TCR_Public/130224.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, February 24, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 54

                            Headlines

APIDOS CDO I: Moody's Raises Rating on $8MM Class D Notes to Ba2
ASC 1997-D5: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. PS-1 CMBS to 'Caa2'
ASSURED GUARANTY: S&P Corrects Ratings on Five Note Classes
ATRIUM II: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 CLO Note Classes to 'Baa2'
BACM COMMERCIAL 2008-LS1: Moody's Cuts Rating on 8 CMBS Classes

BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Six Certs
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-2: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Four Certs to 'C'
BANC ONE 2000-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class X Certs. to 'C'
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class P Cert. to 'C'
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

CENT CDO 12: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
CENT CLO 17: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CITIGROUP 2009-1: S&P Reinstates CC Rating to Cl. 1A2C Securities
COMM 2012-LC4: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certificates
COMM 2005-LP5: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 18 CMBS Classes

COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2013-CCRE6: DBRS Rates Class E Certs 'BB'
CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C3: Moody's Lowers Ratings on Six CMBS Classes
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C4: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 9 CMBS Classes
CREST 2000-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class D Notes
CREST CLARENDON: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CC'

CS FIRST 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. A-X CMBS
DBUBS 2011-LC1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certificates
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE 1998-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on X CMBS to Caa3
DIVERSIFIED ASSET: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class B-1 Notes
DLJ COMMERCIAL 1998-CF1: Mood's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. S CMBS

DRYDEN XI: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating to Class D Notes
FIGUEROA CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
GALE FORCE 3: Moody's Ups Rating on $21.6MM Class E Notes to Ba1
GMAC COMMERCIAL 1997-C1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. G Certs
GMAC COMMERCIAL 1997-C1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on Cl. X CMBS

GOLUB CAPITAL: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
GRESHAM CAPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
GS MORTGAGE 2013-G1: DBRS  Rates Class DM Certificates 'BB(sf)'
GS MORTGAGE 2013-G1: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class DM Certs.
GS MORTGAGE 2013-G1: S&P Gives Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on DM Notes

GS MORTGAGE 2013-KYO: Moody's Rates Class E CMBS 'Ba2'
INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating on Class G Certs
JAMESTOWN CLO II: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class D Notes
JP MORGAN 1997-C5: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Class X CMBS
JP MORGAN 2002-C3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X-1 CMBS to 'Caa3'

JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC18: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 9 CMBS Classes
LANDMARK VI CDO: Moody's Lifts Rating on $10MM of Notes to 'Ba3'
LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. IO CMBS to Caa2
MARATHON CLO V: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C2: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on Cl. IO Certs

MERRILL LYNCH 2002-CA: DBRS Hikes Rating on 2 Securities From 'B'
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Cl. N Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP9: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on N Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class G Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C8: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY 2013-8: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
MORTGAGE CAPITAL 1998-MC2: Moody's Cuts Rating on X CMBS to Caa2
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL IV: Moody's Raises Cl. B-2L Notes' Rating to Ba2
MOUNTAIN HAWK I: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
N-45O FIRST CBMS: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class F Notes

NEMUS FUNDING NO. 1: S&P Withdraws 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL VI: Moody's Raises Cl. C Notes' Rating to Ba1
OCTAGON INVESTMENT VIII: Moody's Ups Rating on $16MM Notes to Ba2
OCTAGON INVESTMENT XV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
OZLM FUNDING: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes

RACE POINT VIII: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class E Notes
RADAMANTIS (ELOC 24): S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
RBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class F Notes
REGATTA II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
RESI FINANCE: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Five Loan Tranches

RESIDENTIAL REINSURANCE: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class 5 Notes
RESTRUCTURED ASSET 2002-10-TR: Moody's Cuts Certs Rating to 'C'
SALOMON BROTHERS 1999-C1: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. X CMBS
SEAWALL 2006-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
SEMPER FINANCE 2006-1: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Rating on Class F Notes

SEMPER FINANCE 2007-1: S&P Withdraws 'B' Rating on Class G Notes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Fitch to Assign 'BB' Rating to Class B-4 Certs.
SILVERLEAF FINANCE: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class G Notes
SLM PRIVATE 2007-A: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'BB+'
SPRINGLEAF FUNDING: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on Class D Notes

STONE TOWER: Moody's Ups Rating on $20MM Cl. A-3L Notes to 'Ba2'
SYMPHONY CLO III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
TCW GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
TRAPEZA CDO II: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-1B Notes to BB+
TROPIC CDO I: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class A-3L Notes to 'D'

UBS-BB 2013-C5: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class F CMBS
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-WHALE 6: Moody's Keeps Caa2 Rating on 3 CMBS

* Moody's Cuts Ratings on 29 Tranches of 4 Wells Fargo RMBS Deals
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 36 Tranches of Alt-A Loans
* Moody's Takes Action on 84 RMBS Tranches Issued 2003 and 2004
* Moody's Takes Action on $17.7MM of Credit Suisse Alt-A RMBS
* Wind-Down of TARP's CPP May Impact TruPS CDOs, Fitch Says

* U.S. CREL CDO Delinquencies Drop 12.7% in January, Fitch Says


                            *********

APIDOS CDO I: Moody's Raises Rating on $8MM Class D Notes to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Apidos CDO I:

USD15,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf);

USD20,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to A2
(sf);

USD13,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf);

USD8,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S. $265,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $120,140,909), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 8, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in August 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes have been paid down by approximately 54% or $143.9 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated January 24, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 135.76%, 120.65%,
112.70% and 108.31% respectively, versus July 2011 levels of
122.01%, 113.69%, 108.97% and 106.26%, respectively. The January
overcollateralization ratios do not reflect the principal payment
to the Class A-1 notes on the January 28, 2013 payment date.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action in August 2011. Based on the January 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2423
compared to 2522 in July 2011.

Notwithstanding the improvement in credit quality of the
underlying portfolio, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio
includes a number of investments in securities that mature after
the maturity date of the notes. Based on the January 2013 trustee
report, securities that mature after the maturity date of the
notes currently make up approximately 5.19% of the underlying
portfolio. These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $192.5 million,
defaulted par of $4.3 million, par that matures beyond the
maturity date of the notes of $13.2 million, a weighted average
default probability of 15.27% (implying a WARF of 2568), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.0%, and a
diversity score of 54. The default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Apidos CDO I, issued in August 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described, Moody's also
performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated
notes of various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2055)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3082)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


ASC 1997-D5: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. PS-1 CMBS to 'Caa2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of the IO class of
Asset Securitization Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1997-D5 as follows:

Cl. PS-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class PS-1, is due to the recent
paydown of its highest-rated referenced classes. The rating of the
IO Class is based on the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of
its referenced classes.

Moody's current base expected loss is less than 1% of the current
pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 6% of the original pooled balance, unchanged from Moody's last
review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class PS-1.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 29, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $57 million
from $1.79 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 33% of the pool. The pool contains no
loans with investment-grade credit assessments. Seven loans,
representing approximately 67% of the pool, are defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

One loan, representing 1% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. The servicer has
notified Moody's that the single watchlisted loan was officially
removed from its watchlist on January 14, 2013. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $105 million (67% average loan loss
severity). Currently, one loan, representing 3% of the pool, is in
special servicing. Moody's does not anticipate a loss from this
loan.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 78% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding the specially-serviced loan, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 53% compared to 60% at last full review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.2%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.2%

Excluding the specially-serviced loan, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 0.95X and 2.22X, respectively, compared to 1.71X and
2.47X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22% of the pool.
The Cablevision Net Lease Loan, the 2080 North Black Horse Pike
Loan, and the Value City -- Gurnee Loan, are each fully-
amortizing, and are secured by properties which are 100% leased
through the loan term to Cablevision, Sam's Club (Wal-Mart
Stores), and Value City, respectively. Moody's current LTV ranges
from 44% to 64% and Moody's stressed DSCR metric is >1.60X for
each of these loans.


ASSURED GUARANTY: S&P Corrects Ratings on Five Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on five
classes from five U.S. RMBS transactions issued between 2001 and
2008.

Three of the classes affected benefit from a certificate guaranty
insurance policy issued by Assured Guaranty Corp. (AGC; 'AA-'
financial strength rating).  The two remaining classes benefit
from a certificate guaranty insurance policy issued by MBIA
Insurance Corp. (MBIA; 'B' financial strength rating).  Due to an
error, S&P lowered these ratings incorrectly.

The ratings reflect S&P's bond insurance criteria, whereby it
assign to an insured class either the rating on the insurance
provider or the rating S&P would assign to the class without the
benefit of the insurance, whichever is higher.  These transactions
are backed by subprime mortgage collateral.
Overcollateralization, excess spread, subordination, and bond
insurance provide credit support for these transactions.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS CORRECTED

CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2002-HE1
Series 2002-HE1
                                        Rating
Class      CUSIP        Current         2/04/13    Pre-2/04/13
A          12506YAF6    AA- (sf)        A+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)

CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE16
Series 2001-HE16
                                        Rating
Class      CUSIP        Current         2/04/13    Pre-2/04/13
A          22540A3L0    AA- (sf)        AA+ (sf)   AAA (sf)

CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2005-13
Series 2005-13
                                        Rating
Class      CUSIP        Current         11/16/12   Pre-11/16/12
AF-5       126670GS1    B (sf)          CCC (sf)   B (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-4
Series 2005-4
                                        Rating
Class      CUSIP        Current         11/16/12   Pre-11/16/12
AF-5B      126673N81    B (sf)          B- (sf)    BBB- (sf)

Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD 2000-B
Series SPMD 2000B
                                        Rating
Class      CUSIP        Current         2/04/13    Pre-2/04/13
AF-1       456606AS1    AA-(sf)         BBB+ (sf)  AAA (sf)


ATRIUM II: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 CLO Note Classes to 'Baa2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Atrium II:

USD11,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 19, 2012 Upgraded to A1
(sf);

USD6,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf); previously on April 19, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

USD6,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to Baa2
(sf); previously on April 19, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

USD185,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016 (current
balance of $11,551,428), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 19,
2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

USD12,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on April 19, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

USD5,000,000 Class A-2b Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on April 19, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in April 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes have been paid down by approximately 82% or $52 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated January 14, 2013, the Class A, Class B and Class C
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 192.7%, 151.4%, and
122.7%, respectively, versus March 2012 levels of 147.2%, 129.5%,
and 114.5%, respectively. The trustee reported
overcollateralization ratios do not reflect the principal payments
distributed on the January 22, 2013 payment date.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the underlying portfolio includes a number of investment in
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes. Based
on the January 2013 trustee report, securities that mature after
the maturity date of the notes currently make up approximately 53%
of the underlying portfolio. These investment potentially expose
the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time
of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $63.5 million,
defaulted par of $8.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 12.19% (implying a WARF of 2611), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.92%, and a diversity
score of 23. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Atrium II, issued on December 18, 2003, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3133)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2089)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities, which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3)Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value. In consideration of the large size of the deal's
exposure to long-dated assets, which increase its sensitivity to
the liquidation assumptions used in the rating analysis, Moody's
ran different scenarios considering a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposure and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the extent of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long
dated assets.


