Suisse lease, which expires in April 2017, is at
a below-market rent. Total property occupancy was 99% as of
September 2012. The second-largest tenant in the building, AON,
has a lease for 138,000 square feet (6% of property NRA), which
expires in April 2013. AON is not expected to renew its lease at
expiration. GFT USA Corp., recently the third-largest tenant
(100,000 square feet; 4% of property NRA), vacated the property
after its lease expired on January 31, 2013. Moody's analysis
considers the significant value upside embedded in the anchor
tenant's below market rent, weighed against downside risks, which
include the near-term lease rollover of minor tenants, and the
close timing of loan maturity and the expected expiration of the
Credit Suisse lease (a difference of approximately 7 months).
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.76X,
respectively, the same as at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the 280 Park Avenue Loan ($300 million
-- 8% of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a
$441 million loan. The loan is secured by a 1.2 million square
foot Class A office building located in the Park Avenue office
submarket of New York City. The loan is also encumbered by a $670
million mezzanine loan. The property was 56% occupied as of
September 2012 compared to 64% the prior year. Property
performance has declined following the departure of several large
tenants, including the National Football League, which in February
2012 vacated its 205,000 square-foot space. Further lease rollover
is possible in the medium-term, as two of the three top tenants
(together occupying nearly 12% of property NRA) have leases
scheduled to expire in January 2014. Moody's analysis considers
the asset's prime location and leased up vacant space to current
market rents and vacancy levels. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
84% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 75% and 0.86X at Moody's
last review.

The third largest loan is the Ritz Carlton South Beach Loan ($181
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 376-room full-
service luxury hotel located in Miami Beach, Florida. The loan was
placed on the master servicer's watchlist in October 2009 as the
result of declining performance in a competitive hotel market. The
subject is currently completing renovations begun in August 2012.
A new marketing campaign showcasing the recent property upgrades
is expected. 2012 RevPAR increased to $333 from $324 in 2011. The
hotel has made big strides in performance since 2010, when RevPAR
reached a low of $208. Despite recent performance improvements,
Moody's considers this loan a troubled loan. Moody's current LTV
and stressed DSCR are 143% and 0.76X.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-TFL2: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Cl. J Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two
pooled classes and affirmed its ratings on 10 other pooled classes
of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s Series 2006-TFL2,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
Concurrently, S&P lowered its rating on one non-pooled certificate
and affirmed its ratings on 18 non-pooled certificates from the
same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, which
included the revaluation of the collateral securing the four
remaining loans in the trust, one of which is currently with the
special servicer.  S&P's review also considered the transaction
structure, interest shortfalls, liquidity available to the trust,
and refinancing risk.

The upgrades on the pooled certificates reflect increased credit
support levels due to the deleveraging of the pooled trust balance
to date.  As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
pooled trust balance consisted of three pooled mortgage loans, all
of which are secured by lodging properties, totaling $467.1
million.  This is down from 14 loans with a pooled trust balance
totaling $1.9 billion at issuance.  The pooled mortgage loans are
indexed to one-month LIBOR.  The one-month LIBOR rate was 0.206%
according to the February 2013 trustee remittance report.  To
date, the pooled trust experienced losses totaling $249,356.

The affirmed ratings on the pooled principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination and liquidity support levels
that are consistent with S&P's outstanding ratings.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the Class 'KER' raked certificates
based on its analysis of the Kerzner International loan.  The
raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from a
subordinate non-pooled component of the loan.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the Class NHK-A raked
certificates based on its analysis of the NH Krystal Hotels loan.
The raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from a
subordinate non-pooled component of the loan.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the Class SV-A1, SV-A2, SV-B, SV-C,
SV-D, SV-E, SV-F, SV-G, SV-H, and SV-J raked certificates based on
its analysis of the non-pooled Sava Portfolio and Fundamental
Portfolio mortgage loans.  The 'SV' non-pooled certificates derive
100% of their cash flow from the loans.

S&P based the downgrade of the Class SV-K raked certificate to
'BB+ (sf)' on its updated criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian
CMBS transactions, which applies a credit enhancement minimum
equal to 1% of the transaction or loan amount to address the
potential for unexpected trust expenses that may be incurred
during the life of the loan or transaction.  These potential
unexpected trust expenses may include servicer fees, servicer
advances, workout or corrected mortgage fees, and potential trust
legal fees.  According to the master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate
Capital (KeyBank), the junior participation note balance has been
reduced to $6.9 million from the previously reported $9.7 million.
Therefore, the junior participation note balance is no longer
sufficient to cover any potential or unexpected expenses.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the Class A-X-1, A-X-3, and
SV-AX interest-only (IO) certificates based on its current
criteria for rating IO securities.

S&P based its analysis of the remaining three performing pooled
and non-pooled loans, in part, on a review of the borrower's
operating statements for the available trailing 12 months ended
2012 and the years ended Dec. 31 2011, 2010, and as well as the
available borrower's budget.  Details on the three pooled loans,
one of which is with the special servicer, and the non-pooled loan
are as follows:

The Kerzner International loan is the largest loan in the pool.
The fee interest in two full-service resort hotels totaling 3,023
rooms secures the loan.  The collateral for this loan also
includes a water park, casino, 18-hole golf course, vacant land,
the assignment of the borrower's 50% joint-venture interest in
timeshare units, a 50% joint-venture interest in net sale proceeds
from an on-site condo project, and a marina project, all located
on Paradise Islands, Bahamas.  To date, the whole-loan balance has
been paid down by $506.0 million to $2.27 billion, which is
bifurcated into a $1.25 billion senior participation interest and
a $1.02 billion subordinate nontrust junior participation
interest.  The senior participation interest is split into two
pari passu notes.  One of the notes is in this transaction, which
consists of a $350.8 million senior pooled component (75.1% of the
pool trust balance) and a $276.2 million subordinate non-pooled
component raked to the KER certificates.  The other pari passu
note is in the COMM 2006-FL12 transaction, which includes a $481.9
million senior pooled component and a $145.1 million subordinate
non-pooled component raked to the KR certificates.

The Kerzner International loan was assigned and assumed by
Brookfield Asset Management Inc., the current sponsor, and
modified on Dec. 31, 2011.  The modification terms include, among
other items, extending the loan's maturity date from Dec. 30,
2011, to Sept. 9, 2014.  According KeyBank, the borrower paid the
fees associated with the workout of the loan.  KeyBank reported
debt-service coverage (DSC) of 6.30x on the trust balance and
overall occupancy on the property of 65.0% for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2011.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a weighted-average
capitalization rate of 9.6%, yielded a stressed in-trust loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio of 117.9%.

The JW Marriott Starr Pass loan, the second-largest loan in the
pool, has a whole-loan balance of $145.0 million, which consists
of a pooled trust balance of $78.0 million (16.7% of the pooled
trust balance) and a nontrust junior participation balance of
$67.0 million.  In addition, the borrower's equity interest in the
whole loan secures a $20.0 million mezzanine loan.  The loan is
secured by a 575-room, full-service resort hotel in Tucson, Az.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on April 21,
2010, due to impending maturity default.  A receiver was appointed
in November 2011, and has remained in place thereafter.  The
nonperforming matured balloon loan has a reported total pooled
trust exposure of $79.0 million, including interest advances of
$996,168.

The NH Krystal Hotels loan, the smallest loan in the pool, has a
whole-loan balance of $41.4 million that consists of a
$38.3 million senior pooled component (8.2% of the pooled trust
balance) and a $3.1 million subordinate non-pooled component that
is raked to the Class NHK-A certificates.  According to KeyBank,
200 rooms from the Puerto Vallarta property were released as
collateral in 2011, and as part of the release, the loan was paid
down by $12.7 million.  The loan is currently secured by three
full-service hotels totaling 952 rooms in Cancun, Ixtapa, and
Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.  The loan matures on Aug. 9, 2013, and
has a one-year extension option available.  KeyBank reported a
combined DSC of 4.38x on the trust balance and a combined
occupancy of 56.5% for the 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2012.  S&P's
adjusted valuation, using a weighted-average capitalization rate
of 8.0%, yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 82.9%.

The non-pooled cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted Sava
Portfolio and Fundamental Portfolio loans have a whole-loan
balance of $849.6 million that consists of an $842.7 million non-
pooled trust balance that provides 100% support for the SV raked
certificates and a $6.9 million nontrust junior participation
note.  The junior participation note balance was previously
reported as $9.7 million, however KeyBank has informed S&P that
this balance is now $6.9 million.  In addition, the borrower's
equity interests in the whole loan secure mezzanine loans totaling
$185.0 million.  The loans are currently secured by 191 health
care, predominantly skilled nursing facilities totaling 23,303
beds in various locations throughout the U.S.  The loan currently
matures on June 9, 2013, and has one 12-month extension option
remaining.  The master servicer reported a DSC of 19.59x for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012.  According to the master
servicer, the borrower is working on refinancing the loans.  S&P's
adjusted valuation, using a weighted-average capitalization rate
of 11.5%, yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 48.5%.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED - POOLED CERTIFICATES

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2
            Rating
Class   To          From
B       AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C       AA- (sf)    A+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED - POOLED CERTIFICATES

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2

Class         Rating
A-2           AAA (sf)
D             A- (sf)
E             BB+ (sf)
F             B+ (sf)
G             B- (sf)
H             CCC+ (sf)
J             CCC (sf)
K             CCC- (sf)
A-X-1         AAA (sf)
A-X-3         AAA (sf)

RATING LOWERED - NON-POOLED CERTIFICATE

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2
            Rating
Class   To          From
SV-K    BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED - NON-POOLED CERTIFICATES

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2

Class         Rating
SV-A1         AAA (sf)
SV-A2         AAA (sf)
SV-B          AA+ (sf)
SV-C          AA (sf)
SV-D          AA- (sf)
SV-E          A+ (sf)
SV-F          A (sf)
SV-G          A- (sf)
SV-H          BBB+ (sf)
SV-J          BBB (sf)
SV-AX         AAA (sf)
KER-A         B (sf)
KER-B         CCC (sf)
KER-C         CCC- (sf)
KER-D         CCC- (sf)
KER-E         CCC- (sf)
KER-F         CCC- (sf)
NHK-A         CCC- (sf)


CRYSTAL RIVER 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 8 Notes Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes from Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd. (Crystal
River 2006-1), a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
the termination of the interest rate swap contract for the
transaction, resulting in a payment to the hedge counterparty.
S&P lowered the ratings on Classes C through K to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)' to reflect its expectation that the classes are unlikely
to be repaid in full.

According to the most recent trustee report, the hedge
counterparty previously terminated the interest rate swap contract
for the transaction following a payment default.  The termination
of the hedge triggered a termination payment totaling
$34.9 million to the counterparty.  Based on the transaction's
documents and payment waterfall, it is S&P's understanding that
the termination payments to the hedge counterparty are made pro
rata to interest and principal payments to Class A and before any
interest or principal proceeds are made available to any classes
subordinate to Class A.

According to the Feb. 22, 2013, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $238.1 million, and the transaction's
liabilities--including capitalized interest--totaled
$399.6 million.  This is up from $390.3 million in liabilities at
issuance.  The transaction's current asset pool consists of 44
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS, $238.1 million) from 26 distinct transactions issued from
2002 through 2007.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Crystal River 2006-1 according to S&P's
current criteria.  The analysis is consistent with the lowered
ratings.

RATINGS LOWERED

Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
C        D (sf)               CC (sf)
D        D (sf)               CC (sf)
E        D (sf)               CC (sf)
F        D (sf)               CC (sf)
G        D (sf)               CC (sf)
H        D (sf)               CC (sf)
J        D (sf)               CC (sf)
K        D (sf)               CC (sf)


CTX CDO I: S&P Withdraws 'D' Rating on 11 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on all 11
classes from CTX CDO I Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction, following
the complete liquidation of the underlying collateral and
subsequent termination of the transaction's liabilities.

The current ratings on all classes are 'D (sf)'.  According to the
trustee notice, all classes in the transaction experienced partial
or full principal loss upon the liquidation of the collateral.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

CTX CDO I Ltd.
                           Rating
Class             To                   From
Super-Senior      NR                   D (sf)
A                 NR                   D (sf)
B                 NR                   D (sf)
C                 NR                   D (sf)
D                 NR                   D (sf)
E                 NR                   D (sf)
F                 NR                   D (sf)
G                 NR                   D (sf)
H                 NR                   D (sf)
J                 NR                   D (sf)
K                 NR                   D (sf)

NR-Not rated.


CWABS 2004-13: Moody's Takes Action on $367MM of Subprime RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of four
tranches, and affirmed the rating of 25 tranches from two
transactions issued by CWABS, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-13

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. AF-5A, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. AF-5B, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. AF-6, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. MF-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BF, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BV, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. MF-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-BC5

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Confirmed at
B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools. The rating actions constitute a number of upgrades
and affirmations.

The tranches rated A3 (sf) do not have interest shortfalls but in
the event of an interest shortfall, structural limitations in the
transactions will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls even
if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on these tranches can typically only be made up from
excess interest after the overcollateralization is built to a
target amount. In these transactions since overcollateralization
is already below target due to poor performance, any future missed
interest payments to these tranches are unlikely to be paid.
Moody's caps the ratings of such tranches with weak interest
shortfall reimbursement at A3 (sf) as long as they have not
experienced any shortfall.

Ratings on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3 (sf). For tranches with
larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009. These rating action take into account
only credit-related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

The methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG2: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on Cl. S CMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes of
DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-CG2 as follows:

Cl. B-4, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. S, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the principal class is due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
class is sufficient to maintain its current rating. The rating of
the IO Class, Class S, is consistent with the performance of its
referenced classes and is thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.3% of the
current balance compared to 10.4% at last review. Base expected
loss plus realized losses is 4.1% of the original balance, the
same as at last review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs
and the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced
loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class S.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 9 compared to 12 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools - MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated March 8, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 11, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $45 million
from $1.55 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 25 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 23% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 81% of
the pool. The pool includes of two defeased loans representing 2%
of the pool which are secured by US Government securities.

Twelve loans, representing 44% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifty-five loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $61.9 million (26% average loan loss
severity). Currently one loan, the Rustic Ridge Apartments Loan
($1.6 million -- 4% of the pool), is in special servicing. This
loan is secured by a 84 unit multifamily property located in
Columbus, Ohio. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
October 2012 due to Imminent Monetary Default. The special
servicer is currently pursuing foreclosure of the property. As of
January 2013, the property was 83% leased.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $819 thousand loss
(25% expected loss severity based on a 56% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 77% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 61% compared to 72% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.3%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.42X and 2.13X, respectively, compared to
1.30X and 1.81X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 47% of the pool. The
largest loan is the Pines of Westbury Loan ($10.2 million -- 23%
of the pool). The loan is secured by a 940-unit multifamily
property located in the Katy/Southwest Houston submarket of
Houston, Texas. Performance at the property has improved since
Moody's last review, in line with improvements in the Houston
multifamily market. As of April 2012 the property was 65% leased.
The loan is currently on the watchlist due to low occupancy.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to 107% and 1.02X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Hazelcrest Place Loan ($7.1 million
-- 16% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 241-unit multifamily
property located in Hazel Park, Michigan, a northern suburb of
Detroit. The property was 99% leased as of June 2012. Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.46X, respectively,
compared to 69% and 1.45X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Garden City Tower Loan ($3.8 million
-- 9% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 170-unit multifamily
property located in Garden City, Michigan, approximately 20 miles
west of downtown Detroit. As of June 2012, the property was 100%
leased. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and 1.65X
respectively, compared to 58% and 1.73X at last review.


EMPORIA PREFERRED I: Moody's Hikes Ratings on Two Notes to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Emporia Preferred Funding I, Ltd.:

  US$36,615,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 12,
  2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on November 3, 2011
  Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

  US$5,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due October 12, 2018,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on November 3, 2011 Upgraded
  to Aa2 (sf);

  US$24,360,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due October 12, 2018,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on November 3, 2011 Upgraded
  to A3 (sf);

  US$24,360,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due October 12, 2018,
  Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on November 3, 2011 Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf);

  US$8,000,000 Class E-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 12,
  2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on November 3, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  US$5,195,000 Class E-2 Floating Rate Notes Due October 12,
  2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on November 3, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

  US$280,140,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due October 12, 2018
  (current outstanding balance of $66,642,055), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on October 21, 2005 Assigned Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in November 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 75.7% or $208.1 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated January 8, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 148.8%, 130.4%,
116.0% and 109.5%, respectively, versus October 2011 levels of
126.8%, 117.8%, 109.9% and 106.1%, respectively. Moody's notes
that the overcollateralization ratios in the latest trustee report
do not include the January 14, 2013 payment distribution when
$63.9 million of principal proceeds were used to pay down the
Class A Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $191.5 million,
defaulted par of $8.2 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.23% (implying a WARF of 3205), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.99%, and a diversity
score of 34. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Emporia Preferred Funding I, issued in October 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans, with significant exposure to middle market
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, the default probability adjustments include (1) a 1
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months. Moody's applied the
adjustment described in (1) to 5.8% of the collateral pool and the
adjustment described in (2) to 4.8% of the collateral pool.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2564)

Class A: 0
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: +2
Class E-1: +1
Class E-2: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3846)

Class A: 0
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0
Class C: -1
Class D: -1
Class E-1: -1
Class E-2: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.


FORTRESS CREDIT: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Fortress Credit BSL Ltd./Fortress Credit BSL LLC's $367.5 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2891%-12.8133%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available prior to paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees, subordinated
      hedge termination payments, and subordinated note payments
      to principal proceeds for the purchase of additional
      collateral assets during the reinvestment period and to
      reduce the balance of the rated notes outstanding,
      sequentially, after the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1360.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Fortress Credit BSL Ltd./Fortress Credit BSL LLC

Class                Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)               247.00
B                    AA (sf)                 48.00
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                  29.50
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                21.00
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                 22.00
Subordinated notes   NR                      44.50

NR-Not rated.


GALAXY IV: Moody's Raises Rating on US$14MM Notes to 'Baa1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Galaxy IV CLO:

US$25,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Notes Due April 17, 2017, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on May 11, 2012 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

US$14,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due April 17,
2017, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf);

US$5,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes Due April 17,
2017, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf);

Class Z Combination Notes Due April 17, 2017 (current rated
balance of $583,320), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August
3, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$235,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Notes Due April 17, 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $30,717,958), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$65,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due April 17,
2017 (current outstanding balance of $8,496,457), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$21,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due April 17, 2017, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on May 11, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in May 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes have been paid down by approximately 77% or $101 million and
Class A-2 Notes have been paid down by approximately 77% or $28
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated January 7, 2013, the Senior and Mezzanine
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 156.84% and 112.77%,
respectively, versus May 2012 levels of 128.87% and 108.02%,
respectively. The overcollateralization ratios reported in the
January 2013 trustee report do not reflect principal payments of
$54.9 million distributed to the Class A Notes on the January 17,
2013 payment date.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
somewhat since the last rating action. Based on the January 2013
trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2997 compared to 2723 in April 2012.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the January 2012 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 8% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $120 million,
defaulted par of $6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.60% (implying a WARF of 2936), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 53.07%, and a diversity
score of 38. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Galaxy IV CLO, issued in March 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011 and
"Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes"
published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2349)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D Floating: +3

Class D Fixed: +3

Class Z: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3523)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D Floating: -1

Class D Fixed: -1

Class Z: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.


GALAXY V: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on 2 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B and C notes from Galaxy V CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by PineBridge Investment LLC.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2,
D-1, and D-2 notes.

