TCR_Public/130303.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

               Sunday, March 3, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 61

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2006-10: S&P Withdraws 'CC' Rating on Class G Notes
ANDERSON MEZZANINE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Class S Notes to 'Ca(sf)'
ASSET SECURITIZATION: Moody's Cuts PS-1 Cert Rating to Caa2
ATRIUM IX: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2002-X1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on XC Certs

BANC OF AMERICA 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class N Certs
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-2: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class J Notes
BEXAR COUNTY 2001A: Moody's Keeps Underlying Ratings at Caa3
BLC CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC-'
BWAY 2013-1515: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class F Notes

C-BASS CBO IX: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Class C and D Notes
CABELA: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class D Fixed-Rate Notes
CARLYLE HIGH YIELD: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
CASTLE GARDEN: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Ba1'
CASTLE HOLDING 1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Notes to 'Caa1'

CAVALRY CLO II: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class E Notes
CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class A-J Certificates to Csf
CFIP CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
COBALT CMBS 2007-C2: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'C'
COMM 1999-1: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3' Rating on Cl. X Certificates

CORNERSTONE 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC-'
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKN2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class F Certs to 'D'
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKS4: Moody's Cuts Rating on A-X Certs to Caa3
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class L Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-TFL1: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 13 CMBS Classes

CREDIT SUISSE 2013-TH1: Fitch Rates Class B-4 Certs. 'BB'
DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating for Cl. S Certs
FAIRFIELD STREET 2004-1: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 11 Debt Classes
FIRST UNION: Fitch Lowers Ratings on Class N Notes to 'D'
FIRST UNION-LEHMAN 1997-C1: Moody's Cuts IO Certs Rating to Caa3

GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C2: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. X Certs
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2001-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. H Certs
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Cl. E Certs to 'C'
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2005-FL3: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 3 Tranches
GS MORTGAGE 2006-CC1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Note Classes

GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG8: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class N Cert. to 'Csf'
HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
ING IM 2012-3: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
INWOOD PARK: Moody's Hikes Rating on $50MM Notes to 'Ba2'
JAMESTOWN CLO II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

JP MORGAN 2001-CIBC2: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
JP MORGAN 2013-C10: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Class F Certs.
JP MORGAN 2013-C10: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
KATONAH V: Moody's Retains 'Ca' Rating on $9.25MM Notes
KVK CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to $27.23MM Class E Notes

LANDGROVE SYNTHETIC: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class C2 Notes
LB-UBS 2007-C7: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certificates
LCM XIII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
LEHMAN BROS: S&P Puts 'CCC+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
LIGHTPOINT CLO 2004-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'

LNR CDO 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 7 Note Classes
MADISON PARK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB'
MAGNETITE VI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
MARATHON CLO IV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $16.4MM Class D Notes
MARKET SQUARE: Moody's Lifts Rating on $8.25MM Notes to 'Baa3'

MERRILL LYNCH 1997-C2: Moody's Retains Caa2 Rating on Cl. IO Certs
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C3: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. IO Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY 1997-C1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on X-1 Certs
NATIONSLINK 1999-1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on Class X Certs
NATIONSLINK 1998-2: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. X Certs

NF CLO XIV: Moody's Hikes Rating on $11.25MM Certs. to 'Ba2'
OHA PARK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $28.13-Mil. Notes
ONE WALL STREET III: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes
PARCS MASTER: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. 2007-18 Piedmont Debt to D
PEGASUS 2007-1: Fitch Cuts Ratings Two CBMS Classes to 'Bsf'

PHOENIX CDO II: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Two Note Classes
PUTNAM 2001-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. B Notes to 'Ba2'
R.E. REPACK 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class A Notes
SIERRA TIMESHARE: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class C Notes
SLATER MILL: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

SORIN REAL III: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Five Note Classes
SPIRIT MASTER: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 4 Note Classes
SPRINGLEAF FINANCE: S&P Puts 'CCC' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
SOUTH COAST IV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class A-2 Notes
SOUTHFORK CLO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $36MM Cl. C Notes

STRIPS III: S&P Lowers Rating on Class N Notes to 'B-'
TELOS CLO 2013-3: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Notes
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C5: Fitch Rates Class F Certificates 'Bsf'
VENTURE X: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class F Notes
WAVE 2007-1: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'Ca'

ZOHAR III: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Ratings on Three Note Classes
ZOHAR CDO 2003-1: Moody's Withdraws 'Ca' Rating  on Class A Notes

* Moody's Takes Ratings Action on $155.3MM Alt-A RMBS Tranches
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $96 Million of 2004 RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $295-Mil. of US Alt-A RMBS Tranches
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 129 Subprime RMBS Tranches
* Moody's Takes Actions on $389 Million Worth of RMBS Tranches

* Moody's Takes Actions on 24 Scratch-and-Dent RMBS Tranches
* S&P Puts 5 Ratings on 4 US CDO of TRuPs on CreditWatch Positive
* S&P Affirms 4 Ratings on 8 US CDO Cash Flow Trust Transactions
* S&P Lowers Rating on 321 Classes from 175 U.S. RMBS to 'D'
* S&P Lowers 180 Ratings from 68 US RMBS Re-REMIC Transactions

* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on Synthetic CDOs


                            *********

ABACUS 2006-10: S&P Withdraws 'CC' Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
Class G Notes issued by Abacus 2006-10 Ltd., a synthetic corporate
investment-grade collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions.

The rating withdrawal follows the redemption of the notes.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING WITHDRAWN

Abacus 2006-10

               Rating  Rating
Classes        To      From
G              NR      CC (sf)

NR-Not Rated.


ANDERSON MEZZANINE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Class S Notes to 'Ca(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Anderson Mezzanine Funding 2007-1, Ltd.

  US$2,490,000 Class S Floating Rate Notes due July 2013 (current
  outstanding balance of $291,773.28), Downgraded to Ca (sf);
  previously on December 21, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$130,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes due July 2042
  (current outstanding balance of $106,516,107.88), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)/;

  US$53,000,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes due July 2042
  (current outstanding balance of $43,436,295.59), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$30,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due July 2042
  (current outstanding balance of $30,494,763.64), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$42,700,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due July 2042,
  Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to C
  (sf);

  US$16,775,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due July
  2042 (current outstanding balance of $24,458,214.67), Affirmed
  C (sf); previously on October 8, 2008 Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$11,090,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due July
  2042 (current outstanding balance of $14,625,759.38), Affirmed
  C (sf); previously on October 8, 2008 Downgraded to C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily due to the shortfalls in scheduled principal
amortization of the Class S Notes, and the short period of time
remaining until the final maturity of the Class S Notes in July
2013. As per the trustee report dated February 6, 2013, the Class
S Notes received a principal distribution of $17,182.89, instead
of the scheduled monthly principal amortization of $34,583.33.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio consists of five
defaulted RMBS securities with a notional of $11.3 million. The
expected cash flows from these securities are not likely to pay
down the notes in full at their stated maturity.

Anderson Mezzanine Funding 2007-1, Ltd is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of RMBS securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's did not use a cash flow model to analyze the default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool. Instead, Moody's
analyzed the transaction by assessing the ratings impact of,
various liquidation/recovery scenarios on the ratings of the
notes.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and the residential real
estate property markets. Among the uncertainties in the
residential real estate property market are those surrounding
future housing prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures,
loan modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.


ASSET SECURITIZATION: Moody's Cuts PS-1 Cert Rating to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one interest-
only class of Asset Securitization Corporation Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1997-
D4 as follows:

Cl. PS-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class PS-1, is due to the decline
in credit performance of its reference classes as a result of
principal pay downs of higher quality referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.7% of the
current balance. At last full review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 4.5%. The increase in the cumulative base
expected loss percentage is due to the deal being paid down over
66% from Moody's prior review. On a dollar basis the base expected
loss actually decreased to $5.8 million from $8.7 million at last
review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now
2.4% of the original pooled balance compared to 2.5% at last
review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of one compared to three at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's currently rates only
the IO class; the previous review was done on February 22, 2012
due to the change in the Moody's IO methodology. Prior to the
previous review a full review was done on March 9, 2011.

Deal Performance:

As of the January 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $66.4
million from $1.4 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 65% of the pool. One loan, representing 28% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

One loan, representing 65% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $28.5 million (average loss severity
of 19%). One loan is currently in special servicing. Moody's is
expecting a significant loss from the specially serviced loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for the one non-specially serviced and non-
defeased loan. This loan is the Kmart Distribution Center Loan
($42.8 million -- 64.5% of the pool), which is secured by two
warehouse/distribution centers totaling 2.8 million square feet
(SF). The loan is fully amortizing. One property is located in
Brighton, Colorado, which is approximately 22 miles northeast of
Denver and the second property is located in Greensboro, North
Carolina. The properties are 100% leased to Kmart through Arch
2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 60% and 1.80X,
respectively, compared to 66% and 1.64X at last review. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.0% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.


ATRIUM IX: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Atrium
IX/Atrium IX LLC's $747.75 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior-secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.3950%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees, subordinated hedge
      termination payments, portfolio manager incentive fees, and
      subordinated note payments to principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period and to reduce the balance of the rated
      notes outstanding, sequentially, after the reinvestment
      period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1258.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Atrium IX/Atrium IX LLC

Class                      Rating           Amount
                                          (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)         522.00
B-1                        AA (sf)           52.00
B-2                        AA (sf)           35.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)            66.50
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)          38.25
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)           34.00
Subordinated notes         NR                84.25

NR-Not rated.


BANC OF AMERICA 2002-X1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on XC Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one interest-only
class of Banc of America Structured Securities Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-X1 as follows:

Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's currently only rates the Class XC, the interest-only
class. The affirmation is due to the credit quality of the
remaining principal bond, which the IO references.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 23.4% of
the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 26.0%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 5.9% of the original pooled balance compared to 5.6%
at last review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit assessments for the principal classes could decline below
their current levels. If future performance materially declines,
the expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are in
recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter, amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class XC.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 11 compared to 16 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output. The rating
action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative
tools -- MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial
Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a
comprehensive review. Moody's currently rates only the IO class;
the previous review was done on February 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 11, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $10.2
million from $287.8 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 41% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
99% of the pool. There is one loan in the pool, representing
approximately 1% of the pool, that is securitized by US Government
securities.

No loans are currently on the Master Servicer's watch list.
Sixteen have been liquidated since securitization, which have
generated a loss of $14.6 million (27% average loss severity).
Currently, there are four loans in special servicing, representing
56% of the pool, for which Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of
$2.29 million loss (40% expected loss on average) at this time.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 79% and 70% of the pool's non-specially
serviced and non-defeased loans, respectively. Excluding specially
serviced loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 58% compared to
93% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 11%.

Excluding special serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.43X and 2.17X, respectively, compared to 1.12X and
1.45X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 36% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Pennsylvania Place Apartment Loan ($2.73 million -- 26.7% of
the pool), which is secured by a 152-unit multi-family property
located in Forth Worth, Texas. As of December 2012, the property
was 94% leased compared to 92% last review. Overall, the property
performance is stable and the loan has benefitted from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.47X,
respectively, compared to 69% and 1.48X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Madison Parkway Apartments Loan
($0.59 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 32-unit
multi-family property located in Plainfield, New Jersey. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 26% and 4.22X, respectively, compared to
25% and 4.42X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Post Office -- White Pine Loan
($0.34 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 5,000
square foot property located in White Pine, Tennessee that is 100%
leased to the US Postal Service through June 2019. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 56% and 2.03X, respectively, compared to 67% and
1.68X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class N Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes and affirmed eight
classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-1.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses due to
further deterioration in performance, most notably on loans in
special servicing. The Negative Rating Outlooks reflect the
uncertainty related to the expected losses of specially serviced
loans coupled with high concentration of near-term maturities.
Fitch modeled losses of 7.0% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 6.6%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $25.6 million (1.9% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 18 loans (23.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes four specially serviced assets (8.7%).

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 32.7% to $892.6 million from
$1.33 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 10 loans
(7.9% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 287,111 sf office
property (2.9% of the pool) located in Troy, MI. The asset is real
estate owned (REO) as of February 2012. The property was 10.4%
occupied as of YE 2012 with limited leasing activity due to the
weakness of the market. Fitch expects significant losses upon
disposition of the asset.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 347,547 sf
retail property (4.3%) located in Reno, NV. The loan transferred
to special servicing in November 2011 due to imminent default. The
center has been suffering from occupancy issues due to a dark
grocery anchor. Additionally, several tenants vacated at lease
expiration in 2012. The servicer has contacted the borrower to
discuss potential workout proposals. The loan was current as of
the January 2013 payment date.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a 328,237 sf
retail property (3.9%) located in Hillsborough, NJ. Occupancy for
the center declined in 2010 due to the grocery anchor tenant
vacating as a result of bankruptcy proceedings. The space has
since been backfilled by another grocery tenant anticipated to
open in 2013. With the commencement of the new tenant, occupancy
for the property is expected to be 98%. The loan was current as of
the January 2013 payment date and is with the master servicer.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) and Rating Outlooks as indicated:

-- $13.3 million class C to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook
    Negative;
-- $29.9 million class D to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Negative;
-- $13.3 million class E to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook
    Negative;
-- $18.2 million class F to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $11.6 million class G to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf', RE 0%;
-- $19.9 million class H to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $6.6 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes but revises the Rating Outlook
as indicated:

-- $31.5 million class B at 'AAAsf', Outlook to Negative from
    Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $207.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $514.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $6.6 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $8.3 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $8.3 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $2.6 million class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3 and X-P have paid in full. Fitch does not
rate the class P certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class XC certificates.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-2: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class J Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction,
including the ratings on the interest-only class.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets and the
transaction-level changes.  In addition, S&P also considered the
volume of nondefeased and nonspecially serviced near-term maturing
loans that are scheduled to mature through Dec. 31, 2014 (44
loans, $438.1 million, 85.1% of the trust balance).

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class XC interest-only
(IO) certificate based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-2

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-4        AAA (sf)                          31.28
A-5        AAA (sf)                          31.28
B          AA+ (sf)                          26.03
C          AA (sf)                           23.54
D          A+ (sf)                           18.84
E          A (sf)                            16.62
F          A- (sf)                           13.58
G          BBB+ (sf)                         11.65
H          BBB-(sf)                           8.61
J          BB+ (sf)                           7.78
K          BB (sf)                            6.67
L          BB- (sf)                           5.57
M          B+ (sf)                            4.18
N          B (sf)                             3.63
O          B- (sf)                            3.08
XC         AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


BEXAR COUNTY 2001A: Moody's Keeps Underlying Ratings at Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed the underlying ratings of Bexar County (TX)
Housing Finance Corporation Housing Revenue Bonds (Nob Hill
Apartments Project) Series 2001A at Caa3 and Series 2001B at C.
The outlook remains negative on the Series 2001A bonds.

Rating Rationale

The rating affirmations are based on an underfunded debt service
reserve fund for the Senior Bonds, continued default of the
subordinate bonds, and continued occupancy challenges at the Nob
Hill Apartments. Currently, approximately 9.2% of the units at Nob
Hill apartments are temporarily down as a result of a fire that
occurred in 2012 and water intrusion.

Strengths

- Financial performance on the project has improved and debt
   service was paid in full on the Senior Bonds on the December
   1, 2012 interest payment date.

- The debt service reserve fund for the Senior Bonds, while
   depleted, remains partially funded.

- The Project receives contributions from the American
   Opportunity for Housing, Inc.

Challenges

  - A fire in 2012 and water intrusion reduced occupancy levels
    for the Project.

  - The Series B bonds are in default and the Series B debt
    service reserve fund is depleted.

Outlook

The outlook on the bonds remains negative to reflect the occupancy
challenges for the of the Project and the uncertainties around the
operating performance of the Project in 2013.

What Could Change The Rating -- UP

- Substantial increase in debt service coverage and repayment of
   all amounts due

- Replenishment of reserves

What Could Change The Rating -- DOWN

- Further deterioration of financial indicators

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Housing
Projects published in July 2010.


BLC CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on BLC
Capital Corp.'s series 2002-A class A notes to 'CCC+ (sf)' from
'BB+ (sf)' and B notes to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

BLC Capital Corp. 2002-A is an asset-backed securities transaction
collateralized primarily by a pool of small business development
loans.

The credit performance of the transaction has deteriorated since
S&P's last rating actions in June 2011, as evidenced by an
increase in the cumulative net losses the portfolio has realized.
The cumulative net losses for the transaction were $4.82 million
according to the January 2013 servicer report, up from
$1.92 million, in May 2011 servicer report that S&P used for its
June 2011 review.

According to the January 2013 servicer report, the portfolio has
seven loans remaining.  The two largest loans represent more than
50% of the collateral pool, increasing the transaction's  exposure
to concentration risks in the underlying portfolio.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the current ratings on both transactions remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support the ratings and take
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

BLC Capital Corp.
2002-A
                               Rating
Class                To                   From
A                    CCC+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                    CCC- (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg


BWAY 2013-1515: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to BWAY 2013-1515's $900.0 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2013-1515.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $900.0 million commercial mortgage loan
secured by the fee interest in 1515 Broadway, a 1.66 million-sq.-
ft. (excluding the 72,355-sq.-ft. parking garage) class A high-
rise office building located in Midtown Manhattan, N.Y.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 22,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 82.1% and an ending LTV
ratio of 66.6%, based on Standard & Poor's value.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1329.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BWAY 2013-1515

Class       Rating(i)               Amount
                                       ($)
A-1         AAA (sf)           164,512,000
A-2         AAA (sf)           298,592,000
X-A         AAA (sf)       463,104,000(ii)
X-B         BBB- (sf)      336,496,000(ii)
B           AA- (sf)           126,056,000
C           A- (sf)            109,600,000
D           BBB (sf)            54,810,000
E           BBB- (sf)           46,030,000
F           BB (sf)             90,986,000
G           BB- (sf)             9,414,000

(i) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
     buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.


C-BASS CBO IX: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Class C and D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of notes issued by C-BASS
CBO IX, Ltd./Corp (C-BASS IX) as follows:

-- $17,828,900 class A-2 notes at 'CCCsf';
-- $10,000,000 class B notes at 'CCsf';
-- $12,000,000 class C notes at 'Csf';
-- $7,227,634 class D notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch
also considered additional qualitative factors in its analysis, as
described below, to conclude the rating affirmations for the rated
notes.

Key Rating Drivers

At the last payment date in January 2013, the class A-1 notes
Paid-In-Full and the class A- 2 notes received their first
principal distribution. The affirmation for the class A-2 notes is
due to the amortization of the notes increasing credit enhancement
to offset any negative migration in the underlying portfolio. The
class has received approximately $2.2 million or 10.9% of its
previous balance since the last review. The affirmation is in line
with the breakeven levels from the cash flow model.

Since Fitch's last rating action in March 2012, the credit quality
of the collateral has deteriorated with approximately 42.9% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 4.4 notches.
Approximately 86.4% of the portfolio has a Fitch-derived rating
below investment grade and 64.2% rated in the 'CCC' category or
lower, compared to 71.1% and 52.7%, respectively, at last review.

Breakeven levels for the class B, C, and D notes were below SF
PCM's 'CCC' default level, the lowest level of defaults projected
by SF PCM. Therefore Fitch compared the classes' credit
enhancement level to the expected losses from distressed and
defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). Based
on this comparison, the ratings for each of the classes are
affirmed.

Rating Sensitivities

The transaction remains sensitive to further negative migration
and increasing concentration in assets of a weaker credit quality.
Moreover, interest coming off defaulted bonds which currently
contributes to the A-2 notes' paydown may not be sustainable at
the same levels in the future.

C-BASS IX is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on March 23, 2004. The portfolio
is currently monitored by NIC Management LLC, an affiliate of
Newcastle Investment Corp. and consists of 85% residential
mortgage-backed securities, 12.9% commercial and consumer asset-
backed securities, and 2.1% SF CDOs from 2001 through 2004 vintage
transactions.


CABELA: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class D Fixed-Rate Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings to Cabela's
Credit Card Master Note Trust's asset-backed notes, series 2013-I,
as follows:

-- $255,000,000 class A fixed-rate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,000,000 class B fixed-rate 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,750,000 class C fixed-rate 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,250,000 class D fixed-rate 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch's expected ratings are based on the underlying receivables
pool, available credit enhancement, World's Foremost Bank's
underwriting and servicing capabilities, and the transaction's
legal and cash flow structures, which employ early redemption
triggers.