BACM COMMERCIAL 2008-LS1: Moody's Cuts Rating on 8 CMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
and affirmed the ratings of nine classes of BACM Commercial
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2008-LS1 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2008 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4BF, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-SM, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XW, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades of the eight principal bonds are due to higher than
expected realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal and interest bonds are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class XW, is consistent with the
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.8% of
the current pooled balance compared to 10.4% at last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 16.5% of
the original pooled balance compared to 14.1% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating the Interest-Only
Security was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class XW.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 52 compared to 53 at Moody's prior review.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 9, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 16% to $2.0
billion from $2.35 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 205 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 33%
of the pool. The pool does not contain any defeased loans or loans
with credit assessments.

Fifty one loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $153 million (50.4% average loss
severity). Twenty eight loans, representing 16% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
exposure is the Boulder Green Office & Industrial Portfolio ($53
million -- 2.7% of the pool) The portfolio consists of one loan
secured by five office buildings and one industrial building. The
loan is REO and the servicer has recognized a combined $26 million
appraisal reduction for this portfolio. The remaining 27 specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types. Moody's has
estimated a $147 million loss (48% expected loss) for all the
specially serviced loans. The servicer has recognized a $118
million aggregate appraisal reduction for 19 of the 28 specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 23 poorly
performing loans representing 10% of the pool and has estimated a
$40.5 million aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 96% and 87% of the pool's loans,
respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 107%
compared to 109% at last review. The conduit portion of the pool
excludes specially serviced, troubled and defeased loans. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.33X and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 1.33X and .96X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 18% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the COPT Office Portfolio Loan ($150 million -- 8%
of the pool), which is secured by a 694,000 SF of office space in
the Westfields Corporate Center. The loan's sponsor, Corporate
Office Properties, owns a total of nine buildings totaling 1.5
million SF in Westfields Corporate Center, which is located in
Chantilly, Virginia. The portfolio is 96% leased as of September
2012 compared to 93% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 140% and 0.69X, respectively, compared to 132% and 0.74X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the 600 West Chicago Loan ($134 million
-- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.6 million SF Class A
office complex located on the edge of River North in Chicago's
central business district. The collateral is the former Montgomery
Ward & Co. catalog building and is a landmarked asset. It also
serves as Groupon's headquarters. CommonWealth REIT acquired the
property for $390 million in September 2011. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to 118%
and 0.85X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Hallmark Building Loan ($64 million
-- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 305,000 SF office
building located in Dulles, Virginia. The Dulles Hilton Hotel is
attached to the Hallmark Building, but it is not part of the
collateral. The property was 99% leased as of September 2012
compared to 89% at last review. This loan is included as one of
the 22 poorly performing loans that Moody's has identified as a
troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 174% and 0.59X,
respectively, compared to 181% and 0.57X at last review.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes D through J
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs),
extraordinary trust expenses, loan modifications that include
either an interest rate reduction or a non-accruing note
component, and non-recoverability determinations by the servicer
that involve either a clawback of previously made advances or a
decision to stop making future advances.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Six Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 23 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2004-4.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement to the
remaining Fitch rated classes after consideration for expected
losses and significant maturity concentration in 2014. Fitch
modeled losses of 10% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 4.8%, including losses already
incurred. The pool has experienced $4 million (0.3% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 17 loans (22.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes eight specially serviced assets (15.1%).

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 57.5% to $606.7 million from
$1.43 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, four loans
(5.6% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 723,971 square
foot (sf) industrial property (3.2%) located in North Kingstown,
RI. The loan transferred to special servicing in October 2008 for
payment default and is real estate owned (REO). The servicer is
working to improve occupancy prior to marketing the property for
sale.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a 161,727 sf
retail property (1.7%) located in Philadelphia, PA. The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2009 due to maturity
default and is REO. Several anchor tenants have relocated to a
nearby retail center and the servicer is marketing the vacant
spaces.

Fitch affirms and revises the Outlooks of the following classes as
indicated:

-- $16.2 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $11.3 million class G at 'B-sf', Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $35.3 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $272.2 million class A-6 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $111.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $35.6 million class B at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $11.3 million class C at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $21.1 million class D at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $9.7 million class E at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $16.2 million class H at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $6.5 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $6.5 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $6.5 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $3.2 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $3.2 million class N at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $4.9 million class O at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $1.9 million class DM-A at 'A+sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $4.1 million class DM-B at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $3.3 million class DM-C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $3.5 million class DM-D at 'BBB+sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $3.7 million class DM-E at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $3.4 million class DM-F at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $3.2 million class DM-G at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class P and BC certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-C and
X-P certificates.

The class DM certificates are related to a non-pooled B-note
secured by the Dallas Market Center. The underlying collateral is
a 3 million sf trade mart property located in Dallas, TX. Fitch
affirms these classes as performance of the property has remained
stable with trailing 12 month (TTM) servicer reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 6.66x and occupancy of 80% as of
September 2012.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-2: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Four Certs to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes and affirmed 19 classes
of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-2 due primarily to increased
loss expectations on the specially serviced assets.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 15.6% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 14.7%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $152.1 million (4.8% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 35 loans (20.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 20 specially serviced assets (15.9%). The Negative Rating
Outlook on Class A-M is due to the high loan to value ratios on
several large retail loans located in weaker markets.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 36.5% to $2.01 billion from
$3.17 billion at issuance. No loans have defeased since issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes D through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Beacon Seattle &
DC Portfolio loan (11.1% of the pool), which was initially secured
by 16 properties, the pledge of the mortgage and the borrower's
ownership interest in one property, as well as the pledge of cash
flows from three properties. In the aggregate, the 20 properties
comprised approximately 9.8 million square feet (sf) of space. The
loan transferred to special servicing in April 2010 and remained
current as the borrower was negotiating a modification, which
closed in December 2010. Key modification terms included a five-
year extension of the loan to May 2017, a deleveraging structure
that provided for the release of properties over time, and an
interest rate reduction. The loan was returned to the master
servicer in May 2012 and is performing under the modified terms.

Under the modification, nine properties were released in total,
which included Market Square (Washington, D.C.), Key Center
(Bellevue, WA), City Center Bellevue (Bellevue, WA), 1616 North
Fort Myer Drive (Arlington, VA), Liberty Place (Washington, D.C.),
Army and Navy Building (Washington, D.C.), 1300 North Seventeenth
Street (Arlington, VA), Reston Town Center (Reston, VA), and
Washington Mutual Tower (Seattle, WA). As of the February 2013
remittance, the loan has been paid down by $1.1 billion or 41%.
Following the sale and release of the Market Square property in
March 2011, the contract interest rate adjusted to 5.00% from
5.797% retroactively effective as of Dec. 7, 2010. Since the total
debt was paid down by at least $900 million by May 7, 2012 (the
original maturity date), the interest rate was reduced further to
4.50%. Beginning in June 2012, the pay rate became 3.75% with
required quarterly payments of excess cash flow up to a pay rate
of 4.50%.

Combined occupancy for the 11 remaining properties is 78.4%, down
sharply from 96.4% at issuance for the same properties. For the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012, annualized servicer-reported net
operating income (NOI) was $86.6 million for the remaining
properties, a 1% increase from the same period in 2011 for the
same properties.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Connecticut Financial Center loan (6.5%), which is
secured by a 27-story, 466,073-sf office building in the CBD of
New Haven, CT. The property's largest tenant, United Illuminating
Company, leased approximately 47% of the net rentable area (NRA)
but vacated a large block of space at its June 2012 lease
expiration. This caused occupancy to fall to 70% as of September
2012, according to the servicer. The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2012 and workout negotiations are ongoing.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Venture Pointe loan (1.3%), which is secured by a
335,420-sf shopping center in Atlanta, GA. The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2011 for imminent default. A receiver
is in place and is working to lease-up and stabilize the property
before it is marketed for sale.

Fitch downgrades the following class and removes it from Rating
Watch Negative:

-- $317.3 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf', assigns
    Negative Outlook.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $31.7 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $15.9 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $27.8 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $27.8 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $114.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $8.4 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $162.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $52.4 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $602 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $276.3 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $153.8 million class A-J at 'CCCsf', RE 65%;
-- $100 million class A-JFL at 'CCCsf', RE 65%;
-- $15.9 million class B at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $47.6 million class C at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $43.6 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $17 million class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class S certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class XW certificates.


BANC ONE 2000-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class X Certs. to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class of
Banc One/FCCC Commercial Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2000-C1 as
follows:

Cl. X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's currently only rates Class X, the interest-only class. The
downgrade is due to this security not receiving any excess
interest generated from the spread between the net collateral
weighted-average coupon (WAC) of the loans and the WAC pass-
through rate of the remaining principal bond, which the IO
references. Moody's anticipates that the IO class will not receive
any interest in the future because no single loan in the pool has
a coupon greater than the pass-through rate of the remaining bond.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are in
recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter, amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS IO
calculator v1.1 which uses the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original
and current bond ratings and credit assessments; original and
current bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the
IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type
corresponding to an IO type as defined in the published
methodology. The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating
based on both a target and mid-point. For example, a target rating
basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint
rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple
average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating
factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the
CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO
indication for consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output. The rating
action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative
tools -- MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial
Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp - and on a periodic basis through a
comprehensive review. Moody's currently rates only the IO class;
the previous review was done on February 22, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $1.86
million from $857.1 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
86% of the pool. Approximately 85% of the loans fully amortize.
All properties are located in the Greater Chicago MSA area, of
which 66% are secured by multi-family properties.

Three loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated since securitization, which have
generated a loss of $1.76 million (11% average loss severity).
Currently, there is one loan in special servicing, representing 7%
of the pool. Moody's does not estimate a loss from this loan at
this time.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class P Cert. to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes and affirmed eight
classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-PWR5.