The upgrades of the class B and C notes reflect paydowns to the
class A-1 and A-2 notes.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-
1, A-2, D-1, and D-2 notes to reflect the availability of adequate
credit support at the current rating levels.

The transaction is in its amortization phase following the end of
its reinvestment period in October 2011 and has commenced paying
down the class A-1 and A-2 notes, which are pari passu.  On
Jan. 22, 2013, class A-1 and A-2 notes received $98.8 million
principal pay down in total.  After this most recent payment, the
class A-1 and A-2 outstanding balances were about 47% of the
original balances.

The transaction continues to maintain a low level of defaults in
the collateral pool.  The February 2013 monthly trustee report
indicated about $2.3 million (less than 1%) of the pool as
defaults.

The ratings on the class D-1 and D2 notes are driven by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test S&P introduced as part of its 2009 corporate criteria
update.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS
Galaxy V CLO Ltd.
Class              Rating
             To               From
A-1          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-2          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
B            AAA (sf)         AA (sf)
C            AA (sf)          A (sf)
D-1          BB+ (sf)         BB+ (sf)
D-2          BB+ (sf)         BB+ (sf)


GE COMMERCIAL 2003-C2: Fitch Puts 7 Certs Rating on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed seven classes of GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2003-C2 on Rating Watch Negative.

Key Rating Drivers

The placement on Rating Watch Negative reflects concerns
surrounding the transaction's specially serviced loans,
particularly the transfer of the largest loan in the pool, the
Boulevard Mall (7.4%). The loan transferred to special servicing
due to imminent default. The decline in performance is mostly
attributed to decreased rental income. The most recent debt-
service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of Sept. 30, 2013 is 1.11x.

Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch Negative status within
the next several months following a complete review of the
transaction including updated valuation details and
collateral/workout discussions with the loan servicers.

Rating Sensitivities

The classes placed on Rating Watch Negative may be downgraded by
one or more rating categories. The rake classes, BLVD 2 through 5,
are solely dependent on the Boulevard Mall collateral; should the
loan no longer cover debt service and the property's cash flow
deteriorate further, rating changes are likely to be several
categories.

Fitch places the following classes on Rating Watch Negative:

-- $14.8 million class H 'Asf';
-- $19.2 million class J 'BBsf';
-- $7.4 million class K 'Bsf';
-- $2.3 million class BLVD-2 'A-sf';
-- $4.5 million class BLVD-3 'BBB+sf';
-- $3.5 million class BLVD-4 'BBBsf';
-- $8 million class BLVD-5 'BB+sf'.


GOLDEN KNIGHT II: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Golden Knight II CLO, Ltd.:

  US$40,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Floating Rate
  Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on August 23,
  2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$292,500,000 Class A First Priority Senior Floating Rate
  Notes due 2019 (current balance of $284,445,114), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on August 23, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  US$18,250,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Subordinate
  Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Affirmed Baa1
  (sf); previously on August 23, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

  US$14,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinate Deferrable
  Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Affirmed Ba1 (sf);
  previously on August 23, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

  US$13,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Junior Subordinate
  Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Affirmed Ba3
  (sf); previously on August 23, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread and diversity levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in August
2011. Moody's modeled weighted average spread and Diversity levels
of 3.6% and 73, respectively compared to 2.8% and 65,
respectively, at the time of the last rating action. Moody's also
notes that the transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios
and other collateral quality metrics are stable since the last
rating action.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the Moody's calculation, securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 6.6% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $390 million, no
defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of 18.85%
(implying a WARF of 2764, a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.51%, and a diversity score of 73. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Golden Knight II CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2211)

Class A: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +3
Class D: +2
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3317)

Class A: 0
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: 0
Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


GOLDMAN SACHS 1999-C1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class H CMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of three classes of
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 1999-C1 as follows:

  Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
  to C (sf)

  Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Confirmed
  at Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The two principal and interest bonds are affirmed based on
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 33.1% of
the current pooled balance compared to 26.6% at last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.3% of the
original pooled balance compared to 4.7% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for classes could decline below the current
levels. If future performance materially declines, the expected
level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow
waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of these
classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 9 compared to 10 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 19, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $31
million from $891 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 26 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 23% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 78% of
the pool. One loan, representing 2% of the pool, has been defeased
and is collateralized with U.S. Government Securities.

Ten loans, representing 44% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Forty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $28 million (27% average loss
severity). One loan, representing 19% of the pool, is currently in
special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the Old Times
Union Building Loan ($6 million), which is secured by a vacant
100,000 square foot (SF) office located in Albany, New York. The
State of New York occupied the building until mid-2010. The loan
was recently sold for $1.4 million. The trust will incur a near
100% loss for this loan after accounting for closing costs and
accumulated Appraisal Subordinate Entitlement Reductions (ASERS)
and advances.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans representing 15% of the pool and has estimated a
$2 million aggregate loss (48% expected loss based on a 67%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 97% and 82% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 74% compared to 51% at
Moody's prior review. The conduit portion of the pool excludes
specially serviced, troubled and defeased loans. Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 7% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.31X and 2.57X,
respectively, compared to 1.31X and 2.81X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 36% of the pool. The
largest loan is The Riverwalk Plaza Hotel and Suites Loan ($7
million -- 23.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 128 unit
limited service hotel in San Antonio, Texas. The property was
formerly known as the Howard Johnson Riverwalk Plaza Hotel Loan.
The borrower previously filed for bankruptcy and the loan was
modified in bankruptcy. The A-note amount was increased to account
for accrued interest, out of pocket expenses and other hard costs.
The A-Note recently began to amortize over a new 300 month
schedule at the original 6.53% interest rate. A $1.5 million B-
Note was also created, which represents default interest and other
soft costs. Moody's has identified the B-Note as a troubled loan.
Moody's A-Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 139% and 0.93X,
respectively, compared to 227% and 0.7X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Meadow Brook Apartments Loan ($2
million -- 7.2%), which is secured by a 120 unit apartment
building located 30 miles northwest of Pittsburgh in Center
Township, Pennsylvania. Property occupancy has declined to 85% as
of September 2012 from 95% as of September 2011. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 41% and 2.37X, respectively, compared to 55% and
1.77X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Food-4-Less Center Loan ( $2
million -- 5.4%) , which is secured by a single-tenant 50,000 SF
retail property located halfway between San Francisco and Los
Angeles in San Luis Obispo, California. The loan is fully
amortizing and is fully leased to Food-4-Less through December
2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 36% and 2.7X,
respectively, compared to 41% and 2.37X at last review.


GSC PARTNERS VI: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class D Notes to Baa2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by GSC Partners CDO Fund VI, Ltd.:

US$37,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October
23, 2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on October 21, 2011
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

US$4,300,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due October 23,
2017, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 21, 2011
Upgraded to A3 (sf);

US$8,700,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October
23, 2017, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 21, 2011
Upgraded to A3 (sf);

US$21,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October
23, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $20,933,924), Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf); previously on October 21, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$259,200,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Delayed Funding
Notes Due October 23, 2017 (current outstanding balance of
$66,884,356), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 21, 2005
Assigned Aaa (sf);

US$28,800,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due October 23,
2017, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 21, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action on October 21, 2011. Moody's notes that the
Class A Notes have been paid down by approximately 67% or $135.5
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated January 11, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and
Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 160.4%,
131.0%, 123.1% and 112.1%, respectively, versus August 2011 levels
of 142.1%, 122.5%, 116.9% and 108.8%, respectively. Moody's notes
that the overcollateralization ratios in the latest trustee report
do not include the January 23, 2013 payment distribution, when
$69.2 million of principal proceeds were used to pay down the
Class A-1 Notes. In addition, the actions reflect an increase in
the weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio since the last
rating action. Moody's modeled a recovery rate of 53.22% compared
to 50.46% at the time of the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $187 million,
defaulted par of $19.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 11.57% (implying a WARF of 3187), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 53.22%, and a diversity
score of 25. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

GSC Partners CDO Fund VI, Ltd, issued in October 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans with significant exposure to middle market
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability adjustments. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) as
described in Moody's Ratings Implementation Guidance "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions",
October 2009. Moody's applied this adjustment to 7.3% of the
collateral pool.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2550)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3824)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates. Moody's also conducted tests to assess
the collateral pool's concentration risk in obligors bearing a
credit estimate that constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.


HARBOR SERIES 2006-2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A Notes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings of one class of Notes and
affirmed the ratings of three classes of Notes issued by Harbor
Series 2006-2 LLC. The downgrade is due to the deterioration in
the underlying collateral as evidenced by an increase in the
Moody's weighted average rating factor (WARF) and a decrease in
the recovery rate (WARR). The affirmations are due to the key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Harbor Series 2006-2 LLC is a static synthetic transaction backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(100% of the reference obligation pool balance). As of the
February 20, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of
the transaction is $119,989,722 from $120,000,000 at issuance,
with the reference pool amortization being paid to the Notes on a
pro-rata basis. This transaction features a pro-rata to senior-
sequential waterfall switch which is based upon certain collateral
performance and transaction amortization thresholds.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
We have completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's rated
reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
1,154 compared to 486 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated reference collateral and assessments for non-Moody's
rated reference collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (20% compared to
26.1% at last review), A1-A3 (21.2% compared to 25.3% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (23.7% compared to 36.6% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (24.5% compared to 7.8% at last review), B1-B3 (3.5% compared
to 2.9% at last review), and Caa1-C (7.2% compared to 1.3% at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3 years compared to 3.9 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on revised assumptions on
extensions on the underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 36.3% compared to 42.2% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 18.9% compared to 27.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
pro-rata and sequential payment priorities and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, rated notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes of the underlying reference
obligations. Holding all other key parameters static, changing the
current ratings and credit assessments of the underlying reference
obligations by one notch downward or one notch upward would result
in no further modeled rating movement.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.


HARBOR SERIES 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A Notes to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded the ratings of one class of Notes and affirmed
the ratings of three classes of Notes issued by Harbor Series
2006-1 LLC. The downgrade is due to deterioration in the
underlying collateral as evidenced by an increase in the Moody's
weighted average rating factor (WARF) and a decrease in the
recovery rate (WARR). The affirmations are due to the key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Harbor Series 2006-1 LLC is a static synthetic transaction backed
by a portfolio of credit default swaps on commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the reference obligation pool
balance). As of the February 20, 2013 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction is $159.4 million from
$160 million at issuance, with the reference pool amortization
being paid to the Notes on a pro rata basis. This transaction
features a pro-rata to senior-sequential waterfall switch which is
based upon certain collateral performance and transaction
amortization thresholds.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
We have completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's rated
reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 653
compared to 432 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated reference collateral and assessments for non-Moody's
rated reference collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (47.5% compared
to 47.2% at last review), A1-A3 (13% compared to 27.2% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (15% compared to 15.6% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(16.5% compared to 3.8% at last review), B1-B3 (5.5% compared to
3.8% at last review), and Caa1-C (2.5%, the same as at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.6 years compared to 3.5 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the revised assumptions on
extensions on the underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 47.3% compared to 50.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 15.8% compared to 17.4% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
pro-rata and sequential payment priorities and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
rating changes of the underlying reference obligations. Holding
all other key parameters static, changing the current ratings and
credit assessments of the underlying reference obligations by one
notch downward or one notch upward would result in a modeled
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward
and 0 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


HARCH CLO III: Moody's Keeps Ba3 Rating on US$15MM Cl. E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Harch CLO III Limited:

US$20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2012 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$246,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $78,500,000), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on April 30, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$43,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on May 9, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020,
Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2012 Upgraded to Baa3
(sf)

US$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes since the
rating action in May 2012, and the short period of time remaining
before the end of the reinvestment period in April 2013.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 19% or $18 million since the last rating action.
Based on the latest trustee report dated January 18, 2013, the
Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 141.7%, 124.8%, 112.2%, and 103.8%,
respectively, versus April 2012 levels of 136.7%, 122.0%, 110.7%
and 103.2%, respectively.

Additionally, the rating actions taken on the notes also reflect
the benefit of the short period of time remaining before the end
of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In consideration
of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during the
amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread and diversity levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in May
2012. Moody's also notes that the transaction's other collateral
quality metrics are reported stable since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $203 million,
defaulted par of $7.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.73% (implying a WARF of 2353), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.9%, and a diversity score
of 53. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Harch CLO III Limited, issued in April 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1882)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2824)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence in the amortization period and at what
pace. Deleveraging may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in
the loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may
have significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


HELLER FINANCIAL 1999-PH1: Moody's Keeps 'Caa3' Rating on X Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes of
Heller Financial Commercial Mortgage Asset Corp., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 1999-PH1 as follows:

  Cl. G, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2012 Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf)

  Cl. X , Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation for the principal bond is due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR
and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable
ranges. Based on our current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed class is sufficient to
maintain its current rating. The class is also fully covered by
defeasance.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.8% of the
current pooled balance compared to 6.1% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 5.8% of the original
pooled balance, which is the same as at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current rating.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 3 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 7, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $60
million from $1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by ten mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 2% to 43% of the pool. Five loans, representing 30% of the
pool, have been defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government Securities.

Three loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $54 million (56% average loss
severity). The pool does not contain any loans that are currently
in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loans representing 11% of the pool and has estimated a
$3 million aggregate loss (49% expected loss based on a 75%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 98% of the pool's non-defeased loans,
respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 74%, which
is the same as at Moody's prior review. The conduit portion of the
pool excludes troubled and defeased loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.12X and 1.58X,
respectively, compared to 1.01X and 1.43X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The conduit only consists of three loans. The largest conduit loan
is the Barefoot Landing Loan ($26 million -- 43.1% of the pool;
87% of the conduit), which is secured by a 244,000 SF retail
property located in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The servicer has
informed Moody's of the borrower's intent to defease the loan.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.56X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 1.36X at last review.


JER CRE 2005-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 5 Note Classes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes from JER CRE CDO 2005-1 Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.

S&P lowered the ratings on classes C through G to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)' to reflect its expectation that the classes are unlikely
to be repaid in full.

According to the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $166.6 million and the transaction's
liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled
$336.1 million.  This is down from $416.0 million in liabilities
at issuance.  The transaction's current asset pool includes 35
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS, $166.6 million, 100%) from 11 distinct transactions issued
from 1998 through 2005.

Standard & Poor's analyzed JER CRE CDO 2005-1 Ltd. according to
S&P's current criteria.  The analysis is consistent with the
lowered ratings.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

JER CRE CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
C        D (sf)               CC (sf)
D        D (sf)               CC (sf)
E        D (sf)               CC (sf)
F        D (sf)               CC (sf)
G        D (sf)               CC (sf)


JP MORGAN 2001-CIBC2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class F Certs. to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2001-CIBC2 and revised Outlooks on
the two 'AAAsf' rated classes to Negative from Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses. The
performance of several loans, including the two largest in the
transaction, has deteriorated since Fitch's previous rating
action. In addition, the value of the specially serviced asset has
also deteriorated.

Rating Sensitivity

The Negative Outlooks reflect Fitch's concern over the quality of
the remaining pool given the concentration with only 11 loans
remaining. If additional loans default, interest shortfalls may be
incurred by all remaining classes. If interest shortfalls impact
classes C and D, currently rated 'AAAsf', downgrades to 'Asf' are
possible. According to Fitch's criteria, ratings at 'AAAsf' and
'AAsf' should not incur interest shortfalls.

Fitch modeled losses of 35.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses of the original pool are at 9.5%, including losses already
incurred to date (5.7%). Fitch has designated five loans (83%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes one specially serviced
asset (9%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 89.4% to $101.9 million from
$961.7 billion at issuance. The transaction has become highly
concentrated with only 11 loans remaining in the pool. Interest
shortfalls are affecting the non-rated class NR through class G,
with cumulative unpaid interest totaling $2.6 million. Two loans
in the remaining (2.8% of the pool) are defeased.

The largest contributor to modeled losses, which is also the
largest remaining loan in the pool, consists of the non-anchor
spaces (332,055 SF) of a 1.1 million square foot regional mall in
Plano, TX (60.8% of the pool). The shadow anchors are Macy's, JC
Penney's, Dillard's and Sears. Except Dillard's, all other three
shadow anchors are under long-term leases. The property
performance has deteriorated since year-end 2009 primarily due to
decrease in rents and increase in operating expenses. The
servicer-reported YE 2011 and third quarter (3Q) 2012 DSCR was
0.97x and 0.84x, respectively, compared to 1.1x at YE 2010, 1.64x
at YE2009 and 1.75x at issuance. The property has experienced
strong market competition from newer retail centers nearby.
Occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2012 was 93%, compared to 98% at
issuance. The loan remains current on debt service.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a REO 162,568
SF office property in Riverside, OH (9%). The loan transferred to
the special servicer in January 2010 due to imminent default. A
foreclosure sale took place in August 2011. The most recent
property valuation indicates losses upon the liquidation of the
property.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses consists of two
office properties in Baltimore, MD totaling 137,990 SF (9.6%). At
YE2011, the portfolio experienced significant occupancy decline
primarily due to a large tenant (18% NRA) vacating upon lease
expiration. The combined occupancy rate dropped to 71% at YE2011
from 90% at YE2010. The portfolio was 99.2% occupied at issuance.
The servicer-reported 3Q12 DSCR was 1.05x, compared to 1.42x at
YE2011. The occupancy is expected to improve by the end of 2013 as
a new lease (7,648sf or 6%) was signed which will become effective
in mid-December 2013.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

-- $28.9 million class E to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
    Negative;
-- $12 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE40%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $21.5 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $14.4 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $24.9 million class G to at 'Dsf'; RE0%.

Classes A-1 through B have paid in full. Classes H, J, K, L and M
have been depleted due to losses and remains at 'Dsf/RE0%'. Fitch
does not rate NR class certificates. Fitch has previously
withdrawn the ratings on the Interest-only class X-1 and X-2.


JP MORGAN 2000-C9: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on H Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms class H from J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage
Finance Corp.'s mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2000-
C9.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation is due to the stable performance of the remaining
collateral.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced approximately 97.4% to $21.7
million from $814.4 million at issuance, including 4.6% realized
losses to date. There are only five of the 140 original loans
remaining. The largest loan (41.9%) of the pool is defeased.
Interest shortfalls are affecting the non-rated classes J through
NR with cumulative unpaid interest totaling $1.4 million. The
weighted average debt service coverage ratio for the non-defeased
loans in the pool is 1.36x.

Rating Sensitivity

Fitch expects the Rating Outlook on the remaining rated class to
remain Stable. Although the credit enhancement for class H has
increased significantly, upgrades are not warranted due to the
uncertain outcome related to the second largest loan in the pool.
Downgrades are not likely as the pool benefits from defeasance of
the largest loan.

Fitch has identified the second largest loan (36.7%) as a Loan of
Concern. The loan is secured by a four-building industrial
property totaling 1.02 million square feet (sf) in Elisabeth, NJ.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in October 2009
as the borrower was not able to refinance the loan at the
anticipated repayment date (ARD) of Sept. 1, 2009. The loan was
modified in January 2012 with a five-year extension of the ARD
date and reduced interest rate. The loan was returned to the
master servicer in April 2012. As of third quarter (3Q) 2012, the
property performance has improved with significant increase in net
operating income (NOI) primarily due to reduced operating
expenses. Servicer reported occupancy was 75%, compared to 84% at
year-end (YE) 2011 and 97% at underwriting.