The transaction structure is similar to series 2012-II, with
credit enhancement totaling 15% for class A, credit enhancement of
7% for the class B, credit enhancement of 2.75% plus an amount
from a spread account for the class C, and credit enhancement of
an amount from a spread account for the class D notes only.


CARLYLE HIGH YIELD: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII, Ltd.:

  US$19,000,000 Class A-2-B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
  Due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 7, 2011
  Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  US$34,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 7, 2011
  Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  US$34,250,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
  (current outstanding balance of $28,492,924.04), Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf); previously on September 7, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$189,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 7, 2011
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  US$170,000,000 Class A-2-A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
  Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 31, 2006
  Assigned Aaa (sf)

  US$28,750,000 Class C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  2021, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on September 7, 2011
  Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in May 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread and diversity levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
September 2011. Moody's modeled a WAS of 3.84% and diversity of 75
compared to 2.96% and 60 at the time of the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $498.0 million,
defaulted par of $9.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.43% (implying a WARF of 2753), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.08%, and a diversity
score of 75. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2202)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2-A: 0
Class A-2-B: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +3
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3304)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2-A: 0
Class A-2-B: -1
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


CASTLE GARDEN: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Castle Garden Funding:

US$379,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 27, 2020
(current outstanding balance of $264,726,210), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$150,000,000 Class A-2 Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes Due
October 27, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $104,772,906),
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

US$12,000,000 Class A-3b Floating Rate Notes Due October 27, 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

US$39,500,000 Class A-4 Floating Rate Notes Due October 27, 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

US$25,500,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October
27, 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 26, 2011
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due October
27, 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 26, 2011
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 27, 2020,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf)

US$12,500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due October 27, 2020,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf)

US$15,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 27, 2020,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf)

US$1,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due October 27, 2020,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

US$105,000,000 Class A-3a Floating Rate Notes Due October 27, 2020
(current outstanding balance of $69,722,867), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-1,
Class A-2 and Class A-3 Notes have been paid down by approximately
$114 million, $45 million and $35 million, respectively or 30%,
30% and 34%, respectively since the last rating action. Based on
the latest trustee report dated January 25, 2013, the Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 134.92%, 123.47%, 115.91% and 112.75%, respectively,
versus June 2011 levels of 122.91%, 115.26%, 109.99% and 107.74%,
respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Moody's adjusted WARF has increase
to 2987 from 2790 since the last rating action due to an increase
in the percentage of securities with ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook."

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $668 million,
defaulted par of $6.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.76% (implying a WARF of 2987), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.09%, and a diversity
score of 71. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Castle Garden Funding, issued in October 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2389)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3a: 0

Class A-3b: 0

Class A-4: 0

Class B-1: +3

Class B-2: +3

Class C-1: +3

Class C-2: +3

Class D-1: +2

Class D-2: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3854)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3a: 0

Class A-3b: 0

Class A-4: -2

Class B-1: -3

Class B-2: -3

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


CASTLE HOLDING 1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Notes to 'Caa1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of the following
notes:

Issuer: Castle Holding Trust 1

  Up to US$355,000,000 Class A-1 Notes (Trust 1), Downgraded to
  Caa3; previously on October 16, 2012 Downgraded to Caa1.

  Underlying Securities: $355MM Texas Competitive Electric
  Holdings 2017 Term Loan

  Up to US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Notes (Trust 1), Downgraded to
  Caa3; previously on October 16, 2012 Downgraded to Caa1.

  Underlying Securities: $50MM Texas Competitive Electric
  Holdings 2017 Deposit L/C Loan

Issuer: Castle Holding Trust 2

  Up to US$45,000,000 Class A-1 Notes (Trust 2), Downgraded to
  Caa3; previously on October 16, 2012 Downgraded to Caa1.

  Underlying Securities : $45MM Texas Competitive Electric
  Holdings 2017 Term Loan

Ratings Rationale

The transactions are structured notes whose ratings are based on
the rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction. The rating action is the result of the change of
the rating of the underlying securities issued by Texas
Competitive Electric Holdings Company LLC., which were downgraded
to Caa3 by Moody's on February 26 , 2013.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the ratings are a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying securities.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


CAVALRY CLO II: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned ratings to Cavalry CLO
II Ltd./Cavalry CLO II LLC's $409 million notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated, speculative-grade, senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis
      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
      various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.3909%-12.5332%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1340.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cavalry CLO II Ltd./Cavalry CLO II LLC

Class                 Rating           Amount
                                      (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)        279.00
B-1                   AA (sf)          44.00
B-2                   AA (sf)          16.50
C (deferrable)        A (sf)           26.50
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)         21.50
E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)         21.50
Subordinated notes    NR               46.33

NR-Not rated.


CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class A-J Certificates to Csf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed 21 classes
of CD Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2007-CD4 due to further deterioration of
performance, most of which involves increased loss expectations on
the specially serviced assets.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 18.1% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 15.9%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $104.3 million (1.6% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 94 loans (27.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 34 specially serviced assets (20.3%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 19.6% to $5.34 billion from
$6.64 billion at issuance. No loans have defeased since issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes A-J through S.

The largest contributors to expected losses are two regional mall
assets, Citadel Mall (2.7% of the pool) and Northwest Arkansas
Mall (2.4%). The two assets were originally crossed as a
portfolio. The malls are located in Colorado Springs, CO and
Fayetteville, AR. The loans transferred to special servicing in
October 2009 due to imminent default and are currently both real
estate owned (REO).

The anchors at the Citadel Mall, all of which own their own space,
are JCPenney and Dillard's. Inline occupancy including temporary
tenants is currently 96%; 60% excluding temporary tenants and 94%
overall. Current inline sales at the mall are approximately $330
per square foot (psf).

The anchors at the Northwest Arkansas Mall are Dillard's (not part
of the collateral), JCPenney and Sears. Inline occupancy is
currently 94% including temporary tenants; 84% excluding temporary
tenants and 97% overall. Current inline sales at the mall are
approximately $190 psf.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Riverton Apartments (4.2% of the pool), which is secured
by a class B, rent-stabilized multifamily housing project,
consisting of 1,228 units, located in Harlem, NY. The loan
transferred to special servicing in August 2008 due to imminent
default and is currently REO

Per the special servicer, the asset is performing well as their
focus has been on maintaining occupancy. The special servicer was
able to recover several low paying rent stabilized units last year
which has enabled them to renovate and re-lease the units at
market rent. The asset is currently 98% occupied.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Loews Lake Las Vegas (2.2%), which is secured by a 493
room full-service hotel located in Lake Las Vegas, NV, 13 miles
east of the Las Vegas strip. The property is an attractive resort
with usual amenities, but does not have a casino. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2009 due to imminent
default and is currently REO.

Per the special servicer, the asset is now operating as a Westin
hotel following a rebranding of the property. Although performance
has seen some improvement in 2012, the property continues to
underperform its competitive set. Per the December 2012 Smith
Travel Research (STR) report, the trailing 12 month (TTM)
occupancy is 37.4%, with an average daily rate (ADR) $128.89, and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) of $48.20 compared to 64.7%,
$109.68, and $70.91 for its competitive set.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings of the investment grade classes are expected to remain
stable. The distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected to be subject to further downgrades as losses are
realized. The 'BB' rated classes, while expected to be stable may
be subject to further rating actions should realized losses be
greater or less than Fitch's expectations. Furthermore, due to the
high volume of special serviced assets any prolonged workouts may
result in increased fees and expenses, leading to further
downgrades.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $595 million class A-MFX to 'BBsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $65 million class A-MFL to 'BBsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $585.7 million class A-J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 45%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $226.6 million class A-2B at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $464.2 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $134.9 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $1.7 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $861.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $40.5 million class WFC-X at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.7 million class WFC-1 at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.7 million class WFC-2 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.1 million class WFC-3 at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.2 million class B at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $90.7 million class C at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $57.7 million class D at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $41.2 million class E at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $49.5 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $66 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $74.2 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $66 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $74.2 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $24.7 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $16.5 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $16.5 million class N at 'Csf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2A certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class O, P, Q and S certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class XP, XC and XW
certificates.

Classes WFC-1, WFC-2, and WFC-3 and the interest only WFC-X is
backed by the B-note of One World Financial Center. The classes
are affirmed due to the stable performance.


CFIP CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to CFIP
CLO 2013-1 Ltd./CFIP CLO 2013-1 LLC's $370.50 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      income notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.30%-11.36%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1343.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED
CFIP CLO 2013-1 Ltd./CFIP CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                Rating            Amount (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)                   258.00
B                    AA (sf)                     44.75
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                      30.00
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                    19.25
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                     18.50
Income notes         NR                          42.21

NR-Not rated.


COBALT CMBS 2007-C2: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine classes and affirmed 13 classes
of COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust's (COBALT) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C2 due to increased
loss expectations on specially serviced loans and further
deterioration of loan performance.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 12.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 12.5%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $61.7 million (2.6% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 63 loans (47.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 12 specially serviced assets (20.4%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 18% to $1.98 billion from
$2.42 billion at issuance. No loans have defeased since issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes F through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Peter Cooper Village/Stuyvesant Town (PCV/ST) loan (12.6%
of the pool), which is secured by 56 multi-story apartment
buildings, situated on 80 acres, and includes a total of 11,227
units. The special servicer gained control of the property by
acquiring the mezzanine debt of the borrower. The special servicer
reports that as of third-quarter 2012, the property was 99%
leased. Performance has continued to improve which can be somewhat
attributed to lower labor costs and management fees. A settlement
has been reached in the Roberts Litigation. This settlement
appears to be a positive in the resolution of the loan as it
addresses amounts due on historical and future rents. However
Fitch Ratings expects the workout will continue for at least the
next 18 - 24 months as finding a new buyer will likely be
difficult until appeals and final rulings occur. The property is
also still undergoing some repairs to the basements of the
buildings from Hurricane Sandy. The special servicer reports that
all damages should be recovered through ample insurance proceeds.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a loan (2.1%),
which is secured by a 15-story, 293-key full-service hotel located
in Fort Lauderdale, FL. The property's performance continues to
struggle due to pricing pressures from new competition entering
the market over the last several years. The servicer reports that
occupancy has remained consistent over the last couple of years at
72% as of year-end 2012. The year-end 2011 DSCR was 1.15x and is
expected to drop further in 2012 as the loan began amortizing in
May 2012.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced real estate owned (REO) asset (1.2%), which is secured by
a 135,285 square foot (sf) grocery anchor retail center in Ormond
Beach, FL. The loan transferred to special servicing in August
2010 for imminent default due to a large tenant vacating the
property. Foreclosure occurred in March 2012. The special servicer
reported that the property is 88% occupied and is working toward
90-92% occupancy before listing for sale.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings to the super senior classes are expected to remain
stable. The A-M classes may be subject to a downgrade if there is
further deterioration to the pool's cash flow performance and/or
decrease in value of the specially serviced loans. The distressed
classes (those rated below B) are expected to be subject to
further downgrades as losses are realized. The distressed classes
are also subject to further downgrades if losses to specially
serviced loans are higher than expected.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $102.6 million class A-JFX to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf', RE 90%;
-- $100 million class A-JFL to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf', RE 90%;
-- $21.2 million class B to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $27.2 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $21.2 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $15.1 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $18.1 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $30.2 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $24.2 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $7.8 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $857.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $454 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $221.9 million class A-MFX at 'AAAsf', Outlook to Negative
    from Stable;
-- $20 million class A-MFL at 'AAAsf', Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $24.2 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $30.2 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $7.9 million class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class S certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


COMM 1999-1: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3' Rating on Cl. X Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one interest-only
class of COMM 1999-1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-1 as follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
performance of its reference classes and thus is affirmed. The IO
class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class in this
transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 16.5% of
the current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 4.1% of the original pool balance. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit assessments for the principal
classes could decline below their current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected credit assessments
of the referenced tranches may be insufficient to support the
current ratings of the interest-only classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's currently rates only
IO class; the previous review was done on February 22, 2012 due to
the change in the Moody's IO methodology. Prior to the previous
review, a full review was done on October 17, 2007.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $14.0
million from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 30% of the pool. Two loans, representing 43% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

One loan, representing 25% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $51 million (51% loss severity on
average). One loan, representing 29% of the pool, is currently in
special servicing. The Fiesta Crossing Loan ($4.1 million -- 29.3%
of the pool), is secured by 79,252 square foot (SF) retail
property located in Mesa, Arizona. The property was 53% leased as
of June 2012 with reported DSCR at 0.8X. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in October 2012 for monetary default. Moody's
has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 24.6% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $2.3 million loss (31% expected loss on
average) from the specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% of the two non-specially serviced and
non-defeased loans.

The largest loan is the Westhill Plaza Shopping Center Loan ($3.4
million -- 24.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 108,407 SF
shopping center located in Grand Chute, Wisconsin. The property
was 66% leased as of December 2011. The loan is on the servicer
watchlist due to low DSCR and occupancy. The loan matures in June
2013. Due to a poor performance and a near term refinancing risk,
the loan was recognized as a troubled one. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 125% and 0.86X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Oak Hill Storage Facility Loan
($0.5 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 61,375
SF self-storage facility located in Austin, Texas. The property
was 100% leased as of September 2012. Performance has been stable.
The loan has amortized 66% since securitization and matures in
June 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 16% and 6.3X.


CORNERSTONE 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 PLC's class B and C notes.  At the same
time, S&P has lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its
rating on the class A2 notes and affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on
the class D and E notes.  S&P's 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class A1
notes remain unaffected by today's rating actions.

The rating actions reflect S&P's opinion of the effect of cash
flow disruptions in the transaction.  As the January 2013 cash
manager report reflects, the class A2 to E notes have deferred
unpaid interest.  As of January 2013, the cumulative amount of
deferred interest under these classes of notes is EUR3.0 million.

S&P understands that the excess spread distributed to the unrated
class X notes is not available to mitigate interest shortfalls for
the other classes of notes in this transaction.  The issuer relies
on servicer advances to address the timely payment of interest on
the class A1 and A2 to E notes.  However, under the transaction
documents, the back-up advance provider cannot make advances to
cover interest shortfalls if the shortfalls result from:

   -- Extraordinary expenses payable to the transaction parties
      (for example, special servicing fees); or

   -- The reduction of servicing advances.

S&P believes that it might be difficult to refinance individual
loans, and S&P therefore considers that the number of loans in
special servicing will likely increase.  In S&P's view, this
refinancing challenge combined with impending lease rollovers and
a decreasing floating interest-rate may exacerbate the risk of
cash flow disruptions to the senior classes of notes on future
payment dates.

                          RATING ACTIONS

S&P's ratings address the timely payment of interest quarterly in
arrears, and the payment of principal no later than the legal
final maturity date in January 2017.

On Dec. 6, 2012, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its rating on
the class A2 notes following the application of S&P's updated
criteria for rating European commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transactions.

S&P has lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its rating on the class A2 notes because this
class of notes experienced an interest shortfall on the January
2013 payment date.  S&P has not lowered its rating on the class A2
notes to 'D (sf)', because the existing shortfall remains minor,
in S&P's view.

S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the
class B notes because this class of notes experienced interest
shortfalls on the January 2013 payment date.  S&P has not lowered
its rating on the class B notes to 'D (sf)', because the existing
shortfall remains minor, in S&P's view.

S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the
class C notes because this class of notes is highly vulnerable to
principal losses under its base case scenario, and experienced an
interest shortfall on the January 2013 payment date.

At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the
class D and E notes because these classes of notes continue to
experience interest shortfalls.

S&P's existing rating on the class A1 notes already incorporates
its view of liquidity risks associated with this class of notes.
Therefore, S&P's rating on this class of notes is unaffected by
the rating actions.

S&P is likely to take further rating actions if interest
shortfalls continue.

Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 is a European CMBS transaction that
closed in March 2007.  It is currently secured on 21 pan-European
commercial real estate loans.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
           To               From

Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 PLC
EUR1.322 Billion Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2         B (sf)           BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

B          CCC- (sf)        B- (sf)
C          D (sf)           CCC-(sf)

Ratings Affirmed

D          D (sf)
E          D (sf)

Rating Unaffected

A1         A+ (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKN2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class F Certs to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC (sf)' on the class F certificates from Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2002-CKN2, a U.S.
CMBS transaction.

"We lowered our rating on class F to 'D (sf)' to reflect principal
losses due to the liquidation of two assets.  The trust incurred a
total principal loss of $ 13,343,327 according to the Feb. 15,
2013, trustee remittance report from the liquidation of two
specially serviced assets, Gateway Office Building and Tollway
Center II & III.  Consequently, class F sustained a principal loss
of $5,284,560, representing 38.4% of its $13,772,000 beginning
balance.  Class G, which we previously downgraded to 'D (sf)',
lost 100% of its $8,058,767 beginning balance," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKS4: Moody's Cuts Rating on A-X Certs to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class,
downgraded one class and affirmed three classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates 2002-CKS4 as follows:

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade is due to increased credit subordination from payoffs
and amortization. The deal has paid down 94% since last review.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class A-X, is downgraded based on the
credit performance of the security's referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 46% of the
current pooled balance compared to 5% at last review. The
significant increase in base expected loss is due to the deal
paying down 94% since last review. Moody's based expected loss
plus realized losses is now 8.2% of the original pooled balance
compared to 8.7% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand with
a growing renter base and declining home ownership. Recovery in
the office sector continues at a measured pace with minimal
additions to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 18 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Since 90% of the pool is in special servicing, Moody's also
utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating this deal. In this
approach, Moody's determines a probability of default for each
specially serviced loan and determines a most probable loss given
default based on a review of recent third-party data and/or
broker's opinions of value (if available), other information from
the special servicer and available market data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration servicer
advances to date and estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST    Reports and a proprietary program that
highlights significant credit changes that have occurred in the
last month as well as cumulative changes since the last full
transaction review. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs a
full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated February 16, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $44
million from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to
44% of the pool, with the top three loans representing 84% of the
pool.

Thirty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $81 million (34% average loss
severity). Six loans, representing 90% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Forum at Gateways Loan ($19.4 million -- 44% of the pool), which
is secured by a 258,300 square foot (SF) retail property located
in Sterling Heights, Michigan. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in July 2010 for imminent default and is currently real
estate owned (REO). The master servicer recognized a $9.5 million
appraisal reduction for this loan in February 2013.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Williamsburg
Crossing Loan ($12.2 million-28% of the pool), which is secured by
a 150,000 SF retail property located in Williamsburg, Virginia.
The asset is currently REO. The master servicer recognized a $7.9
million appraisal reduction for the loan in February 2013.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by three
multifamily and one office property. The servicer has recognized
an aggregate $18.1 million dollar appraisal reduction for four of
the specially serviced loans. Moody's has recognized an aggregate
$20.4 million loss (51% expected loss overall)

Based on the February remittance statement, classes H through J
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $1.6
million compared to $253 thousand at last review. Moody's
anticipates that the pool will continue to experience interest
shortfalls because of the exposure to specially serviced loans.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs), extraordinary trust expenses, loan
modifications that include either an interest rate reduction or a
non-accruing note component, and non-recoverability determinations
by the servicer that involve either a clawback of previously made
advances or a decision to stop making future advances.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 75% and 100% of the pool, respectively. The
only loan not in special servicing and in the conduit model is the
Best Buy- Sandy, Utah. ($4.3 million -- 9.8% of the pool) The Best
Buy loan has a Moody's LTV of 98% and stressed DSCR of 1.11X,
respectively.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class L Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., series 2005-C1 (CSFB 2005-C1),
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect stable performance and sufficient credit
enhancement to offset Fitch modeled losses for the pool. Fitch
modeled losses of 8.6% of the remaining pool; modeled losses of
the original pool are 8.7%, including losses already incurred to
date.

The Negative Rating Outlook on classes B, C, and D reflects
significant upcoming loan maturities in the pool and the
possibility for further underperformance on loans in the top 15
(27.7% of the remaining pool). Approximately 84% of the remaining
pool has a maturity date within the next three years, with
concentrations in 2014 (44.5% of pool) and 2015 (36.7%).