Rating Sensitivities

The downgrades are primarily due to increased loss expectations.
Fitch modeled losses of 3.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 3%, including $12.1
million in losses already incurred. Fitch has designated 20 loans
(10.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes one specially
serviced loan (0.8%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 37.5% to $770.9 million from
$1.23 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, nine loans
(26.5% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting class Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses consists of a four-
building office property totaling 151,895 square feet (sf) located
in San Diego, CA (0.9% of the pool). According to the 2010 rent
roll, the occupancy rate dropped sharply to 12.6% due to vacancies
upon lease expirations. Occupancy has gradually increased and as
of year-end (YE) 2011, occupancy was reported at 45.2%. A new
lease for 22.1% of the net rentable area (NRA) (March 1, 2013
move-in date) will further improve occupancy. In association with
the low occupancy and related income loss, the loan has not
covered its debt service over the last few years; however, the
borrower has kept the loan current.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a 36,066 sf
retail property (0.9%) in Denver, CO (0.9%). The servicer reported
3Q'12 DSCR was 0.86x, compared to 0.76x at YE2011 and 1.48x at
issuance. The property has experienced occupancy declines, and
concessions have been offered to attract new tenants. The 3Q'12
occupancy was 79%, compared to 85% at YE2011 and 93.4% at
issuance. The loan remains current and with the master servicer.

The third largest contributor to expected losses consists of five
free-standing retail/branch bank buildings in Dallas, TX (0.8%).
All were previously occupied by Bank of America. Four of the
leases expired in October 2012 and one in December 2012. Bank of
America renewed three of the leases for five years and vacated the
other two buildings, reportedly reducing cash flow by
approximately 25%. The loan, scheduled to mature in October 2012,
was not able to refinance given the loss of tenancy and
transferred to special serving at that time (October 2012). The
property values obtained by the servicer indicate losses upon
liquidation of the loan.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $18.5 million class H to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $4.6 million class J to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf', RE 95%;
-- $4.6 million class K to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf', RE 0%;
-- $6.2 million class L to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $4.6 million class M to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $4.6 million class N to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $3.1 million class P to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $46.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $579.1 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $29.3 million class B at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $9.3 million class C at 'AAsf', Outlook Positive;
-- $20 million class D at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $13.9 million class E at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15.4 million class F at 'BBB+sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $9.3 million class G at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2
certificates.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 LLC's
$369.20 million floating-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of Aug. 24, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED
BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     253.90
B                          AA (sf)                       43.70
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        34.80
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      19.40
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       17.40


CENT CDO 12: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
B note from Cent CDO 12 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that is managed by Columbia Management.  S&P
affirmed its ratings on the other four classes of notes.

S&P last took rating actions on this transaction in January 2011,
when it upgraded various classes due to an improvement in the
portfolio credit quality and an increase to the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios.  This transaction remains in
its reinvestment phase until November 2013.  As of the January
2013 trustee report, the balance of defaulted assets has decreased
to $2.42 from $13.99 million in December 2010, while the class A/B
senior O/C ratio increased to 123.9% from 122.4%.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the other four classes of notes to
reflect the availability of sufficient credit support at the
current rating level.  Although there has been a notable increase
in credit enhancement since S&P's last rating action, the
improvements were not sufficient to support a higher rating for
these notes at this time.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Cent CDO 12 Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To           From
A                  AA+(sf)      AA+(sf)
B                  AA(sf)       AA-(sf)
C                  A(sf)        A(sf)
D                  BBB(sf)      BBB(sf)
E                  BB(sf)       BB(sf)


CENT CLO 17: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Cent
CLO 17 Ltd./ Cent CLO 17 Corp.'s $370.50 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.30%-11.36%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1295.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cent CLO 17 Ltd./Cent CLO 17 Corp.

Class                     Rating               Amount (mil. $)
A-1                       AAA (sf)                      262.00
A-2A                      AA (sf)                        22.50
A-2B                      AA (sf)                        20.00
B (deferrable)            A (sf)                         29.00
C (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                       19.50
D (deferrable)            BB (sf)                        17.50
Subordinated notes        NR                             44.30

NR-Not rated.


CITIGROUP 2009-1: S&P Reinstates CC Rating to Cl. 1A2C Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Corrects Ratings On Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-1
Classes 1A2A, 1A2B, And 1A2C

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected on February 15, 2013,
its ratings on Classes 1A2A, 1A2B, and 1A2C from Citigroup
Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-1 by reinstating them to BB(sf),
BB-(sf), and CC(sf), respectively.  S&P then placed its ratings on
Classes 1A2A and 1A2B back on CreditWatch negative, where they
were placed on Oct. 26, 2012.

On Dec. 7, 2012, S&P incorrectly withdrew its ratings on Classes
1A2A, 1A2B, and 1A2C due to a trustee reporting error in the
October 2012 remittance period.  The reinstated ratings take into
account the exchangeable schedule and payment priority for these
classes.

The underlying collateral for this transaction consists of U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) certificates.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS CORRECTED

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-1


                                     Rating
Class    CUSIP        Current        12/7/12     Pre-12/7/12

1A2A     17314UAE8    BB (sf)/       NR          BB (sf)/
                      Watch Neg                  Watch Neg

1A2B     17314UAF5    BB- (sf)/      NR          BB- (sf)/
                      Watch Neg                  Watch Neg

1A2C     17314UAG3    CC (sf)        NR          CC (sf)


COMM 2012-LC4: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of German American Capital
Corp.'s COMM 2012-LC4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch's affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. There have been no delinquent or
specially serviced loans since issuance. Fitch reviewed the most
recently available quarterly financial performance of the pool as
well as updated rent rolls for the top 15 loans, which represent
69.3% of the transaction.

As of the February 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 1% to $942.3 million from
$951.3 million at issuance.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by 541,128 square feet
(sf) of a 928,667 sf two-level regional mall located in Saugus, MA
(10.5% of the pool), approximately 10 miles north of Boston. The
collateral is shadow anchored by Sears and Macy's, which own their
own stores. Largest tenants include Dick's Sporting Goods (12.7%
of NRA) and Best Buy (11.1%). Per the servicer, the Best Buy lease
expires on Feb. 28, 2013 and negotiations for an extension are
underway. As of third quarter 2012, the property was 88% occupied,
compared to 90% at UW.

The second largest loan is secured by the leasehold interest in a
236,215 sf multi-level anchored retail center located in the Union
Square area of Manhattan (8%). The property is 100% occupied by
seven tenants, including a 14-screen Regal Cinemas theater
(50.3%), Best Buy (19.5%), and Nordstrom Rack (13.6%). The
earliest lease expiration date is January 2017. The loan has an
investment grade credit opinion by Fitch.

Fitch affirms the following classes and maintains the Stable
Outlook:

-- $40.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $77.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $115.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $416.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $93 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
-- $44.7 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $32.9 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $52.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15.3 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $11.8 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G and HP certificates, or the
interest-only class X-B.


COMM 2005-LP5: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 18 CMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed eighteen classes of COMM 2005-
LP5 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Confirmed at
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Confirmed at
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Confirmed at A2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Confirmed at A3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Confirmed at
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Confirmed at
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations for seventeen principal and interest bond classes
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-C, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.6% of the
current pooled balance compared to 3.3% at last review. Moody's
based expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.5% of the
original pooled balance compared to 2.3% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating the Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X-C.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25 compared to 30 at Moody's prior review.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 29, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 11, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 51% to
$842.3 million from $1.7 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 111 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 47% of the pool. Five loans, representing 6% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
Securities.

Twenty-four loans, representing 36% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $12.3 million (7% average loss
severity). There are two loans, representing 2% of the pool, that
are currently in special servicing.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $2.3 million appraisal
reduction for one of the specially serviced loans and Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $10.6 million loss (56% average expected
loss) for all specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$5.7 million aggregate loss (17% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 99% and 27% of the pool's non-defeased and
non-specially serviced loans, respectively. Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 85% compared to 90% at Moody's prior
review. The conduit portion of the pool excludes specially
serviced, troubled and defeased loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.63X and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to 1.55X and 1.22X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool. The largest
performing loan is the Bank of America Tower at Las Olas City
Centre Loan ($90.0 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a 409,075 square foot (SF) Class A office and retail building
located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The property was 95% leased
as of January 2013 compared to 97% leased at last review.
Financial performance improved in 2012 after declining in 2011 due
to major tenant lease expirations that lowered revenue
achievement. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.01X,
respectively, compared to 103% and 0.97X at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Lakeside Mall Loan
($82.3 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which represents the
borrower's interest in a 50% pari-passu A note in a 643,375 SF
regional shopping mall located in Sterling Heights, Michigan. The
property was 93% leased as of September 2012 versus 90% at last
review. The in-line tenant occupancy rate was 70% as of September
2012 compared to 66% at last review. Financial performance has
improved in concert with occupancy since last review. The loan
sponsor is General Growth Properties (GGP). Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.11X, respectively, compared to 110%
and 0.89X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Continental Park Plaza
Loan ($52.0 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by
three attached six-story Class A office buildings totaling 476,852
SF located in El Segundo, California. The property was 83% leased
as of September 2012 compared to 86% at last review. Financial
performance has improved since last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.89X, respectively, compared to 57% and
1.85X at last review.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2013-CCRE6: DBRS Rates Class E Certs 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE6
(the Certificates), to be issued by the COMM 2013-CCRE6 Mortgage
Trust.  The trends are Stable.

- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
- Class B at AA (sf)
- Class PEZ at A (sf)
- Class C at A (sf)
- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
- Class E at BB (sf)
- Class F at B (sf)

Classes A-3FL, A-3FX, X-B, A-M, B, PEZ, C, D, E and F have been
privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The Class X-A and Class X-B balances are notional.  DBRS ratings
on interest-only certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers
the interest-only certificate's position within the transaction
payment waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.  The
Class PEZ certificates are exchangeable for the Class A-M, B and C
certificates (and vice versa).

The collateral consists of 48 fixed-rate loans secured by 80
commercial properties.  The transaction has a balance of
$1,494,076,230.  The pool consists of relatively low-leverage
financing, with a DBRS weighted-average term debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.99 times and 10.4%, respectively.
The pool is relatively concentrated by loan balance and geography,
with a concentration level equivalent to a pool of 20 equal-sized
loans.