Per borrower notice, the property is subject to partial
condemnation due to the intention of the Port Authority of NY & NJ
to replace an existing bridge with a new one. The Port Authority
is currently working to finalize a compensation plan.

Fitch has affirmed the following class, as indicated:

-- $12.2 million class H at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1 through G have paid in full. Classes J, K and NR are
not rated by Fitch. Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating on
the Interest-only class X.


JP MORGAN 2003-PM1: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class G Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s Series
2003-PM1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings on these classes also reflect the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets as well as
the transaction-level changes.

S&P tempered its rating actions because it also considered the
ongoing litigation on the Palm Beach Mall specially serviced
asset, the volume of nondefeased performing loans with 2013
maturity dates or anticipated repayment dates (ARDs), and the
rated certificate classes' interest shortfall history.

The affirmation of the Class X-1 interest-only (IO) certificate
reflects S&P's current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PM1

Class    Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-4      AAA (sf)                 27.08
A-1A     AAA (sf)                 27.08
B        AA+ (sf)                 22.10
C        AA (sf)                  20.15
D        AA- (sf)                 16.03
E        BBB- (sf)                14.08
F        B+ (sf)                  11.69
G        CCC (sf)                  9.74
X-1      AAA (sf)                   N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class M Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and affirmed 16 classes
of JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2005-LDP1 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates due to an
increase in Fitch expected losses on the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch modeled losses of 6.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.5%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $57.9 million (2% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 33 loans (17.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes eight specially serviced assets (3.9%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 43.6% to $1.62 billion from
$2.88 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 15 loans
(7.6% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes J through NR.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Independence Plaza loan (1.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 252,000 sf retail shopping center located in Hamilton
Township, NJ. The property lost its grocery anchor to bankruptcy
in 2011. Further, T.J. Maxx vacated at its lease maturity in
January 2013. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
March 2010 due to missed debt service payments; a foreclosure
action was commenced in October 2010 and is still ongoing.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Preston
Center Pavilion & Square loan (2.5%), which is secured by a
233,000 sf retail center located in Dallas, TX. While the Dec. 31,
2012 rent roll reported occupancy of 95%; it was expected to drop
to at least 74% in the first half of 2013 significantly impacting
property cash flow. As part of a lease renewal, the largest tenant
is expected to downsize its space by 19,000 sf while the third
largest tenant (31,000 sf) vacated its space at lease expiration
in January 2013.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of the investment grade classes are expected to remain
stable, although value declines and/or prolonged workouts on the
specially serviced loans may lead to further downgrades. The
distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are expected to be
subject to further downgrades as losses are realized. The 'B'
rated class, may be subject to further rating actions should
realized losses be greater or less than Fitch's expectations.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks as indicated:

-- $54 million class D to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative;

-- $28.8 million class E to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to
    Stable from Negative;

-- $32.4 million class H to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

-- $10.8 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns REs as indicated:

-- $28.8 million class G at 'CCCsf'; RE 30%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $234.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $76 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $157.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $601.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $36 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $94.3 million class A-J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $100 million class A-JFL at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $68.4 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $25.2 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $46.8 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $14.4 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $10.8 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $3.3 million class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class
X-1 and X-2 certificates.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B Certs to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 18 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Series Corp., commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP4.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade reflects an increase in Fitch expected losses due to
further deterioration in performance, most notably on loans
currently in special servicing.

Fitch modeled losses of 14.7% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 11.5%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $68.8 million (2.6% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 39 loans (31%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes seven specially serviced assets (12.2%).

Rating Sensitivities

The Negative Outlook on class AJ reflects the uncertainty related
to the expected losses on the specially serviced loans,
particularly losses associated with the largest loan in the pool,
Silver City Galleria (7.4% of the pool). The investment grade
classes are expected to remain stable, but increased modeled
losses due to prolonged workouts or significant value declines,
may have adverse rating actions over the longer term. The
distressed classes (those rated below B) are expected to be
subject to further downgrades as losses are realized.

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 39.4% to $1.62 billion from
$2.68 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, five loans
(7.2% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes D through NR.

The largest contributor to Fitch-expected losses is the specially-
serviced Silver City Galleria loan (7.4% of the pool), the largest
loan in the pool. The loan is secured by a 714,898 square foot
(sf) regional mall located in Taunton, MA. The property
transferred to special servicing in October 2009 after
experiencing cash flow issues due to occupancy declines. The
lender foreclosed on the property and the asset became real estate
owned (REO) in December 2011. The servicer has hired a management
company to assist with leasing efforts and is also attempting to
sell the property through a national sales marketing effort.
According to the servicer the property's value continues to be
negatively impacted due to declining tenant sales and tenant
vacancy's, as well as lower rental income and shorter term
renewals on existing tenants. The servicer reports that these
factors continue to impact the value, sales pricing, and volume of
bidding activity.

The next largest contributor to Fitch-expected losses is the One
World Trade Center loan (5.4%), the second largest loan in the
pool. The loan is secured by a 573,000sf, 27 story class 'A'
office building located in Long Beach, CA. The property has
experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines. Occupancy
has remained flat since 2010 with the February 2013 rent roll
reporting at 70%, a significant decline from issuance at 87%.
Leases for 38% of the net rentable area (NRA) are scheduled to
expire within the next two years which includes the buildings
largest tenant, United States of America (20.3%), whose government
lease expires in September 2013. Debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) reported at 0.93 times (x) for year to date (YTD) June
2012, compared to 0.90x in 2011 and 1.32x in 2010. The partial
interest only loan has been amortizing since the September 2010
payment. The loan remains current as of the February 2013 payment
date.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-expected losses is secured
by a 129,020 sf retail property in Lincoln, CA (2.3%). The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to imminent
default. The lender foreclosed on the property and the asset
became REO in June 2012. The December 2012 rent roll reports
occupancy at 87%. The servicer is working to stabilize the
property and market for sale.

Fitch downgrades the following class and assigns Recovery
Estimates (RE) as indicated:

-- $50.2 million class B to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf', RE 70%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $201 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $53.3 million class A-3A2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $580.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $53.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $267.7 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $204.1 million class A-J at 'BBsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $23.4 million class C at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $46.8 million class D at 'CCsf', RE 0%.
-- $23.4 million class E at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $40.2 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $26.8 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $30.1 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $10 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $11.9 million class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Cass N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The balances for classes L, M, N, P, and the unrated class NR have
been reduced to zero due to realized losses. The class A-1, A-2,
A-2FL and A-3A1 certificates have paid in full.


JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Moody's Lowers Rating on 3 CMBS Classes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed the remaining 17 classes of JP Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2008-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2008
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2008
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. T, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades of the principal classes are due to higher than
expected realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans and concerns about potential increases in
interest shortfalls. The downgrade of the IO Class, Class X, is
due to the decline in credit performance of its referenced
classes.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges.
Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of $278
million or 27.2% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's
base expected loss was $232 million or 20.9%. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20 compared to 22 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools - MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated April 27, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 12% to $1.0 billion
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 57% of
the pool. The pool includes two loans, representing 4% of the
pool, that have investment grade credit assessments.

Twenty two loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $25.2 million realized loss (46% loss severity on
average). Currently eight loans, representing 24% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Promenade Shops at Dos Lagos (now called the The Shops at Dos
Lagos) ($124.6 million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by a
retail property located in Corona, California. The loan has been
in special servicing since November 2008 and became real estate
owned (REO) in December 2009. As of December 2012 the property was
82% leased compared to 96% at securitization. The servicer is
currently marketing the property for sale.

The second largest specially serviced loan is The Westin Portfolio
($102.5 million -- 10%), which is secured by a pari passu interest
in two Westin hotels (487-room hotel in La Paloma - Tuscon,
Arizona; 412-room hotel in Hilton Head, South Carolina). The loan
has been in special servicing since November 2008. A loan
modification was approved through bankruptcy that requires no
interest payments and an extended loan maturity of 21 years.
However, the special servicer has appealed and the modification
remains subject to change.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Jefferson Plaza
Loan ($21.1 million -- 2% of the pool), which is secured by a
172,329 square-foot (SF) office property located in Whippany, New
Jersey. As of December 2012, the property was 86% leased. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in January 2013 due to
imminent default.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
the property types. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $226
million loss for the specially serviced loans (81% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for an additional
13 poorly performing loans representing 18% of the pool and has
estimated an aggregate $43 million loss (24% expected loss on
average) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes A-M through
T has experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $43
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans and poorly performing loans. Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including workout
and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 97% and 71% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 107% compared to 130% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.6%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.12X and 0.98X, respectively, as compared
to 1.12X and 0.88X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is Two Democracy Plaza
($31.0 million -- 3% of the pool) which is secured by a 274,000 SF
office building located in Bethesda, Maryland. The largest tenant
is the National Institute of Health (NIH), which leases 84% of the
net rentable area (NRA) and recently extended its lease through
July 2022. As of September 2012, the property was 97% leased
compared to 99% at last review. Moody's current credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.79X, respectively, compared to A2
and 1.77x at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Lofts at New Roc
Loan ($4.7 million - 0.5%), which is secured by a 98-unit
residential cooperative located in New Rochelle, New York. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 3.37X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.80X at last review.

The top three performing loans represent 18.8% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Block at Orange ($107.8
million - 11%), which represents a pari passu interest in a $215.6
million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 700,000 SF
retail and entertainment center located in Orange County,
California. The property is anchored by an AMC Entertainment movie
theater, Dave & Buster's and Vans Skate Park. As of March 2012,
the property was 91% leased compared to 86% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.83X, respectively,
compared to 120% and 0.79X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Station Casinos
Headquarters Loan ($42.2 million -- 4%), which is secured by a
139,000 SF office building located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The
building is 100% leased to Station Casinos under a 20-year lease
through October 2026 and serves as its corporate headquarters.
Upon emerging from bankruptcy in August 2010, the lease was
renegotiated at a significant reduction in base rent. Moody's
analysis is based on the new lease terms. Moody's has classified
this loan as a troubled loan because of concerns of the
significant decline in performance due to lower rental
achievement. Moody's performed a "lit/dark" analysis on this
property. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 205% and 0.55X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 333 Elliott Avenue West Loan
($42 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 137,000 SF
office property located in Seattle, Washington. The property was
constructed as a built-to-suit for F5 Networks as its corporate
headquarters in 2008. F5 Networks currently occupies the entire
space with a lease expiration of May 2018. Moody's performed a
"lit/dark" analysis on this property. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 131% and 0.82X, respectively, compared 137% and 0.79X at
last review.


KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Moody's Cuts Class E Note Rating to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed five classes of Key Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2007-SL1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-SL1 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to higher than expected realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, and
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on our current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The affirmation of
the interest-only tranche, Class X, is due to the credit quality
of its referenced classes.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent
approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe,
have generally experienced higher defaults and losses than
traditional conduit and fusion transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.0% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
8.9%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.4%
of the original pooled balance compared to 7.8% at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 53 compared to 63 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated July 26, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 48% to $123.3
million from $237.5 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 91 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 32%
of the pool.

Forty-three loans, representing 46% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $10.1 million (68% loss severity on
average). Currently, there are two loans in special servicing,
representing 2% of the pool. The special servicer has confirmed
that the HCTC loan, which represents approximately 1.1% of the
pool, was recently returned to the Master Servicer. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $0.74 million loss (68% expected loss on
average) for the remaining specially serviced loan.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 14 poorly
performing loans, representing 14% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $5.9 million loss (34% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full year 2011
operating results for 95% and 98% of the pool's non-specially
serviced loans, respectively. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 89% compared to
91% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of approximately 10% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.33X, respectively, compared to
1.35X and 1.28X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


KODIAK CDO II: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on 2 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, and D notes from Kodiak CDO II
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
collateralized mostly by trust preferred securities issued by
mortgage REITs and structured finance assets.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class C-1, C-2, E, and F notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's performance review of Kodiak CDO
II Ltd. and reflect a decline in credit quality available to
support the notes since S&P's June 2012 rating actions, when it
lowered its ratings on three classes of notes.

For S&P's analysis, it observed $153.3 million (or 23.4%) in
defaulted assets, up from $130.7 million (or 14.1%) that S&P
observed in June 2012.  Furthermore, $129.6 million (or 19.8%) of
the transaction's assets were from obligors rated in the 'CCC'
category.  Also, according to the February 2013 trustee report,
the transaction's overcollateralization ratios have decreased by
approximately 6.5% on average compared with the May 2012 report,
which S&P referenced for its June 2012 rating actions.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class C-1, C-2, E, and F notes to
reflect its belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current ratings.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in its view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deem necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Kodiak CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                   To           From
A-1                     BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)
A-2                     B- (sf)      BB- (sf)
A-3                     CCC+ (sf)    B- (sf)
B-1                     CCC- (sf)    CCC (sf)
B-2                     CCC- (sf)    CCC (sf)
D                       CC (sf)      CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Kodiak CDO II Ltd.

Class                   Rating
C-1                     CCC- (sf)
C-2                     CCC- (sf)
E                       CC (sf)
F                       CC (sf)


LANDMARK IX: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $18.5MM Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Landmark IX CDO Ltd.:

US$68,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

US$16,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

US$35,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$274,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on June 29, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf);

US$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf);

US$18,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher spread levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in August
2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2644 compared to 2970 at the time
of the last rating action and a WAS of 3.88% versus 2.96%. Moody's
also notes that the transaction's reported overcollateralization
ratio are stable since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $441.9 million,
defaulted par of $11.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.75% (implying a WARF of 2644), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.1%, and a diversity score
of 82. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Landmark IX CDO Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (3173)

A1: 0
A2: 0
B: -2
C: -2
D: -1
E: -1

Moody's Adjusted WARF -20% (2115)

A1: 0
A2: 0
B: 0
C: +2
D: +2
E: +1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


LB-UBS 2000-C5: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C5, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's affirmations follows its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity support available to the
trust.

"The affirmations of our ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect our expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within our estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  We affirmed our ratings on these classes to also reflect
the credit characteristics and performance of the remaining
assets, transaction-level changes, and liquidity support available
to the trust," S&P said.

"We tempered our rating actions on Classes D and E because we
expect the trust to experience decreased liquidity support
resulting from potential additional interest shortfalls.  We
believe these increased interest shortfalls may likely result from
one ($23.3 million, 40.3%) of the remaining seven assets
($57.8 million) that is with the special servicer as well as from
any of the three loans that are on the master servicer's watchlist
($32.4 million, 56.0%) due to reported debt-service coverage of
less than 1.00x," S&P added.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted DSC of 0.78x and a Standard & Poor's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 83.1% for five of the seven remaining
assets in the pool.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude one
asset ($23.3 million, 40.3%) that is with the special servicer
(details below) and one defeased loan ($679,129, 1.2%).

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $57.8 million, down from
$997.2 million at issuance.  The pool comprises six loans and one
real estate owned (REO) asset, down from 110 loans at issuance.
To date, the transaction has experienced losses totaling $56.4
million (5.7% of the transaction's original certificate balance).
One ($23.3 million, 40.3%) of the remaining seven assets is with
the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR), which S&P discusses
below.  There are three assets ($32.4 million, 56.0%) on the
master servicer's watchlist.  Excluding the specially serviced
asset and one defeased loan, the three loans ($32.4 million,
56.0%) on the master servicer's watchlist had a reported DSC below
1.00x.  Details on the two largest assets in the pool on the
master servicer's watchlist are as follows:

The Utica Park Place Shopping Center loan ($26.5 million, 45.8%),
the largest asset in the pool, is secured by a 455,810-sq.-ft.
anchored retail center located in Utica, Mich., in the Macomb
County submarket.  According to the master servicer, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), the DSC for year-end 2011 was 0.90x.
Wells Fargo attributed the low reported DSC to the borrower
offering rent concessions to remain competitive.  It is S&P's
understanding from Wells Fargo that the borrower is actively
marketing the property.  Occupancy was 88.6% according to the
October 2012 rent roll.

The Express Scripts Building loan ($5.3 million, 9.1%), the third-
largest asset in the pool, is secured by a 99,396-sq.-ft.  Mixed-
use property in Albuquerque, N.M. Wells Fargo reported a DSC of
0.02x and 36.4% occupancy for the nine months ended Sept. 30,
2012.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSET

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the River
Plaza asset ($23.3 million, 40.3%) is the sole asset with the
special servicer, LNR.  The River Plaza asset, a 202,253-sq.-ft.,
office property in Stamford, Conn., is the second-largest asset in
the pool and has a reported total exposure of $31.0 million.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on March 4, 2009, due
to monetary default, and the property became REO on Oct. 21, 2010.
LNR reported that the property is currently under contract for
sale and is expected to close in March 2013.  An appraisal
reduction amount of $17.2 million is in effect for this asset.
S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

As it relates to the above asset resolution, S&P considers a
minimal loss to be less than 25%, a moderate loss to be between
26% and 59%, and a significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
D          A+ (sf)                    74.87
E          B+ (sf)                    61.93


LB-UBS 2002-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X-CL Certs to Caa3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed three classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-
C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-C2
as follows:

Cl. Q, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. T, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to the expected loss and principal
recoveries from specially serviced loans as well as key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class X-CL, is a result of the
decline in its credit performance due to the paydowns of highly
rated referenced classes. The certificate balance has decreased
96% to $11.5 million from $270.4 million at last review.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 51.3% of
the current balance, compared to 6.3% at last review. The
percentage increase in base expected loss is due to the
significant decrease of the total certificate balance. On a dollar
basis, the base expected loss is $5.9 million, compared to $17.0
million at last review. Moody's base expected plus realized losses
is now 1.6% of the original pool balance, compared to 2.5% at last
review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments..

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class X-CL.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2 compared to 13 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Since approximately 97% of the pool is in special servicing,
Moody's also utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating this
deal. In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan and determines a most
probable loss given default based on a review of recent broker's
opinions of value (if available), other information from the
special servicer and available market data. The loss given default
for each loan also takes into consideration servicer advances to
date and estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating
the probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $11.5
million from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from 3% to
49% of the pool.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.8 million (17% loss severity on
average). Three loans, representing 97% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
South Rivers Market Loan ($5.6 million -- 48.6% of the pool),
which is secured by a 81,000 square foot (SF) retail property
located in Greensville, Mississippi. The loan transferred to
special servicing in June 2009 due to payment default after the
property's anchor tenant, representing 40% of the net rentable
area (NRA), vacated the property. The loan then transferred to
real estate owned (REO) in March 2011. A replacement anchor took
occupancy in March 2011 and the property was 89% leased as of
December 2012. Even with the new anchor, the reported NOI for 2012
decreased more than 30% as compared to 2008. The special servicer
indicated that it plans to market the property for sale.

The second largest loan in special servicing is the Square 67
Shopping Center Loan ($4.7 million -- 41.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 183,000 SF retail property in Dallas, Texas. The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2012 due to the
borrower's bankruptcy and the special servicer indicated it is in
the bankruptcy process with the courts. This loan has been deemed
non-recoverable by the master servicer.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a multifamily
property in Cincinnati, Ohio. Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.9
million loss for the specially serviced loans (53% expected loss
on average).

The only loan in the pool that is not in special servicing is the
Lake Orion Self Storage Loan ($359,906 -- 3.1% of the pool), which
is secured by a self-storage facility located in Lake Orion,
Michigan. The loan is fully amortizing and matures in May 2017.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and 3.21X, respectively.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


LB-UBS 2005-C3: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 13
classes of the commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, including S&P's
'AAA (sf)' ratings on five of those classes.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings on these classes also reflect the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets as well as
the transaction-level changes.