Fitch has designated 49 loans (47.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes five specially serviced loans (6.2%). Eleven of the
top 15 loans (36.5%) have Fitch stressed loan-to-values greater
than 90%. These loans may experience difficulties refinancing at
loan maturity. In addition, sponsor concentration exists for the
multifamily collateral (8.7%) in the top 15; this sponsor has
defaulted on prior securitized multifamily loans.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 33.7% of the original pool
balance to $1 billion from $1.51 billion at issuance.
Approximately 30.7% was due to principal paydowns and 3% was due
to realized losses. Fifteen loans (11.5%) have been fully defeased
since issuance. Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $4.8
million are currently affecting classes H through P.

The largest contributors to modeled losses are three (8.5%) of the
top 15 loans; two (5%) of which are currently specially serviced.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (3.5%) secured
by a 168,006 square foot (sf) retail and entertainment complex
located in downtown Manhattan. As of September 2012, the servicer-
reported occupancy was 63%, a slight improvement from the 58% at
year-end (YE) 2011, but still a significant decline from the 79%
and 98% reported at YE 2010 and at issuance, respectively.

Many of the property's original tenants have vacated. In the third
quarter of 2010, the second and third largest tenants (18% and
10%, respectively, of NRA) both terminated their leases and
vacated prior to lease expiration. However, multiple new leases,
predominately restaurant tenants, have been signed throughout 2011
and 2012, which helped to boost occupancy. Further, the largest
tenant renewed its lease until July 2016.

For the first nine months of 2012, the debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR), on a net operating income (NOI) basis, was 0.47x, an
improvement from a negative NOI DSCR of -0.04x at YE 2011, but
still representing a significant decline from the 1.34x reported
at issuance. The loan sponsor is covering debt service shortfalls
out of pocket.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially
serviced loan (3.3%) secured by a 305,887 sf anchored retail
property located in Yuba City, CA. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in March 2011 due to imminent default.

Two of the anchor tenants at the property have lease expirations
in 2015. Another tenant announced it would close all stores
nationally, which will result in a closure of the store at the
property. Legal counsel has been engaged and the special servicer
continues to gather information from the borrower and evaluate
possible workout strategies. The lender is in discussions with the
borrower on a potential A and B note loan modification.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially
serviced loan (1.6%) on a 76,916 sf retail property located in
Thousand Oaks, CA. The loan was transferred to special servicing
in April 2009 due to imminent default. The asset became real-
estate owned (REO) in January 2012.

The asset remains REO and unlisted. The special servicer is in the
process of working through the remainder of the leases at the
property as well as evictions of defaulted tenants. The former
borrower was extremely uncooperative and did not turn over any
leases, rent rolls, or operating statements. The special servicer
indicated there are several restaurant tenants interested in the
property. The best disposition strategy is still being determined
at this time.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

-- $15.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $674.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $92.5 million class A-J at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43.4 million class B at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $13.2 million class C at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $24.5 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $18.9 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $20.8 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $15.1 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $18.9 million class H at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $5.7 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $3.1 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full. Fitch does not rate class
P. Fitch had previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
classes A-X and A-SP.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-TFL1: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 13 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed 13 CMBS classes of Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2007-TFL1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Confirmed at B1
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of
the two interest-only classes, Class A-X-1 and Class A-X-2, are
consistent with the expected credit performance of their
referenced classes, and thus are affirmed.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class A-X-1
and Class A-X-2.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3
(sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating
committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated April 5, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 71%
to $373.0 million from $1.27 billion at securitization due to the
payoff of six loans, the liquidation of two loans and partial pay
downs of two of the three remaining floating rate loans in the
pool. The trust has experienced $145,839 in losses and accumulated
interest shortfalls total $109,578 affecting Classes K and L.

Moody's weighted average LTV for the pooled trust mortgage balance
is 123%, compared to 115% at last review. Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the pooled trust mortgage
balance is 1.16X compared to 1.23X at last review. Since last
review the SLS at Beverly Hills Loan in the amount of $53.0
million paid off in full on February 6, 2013.

The largest loan, the JW Marriott Las Vegas Resort & Spa Loan
($150.0 million -- 40% of the pooled balance), is secured by a
548-guestroom full-service hotel with a 56,750 square foot casino
and 44,396 square feet of retail/restaurant space. The hotel is
located in Summerlin (Las Vegas), Nevada and was constructed in
1999 and renovated in 2006. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in September 2011 as a result of imminent default. The
loan matured on November 9, 2011 and went into default as the
borrower failed to pay off the loan at maturity. The $160.0
million whole loan includes a $10.0 million junior participation
interest that is not included in the trust. An Appraisal Reduction
in the amount of $66,911,550 was applied on January 29, 2013.

The B-Note Holder, Galante Holdings, Inc. (Galante) exercised its
Fair Value Purchase Option equal to $84.6 million on December 16,
2011. Certificate holders of Classes K and L brought suit against
Galante, the special servicer and other parties seeking, among
other things, to block the sale. The property had been appraised
in November 2011 for an as-is value of $98.4 million. The sale was
scheduled to close in December 2011, but was stayed due to a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction issued by
the Supreme Court of the State of New York (the Court). The
temporary restraining order was dissolved and the Plaintiffs'
application for a preliminary injunction was denied and on appeal,
the Court's decision was affirmed. In October 2012 plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint with the Court. In December 2012 the
Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs' motion for permission to
appeal. The master servicer filed a cross-claim on December 17,
2012 against co-defendant Galante for a declaratory judgment as to
whether Galante was a Qualified Institutional Lender when it
acquired the Participation B interest. The special servicer
subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction to stay the sale
and Galante moved for a temporary restraining order to stay the
sale and the scheduled appraisal reduction event. In January 2013
the Court granted a preliminary injunction as to the sale but
denied the request to stay the scheduled appraisal reduction
event.

The loan is current for debt service payments and the servicer
continues to monitor use of cash to fund operating expenses to
maintain normal operations. Legal fees incurred by both the
special servicer and master servicer are to be reimbursed by the
trust. Moody's expects that the legal expenses will be paid from
principal and not cause an interruption of interest paid to the
certificate holders. Moody's credit assessment is C, the same as
last review.

The Hines Portfolio Loan ($123.4 million -- 33%) is secured by 17
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted properties with a total
of 1.6 million square feet. Twelve properties are located in
Silicon Valley (80%), with the remainder located on the San
Francisco Peninsula. Research and development (R&D) properties
account for 51%, followed by office (40%) and industrial (9%). The
loan was modified in September 2012. Significant terms of the loan
modification include an extension of the final maturity date to
February 9, 2015 and an exchange of the $30.0 million
Participation B-2 interest held by Torchlight Investors for an
equity interest. The borrower and Torchlight Investors jointly
funded $14.45 million into a newly formed reserve account to be
used for leasing and capital costs. On-going reserves are to be
funded up to $7.5 million from excess cash flow in addition to
$100,265 per month impounded for lease turnover. The $227.8
million whole loan includes a $104.5 million non-trust junior
secured loan component. As of November 2012 the portfolio was 75%
leased, the same as at securitization, compared to 59% at Moody's
last review. Moody's credit assessment is Caa2, the same as last
review.

The Renaissance Aruba Beach Resort & Casino Loan ($99.7. Million -
- 27%) is secured by a fee and leasehold interest in a full-
service hotel with 558-guestrooms (including 118 time-share
units), two casinos, two shopping centers and a private island.
The gaming component accounts for about 40% of total revenue. The
loan was modified in February 2012 with a principal pay down of
$15.9 million and an extension of the loan maturity date to June
9, 2014. The current whole loan balance of $158.1 million includes
a $58.4 million non-trust junior secured loan component. Trust
debt has paid down 22% since securitization. An additional loan
pay down of approximately $4.0 million is due and payable in June
2013. RevPAR for full-year 2012 was $130, a 3% decline from the
prior year. Total revenue in 2012 did not significantly change
from 2011. An increase in expenses resulted in a 6% decline in net
cash flow. Moody's credit assessment is Ba3, the same as last
review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2013-TH1: Fitch Rates Class B-4 Certs. 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings and Outlooks to Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s, mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2013-TH1 (CSMC 2013-TH1):

-- $392,437,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $392,437,000 notional class A-IO-1 certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $8,655,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,966,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,344,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,799,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the senior certificates reflects the 7.05%
subordination provided by the 2.05% class B-1, 1.65% class B-2,
1.05% class B-3, 0.90% non-offered class B-4 and 1.40% non-offered
class B-5. Class B-5 is not rated by Fitch.

Key Rating Drivers

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool that was
aggregated by Credit Suisse (CS) consists primarily of 30-year
fixed-rate, fully amortizing, and fully documented loans to
borrowers with strong credit profiles, low leverage, and
substantial liquid reserves. Third-party, loan-level due diligence
was conducted on 100% of the overall pool. As such, Fitch believes
the results of the review indicate strong controls.

Originators with Limited Performance History: The majority of the
pool was originated by lenders with limited non-agency performance
history. However, only two originators, representing 3.3% of the
pool, have not contributed to prior post-crisis RMBS
securitizations. Fitch has performed a full originator review on
originators who contributed over 50% of the pool. On an additional
10% of the pool, Fitch conducted a conference call with senior
staff to familiarize itself with the originators' underwriting
guidelines and procedures. Fitch believes the credit enhancement
(CE) on this transaction is sufficient to mitigate the originator
risk.

Limited Protection from CS Representations and Warranties (R&W)
Backstop: While the transaction benefits from notable rep and
warranty improvements relative to the CSMC 2012-CIM3 transaction
issued last year, Fitch believes that the backstop being provided
by Credit Suisse (CS) is weaker relative to those provided in
other Fitch rated post-crisis RMBS transactions due to the
inclusion of a 36-month sunset on a number of provisions and the
conditional clauses in the breach definition. CSMC 2013-TH1 does
benefit from life of loan reps being provided by each of the
lenders that are generally consistent with Fitch's criteria.

The transaction also does not provide for an automatic breach
review trigger. However, senior and subordinate investors can
direct the trustee to initiate loan reviews and enforce put-back
rights on loans that breach R&W covenants. Fitch accounted for the
weaker R&W features as part of its transaction analysis.

High Geographic Concentration: While the collateral pool has a
sizable geographic concentration risk in California (50%), the
properties are distributed across several metropolitan statistical
areas (MSA) in the state. Fitch applied a 1.05x lifetime default
expectation adjustment across the entire pool to account for the
geographic concentration risk.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating
sensitivities are only an indication of some of the potential
outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumed MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the 10%
projected by the sustainable home price (SHP) model. The analysis
indicated no rating impact with further 10% MVDs from the current
model projection. However, Fitch's analysis did indicate some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Another set of sensitivities was focused on areas where the model
projected lower home price declines than that of the overall
collateral pool. From the top ten contributing MSAs, Fitch
selected four regions with the lowest sustainable MVDs (sMVDs).
Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis assuming increased sMVDs of
10%, 15%, and 20% for these identified metropolitan areas. The
sensitivity analysis indicated no impact on ratings for all bonds
in each scenario.

CSMC 2013-TH1 will be Credit Suisse's first transaction of prime
residential mortgages in 2013. The aggregate pool included loans
originated from Quicken Loans (19%), PHH Mortgage (17%), BofI
Federal Bank (10%), First Savings Mortgage (10%), Skyline
Financial (9%), Caliber Funding (8%), Pinnacle Capital Mortgage
(5%), and Prospect Mortgage (5%). The remainder of the mortgage
loans was originated by various mortgage lending institutions,
each of which contributed less than 5% to the transaction.

As of Fitch's final collateral analysis, the aggregate pool
consisted of 555 loans with a total balance of $425,672,567; an
average balance of $766,978; a weighted average original combined
loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) of 68.2%, and a weighted average coupon
(WAC) of 3.99%. Rate/Term and cash out refinances account for
64.6% and 3.5% of the loans, respectively. The weighted average
original FICO credit score of the pool is 779. Owner-occupied
properties comprise 98.1% of the loans. The states that represent
the largest geographic concentration are California (50%),
Virginia (6.2%), and Washington (5.8%) As of the closing date,
five loans were removed from the pool resulting in a total pool
balance of $422,202,729.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as the master servicer and
Christiana Trust will act as the Trustee for the transaction. For
federal income tax purposes, elections will be made to treat the
trust as one or more real estate mortgage investment conduits
(REMICs).


DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating for Cl. S Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one interest-only
class of DLJ Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
1999-CG1 as follows:

Cl. S, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO class, Class S, is consistent with the credit
performance of its reference classes and thus is affirmed. The IO
class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class in this
transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 3.4% of the original pool balance. Depending on the timing
of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit assessments for the principal
classes could decline below their current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected credit assessments
of the referenced tranches may be insufficient to support the
current ratings of the interest-only classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's currently rates only
IO class; the previous review was done on February 22, 2012 due to
the change in the Moody's IO methodology. Prior to the previous
review a full review was done on June 25, 2009.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 11, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $27.4
million from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 34% of the pool. One loan, representing 5% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

One loan, representing 13% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $42 million (31% loss severity on
average). There are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% of the pool.

Moody's weighted average LTV is 67%. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.14X and 1.63X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 80% of the pool. The largest loan is
The Links at Bixby Loan ($9.3 million -- 34.0% of the pool), which
is secured by a 324 unit multifamily property located in Bixby,
Oklahoma. As of June 2012 occupancy was 100%. Performance has been
stable. The loan has amortized 36% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.47X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Shoppes at Longwood Loan ($9.1
million -- 33.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 136,200
square foot (SF) retail center located in Kennett Square,
Pennsylvania. As of June 2012 the property was 96% leased. The
loan has amortized 36% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 54% and 1.91X, respectively.

The third largest conduit loan is the U.S. Highway 441 at Glades
Rd. Loan ($3.6 million -- 13.2% of the pool), which is secured by
a 41,520 SF retail property located in Boca Raton, Florida. The
property was 100% leased as of June 2012. The property was
previously occupied by Linens N Things, which declared bankruptcy
in May 2008 and vacated the property in August 2008. HH Gregg
Appliances took occupancy in 2011. The loan has amortized 30%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and
1.29X, respectively.


FAIRFIELD STREET 2004-1: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 11 Debt Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed 11 classes of Notes issued by Fairfield
Street Solar 2004-1 Ltd. Collateralized Debt Obligations due to
the key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO Re-REMIC)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. A-2a, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2b, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. C-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Fairfield 2004-1 Ltd. is a currently static (the reinvestment
period ended November 2009) CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (70.9%),
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligations (CRE CDO)
(13.1%), REIT debt (11.6%), CMBS Rake Bonds (2.3%), and grantor
trust loans (2.1%). As of the January 31, 2013 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction has decreased to $432.1
million from $515.0 million at issuance, with the paydown directed
to the Class A-1 and Class A-2a Notes, as a result of regular
amortization of the underlying collateral and the failure of
certain overcollateralization tests.

There are thirty-two assets with a par balance of $142.8 million
(27.6% of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the January 31, 2013 Trustee report. Twenty-seven
of these assets (86.6% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS and five
assets (13.4%) are CRE CDO.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,308
compared to 3,999 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (4.9% compared to 11.8% at last
review), A1-A3 (6.8% compared to 6.3% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(22.9% compared to 17.5% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (17.6% compared
to 16.8% at last review), B1-B3 (4.2% compared to 6.0%), and Caa1-
C (43.5% compared to 41.6%).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.1 years compared to 4.2 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 20.1% compared to 21.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 6.9% compared to 6.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM  v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge  v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
20.1% to 10.1% or up to 30.1% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notches downward and 0 to
4 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


FIRST UNION: Fitch Lowers Ratings on Class N Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed three
classes of First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
2001-C3, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades are due to increased certainty of losses on the
speculative rated classes. Fitch modeled losses of 18.1% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
4%, including losses already incurred. Fitch has designated three
loans (51.4% of the pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes two specially serviced assets (34.8% of the pool).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.3% to $22.3 million from
$818.8 million at issuance. Eleven loans remain, two of which
(34.8% of the pool) are in special servicing. The pool has
experienced $28.6 million (3.5% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date. There is one defeased loan in the pool
(20.4% of the pool). Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes M through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-serviced
loan (24.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 103,665 sf
suburban office property located in Wheaton, IL within the Chicago
MSA. The loan was transferred to special servicing in 2010 due to
imminent default and matured in 2011. Occupancy was 74.6% as of
January 2013.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-
serviced loan (10.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 59,065 sf
suburban office building located in Schaumburg, IL within the
Chicago MSA. The loan transferred to special servicing in 2011 due
to maturity default. Foreclosure sale is anticipated for the end
of March 2013. Occupancy was 60% as of January 2013.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a 96-unit, 9-
building garden style apartment complex located in Austin, Texas
(16.6% of the pool).

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns or revises Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $4.1 million class M to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 100%;
-- $4.1 million class N to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $8 million class K at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.1 million class L at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and J certificates
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class
IO-I certificates.


FIRST UNION-LEHMAN 1997-C1: Moody's Cuts IO Certs Rating to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one interest-
only class of First Union-Lehman Brothers Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1997-
C1 as follows:

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class IO, is due to the decline in
credit performance of its reference classes as a result of
principal pay downs of higher quality referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.8% of the
current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is 1.3% of the original pooled balance. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit assessments for the principal classes
could decline below their current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected credit assessments of the
referenced tranches may be insufficient to support the current
ratings of the interest-only classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's currently rates only
the IO class; the previous review was done on February 22, 2012
due the change in Moody's IO methodology. Prior to the previous
review, a full review was done in March 17, 2005 with the results
summarized in a press release as of that date.

Deal Performance:

As of the January 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $16.5
million from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 15% of the pool. One loan, representing 31% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

Three loans, representing 37% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $16.4 million. No loans are
currently in special servicing. Moody's has assumed a high default
probability for one poorly performing loan representing 4% of the
pool. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $628,000 loss (25%
expected loss) from the troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 68% of the pool's non-specially
serviced and non-defeased loans, respectively. Excluding the
troubled loan, Moody's weighted average LTV is 65% compared to 85%
at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
0.97X and 1.72X, respectively, compared to 1.35X and 1.39X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C2: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. X Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one interest-only
class of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 1998-C2 as follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
quality of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed. The IO
class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class in this
transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.1% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base expected
loss was 9.2%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 2.9% of the original pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at last
review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to 24 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model to evaluate pools
of credit tenant loans (CTLs) within CMBS transactions. Moody's
public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-5 is used to generate a
portfolio loss distribution to assess the ratings. Under Moody's
CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is
primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds. This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan. The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust. The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default. Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST    Reports and a proprietary program that
highlights significant credit changes that have occurred in the
last month as well as cumulative changes since the last full
transaction review. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs a
full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's currently only rates the IO class. The
previous review was done on February 22, 2012 due to the change in
Moody's IO methodology. Prior to the previous review, a full
review was done on March 30, 2011 with the results summarized in a
press release as of that date.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $142.8
million from $2.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 57 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool. Twelve of the loans are credit tenant lease
(CTL) loans secured by properties leased to five corporate
credits, representing 12% of the pool. Thirteen loans,
representing 37% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. Government securities.

Nine loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Forty five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $65.6 million (35% loss severity on
average). Currently one loan, representing 4% of the pool is in
special servicing. The specially serviced loan is Georgetown Plaza
Shopping Center ($5.3 million -- 4%% of the pool). This loan
transferred into special servicing in May 2008 as the result of
maturity default. The borrower could not refinance due to
environmental concerns regarding a former dry cleaners tenant.
Phase I and II reports were completed. Litigation with the former
tenant, various insurance companies and the management company
continues.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 1% of the pool. Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $5.2 million loss for the specially serviced and
troubled loan (77% expected loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 89% of the pool, respectively,
excluding the CTL and defeased loans. The conduit pool, which
excludes CTL loans and defeased loans, represents approximately
47% of the pool. Moody's conduit weighted average conduit LTV is
50%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of
11% to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's conduit actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.66X and 2.82X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The pool's largest CTL exposures are Walgreen Co. ($6.7 million --
4.7% of the pool balance; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa1;
outlook negative) and Rite Aid Corporation ($6.2 million -- 4.3%
of the pool balance; Moody's senior unsecured rating Caa2; outlook
ratings under review).