Loans secured by hotels represent 25.9% of the pool, including
three of the largest ten loans.  Hotel properties have higher cash
flow volatility than traditional property types because their
income, which is derived from daily contracts rather than multi-
year leases, and their expenses, which are often mostly fixed, are
quite high as a percentage of revenue.  These two factors cause
revenue to fall swiftly during a downturn and cash flow to fall
even faster because of the high operating leverage.  The DBRS
sample included 26 loans, representing 87.6% of the pool balance.
A relatively high percentage of properties from the DBRS sample
were classified as Above Average or Excellent (29.5% of the
sample, 25.8% of the pool), above the respective figures for other
recently rated DBRS conduit transactions.  The largest loan in the
pool, representing 8.7% of the deal balance, was shadow-rated
investment grade by DBRS.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure
and underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to
ongoing surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades
by DBRS after the date of issuance.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C3: Moody's Lowers Ratings on Six CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded six classes and affirmed four
classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-C3 as follows:

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations for the three principal and interest bond classes
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The downgrades for the six principal and interest bond classes are
due to realized losses and an increase in expected losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating of the IO Class, Class A-X is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.3% of the
current pooled balance compared to 6.3% at last review. Moody's
based expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.4% of the
original pooled balance compared to 7.4% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating the Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published
in February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class A-X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17 compared to 22 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
Large Loan / Single borrower methodology. This methodology uses
the excel-based Large Loan Model v. 8.5 and then reconciles and
weights the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 29, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $1.07
billion from $1.6 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 136 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
32% of the pool. Twenty-nine loans, representing 38% of the pool,
have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
Securities.

Twenty-one loans, representing 6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $86.3 million (55% average loss
severity). There are thirteen loans, representing 7% of the pool,
that are currently in special servicing.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $36.5 million in
appraisal reductions for nine of the specially serviced loans and
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $41.7 million loss (56% average
expected loss) for all specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated a
$8.2 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 26% of the pool's non-defeased and
non-specially serviced loans, respectively. Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 89% compared to 88% at Moody's prior
review. The conduit portion of the pool excludes specially
serviced, troubled and defeased loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.23X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.21X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 20% of the pool. The largest
performing loan is the Pacific Design Center Loan ($138.1 million
-- 12.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 916,000 square foot
(SF) office and design showroom building located in West
Hollywood, California. In addition to the showroom and office
space, the property also houses a 384-seat theater and screening
room, conference facilities, a two-story gallery leased to the
Museum of Contemporary Art, a fitness facility and two
restaurants. The property is 68% leased compared to 70% at last
review. Financial performance has declined since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 1.08X, respectively,
compared to 95% and 1.14X at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the BC Wood Portfolio Loan
($39.5 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by four
shopping centers located in Louisville, Lexington and Paris,
Kentucky, all built between 1951 and 1989. The weighted average
occupancy for all properties was 92% compared to 90% at last
review. The loan sponsor is Brian C. Wood. Financial performance
has declined slightly since last review which is offset by the
benefits of amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95%
and 1.12X, respectively, compared to 96% and 1.1X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Private Mini Storage
Portfolio Loan ($36.4 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is
secured by nine self-storage properties located in seven different
markets within the state of Texas. Financial performance has
improved since last review and the loan benefits from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 91% and 1.1X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C4: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 9 CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine classes
and affirmed 16 classes of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-
C4 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-1-AM, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-1-AJ, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades to the principal classes are due to higher than
expected realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans. The affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class A-X, is downgraded based on a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.2% of
the current pooled balance compared to 10% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 15.9% compared to 11.8%
at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was " Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class A-X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 24 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 23, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $1.84 billion
from $2.08 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 180 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 49% of the pool. One loan, representing 0.1% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.
There are no loans with investment grade credit assessments.

Forty-eight loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
approximately a $50.7 million loss (52.8% loss severity on
average). Twenty-six loans, representing 22.8% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the 245 Fifth Avenue Loan ($130.0 million -- 7.0% of the
pool), which is secured by a 303,139 square foot (SF) Class B
office building located at the intersection of 5th Avenue and 28th
street in Manhattan. The property was 80% leased as of November
2012 compared to 82% at last review. The largest tenant, Citibank
(15% of the NRA) vacated the building as of December 2012,
reducing occupancy to 65%. The borrower has executed a
modification as of December 2012. Per the modification, the
Borrower paid down the loan by $10 million while posting
approximately $13 million of additional reserves. Maturity has
been extended till January 2016 on an interest only basis with a
new interest rate of 6.114% (0.641% increase) to offset any
monthly workout fees along with any anticipated liquidation
expenses. The loan is expected to return to the master servicer in
March 2013.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the City Tower Loan
($115.0 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
411,000 SF Class A office building located in Orange County,
California. The loan transferred to special servicing in October
2010 due to monetary default. The special servicer appointed a
receiver in June 2011. The loan is cash managed and all property
revenues are being deposited into an account controlled by the
court-appointed receiver in accordance with the receivership
order. The property is currently 64% occupied, the same at last
review.

The remaining 24 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $143.3 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (34% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 24 poorly
performing loans representing 14% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $72.9 million loss (28.1% expected loss on average) from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 94%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 129% compared to 132% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 6.5%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.18X and 0.83X, respectively, compared to
1.18X and 0.80X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 25.6% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the Shutters on The Beach & Casa Del Mar
Loan ($310.0 million -- 16.8% of the pool), which is secured by
two luxury hotel properties located in Santa Monica, California.
Shutters on the Beach is a 198-room full service hotel and Casa
Del Mar is a 129-room bed and breakfast inn. In addition to the
first mortgage loan, there is a $72.0 million mezzanine loan held
outside the trust. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 157% and
0.69X, respectively, the same as last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Meyberry House Loan ($90
million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 180-unit
apartment building located on the Upper East Side of Manhattan in
New York City. In addition to the first mortgage loan, there is a
$34 million mezzanine loan held outside the trust. The loan is
currently on the watchlist due to identified repair and
maintenance issues. As of October 2012, the property was 94%
occupied compared to 96% at last review. Moody's analysis of this
loan is based on a floor value. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
125% and 0.82X, respectively, compared to 143% and 0.72X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Hamburg Trust Portfolio Loan
($71.6 million --3.9% of the pool), which is secured by five
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted properties located in
Florida and Texas. The properties were renovated in 2005 and 2006.
As of September 2012, combined occupancy was 93%. The loan has
steadily improved and benefiting from amortization, which began in
August 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.72X,
respectively, compared to 137% and 0.67X at last review.


CREST 2000-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one class issued by Crest 2000-1
Ltd./Corp.

Key Rating Drivers:

The class D notes are currently under-collateralized by
approximately $4.2 million and have been affirmed at 'Csf',
indicating that default is inevitable. With 84.2% of the remaining
collateral rated investment grade, Fitch expects a moderate
recovery on the notes.

Since the last rating action in March 2012, approximately 10.7% of
the collateral has been downgraded. Currently, 15.8% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and
4.6% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and below, compared to
2.9% and 2.9%, respectively, at the last rating action.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. The transaction was
not analyzed within a cash flow model framework, as the impact of
structural features and excess spread, or conversely, principal
proceeds being used to pay collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
liabilities, was determined to be minimal in the context of the
CDO's rating.

Crest 2000-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on Nov. 3, 2000. The current portfolio consists of four
bonds from four obligors, of which 84.2% are commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS), 11.2% are residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), and 4.6% are commercial asset-backed
securities. Additionally, there is one interest only (IO)
security.

Fitch has affirmed this class:

-- $15,647,674 class D notes at 'Csf'.


CREST CLARENDON: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed two classes issued
by Crest Clarendon Street 2002-1, Ltd./Corp.

Sensitivity/Rating Drivers:

Since the last rating action in March 2012, approximately 30% of
the collateral has been downgraded and 11.9% has been upgraded.
Currently, 47% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade with 40.4% of the portfolio having a rating in
the 'CCC' category and below, compared to 14.5% and 6%,
respectively, at the last rating action. Over this period, the
transaction has received $77.3 million in pay downs which has
resulted in the full repayment of the class A notes and $25
million in paydowns to the class B notes.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. Based on this analysis, the class B and C notes'
breakeven rates are generally consistent with the ratings assigned
below.

For the class D notes, Fitch analyzed each class' sensitivity to
the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below). Given the
high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class D
notes have been downgraded to 'CCsf', indicating that default is
probable.

The Stable Outlook on the class B notes reflects Fitch's view that
the transaction will continue to delever. The Negative Outlook on
the class C notes reflects the risk of adverse selection as the
portfolio continues to amortize.

Crest Clarendon Street 2002-1 is a cash flow commercial real
estate collateralize debt obligations (CRE CDO) issued in
September 2002. The current portfolio consists of 14 bonds from 13
obligors, all of which are commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) from the 1998 through 2002 vintages.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Outlooks on these classes:

-- $10,407,506 class B-1 notes at 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative;

-- $3,588,795 class B-2 notes at 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

-- $15,000,000 class C notes to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Negative;

-- $10,364,749 class D notes to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'.


CS FIRST 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. A-X CMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one interest-only
class of CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp 1998-C1 as
follows:

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the IO Class, Class A-X, is consistent with the
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.
The IO class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class in this
transaction.

Moody's analysis reflects a base expected loss of 17.1% of the
current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 4.8% of the original pooled balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
conduit pool has a Herf of 1.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model to evaluate pools
of credit tenant loans (CTLs) within CMBS transactions. Moody's
public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-5 is used to generate a
portfolio loss distribution to assess the ratings. Under Moody's
CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is
primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds. This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan. The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust. The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default. Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release.

Deal Performance

As of the January 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $168 million
from $2.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 60 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool. Thirty-eight of the loans are credit tenant
lease (CTL) loans secured by properties leased to ten corporate
credits, representing 77% of the pool. Thirteen loans,
representing 13% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. Government securities.

Seven loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Forty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $89.7 million. There are no loans
currently in special servicing.

The pool's largest exposures are Best Buy ($31.4 million - 19% of
the pool balance; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 -
developing outlook), CarMax ($24.7 million - 15%) and Elder-
Beerman ($23.6 million -- 14%; parent company is Bon-Ton Stores,
Moody's senior unsecured rating Caa3 -- negative outlook).
Corporate tenants representing approximately 45% of the pool,
excluding defeased loans, are publicly rated by Moody's.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 89%
of the pool's non-defeased loans. The conduit pool, which excludes
CTL loans and defeased loans, represents approximately 10% of the
pool. Moody's conduit weighted average LTV is 65%. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's conduit actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.22X and 3.14X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.