The affirmation of the interest-only (IO) certificates reflects
S&P's current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C3

Class    Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-4      AAA (sf)                 41.03
A-AB     AAA (sf)                 41.03
A-5      AAA (sf)                 41.03
A-M      AAA (sf)                 25.99
A-J      BBB (sf)                 11.88
B        BBB- (sf)                10.19
C        BB+ (sf)                  8.68
D        BB (sf)                   7.18
E        BB- (sf)                  6.24
F        B+ (sf)                   4.73
G        B+ (sf)                   3.60
H        CCC- (sf)                 1.91
X-CL     AAA (sf)                   N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


LB-UBS 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 6 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2006-C1 and affirmed the super senior and mezzanine 'AAA'
classes. In addition, Fitch has downgraded nine of the rake bond
classes, which include junior non-pooled trust balances.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades on the pooled trust classes B through F reflect an
increase in Fitch expected losses across the pool due to further
deterioration in performance. The downgrades on the rake bond
classes is due to an updated lower appraisal value of the Intel
Corporate Building loan, whose $20 million B-Note accounts for 73%
of the non-pooled balances.

Fitch modeled losses of 6.1% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 9.7%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $124.4 million (5% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 34 loans (19.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes seven specially serviced assets (4.7%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on classes A-J and B reflect performance
concerns and high leverage on several loans in the top 15. The
allocation of the loan pool is highly concentrated with the top 15
loans representing 72% of the pool balance; the top two loans
combined represent 30% of the pool balance. Ratings may be subject
to more downward pressure should values decline further on the
specially serviced loans or if currently performing loans with
high Fitch loan to values experience further cash flow declines.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 22.4% to $1.93 billion from
$2.48 billion at issuance. No loans have defeased since issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes G through T.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the DHL Center loan
(2.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 490,000 square foot (SF)
distribution facility operated and 100% leased by DHL Express
(USA), Inc. (DHL). On Nov. 10, 2008, DHL announced that it would
stop shipping within the United States effective Jan. 30, 2009.
DHL no longer occupies this property; however, there is a 20-year
lease in place that commenced in 2006. The lease is also
guaranteed by Deutsche Post AG (rated 'BBB+'). The loan has
remained current as DHL continues to pay rent, as well as provide
onsite security and maintenance. The servicer-reported year to
date (YTD) September 2012 net operating income (NOI) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.29 times (x).

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Sterling
Portfolio loan (2.5%), which is secured by four office buildings
with a total of 402,399 SF. All four office buildings are located
within eight miles of each other in the Nassau/Suffolk counties of
Long Island, NY, approximately 40 miles outside of Manhattan.
Occupancy has recently improved to 85%, after declining from 89%
in December 2010 to 81% in December 2011. As a result, NOI DSCR
has slightly improved to 0.94x for YTD September 2012, compared to
0.82x at year end (YE) December 2011. The partial interest-only
loan has been amortizing since January 2011. The loan remains
current as of the February 2013 remittance date.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Highwoods II Portfolio (1.4%), which is five Georgia
office properties, two of which are located in Norcross and the
remaining three properties located in Alpharetta. The properties
have experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines. The
loan transferred to special servicing in October 2010 due to
imminent maturity default; the loan matured in in January 2011.
Servicer negotiations with the borrower had failed, and the loan
became lender real estate owned (REO) in April 2012. The servicer
has hired a third party property management and leasing company to
help stabilize the property and is positioning the assets for sale
at auction.

The IUU classes represent the B-note rakes of three separate
loans, Intel Corporate Building, U Haul 26 Portfolio, and U Haul
SAC Portfolio. The A-notes of all three loans are included in the
pooled portion of the trust. Both the U-Haul 26 and U Haul SAC
portfolio loans are current. The Intel Corporate Building notes
transferred to special servicing in January 2011 due to maturity
default. Borrower negotiations fell through and the property
became lender real estate owned (REO) in September 2012. The
property is 100% leased to Intel Corp. (rated 'A+') through
December 2015, however Intel has vacated the property and
currently subleases 69% of the net rentable area. Payments
continue to be remitted to the notes, and the servicer is trapping
all excess cash flow into a reserve account.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $15.4 million class B to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $27.6 million class C to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 90%;
-- $24.6 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $18.4 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $21.5 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Rating Outlook
on class A-J as indicated:

-- $9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $92 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.3 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $245.6 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $221 million class A-J at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $21.5 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $16.8 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The balances for classes J, K, L, M, and N have been reduced to
zero due to realized losses. The class A-1 certificates have paid
in full. Fitch does not rate the class P, Q, S and T. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP
and X-CL certificates.

Fitch also downgrades the following non-pooled rake classes and
revises Rating Outlooks as indicated:

-- $6.1 million class IUU-1 to 'BBsf' from 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
    to Negative from Stable;

-- $2.6 million class IUU-2 to 'Bsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    to Negative from Stable;

-- $3.6 million class IUU-3 to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
    to Negative from Stable;

-- $1.9 million class IUU-4 to 'CCsf' from 'BB+sf';
-- $1.3 million class IUU-5 to 'CCsf' from 'BBsf';
-- $908,999 class IUU-6 to 'CCsf' from 'BB-sf';
-- $960,210 class IUU-7 to 'CCsf' from 'B+sf';
-- $1 million class IUU-8 to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf';
-- $1.1 million class IUU-9 to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'.

Fitch does not rate the $6.9 million class IUU10.


LB-UBS 2006-C7: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 2 Certificate Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed 20 classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust (LBUBS 2006-C7) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-C7.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects expected losses from loans in special
servicing including loans in the top 15 with continued
underperformance. The affirmations reflect sufficient credit
enhancement to the remaining Fitch classes after consideration for
expected losses. In addition, Fitch has resolved the Rating Watch
Negative on class A-M.

Fitch modeled losses of 14.7% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 13.6%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $35 million (1.2% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 54 loans (30.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 20 specially serviced assets (17.1%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-2 through A-1A remain, and no
rating actions are anticipated. Fitch resolves the Rating Watch
Negative on class A-M and assigns a Stable Outlook as the class is
expected to remain stable. The 'A' rated class, while expected to
remain stable may be subject to further downgrade based on
recovery prospects of specially serviced assets and further cash
flow declines of performing loans with high loan-to-values.

In addition, the distressed classes (those rated below 'B') may be
subject to downgrades based on the timing and resolution of
multiple REO assets that may incur additional fees and expenses.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 15% to $2.57 billion from
$3.02 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, one loan
(0.1% of the pool) has defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes D through T.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Arizona Retail
Portfolio (3.4% of the pool), which consists of multiple retail
shopping centers in the Phoenix MSA. The properties were
foreclosed upon in April 2010 and are currently real estate owned
(REO). Nine of the original 14 assets have been disposed and five
assets remain in the portfolio. The receiver is working to
increase occupancy while simultaneously positioning the assets for
sale. Fitch expects significant losses upon disposition of the
assets.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is an office
property in Atlanta, GA (1.3%), secured by two office buildings, a
retail mall building and a three-level underground parking lot
totaling 827,252 sf. The loan was modified in December 2012 into
an A/B note structure with a maturity extension to October 2016.
The borrower infused additional equity to fund reserves and bring
the loan current. The loan is in process of being returned to the
master servicer.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a four-story
258,657 sf office property (1.4%) located in Fairfield, NJ. The
asset transferred to special servicing in 2010 and became REO in
September 2012. The asset is being marketed for sale.

Fitch downgrades the following class and assigns the Rating
Outlook as indicated:

-- $302 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'AAsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $327 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $41.1 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $968.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $359.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $294.4 million class A-J at 'CCCsf', RE 30%;
-- $22.6 million class B at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $30.2 million class C at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $30.2 million class D at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $26.4 million class E at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $26.4 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $26.4 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $30.2 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $26.4 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $26.4 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $7.5 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $3.8 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $11.3 million class N at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $3.8 million class P at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $2.8 million class Q at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class S at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class T certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP, X-CL and X-W
certificates.


LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-1: Moody's Review 7 Tranches for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible downgrade
seven tranches issued in the Lehman Brothers 2007-1 and 2007-2
securitizations of small balance commercial real estate loans. The
deals are serviced by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.

Ratings Rationale:

The review actions are due to sustained high levels of
delinquencies combined with consistent net charge-offs, which,
based on preliminary results, will increase Moody's expected
lifetime net losses.

As of the January 2013 distribution date, for the 2007-1
securitization, cumulative net loss increased to 13.5% from 8.2%
of the original pool balance since the last rating actions in
September 2011. Additionally, loans 60 days or more past due,
including foreclosure and REO, increased to 27.8% from 24.1% of
the current pool balance. For the 2007-2 deal, cumulative net
losses increased to 11.5% from 10.3% of the original pool balance
since the last rating actions in September 2012. Loans 60 days or
more past due, including foreclosure and REO, have remained
relatively constant at 20% to 23% of the outstanding pool balance.

For the 2007-1 securitization, available hard credit enhancement
is 22.2%, 22.2%, 5.8%, 2.0%, and 0.2% of the outstanding pool
balance for Classes 1A, 2A3, M3, M4, and B, respectively.

For the 2007-2 securitization, the total amount of notes
outstanding exceeds the total collateral value by an amount that
is greater than the Class B note balance. As a result, there is no
hard credit enhancement available to the Class M5.

The methodology is described as follows:

The methodology used in this review action included an analysis of
the collateral to arrive at preliminary lifetime expected net
losses. Moody's evaluated these preliminary lifetime expected net
losses against available credit enhancement for the bonds,
provided by subordination, a reserve account,
overcollateralization, and excess spread. In these review actions,
Moody's considered the sufficiency of coverage in light of the
credit quality of the collateral pool, industry, geographical and
loan concentrations, historical variability of losses experienced
by the issuer, and servicer quality.

During the review period, Moody's will determine its revised
lifetime expected net losses and will evaluate whether or not the
available credit enhancement for each tranche adequately protects
investors against future collateral losses for a given rating.
Moody's will project lifetime expected net losses on the
underlying pools of loans using delinquency roll rates and an
estimate of recoveries.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating these transactions can also be found on
Moody's website.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-1

Cl. 1A, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 13, 2011 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 2A3, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 13, 2011 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M3, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 13, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M4, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 13, 2011 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 13, 2011 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-2

Cl. M5, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Sep 13, 2012 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)


MARATHON CLO V: S&P Corrects Feb. 21 Ratings Release
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Marathon CLO V Ltd./Marathon CLO V LLC's $550.95 million fixed-
and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's cash flow structure, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined
      in the corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
      criteria, which can withstand the default rate projected by
      Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's expectation of the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, assessed using its
      cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
      assigned ratings under various interest rate scenarios,
      including LIBORs ranging from 0.31%-12.81%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds that are
      available prior to paying uncapped administrative expenses
      and fees, subordinated hedge termination payments,
      collateral manager incentive fees, and subordinated note
      payments to principal proceeds for the purchase of
      additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1309.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Marathon CLO V Ltd./Marathon CLO V LLC

Class                  Rating              Amount (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                     371.10
A-2a                   AA (sf)                       50.25
A-2b                   AA (sf)                        9.00
B-1 (deferrable)       A (sf)                        51.00
B-2 (deferrable)       A (sf)                         7.50
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                      31.20
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                       30.90
Subordinated notes     NR                            63.30

NR-Not rated.



MARLBOROUGH STREET: Moody's Upgrades Class E Notes' Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Marlborough Street CLO, Ltd.:

US$14,000,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2019, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 (sf)
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

US$13,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2019,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 (sf) Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf);

US$15,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2019, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 (sf)
Upgraded to A3 (sf);

US$15,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2019, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

US$9,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2019, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded
to B1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$93,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2019 (current outstanding balance of $90,460,123), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 31, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$126,000,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2019 (current outstanding balance of $122,176,530), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on April 26, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, higher spread and diversity
levels compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
August 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF, WAS and Diversity of 2638,
3.46% and 71, respectively, compared to 2802, 2.85% and 65,
respectively, at the time of the last rating action. Moody's also
notes that the transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios
are stable since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $291 million, no
defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of 18.28%
(implying a WARF of 2638), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 52.77%, and a diversity score of 71. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Marlborough Street CLO, Ltd, issued in April 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2110)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3166)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds will
commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.


MASTR 2005-OPT1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class M-3 RMBS to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on four tranches,
affirmed the ratings on three tranches, and downgraded the rating
on two tranches from two transactions issued by MASTR. The
collateral backing the transaction are subprime residential
mortgage loans.

Complete Rating Actions:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-OPT1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The rating actions constitute a number of downgrades, affirmations
and upgrades. The downgrades are primarily due to the weak
interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism on the bonds.

The Class M-1 issued by MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-
OPT1 and the Class M-2 issued by MASTR Asset Backed Securities
Trust 2005-WMC1 do not have current interest shortfalls but in the
event of a future interest shortfall, structural limitations in
the transactions will likely prevent recoupment of interest
shortfalls even if funds are available in subsequent periods.
Missed interest payments on these tranches can typically only be
made up from excess interest after the overcollateralization is
built to a target amount. In this transaction since
overcollateralization is already below target due to poor
performance, any future missed interest payments to this mezzanine
tranche are unlikely to be paid. Moody's generally caps the
ratings of such tranches with weak interest shortfall
reimbursement at A3 as long as they have not experienced any
shortfall.

Generally, ratings on tranches that currently have very small
unrecoverable interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3. For tranches
with larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default" published in November 2009. These approaches take into
account only credit-related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for its current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace. The methodology only
applies to pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of
greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool
factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines
to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural features allow for
a monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


MBIA INSURANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on 11 Note Classes to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of notes from six U.S. cash flow collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions.  The rating actions follow the
lowering of S&P's long-term rating on MBIA Insurance Corp. on
Feb. 28, 2013.

S&P bases its ratings on these notes on the financial
insurance/guarantee that MBIA Insurance Corp. provides.

For insured classes of notes, S&P's rating is generally the higher
of the rating on the insurer or the Standard & Poor's underlying
rating (SPUR) for the tranche.  A SPUR is S&P's opinion of the
stand-alone creditworthiness of an obligation--that is, the
capacity to pay debt service on a debt issue in accordance with
its terms--without considering an otherwise applicable bond
insurance policy.

Since the SPURs of these notes are lower than or equal to the
current 'CCC' rating on MBIA Insurance Corp., the notes' ratings
are dependent on their insurer and hence lowered.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Coronado CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC (sf)            B (sf)
A-2                 CCC (sf)            B (sf)

Fulton Street CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                CCC (sf)            B (sf)

Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                CCC (sf)            B (sf)
A-1B                CCC (sf)            B (sf)
A-1W                CCC (sf)            B (sf)

Mulberry Street CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                CCC (sf)            B (sf)

Oceanview CBO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                CCC (sf)            B (sf)

Zohar II 2005-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC (sf)            B (sf)
A-2                 CCC (sf)            B (sf)
A-3                 CCC (sf)            B (sf)


MERRILL LYNCH 2001-CA: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the following classes of Merrill Lynch
Financial Assets Inc., Series 2001-Canada 5:

-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at B (sf)

The trend on all classes is Stable.  In addition, DBRS has
discontinued its rating of Class C, as this class has been repaid
in full with the February 2013 remittance.

There are four loans remaining in the pool, and all are scheduled
to mature on or before May 1, 2013.

The pool is concentrated in three loans, which together make up
the Plaza Group Rollup (Prospectus ID#7, 33, 53, 74.9% of the
current pool balance).  The largest of these crossed loans,
Lansdowne Place, is secured by an anchored retail property in
Saint John, New Brunswick.  This property lost its two largest
tenants, Zellers and Eddie Bauer, in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
These tenants accounted for almost half of the property's base
rental income, and as of the March 2012 rent roll, the borrower
has not been able to back fill these spaces, leaving the property
almost 50% vacant.  The loan benefits from cross-collateralization
with two other assets in the pool, which have continued to exhibit
stable performance.  These three loans have a full recourse
guarantee to the original sponsor, Plazacorp Retail Properties
Limited, and have no history of delinquency.  The combined debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) for all three properties was 1.48
times (x) for YE2011.

The pool also contains an outstanding loan secured by a 143,117
square foot (sf) industrial building in Scarborough, Ontario.
This property was 93.3% occupied as of the May 2012 rent roll and
the loan is scheduled to mature on April 1, 2013.  The YE2011 DSCR
was reported to be 3.5x and the corresponding debt yield was
41.5%.  DBRS views loans with an exit debt yield in excess of 11%
to have a healthy refinance profile.

DBRS used conservative metrics in sizing this pool as a result of
the concentration of the four loans remaining, the status of the
Lansdowne Place loan and lack of updated 2012 financials.
Although the dark anchor space at Lansdowne Place could
potentially affect a timely refinance, DBRS views the cross-
collateralization and sponsor guarantee of the three Plaza Group
properties favourably and does not foresee an immediate risk of
monetary default.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-BPC1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on Cl. N Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes and affirmed nine
classes Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2004-BPC1 due to an increase in
Fitch's expected losses.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 11.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 8.3%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $21.4 million (1.7% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 19 loans (32.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes six specially serviced assets (10.1%).

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings to the super senior classes are expected to remain
stable. The A-J, B, and C classes may be subject to a downgrade if
there is further deterioration to the pool's cash flow performance
and/or decrease in value of the specially serviced loans.
Additional downgrades to the distressed classes (those rated below
B) are expected as losses are realized.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 42.8% to $710.6 million from
$1.24 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, five loans
(5.3% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes G through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced REO Prium Office Portfolio (3.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a portfolio of 10 office buildings totaling 287,921
square feet (sf) located in Washington state, mainly around the
state capital. The tenants are primarily state agencies and other
official state tenants. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in July 2010 after the borrower placed junior financing
on the properties without lender consent. Performance has
deteriorated; the combined occupancy of the all the buildings is
10.6%. The special servicer has sold three of the properties and
the remaining seven are REO.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Simon -
Washington Square Mall (3.8%), which is secured by by a 448,762 sf
portion of a regional mall totaling 922,614 sf located in
Indianapolis, IN. The loan transferred to special servicing in
June 2010 and was modified. The modification closed in December
2010, and the loan was transferred back to the master servicer in
March 2011. The loan was split into a $15 million A-Note and $12.5
million B-Note. The borrower made an equity contribution to fund
additional reserves and paydown a portion of the outstanding
balance. The maturity of the loan has been extended to July 1,
2016 and the IO period was extended to December 2011. As of
December 2011 the NCF DSCR was 1.39x but would be 1.19x assuming
the loan was amortizing during that period. Fitch expects losses
at maturity of the loan as current performance of the property
does not support the refinance of both the A and B notes.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a 92,522 sf
(1.3%) office property located in independence, MO. The property
became REO in May 2012 and is currently 11% occupied. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in February 2011 due to
monetary default when the largest tenant, State Farm, vacated 74%
of the net rentable area. The property is expected to be marketed
for sale in the near term.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $94.8 million class AJ to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $26.4 million class B to 'BBB-sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $12.4 million class C to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
    Negative;
-- $18.6 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 100%;
-- $9.3 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $15.5 million class F to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $10.9 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $15.5 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $77.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $397.2 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.2 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4.7 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.2 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4.7 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $1.9 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class Q certificates. Fitch previously withdrew
the ratings on the interest-only class XC and XP certificates.
(For additional information on the withdrawal of the rating on
class X, see 'Fitch Revises Practice for Rating IO & Pre-Payment
Related Structured Finance Securities', dated June 23, 2010.)