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the D'Amato Portfolio Loan ($18.2
million -- 13% of the pool), which is secured by 37 industrial and
retail properties located in Connecticut and Rhode Island. The
portfolio was 83% leased as of December 2011. The loan has been on
the master servicer's watchlist since October 2009, due to
volatility in rent payments and deferred maintenance. The loan has
paid down 36% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 58% and 1.91X.

The second largest loan is the Saratoga Apartments Loan ($9.7
million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 183-unit
multifamily property located in Washington, DC. The property was
92% leased as of October 2012. The loan has paid down 25% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 30% and 2.87X.

The third largest loan is the Columbus Georgia Apartments Loan
($3.8 million -- 2.6% of the pool). The loan is secured by four
cross collateralized and cross defaulted properties located in
Columbus, Georgia. The weighted average occupancy is 90%. The loan
has paid down 37% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 42% and 2.55X.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2001-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. H Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc. mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-
C1 (GMAC 2001-C1). In addition, Fitch affirms two classes and
removes three from Rating Watch Negative.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses from the
specially serviced loans; three of the four remaining loans are in
special servicing.

The affirmation of class E is due to sufficient credit enhancement
in light of the concentrated nature of the pool. Full payoff and
recovery of interest shortfalls is likely due to the future
amortization of the remaining performing loan as well as
anticipated proceeds from the ultimate disposition of the
specially serviced assets.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 95.5% to $47.7 million from $864.1 million
at issuance. Realized losses to date are 7.3% of the original pool
balance. As of the February 2013 remittance, interest shortfalls
are affecting class E through P and total $5.7 million.

Bridgewater Place (73.1% of the pool), is an REO office property
located in Grand Rapids, MI. The 315,202 square foot (sf) 17 story
office property was built in 1993 within the central business
district (CBD). The servicer reported occupancy was 57% as of
February 2013. Varnum, the largest tenant, occupying 98,889 sf of
net rental area recently extended their lease for another ten year
term.

Bel Air Park II (11.4%) is a REO office property located in
suburban Mobile, AL. The building's occupancy recently dropped to
65% due to the exit of Virginia College at their lease expiration.
The building management continues in efforts to lease the vacant
space.

The third largest loan, Insight Air Center #7 (8.1%), is 78,829 sf
vacant industrial building located in Las Vegas, NV. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in September 2010 due to
maturity default. The special servicer continues to monitor the
loan and evaluate workout options.

The fourth largest loan, Live Oak Village Shopping Center (7.4%),
is 106,283 sf retail center located in Pensacola Beach, FL. The
center is anchored by Office Depot and Dollar General. The year
end 2012 occupancy provided by the servicer was 85%.

Fitch has downgraded and removed the Rating Watch Negative from
these classes:

-- $13 million class F to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative
-- $13 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE25 from RE100.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $7.4 million class E at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable from Rating
     Watch Negative;
  -- $14.4 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE0.

Classes J, K, L, M, and N remain at 'Dsf'; RE0%; due to realized
losses.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, and the interest only class X-2
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate class P. Class X-1 and O
were previously withdrawn.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Cl. E Certs to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed 14 classes of GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., series 2005-C1 (GMACC 2005-
C1), commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool, due to further deterioration of loan performance, most
of which involves significantly higher losses on the specially
serviced loans, as well as several loans in the top 15 with
continued underperformance (16.1% of the remaining pool). Fitch
modeled losses of 14% of the remaining pool; modeled losses of the
original pool are 12.2%, including losses already incurred to
date.

The super-senior and mezzanine 'AAA' classes have benefited from
the significant deleveraging of the transaction, which has
resulted in increased credit enhancement to these classes. As of
the February 2013 distribution date, credit enhancements for the
super-senior and mezzanine 'AAA' classes have improved to above
50% and 30%, respectively, compared to 30% and 20% at issuance.

Fitch has designated 34 loans (51.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 11 specially serviced loans (18.2%). Seven of the
top 15 loans (28.1%) have been designated as Fitch Loans of
Concern, six (26.2%) of which have Fitch stressed loan-to-values
greater than 90%. These loans may experience difficulties
refinancing at loan maturity.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 47.7% of the original pool
balance to $774.3 million from $1.598 billion at issuance due to a
combination of principal repayment (42.3%) and realized losses
(5.4%). Four loans (2.7%) have been fully defeased. Cumulative
interest shortfalls totaling $9.6 million are currently affecting
classes B through P. There is significant upcoming loan maturities
as 67% of the remaining pool has a loan maturity date concentrated
in 2015.

The largest contributors to modeled losses are three (12.7%) of
the top 15 loans; two (5.2%) of which are currently specially
serviced.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (7.5%) secured
by a 321,041 square foot (sf) office property located in Las
Vegas, Nevada. The loan was previously transferred to special
servicing in April 2009 for imminent default due to a significant
decrease in occupancy. In December 2010, the loan was restructured
into an A and B note and the loan's maturity date was extended
until 2020. The loan was subsequently returned to the master
servicer and is currently performing under the terms of the
modification. Fitch modeled a full loss on the B note portion of
the loan.

For the first nine months of 2012, the debt service coverage
ratio, on a net operating income basis, was 1.09x compared to
1.34x and 1.59x at YE 2011 and at issuance, respectively. The
property has undergone significant lease-up, but occupancy still
remains weak. As of September 2012, the property was 62.4%
occupied, improving from the 41% and 48% reported at YE 2011 and
YE 2010, respectively, but still remaining below the 96% reported
at issuance. Throughout 2011 and 2012, multiple new leases,
accounting for nearly 24% of the net rentable area (NRA), were
signed, helping to drive up property occupancy.

According to REIS and as of the fourth quarter of 2012, the
overall Las Vegas office market remains very weak with a metro
vacancy of 26.2%. The property is located in the Northwest office
submarket of Las Vegas, which is performing worse than the overall
metro and reported a vacancy of 33.7%. The property faces near-
term rollover risk as 14.8% of the NRA roll over the next three
years.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially
serviced loan (2.8%) secured by a 5,300-stall parking facility
located at Bradley International Airport in Windsor Lock,
Connecticut. The loan was transferred to special servicing because
the operator of the facility filed for bankruptcy and rejected its
lease in January 2010. The borrower has since entered into a new
management agreement with another third party.

The loan was modified into an A and B note and the loan's maturity
date was extended until 2016. The loan was supposed to be returned
to the master servicer; however, the borrower defaulted on the
terms of the modification because it was unable to satisfy the
November 2011 (and subsequent) debt service payments. The borrower
cited delays in property repairs and damages incurred during an
October 2011 snowstorm that caused property occupancy and revenues
to decline.

According to the special servicer, the borrower has requested an
additional modification to allow time to work through the
transitional period with a new brand and a new operator and to
overcome damages and disruptions caused by the snowstorm. Legal
counsel is dual tracking foreclosure, while negotiations with the
borrower continue. The special servicer indicates that the
borrower is remitting all net cash flow on a monthly basis.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially
serviced loan (2.5%) secured by a 243,212 sf retail property
located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in June 2011 due to imminent default.

As of September 2012, the property was 39% occupied. The
property's original anchor tenant (initially occupying nearly 26%
of the NRA) vacated upon its lease expiration. This significantly
impacted property cash flow as the tenant accounted for nearly
one-third of the property's total rental income. The borrower
indicated that it would submit a discounted payoff proposal;
however, the special servicer has not received any offers to date.
Foreclosure was filed in February 2013 and a sale date is
projected for later in 2013.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

-- $127.8 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 100%;
-- $12 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $24 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $16 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

-- $133.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $157.4 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $159.8 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $16 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $3.4 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full. Fitch does not rate class
P. Fitch had previously withdrawn the ratings on classes O, X-1,
and X-2.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2005-FL3: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 3 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three rake or
non-pooled classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FL3.

Cl. H-LH, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. K-LH, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-LH, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges. The single loan
in the transaction is collateralized by The Lowell Hotel, a luxury
hotel in New York City.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GPD
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated April 18, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 8, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $39 million
from $708 million at securitization as the result of the payoff of
13 loans originally in the pool and the partial pay down of the
remaining loan. The Certificates are now collateralized by a
single mortgage loan.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization nor
are there outstanding interest shortfalls.

The remaining loan in the pool, the Lowell Hotel ($26 million
pooled portion and $13 million rake or non-pooled portion), is
secured by a first mortgage lien on a 70-room luxury boutique
hotel located on the Upper East Side in New York City. The hotel
has experienced stress to the net cash flow similar to other New
York City luxury hotels. The property posted revenue per available
room (RevPAR) of $617 for the year end 2012 which is a 3.1%
increase over the previous year. RevPAR reached a high in 2008 of
$717.

The loan was modified in November of 2010 which included a
principal pay-down and a loan extension. The final maturity date
with extensions is September 2013. A November 2010 appraisal
valued the property at $101 million. Moody's weighted average
pooled loan to value ("LTV") ratio is 71% and Moody's stressed
debt service coverage ratio ("DSCR") is 1.25X. Moody's current
credit assessment for the pooled balance is Ba2, the same as last
review.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-CC1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of three classes of notes issued
by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Series 2006-CC1. The
affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Series 2006-CC1 is a static
cash transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS); 100% of the collateral balance. As of
the January 24, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate note balance of
the transaction, has decreased to $323.7 million from $406.2
million at issuance. The paydowns are due to amortization of the
underlying collateral and directed to the class A certificates.
Currently, classes C through M have been either partially or fully
written down as a result of realized losses on the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,808
compared to 5,469 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (1.6% compared to 2.5% at last
review), A1-A3 (1.6% compared to 1.4% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(10.7% compared to 12.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (14.9% compared
to 16.9% at last review), B1-B3 (14.2% compared to 13.0% at last
review), and Caa1-C (56.9% compared to 53.3% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.4 years compared to 4.1 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 5.5% compared to 6.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 13.9%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM  v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge  v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 5.5% to 15.5% would result in average rating movement on
the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch upward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG8: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class N Cert. to 'Csf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes and affirmed 17 classes
of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2006-GG8 due to increased loss
expectations on specially serviced loans and further deterioration
of loan performance.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 14.6% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 13.3%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $96.1 million (2.3% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 77 loans (44.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 16 specially serviced assets (12.1%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 24.2% to $3.21 billion from
$4.24 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls of approximately $55.7 million are currently affecting
classes G through S.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Pointe South
Mountain Resort loan (5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
640-key resort complex located in Phoenix, AZ. The property is now
called the Arizona Grand Resort. The loan has been modified and
returned to the master servicer after the original loan was split
into an A/B note structure. Although property performance improved
in 2011 and 2012, the property's cash flow is significantly below
underwritten levels and does not generate sufficient cash flow to
service its total debt.

The next largest contributor to modeled losses is the real-estate
owned (REO) Ariel Preferred Portfolio (2.8%). The retail portfolio
consists of the four remaining outlet centers located in various
states. Two of the original six properties have been sold. The
portfolio transferred to special servicing in June 2009 for
imminent default. The most recent servicer reported average
portfolio occupancy is 75% as of December 2012, compared to the
overall portfolio occupancy of 82.7% at issuance.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is the specially-
serviced Rubloff Retail Portfolio loan (1.8%), which is secured by
four regional malls located in various states. The loan
transferred to special servicing in late November 2012 for
imminent default. As of third-quarter 2012, the combined occupancy
of the portfolio fell below 70% as several anchor tenants have
vacated or filed for bankruptcy.

Fitch downgrades the following class, removes it from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigns an Outlook:

-- $424.3 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable.

Fitch downgrades these classes as indicated:

-- $302.3 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf', RE 95%;
-- $26.5 million class B to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf', RE 0%;
-- $42.4 million class F to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $15.3 million class N to 'Dsf' from 'Csf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

-- $143.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.6 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $161.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53 million class C at 'CCCsf', RE 0%.
-- $37.1 million class D at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $37.1 million class E at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $53 million class G at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $47.7 million class H at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $53 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $42.4 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $26.5 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $15.9 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%.

Classes O, P and Q remain at 'Dsf', RE 0% due to realized losses.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class S certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class X certificate.


HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 Ltd./Highbridge Loan Management
2012-1 LLC's $283.25 million floating-rate notes following the
transaction's effective date as of Nov. 12, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P noted.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P added.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 Ltd./Highbridge Loan Management
2012-1 LLC

Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)               200.00
A-2                     AA (sf)                 27.50
B (deferrable)          A (sf)                  23.00
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                13.50
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)                 12.25
E (deferrable)          B (sf)                   7.00


ING IM 2012-3: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on ING IM
CLO 2012-3 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2012-3 LLC's $416.892 million floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
Nov. 15, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of S&P's review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, S&P perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with their criteria to assess
whether the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit
enhancement based on the effective date collateral portfolio.
S&P's analysis relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a
scenario default rate at each rating level based on the effective
date portfolio, full cash flow modeling to determine the
appropriate percentile break-even default rate at each rating
level, the application of S&P's supplemental tests, and the
analytical judgment of a rating committee.

In S&P'spublished effective date report, it discusses its analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to publish an
effective date report each time it issues an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deem
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ING IM CLO 2012-3 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2012-3 LLC

Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)              294.428
B                       AA (sf)                46.929
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                 36.321
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)               20.571
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                18.643

NR-Not rated.


INWOOD PARK: Moody's Hikes Rating on $50MM Notes to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Inwood Park CDO Ltd.:

US$90,625,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

US$68,750,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2021,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to A3
(sf);

US$50,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2021,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following class of notes:

US$565,500,000 Class A-1-A Floating Rate Notes due 2021(current
balance of $564,701,744), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January
30, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf);

US$141,375,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on September 3, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf);

US$177,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2021(current
balance of $177,299,554), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January
30, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf);

US$50,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2021,
Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the end of the deal's reinvestment period
in January 2013. In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions
applicable during the amortization period, and therefore limited
ability to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from higher diversity
and spread levels compared to the levels assumed at the last
rating action in August 2011. Moody's modeled a WAS and Diversity
of 3.77% and 82, respectively, compared to 2.8% and 72 at the time
of the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $1.18 billion,
defaulted par of $34.2 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.43% (implying a WARF of 2647), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.67%, and a diversity
score of 82. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Inwood Park CDO Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2118)

Class A-1-A: 0

Class A-1-B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3176)

Class A-1-A: 0

Class A-1-B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below (choose the ones that are applicable):

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


JAMESTOWN CLO II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Jamestown CLO II Ltd./ Jamestown CLO II Corp.'s $460.00 million
fixed-rate and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.3005%-12.813%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees; subordinated collateral
      management fees; collateral manager incentive fees; and

   -- subordinated note payments into principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1326.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Jamestown CLO II Ltd./Jamestown CLO II Corp.

Class                  Rating                 Amount
                                            (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)               307.50
A-2A                   AA (sf)                 31.25
A-2B                   AA (sf)                 31.25
B (deferrable)         A (sf)                  42.50
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                28.00
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                 19.50
Subordinated notes     NR                      50.10

NR-Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2001-CIBC2: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2001-CIBC2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

S&P's affirmations follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on these classes to also
reflect the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining assets, as well as the transaction-level changes.

S&P tempered its rating actions because it expects the trust to
experience decreased liquidity support resulting from potential
additional interest shortfalls.  S&P believes these increased
interest shortfalls may likely result from one asset that is
currently with the special servicer ($9.2 million, 9.0%) and three
($75.8 million, 74.6%) of the remaining 11 assets ($101.7 million)
that were previously with the special servicer but have been
returned to the master servicer.

The Collin Creek Mall ($61.8 million, 60.8%), Heaver Portfolio
($9.8 million, 9.6%), and Automobile Boulevard Industrial Park
($4.2 million, 4.2%) loans were previously with the special
servicer and have since been returned to the master servicer.
According to the transaction documents, the special servicer
is entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.00% of all future
principal and interest payments on the corrected mortgage loans,
provided they continue to perform and remain with the master
servicer.  Upon the disposition of the loans there is a potential
for additional interest shortfalls to affect the trust.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-1 interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 0.99x
and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 85.4% for
eight of the 11 remaining assets in the pool.  The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude one asset ($9.2 million, 9.0%) that is with
the special servicer and two defeased loans ($2.9 million, 2.8%).

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $101.7 million, down from
$961.7 million at issuance.  The pool comprises 10 loans and one
real estate owned (REO) asset, down from 143 loans at issuance.
To date, the transaction has experienced losses totaling
$54.4 million or 5.7% of the transaction's original certificate
balance.  One ($9.2 million, 9.0%) of the remaining 11 assets is
with the special servicer, which S&P discusses below.  In
addition, six loans ($80.6 million, 79.3%) were reported on the
master servicer's watchlist.  Excluding the specially serviced
asset and two defeased loans, three loans ($65.5 million, 64.4%)
reported DSC of below 1.00x.  Details on three of the largest
assets on the master servicer's watchlist are as follows:

The Collin Creek Mall loan ($61.8 million, 60.8%), the largest
asset in the pool, is secured by 332,055 sq. ft. of a 1.1 million-
sq.-ft. regional shopping center in Plano, Texas.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported
DSC. The master servicer, Midland Loan Services (Midland),
reported a DSC of 0.95x for year-end 2011.  According to the
Sept. 30, 2012, rent roll, the collateral property was 92.7%
occupied.

The Heaver Portfolio loan ($9.8 million, 9.6%), the second-largest
asset in the pool, is secured by two suburban office buildings
totaling 137,990 sq. ft. in Lutherville and Towson, Md.  The loan
is on Midland's watchlist due to a low reported DSC, which was
1.13x for year-end 2011.  According to the Oct. 1, 2012, rent
rolls, the combined occupancy at the properties were 71.6%.

The Automobile Boulevard Industrial Park loan ($4.2 million,
4.2%), the fifth-largest asset in the pool, is secured by a
211,411-sq.-ft. industrial warehouse/distribution facility in
Clearwater, Fla.  The loan is on Midland's watchlist due to a low
reported DSC, which was 1.07x for year-end 2011.  According to the
September 2012 rent roll, the property was 76.1% occupied.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSET

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the Wright
Point Office Complex asset ($9.2 million, 9.0%), comprising two
suburban office buildings totaling 162,568 sq. ft. in Riverside,
Ohio, is with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-
III).  The asset is the third-largest asset in the pool and has a
reported total exposure of $11.6 million.  The loan was
transferred to C-III on Jan. 14, 2010, and the property became REO
on Aug. 19, 2011.  C-III informed S&P that it is in the process of
listing the property for sale.  C-III stated that the property is
currently 50.0% occupied and net cash flow at the property is
insufficient to cover debt service.  An appraisal reduction amount
of $5.6 million is in effect for this asset.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

As it relates to the above asset resolution, minimal loss is
considered to be less than 25%, moderate loss is between 26% and
59%, and significant loss is 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CIBC2

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
C          AAA (sf)                     78.88
D          AA+ (sf)                     64.70
E          BBB+ (sf)                    36.33
F          B- (sf)                      24.51
X-1        AAA (sf)                       N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


JP MORGAN 2013-C10: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Class F Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the JPMCC 2013-C10
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $63,440,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $87,164,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22,445,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $185,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $430,080,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $106,694,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $107,059,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,001,882,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84,689,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55,926,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,937,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,360,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,783,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 20, 2013. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$44,741,391 non-rated class or the $276,436,391 class X-B.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 101 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.138 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, CIBC
Inc. and Redwood Commercial Mortgage Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 78.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 78.7%, and asset summary reviews
on 78.7% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.28x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 101.8%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 8.7%. Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 8.18% to issuer cash flows.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be Midland Loan
Services, Inc. and CWCapital Asset Management LLC, rated 'CMS1'
and 'CSS1-', respectively, by Fitch.