DBUBS 2011-LC1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes of
DBUBS 2011-LC1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The affirmations of the IO Classes, Classes X-A and X-B, are
consistent with credit performance of their referenced classes and
are thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance compared to 2.2% at last review. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the ratings of X-
A and X-B.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
ver1.1 would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication
for consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review.

Deal Performance

As of the February 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2.2% to $2.13
billion from $2.18 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 47 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
0.1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 66%
of the pool. The pool includes two loans, representing 11% of the
pool, with credit assessments.

Four loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance. No loans have liquidated and none are in
special servicing. Moody's did not identify any troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 93%compared to 96% at prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 7.2% to the most
recently available net operating income, compared to 9.4% at prior
review. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.2%.

Moody's conduit actual and stressed DSCR are 1.46X and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.05X at prior review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Kenwood Towne
Centre Loan ($227.9 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a super-regional mall located in Cincinnati, Ohio. The
property was constructed in 1956 and renovated most recently in
2009. The mall contains approximately 1,157,077 square foot (SF)
in the aggregate; 756,412 SF of which is owned by the sponsor.
Anchor tenants include Macy's (non-collateral), Dillard's and
Nordstrom (non-collateral). The loan is sponsored by GGP and The
Teachers' Retirement of the State of Illinois. As of September
2012 the mall was 97% leased compared to 96% at securitization.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.33X,
compared to Baa3 and 1.31X at prior review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the ARC IHOP Portfolio
Loan ($12.5 million -- 0.6% of the pool), which is secured by 18
IHOP properties located across 13 states. All of the properties
are end-cap or pad locations at established retail properties with
good visibility. There is no rollover scheduled within the loan
term and all leases are long term, triple net and guaranteed by
DineEquity, Inc (Moody's Senior Unsecured Rating B3, Stable
Outlook). Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and
1.7X, respectively, the same as at the prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 26% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the 353 North Clark Street Loan
($219.78 million -- 10.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 45-
story, Class A office building located in downtown Chicago,
Illinois. The property contains approximately 1,180,220 SF of
office space and an underground parking garage that provides 164
spaces. The building was constructed between 2006 and 2009. As of
June 2012 the property was 88% leased compared to 82% at prior
review and 80% at securitization. The property has high tenant
concentration with top two tenants comprising 65% of the NRA.
However, there is no lease turnover during loan term. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR 108% and 0.9X, respectively, compared to 97% and
1.01X the prior review.

The second largest loan is the Temple Marketplace Loan ($194.9
million -- 9.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 1,069,593 SF
lifestyle/power center located in Tempe, Arizona. The property was
constructed in 2007 and is anchored by Target (non-collateral), JC
Penney, Harkins Tempe Marketplace movie theater and Dave &
Buster's. The property also contains a pad space leased to Sam's
Club, which is currently under construction. As of October 2011,
the property was 93% leased, the same as at securitization. The
property benefits from a Governmental Property Lease Excise Tax
(GPLET) statute that significantly reduces real estate tax
assessments at the property through 2037. The property also
benefits from an Arizona authorized sales tax reimbursement
development agreement with the city of Tempe, which allows the
property to share a portion of sales tax revenue with the city
subject to a cap of $26.7 million. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
94% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 95% and 1.0X at the prior
review.

The third largest loan is the 7 Hanover Square Loan ($143.4
million -- 6.7% of the pool), which is secured by a Class A office
building located within the South Ferry Financial District
submarket of New York City. The property offers 26 stories of
rentable space that contain approximately 842,415 SF in the
aggregate. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America (Insurance
Financial Strength rating Aa2, Stable Outlook) leases virtually
the entire building through September 2019 and has occupied the
building as its headquarters since 1998. Property improvements
were constructed in 1983 and most recently renovated in 2000. This
loan is currently on the watchlist due to major damages caused by
Hurricane Sandy. Moody's analysis is based on a lit/dark approach
because of the risk of single tenancy. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR 96% and 1.07X, respectively, compared to 97% and 1.06X at
prior review.


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE 1998-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on X CMBS to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class of
Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C1 as follows:

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade of the rating of the IO Class, Class X, is due to
the payoff of highly rated classes and a decline in performance of
its referenced classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's rated class in this transaction.

Moody's analysis reflects a base expected loss of 12.9% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 5.3% of the original pooled balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit assessments of the referenced tranches
may be insufficient to support the current ratings of the
interest-only class.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review.

Deal Performance

As of the January 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $47.1
million from $1.8 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 32% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 92% of
the pool. The pool includes one defeased loan representing 3% of
the pool.

Four loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a realized loss of $89 million (40% loss severity). Three loans,
representing 20% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially-serviced loan is the Old Town Center Loan
($5.6 million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by a 101,000
square-foot theme park located in Kissimmee, Florida. The property
includes 75 specialty shops, eight restaurants and 18 thrill
rides. The loan was transferred to special servicing in February
2012. Per the Special Servicer, the most recent financials
received are as of September 2011. As of September 2011, the
property was 88% leased.

The second-largest specially-serviced loan is the North Main Place
Loan ($3.3 million -- 7% share of the pool), which is secured by a
61,000 square-foot anchored retail property located in High Point,
North Carolina. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
November 2012. As of September 2012, the property was 100% leased.

The third-largest specially-serviced loan is the Newport Business
Plaza Loan ($573,812 -- 1% share of the pool), which is secured by
a 88,000 square-foot industrial property located in Newport,
Oregon. As of March 2012, the property was 91% leased.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.6 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (58% expected loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 92% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's weighted average LTV
is 60%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 18% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.2%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.42X and 2.04X, respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 54% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Brea Union Plaza Loan ($14.9
million -- 32% of the pool), which is secured by a 164,000 square-
foot grocery anchored retail property located in Brea, California.
As of September 2012, the property was 100% leased. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 53% and 1.73X.

The second largest loan is the Homebase Brea Union Plaza Loan
($7.5 million -- 16% of the pool), which is secured by a 110,000
square-foot Home Depot (Moody's senior unsecured rating A3;
positive outlook) located in Brea, California. Home Depot's lease
currently expires in August 2017. Moody's performed a "lit/dark"
analysis on this property. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83%
and 1.18X.

The third largest loan is the Wichita Square Shopping Center Loan
($3.0 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 58,000
square-foot retail property located in Wichita Fall, Texas. As of
December 2012, the property was 100% leased. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.28X, respectively.


DIVERSIFIED ASSET: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class B-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes and revised the Outlook on
two classes of notes issued by Diversified Asset Securitization
Holdings II, L.P./Corp. as:

-- $6,992,481 class A-1 notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative;
-- $44,285,724 class A-1L notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $50,000,000 class A-2L notes at 'Csf';
-- $37,000,000 class B-1 notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio. These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various default timing
and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch also
considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis, as
described below, to conclude the rating affirmations for the rated
notes.

The affirmations for the class A-1 and A-1L notes are due to the
relatively stable performance of the transaction, with continued
note paydowns offsetting negative deterioration of the underlying
collateral. Since the last review, the notes have amortized
approximately $38.4 million, or 42.8% of its previous balance,
increasing the amount of credit enhancement available to the
classes. Excess spread has also been available to pay down these
notes on the past four payment dates due to a failing class B
overcollateralization (OC) ratio. The affirmations are in line
with the breakeven levels from the cash flow model.

The Outlook Stable on the class A-1 and A-1L notes reflects
Fitch's expectations of near-term rating stability for the notes.

Breakevens for the class A-2L and class B notes were below the SF
PCM's 'CCC' default level, the lowest level of defaults projected
by SF PCM. For these classes, Fitch compared the respective credit
enhancement levels to expected losses from the distressed and
defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). This
comparison indicates that default appears to remain inevitable for
both classes of notes at or prior to maturity. Accordingly, these
notes are affirmed at 'Csf'.

DASH II is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Sept. 13, 2000. The portfolio is
currently monitored by Western Asset Management Co., who became
the substitute asset manager for Asset Allocation & Management,
LLC in November 2002 and actively managed the portfolio until DASH
II exited its reinvestment period in 2005. The portfolio is
composed of 55.8% residential mortgage-backed securities, 29.7%
commercial and consumer asset-backed securities, and 14.5%
commercial mortgage-backed securities from 1995 through 2005
vintage transactions.


DLJ COMMERCIAL 1998-CF1: Mood's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. S CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of one class of DLJ
Commercial Mortgage Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1998-CF1 as follows:

Cl. S, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class S, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed. The IO class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class
in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.9% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 1.9% of the original pooled balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand with
a growing renter base and declining home ownership. Primary urban
markets are outperforming secondary suburban markets. Performance
in the retail sector continues to be mixed with retail rents
declining for the past four years, weak demand for new space and
lackluster sales driven by internet sales growth. Across all
property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to
improve with robust securitization activity of commercial real
estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5 compared to 10 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 20, 2010.

Deal Performance

As of the January 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $36.6
million from $838.8 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1.6%
to 24% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 93% of the pool. One loan, representing 7% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool has no loans with investment grade credit assessments.

Three loans, representing 33% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.7 million (25% loss severity on
average). Currently there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 24% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $1.3 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 93%
of the pool's non-defeased loans. Excluding troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 86%. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 11.0%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.05X and 1.50X, respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 48% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Walgreens Portfolio Loan ($11.1 million --
30.4% of the pool), which is cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted of five Walgreens properties. Two are located in
California, two in Nevada and one in Washington. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 96% and 1.24X, respectively.

The second largest conduit loan is the Randall's Store Loan ($3.8
million -- 10.4% of the pool), which is secured by 59,000 square
foot (SF) grocery store located in Sugar Land, Texas. The loan
matures in December 2017 with the properties lease extending an
additional five years till 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
87% and 1.37X, respectively.

The third largest conduit loan is the Walgreens - Seattle Loan
($2.6 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 13,900
SF retail store located in Seattle, Washington. The loan matures
in November 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.32X,
respectively.


DRYDEN XI: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating to Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on all
eight classes of notes from Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Prudential Investment Management.

S&P last took rating actions on this transaction in January 2011,
when it upgraded various tranches due to significant improvements
to the credit quality of the portfolio and the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios.  The credit quality of the
portfolio and the O/C ratios have not changed notably since.
There is a significant balance of assets with LIBOR floor base
rates which can provide additional credit given a low interest
rate environment.