Additional information on Fitch's criteria for analyzing U.S. CMBS
transactions is available in the Dec. 18, 2012 report, 'U.S.
Fixed-Rate Multiborrower CMBS Surveillance and Re-REMIC Criteria'.



MMCAPS FUNDING I: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on US$77MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by MMCaps Funding I, Ltd.:

US$191,500,000 of Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due June 30, 2031
(current balance of $23,355,633.80 ), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued by
MMCaps Funding I, Ltd.:

US$77,000,000 Fixed Rate Mezzanine Notes Due June 15, 2031
(current balance of $ 94,151,983.62, including deferred interest),
Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of the deleveraging of the Senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the last rating action in March 2009.

Moody's noticed that the senior notes have been paid down by
approximately 86% or $145 million since the last rating action,
due to diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions and sales of underlying
assets. As a result of this deleveraging, the senior notes' par
coverage improved to 311.5% from 138.4% since the last rating
action, as calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest trustee note
valuation report dated December 17, 2012, the Senior Coverage
Ratio and Mezzanine Coverage Ratio are reported at 239.91% (limit
142.00%) and 66.83% (limit 103.00%), respectively, versus January
29, 2009 levels of 146.95% and 101.00%, respectively. Going
forward, the senior notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the proceeds from future
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

However, Moody's also notes that the credit quality of the
portfolio has slightly deteriorated and the cumulative assumed
defaulted amount has increased significantly by 88.5% from $39
million to $73.5 million.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $72.7 million, defaulted/deferring par of
$73.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 16.25%
(implying a WARF of 811), Moody's Asset Correlation of 35%, and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment, and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

MMCaps Funding I, Ltd., issued on March 2001, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q3-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 389 points from the
base case of 811, the model-implied rating of the senior notes is
one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the WARF
is decreased by 361 points, the model-implied rating of the senior
notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed one additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. Moody's ran alternative default-timing
profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a large spike
in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis:

Senior Notes: 0

Mezzanine Notes: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities. Moody's continues to have a stable outlook
in the insurance sector, other than the negative outlook on the
U.S. life insurance industry.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-12: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 26 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-
12.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement to offset
Fitch modeled losses across the pool. Fitch modeled losses of
20.1% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 17.2%, including losses already incurred. The pool
has experienced $41.5 million (2.1% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date. Interest shortfalls totaling $20.4
million are currently affecting classes C through S. Fitch has
designated 32 loans (65.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes four specially serviced assets (3.1%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings to the super senior classes are expected to remain
stable. The two A-M classes may be subject to a downgrade if there
is further deterioration to the pool's cash flow performance, or
recoveries on large modified or non-stabilized assets are lower
than anticipated. The distressed classes may also be subject to
further downgrades if losses to defaulted loans are higher than
expected.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 24.7% to $1.47 billion from
$1.96 billion at issuance. No loans have defeased since issuance

The largest contributors to modeled losses are the four largest
loans remaining in the pool: Columbia Center loan (25.8% of the
pool); Parkoff Portfolio (11.5%); Douglas Entrance (6.9%) and
Beacon Seattle & DC Portfolio (6.4%).

The Columbia Center loan is secured by a 1.5 million square foot
(sf), 76-story office building located in the Seattle downtown
CBD. The property has experienced significant declines in
occupancy since issuance most recently associated with the vacancy
of Amazon, which vacated at lease expiration in February 2011. The
loan has been split into a $300 million A-note and $80 million B-
note as part of the modification, with a scheduled maturity
extended to 2015. The reported occupancy as of Sept. 2012 was
62.2%. According to the REIS Seattle office report as of fourth-
quarter 2012, the subject property has below market occupancy with
above market rents.

The Parkoff Portfolio loan is secured by is secured by a 312 unit,
six-property portfolio of multifamily buildings located on the
upper east side of Manhattan. Property stabilization remains
behind schedule. The reported occupancy was 96.8% as of Sept. 2012
with a reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.63 times
(x) though the loan remains current. While Fitch modeled losses on
the loan based on the current cash flow, there is high likelihood
of ultimate recovery of the loan given the assets' strong location
and market. The loan is scheduled to mature in 2017.

Douglas Entrance is secured by five suburban office buildings
totaling approximately 465,500 sf located in Coral Gables, FL. The
loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to
imminent default. The loan was modified in June 2011 and is
performing per the terms of the modification agreement which
included an extension of the loan to April 2014. The loan was
split into an $85 million A-note and $16.5 million B-note. As of
the August 2012 rent roll, the consolidated occupancy for the
properties was 74.2%.

The Beacon Seattle & DC Portfolio was initially secured by 16
properties, the pledge of the mortgage and the borrower's
ownership interest in one property, as well as the pledge of cash
flows from three properties. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2010 and remained current as the borrower was
negotiating a modification, which closed in December 2010. Key
modification terms included a five-year extension of the loan to
May 2017, a deleveraging structure that provided for the release
of properties over time, and an interest rate reduction. As of the
February 2013 remittance, the total loan has been paid down by
$1.1 billion. Combined occupancy for the 11 remaining properties
is 78.4%, down considerably from 96.4% at issuance for the same
properties.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $172.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $201.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40.7 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $234 million class A-2FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $131.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $170.9 million class A-M at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $25 million class A-MFL at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $53 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;
-- $91.4 million class A-JFL at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;
-- $41.6 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $22 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.5 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $14.7 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.5 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $22 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $22 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $14.7 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4.9 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.3 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4.9 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

The $2.6 million class N and classes O, P and Q remain at 'Dsf'/
RE 0% due to realized losses.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class S certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class X certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-ALTM: S&P Gives Prelim BB+ Rating to E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2013-ALTM's
$160.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-ALTM.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one 12-year, $160 million commercial
mortgage loan secured by the fee interest in Altamonte Mall and
the accompanying leases, rent, and other income.  Altamonte Mall
is a 1.16 million-sq.-ft regional mall located in Altamonte
Springs, Fla.  Of the total mall square footage, 636,566 sq. ft.
will serve as the loan's collateral.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 5,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.  Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
has determined that the loan has a beginning and ending loan-to-
value ratio of 76.3% and 65.7%, respectively, based on Standard &
Poor's value.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1355.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2013-ALTM

Class         Rating(i)            Amount ($)
A-1           AAA (sf)             22,500,000
A-2           AAA (sf)             74,400,000
X-A           AAA (sf)         96,900,000(ii)
X-B           AA- (sf)         21,000,000(ii)
B             AA- (sf)             21,000,000
C             A- (sf)              15,700,000
D             BBB- (sf)            19,300,000
E             BB+ (sf)              7,100,000
R             NR                          N/A

  (i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
      institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the
      Securities Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.
  NR - Not rated.
  N/A - Not applicable.


MSC 2007-SRR4: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Cl. B and C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of two classes of notes issued by
MSC 2007-SRR4. The affirmations are due to the key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation and collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Class B Variable Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, Affirmed C (sf);
previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Class C Variable Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, Affirmed C (sf);
previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

MSC 2007-SRR4 is a static synthetic transaction backed by a
portfolio of credit default swaps referencing $776.7 million
notional balance of commercial mortgage backed securities; 100% of
the reference obligation balance. As of the February 20, 2013
Trustee report, the aggregate issued notional balance of the
transaction has decreased to $15.4 million from $158.7 million at
issuance, due to writedowns to the underlying reference obligation
pool.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 9,006 compared to 8,674 at last review. The current
distribution of Moody's rated referenced collateral and
assessments for non-Moody's rated referenced collateral is as
follows: Ba1-Ba3 (0.0% compared to 8.3% at last review), B1-B3
(9.7% compared to 1.1% at last review) and Caa1-C (90.3% compared
to 90.6% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.8 years, compared to 3.8 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 1.2%, compared to
1.9% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to credit changes within the reference obligations.
Holding all other key parameters static, changing the current
ratings and credit assessments of the reference obligations by one
notch downward or by one notch upward does not result in any
rating changes to the current ratings on the notes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


NEW YORK LIBERTY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class B Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of New York Liberty
Development Corporation Liberty Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series
2012 (7 World Trade Center Project) And 7 WTC Depositor, LLC Trust
2012-WTC as follows:

-- $18,475,000 class 1 maturing on Sept. 15, 2028 at 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $19,410,000 class 1 maturing on Sept. 15, 2029 at 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $20,390,000 class 1 maturing on Sept. 15, 2030 at 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $21,425,000 class 1 maturing on Sept. 15, 2031 at 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $22,510,000 class 1 maturing on Sept. 15, 2032 at 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $73,670,000 class 1 maturing on Sept. 15, 2035 at 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $137,220,000 class 1 maturing on Sept. 15, 2040 at 'AAAsf' ;
    Outlook Stable;

-- $108,000,000 class 2 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $29,190,000 class 3 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $114,485,000 class A* at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $10,515,000 class B* at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations and Stable Outlooks are the result of stable
performance and limited 2012 reporting. As of the six months
ending Sept. 30, 2012 the servicer-reported net cash flow DSCR was
1.25x compared to a 1.23x underwritten at issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

All classes maintain stable outlooks. No rating actions are
expected unless there are material changes in property occupancy
or cash flow. The property performance is consistent with
issuance.

The transaction represents a securitization of the beneficial
leasehold mortgage interest in 7 World Trade Center, a 52-story,
class A office building, totaling approximately 1.7 million sf and
located on the north end of the World Trade Center site in the
Downtown submarket of New York City. Proceeds of the loans were
used to refinance the prior liberty bonds, pay closing costs, and
return preferred equity investment to the sponsor.

The bonds and the CMBS certificates follow a sequential pay
structure. The total loan includes $575.3 million of liberty bonds
and a CMBS loan secured by a mortgage backed by two cross-
defaulted loans on 7 WTC. The senior loan is a $450.3 million tax-
exempt liberty bond financing designated loan and the junior loan
is a $125 million CMBS loan. The liberty bonds loan and the CMBS
loan are administered pursuant to a traditional CMBS servicing
agreement. The liberty bonds loan has a priority in payment over
the CMBS certificates. Both loans are to be cross-defaulted.

The liberty bonds and CMBS certificates are scheduled to amortize
fully by their respective maturity dates following an initial
interest-only periods. The CMBS bonds are interest-only for the
first year followed by a six year full amortization. The Liberty
Bonds are interest-only for 16 years followed full amortization by
2044.


NOMAD CLO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Nomad CLO Ltd./Nomad CLO LLC's $368.0 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 6,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (not counting excess spread), and cash flow
      structure, which can withstand the default rate projected
      by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods
      outlined in its corporate collateralized debt obligation
      criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.29%-13.84%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1361.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Nomad CLO Ltd./Nomad CLO LLC

Class           Rating           Amount
                               (mil. $)
A-1             AAA (sf)         250.00
A-2             AA (sf)           40.50
B (deferrable)  A (sf)            35.00
C (deferrable)  BBB (sf)          19.00
D (deferrable)  BB (sf)           23.50
Income notes    NR                43.90

NR-Not rated.


NXT CAPITAL 2013-1: Moody's Rates $31MM Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following provisional
ratings to notes to be issued by NXT Capital CLO 2013-1, LLC:

US$200,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf).

US$29,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf).

US$30,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2024 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf).

US$16,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2024 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf).

US$31,250,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2024 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf).

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's provisional ratings of the Class A Notes, the Class B
Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes
address the expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional
ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying
portfolio of loans, the transaction's legal structure, and the
characteristics of the underlying assets.

NXT 2013-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized substantially by small to medium enterprise first-
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 95% of the portfolio
must be invested in senior secured loans, cash and eligible
investments and up to 5% of the portfolio may consist of second-
lien loans. The underlying portfolio will be approximately 75%
ramped up as of the closing date.

NXT Capital Investment Advisers, LLC (the "Manager"), an affiliate
of NXT Capital, LLC, will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage
in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's three-year reinvestment period.

In addition to the Notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
membership interests in the Issuer.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par of $350,000,000

Diversity of 31

WARF of 3350

Weighted Average Spread of 4.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 45.0%

Weighted Average Life of 7.5 years.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
additional sensitivity analyses which were an important component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Notes. These
sensitivity analyses include increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3350 to 3853):

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3350 to 4355):

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C Notes: -3

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: -1.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," (the "CLO V Score Report") dated
July 6, 2009. A significant portion of the underlying assets for
this transaction are SME corporate loans, which receive Moody's
credit estimates, rather than publicly rated corporate loans. This
distinction is an important factor in the determination of this
transaction's V Score, since loans publicly rated by Moody's are
the basis for the CLO V Score Report.

Several scores for sub-categories of the V Score differ from the
CLO sector benchmark scores. The scores for the quality of
historical data for U.S. SME loans and for disclosure of
collateral pool characteristics and securitization performance
reflect higher volatility. This results from lack of a centralized
default database for SME loans, as well as obligor-level
information for SME loans being more limited and less frequently
provided to Moody's than that for publicly rated companies. In
addition, the score for alignment of interests reflects lower
volatility since the transaction is a financing vehicle.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the rating. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in
June 2011.


PACIFICA CDO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Two Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Pacifica CDO II, Ltd.:

US$21,563,000 Class B--1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$937,000 Class B--2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Aa3
(sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$25,000,000 Class A--2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 (current
outstanding balance of $14,071,524.07), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$9,000,000 Class C--1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Affirmed Ba3
(sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

US$3,000,000 Class C--2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Affirmed Ba3
(sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

US$8,000,000 Class D Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015 (current
outstanding balance of $11,148,011.04), Affirmed C (sf);
previously on June 17, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 43.7% or $10.9 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated February 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 397.66%, 153.00%,
115.20% and 93.70%, respectively, versus July 2011 levels of
136.6%, 110.1%, 99.4% and 92.1% respectively.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes. Based on Moody's calculation,
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes
currently make up approximately 46.5% of the underlying portfolio.
These investments potentially expose the notes to market risk in
the event of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $54.7 million,
defaulted par of $4.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 12.15% (implying a WARF of 2842), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 46.81%, and a diversity
score of 16. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Pacifica CDO II, Ltd., issued in July 2003, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability adjustments. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) as
described in Moody's Ratings Implementation Guidance "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions",
October 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2274)

Class A-2: 0
Class B-1: +1
Class B-2: +1
Class C-1: +1
Class C-2: +1
Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3410)

Class A-2: 0
Class B-1: -2
Class B-2: -2
Class C-1: 0
Class C-2: 0
Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value. In consideration of the large size of the deal's
exposure to long-dated assets, which increase its sensitivity to
the liquidation assumptions used in the rating analysis, Moody's
ran different scenarios considering a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposure and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the extent of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long-
dated assets.


PPLUS TRUST LMG-3: Moody's Raises Rating on A Certs. to 'B2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
certificates issued by PPLUS Trust Series LMG-3:

US$30,550,000 PPLUS 7.00% Class A Trust Certificates, Upgraded to
B2; previously on September 27, 2011 Downgraded to B3;

PPLUS 1.25% Class B Trust Certificates, Upgraded to B2; previously
on September 27, 2011 Downgraded to B3.

Ratings Rationale:

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on
the ratings of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure
of the transaction. The rating actions are a result of the change
of the rating of 8.25% Senior Debentures due 2030 issued by
Liberty Media Corporation which were upgraded to B2 by Moody's on
March 4, 2013.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities " published in April
2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security and the legal structure of the
transaction.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


PPLUS TRUST LMG-4: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Cert Classes to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
certificates issued by PPLUS Trust Series LMG-4:

$35,000,000 PPLUS 6.70% Class A Trust Certificates, Upgraded to
B2; previously on September 27, 2011 Downgraded to B3;

$35,000,000 Notional Principal PPLUS 1.55% Class B Trust
Certificates, Upgraded to B2; previously on September 27, 2011
Downgraded to B3.

Ratings Rationale:

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on
the ratings of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure
of the transaction. The rating actions are a result of the change
of the rating of 8.25% Senior Debentures due 2030 issued by
Liberty Media Corporation which were upgraded to B2 by Moody's on
March 4, 2013.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security and the legal structure of the
transaction.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST LMG-1: Moody's Ups 8.75% Certs.' Rating to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust Series LMG-1:

$125,875,000 PREFERREDPLUS 8.75% Trust Certificates, Upgraded to
B2; previously on September 27, 2011 Downgraded to B3

Ratings Rationale:

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of 8.25% Senior Debentures due 2030 issued by Liberty Media
Corporation which were upgraded to B2 by Moody's on March 4, 2013.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security and the legal structure of the
transaction.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST LMG-2: Moody's Ups 8.50% Certs.' Rating to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust Series LMG-2:

$31,000,000 PREFERREDPLUS 8.50% Trust Certificates, Upgraded to
B2; previously on September 27, 2011 Downgraded to B3

Ratings Rationale:

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of 8.50% Debentures due 2029 issued by Liberty Media
Corporation which were upgraded to B2 by Moody's on March 4, 2013.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security and the legal structure of the
transaction.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


PRIMA CAPITAL 2005-1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class H Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's upgraded three and affirmed two classes of Prima Capital
CDO 2005-1, Ltd. Collateralized Debt Obligations ("Prima 2005-1").
The upgrades are due to greater than expected amortization of the
underlying collateral as evidenced by the improvement in certain
par value and interest coverage ratios, more than offsetting the
negative migration in rating distribution and related recovery
rate. The affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO Re-REMIC) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Confirmed at
B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Prima 2005-1 is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio, commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (54.7% of
the pool balance), whole loans (31.6%), and a B-Note (13.7%). As
of the January 18, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance
of the transaction has decreased to $72.6 million from $406.6
million at issuance, with the paydown now directed to the Class D
Notes (the Class A, Class B and Class C Notes having fully
amortized prior to the current review).

As of the January 18, 2013 Trustee report, there are no defaulted
or impaired assets in the underlying collateral pool.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
We have completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's rated
collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2,171 compared
to 1,285 at last review. The current distribution of Moody's rated
collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated collateral is as
follows: Aaa-Aa3 (20.4% compared to 46.1% at last review), A1-A3
(20.0% compared to 16.4% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (16.9%
compared to 13.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (15.9% compared to 6.5%
at last review), B1-B3 (4.9% compared to 2.5%), and Caa1-C (21.9%
compared to 15.5%).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.5 years compared to 4.0 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 31.3% compared to 39.4% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 9.4% compared to 8.0% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
31.3% to 21.3% or up to 41.3% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notches downward and 0 to
2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


PRUDENTIAL 2000-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X Secs to Caa3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) downgraded the rating of one
class and affirmed one class of Prudential Securities Secured
Financing Corporation, Series Key 2000-C1 as follows:

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Class M is affirmed as its rating is consistent with realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans. As of
the most recent remittance report Class M has already realized a
93% loss from its balance at securitization.

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class X, is a result of paydowns of
its highly rated referenced classes due to the certificate balance
decreasing 72% from Moody's prior review.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.2% of
the current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 18.2%. Realized losses have increased from 2.9% of the
original balance to 3.4% since the prior review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.6% of the original
pooled balance compared to 3.9% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in the rating of the Interest-Only Security was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used
for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7 compared to 12 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 8, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $11.9
million from $816.3 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from 2%
to 27% of the pool.