JP MORGAN 2013-C10: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2013-C10's $1.28 billion commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2013-C10.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 50 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $1,278.3 million, secured by the
fee and leasehold interests in 101 properties across 28 states.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 22,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect the credit support provided by the
transaction structure, S&P's view of the underlying collateral's
economics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's
relative diversity, and S&P's overall qualitative assessment of
the transaction.  Standard & Poor's determined that the collateral
pool has, on a weighted average basis, debt service coverage of
1.70x and beginning and ending loan-to-value ratios of 85.7% and
74.0%, respectively, based on Standard & Poor's values.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1328.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C10

Class         Rating(i)           Amount ($)
A-1           AAA (sf)            63,440,000
A-2           AAA (sf)            87,164,000
A-3           AAA (sf)            22,445,000
A-4           AAA (sf)           185,000,000
A-5           AAA (sf)           430,080,000
A-SB          AAA (sf)           106,694,000
A-S           AAA (sf)           107,059,000
X-A           AAA (sf)    1,001,882,000(iii)
X-B(ii)       NR            276,436,391(iii)
B             AA- (sf)            84,689,000
C             A- (sf)             55,926,000
D             BBB- (sf)           47,937,000
E(ii)         BB (sf)             30,360,000
F(ii)         BB- (sf)            12,783,000
NR(ii)        NR                  44,741,391

  (i) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
      buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii) Non-offered certificates.
(iii) Notional balance.
NR - Not rated.


KATONAH V: Moody's Retains 'Ca' Rating on $9.25MM Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of the following
notes issued by Katonah V, Ltd.:

US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 (current
outstanding balance of $987,923), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
June 8, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$14,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Affirmed Aa3
(sf); previously on May 11, 2012 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

US$4,000,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Affirmed Aa3
(sf); previously on May 11, 2012 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

US$9,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Affirmed Ba2
(sf); previously on May 11, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

US$9,250,000 Class D Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Affirmed Ca (sf);
previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of two factors: deleveraging of the senior notes and
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the rating action in May 2012. These two factors offset each
other and their combined effect is credit neutral to the rated
notes.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been fully paid down
and the Class A-2 Notes have been paid down by approximately 90%
or $9.0 million since the last rating action.

Notwithstanding the benefits of deleveraging, the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated since the last rating
action. In its base case, Moody's modeled a weighted average
rating factor (WARF) and weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of
3639 and 42.9%, compared to 3508 and 46.3% at the time of the last
rating action, respectively.

Additionally, the Class D Notes continue to face interest
shortfalls and have a current deferred interest balance of $2.0
million.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the January 2013 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 15.3% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $28.3 million,
defaulted par of $10.1 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.3% (implying a WARF of 3639), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 42.9%, and a diversity score of 20.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Katonah V, Ltd., issued in May 2003, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans
and senior unsecured bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability adjustments. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) as
described in Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions",
published in October 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2911)

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: +1

Class B-2: +1

Class C: +1

Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4367)

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: -2

Class B-2: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the bond/loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates. Moody's also conducted tests to assess
the collateral pool's concentration risk in obligors bearing a
credit estimate that constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.


KVK CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to $27.23MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to KVK CLO
2013-1 Ltd./KVK CLO 2013-1 LLC's $506.55 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.34%-12.87%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50% of excess interest proceeds that are available prior to
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
      subordinated portfolio management fees, portfolio manager
      incentive fees, and payments to the subordinated notes to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1339.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

KVK CLO 2013-1 Ltd./KVK CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                 Rating            Amount
                                      (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)          346.50
B                     AA (sf)            61.05
C (deferrable)        A (sf)             42.35
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)           29.43
E (deferrable)        BB (sf)            27.23
Subordinated notes    NR                 63.45

NR-Not rated.


LANDGROVE SYNTHETIC: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class C2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
Classes C2 and 7A2 senior notes issued by Landgrove Synthetic CDO
SPC 2007-2, a synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transactions.  The ratings currently are on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

The ratings withdrawal follows the redemption and termination of
the notes.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating  relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Landgrove Synthetic CDO SPC 2007-2

               Rating    Rating
Classes        To        From
C2             NR        CCC- (sf)
7A2 Sr         NR        BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

NR-Not Rated.


LB-UBS 2007-C7: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C7.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement to offset
Fitch modeled losses across the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 8.5%
of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 11.7%, including losses already incurred. The
Negative Outlook on classes A-M and A-J reflect performance
concerns and the overall high leverage on several loans in the top
15. The allocation of the loan pool is highly concentrated with
the top 15 loans representing 79% of the pool balance; the top
three loans combined represent 39% of the pool balance with their
individual loan balances each representing greater than 10% of the
pool.

Fitch has designated 19 loans (27%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 11 specially serviced assets (8.7%). The specially
serviced loans include two loans in foreclosure (5.84%), six loans
greater than 90 days delinquent (1.71%), one loan greater than 60
days delinquent (0.56%), and two loans greater than 30 days
delinquent (0.55%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 15.5% to $2.68 billion from
$3.17 billion at issuance, of which 11% was due to paydowns and
4.5% was due to realized losses. Per the servicer reporting, one
loan is partially defeased (0.1% of the pool). Interest shortfalls
are currently affecting classes F through T.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the District at
Tustin Legacy loan (7.7% of the pool), which is secured by 521,694
square feet (sf) of a 979,883 sf retail center in Tustin, CA.
Major tenants include Target, Whole Foods, TJ Maxx, and an AMC
Theater. Non-collateral anchors are Costco and Lowes. Best Buy,
which leases 30,000 sf of the collateral (or 5.8% of the net
rentable area [NRA]) through January 2016, had vacated the
property in 2012; the space remains dark and Best Buy continues to
pay rent. The December 2012 rent roll reported the property 98.5%
leased (which includes the vacant Best Buy space). Despite the
high occupancy since issuance, the property's net operating income
(NOI) has performed lower than expected as rental rates and
reimbursements remain below underwritten levels. The NOI debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) reported at 0.90 times (x) and 0.92x
for year-to-date (YTD) September 2012 and year end (YE) December
2012, respectively. The loan remains current as of the February
2013 remittance.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Ritz
Carlton Bachelor Gulch loan (2.3%), which is secured by a 117-
room, full service resort hotel in Avon, CO located in Colorado's
Vail Valley on Beaver Creek Mountain. The loan had previously
transferred to special servicing in October 2010 due to payment
default. The property had experienced cash flow issues in 2009
from declining occupancy and RevPAR stemming from the recent
economic recession. The loan was modified while in special
servicing and returned to the master servicer in June 2012;
modified terms include a reduced pay rate and a deferred accrual
rate. As of February 2013, the loan is current under its modified
terms. The trailing 12 month (TTM) December 2012 occupancy
reported at 55%, ADR at $393.41, and RevPAR at $216.35, an
increase of 2%, 2.5%, and 4.6%, respectively, over the prior year.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced The Legends at Village West loan (5.1%), which is secured
by a 680,157 sf retail center in Kansas City, KS. The open-air
life style center, built in 2006, features several restaurants as
well as 'premium brand' outlet tenants including Saks Fifth
Avenue, Tommy Hilfiger, Polo Ralph Lauren, Nike, and BCBG. The
property had experienced cash flow issues due to an increase in
expenses since underwriting. The borrower had requested a
restructure of the loan, and the loan transferred to special
servicing in November 2011 due to payment default.

After transferring to special servicing, the borrower continued to
aggressively lease up the property. Current occupancy is 93%, a
significant improvement from June 2011 at 79%. A foreclosure
auction occurred in January 2013, and the special servicer
approved the sale which is expected to close by early March 2013.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $1.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $69.4 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $1.7 billion class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $132.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $317 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $269.5 million class A-J at 'B-sf', Outlook Negative;
-- $47.6 million class B at 'CCCsf', RE 20%;
-- $35.7 million class C at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $23.8 million class D at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $27.7 million class E at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $15.9 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $31.7 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $27.7 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $11.5 million class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class Q at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- Class S at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The balances for classes K, L, M, N, P, Q, and S have been reduced
to zero due to realized losses. The class A-1 certificate has paid
in full. Fitch does not rate the class T certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP,
X-CL and X-W certificates.


LCM XIII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to LCM
XIII L.P./ LCM XIII LLC's $467.0 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis
      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.31%-12.26%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest reinvestment test, a failure of
      which during the reinvestment period will lead to the
      reclassification of excess interest proceeds (that are
      available prior to paying subordinated management fees),
      uncapped administrative expenses, and limited partnership
      (L.P.) certificate payments to the principal proceeds for
      the purchase of collateral assets or, at the asset manager's
      discretion (subject to the majority consent of the L.P.
      certificates), to sequentially reduce the balance of the
      rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1281.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

LCM XIII L.P./LCM XIII LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
X                          AAA (sf)                       3.25
A                          AAA (sf)                      322.5
B                          AA (sf)                        52.5
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                         45.0
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                       22.5
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       21.25
Combination notes(i)       A- (sf) (pNRi)             20.0(ii)
Subordinated notes
(L.P. certificates)        NR                             52.0

NR - Not rated.
(i) The combination notes' principal comprises $12 million of
     class C and $8 million of class D note principal.
(ii) Each component of the combination notes is included in (not
     in addition to) the respective principal amount of the class
     C and D notes.


LEHMAN BROS: S&P Puts 'CCC+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 11
classes from three Lehman Bros. Small Balance Commercial
securitizations on CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
transactions' collateral consists of conventional small business
loans.

The credit performance of these securitizations issued by Lehman
Bros. Small Balance Commercial Loan Trusts has deteriorated since
S&P's last rating actions on these transactions in June 2011, as
evidenced by rising delinquencies, increased default frequencies,
and lower recovery rates.

Standard & Poor's expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements
within next 90 days after it conducts a more detailed review, and
it may take further rating actions as appropriate.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

CreditWatch Action

Lehman Bros. Small Balance Commercial Series 2005-1
                    Rating                   Rating
Class               To                       From
M1                  AA (sf)/Watch Neg        AA (sf)
M2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Neg        A+ (sf)
B                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg      BBB+(sf)

Lehman Bros. Small Balance Commercial Series 2005-2
                    Rating                   Rating
Class               To                      From
M1                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg      BB+ (sf)
M2                  BB (sf)/Watch Neg       BB (sf)
M3                  B+ (sf)/Watch Neg       B+ (sf)
B                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC+ (sf)

Lehman Bros. Small Balance Commercial Series 2006-1
                    Rating                   Rating
Class               To                        From
M1                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg       BBB+ (sf)
M2                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg        BB+ (sf)
M3                  B+ (sf)/Watch Neg         B+ (sf)
B                   B (sf)/Watch Neg          B (sf)


LIGHTPOINT CLO 2004-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
E notes from LightPoint CLO 2004-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P withdrew its rating
on the class D notes.

S&P last took a rating action on this transaction in February 2011
when it raised the ratings on various notes because of improved
portfolio loans as well as paydowns on the class A-1A notes.  At
that time, the class E overcollateralization ratio was less than
100% while the class E notes continued to defer on their interest
payments, leading to a sizeable interest deferral balance.

The rating actions reflect that as of the February 2013 payment
date, the class D principal balance and the class E interest
deferral balance were paid down in full.  The class E principal
balance was paid down to $110,000.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in its view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

LightPoint CLO 2004-1 Ltd.

Class               Rating
             To               From
D            NR               BB (sf)
E            BB (sf)          CC (sf)

NR-Not rated.


LNR CDO 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 7 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes issued by LNR CDO 2002-1
Ltd./Corp (LNR 2002-1).

Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers:

Since the last rating action in March 2012, approximately 25.6% of
the collateral has been downgraded. Currently, 82.5% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade with
71.3% of the portfolio having a rating in the 'CCC' category and
below, compared to 88.2% and 63.9%, respectively, at the last
rating action. Over this period, the transaction has received
$82.5 million which has resulted in the full repayment of the
class A notes and a repayment of $39.4 million to the class B
notes.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. Based on this analysis, the class B and C notes'
breakeven rates are generally consistent with the ratings assigned
below.

For the class D through H notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class D notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf', indicating that
default is probable. Similarly, the class E through H notes have
been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is inevitable. The
Stable Outlook on the class B and C notes reflects Fitch's view
that the transaction will continue to delever.

LNR 2002-1 is backed by 51 tranches from 20 commercial mortgage
backed security (CMBS) transactions and is considered a CMBS B-
piece resecuritization (also referred to as first loss commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation [CRE CDO]) as it
includes the most junior bonds of CMBS transactions. The
transaction closed in July 2002.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $40,630,417 class B notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative;
-- $25,000,000 class C notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $40,150,000 class D-FX notes at 'CCsf';
-- $45,000,000 class D-FL notes at 'CCsf';
-- $22,000,000 class E-FX notes at 'Csf';
-- $33,059,000 class E-FXD notes at 'Csf';
-- $21,000,000 class E-FL notes at 'Csf';
-- $25,000,000 class F-FX notes at 'Csf';
-- $27,041,000 class F-FL notes at 'Csf';
-- $40,032,000 class G notes at 'Csf';
-- $54,042,000 class H notes at 'Csf'.


MADISON PARK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
D notes from Madison Park Funding II Ltd. and the class B and D
notes from Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2a, A-2b, A-3, B-1, B-2,
C-1, and C-2 notes from Madison Park Funding II Ltd. and the class
A-1, A-2, C, and E notes from Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.  The
two deals are U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions managed by CSFB Alternative Capital Inc.

The Madison Park Funding II Ltd. reinvestment period is expected
to end in March 2013 and the Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.
reinvestment period is expected to end in January 2015.  The
upgrades reflect the increased amount of collateral supporting the
notes compared with the portfolios at the time of S&P's 2011
rating actions.  As a result, the class A, B, C, and D par value
ratios have increased for Madison Park Funding II Ltd. and the
class A/B, C, D, and E overcollateralization ratios have increased
for Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.

The affirmations reflect the sufficient credit support available
to the notes at the current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Madison Park Funding II Ltd.
              Rating       Rating
Class         To           From
D             BB (sf)      BB- (sf)

Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.
              Rating       Rating
Class         To           From
B             AA (sf)      AA- (sf)
D             BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Madison Park Funding II Ltd.
Class               Rating
A-1                 AA+ (sf)
A-2a                AAA (sf)
A-2b                AA+ (sf)
A-3                 AA (sf)
B-1                 A (sf)
B-2                 A (sf)
C-1                 BBB- (sf)
C-2                 BBB- (sf)

Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.
Class               Rating
A-1                 AAA (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)
C                   A (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)


MAGNETITE VI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Magnetite VI Ltd./Magnetite VI Corp.'s $369.75 million floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
Oct. 31, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of S&P's review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deem
necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Magnetite VI Ltd./Magnetite VI Corp.

Class                     Rating                Amount (mil. $)
X                         AAA (sf)                      2.00
A                         AAA (sf)                    245.75
B                         AA (sf)                      51.50
C (deferrable)            A (sf)                       32.50
D (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                     20.00
E (deferrable)            BB (sf)                      18.00


MARATHON CLO IV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $16.4MM Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Marathon CLO IV Ltd./Marathon CLO IV LLC's $321.10 million fixed-
and floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date
as of Aug. 16, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P noted.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Marathon CLO IV Ltd./Marathon CLO IV LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     222.10
A-2                        AA (sf)                       36.40
B-1(i)                     A (sf)                        15.80
B-2(i)                     A (sf)                        12.00
C(i)                       BBB (sf)                      18.40
D(i)                       BB (sf)                       16.40

(i)-Deferrable.


MARKET SQUARE: Moody's Lifts Rating on $8.25MM Notes to 'Baa3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Market Square CLO Ltd.:

U.S.$27,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due April 20, 2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
April 23, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

U.S.$8,250,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due April 20, 2017, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
April 23, 2012 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

U.S.$8,250,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due April 20, 2017, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
August 3, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

U.S. $232,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
April 20, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $24,586,810),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in April 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 78.6% or $90.3 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
in February 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 319.0%, 152.0%,
131.1% and 114.7%, respectively, versus March 2012 levels of
146.3%, 118.4%, 111.9% and 105.8%, respectively.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on Moody's calculation, securities that mature
after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 7.0% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $77.0 million,
defaulted par of $3.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.5% (implying a WARF of 2551), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.0%, and a diversity score of 33.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Market Square CLO Ltd., issued in May 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2041)

Class A: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +1
Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3061)

Class A: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -2
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


MERRILL LYNCH 1997-C2: Moody's Retains Caa2 Rating on Cl. IO Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class of
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1997-C2 as follows:

Cl. IO, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class IO, is consistent with the
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.
The IO class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class in this
transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.9% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 3.6% of the original pooled balance. Depending on
the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses
from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 23, 2011.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 11, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $41.7
million from $686.3 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from 1%
to 32% of the pool. The pool has no investment grade credit
assessments or defeased loans.

Two loans, representing 33% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $23.3 million (62% loss severity on
average). The pool currently has no specially serviced or troubled
loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for
100% of the pool's loans. Moody's weighted average LTV is 69%.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 7% to
the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.12X and 1.63X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 78% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Northlake Tower Festival Loan ($13.3 million -- 31.8% of the
pool), which is secured by a 322,000 square foot (SF) anchored
retail center located in Tucker, Georgia. As of November 2012, the
property was 84% leased. This loan has an anticipated repayment
date (ARD) in March 10, 2013 with the final maturity in December
2027. The borrower has not indicated any payoff plans. Currently
the loan is on the watchlist due to lowering occupancy. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 1.06X, respectively.

The second largest loan is The Links at Joneboro Loan ($9.9
million -- 23.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 432-unit
apartment complex located in Jonesboro, Arkansas. As of February
2013, the property was 92% occupied. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 55% and 1.87X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Harbor Pointe Apartments Loan ($9.5
million -- 22.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 344-unit
apartment complex located in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. The
property was 94% occupied as of December 2012. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 55% and 1.88X, respectively.


MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C3: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. IO Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed one class of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C3 as follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's only rates Classes E and IO. The upgrade of Class E was
due to increased credit subordination from payoffs and
amortization. The affirmation of the interest-only tranche, Class
IO, is due to the credit quality of its referenced tranches.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base expected
loss was 1.8%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 4.8% of the original pooled balance compared to 5.0% at last
review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the rating and
credit assessments for the principal classes could decline below
their current levels. If future performance materially declines,
the expected credit support of these classes may be insufficient
to support the current rating and credit assessments.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class IO was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 11 compared to 3 at Moody's prior review. The
increase in Herf is due to the 1700 Broadway Loan, which had a
$46.9 million outstanding balance at last review, paying off in
September 2012.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 23, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $47.7
million from $638.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 20 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 58% of the pool. Five loans, representing 31% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
Three of the defeased loans ($11.7 million) are scheduled to
mature by December 2013.

Five loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $29.9 million (56% loss severity on
average). Currently, there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 65% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Moody's weighted average LTV is 55% compared
to 50% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.33X and 2.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.82X and 1.22X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan is the BJ's Wholesale Club Loan ($5.6 million --
11.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 105,000 square foot (SF)
single-tenant retail property located in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. The property is 100% leased to BJ's Wholesale Club
Inc. through May 2013. The master servicer has confirmed that the
borrower recently negotiated a 20-year lease renewal. Furthermore,
the borrower is in the process of securing refinancing; the loan
matures in October 2013. At last review, Moody's stressed the cash
flow due to single-tenant risk and lease expiration. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.36X, respectively, compared to 96%
and 1.09X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Republic Beverage Building Loan
($4.5 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 385,000
SF industrial property located in Grand Prairie, Texas. The
property is 100% leased to Republic Beverage Co. through August
2018. Performance remains stable. The loan fully amortizes over
its 20-year loan term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 50% and
2.05X, respectively, compared to 58% and 1.78X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Santa Monica Sav-On Loan ($3.0
million -- 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 27,500 SF
retail property located in Santa Monica, California. The property
is 96% leased to CVS (Long-term rating of Baa2 (sf); Positive
Outlook) through August 2022. Performance remains stable. The loan
fully amortizes over its 24-year loan term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 45% and 2.19X, respectively, compared to 53% and
1.94X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 1997-C1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on X-1 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one interest-only
class of Morgan Stanley Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1997-C1 as follows:

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the IO Class, Class X-1, is due to the credit
performance of its reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 0.9% of the original pooled balance compared to 0.8% at
last full review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit assessments for the principal classes could decline below
their current levels. If future performance materially declines,
the expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of three compared to 16 at last full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's currently rates only
IO class; the previous review was done on February 22, 2012 due to
the change in the Moody's IO methodology. Prior to the previous
review a full review is summarized in a press release dated April
1, 2009.

Deal Performance:

As of the January 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $4.0 million
from $640.7 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 46% of the pool. No loans are defeased.

Two loans, representing 60% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $5.4 million (average loss severity of
96%). There are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 60% of the pool's loans,
respectively. Moody's weighted average LTV is 32% compared to 44%
at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11.6% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.43X and 3.58X,
respectively, compared to 1.78X and 3.73X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.