The affirmations reflect the availability of sufficient credit
support at the current rating levels.  The transaction will
continue to reinvest until April 2013.  S&P will continue to
review its ratings on the notes and assess whether, in its view,
the ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006

Class        Rating
A-1          AA+ (sf)
A-2A         AAA (sf)
A-2B         AA+ (sf)
A-3          AA+ (sf)
B            A+ (sf)
C-1          BBB (sf)
C-2          BBB (sf)
D            BB+ (sf)


FIGUEROA CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Figueroa CLO 2013-1 Ltd./Figueroa CLO 2013-1 LLC's
$356.0 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 21,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated, speculative-grade, senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      preliminary rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash
      flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the assigned
      preliminary ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
      including LIBOR ranging from 0.3105%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available prior to paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees, collateral
      manager incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets during the reinvestment period.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1324.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Figueroa CLO 2013-1 Ltd./Figueroa CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                    Rating              Amount
                                            (mil. $)
A-1                      AAA (sf)             249.0
A-2                      AA (sf)               43.0
B (deferrable)           A (sf)                20.0
C (deferrable)           BBB (sf)              19.0
D (deferrable)           BB (sf)               25.0
Subordinated notes       NR                    44.0

NR-Not rated.


GALE FORCE 3: Moody's Ups Rating on $21.6MM Class E Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Gale Force 3 CLO, Ltd.:

USD32,400,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September
30, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

USD12,000,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 30,
2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

USD26,100,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

USD27,600,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

USD21,600,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September
30, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

USD300,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

USD143,300,000 Class A-2 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Term Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher spread levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
September 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2624 compared to 3182 at
the time of the last rating action and a WAS of 4.00% compared to
3.00% at the time of the last rating action. Moody's also notes
that the transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios are
stable since the last rating action.

Moody's notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on the
latest trustee report dated January 9, 2013, the weighted average
rating factor is currently 2582 compared to 2623 in September
2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $576.5 million,
defaulted par of $14 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.28% (implying a WARF of 2624), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.07%, and a diversity
score of 75.

The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Gale Force 3 CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2099)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: +1

Class B-2: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3149)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: -2

Class B-2: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal may be allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period. Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis given that the post-reinvestment period reinvesting
criteria provides some reinvestment flexibility that may have the
result of increasing the weighted average life of the portfolio
relative to its current level.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1997-C1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one class of GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc. commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 1997-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation is due to sufficient credit enhancement to the
remaining Fitch rated class and minimal Fitch expected losses
across the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 2.8% of the remaining
pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total 3.7%,
including losses already incurred. The pool has experienced $60.9
million (3.6% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated three loans (8.5%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes the two specially serviced assets.

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95.2% to $80.9 million from
$1.7 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, one loan
(25.4% of the pool) is defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through K.

Although credit enhancement of the one remaining rated class G is
high for a 'BB' rating, upgrades are not warranted. The pool is
concentrated with 10 of the remaining 22 loans secured by
properties occupied by single tenants and thus carry a great deal
of binary risk.

The largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a 52,419
square foot (sf) business park (1.9% of the pool) located in
Plantation, Florida. The Borrower has been involved in two recent
lawsuits, though these legal issues have since been cleared and
the borrower has expressed a desire to pay the loan in full. The
borrower is, however, contesting amounts due.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a loan secured
by two shopping centers totaling 175,369-sf located in Portage, WI
and Waseca, MN. Occupancy declined 23% when Wal-Mart vacated upon
its Feb. 27, 2007 lease expiration date. The market remains slow
in the local area.

Fitch affirms these classes:

-- $34.3 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1 through F are paid in full. Fitch does not rate the
class H or K certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class X certificates.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1997-C1: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on Cl. X CMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of one class of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., 1997-C1, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 1997-C1 as follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed. The IO class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class
in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.0% of the
current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 4.0% of the original pooled balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand with
a growing renter base and declining home ownership. Recovery in
the office sector continues at a measured pace with minimal
additions to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12 compared to 19 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release date May 20, 2010.

Deal Performance

As of the January 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $81.1
million from $1.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 22 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 25% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 58% of the pool. One loan, representing 25% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains no loans with investment grade credit
assessments.

Four loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $65.1 million (61% loss severity
on average). Two loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. Moody's estimates approximately an aggregate
$920,000 loss for the specially serviced loans (35.4% expected
loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loans representing 2.5% of the pool and has estimated
an aggregate $308,000 loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 63%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 65%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 9.6% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.4%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.12X and 2.42X, respectively. Moody's actual
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Central Valley Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($11.7 million -- 14.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
300,000 square foot (SF) retail center in Modesto, California
anchored by Wal-Mart. The property was 90% leased as of October
2012 compared to 93% as of October 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 69% and 1.56X, respectively.

The second and third conduit loans are both CarMax Loans ($5.1
million -- 6.3% of the pool) & ($4.6 million -- 5.6% of the pool),
respectively. Both loans are backed by properties 100% occupied by
CarMax, one in Stockbridge, GA and one in Houston, TX. In
addition, both loans are fully amortizing.


GOLUB CAPITAL: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Golub
Capital Partners CLO 15 Ltd./ Golub Capital Partners CLO 15 LLC's
$452.0 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by a revolving
pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured
loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.3439%-12.6500%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which would lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1280.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Golub Capital Partners CLO 15 Ltd./Golub Capital Partners CLO 15
LLC

Class              Rating          Amount
                                   (mil. $)(i)
A-1                AAA (sf)        296.00
A-2                AA (sf)         56.00
B (deferrable)     A (sf)          40.50
C (deferrable)     BBB (sf)        20.50
D (deferrable)     BB (sf)         39.00
Subordinated       NR              61.20

NR-Not rated.
N/A-Not applicable.


GRESHAM CAPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Gresham Capital CLO 1 B.V.'s class B, C, D, and E notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A1, RLF, and
A2 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the latest available trustee report
and its credit and cash flow analysis.  S&P has taken into account
recent developments in the transaction and reviewed it under S&P's
relevant criteria.

S&P has observed a number of positive developments in this
transaction.  The class A-1 and RLF notes have partially redeemed
in 2012.  The level of available credit enhancement has increased
across all rated classes of notes, compared with S&P's previous
review of the transaction.

Over the same period, the percentage of defaulted assets has
decreased to 1.59% of the pool from 3.33%.  The transaction now
has a shorter weighted-average life of 4.09 years.  In addition,
the weighted-average spread has increased to 3.63% for euro-
denominated assets in the pool, and to 3.84% for pound sterling-
denominated assets.

Those positive developments were partially mitigated by the
increased proportion of assets that S&P rates in the 'CCC'
category (i.e., rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') has increased to
12.98% of the remaining pool, from 8.97% as of S&P's December 2011
review.  This is mainly explained by the presence of junior
tranches of other collateralized loan obligations in the
portfolio.

"We subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash flow
analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each rated
class of notes at each rating level.  We applied a number of cash
flow stress scenarios, using various default patterns, in
conjunction with different interest rate and foreign exchange
stress scenarios.  Our analysis shows that the BDRs for class B,
C, and D notes now pass at higher rating level and their credit
enhancement has increased.  We have therefore raised our ratings
on the class B notes to 'AAA (sf)', on the class C notes to 'AA-
(sf)', and on the class D notes to 'BB+ (sf)'," S&P said.

At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the
class A1, RLF, and A2 notes.  Their level of available credit
enhancement has improved and is commensurate with the currently
assigned ratings.

S&P's rating on the class E notes is constrained by the
application of the largest obligor test, a supplemental stress
test that S&P introduced in its 2009 criteria for cash flow
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  This test addresses event
and model risk that might be present in the transaction.  The BDRs
for class E are now passing at a higher rating level compared with
previous review and its credit enhancement has increased.
However, the extent of rating uplift was limited by the
application of the supplemental test.  S&P has therefore raised to
'B+ (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

The Bank of New York Mellon (AA-/Negative/A-1+) acts as account
bank and custodian in the transaction.  Under S&P's 2012
counterparty criteria, the counterparty is appropriately rated to
support its ratings in Gresham Capital CLO 1.

At closing, Gresham Capital CLO 1 entered into currency options
agreements with Merrill Lynch Capital Markets Ltd.  S&P considers
that the documentation for these options is not fully in line with
its 2012 counterparty criteria.  S&P did not therefore give
benefit to the currency options in stress scenarios above a 'A'
rating level in S&P's cash flow analysis.

Gresham Capital CLO 1 is a cash flow CLO transaction that
securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms.
The transaction closed in March 2006 and is managed by Investec
Bank (U.K.) Ltd.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                Rating
              To                From
Gresham Capital CLO 1 B.V.
EUR300 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes And Revolving Loan
Facility

Ratings Raised

B             AAA (sf)          AA (sf)
C             AA- (sf)          A- (sf)
D             BB+ (sf)          BB (sf)
E             B+ (sf)           CCC+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A1            AAA (sf)
RLF           AAA (sf)
A2            AAA (sf)

RLF-Rev ln fac.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-G1: DBRS  Rates Class DM Certificates 'BB(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-G1 (the
Certificates), to be issued by GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-
G1.  The trends are Stable.

- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
- Class B at AA (sf)
- Class C at A (sf)
- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
- Class DM at BB (sf)

All classes will be privately placed pursuant to Rule 144a.

Class DM is secured by a non-pooled subordinate rake bond
associated solely with the Deptford Mall loan.

The Class X-A balance is notional.  DBRS ratings on interest-only
certificates address the likelihood of receiving interest based on
the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers the interest-only
(IO) certificate's position within the transaction payment
waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral consists of three fixed-rate loans that are secured
by two outlet malls and one regional mall - Great Lakes Crossing
Outlets, Katy Mills and Deptford Mall - located in established
suburban markets outside of Detroit, Houston and Philadelphia.
Combined, the three senior pooled mortgage loans total
$543,885,000 and are not cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted.
The three ten-year loans carry a weighted-average interest rate of
3.619%, with Great Lakes Crossing Outlets and Deptford Mall
amortizing on 30-year schedules and Katy Mills IO for the entire
loan term.

Each of the three loans is sponsored by a major mall operator
(Taubman Centers Inc., The Macerich Company and Simon Property
Group, Inc.) with significant national relationships and financial
resources.  For malls, it is highly desirable to have an owner
that owns many other malls, as they can leverage their
relationships with tenants in order to bring certain tenants to
the mall that otherwise would not locate there.  With only three
loans, the pool is concentrated by loan size.  This lack of
diversity exposes the pool to event risk, as losses incurred to
any of the three senior trust loans would result in losses to
investment-grade rated bonds.  The DBRS sizing hurdles, which were
used to arrive at the ratings for the pool, contemplate stand-
alone transactions with no diversity.  DBRS gave minimal credit to
the diversity afforded by pooling the three loans, which amounted
to increasing the AAA loan-to-value (LTV) hurdle by 3.75%.  As a
result of the stable market positions, strong in-line sales
performance, high-quality sponsorship and the low-leverage
financing, Great Lakes Crossing Outlets and Katy Mills carry DBRS
shadow ratings oft A (low) and BBB (high), respectively, while
DBRS considers the credit qualities associated with the senior
pooled portion of the Deptford Mall loan to be BBB (low).