One loan, representing 16% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $27.9 million (27% loss severity
on average). One loan is currently in special servicing. The
specially serviced loan is the Colonial Corners Shopping Center
Loan ($2.7 million -- 22.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
50,000 square foot (SF) retail property in Orlando, Florida. The
loan transferred to special servicing in February 2010 due to
maturity default and a receiver was appointed in March 2011. As of
December 2012, the property was 84% leased. The special servicer
indicated the receiver is currently marketing the property for
sale.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, the Eagles Run Apartments, Phase II Loan,
representing 16.0% of the pool. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$1.4 million loss (31% expected loss on average) from the
specially serviced and troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for
100% of the pool's non-specially serviced loans. Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 58% compared to 77% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 23% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.21X and 2.36X, respectively, compared to
1.13X and 1.69X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 58% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the Random House Distribution Warehouse
Loan ($3.2 million -- 26.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
300,000 SF distribution center located in Jackson, Tennessee. The
property is fully leased to Perseus Distribution through October
2014 and the loan has passed its anticipated repayment date (ARD)
of December 2009. Due to the single tenant nature of the property,
Moody's value for this loan reflects a lit/dark analysis. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.51X, respectively, compared to
59% and 1.74X at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Eagles Run Apartments,
Phase II Loan ($1.9 million -- 16.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a garden style multifamily property located in Atlanta,
Georgia. The property was built in 1972 and was 53% leased as of
December 2012. Property performance has declined due to an
increase in vacancy and poor market conditions. This loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR, which was below
0.30X as of year-end 2012. Due to the poor property performance,
Moody's views this as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 174% and 0.59X, respectively, essentially the same as at
last review.

The third largest performing loan is the K-Mart Store Loan ($1.8
million - 15.4% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
property located in Menomonie, Wisconsin. The property is fully
leased to Kmart through December 2014 which is one month prior to
the loan maturity date of January 2015. The loan has amortized
approximately 33% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 74% and 1.43X, respectively, compared to 64% and 1.61X at
last review.



REALT 2006-2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 18 CMBS Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 18 classes of
Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-2 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. XP-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XP-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The ratings of the IO Classes XP-1, XP-2, XC-1 and XC-2 are
affirmed based on the credit quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.3% of the
current balance compared to 1.2% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 1.1% of the securitized
balance, up from 0.9% at last review. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
classes XP-1, XP-2, XC-1 and XC-2.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, compared to 21 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 29, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to $303.8
million from $412.2 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 50 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 67% of the pool. The pool includes five
loans with investment-grade credit assessments, representing 33%
of the pool. Three loans, representing approximately 3% of the
pool, are defeased and are collateralized by Canadian Government
securities.

Nine loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $666,000. There are no loans in special
servicing. Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one
poorly performing loan which represents 2% of the pool. Moody's
has estimated a $900,200 loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) for the troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and 2011 operating
results for 90% and 93% of the performing pool respectively.
Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's weighted average LTV is 71%
compared to 73% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12.5% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.55X and 1.59X, respectively, compared to 1.56X and 1.48X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Crombie Pool A
Loan ($29.7 million -- 9.8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted portfolio of four
anchored and unanchored retail centers located in Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, and Newfoundland. The sponsor is the Crombie REIT, a
Canadian Real Estate Investment Trust based in Stellarton, Nova
Scotia. As of December 2011, the portfolio's weighted average
occupancy was 85%. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
Baa3 and 1.42X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.36X at last
review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Trinity
Crossing Orleans Loan ($28.6 million -- 9.4% of the pool), which
is secured by a 200,000 square foot (SF) retail center located in
Orleans, Ontario. The property anchor is the Real Canadian
Superstore, which occupies space not included in the loan
collateral. As of January 2012, the property was 100% leased, the
same as at last review. Performance remains stable. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.11X at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the Sandman Vancouver
Loan ($20.6 million -- 6.8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
302-room, full-service hotel located in downtown Vancouver,
British Columbia. RevPar and occupancy in 2011 were $95.55 and
65%, respectively, compared to $73.12 and 68% in 2010. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.79X
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.91X at last review.

The fourth loan with a credit assessment is the Merivale Market
Shopping Centre Loan ($13.4 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is
secured by an 80,000 SF neighborhood retail center located in
Ottawa, Ontario. The anchor tenant is the Food Basics supermarket
chain. The loan sponsor is RioCan Real Estate Investment Trust,
Canada's largest REIT. As of December 2011, the property was 100%
leased, the same as at last review. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.05X respectively,
compared to Baa3 and 0.96X at last review.

The fifth loan with a credit assessment is the Abbey Plaza Loan
($7.6 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 95,000
SF grocery-anchored neighborhood retail center in Oakville,
Ontario. As of August 2012, the property was 100% leased, the same
as at last review. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Aa1 and 2.11X respectively, compared to Aa1 and 1.92X at
last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Distillery District Loan ($28.9 million -- 9.5% of the
pool), which is secured by a 330,000 SF mixed-use redevelopment of
the historic Gooderham & Worts distillery site located in the east
end of downtown Toronto, Ontario. As of March 2012, the property
was 96% leased compared to 97% at last review. Moody's current LTV
and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.73X, respectively, compared to 65%
and 1.49X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Dominion Square Loan ($26.3 million
-- 8.7% of the pool), which represents a 50% pari passu interest
in a first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 12-story
373,000 SF, mixed-use building located in downtown Montreal,
Quebec. Local and state government agencies represent 26% of the
tenancy in the building. As of December 2012, the property was 87%
leased, down from 98% at last review. Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 99% and 0.98X, respectively, compared to 82% and
1.19X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Crombie Pool B Loan ($23.6 million -
- 7.8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted portfolio of three anchored retail centers and
one mixed-use property located in British Columbia, Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick. The largest property is the 386,000 SF Aberdeen
Shopping Centre located in Richmond, British Columbia,
representing nearly 50% of the portfolio NRA. As of December 2011,
weighted average occupancy was 78%. Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.54X respectively, compared to 77% and
1.33X at last review.


SARGAS CLO II: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+ (sf)' rating
on the class E notes from Sargas CLO II Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Pangaea
Asset Management LLC.

The affirmed 'B+ (sf)' rating on the class E notes reflects S&P's
belief that the credit support available to this tranche is
commensurate with their current rating levels.

The amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's
asset portfolio declined since the time of S&P's last rating
action on March 28, 2011.  According to the Jan. 31 2013, trustee
report, the transaction held $14.45 million in 'CCC' rated
collateral, down from $33.65 million noted in the Feb. 28, 2011,
trustee report, which S&P used for its March 2011 rating actions.
The defaulted securities also decreased to $3.88 million from
16.40 million within the same period.

The class E notes have been paid down by $12.93 million over the
same time period, primarily due to post reinvestment period
amortization of the underlying collateral.  The pay downs have
resulted in an increase in the transaction's general
overcollateralization ratio tests by 343.33%.

S&P notes that the transaction has concentration risk since only
seven obligors remaining from the underlying portfolio.  In
addition, the defaulted securities represent over 10% of the
aggregate outstanding loan balance as of Jan. 31, 2013.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the rating assigned to the notes remains consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


SDART 2013-2: Moody's Rates New Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-
2 (SDART 2013-2). This is the second transaction of the year for
Santander Consumer USA Inc.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-2

Class A-1, Assigned (P)P-1 (sf)

Class A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class B, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Class C, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Class D, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Class E, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of SCUSA as
servicer.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities published in May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2013-2 pool
is 16.5% and the Aaa level is 50.0%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of SCUSA's portfolio vintage performance as
well as performance of past securitizations, and current
expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the presence of the investment
grade rated parent, Banco Santander (Baa2/P-2). In addition, the
securitization documents include a provision that requires the
appointment of a back-up servicer in the event that the rating on
Banco Santander is downgraded below Baa3.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 19.0%, 25.5% or
29.0%, the initial model output for the Class A notes might change
from Aaa to Aa1, A1, and Baa1, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.75%, 19.5% or
22.5%, the initial model output for the Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to Aa2, A2, and Baa2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.75%, 19.0% or
22.0%, the initial model output for the Class C notes might change
from A2 to A3, Baa3, and Ba3, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.75%, 18.5% or
23.0%, the initial model output for the Class D notes might change
from Baa2 to Baa3, Ba3, and in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.75%, 18.5% or
23.0%, the initial model output for the Class E notes might change
from Ba2 to Ba3, B3, and
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


SDART 2013-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-2's
$1,269.57 million automobile receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 4,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of 49.80%, 43.74%, 35.32%, 31.28%, and
      26.64% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E
      notes, respectively, based on stress cash flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 3.5x, 3.0x, 2.3x, 1.75x, and 1.6x S&P's 13.50%-14.50%
      expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the
      assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A,
      B, and C notes will remain within one rating category of the
      assigned preliminary ratings during the first year, and its
      ratings on the class D and E notes will remain within two
      rating categories of the assigned preliminary ratings, which
      is within the outer bounds of our credit stability criteria.

   -- The originator/servicer's history in the subprime/specialty
      auto finance business.

   -- S&P's analysis of six years of static pool data on Santander
      Consumer USA Inc.'s lending programs.

   -- The transaction's payment/credit enhancement and legal
      structures.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1352.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-2

Class     Rating       Type           Interest          Amount
                                      rate(i)      (mil. $)(i)
A-1       A-1+ (sf)    Senior         Fixed             175.00
A-2       AAA (sf)     Senior         Fixed             341.00
A-3       AAA (sf)     Senior         Fixed             304.87
B         AA (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed             135.65
C         A (sf)       Subordinate    Fixed             166.96
D         BBB (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed              76.52
E         BB+ (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed              69.57

(i) The interest rates and actual sizes of these tranches will be
     determined on the pricing date.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Fitch Assigns BB Ratings to Cl. B-4 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to Sequoia Mortgage
Trust 2013-3, mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2013-3:

-- $150,196,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $411,000,000 class A-2 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150,196,000 notional class A-IO1 certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $561,196,000 notional class A-IO2 certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $11,404,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,904,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,102,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,001,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the senior certificates reflects the 6.50%
subordination provided by the 1.90% class B-1, 1.65% class B-2,
1.35% class B-3, 0.50% non-offered class B-4 and 1.10% non-offered
class B-5. The class B-5 is not rated by Fitch. The Class A-3 and
Class A-IO3 that were presented at the time of marketing will not
be issued, and as a result, Fitch has withdrawn its ratings.

Fitch's ratings reflect the high quality of the underlying
collateral, the clear capital structure and the high percentage of
loans reviewed by third party underwriters. In addition, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as the master servicer and Christiana
Trust will act as the Trustee for the transaction. For federal
income tax purposes, elections will be made to treat the trust as
one or more real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs).

SEMT 2013-3 will be Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation's
third transaction of prime residential mortgages in 2013. The
certificates are supported by a pool of prime fixed rate mortgage
loans. The loans are predominantly fully amortizing; however, 2.4%
have a 10-year interest-only (IO) period. The aggregate pool
included loans originated from First Republic Bank (14%), Cole
Taylor Bank (9.1%), United Shore Financial Services (8.8%),
PrimeLending(7.5%), Flagstar Capital Markets Corporation (6.0%)
and Fremont Bank (5.2%). The remainder of the mortgage loans was
originated by various mortgage lending institutions, each of which
contributed less than 5% to the transaction.

As of the cut-off date, the aggregate pool consisted of 746 loans
with a total balance of $600,210,241; an average balance of
$804,571; a weighted average original combined loan-to-value ratio
(CLTV) of 67%, and a weighted average coupon (WAC) of 3.819%.
Rate/Term and cash out refinances account for 58.1% and 8.8% of
the loans, respectively. The weighted average original FICO credit
score of the pool is 772. Owner-occupied properties comprise 95.8%
of the loans. The states that represent the largest geographic
concentration are California (43.1%), Massachusetts (10.5%), and
Texas (6.3%)

Additional detail on the transaction is described in the new issue
report 'Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2013-3'.


SOUND POINT I: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Sound
Point CLO I Ltd./Sound Point CLO I Inc.'s $359.25 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date
as of Jan. 11, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to S&P's effective date review are
generally based on the application of its criteria to a
combination of purchased collateral, collateral committed to be
purchased, and the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P
by the collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions
about the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because
not all assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, it perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with S&P's criteria to assess
whether the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit
enhancement based on the effective date collateral portfolio.
S&P's analysis relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a
scenario default rate at each rating level based on the effective
date portfolio, full cash flow modeling to determine the
appropriate percentile break-even default rate at each rating
level, the application of S&P's supplemental tests, and the
analytical judgment of a rating committee.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discuss its analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to publish an
effective date report each time it issues an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, S&P will periodically review whether, in its view,
the current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Sound Point CLO I Ltd./Sound Point CLO I Inc.

Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                 2.75
A                       AAA (sf)               250.25
B                       AA (sf)                 36.75
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                  34.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                19.00
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                 16.50


SOUND POINT II: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' Rating to Class B-3L Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Sound Point CLO II Ltd./Sound Point CLO II LLC's
$357.5 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 7,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not including excess spread).

   -- The cash-flow structure, which can withstand the default
      rate projected by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as
      assessed by Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and
      methods outlined in its corporate collateralized debt
      obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections of the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash-flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2891%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which during the reinvestment period will lead to the
      reclassification of up to 50% of available excess interest
      proceeds (before paying uncapped administrative expenses,
      subordinate and incentive management fees, expenses for
      refinancing and additional securities issued, expense
      reserve account top-up, hedge amounts, and subordinated note
      payments) to principal proceeds for the purchase of
      additional collateral assets or to pay principal on the
      notes sequentially, at the option of the collateral manager.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1364.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Sound Point CLO II Ltd./Sound Point CLO II LLC

Class               Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A-1L                AAA (sf)                230.5
A-1F                AAA (sf)                 10.0
A-2L                AA (sf)                  27.5
A-2F                AA (sf)                  10.0
A-3L (deferrable)   A (sf)                   31.5
B-1L (deferrable)   BBB (sf)                 19.5
B-2L (deferrable)   BB- (sf)                 19.0
B-3L (deferrable)   B (sf)                    9.5
Subordinated notes  NR                       42.5

NR-Not rated.


UBS-BB 2013-C5: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to fourteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by UBS-BB 2013-C5, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C5.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S**, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B**, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. EC**, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. C**, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

** Reflects Exchangeable Certificates

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 81 fixed rate loans secured
by 122 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR; and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.96X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.07X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 95.7% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 96.5% is also considered
when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is
17.3., which is slightly lower than Herfindahl scores found in
most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009. With respect
to property level diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl
Index is 20.0, which is also slightly lower than the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.
Both Herfindahl scores, however, are significantly impacted by the
presence of the two largest loans in the pool, which account for
27.6% of the pool balance. The two loans, identified as Santa
Anita Mall and Valencia Mall, are of relatively low leverage as
they are assigned a Moody's LTV's of 81.3% and 84.2%,
respectively. Excluding these two properties, the pool's loan
level and property level Herfindahl scores are 26.9 and 46.4,
respectively.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa class with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals. The transaction was structured with additional
subordination at class A-S to mitigate the potential increased
severity to class A-S.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.17, which is higher
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

In terms of waterfall structure, the transaction contains a unique
group of exchangeable certificates. Classes A-S (Aaa (sf)), B (Aa3
(sf)) and C (A3 (sf)) may be exchanged for Class EC (A2 (sf))
certificates and Class EC may be exchanged for the Classes A-S, B
and C. The EC certificates will be entitled to receive the sum of
interest distributable on the Classes A-S, B and C certificates
that are exchanged for such EC certificates. The initial
certificate balance of the Class EC certificates is equal to the
aggregate of the initial certificate balances of the Class A-S, B
and C and represent the maximum certificate balance of the EC
certificates that may be issued in an exchange.

Moody's considers the probability of certificate default as well
as the estimated severity of loss when assigning a rating. As a
thick vertical tranche, Class EC has the default characteristics
of the lowest rated component certificate (A3 (sf)), but a very
high estimated recovery rate if a default occurs given the
certificate's thickness. The higher estimated recovery rate
resulted in an A2 (sf) rating, a rating higher than the lowest
rated component certificate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Classes X-A
and X-B.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.62
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship, and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver_1.1, which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 22%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa Super Senior class would be Aaa, Aaa, and Aa1,
respectively; for the most junior Aaa rated class A-S would be
Aa1, Aa3, and A1, respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time; rather they are designed to provide a quantitative
calculation of how the initial rating might change if key input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. Parameter
Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each scenario
from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint. Qualitative
factors are also taken into consideration in the ratings process,
so the actual ratings that would be assigned in each case could
vary from the information presented in the Parameter Sensitivity
analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


VENTURE IV: Moody's Lifts Rating on $11MM Class D Notes to 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Venture IV CDO:

US$20,500,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due August 15, 2016,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 7, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf);

US$8,500,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due August 15, 2016,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 7, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf);

US$10,500,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due August 15, 2016,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 7, 2012 Upgraded to Baa3
(sf);

US$6,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due August 15, 2016,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 7, 2012 Upgraded to Baa3
(sf);

US$11,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due August 15, 2016,
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2011 Upgraded to B1
(sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$373,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due August 15, 2016
(current outstanding balance of $21,025,185), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$27,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due August 15, 2016,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in June 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes have been paid down by approximately 50% or $61.3 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated January 10, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 178.2%, 133.8%,
117.2% and 108.3, respectively, versus May 2012 levels of 136.2%,
118.7%, 110.6% and 105.8%, respectively. Moody's notes that the
overcollateralization ratios in the January 2013 trustee report do
not include the February 15, 2013 payment distribution when $39.0
million of principal proceeds were used to pay down the Class A-1
Notes.

Notwithstanding the benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes
that the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has
deteriorated since the last rating action. Based on the January
2013 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 2920 compared to 2659 in May 2012.

Moody's also notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number
of investments in securities that mature after the maturity date
of the notes. Based on the January 2013 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 13.5% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $152 million,
defaulted par of $22.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.12% (implying a WARF of 3003), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 46.95%, and a diversity
score of 46. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Venture IV CDO, issued in August 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2402)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C-1: +3

Class C-2: +3

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3604)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


VENTURE XI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Venture
XI CLO Ltd./Venture XI CLO Corp.'s $469.00 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Jan. 28,
2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, it perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with its criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  S&P's analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Venture XI CLO Ltd./Venture XI CLO Corp.

Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)               326.30
B                       AA (sf)                 57.90
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                  35.10
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                18.60
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                 20.10
F (deferrable)          B (sf)                  11.00


WACHOVIA BANK 2002-C1: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class N Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC+ (sf)' rating
on the class N commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2002-C1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's affirmation follows its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC+ (sf)' rating on the class N principal and
interest certificates to reflect its expectation that the
available credit enhancement for this class will be within S&P's
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current outstanding rating.  The affirmation also reflects the
credit characteristics and performance of the remaining assets, as
well as the transaction-level changes.

S&P tempered its rating action because it also considered that the
three loans with the special servicer ($8.1 million, 53.2%) could
lead to additional interest shortfalls and decreased liquidity
support available to the trust.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.43x
and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 39.6% for
four of the eight remaining loans in the pool.  The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude three loans ($8.1 million, 53.2%) that are
with the special servicer (details below) and one defeased loan
($4.8 million, 31.6%).