NATIONSLINK 1999-1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on Class X Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of the CMBS
interest-only class of NationsLink Funding Corporation, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-1 as follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced class and thus is affirmed. Moody's
rates only the IO Class in this deal.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.0% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is 0.4% of the original pooled balance. Moody's provides a
current list of base and stress scenario losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, wfshere a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool currently has a Herf of 7.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's currently rates only
IO class; the previous review was done on February 22, 2012 due to
the change in the Moody's IO methodology. Prior to the previous
review a full review was done May 26, 2010.

Deal Performance

As of the February 2, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $16 million
from $1.22 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 18 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 23% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 94% of the pool. The pool contains no
loans with investment-grade credit assessments. Two loans,
representing approximately 2% of the pool, are defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Five loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-eight loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $5 million (5% average loan loss
severity). There are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% of the. Moody's weighted average pool
LTV is 48%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.9%

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.95X and >4.00X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 52% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Horton 4th Avenue Apartments Loan ($4 million -- 23% of the
pool), which is secured by a 66-unit multifamily property in San
Diego, California. the property was 95% leased as of September
2012 reporting. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 52% and
1.97X, respectively.

The second-largest loan is the 277 Broadway Office Building Loan
($3 million -- 18% of the pool). The loan is secured by an 84,000
square foot office property in the Civic Center office submarket
of New York City. As of September 2012, the property was 99%
leased. The tenant base is diverse, with the largest tenant
occupying just 6% of the property's net rentable area. Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 24% and >4.00X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Northpark Village Apartments Loan
($2 million -- 12% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 120-unit
multifamily property in Joplin, Missouri. The loan is on the
watchlist for a decline in performance. Nevertheless, property
occupancy improved to 96% in September 2012, up from 88% the prior
year. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.25X
respectively.


NATIONSLINK 1998-2: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. X Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class of
NationsLink Funding Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1998-2:

Cl. X Certificate, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22,
2012 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed. The IO
class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class in this
transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.6% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's based expected loss plus realized
losses is now 1.9% of the original pooled balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand with
a growing renter base and declining home ownership. Recovery in
the office sector continues at a measured pace with minimal
additions to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST    Reports and a proprietary program that
highlights significant credit changes that have occurred in the
last month as well as cumulative changes since the last full
transaction review. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs a
full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's currently rates only IO class; the previous
review was done on February 22, 2012 due to the change in the
Moody's IO methodology. Prior to the previous review a full review
was done on January 22, 2004.

Deal Performance:

As of the January 22, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $91
million from $1.6 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 24 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 28% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 44% of the pool. Eleven loans, representing 56% of
the pool, have been defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government Securities.

Six loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $30.2 million (18% average loss
severity). Currently there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 99%
of the pool's non-defeased loans. Moody's weighted average conduit
LTV is 64%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 13% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 2.51X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 42% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Corridor Marketplace Shopping Center Loan ($25.6 million --
28% of the pool), which is secured by a 444,600 square foot (SF)
retail center in Laurel, Maryland anchored by Target. The property
was 99% leased as of September 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 65% and 1.59X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Worth Plaza Arcade Loan ($9.5
million -- 10.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 20,700 SF
retail center in Palm Beach, Florida. The property was 100% leased
as of February 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and
1.76X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the New Heritage Apartments Loan ($2.8
million -- 3.0%), which is secured by a 100 unit apartment
property located in Albany, Oregon. The property was 100% leased
as of June 30, 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and
1.15X, respectively.


NF CLO XIV: Moody's Hikes Rating on $11.25MM Certs. to 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Ares NF CLO XIV Ltd.:

USD14,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf);

USD16,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded
to A3 (sf);

USD14,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf);

USD11,250,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

USD229,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 30, 2007 Assigned Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher spread levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in August
2011. Moody's modeled a WARF, WAS and Diversity of 2492, 3.51% and
59, respectively, compared to 2603, 2.67% and 55, respectively at
the time of the last rating action. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $301.4 million,
defaulted par of $1.1 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.97% (implying a WARF of 2492), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 51.18%, and a diversity
score of 59. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Ares NF CLO XIV Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1993)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2990)

Class A: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


OHA PARK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $28.13-Mil. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by OHA Park Avenue CLO I, Ltd.:

US$30,940,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 8, 2011
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$50,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
Notes, Due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 8,
2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$346,560,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 8, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

US$36,560,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2022, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on September 8, 2011 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

US$25,310,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2022, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on September 8, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

US$28,130,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2022, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on September 8, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in March 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread levels compared to the
levels assumed at the last rating action in September 2011.
Moody's modeled a WAS of 3.76%, compared to 2.88% at the time of
the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $547 million,
defaulted par of $22.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.15% (implying a WARF of 2846), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.22%, and a diversity
score of 51. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

OHA Park Avenue CLO I, Ltd., issued in March of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2277)

Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-2: 1
Class B: 2
Class C: 2
Class D: 1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3415)

Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-2: -2
Class B: -1
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


ONE WALL STREET III: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by One Wall Street CLO II Ltd.:

U.S.$244,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Term Floating Rate Notes Due
April 22, 2019, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 24,
2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf);

U.S.$50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes
Due April 22, 2019, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 24,
2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf);

U.S.$34,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due April 22,
2019, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded
to A2 (sf);

U.S.$15,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
Due April 22, 2019, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on August
24, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S.$16,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
Due April 22, 2019, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on August 24,
2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

U.S.$10,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes Due
April 22, 2019, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on August 24, 2011
Upgraded to B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher spread and
diversity levels compared to the levels assumed at the last rating
action in August 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2488 compared to
2689 at the time of the last rating action, a weighted average
spread of 3.56% compared to 2.75% at the time of the last rating
action and a Diversity Score of 70 compared to 55 at the time of
the last rating action. In addition, the weighted average recovery
rate has increased since the last rating action. Moody's modeled a
recovery rate of 50.06% compared to 47.95% at the time of the last
rating action. In addition, the deal's overcollateralization
ratios have been stable since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $377 million,
defaulted par of $8.2 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.60% (implying a WARF of 2488), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.06%, and a diversity
score of 70. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

One Wall Street CLO II, issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1990)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: +1
Class C: +2
Class D: +2
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2986)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: -3
Class C: -2
Class D: 0
Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


PARCS MASTER: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. 2007-18 Piedmont Debt to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the PARCS
Master Trust Class 2007-18 Piedmont rating to 'D(sf)' issued by
PARCS Master Trust, a synthetic corporate investment-grade
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions.

The rating downgrade follows losses because of credit events that
caused principal losses on the rated notes.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING WITHDRAWN

PARCS Master Trust, Class 2007-18 Piedmont

                Rating               Rating
Classes         To                   From
Trust Unit      D (sf)               CCC- (sf)


PEGASUS 2007-1: Fitch Cuts Ratings Two CBMS Classes to 'Bsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes issued by Pegasus 2007-1
Ltd. due to negative credit migration of the commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS).

Sensitivity/Rating Drivers

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the reference portfolio. The degree of correlated
default risk of this reference collateral is high given the single
sector and vintage concentration. Based on this analysis and the
credit enhancement available to class A-1 and A-2, the credit
characteristics of the bonds are consistent with a 'Bsf' rating.
Approximately 32.1% of the portfolio has been downgraded an
average of four notches and 10.7% upgraded a weighted average of
two notches. The weighted average rating factor (WARF) has
declined to 'BBB+/BBB' from 'A/A-' at the last rating action.
Currently, 85.7% is rated investment grade, with four assets in
the reference portfolio carrying a Fitch derived rating in the
'BB' category.

The Negative Outlook on the notes reflects the concentration and
the potential for further negative migration in the reference
portfolio which consists of CMBS bonds from the 2006 vintage.

Pegasus 2007-1, issued in April 2007, is a synthetic
securitization referencing a portfolio of 28 $100 million class A-
M CMBS bonds. The transaction is designed to provide credit
protection for realized losses on the reference portfolio through
a credit default swap between the issuer and the swap
counterparty, DEPFA BANK PLC. (DEPFA) rated 'BBB+/F2' with a
Negative Outlook by Fitch. An amount equal to $20,000,000 minus
the aggregate amount of any actual principal writedowns is
available as subordination with respect to each reference
obligation. Until the writedowns related to a reference obligation
exceed $20,000,000 the issuer will not be required to pay any cash
settlements upon the trigger of a credit event. To date, there
have been no principal writedowns.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

-- $112,000,000 class A-1 notes to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
    Outlook Negative;

-- $1,400,000 class A-2 notes to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
    Outlook Negative.


PHOENIX CDO II: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Two Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of the following
notes issued by Phoenix CDO II, Ltd.:

  US$39,000,000 Class B Secondary Priority Senior Secured
  Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current outstanding balance of
  $20,340,106), Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on February 8,
  2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  US$20,000,000 Class C-1 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2035 (current outstanding balance of
  $32,869,903), Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 4, 2004
  Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$10,500,000 Class C-2 Third Priority Senior Secured Fixed
  Rate Notes Due 2035 (current outstanding balance of
  $28,885,001), Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 4, 2004
  Downgraded to C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, notwithstanding the improvement in the Class
B overcollateralization ratio since the last rating action in July
2011, the affirmation of the Class B Notes and Class C Notes is
due to the concentration risk in the portfolio, particularly with
respect to the 20.2% of the portfolio par with insufficient credit
information. These obligations are modeled with a base case
ratings in the Caa range.

Furthermore, as reported by the trustee on August 15, 2003, the
transaction experienced an "Event of Default" caused by a failure
of the Aggregate Principal Balance of all Collateral Debt
Securities (other than Defaulted Securities and Deferred Interest
PIK Bonds) on such Measurement Date plus (b) with respect to each
Defaulted Security or Deferred Interest PIK Bond, the Calculation
Amount of such Defaulted Security or Deferred Interest PIK Bond to
be at least equal to the Aggregate Outstanding Amount of the Rated
Notes on such Measurement Date, as required under Section 5.1(j)
of the indenture dated May 16, 2000. Holders of at least 50% of
the controlling class subsequently directed the trustee to declare
the notes to be immediately due and payable. The event of default
is continuing and there remains a possibility that a liquidation
event could be declared. The risk of a liquidation being declared
is low, however, given the strict voting requirement of 66-2/3% of
the Aggregate Outstanding Amount of the Class A Notes, the Class B
Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes (each voting as a
separate Class).

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.

Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, a number
of sources of uncertainty exist, operating both on a macro level
and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. Among the uncertainties in the residential
real estate property market are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates. In addition, uncertainty exists with the credit quality and
concentration risk of the portfolio. Approximately 20.2% of the
portfolio has limited credit information and is assumed to have a
Caa rating.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss, assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa rated assets notched up by 2 rating notches:

Class B: +1
Class C-1: 0
Class C-2: 0

Moody's Caa rated assets notched down by 2 rating notches:

Class B: -1
Class C-1: 0
Class C-2: 0

Phoenix CDO II, Ltd., issued in May 2000, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of CMBS, RMBS and ABS
originated from 1997 to 2002.


PUTNAM 2001-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. B Notes to 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded the ratings of four classes and affirmed the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Putnam Structured
Product Funding 2001-1 Ltd. ("Putnam 2001-1, Ltd."). The upgrades
are due to greater than expected amortization resulting in
approximately $37 million of paydown to three senior pari-passu
bond classes since last review. The affirmations are due to the
key transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate
with the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$56,000,000 Class A1-MM-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2032, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$50,000,000 Class A1-MM-b Floating Rate Notes Due 2032, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$105,000,000 Class A1-SS Floating Rate Notes Due 2032, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

US$9,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2037, Affirmed C
(sf); previously on Feb 24, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

US$9,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2037, Affirmed C (sf);
previously on Feb 24, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Putnam 2001-1, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of, asset backed securities (ABS) (26.0% of the pool
balance) which are primarily in the form of home equity and Alt-A
securities, commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (13.6%),
CRE CDO bonds (13.3%), corporate bonds (15.2%), and real estate
investment trust (REIT) debt (31.9%). As of the December 31, 2012
Trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, is $114.5 million; compared to $300
million at issuance. Paydown is directed to the Class A pari-passu
notes, as a result of amortization and the failing of certain par
value tests.

There are nine assets with a par balance of $3.6 million (3.2% of
the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted securities
as of the December 31, 2012 Trustee report. Eight of these assets
(58.9% of the defaulted balance) are home equity or Alt-A (1.9%),
and one asset is a CRE CDO Securities (1.3%). Moody's does expect
significant losses to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2,161
compared to 1,825 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (14.4%, same as last review),
A1-A3 (5.9% compared to 11.7% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (51.1%
compared to 45.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (5.5% compared to 6.6%
at last review), B1-B3 (2.2% compared to 4.2% at last review), and
Caa1-C (20.9% compared to 17.2% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.4 years compared to 2.9 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 35.4% compared to 38.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 1.7% compared to 1.6% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM  v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge  v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
35.4% to 25.4% or up to 45.4% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward and 0 to
1 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


R.E. REPACK 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed class A of R.E. Repack Trust 2002-1
(R.E. Repack 2002-1) in conjunction with its rating actions on the
trust's underlying security.

Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers:

The rating of class A of R.E. Repack 2002-1 is based on the credit
quality of its underlying security which is the $40,630,417 class
B issued by LNR CDO 2002-1, Ltd./Corp. (LNR 2002-1). For a
detailed description of Fitch's rating analysis of LNR 2002-1,
please see the press release 'Fitch Affirms LNR CDO 2002-1
Ltd./Corp.' dated Feb. 27, 2013 and available on the Fitch Ratings
web site at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

Fitch has affirmed the following class as indicated:

-- $40,630,417 class A Notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative.


SIERRA TIMESHARE: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on the notes issued by
various Sierra Timeshare Receivables transactions as detailed
below:

Sierra Timeshare 2010-1 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2011-1 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C notes at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2012-1 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

These affirmations reflect the ability of each transaction's
credit enhancement to provide loss coverage consistent with the
current rating levels. The Stable Rating Outlooks reflect Fitch's
expectation that the notes will remain sufficiently enhanced to
cover the stressed loss levels consistent with the current ratings
for the next 12 to 18 months.

It is important to note that default performance in these
transactions is above Fitch's initial expectations. For the Sierra
2011-1 transaction, loss coverage multiples at this time fall
short of Fitch's expected multiples for the current ratings.
However, the seller has actively exercised its option to
repurchase defaulted loans, a practice to which Fitch does not
give credit. Furthermore, due to the delevering structure of the
transactions, enhancement is adequate to support the higher than
expected default pace.

Fitch will continue to monitor economic conditions and their
impact as they relate to timeshare asset-backed securities and the
trust level performance variables and update the ratings
accordingly.

Rating Sensitivity:

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults could produce
default levels higher than the current projected base case default
proxy and impact available default coverage and multiples levels.
Lower default coverage could impact ratings and rating outlooks,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. In Fitch's
initial review of the transaction, the notes were found to have
limited sensitivity to a 1.5x and 2.0x increase of Fitch's base
case default expectation. To date, the transaction has exhibited
no defaults (due to repurchases) and default performance is
consistent with Fitch's initial expectations. Default coverage and
multiple levels are consistent with the current ratings. A
material deterioration in performance would have to occur within
the asset pool to have potential negative impact on the
outstanding ratings.


SLATER MILL: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Slater
Mill Loan Fund L.P./Slater Mill Loan Fund LLC's $279.55 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of Aug. 20, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Slater Mill Loan Fund L.P./Slater Mill Loan Fund LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
X                          AAA (sf)                       1.30
A                          AAA (sf)                     190.00
B                          AA (sf)                       37.50
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        21.75
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      15.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       14.00


SORIN REAL III: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Five Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of notes issued by Sorin Real
Estate CDO III Ltd. The affirmations are due to key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation and re-remic (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Sorin Real Estate CDO III Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(62.6% of the collateral pool balance), asset backed securities
(27.9%) that are primarily in the form of subprime residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), and CRE CDOs (9.5%). As of the
January 8, 2013 note valuation report, the aggregate note balance
of the transaction has decreased to $904.2 million from $1.0
billion at issuance. The paydown was directed to the class A-1B
notes from regular amortization of collateral, interest proceeds
directed as principal proceeds as a result of failing certain par
value tests, and reclassification of interest proceeds from
defaulted securities as principal proceeds.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,407
compared to 4,136 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (9.4% compared to 9.7% at last
review), A1-A3 (5.5% compared to 8.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(14.5% compared to 16.1% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (15.7% compared
to 15.3% at last review), B1-B3 (13.0% compared to 12.7% at last
review), and Caa1-Ca/C (41.9% compared to 38.2% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.0 years, compared to 4.8 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 16.6% compared to 17.6% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 10.3% compared to 8.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM  v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge  v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 16.6% to 6.6% or up to 26.6% would result in rating
movements on the rated tranches of 0 notch downward or 0 to 1
notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


SPIRIT MASTER: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 4 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+ (sf)' ratings
on the class A-1 and A-2 notes from Spirit Master Funding LLC's
series 2005-1, the class A notes from Spirit Master Funding II
LLC's series 2006-1, and the class A notes from Spirit Master
Funding III LLC's series 2007-1.  The three series share one
collateral pool comprised primarily of single-tenant, freestanding
commercial real estate properties and the related rental payments
under triple-net leases.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view of the master trusts' relative
stable performance and their ability to generate cash (by lease
payments and property liquidation) to pay timely interest and full
principal on the rated notes by each series' rated final payment
date at the 'BB+' rating stress.

For each series, Ambac Assurance Corp. (Ambac) guarantees the
timely interest payments on each payment date and the ultimate
principal payments on the rated final payment date (July 1, 2023,
for series 2005-1; March 1, 2024, for series 2006-1; and March 1,
2025, for series 2007-1).  Since S&P withdrew its rating on Ambac
on Nov. 30, 2010, S&P's ratings on the three series no longer
depend on its rating on Ambac.

S&P estimates that the three series will amortize to approximately
64% of the original balance by the legal final payment date.  S&P
expects the originator to refinance each series on its legal final
payment date (July 1, 2020, for series 2005-1; March 1, 2021, for
series 2006-1; and March 1, 2022, for series 2007-1), which is
three years earlier than the respective rated final payment date.
If the originator does not refinance at that time, a rapid
amortization trigger will occur and all available funds will be
used to pay down each series' principal.

S&P's ratings reflect the scenario whereby the originator is
unable to refinance, Ambac is unable to pay under the bond
insurance policy, and, as a result, the real estate properties
collateralizing the transactions are liquidated in a stressed
environment.

As of the Feb. 14, 2013, distribution date, the collateral pool
comprised more than 700 properties.  The total rent and mortgage
collection in the January 2013 payment period was about
$11.6 million.  Since S&P's last review of the three transactions
in 2011, the manager has sold 55 properties and purchased 16.

For the series 2005-1 transaction, although the class A-1 and A-2
notes are pari passu in terms of interest payment, the class A-1
notes are senior to the class A-2 notes in terms of principal
payment.  The class A-2 notes only receive interest until the
class A-1 notes are paid in full.  As of the Feb. 20, 2013,
payment date, the class A-1 notes had been paying down according
to the schedule and had a remaining balance of $110.9 million.
The class A-2 note balance was $258.3 million, the same amount as
when the transaction closed.

As of the Feb. 14, 2013, distribution date, the class A notes from
the series 2006-1 transaction had a balance of $257.8 million and
the class A notes from the series 2007-1 transaction had a balance
of $321.2 million.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the industry trends,
utilization rates, lease rates, and other related metrics to
determine whether, in its view, the ratings assigned to the notes
remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to support
them and take rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Spirit Master Funding LLC
Series 2005-1

Class        Rating
A-1          BB+ (sf)
A-2          BB+ (sf)

Spirit Master Funding II LLC
Series 2006-1

Class        Rating
A            BB+ (sf)

Spirit Master Funding III LLC
Series 2007-1

Class        Rating
A            BB+ (sf)


SPRINGLEAF FINANCE: S&P Puts 'CCC' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its ratings on
Evansville, Ind.-based Springleaf Finance Corp., including its
'CCC/C' issuer credit ratings, on CreditWatch with positive
implications.