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure
and underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to
ongoing surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades
by DBRS after the date of issuance.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-G1: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class DM Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the Goldman Sachs &
Co. GS Mortgage Securities Trust Series 2013-G1 transaction.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $84,172,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $295,683,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $379,855,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,045,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,700,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,285,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,080,073** class DM 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Interest-only class; notional balance of classes A-1 and A-2.

** Class DM represents an interest solely in the subordinate
    component of the Deptford Mall Mortgage Loan.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 14, 2013.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
the primary assets of which are three loans secured by three
separate regional malls having an aggregate pooled principal
balance of approximately $569 million as of the cutoff date. The
loans are not cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted. The loans
were originated by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company.

Fitch reviewed the transaction's collateral, including site
inspections, cash flow analysis and asset summary reviews.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.27x, a Fitch stressed loan-to value (LTV) of 69.6%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 11.1%. Fitch's net cash flow represents
a variance of 5.4% to the issuer cash flow.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be KeyCorp Real
Estate Capital Markets, Inc, rated 'CMS1' and 'CSS2+',
respectively, by Fitch.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-G1: S&P Gives Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on DM Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-G1's $569.0 million
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The note issuance is a CMBS securitization backed by three
commercial mortgage loans secured by three regional shopping
malls: Great Lakes Crossing Outlets, Deptford Mall, and Katy
Mills.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 21,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflects S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsors' and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loans' terms, and
the transaction's structure.  Standard & Poor's has determined
that the loans have a beginning and ending loan-to-value ratio of
71.7% and 59.0%, respectively, based on its values.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 disclosure report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

     http://www.standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1325.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-G1

Class       Prelim. rating   Prelim. amount ($)       LTV (%)
A-1         AAA (sf)                 84,172,000          46.7
A-2         AAA (sf)                295,683,000          46.7
X-A         AAA (sf)                379,855,000(i)        N/A
B           AA- (sf)                 76,045,000          56.1
C           A- (sf)                  49,700,000          62.2
D           BBB- (sf)                38,285,000          66.9
DM(ii)      BB- (sf)                 25,080,073          84.6

(i) Notional balance.
(ii) Loan-specific class.
LTV - Loan-to-value ratio, based on Standard & Poor's
       Ratings Services' values.
NR - Not rated.
N/A - Not applicable.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-KYO: Moody's Rates Class E CMBS 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to eight
classes of CMBS securities, issued by GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation Trust 2013-KYO, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-KYO.

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XA-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XA-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. XB-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by
cross collateralized and cross defaulted first lien commercial
mortgage related to six full-service hotel properties. The ratings
are based on the collateral and the structure of the transaction.

Moody's rating approach for securities backed by a single loan
compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying properties
with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings Moody's also considers a range
of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two
factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely
driven by the LTV of the underlying loan. Moody's Trust LTV Ratio
is 76.8%. Moody's Total LTV ratio (inclusive of subordinated debt)
of 129.2% is also considered when analyzing various stress
scenarios for the rated debt. The Moody's Trust Stressed DSCR of
1.37X and Moody's Total Stressed DSCR (inclusive of subordinated
debt) is 0.82X.

The loan is solely collateralized by full-service hotel properties
that are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted. Lodging
properties are more correlated than properties of other commercial
real estate sector. In addition, this pool is geographically
concentrated as over 80% of the collateral (by allocated loan
balance) are located on Waikiki Beach, HI. The pool's performance
has tracked that of the lodging sector as a whole, with both
having deteriorated dramatically beginning in 2008 and rebounding
sharply beginning in 2010. The pool's performance was also
impacted by significant capital projects that were underway during
this time.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Classes XA-1,
XA-2, and XB-1.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based Large Loan Model v.8.5
which derives credit enhancement level based on an adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratio. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity.

Moody's analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.1
which references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Single Borrower CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, or 25%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa classes would be Aa1, Aa2, or A2, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating on Class G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Institutional Mortgage Capital, LP's Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2013-3:

-- $37,370,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $96,370,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81,600,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5,321,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,451,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,886,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,756,000 class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,129,941a class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2,503,953a class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Non-offered certificates.
    All currencies are in Canadian dollars (CAD).

Fitch does not rate the $250,395,295 (notional) interest-only
class X or the non-offered $5,007,401 class H certificate.


JAMESTOWN CLO II: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Jamestown CLO II Ltd./Jamestown CLO II Corp.'s
$460.00 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 21,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.3005%-12.813%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees; subordinated collateral
      management fees; collateral manager incentive fees; and
      subordinated note payments into principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1326.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Jamestown CLO II Ltd./Jamestown CLO II Corp.

Class                  Rating                 Amount
                                            (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)               307.50
A-2A                   AA (sf)                 31.25
A-2B                   AA (sf)                 31.25
B (deferrable)         A (sf)                  42.50
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                28.00
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                 19.50
Subordinated notes     NR                      50.10

NR-Not rated.


JP MORGAN 1997-C5: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Class X CMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class of J.P
Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1997-C5 as follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed. The IO class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class
in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.8% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 2.6% of the original pooled balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2 compared to 10 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 19, 2010.

Deal Performance

As of the January 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 97%
to $27.4 million from $1.0 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 8 mortgage loans ranging in
size from 1.4% to 67% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased
loans representing 100% of the pool. No loans have defeased and
are secured by U.S. Government securities. The pool also does not
contain any loans with investment grade credit assessments.

Three loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $25.4 million (49% loss severity on
average). There are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 14% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $764 thousand loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for
100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV is 34%. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.94X and 3.18X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 76% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is The Spectrum at Reston Town Center Loan ($18.5
million -- 67.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 202,000
square foot (SF) anchored retail center located in Reston,
Virginia. As of September 2012, the property was 100% leased.
Performance has improved due to increased revenues and decreasing
expenses. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and 3.23X,
respectively.

The second largest conduit loan is the Whitehall Apartments Loan
($1.3 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 68-unit
multifamily complex located in Clarksville, Tennessee. As of
September 2012, the property was 96% occupied. Performance has
improved due to increased occupancy while the loan has amortized
36%. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and 3.03X,
respectively.

The third largest conduit loan is the Clopper II Research &
Development Loan ($1.2 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 79,000 SF industrial building located in
Gaithersburg, Maryland. As of February 2013, the property was 86%
leased compared to 84% leased as of January 2012. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 27% and 4.03X, respectively.


JP MORGAN 2002-C3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X-1 CMBS to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class,
confirmed three classes and affirmed three classes of J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-C3 as follows:

Cl. D, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is downgraded following the
recent paydown of highly-rated referenced classes. The rating of
the IO Class is now consistent with the credit performance of its
referenced classes.

The confirmations and affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges, in addition to the ongoing
risk of interest shortfalls from specially-serviced loans. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 49% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 16%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses metric remained nearly
unchanged, at approximately 11% of the original balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class X-1.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7 compared to a Herf of 16 at Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated November 15, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 14, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $73 million
from $745 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to 24%
of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
representing 87% of the pool. The pool contains no loans with
investment-grade credit assessments. There is one defeased loan,
representing approximately 7% of the pool, which is collateralized
by U.S. Government securities.

Two loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nine loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $45 million (56% average loan loss
severity). Currently, seven loans, representing 74% of the pool,
are in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is
the 78 Corporate Center Loan ($17 million -- 24% of the pool),
which is secured by a 185,000 square foot, two-building office
complex located in Lebanon, New Jersey, approximately 50 miles
west of New York City. The loan transferred to special servicing
in January 2009 due to delinquency. The servicer assumed title in
a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure transaction in August 2009 and the
property is now real estate owned (REO). The property has remained
in the range of 20-25% occupied for more than one year, despite
leasing efforts. The servicer now intends to pursue the sale of
the asset within the coming months.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $35 million loss (65% expected
loss) for all specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% of the performing pool. Excluding
specially-serviced loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 54%
compared to 73% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.3% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.6%

Excluding specially-serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.36X and 2.05X, respectively, compared to 1.49X and
1.53X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 11% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Conroe Shopping Center Loan ($3 million --
4% of the pool), which is secured by a 51,000 square foot retail
center located approximately 41 miles north of downtown Houston,
in Conroe, Texas. The property was 100% leased as of September 30,
2012. The lead tenant, Michael's, recently renewed its lease
through February 2016. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are
55% and 1.88X, respectively, compared to 58% and 1.77X at last
review.

The second-largest loan is the Aero Plastics Loan ($3 million --
4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 144,000 square foot
industrial property located in Leominster, Massachusetts. The
property was 100% leased as of September 30, 2012. The loan's
scheduled maturity date was February 12, 2013, and the servicer
has confirmed the loan has paid off in full. Moody's most recent
LTV and stressed DSCR were 55% and 1.85X, respectively.

The third-largest loan is the Shoal Creek Apartments, Phase II
Loan ($3 million -- 4% of the pool). The loan is secured by an 87-
unit multifamily complex located in Athens, Georgia, near the
University of Georgia campus. The property was 98% occupied as of
September 30, 2012 compared to 91% as of year-end 2011. The
property, built in 2002, may face increased competition from newer
multifamily projects which have recently come online in the area.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.47X,
respectively -- unchanged since Moody's last review.


JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC18: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 9 CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine classes
and affirmed four CMBS classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-CIBC18 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2012
Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due primarily to higher expected realized and
anticipated losses from specially-serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 8.1% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 7.8%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses figure increased to 12.5% of
the original balance, up from 9.9% at Moody's last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 52 compared to a Herf of 56 at Moody's prior
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 23, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 14, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $3.39
billion from $3.90 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 193 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 34% of the pool. The pool contains no
loans with investment-grade credit assessments and no defeased
loans.

Fifty-four loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-nine loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $213 million (39% average loan loss
severity). Currently, 11 loans, representing 10% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Bryant Park Hotel Loan ($87 million -- 3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 128-key, boutique hotel in Midtown Manhattan. The
loan transferred to special servicing in October 2011 due to
imminent default. As of most recent reporting, the property is not
cash-flow positive. Nevertheless, the loan remains current as the
borrower has funded shortfalls out of pocket. The borrower filed a
recent legal complaint against the lender seeking monetary damages
related to alleged improper loan administration. The servicer
strongly disagrees with the borrower's assertion and continues to
seek a positive resolution.