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $15.3 million, down from
$950.0 million at issuance.  The pool comprises eight loans, down
from 156 loans at issuance.  To date, the transaction has
experienced losses totaling $14.2 million or 1.5% of the
transaction's original certificate balance.  Three loans (
$8.1 million, 53.2%) are with the special servicer, which we
discuss below.  In addition, two loans ($1.2 million, 7.9%) were
reported to be on the master servicer's watchlist (further details
are below).  Excluding the specially serviced and defeased loans,
no loans reported DSC of below 1.00x.  Details of the two loans
on the master servicer's watchlist are as follows:

The Rivergreen Office Park loan ($1.2 million, 7.6%), the fifth-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by a suburban office park
totaling 21,398 sq. ft. in Corvallis, Ore.  The loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC.  The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Well Fargo), reported a DSC of
1.01x for year-end 2011.  According to the Sept. 30, 2012, rent
roll, the property was 100% occupied.

The South Rice Shopping Center loan ($40,208, 0.3%), the smallest
loan in the pool, is secured by a 4,133-sq.-ft. retail building in
Bellaire, Texas.  The loan is on Well Fargo's watchlist due to a
low reported DSC, which was 1.00x for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2012.  According to the Sept. 30, 2012, rent roll, the
property was 100% occupied.

                      SPECIALLY SERVICED LOANS

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, three loans
totaling $8.1 million (53.2%) were with the special servicer.  The
reported payment status was as follows: two are in foreclosure
($5.3 million, 35.1%) and one is a nonperforming matured balloon
loan ($2.8 million, 18.1%).  Appraisal reduction amount (ARAs)
totaling $1.0 million were in effect for two of three specially
serviced loans.  Details on the three loans are as follows:

The Ahwatukee Hills Plaza loan ($3.7 million, 24.1%), the second-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 32,580-sq.-ft. retail
building in Phoenix.  The loan has a reported total exposure of
$4.2 million and was transferred to the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC (LNR), on March 15, 2012, for maturity default.  The
loan matured on March 11, 2012.  LNR stated that it is pursuing
foreclosure, however, the borrower has recently filed for
bankruptcy on Feb. 27, 2013.  Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 0.84x
for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2011.  According to the
October 2012 rent roll, the property was 70.6% occupied.  An ARA
of $872,799 is in effect for this loan.  S&P expects a minimal
loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

The Cotton Building loan ($2.8 million, 18.1%), the third-largest
loan in the pool, is secured by a 34,144-sq.-ft. retail building
in Phoenix.  The nonperforming matured balloon loan, which has a
reported total exposure of $3.2 million, was transferred to LNR on
Feb. 6, 2012, for maturity default.  The loan matured on Feb. 1,
2012.  LNR informed S&P that the borrower has filed for
bankruptcy.  Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 1.42x for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2011.  According to the Feb. 21, 2012, rent
roll, the property was 89.5% occupied.  S&P expects a minimal loss
upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

The Eastern Marketplace loan ($1.6 million, 11.0%), the fourth-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by an 11,681-sq.-ft. retail
building in Henderson, Nev.  The loan has a reported total
exposure of $1.8 million and was transferred to LNR on Feb. 6,
2012, for maturity default.  The loan matured on Feb. 1, 2012.
LNR indicated to S&P that it is pursuing foreclosure and
receivership.  Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 1.81x for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2011.  According to the Feb. 1, 2013, rent
roll, the property was 100% occupied.  An ARA of $155,484 is in
effect for this loan.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

As it relates to the above asset resolution, minimal loss is
considered to be less than 25%, moderate loss is between 26% and
59%, and significant loss is 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C20: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 14 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-C20 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-C, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 4.7% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 4.1%. Moody's base
plus realized losses metric increased slightly to 6.8%, from 6.6%
at Moody's prior review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs
and the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced
loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes could
decline below the current levels. If future performance materially
declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and the
priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the
current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X-C.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 28, compared to a Herf of 33 at Moody's prior
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 7, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to $2.13
billion from $3.66 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 140 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 50%
of the pool. The pool includes two loans with investment-grade
credit assessments, representing 10% of the pool. Nine loans,
representing approximately 2% of the pool, are defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Nineteen loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twelve loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $148 million (76% average loan loss
severity). Currently, four loans, representing 2% of the pool, are
in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $25 million
loss (55% expected loss) for all the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly-
performing loans representing 3% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $11 million loss
(15% expected loss severity based on a 50% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 98% and 58% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 95% compared to 99% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 10.7% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.6%.

Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.52X and 1.13X, respectively, compared to
1.50X and 1.09X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the 60 Hudson Street
Loan ($160 million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.1
million square foot data center and telecom office building in the
TriBeCa section of New York City. The largest tenant is Datagryd
Data Centers LLC, which recently signed a new lease for
approximately 193,000 square feet, or 12% of the property's net
rentable area (NRA). Other large tenants include Verizon
Communications, Inc. and Sprint Nextel. The property was 75%
leased as of September 2012 reporting, up from 71% in December
2011. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A1 and
1.94X, respectively, the same as at Moody's last review.

The second-largest loan with a credit assessment is the Westfield
San Francisco Centre Loan ($60 million -- 3% of the pool), which
represents a participation interest in a $120 million mortgage
loan. The loan is secured by the borrower's leasehold interest a
498,000 square foot, multi-story regional mall in downtown San
Francisco, California. The mall anchors are Nordstrom and
Bloomingdale's. The Bloomingdale's space is not part of the loan
collateral. The property was 98% leased as of September 2012
reporting, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's current
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.27X,
respectively, the same as at Moody's last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 24% of the pool.
The largest loan is the NGP Rubicon GSA Pool ($188 million -- 9%
of the pool), which represents a participation interest in a $375
million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a portfolio of 13
office properties and one distribution center, located in ten U.S.
states plus the District of Columbia. The portfolio was 100%
leased as of year-end 2012 reporting, the same as at Moody's last
review. Over 90% of the portfolio is leased to the General
Services Administration. The loan is currently on the watchlist
due to upcoming GSA lease expirations, which will affect several
of the properties. Moody's analysis considers the upcoming lease
rollover risk, and potential vacant space is leased up to market
rent and vacancy rates. Negative impacts from the GSA lease
expirations on the loan metrics are mitigated in part by loan
amortization. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and
0.91X, respectively, compared to 97% and 0.96X at last review.

The second-largest loan is the AmericasMart A-2 Loan ($182 million
-- 9% of the pool), which represents a participation interest in a
$363 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 4.1 million
square foot wholesale trade center located in Atlanta, Georgia.
The property includes over 900,000 square feet of exhibition space
and 3.2 million square feet of permanent exhibition space. The
property tenant base is extremely diverse, with the largest tenant
occupying just 0.6% of property NRA. The property was 85% leased
as of August 2012, up from 83% leased one year earlier. Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.31X, respectively,
compared to 88% and 1.28X at last review.

The third-largest loan is the Millennium Park Plaza Loan ($140
million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a 720,400 square
foot mixed-use property located in Chicago, Illinois. The property
consists of 551 residential units, 36,700 square feet of retail
space and a 94,200 square-foot office and telecom component. The
property was 94% leased as of September 2012, the same as at year-
end 2011 reporting. The property has benefitted from higher rents
since Moody's last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80%
and 1.19X, respectively, compared to 84% and 1.12X at last review.


WASHINGTON MUTUAL 2007-SL2: Moody's Cuts Rating on G Certs to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
and affirmed eight classes of Washington Mutual Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-SL2 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to higher than expected realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf) remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on our
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The affirmation of the interest-only tranche, Class X, is due to
the credit quality of its referenced classes.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent
approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe,
have generally experienced higher defaults and losses than
traditional conduit and fusion transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.6% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
5.8%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.6%
of the original pooled balance compared to 6.3% at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit support
for the rated classes could decline below their current levels. If
future performance materially declines, the expected credit
support may be insufficient to support the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 224 compared to 268 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 2, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 25, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $528.5
million from $842.1 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 468 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 12%
of the pool.

One hundred twenty loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of our ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $20.8 million (50% loss severity
on average). Currently, there are 26 loans in special servicing,
representing 5% of the pool. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$8.76 million loss (50% expected loss on average) for 19 specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 55 poorly
performing loans, representing 12% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $17.1 million loss (27% expected loss based on a 54%
probability default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full year 2011
operating results for 98% and 95% of the pool's non-specially
serviced loans, respectively. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 99% compared to
100% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of approximately 10% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.28X and 1.11X, respectively, compared to 1.27X and
1.09X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.


WASHINGTON MUTUAL 2007-SL3: Moody's Affirms Rating on 16 CMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of 16 classes of
Washington Mutual Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-SL3 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf) remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on our
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The affirmation of the interest-only tranche, Class X, is due to
the credit quality of the referenced bonds.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent
approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe,
have generally experienced higher defaults and losses than
traditional conduit and fusion transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.5% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base expected
loss was 5.4%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 6.4% of the original pooled balance compared to 6.2% at last
review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
support for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, credit
support may be insufficient to support the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, we expect the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to our forecasts remain skewed to
the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 312 compared to 315 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 2, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 23, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 38% to $798.1
million from $1.28 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 642 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 1.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
10% of the pool.

Two hundred and two loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on
the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As
part of our ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Fifty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $31.0 million (37% loss severity on
average). Currently, there are 29 loans in special servicing,
representing 5% of the pool. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$11.1 million loss (40% expected loss on average) for 25 specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 90 poorly
performing loans, representing 15% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $26.4 million loss (22% expected loss based on a 55%
probability default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full year 2011
operating results for 95% and 93% of the pool's non-specially
serviced loans, respectively. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 102%, essentially
the same as at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9.3% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.75%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.28X and 1.12X, respectively, compared to
1.31X and 1.12X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


WATERFRONT CLO 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2 and A-3 notes from Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd., a U.S. cash-
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Grandview Capital Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its ratings on the class A-1, B, C, and D notes, and removed all
six ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive
implications on Jan. 4, 2013.

The transaction is in its reinvestment period (expected to end in
October 2013) and continues to reinvest its principal proceeds.
S&P's last rating action on this transaction was in March 2012,
when it raised its ratings on the class A-2, A-3, B, C, and D
notes, and affirmed the class A-1 rating.

Defaults remain at a low level ($143,154) and all coverage ratios
are passing.  According to the February 2013 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios--especially the class A O/C--
have improved since S&P's last rating action.

The trustee reports the following O/C ratios in its Feb. 6, 2013,
monthly report:

   -- The class A ratio is 125.01%, up from 123.67% in the
      February 2012 trustee report used for our March 2012
      analysis;

   -- The class B ratio is 115.65%, compared with 114.41% in
      February 2012;

   -- The class C ratio is 110.63%, compared with 109.45% in
      February 2012; and

   -- The class D ratio is 106.42%, compared with 105.29% in
      February 2012.

S&P raised its ratings on the class A-2 and A-3 notes because of
the increase in credit support.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the
remaining notes to reflect the availability of adequate credit
support at their current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To            From
A-2           AA (sf)       AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3           AA- (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To             From
A-1           AA+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             BBB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             BBB- (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BB (sf)        BB (sf)/Watch Pos


WEST COAST FUNDING I: Moody's Lifts A-1a Notes' Rating to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by West Coast Funding I, Ltd.:

  US$1,187,950,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes due November 2,
  2041 (current outstanding balance of $194,214,546), Upgraded to
  Caa3 (sf); previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$1,187,950,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes due November 2,
  2041, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded
  to Ca (sf)

  US$100,000 Class A-1v Floating Rate Notes due November 2, 2041
  (current outstanding balance of $58,174), Affirmed Ca (sf);
  previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  US$81,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due November 2,
  2041 (current outstanding balance of $78,973,550), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$81,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes due November 2,
  2041 (current outstanding balance of $78,973,550), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$54,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due November 2, 2041
  (current outstanding balance of $53,798,808), Affirmed C (sf);
  previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  US$60,750,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  November 2, 2041 (current outstanding balance of $68,145,941),
  Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to C
  (sf)

  US$33,750,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  November 2, 2041 (current outstanding balance of $41,321,549),
  Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to C
  (sf)

  US$10,000,000 Combination Notes due November 2, 2041 (current
  rated balance of $11,412,505), Affirmed C (sf); previously on
  April 24, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes since the
rating action in April 2009. Moody's notes that the Class A-1a
Notes have been paid down by approximately 81% or $834 million
since the last rating action. Moody's observes that the deal has
received stable and sizable payments over a significant period of
time -- including from assets declared defaulted by trustee --
that have been used to amortize the Class A-1a Notes.

West Coast Funding I, Ltd., issued in July 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a diversified
portfolio of RMBS originated from 2005 to 2006.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012. The methodology
used in rating the Combination Note was "Using the Structured Note
Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.

Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. Among the uncertainties in the residential
real estate property market are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.

The deal's ratings are not expected to be sensitive to the
sensitivity analyses that notch up or notch down the Caa rated
assets by 2 rating notches.


* Moody's Takes Ratings Action on $340 Million of TRUPS CDO Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by:

Issuer: PreTSL Combination Trust I

  US$10,000,000 Combination Certificates, Series P XV-1 due 2034
  (current rated balance of $4,373,938), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
  previously on November 23, 2010 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

Issuer: Preferred Term Securities XV, Ltd.

  US$323,100,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
  September 26, 2034 (current balance of $256,743,409), Upgraded
  to Aa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Downgraded to Baa3
  (sf);

  US$63,400,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
  September 26, 2034, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on March
  27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  US$15,000,000 Class A-3 Fixed/Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
  September 26, 2034, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on March
  27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued by
Preferred Term Securities XV, Ltd.:

   US$114,500,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Mezzanine Notes Due
   September 26, 2034 (current balance of 123,145,123), Affirmed
   C (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   US$22,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed/Floating Rate Mezzanine Notes
   Due September 26, 2034 (current balance of 23,661,072),
   Affirmed C (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Downgraded to
   C (sf);

   US$36,000,000 Class B-3 Fixed/Floating Rate Mezzanine Notes
   Due September 26, 2034 (current balance of 39,137,620),
   Affirmed C (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Downgraded to
   C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of the improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio, deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the last rating action in November 2010.

Moody's notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
864 compared to 1480 as of the last rating action date. The total
par amount that Moody's treated as defaulted or deferring declined
to $181.2 million compared to $215.5 million as of the last rating
action date.

Moody's also notes that the Class A-1 notes have been paid down by
approximately 14% or $42 million since the last rating action, due
to diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions and sales of underlying
assets. As a result of this deleveraging and resumption of
interest payments by some previously deferred assets, the Class A-
1 notes' par coverage improved to 150.2% from 129.4% since the
last rating action, as calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest
trustee report dated December 21, 2012, the Senior Coverage Ratio
and Class B Mezzanine Coverage Ratio are reported at 115.07%
(limit 128.00%) and 74.01% (limit 103.00%), respectively, versus
September 20, 2010 levels of 104.13% and 70.77%, respectively.
Going forward, the Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from
the diversion of excess interest and the proceeds from future
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in our rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $386 million (including the accreted value of
the Reserve Account Strip), defaulted/deferring par of $181
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.69%
(implying a WARF of 864), Moody's Asset Correlation of 17.78%, and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 9.14%. In
addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Preferred Term Securities XV, Ltd., issued on September 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks and insurance companies that are generally not publicly
rated by Moody's. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS
without public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive their credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data reported
as of Q3-2012. For insurance TruPS without public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of Moody's Insurance team based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual
statutory financial reports.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in these ratings were "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011, and "Using
the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published
in February 2004.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. We analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 216 points from the
base case of 864, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 139 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, we gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis, we
gave par credit to $49.1 million of bank TruPS. In the second
sensitivity analysis, we ran alternative default-timing profile
scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a large spike in
defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +1
Class A-2: +3
Class A-3: +3
Class B-1: +3
Class B-2: +3
Class B-3: +3
Combination Certificates: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class A-3: +1
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0
Class B-3: 0
Combination Certificates: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as our outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities. Moody's continues to have a stable outlook
in the insurance sector, other than the negative outlook on the
U.S. life insurance industry.


* Moody's Takes Rating Action on US$104 Million RMBS
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings on two
tranches, affirmed the ratings on six tranches, and downgraded the
rating on two tranche from two transactions issued by various
trusts. The collateral backing the transaction are subprime
residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2005-HE2

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The rating actions constitute a number of downgrades, affirmations
and confirmations. The downgrades are primarily due to the weak
interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism on the bond.

The Class M-3 issued by IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2005-HE2
does not have current interest shortfalls but in the event of a
future interest shortfall, structural limitations in the
transactions will likely prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls
even if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on this tranche can typically only be made up from excess
interest after the overcollateralization is built to a target
amount. In this transaction since overcollateralization is already
below target due to poor performance, any future missed interest
payments to this mezzanine tranche are unlikely to be paid.
Moody's generally caps the ratings of such tranches with weak
interest shortfall reimbursement at A3 as long as they have not
experienced any shortfall. Generally, ratings on tranches that
currently have very small unrecoverable interest shortfalls are
capped at Baa3. For tranches with larger outstanding interest
shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Securities in Default" published in November 2009. These
approaches take into account only credit-related interest
shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace. The methodology only
applies to pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of
greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool
factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines
to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural features allow for
a monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0%
for the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to
rise in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer activity such as modification-related
principal forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change
resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory
change can also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 92 Subprime RMBS Issues
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 9 tranches,
upgraded the rating of 2 tranches and affirmed the rating of 81
tranches from 10 transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R9

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE4

Cl. M1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M3, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-10

Cl. AF-5A, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
Caa2, Outlook Developing on Nov 19, 2012)

Cl. AF-6, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. MF-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BF, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BV, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2005-HE1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC7

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-MHQ1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2008 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WCW2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WHQ2

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2008 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012 Confirmed at
B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The rating actions constitute of a number of downgrades, upgrades,
and affirmations. The downgrades are primarily due to the
tranches' weak interest shortfall reimbursement mechanisms.

The tranches downgraded to A3 do not have interest shortfalls but
in the event of an interest shortfall, structural limitations in
the transactions will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls
even if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on these tranches can typically only be made up from
excess interest after the overcollateralization is built to a
target amount. In these transactions since overcollateralization
is already below target due to poor performance, any future missed
interest payments to these tranches are unlikely to be paid.
Moody's caps the ratings of such tranches with weak interest
shortfall reimbursement at A3 as long as they have not experienced
any shortfall.

Ratings on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3. For tranches with larger
outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in
November 2009. These rating actions take into account only credit-
related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

The methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0%
for the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to
rise in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer activity such as modification-related
principal forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change
resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory
change can also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Rating Action on $802-Mil. of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one tranche,
upgraded the rating of 14 tranches, confirmed the rating of four
tranches, and affirmed the rating of 54 tranches from eight
transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete Rating Actions:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-CB4

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2A, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A-1C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-CB4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. AF-3, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1

Cl. M4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M5, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-HE5

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-HE2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-2

Cl. M2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-4

Cl. 2A1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1A2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1A3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The rating actions constitute a number of downgrades, upgrades,
confirmations, and affirmations. The downgrade is primarily due to
the interest shortfall on the tranche.

Ratings on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3. For tranches with larger
outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in
November 2009. These rating actions take into account only credit-
related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for its current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

These methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and
a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Various Action on $2.1 Billion Subprime RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of 43 tranches,
upgraded the rating of one tranche, confirmed the rating of one
tranche, and affirmed the rating of 121 tranches from 22
transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
TC1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-3

Cl. M1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Confirmed at
B2 (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W11

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE11

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE8

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-HE1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-HE6

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Securities I Trust 2004-FR2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-OPT1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Confirmed at
B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-9

Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-5, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. MF-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BF, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFH4

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-6, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-WF

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD
2004-A

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-HE1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-WMC3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2004-3

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WCW1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WWF1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-2

Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools. These rating actions constitute of a number of
downgrades, upgrades, confirmations, and affirmations. The
downgrades are primarily due to the tranches' weak interest
shortfall reimbursement mechanisms.