"The CreditWatch placement reflects significant improvements in
Springleaf's funding profile," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Stephen Lynch.  "In February 2013, Springleaf raised
$662 million through a securitization of its consumer loans.  We
view the securitization of consumer loans as especially meaningful
because it points toward a more stable funding profile, allowing
management to build out the consumer lending business while
running off its legacy subprime real estate portfolio."

"Nonetheless, we believe securitization markets for consumer loans
are less developed and more vulnerable to disruptions than those
for residential mortgages, so funding vulnerability will continue
to limit the rating," said Mr. Lynch.  Strong cash flows from the
legacy portfolio in runoff and the possibility that Springleaf
could return to profitability by the end of 2013 are also positive
rating factors.

Finally, S&P believes that positive investor reception to the
consumer loan offering and other debt issuances mitigates the
likelihood of a distressed debt exchange, which further supports
the CreditWatch placement.

In resolving the CreditWatch, S&P will review the company's 2012
financial results and evaluate the longer-term availability of the
consumer loan asset-backed securities market and other funding
options for the firm's consumer loans.  S&P will also meet with
management following the release of the fourth-quarter 2012
results to review the company's business and financial profiles
and the related impact, if any, on S&P's current assessment of
Springleaf's overall creditworthiness.  S&P will resolve the
CreditWatch after the company releases its year-end 2012 results.


SOUTH COAST IV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class A-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-2 notes from South Coast Funding IV Ltd..  South Coast Funding
IV Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
backed by mezzanine structured finance (SF) assets and is managed
by TCW Asset Management Co.

The underlying collateral for this transaction consists of more
than 40% residential mortgage-backed securities, more than 30%
commercial mortgage-backed securities, and the remaining
collateral is in other asset-backed securities.

The transaction experienced an event on default on Jan. 31, 2013,
and on Feb. 20, 2013, a majority of the controlling class A-2
noteholders voted in favor of an acceleration of maturity.  S&P's
current analysis reflects that going forward all proceeds
available after senior expense payments will be used to pay down
the A-2 note interest and principal ahead of any payment to the
other classes.  Despite the potential change to the payment
sequence that will benefit the class A-2 noteholders, S&P notes
that the transaction has undergone credit deterioration since its
last review.

The transaction continues to hold over $64 million in defaulted
assets according to the Jan. 31, 2013, trustee report, which S&P
used for this rating action.  The overcollateralization ratios
have also deteriorated, on average, about 4% since the last
review.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings on
the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions as it
deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING LIST

South Coast Funding IV Ltd.
                       Rating
Class             To           From
A-2               BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)

OTHER RATINGS OUTSTANDING

South Coast Funding IV Ltd.
Class             Rating
B                 D (sf)
C                 D (sf)
Pre shares        D (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             South Coast Funding IV Ltd.
Coissuer:           South Coast Funding IV Corp.
Collateral manager: TCW Asset Management Co.
Trustee:            Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


SOUTHFORK CLO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $36MM Cl. C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Southfork CLO, Ltd.:

US$23,500,000 Class A-3a Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2011
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

US$2,500,000 Class A-3b Fixed Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due 2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2011
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

US$39,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$52,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2017 (current outstanding balance of $27,110,403),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

US$7,000,000 Class A-1b Fixed Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due 2017 (current outstanding balance of $3,649,485), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$400,000,000 Class A-1g Floating rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2017 (current outstanding balance of $208,541,581),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

US$42,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2017, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2011
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$36,300,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2017, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously
on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes have been collectively paid down by approximately 45% or
$194.4 million since the last rating action. Based on the latest
trustee report dated January 22, 2013, the Class A, Class B, and
Class C overcollateralization ratios are reported at 129.6%,
118.0% and 109.0%, respectively, versus May 2011 levels of 123.5%,
114.6%, and 107.4%, respectively. The January 2013 trustee-
reported overcollateralization ratios do not reflect the principal
payments of $91.1 million that were distributed on the February 1,
2013 payment date. Additionally, the transaction's weighted
average recovery rate has increased since the last rating action.
Moody's modeled a recovery rate of 50.4% compared to 48.4% at the
time of the last rating action.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the January 2013 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 17.4% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity. Notwithstanding
the increase in the overcollateralization ratio of the Class C
notes, Moody's affirmed the rating of the Class C notes due to the
market risk posed by the exposure to these long-dated assets.

The rating on the Class A-1g Notes reflects the actual underlying
rating of the Notes. This underlying rating is based solely on the
intrinsic credit quality of the Notes in the absence of the
guarantee from Assured Guaranty Corp., whose insurance financial
strength rating is currently at A3. The above action is a result
of, and is consistent with, Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors as
described in the press release dated November 10, 2008, titled
"Moody's modifies approach to rating structured finance securities
wrapped by financial guarantors."

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $406 million,
defaulted par of $45.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.9% (implying a WARF of 2711), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 50.4%, and a diversity score of 38.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Southfork CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2169)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1g: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3a: 0

Class A-3b: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3253)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1g: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3a: 0

Class A-3b: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value. The deal has continued to experience growing
exposure to long-dated assets due to amendment and extension of
loan agreements. In consideration of the size of the deal's
exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to
the liquidation assumptions used in the rating analysis, Moody's
ran different scenarios considering a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposure and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the extent of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long-
dated assets.


STRIPS III: S&P Lowers Rating on Class N Notes to 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on one class
from STRIPs III Ltd. Series 2003-1, a U.S. commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its rating on one other class from the same
transaction.

"The downgrade and affirmation reflect our analysis of the
transaction, which involved applying various cash flow stress
scenarios to the underlying collateral.  The underlying collateral
consists of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) interest-
only (IO) certificates and an IO strip (the interest cash flow
portion of a principal and interest-paying bond).  Our applied
cash flow stress scenarios entailed projecting the timing of loan-
level defaults (as either term or maturity) and the derivation of
loan-level losses, according to our CMBS criteria.  We then
utilized Trepp's cash flow model to project the cash flows to the
underlying IO and IO strip certificates," S&P said.

"In our analysis of specific default and loss assumptions, we
assumed specially serviced assets default immediately, with
various recovery periods ranging from immediate recovery to a 24-
month recovery period.  Similarly, nonspecially serviced loans
that we project to be term or maturity defaults were assigned
various recovery periods ranging from paid off at maturity to a
12-month recovery period.  For nondefaulted loans, we assumed 100%
prepayment of the underlying loans at the start of the open
prepayment period.  Finally, we only relied on the projected
collateral cash flows through the legal final maturity date of the
liability certificates, which is March 24, 2018," S&P added.

According to the Jan. 22, 2013, trustee report, STRIPS III  Ltd.
Series 2003-1 was collateralized by eight CMBS IO classes with a
notional balance of $168.8 million and one IO strip from a
principal and interest-paying bond with a principal balance of
$2.6 million.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the certificates remain consistent with
S&P's analysis of the underlying collateral and take rating
actions as it determines necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING LOWERED
STRIPs III Ltd.
Series 2003-1
                       Rating
Class            To               From
N                B- (sf)          BB- (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED
STRIPs III Ltd.
Series 2003-1
Class            Rating
M                BB (sf)


TELOS CLO 2013-3: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to TELOS
CLO 2013-3 Ltd./TELOS CLO 2013-3 LLC's $327 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which comprises
      primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.31%-13.84%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees; collateral manager
      subordinated and incentive fees; and subordinated note
      payments into principal proceeds for the purchase of
      additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1304.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

TELOS CLO 2013-3 Ltd./TELOS CLO 2013-3 LLC

Class                      Rating           Amount
                                          (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)         225.00
B                          AA (sf)           36.50
C (deferrable)             A (sf)            26.50
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)          18.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)           15.00
F (deferrable)             B (sf)             6.00
Subordinated notes         NR                34.35

NR-Not rated.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C5: Fitch Rates Class F Certificates 'Bsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
the UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C5 (UBS-BB 2013-
C5) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $82,500,000 Class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,000,000 Class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,000,000 Class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $629,529,000 Class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $110,500,000 Class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $120,660,000ab Class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,160,189,000*a Class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $96,528,000*a Class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $96,528,000ab Class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $274,733,000ab Class EC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57,545,000ab Class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70,540,000a Class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,844,000a Class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,845,000a Class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

(*) Notional amount and interest-only.
(a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
     for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
     exchanged for class A-S, class B, and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the $44,551,824 class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in
the trust, primary assets of which are 81 loans secured by 122
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.485 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by UBS Real Estate Securities, Inc.,
Barclays Bank PLC, General Electric Capital Corp., KeyBank, N.A.,
Archetype Mortgage Funding I LLC, RAIT Partnership, LP, and The
Bancorp Bank.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 77.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 85.2%, and asset summary reviews
on 85.2% of the pool.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch Leverage: This transaction has slightly lower leverage
relative to previously rated deals, with a Fitch Ratings stressed
DSCR of 1.45x and a Fitch stressed LTV of 95.8%. The average 2012
Fitch DSCR and LTV were 1.24x and 97.1%, respectively. The average
2011 Fitch DSCR and LTV were 1.25x and 91.6%, respectively.

Geographic Concentration: The deal is geographically concentrated
with California representing 36.7% of the pool; however, the
largest two loans, comprising 27.6% of the pool,
are secured by malls in California with good sales psf and Fitch
LTVs of 82.3% and 87.1%.

Loan Concentration: The top 10 loans account for 58.2%; the LCI
and SCI are 577 and 1003, respectively. This represents slightly
higher top 10 loan concentration than most 2012 transactions;
however, the sponsor concentration is notably higher, with the top
two loans having a related sponsor and accounting for 27.6% of the
pool.

Additional Debt: One loan (5.1%) has in-place mezzanine debt and
one loan (14.5%) has a pari passu note held outside the trust.
There are eight loans comprising 20.9% of the pool that
allow for additional mezzanine financing subject to DSCR, LTV, and
debt yield constraints.

Rating Sensitivities

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9.6% below
the full-year 2011 net operating income (NOI) (for properties that
2011 NOI was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing
during this period). Unanticipated further declines in property-
level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss severity on
defaulted loans, and could result in potential rating actions on
the certificates. Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings
assigned to WFRBS 2013-C12 certificates and found that the
transaction displays average sensitivity to further declines in
NCF. In a scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'Asf' could result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF
declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. The 'Rating
Sensitivity' section of Fitch's presale report includes a detailed
explanation of additional stresses and sensitivities.

The Master and Special Servicer will be Midland Loan Services,
Inc. (Midland), rated 'CMS1' and 'CSS1', respectively, by Fitch.



VENTURE X: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Venture
X CLO Ltd./ Venture X CLO Corp.'s $383.5 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Sept. 28,
2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to S&P's effective date review are
generally based on the application of its criteria to a
combination of purchased collateral, collateral committed to be
purchased, and the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P
by the collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions
about the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because
not all assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deem
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Venture X CLO Ltd./Venture X CLO Corp.

Class                   Rating         Amount (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)              263.50
B                       AA (sf)                55.75
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                 27.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)               18.50
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                13.75
F (deferrable)          BB- (sf)                5.00



WAVE 2007-1: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'Ca'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded the rating of eight classes and affirmed the
rating of three classes of Notes issued by WAVE 2007-1. The
downgrade is due to deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying collateral as evidenced by an increase in the weighted
average rating factor and a decrease in the weighted average
recovery rate. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

U.S. $1,666,666.66 Swap Transaction, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on Apr 19, 2010 Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S. $2,542,766.67 Swap Transaction, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on Apr 19, 2010 Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S. $2,690,833.33 Swap Transaction, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on Apr 19, 2010 Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S. $516,666.67 Swap Transaction, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on Apr 19, 2010 Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S. $595,591.66 Swap Transaction, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on Apr 19, 2010 Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S. $7,819,225 Swap Transaction, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on Apr 19, 2010 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Wave 2007-1 is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS); 100% of the
collateral balance. As of the January 22, 2013 Trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction has decreased to $952.1
million from $2.0 billion at issuance. The reduction in the
collateral par amount is due to an In-Kind Redemption in September
2011. There have been no paydowns or losses to the collateral
pool.

On March 31, 2010, Moody's assigned ratings to six upfront swaps
(collectively the "Swaps") in the WAVE 2007-1 transaction. Each of
the Swaps is dated as of June 18, 2007 and each is between SMBC
Capital Markets, Inc. (the "Swap Counterparty") and the Trust.
Moody's ratings address the risk posed to the Swap Counterparty on
an expected loss basis arising from the inability of the Trust to
honor its obligations under the Swaps. The ratings take into
account the rating of the Swap Counterparty, the transactions'
legal structure and the characteristics of the collateral pool of
the trust. The rating downgrade action is the result of realized
and projected interest shortfalls on the underlying collateral.
The diminished interest proceeds poses risks to the funds
available to pay the future payment obligations under the Swaps.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3,953
compared to 2,579 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Baa1-Baa3 (6.1% compared to 21.6% at
last review), Ba1-Ba3 (9.4% compared to 25.7% at last review), B1-
B3 (46.5% compared to 32.7% at last review), and Caa1-C (38.0%
compared to 20.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.9 years compared to 4.9 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 10.5% compared to 18.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, compared to 21.8% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 10.5% to 20.5% or down to 0.5% does not result in any
rating changes on the rated tranches.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


ZOHAR III: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Ratings on Three Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of the
following notes issued by Zohar III, Limited:

U.S. $350,000,000 Class A-1D Floating Rate Senior Secured Delayed
Drawdown Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of
$332,048,367), Withdrawn (sf); previously on February 22, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

U.S. $200,000,000 Class A-1R Floating Rate Senior Secured
Revolving Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of
$189,741,924), Withdrawn (sf); previously on February 22, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

U.S. $150,000,000 Class A-1T Floating Rate Senior Secured Term
Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of $142,306,443),
Withdrawn (sf); previously on February 22, 2013 Downgraded to B1
(sf)

U.S. $200,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Second Priority Senior
Secured Term Notes Due 2019, Withdrawn (sf); previously on
February 22, 2013 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

U.S. $116,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Third Priority Senior
Secured Term Notes Due 2019, Withdrawn (sf); previously on
February 22, 2013 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings because it believes it has
insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to support the
maintenance of the ratings on a going forward basis.


ZOHAR CDO 2003-1: Moody's Withdraws 'Ca' Rating  on Class A Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of the
following notes issued by Zohar CDO 2003-1 Limited:

U.S. $297,500,000 Class A-3a Floating Rate Senior Secured Delayed
Drawdown Notes due 2015 (current outstanding balance of
$252,835,597), Withdrawn (sf); previously on February 22, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

U.S. $52,500,000 Class A-3b Floating Rate Senior Secured Delayed
Drawdown Notes due 2015, Withdrawn (sf); previously on February
22, 2013 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings because it believes it has
insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to support the
maintenance of the ratings on a going forward basis.


* Moody's Takes Ratings Action on $155.3MM Alt-A RMBS Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of seven tranches,
downgraded the rating of three tranches, and affirmed the rating
of nine tranches from two transactions, backed by Alt-A loans.

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance review of these
deals and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools. The upgrades on seven tranches are due to an increase in
the credit enhancement that is provided by subordination,
overcollateralization, and excess spread, relative to the expected
losses on the pools.

The downgrades are due to the weak interest shortfall
reimbursement mechanism on the bonds. The tranches downgraded do
not have interest shortfalls but in the event of an interest
shortfall, structural limitations in the transactions will prevent
recoupment of interest shortfalls even if funds are available in
subsequent periods. Missed interest payments on these mezzanine
tranches can only be made up from excess interest and after the
overcollateralization is built to a target amount. In these
transactions since overcollateralization is already below target
due to poor performance, any missed interest payments to mezzanine
tranches are unlikely to be paid. Moody's caps the ratings of such
tranches with weak interest shortfall reimbursement at A3 as long
as they have not experienced any shortfall.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-5

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $96 Million of 2004 RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five tranches,
upgraded the rating of one tranche, and affirmed the ratings of 17
tranches from two RMBS transactions issued by miscellaneous
issuers, backed by Prime loans, and issued in 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HYB1

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3-1, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. A-4-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. IO-1, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. IO-3-1, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. IO-3-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J6

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-6, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Prime jumbo
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance and structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for certain bonds than previously
anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
interest-only securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program to 2013 and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until the
end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools
originated before 2005, Moody's first applies a baseline
delinquency rate of 3.0%. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated is multiplied by a factor ranging from
0.75 to 2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5%
to greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $295-Mil. of US Alt-A RMBS Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 15 tranches
and affirmed the ratings of 20 tranches from four RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by miscellaneous
issuers.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the Alt-A
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance and/or structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for certain bonds than previously
anticipated. For e.g., for shifting interest structures, back-
ended liquidations could expose the seniors to tail-end losses. In
its current approach, Moody's captures this risk by running each
individual pool through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios
in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural nuances of the transaction.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated by a factor ranging from
0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. 1-A-1, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. CB-IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. 3-IO, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-12

Cl. II-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. II-B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. II-B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. II-M-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-9

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-AC6

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. BB, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 129 Subprime RMBS Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 16
tranches, upgraded the rating of 13 tranches, affirmed the rating
of 99 tranches, and confirmed the rating of 1 tranche from 13
transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
HE4

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
HE5

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2008 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R2

Cl. A-1B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R3

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2008 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE6

Cl. M1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M3, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT4

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-11, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Confirmed at
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Confirmed at
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
INABS 2005-A

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-HE1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The rating actions constitute of a number of downgrades, upgrades,
affirmations and a confirmation. The downgrades are primarily due
to the tranches' weak interest shortfall reimbursement mechanisms.

The tranches downgraded to A3 do not have interest shortfalls but
in the event of an interest shortfall, structural limitations in
the transactions will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls
even if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on these tranches can typically only be made up from
excess interest after the overcollateralization is built to a
target amount. In these transactions since overcollateralization
is already below target due to poor performance, any future missed
interest payments to these tranches are unlikely to be paid.
Moody's caps the ratings of such tranches with weak interest
shortfall reimbursement at A3 as long as they have not experienced
any shortfall.

Ratings on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3. For tranches with larger
outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in
November 2009. These rating action take into account only credit-
related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace. The methodology only
applies to pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of
greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool
factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines
to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural features allow for
a monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Actions on $389 Million Worth of RMBS Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on 8 tranches,
confirmed the ratings on 5 tranches, affirmed the ratings on 31
tranches, and downgraded the rating on 1 tranche from 6
transactions issued by various trusts. The collateral backing the
transaction are subprime residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
AG1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B1, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
RM1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2008 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
RM2

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-
ASAP1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR3

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The rating actions constitute one downgrade and a number of
upgrades, affirmations and confirmations. The downgrade is
primarily due to the weak interest shortfall reimbursement
mechanism on the bond.

The Class M-1 issued by ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-WMC1 does not have current interest shortfalls but in the
event of a future interest shortfall, structural limitations in
the transactions will likely prevent recoupment of interest
shortfalls even if funds are available in subsequent periods.
Missed interest payments on this tranche can typically only be
made up from excess interest after the overcollateralization is
built to a target amount. In this transaction since
overcollateralization is already below target due to poor
performance, any future missed interest payments to this mezzanine
tranche are unlikely to be paid. Moody's generally caps the
ratings of such tranches with weak interest shortfall
reimbursement at A3 as long as they have not experienced any
shortfall.

Generally, ratings on tranches that currently have very small
unrecoverable interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3. For tranches
with larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default" published in November 2009. These approaches take into
account only credit-related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted for Moody's current view
on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace. The methodology only
applies to pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of
greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool
factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines
to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural features allow for
a monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Actions on 24 Scratch-and-Dent RMBS Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of nine tranches
and affirmed the rating of 15 tranches from six transactions,
backed by Scratch and Dent loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest Trust 2003-X4

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest Trust 2004-X2

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest Trust 2004-X3

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-CF14

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 19, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Issuer: GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004
Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Quest Trust 2005-X1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance review of these
deals and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools.

The rating actions constitute of a number of downgrades and
affirmations. The downgrades are primarily due to the weak
interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism on the bonds.

The tranches downgraded to A3 do not have interest shortfalls but
in the event of an interest shortfall, structural limitations in
the transactions will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls
even if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on these mezzanine tranches can only be made up from
excess interest and after the overcollateralization is built to a
target amount. In these transactions since overcollateralization
is already below target due to poor performance, any missed
interest payments to mezzanine tranches are unlikely to be paid.
Moody's caps the ratings of such tranches with weak interest
shortfall reimbursement at A3 as long as they have not experienced
any shortfall.