The tranches downgraded to A3 (sf) do not have interest shortfalls
but in the event of an interest shortfall, structural limitations
in the transactions will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls
even if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on these tranches can typically only be made up from
excess interest after the overcollateralization is built to a
target amount. In these transactions since overcollateralization
is already below target due to poor performance, any future missed
interest payments to these tranches are unlikely to be paid.
Moody's caps the ratings of such tranches with weak interest
shortfall reimbursement at A3 (sf) as long as they have not
experienced any shortfall.

Ratings on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3 (sf). For tranches with
larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009. These rating actions take into account
only credit-related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

The methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, we considered the volatility of the projected
losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds backed by
small pools, we also considered the current pipeline composition
as well as any specific loss allocation rules that could preserve
or deplete the overcollateralization available for the senior
bonds at different pace.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $1BB of Subprime RMBS by RASC
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of 32 tranches,
confirmed the rating of one tranche, and affirmed the rating of 43
tranches from nine transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX4 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS10 Trust

Cl. A-I-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-I-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS12 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS3 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS4 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS5 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Confirmed
at Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS6 Trust

Cl. M-1, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Confirmed
at Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS8 Trust

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Confirmed
at Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS9 Trust

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Confirmed
at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools. These rating actions constitute a number of upgrades,
confirmations and affirmations. The upgrades are due to
improvement in collateral performance and structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

The methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, we considered the volatility of the projected
losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds backed by
small pools, we also considered the current pipeline composition
as well as any specific loss allocation rules that could preserve
or deplete the overcollateralization available for the senior
bonds at different pace.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0%
for the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to
rise in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer activity such as modification-related
principal forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change
resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory
change can also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $1.7BB of Alt-A RMBS for 2006-2007
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 11 tranches
and affirmed the ratings of seven tranches from three RMBS
transactions backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Impac.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-3

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2010
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-3M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-4M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-4

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the Feb 4, 2013 Court Judgment to
uphold the waterfall terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements
(PSA) governing these transactions.

In 2010, the Trust had filed a petition (Trust Instruction
Proceeding (TIP)) for these transactions, with respect to the
discrepancies between the payment waterfall provisions as stated
in the PSA and the Prospectus Supplement. According to the
Prospectus Supplement, the distributions to the Class A
certificates in these transactions should be on a pro-rata basis
after credit support depletion date (CSDD). The PSA however, does
not carry this corresponding language, thus retaining the
sequential payment on certain bonds in the transactions. Our
previous ratings on the bonds were based on the PSA but certain
bonds were put on watch direction uncertain as a result of this
proceeding.

The Court's Statement of Decision has instructed the Trustee to
release all escrowed funds pursuant to the waterfall terms of the
PSAs governing the three trusts and has also instructed the
Trustee to continue paying Certificateholders in accordance with
the PSAs governing all the three Trusts as written. As a result,
we are now confirming the ratings on the bonds previously placed
on watch.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a transaction
has a specific structural feature, such as a credit enhancement
floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size, Moody's can
choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 9.0%
in September 2011 to 7.8% in December 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

* Moody's Takes Action on US$940MM of Subprime RMBS Issues
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of 11 tranches,
upgraded the rating of 8 tranches, affirmed the rating of 36
tranches, and confirmed 3 tranches issued by 8 transactions,
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1

Cl. M3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M5, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-HE2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
HE1

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WLL1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-3

Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools. The rating actions constitute of a number of
downgrades, upgrades, confirmations, and affirmations. The
downgrades are primarily due to the tranches' weak interest
shortfall reimbursement mechanisms combined with actual interest
shortfalls.

Structural limitations in these transactions will typically
prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls even if funds are
available in subsequent periods. Missed interest payments on these
tranches can typically only be made up from excess interest after
the overcollateralization is built to a target amount. In these
transactions since overcollateralization is already below target
due to poor performance, any future missed interest payments to
these tranches are unlikely to be paid. Moody's caps the ratings
of such tranches with weak interest shortfall reimbursement at A3
(sf) as long as they have not experienced any shortfall.

Ratings on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3 (sf). For tranches with
larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009. These rating action take into account
only credit-related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted for Moody's current view
on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels into 2014.

The methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on 32 Scratch & Dent-Backed Loan Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of 10 tranches,
confirmed the rating of two tranches, and affirmed the rating of
20 tranches from six transactions, backed by Scratch and Dent
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest Trust 2002-X1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest Trust 2003-X3

Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-IA1

Cl. MV-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-B

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 31, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 31, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 1-A5, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 31, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 2-A4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-RP1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-02

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance review of these
deals and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools. The rating actions constitute of a number of confirmations,
downgrades, and affirmations.

The downgrades are primarily due to the weak interest shortfall
reimbursement mechanism on the bonds. The tranches downgraded to
A3 (sf) do not have interest shortfalls but in the event of an
interest shortfall, structural limitations in the transactions
will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls even if funds are
available in subsequent periods. Missed interest payments on these
mezzanine tranches can only be made up from excess interest and
after the overcollateralization is built to a target amount. In
these transactions since overcollateralization is already below
target due to poor performance, any missed interest payments to
mezzanine tranches are unlikely to be paid. Moody's caps the
ratings of such tranches with weak interest shortfall
reimbursement at A3 (sf) as long as they have not experienced any
shortfall.

Generally, ratings on tranches that currently have very small
unrecoverable interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3. For tranches
with larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default" published in November 2009. These approaches take into
account only credit-related interest shortfall risks. The ratings
for Class M2 and Class M3 in Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc,
Quest Trust 2003-X3; Class 1-A1, Class 1-A2, and Class 2-A2 from
Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-B; And Class M-
2 from C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-RP1, were downgraded to B1 (sf) and below. These tranches
have outstanding interest shortfalls ranging between 0.32% and
7.30% of their original balance and are unlikely to be reimbursed.

The ratings for Class MV-1 and Class MF-1 in Ameriquest Mortgage
Securities Inc, Series 2003-IA1 were confirmed. Moody's has placed
these two tranches on review for downgrade due to the interest
shortfall risk. These tranches have not experienced any interest
shortfall to date. After further review of the deal's performance
and the pooling and servicing agreement, Moody's believes that the
mezzanine tranches, even though have a weak reimbursement
mechanism for interest shortfall, will be reimbursed any possible
interest shortfall since the current overcollateralization amount
is close to the target overcollateralization amount.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until September 2014.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* S&P Withdraws Rating on 66 Note Classes From 25 CDO Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 66
classes of notes from 16 collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions, three collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions backed primarily by residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), three CDO transactions predominantly backed by
tranches from other CDOs, two CDO transactions structured as
principal-protected notes, and one CDO retranche transaction.

The withdrawals follow the complete paydown of the notes on their
most recent payment dates.

Standard & Poor's notes that the following transactions redeemed
their classes in full after notifying S&P that the equity
noteholders directed optional redemptions:

   -- ALM Loan Funding 2010-1 Ltd.
   -- Ares VIII CLO Ltd.
   -- Artus Loan Fund 2007-I Ltd.
   -- Chelsea Park CLO Ltd.
   -- Fraser Sullivan CLO V Ltd.
   -- Mountain Capital CLO III Ltd.
   -- Olympic CLO I Ltd.
   -- Osprey CDO 2006-1 Ltd; and
   -- Zais Investment Grade Ltd. V.

In addition, S&P withdrew its rating on the class cert notes from
ALESCO Preferred Funding II Principal Protected Trust I after the
U.S. treasury strip underlying the trust matured.  Similarly, S&P
withdrew its rating on the class series C notes from ALESCO
Preferred Funding VII Principal Protected Trust I as the notes,
which were supported by the zero-coupon bonds issued by the U.S.
government, were paid down in full on their recent payment date.

Lastly, S&P noted that the commitment on the unfunded portion of
the class B revolving notes from Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1 Ltd.
terminated when the class A notes were paid down in full.
Furthermore, the transaction has not drawn on the class B notes;
therefore, S&P understands this balance will remain at zero over
the remaining life of the transaction.  S&P is withdrawing its
rating accordingly.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   NR                  A (sf)

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding II Principal Protected Trust I
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
Certs               NR                  AA+ (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding VII Principal Protected Trust I
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
Series C            NR                  AA+ (sf)


ALM Loan Funding 2010-1 Ltd.
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

Ares VIII CLO Ltd.
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1B                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
C-1                 NR                  A+ (sf)
C-2                 NR                  A+ (sf)
D-1                 NR                  A+ (sf)
D-2                 NR                  A+ (sf)
D-3                 NR                  A+ (sf)

Artus Loan Fund 2007-I Ltd.
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3L                NR                  AA+ (sf)
B-1L                NR                  BBB+ (sf)
B-2L                NR                  BB+ (sf)

Atlantis Funding Ltd.
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1 Ltd.
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  A+ (sf)

C-Bass CBO VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   NR                  BB- (sf)

Chelsea Park CLO Ltd.
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
B                   NR                  AA (sf)
C                   NR                  A (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Fraser Sullivan CLO V Ltd.
                               Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AA (sf)
B                   NR                  A (sf)
C                   NR                  BBB (sf)
D                   NR                  BB (sf)

Grayston CLO II 2004-1 Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2L                NR                  AAA (sf)

Montauk Point CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Combo Sec           NR                  AA+ (sf)

Mountain Capital CLO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3F                NR                  AA+ (sf)
A-3L                NR                  AA+ (sf)
B-1L                NR                  BB- (sf)

Navigator CDO 2003 Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                  From
C-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
C-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Olympic CLO I Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3L                NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1L                NR                  BB+ (sf)
B-2L                NR                  CCC- (sf)
U                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

Osprey CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                To                  From
X                    NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1LA                NR                  AA+ (sf)
A-1LB                NR                  AA+ (sf)
A-2L                 NR                  A+ (sf)
A-3L                 NR                  A- (sf)
B-1L                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)
B-2L                 NR                  BBB (sf)

Securitized Product of Restructured Collateral Limited SPC for the
account of
the Series 2005-1 Segregated Portfolio
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A2                  NR                  BB+ (sf)

Slater Mill Loan Fund LP
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
X                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Stone Tower CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LA               NR                  AA+ (sf)

Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AA- (sf)

Victoria Falls CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)

Zais Investment Grade Ltd. V
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  BBB- (sf)
A-2                 NR                  D (sf)
B-1                 NR                  CCC- (sf)
B-2                 NR                  CCC- (sf)

Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VI
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)

NR-Not rated.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 13 U.S. Manufactured Housing ABS to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes from 10 Greenpoint and one United Companies Funding Corp.
(UCFC) related manufactured housing (MH) U.S. ABS transactions
(ABS) that are linked to the ratings on MBIA Insurance Corp.
(MBIA; CCC/Negative/--).

MBIA provides a full financial guarantee insurance policy
guaranteeing full payments of principal and interest to the
noteholders of the downgraded classes.  Under S&P's criteria, the
issue credit rating on a fully credit-enhanced bond issue is the
higher of the two ratings: the rating on the credit enhancer or
Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR) on the class.  A SPUR
is S&P's opinion of the stand-alone creditworthiness of an
obligation--that is, the capacity to pay debt service on a debt
issue in accordance with its terms without considering an
otherwise applicable bond insurance policy.

RATINGS LOWERED
(Insured by MBIA Insurance Corp.)

GreenPoint Credit Manufactured Housing Contract Trust

                       Rating
Series   Class    To          From
1998-1   IA       CCC (sf)    B (sf)
1998-1   IIA      CCC (sf)    B (sf)

1999-1   A-5      CCC (sf)    B (sf)

1999-2   A-2      CCC (sf)    B (sf)

1999-3   IA-7     CCC (sf)    B (sf)
1999-3   IIA-2    CCC (sf)    B (sf)

GreenPoint Credit Manuf Hsg Contract Trust

                       Rating
Series   Class    To          From
1999-4   A-2      CCC (sf)    B (sf)

Manufactured Housing Contract Trust

                       Rating
Series   Class    To          From
1999-6   A-2      CCC (sf)    B (sf)

GreenPoint Credit Manufactured Hsg Contract Trust

                       Rating
Series   Class    To          From
2000-2   A-2      CCC (sf)    B (sf)

Manufactured Housing Contract Trust Pass-Thru Cert

                       Rating
Series   Class    To          From
2000-3   IIA-2    CCC (sf)    B (sf)

2000-5   A-3      CCC (sf)    B (sf)

2000-7   A-2      CCC (sf)    B (sf)

United Companies Funding Corp.

                       Rating
Series   Class    To          From
1996-2   A-1      CCC (sf)    B (sf)


* S&P Lowers Rating on 4 Note Classes From 6 U.S. RMBS to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes from six U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions.  S&P's also affirmed its ratings on 33
classes from the affected transactions.

The transactions in this review were issued between 2003 and 2007
and are backed by a mix of adjustable- and fixed-rate subprime and
"scratch-and-dent" loans secured primarily by first liens on one-
to four-family residential properties.

The increase in projected losses resulted from one or both of the
following factors:

   -- On average, 6.94% of nondelinquent loans became reperforming
      or 30-plus-days delinquent and have default frequencies
      ranging from 45% to 100%

   -- A continued elevated level of observed severities.

S&P lowered its ratings on eight classes from six transactions.
S&P rated the classes with lowered ratings in the speculative-
grade category before the rating actions.  Certain transactions
are passing their cumulative-loss triggers, thereby allowing
principal payments to lower-rated subordinate classes and causing
credit support erosion.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, may add a layer of volatility
to its loss assumptions when they are stressed at the rating as
suggested by its cash flow models.  In these circumstances, S&P
affirmed its ratings on those classes in order to buffer against
this uncertainty and promote ratings stability.  In general, the
bonds that were affected reflect the following:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;

   -- Low priority in principal payments;

   -- Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline;

   -- High proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;

   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities; and

   -- Weak hard-dollar credit support.

The six 'AAA (sf)' ratings from three transactions that S&P
affirmed affect bonds that have more than sufficient credit
support to absorb the projected remaining losses associated with
this rating stress.

The two affirmations from two transactions in the 'AA (sf)' and 'A
(sf)' categories affect classes that are currently in first,
second, or third payment priority.

S&P affirmed its ratings on 25 additional classes in the 'CCC
(sf)' or 'CC (sf)' rating categories.  S&P believes that the
projected credit support for these classes will remain
insufficient to cover the revised projected losses to these
classes.

According to S&P's counterparty criteria, it considered any
applicable hedges related to these securities when performing
these rating actions.

Subordination, overcollateralization (when available), and excess
interest generally provide credit support for the reviewed
transactions.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

ABFC 2003-OPT1 Trust
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        04542BDH2   B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2006-SD2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      23242TAH9   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
1-A-3      23242TAW6   CCC (sf)             B (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M1         32027NLA7   B- (sf)              BB (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2005-NC1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        59020URQ0   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        64352VCZ2   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)

NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2007-1
Series      2007-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2A1      669971AB9   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
A-2A2      669971AS2   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ABFC 2003-OPT1 Trust
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        04542BDD1   AAA (sf)
A-1A       04542BDE9   AAA (sf)
A-3        04542BDG4   AA+ (sf)
M-2        04542BDJ8   CCC (sf)
M-3        04542BDK5   CCC (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2006-SD2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-M-1      23242TAJ5   CCC (sf)
1-M-2      23242TAK2   CC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         32027NKV2   AAA (sf)
A5         32027NKZ3   AAA (sf)
M2         32027NLB5   CCC (sf)
M3         32027NLC3   CCC (sf)
M4         32027NLD1   CCC (sf)
M5         32027NLE9   CCC (sf)
M6         32027NLF6   CC (sf)
M7         32027NLG4   CC (sf)
M8         32027NLH2   CC (sf)
M9         32027NLJ8   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2005-NC1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        59020URP2   AA (sf)
M-3        59020URR8   CCC (sf)
B-1        59020URS6   CCC (sf)
B-2        59020URT4   CC (sf)
B-3        59020URU1   CC (sf)
B-4        59020URV9   CC (sf)

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        64352VCW9   AAA (sf)
A-3        64352VCX7   AAA (sf)
M-2        64352VDA6   CCC (sf)
M-3        64352VDB4   CCC (sf)
M-5        64352VDD0   CC (sf)
M-6        64352VDE8   CC (sf)

NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2007-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1A       669971AA1   CCC (sf)
A-2B       669971AC7   CCC (sf)
A-2C       669971AD5   CCC (sf)
A-2D       669971AE3   CCC (sf)


* S&P Puts 43 Ratings on 10 US CLO Transactions on CreditWatch
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 43
tranches from 10 U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.

The tranches are from CLO transactions backed by securities issued
by corporate obligors.  Most of the transactions have experienced
an increase in their overcollateralization levels following
paydowns to the senior note(s) that improved their credit support.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after it completes a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review for each of
the affected transactions.  S&P expects to resolve these
CreditWatch placements within 90 days.  S&P will continue to
monitor the CDO transactions it rates and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as it deems appropriate.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Ballyrock CLO 2006-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Celerity CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
E                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Emporia Preferred Funding II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-3                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
E                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

Four Corners CLO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
E                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)


Genesis CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1L                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-1LB               AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2L                AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-3L                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-2                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
B                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)

Pacifica CDO V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
B-1                 A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
B-2                 A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
D                   BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

Sapphire Valley CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Trimaran CLO IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-3L                AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
B-1L                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
B-2L                B- (sf)/Watch Pos   B- (sf)


* U.S. Auto ABS to Avoid Potholes in 2013, Fitch Says
-----------------------------------------------------
Competitive industry pressures, particularly in the subprime
sector, are leading to looser underwriting which may in turn push
losses modestly higher in U.S. auto ABS, according to Fitch
Ratings. In its latest 'Fitch Voice: Structured Finance', however,
Fitch says that low actual losses, strong average credit quality
and stable or increasing credit enhancement levels will help steer
auto ABS performance away from any significant deterioration.

FICO and credit tier distributions are providing one of the
clearest indications of loosening underwriting standards. Since
the middle of last year, Fitch has seen more originations geared
towards more inclusion of the bottom most tier FICO scores. 'With
the lowest tier FICOs beginning to make up a larger percentage of
an overall ABS pool, losses have the potential to accelerate over
time,' said Managing Director John Bella.

Competitive pressures are likely to be most acute in the subprime
sector where Fitch notes that over 20 subprime issuers have come
to market with ABS transactions since 2008.

Some experts are also predicting the wholesale markets to weaken
somewhat. This along with used car prices are areas that Fitch
will be watching closely since any softening outside these current
expectations might worsen the outlook for losses.

Another trend worth noting is the increasing amount of
'innovation' beginning to show up in auto ABS structures. The
sector has long been known for sticking with traditional features
like simple sequential pay structures and relatively short average
lives that have kept losses very low. However, 'innovations not
seen since 2007 are beginning to show up again in new auto ABS
deals, making them potentially more volatile if the broader
economy deteriorates,' said Bella.

'Fitch Voice: Structured Finance' provides a series of topical
articles on developments in the global structured finance sector.
The latest piece, 'KEYS to Cars in 2013: Will Auto ABS Avoid the
Potholes?' is available at 'www.fitchratings.com'.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Carmel
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Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
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are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
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                  *** End of Transmission ***