Class M-1 in Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest Trust
2003-X4; and Class M-2 in Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.,
Quest Trust 2004-X2; Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest
Trust 2004-X3; and Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest
Trust 2005-X1, were downgraded to B1. These tranches have large
outstanding interest shortfalls and a weak interest shortfall
reimbursement mechanism.

For the tranches with large outstanding interest shortfalls,
Moody's applies "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" published in November 2009. This rating
action takes into account only credit-related interest shortfall
risks.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* S&P Puts 5 Ratings on 4 US CDO of TRuPs on CreditWatch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on class A-1
from ALESCO Preferred Funding IV Ltd., class X from Alesco
Preferred Funding XII Ltd., class A-1 from Trapeza CDO X Ltd.,
class A-1 from Trapeza CDO XI Ltd., and the repackaged securities
from Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced Returns
(RACERS) Series 2004-13-E Trust, on CreditWatch with positive
implications following an improvement in the classes' credit
enhancement.

ALESCO Preferred Funding IV Ltd., Alesco Preferred Funding XII
Ltd., Trapeza CDO X Ltd., and Trapeza CDO XI Ltd., are U.S.
collateralized bond obligation (CBO) transactions, backed by trust
preferred securities (TruPs) issued by financial institutions.
The class X notes from Alesco Preferred Funding XII Ltd. has
continued to pay down based on the schedule specified in its
documents and is currently at 62.50% of its original balance.  The
class A-1 notes from the other TruPs transactions have also
continued to receive paydowns that reduced their respective
outstanding balance and improved their credit support.

The repack transaction is collateralized by (i) a certificate
representing $50 million of the class B floating-rate notes from
SFA CABS II CDO, a mezzanine structured finance collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transaction; (ii) a $50 million zero-coupon
synthetic CDO transaction arranged by Citigroup Global Markets
Ltd.; and (iii) cash deposited in an interest accruing reserve
account.  S&P believes that the balance in the reserve account is
currently sufficient to pay interest on the certificates until
maturity without depending on additional deposits or cash inflows.

Standard & Poor's will resolve the CreditWatch placements in the
appropriate time frame.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

ALESCO Preferred Funding IV Ltd.
                           Rating
Class         To                        From
A-1           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos       CCC+ (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding XII Ltd.
                           Rating
Class         To                        From
X             A- (sf)/Watch Pos         A- (sf)

Trapeza CDO X Ltd.
                           Rating
Class         To                        From
A-1           CCC (sf)/Watch Pos        CCC (sf)

Trapeza CDO XI Ltd.
                           Rating
Class         To                        From
A-1           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos       CCC+ (sf)

Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced Returns Series 2001-
13-E Trust
                           Rating
Class         To                        From
Certificate   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos       CCC+ (sf)


* S&P Affirms 4 Ratings on 8 US CDO Cash Flow Trust Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on 17
tranches from eight U.S. cash flow trust preferred collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed
its ratings on 15 tranches from nine CDOs from CreditWatch with
positive implications.  Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on
four classes from the same transactions.  The affected tranches
are from CDO transactions backed by trust preferred securities
issued by banks and insurance companies.

The upgrades mainly reflect improvements to the principal coverage
ratios due to paydowns the transactions have made to the senior
tranches of each CDO's capital structure.  The paydowns have
generally accelerated over the last year because of increased
redemption of the underlying trust preferred securities.  S&P
believes that many of the transactions' documents contain call
provisions that may be triggered by changes in the regulatory
treatment of trust preferred securities.  The Federal Reserve's
June 7, 2012, notice of proposed rulemaking (the Fed Notice) may
have triggered such provisions in many trust preferred documents.
The Fed Notice includes a proposal to phase out Tier 1 capital
credit for trust preferred securities over a 10-year period for a
broader range of U.S. banks than what was previously generally
considered.

Additionally, most of the transaction's senior notes have also
benefitted from the excess spread that was captured due to
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio failures, leading to further
paydowns to the senior notes.

Furthermore, the upgrades also reflect a slight improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying collateral pools of the mainly
bank trust preferred transactions.

The affirmations listed below reflect the availability of credit
support at the current rating levels

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings it
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deem necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Alesco Preferred Funding XI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To             From
A-1A                BBB+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1B                BBB+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Alesco Preferred Funding XIII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BBB (sf)            B- (sf)/Watch Pos
X                   A+ (sf)             A+ (sf)

MM Community Funding IX Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BB+ (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                 CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities VIII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BBB+ (sf)           B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                 CCC+ (sf)           CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities IX Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                 B+ (sf)             CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3                 B+ (sf)             CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Preferred Term Securities X Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BB+ (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                 B (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A-3                 B (sf)              CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BBB+ (sf)           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                 BB+ (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3                 BB+ (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4                 BB+ (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Pos


TPref Funding III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 BB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Tropic CDO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1L                BB+ (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L                CCC+ (sf)           CCC- (sf)


* S&P Lowers Rating on 321 Classes from 175 U.S. RMBS to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on 321 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 175 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2009.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the impact that
principal writedowns had on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.  Prior to the rating actions, S&P rated all
the lowered classes in this review 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)'.

Approximately 69.16% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A (Alt-A) or prime jumbo
mortgage loan collateral.  The 321 defaulted classes consist of
the following:

   -- 147 classes from prime jumbo transactions (45.79% of all
      defaults);

   -- 75 classes from Alt-A transactions (23.36%);

   -- 8 from subprime transactions (18.07%);

   -- 31 from RMBS negative amortization transactions (9.66%);

   -- Five from resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit (re-REMIC) transactions;

   -- Two from reperforming transactions;

   -- One from a RMBS HELOC transaction;

   -- One from an outside the guidelines transaction; and

   -- One from a small balance commercial transaction

A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable) provide credit
enhancement for all of the transactions in this review.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities that experience principal writedowns, and it will
adjust its ratings as it considers appropriate in accordance with
its criteria.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* S&P Lowers 180 Ratings from 68 US RMBS Re-REMIC Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 180
classes from 34 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transactions and removed 173 of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications and two from CreditWatch with developing
implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on 1,197 classes from
64 transactions and removed 1,140 of them from CreditWatch
negative and 36 of them from CreditWatch developing.  Furthermore,
S&P withdrew its ratings on 18 classes from 13 transactions
because the classes were paid in full or in accordance with S&P's
interest-only (IO) criteria.

The transactions in this review were issued between 2003 and 2010
and are supported by underlying RMBS backed by an assortment of
different collateral types including, but not limited to, prime,
Alt-A, and subprime mortgage loans.  Subordination,
overcollateralization (when available), and excess interest as
applicable generally provide credit support for underlying
securities of the re-REMIC transactions.  In addition,
subordination within the capital structures of the re-REMICs
themselves is generally existent in most transactions.

On Oct. 26, 2012, S&P initially placed its ratings on 2,847
classes from 205 re-REMIC transactions on CreditWatch negative or
developing due to the implementation of S&P's revised criteria.
S&P has completed its review for a portion of these transactions.
The directional movements for the CreditWatch resolutions within
this review are as follows:

                              Three or fewer    More than three
From Watch   Affirmations     notches down      notches down
Watch Neg        1,140             129               44
Watch Dev           36               2                0

Overall, the CreditWatch resolutions indicated in the table above
represent that most re-REMIC classes may have possessed adequate
credit enhancement, which was indicative of a rating affirmation.
The revised criteria did, however, result in a number of downward
rating movements.  While most of these downgrades were due to
projected principal writedowns, S&P attributed roughly 7% of the
downgrades to projected interest shortfalls within the analysis.
In addition, approximately 2% of the downgrades were due to
current interest shortfalls in conjunction with S&P's interest
shortfall criteria.  In particular, the revised criteria resulted
in additional stress to certain underlying securities, thus
affecting some re-REMIC classes.  Such additional stresses
include, but are not limited to, one or more of the following
factors:

   -- An increase in our loss multiples at higher investment-grade
      rating levels;

   -- A substantial portion of nondelinquent loans now categorized
      as reperforming (many of these underlying loans have been
      modified) and have a default frequency from 25%-to-50%;

   -- Overall increases in roll rates (expected default) for 30-
      and 60-day delinquent loans;

   -- Application of a high prepayment/front end stress
      liquidation scenario under investment-grade rating
      scenarios; and

   -- An overall continued elevated level of observed loss
      severities.

For certain transactions, S&P's lowest rating in the re-REMIC may
be different than the lowest rating on an underlying class.  S&P
attributes this to the mechanics of the re-REMIC (such as
additional credit enhancement or rapid pay-down at the re-REMIC
level) or the application of additional stress at the re-REMIC
level in concert with tempered upward rating movement compared
with that of the underlying security.

With this review, S&P has resolved the CreditWatch placements for
roughly ninety percent of the transactions with ratings initially
placed on CreditWatch.  When doing so, S&P applied its loss
projections to the underlying collateral in order to identify the
magnitude of losses that S&P believes could be passed through from
the underlying securities to the applicable re-REMIC classes.  In
addition, S&P stressed its loss projections at various rating
categories to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand
the stressed losses associated with their ratings, while receiving
the appropriate level of interest and principal due.

S&P is in the process of reviewing the remaining ten percent of
transactions remaining from the initial CreditWatch placements and
intend on completing these in subsequent weeks ahead.  In some
cases S&P may be either in the process of analyzing additional
information regarding payment mechanisms, and/or obtaining
underlying security data to apply within S&P's analysis.

S&P lowered its ratings on five classes to 'D (sf)' due to
defaults.  Additionally, S&P affirmed a number of 'CCC' and 'CC'
re-REMIC ratings based on its evaluation of the change in overall
losses and associated downward rating movements of underlying
securities, combined with its overall view that the securities
lack sufficient credit enhancement when compared with S&P's base-
case outlook.  S&P also withdrew its ratings on 18 classes either
because the classes have been paid in full or in accordance with
S&P's interest-only (IO) criteria in which the referenced classes
no longer sustain ratings above 'A+ (sf)'.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on Synthetic CDOs
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 29
tranches from 26 corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions on CreditWatch positive and seven
tranches from six corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions on
CreditWatch negative.  In addition, S&P placed nine ratings from
six synthetic CDO transaction backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) on CreditWatch negative.  At the same time, S&P
raised 37 tranche ratings from 34 corporate-backed synthetic CDO
transactions, removed them from CreditWatch with positive
implications, and affirmed 14 tranche ratings from eight
corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions, removing nine from
CreditWatch positive and placing two on CreditWatch negative.  S&P
lowered two tranche ratings from one synthetic CDO of CMBS.  The
rating actions followed S&P's monthly review of synthetic CDO
transactions.

The CreditWatch positive placements and ratings upgrades reflect
the seasoning of the transactions, the rating stability of the
obligors in the underlying reference portfolios over the past few
months, and the synthetic rated overcollateralization (SROC)
ratios that had risen above 100% at the next highest rating level.
The CreditWatch negative placements and downgrades reflect a
deterioration of the underlying reference portfolio that caused
the SROC ratio to fall below 100% at the current rating level.
The affirmations are from synthetic CDOs that had SROC ratios
above 100% or had sufficient credit enhancement at their current
rating levels.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Archstone Synthetic CDO II SPC
                         Rating           Rating
Class                    To               From
D-2                      AA- (sf)         A- (sf)/Watch Pos

ARLO Ltd.
US$50 mil principal amount secured limited recourse variable
coupon managed CDO notes series 2006 (SKL CD0 - Series 11)
                         Rating                 Rating
Class                    To                     From
A                        BBB-p (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB-p (sf)

Athenee CDO PLC
JPY3.4 bil tranche B Hunter Valley CDO II floating-rate notes due
June 30, 2014 series 2007-6
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche B                BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR25 mil tranche B Hunter Valley CDO II floating rate notes due
June 30, 2014 series 2007-4
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche B                BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR40 mil tranche B Hunter Valley CDO II floating-rate notes due
June 30, 2014 series 2007-14
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche B                BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Claris Ltd.
US$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable
Notes due 2049 Series 94/2007
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche 1                BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)

Claris Ltd.
US$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable
Notes due 2049 Series 93/2007
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche 1                BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)

Claris Ltd.
US$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of
CMBS Variable Notes due 2049 Series 92/2007
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche 1                BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)

Corsair (Jersey) No. 4 Ltd. Series 10
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Credit Default Swap
US$1.4 bil Citibank N.A. - CDO #795246
                         Rating                  Rating
Class                    To                      From
Tranche                  CCC-srb (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC-srb (sf)

Credit Default Swap
US$10 mil Swap Risk Rating-Protection Buyer,
CDS Reference # CA1119131
                         Rating            Rating
Class                    To                From
Tranche                  BBBsrb (sf)       BB+srb (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.891 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506494096
                         Rating            Rating
Class                    To                From
Notes                    BBsrp (sf)        BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.891 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551445
                         Rating            Rating
Class                    To                From
Notes                    BBsrp (sf)        BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.892 bil Swap Risk rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551406
                         Rating            Rating
Class                    To                From
Notes                    BBsrp (sf)        BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.892 bil Swap Risk rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551414
                         Rating            Rating
Class                    To                From
Notes                    BBsrp (sf)        BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.892 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551423
                         Rating            Rating
Class                    To                From
Notes                    BBsrp (sf)        BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546950
                        Rating             Rating
Class                   To                 From
Notes                   BBBsrp (sf)        BBB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546955
                        Rating             Rating
Class                   To                 From
Notes                   BBBsrp (sf)        BBB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506547004
                        Rating             Rating
Class                   To                 From
Notes                   BBBsrp (sf)        BBB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551442
                        Rating             Rating
Class                   To                 From
Notes                   BBsrp (sf)         BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.894 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551435
                        Rating             Rating
Class                   To                 From
Notes                   BBsrp (sf)         BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Sawp Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551383
                        Rating             Rating
Class                   To                 From
Notes                   BBsrp (sf)         BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No SDB506494104
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
Notes                   BBBsrp (sf)         BBB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546935
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
Notes                   BBBsrp (sf)         BBB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546943
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
Notes                   BBBsrp (sf)         BBB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506550851
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
Notes                   BBsrp (sf)          BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref. No.
SDB506551403
                        Rating               Rating
Class                   To                   From
Notes                   BBsrp (sf)           BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.896 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546906
                        Rating               Rating
Class                   To                   From
Notes                   BBBsrp (sf)          BBB-srp (sf)/Watch
Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$300 mil Morgan Stanley Capital Services Inc. - ESP Funding I,
Ltd. Series REF: NGNGX
                        Rating                Rating
Class                   To                    From
Tranche                 A-srb (sf)/Watch Neg  A-srb (sf)

Galena CDO II (Ireland) PLC Series A-1U10-B
                        Rating                Rating
Class                   To                    From
A-1U10-B                B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006 Series 2
                        Rating                Rating
Class                   To                    From
A3-$FMS                 BB-(sf)/Watch Pos     BB-(sf)
A3-$LMS                 BB-(sf)/Watch Pos     BB-(sf)
A3A-$FMS                BB-(sf)/Watch Pos     BB-(sf)
A3B-$LMS                BB-(sf)/Watch Pos     BB-(sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006 Series 1
                        Rating        Rating
Class                   To             From
A3-$LMS                 BBB+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006 Series 6
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
A1A-$LMS                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006 Series 5
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
A1-$LMS                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Infiniti SPC Limited
US$31 mil Infiniti SPC Limited Acting on Behalf of and for the
Account of the Potomac Synthetic CDO 2007-1 Segregated Portfolio
Series 10B-1
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
10B-1                   B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Infinity SPC Limited
US$25 mil Class B Floating Rate Notes (CPORTS POTOMAC 2007-1)
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
B                        B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)

Landgrove Synthetic CDO SPC Series 2007-2
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        BB- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Lorally CDO Limited Series 2006-2
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
2006-2                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)

Lorally CDO Limited Series 2006-4
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
2006-4                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC Series 2006-13
                         Rating             Rating
Class                    To                 From
A                        A- (sf)/Watch Pos  A- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC Series 2006-27
                         Rating             Rating
Class                    To                 From
Class A                  BB- (sf)/Watch Pos BB- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
US$75 mil Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2006-35
                         Rating             Rating
Class                    To                 From
I                        B- (sf)/Watch Pos  B- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC Series NF8BK
                         Rating             Rating
Class                    To                 From
Notes                    AA-srp (sf)        A+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC Series NF8T1
                         Rating             Rating
Class                    To                 From
Notes                    AA-srp (sf)        A+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC Series NF8BM
                         Rating             Rating
Class                    To                 From
Notes                    AA-srp (sf)        A+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC Series NF8T4
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    AA-srp (sf)         A+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-16
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
IB                       BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-12
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
IIIA                     B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Mt. Kailash Series II
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Cr Link Ln               CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Newport Waves CDO Series 1
                        Rating               Rating
Class                   To                   From
A1-$LS                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A3-$LMS                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Newport Waves CDO Series 2
                        Rating               Rating
Class                   To                   From
A1-$FMS                 BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A1-$LS                  BB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A1A-$LS                 BB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A1B-$LS                 BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos
A3-$LMS                 BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A3A-$LMS                BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A7-$LS                  CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Newport Waves CDO Series 4
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
A3-YLS                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)

Newport Waves CDO Series 5
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1-$LMS                  BBB+ (sf)           BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Newport Waves CDO Series 8
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
A3-ELS                   BB- (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Newport Waves CDO Series 7
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1-ELS                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Obelisk Trust 2007-1-Sonoma Valley
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        CCC- (sf)           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                        CCC- (sf)           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Omega Capital Investments PLC
EUR274 mil, JPY20 mil, US$160 mil Palladium CDO I
Secured Floating Rate Notes Series 19
                        Rating               Rating
Class                   To                   From
S-1E                    BBB+ (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

ORSO Portfolio Tranche Index Certificates
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
CL                       AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)

PARCS Master Trust Series 2007-5 CALVADOS
                         Rating               Rating
Class                    To                   From
Trust Unit               B+ (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Pos

PARCS Master Trust Series 2007-6 CALVADOS
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Trust Unit               CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

PARCS-R Master Trust Series 2007-12
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Trust Unit               BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)

Pegasus 2007-1, Ltd.
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1                       B- (sf)/Watch Neg   B- (sf)
A2                       B- (sf)/Watch Neg   B- (sf)

Prelude Europe CDO Ltd. Series 2006-1
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    BB- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Prism Colgate Orso Trust
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
CL                       AAA (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos

REPACS Trust Series 2006-1 Monte Rosa
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)
A-2                      B (sf)/Watch Neg    B (sf)

Repacs Trust Series 2007 Rigi Debt Units
                         Rating              Rating
Class                    To                  From
Debt Units               CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

REVE SPC
EUR50 mil, JPY3 bil, US$154 mil REVE SPC
Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-1
                        Rating        Rating
Class                    To            From
JSS Ser23                BBB (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A Series 4               BB+ (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Pos
A Series 7               BB+ (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Pos
A Series 9               BB+ (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Rutland Rated Investments
US$105 mil Dryden XII - IG Synthetic CDO 2006-2
                        Rating         Rating
Class                   To             From
A1-$LS                  BBB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

Seawall 2007-2 (AAA Synthetic ReREMIC) Ltd
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
A                       B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)
B                       B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)

Seawall 2007-3 (AAA Synthetic ReREMIC) Ltd
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
A                       B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)
B                       B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd. Series 2006-5
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
A2-D2                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd. Series 2007-5
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
Notes                   BB+ (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd. Series 2007-9
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
Notes                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd. Series 2007-28
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
A4-D4                   CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Strata Trust, Series 2007-5
                        Rating              Rating
Class                   To                  From
Notes                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

TIERS Derby Synthetic CDO Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust
Series 2007-4
                        Rating        Rating
Class                    To           From
Certs                    CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)

TIERS Derby Synthetic CDO Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust
Series 2007-5
                        Rating        Rating
Class                   To            From
Certs                   CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)

TIERS Derby Synthetic CDO Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust
Series 2007-8
                        Rating        Rating
Class                   To            From
Certs                   CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Carmel
Paderog, Meriam Fernandez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


                  *** End of Transmission ***