The remaining ten specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
commercial, retail and hotel property types. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $128 million loss (37% expected loss) for all specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 25 poorly-
performing loans representing 14% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $74 million loss
(16% expected loss severity based on a 50% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 90% and 80% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 104% compared to 107% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11.8% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.2%

Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.36X and 0.99X, respectively, compared to
1.36X and 0.97X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool.
The largest loan is the 131 South Dearborn Loan ($236 million --
7% of the pool), which represents a participation interest in a
$472 million senior mortgage secured by the 37-story "Citadel
Center", a 1.5 million square-foot (SF) office tower in the
Central Loop submarket of Chicago, Illinois. The property is also
encumbered by $25 million of mezzanine debt. The property's lead
tenants are JP Morgan Chase, Citadel, LLC, and Seyfarth Shaw, LLP.
Citadel's current lease (325,000 square feet; 22% of property NRA)
is set to expire at the end of 2013, though the firm recently
renewed its lease for additional ten years. As part of the deal,
Citadel will give back approximately 100,000 SF -- or about one
third -- of its current space. The available space is already
being marketed. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 119% and
0.77X, respectively, compared to 118% and 0.78X at last review.

The second-largest loan is the Centro Heritage Portfolio IV Loan
($226 million -- 7% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
portfolio of 16 anchored retail properties across ten U.S. states.
Anchors include Lowe's, TJ Maxx, Burlington, Kmart, Marshall's,
and ShopRite. The portfolio was 90% leased as of year-end 2011
reporting. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and
1.10X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.16X at last review.

The third-largest loan is the Quantico Portfolio Loan ($131
million -- 4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a portfolio of
11 industrial and three office properties located near Washington-
Dulles International Airport in Northern Virginia. Duke Realty
Corporation is the loan sponsor. The portfolio was 92% leased as
of June 2011 reporting. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are
122% and 0.80X, respectively, compared to 118% and 0.82X at last
review.


LANDMARK VI CDO: Moody's Lifts Rating on $10MM of Notes to 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Landmark VI CDO Ltd.

$15,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 upgraded to Aa1
(sf);

$19,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2018, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 upgraded
to A1 (sf);

$15,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2018 Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 upgraded to
Baa3 (sf);

$10,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2018 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on August 8, 2011 upgraded
to B1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$222,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2018
(current balance of $110,563,912.26), affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 8, 2011 upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in August 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately $100 million since the
last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated
January 2013 the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 134.68%, 119.99%,
110.48% and 104.93%, respectively, compared to 124.44%, 114.47%,
107.74% and 103.66%, at the last rating action. The January 2013
OC levels reported by the trustee do not account for the January
2013 principal distribution amount to the Class A Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $174 million,
defaulted par of $17 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.88% (implying a WARF of 2834), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.72%, and a diversity
score of 59. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Landmark CLO VI Ltd., issued in January of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described, Moody's also
performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated
notes of various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2267)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3401)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal may be allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period. Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis given that the post-reinvestment period reinvesting
criteria provides some reinvestment flexibility that may have the
result of increasing the weighted average life of the portfolio
relative to its current level.


LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. IO CMBS to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one interest-
only class of LB Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C1 as follows:

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class IO, is due to the decline in
credit performance of its reference classes as a result of
principal paydowns of higher quality referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.9% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base expected
loss was 2.1%. The increase in the cumulative base expected loss
percentage is due to the deal being paid down over 50% from
Moody's prior review. On a dollar basis the base expected loss
actually decreased to $3.9 million from $4.2 million at last
review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now
3.3% of the original pooled balance, the same as at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 15 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance

As of the January 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $100.5
million from $1.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 23 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 32% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 82% of the pool. Five loans, representing 7% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Seven loans, representing 56% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $53 million (47% loss severity on
average). One loan, representing 4% of the pool, is currently in
special servicing. Moody's has assumed a high default probability
for two poorly performing loans representing 3% of the pool.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $3 million loss (44% expected
loss on average) from the specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 82% of the pool's non-specially
serviced and non-defeased loans, respectively. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 59%
compared to 66% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.27X and 2.08X, respectively, compared to
1.30X and 1.79X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 51% of the pool. The largest
loan is Ohio Valley Plaza Loan ($32.1 million -- 31.9% of the
pool), which is secured by a 577,000 square foot (SF) power center
located in St. Clairsville, Ohio. Major tenants include Lowe's
Home Improvement Warehouse, Wal-Mart, Sam's Club and Kroger. The
property was 99% leased as of September 2012 compared to 98% at
last review. The loan has passed its anticipated repayment date
(ARD) of January 2013. Overall, property performance is stable and
the loan has benefitted from amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.40X, respectively, compared to 75% and
1.36X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Parkway Plaza Shopping
Center Loan ($9.9 million -- 9.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 165,000 SF anchored retail center located in Vestal, New
York. Major tenants include Kohl's, PriceRite, Bed Bath & Beyond
and PetSmart. The property was 100% leased as of October 2012, the
same as prior review. The loan has passed its ARD of December
2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.37X,
respectively, compared to 73% and 1.40X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 1900 Imperial Palm
Apartments Loan ($9.1 million -- 9.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 638 unit senior rental community located in Largo,
Florida. As of September 2012, the property was 93% leased. The
loan is stable and benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 52% and 1.86X, respectively, compared to 54% and
1.82X at last review.


MARATHON CLO V: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Marathon CLO V Ltd./Marathon CLO V LLC's $409.5 million fixed- and
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's cash flow structure, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined
      in the corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
      criteria, which can withstand the default rate projected by
      Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's expectation of the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, assessed using its
      cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
      assigned ratings under various interest rate scenarios,
      including LIBORs ranging from 0.31%-12.81%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds that are
      available prior to paying uncapped administrative expenses
      and fees, subordinated hedge termination payments,
      collateral manager incentive fees, and subordinated note
      payments to principal proceeds for the purchase of
      additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1309.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Marathon CLO V Ltd./Marathon CLO V LLC

Class                  Rating              Amount (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                     371.10
A-2a                   AA (sf)                       50.25
A-2b                   AA (sf)                        9.00
B-1 (deferrable)       A (sf)                        51.00
B-2 (deferrable)       A (sf)                         7.50
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                      31.20
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                       30.90
Subordinated notes     NR                            63.30

NR-Not rated.


MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C2: Moody's Keeps Caa3 Rating on Cl. IO Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed one class of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors, Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1998-C2 as follows:

Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of the IO Class, Class IO, is consistent with the
credit quality of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed. The
IO class is the only outstanding Moody's rated class in this
transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is 4.7% of the original pooled balance. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit assessments for the principal
classes could decline below their current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
assessments of the referenced tranches may be insufficient to
support the current ratings of the interest-only class.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review.

Deal Performance

As of the January 13, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $10.2
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from roughly
3% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 63% of
the pool. The pool consists of three defeased loans representing
31% of the pool and no specially serviced loans.

Four loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a realized loss of $51.4 million (45% loss severity).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 50% and 25% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV is 52%. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.29X and 2.98X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 27% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Holiday Inn Express - Brownsburg
Loan ($1.1 million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured by a 75
key limited service hotel located in Brownsville, Indiana,
approximately 17 miles west of Indianapolis, Indiana. The loan is
currently on the watchlist due to low DSCR however the loan is
fully amortizing and the borrower is current on principal and
amortization payments. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 42% and
3.07X.

The second largest loan is the Best Western Anaheim Hills Loan
($919,006 -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 118 key
limited service hotel located in Anaheim, California,
approximately 12 miles east of Disneyland. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.34X.

The third largest loan is the Concord Green Apartments Loan
($770,452 -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 188 unit
multifamily property located in Houston, Texas. As of September
2012, the property was 99% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 20% and 5.19X.


MERRILL LYNCH 2002-CA: DBRS Hikes Rating on 2 Securities From 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has upgraded the following two classes of Merrill Lynch
Financial Assets Inc., Series 2002-Canada 7 as follows:

-- Class H to AAA (sf) from B (sf)
-- Class J to BBB (low) (sf) from B (low) (sf)

DBRS has also confirmed the following class of Merrill Lynch
Financial Assets Inc., Series 2002-Canada 7:

-- Class X at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These rating actions reflect the overall stable performance of the
three remaining loans in the pool, with a weighted-average debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.34 times (x) and a weighted-
average debt yield of 33.38% as of the YE2011 financials.  The
pool has seen a significant collateral reduction of 98.49% since
issuance.  Two of the remaining three loans are fully amortizing
with a combined balance of $1.67 million, representing
approximately 40% of the remaining trust balance.  Both of those
loans are scheduled to mature in 2016.

The largest loan remaining in the pool has a balance of $2.56
million, representing 60% of the remaining pool balance, and is
expected to mature in 2014.  The loan is secured by a 62,848 sf
office building in Ontario.  The property is 100% occupied, as of
the July 2012 rent roll; however, the property has significant
roll over risk before loan maturity.  The property is currently
performing at a stable level with a DSCR of 1.27x.

As there has been significant paydown since issuance for the pool
overall, the trust's exposure is heavily concentrated on a loan-
by-loan basis.  Given these factors, DBRS sized each loan
individually for the purpose of this review.  DBRS stressed
existing cash flows and applied higher end cap rates by property
type to derive a conservative value for modelling purposes.
Despite the stressed scenario, the resulting credit indicators are
still healthy for the pool overall, providing substantiation for
the rating upgrades.  In addition, all three of the remaining
loans are performing, and there are no loans on the servicer's
watchlist or in special servicing, as of the February 2013
remittance report.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Cl. N Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2003-IQ4.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 5% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 1.7%, including losses already
incurred. The pool has experienced $2.2 million (0.3% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 19 loans (31.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes three specially serviced assets (9.7%) and the three
largest loans in the pool (43.4%).

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 71.6% to $206.5 million from
$727.8 million at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, four loans
(9% of the pool) have defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes K through O.

Following the January distribution date the largest specially-
serviced loan, which was secured by a 260,000 square foot (sf)
mixed-use complex in Cranford, NJ (4.8% of the pool) was sold. A
loss of approximately $3.5 million is expected to be reflected in
the next distribution report.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is secured by a 122-unit
multifamily apartment building in Tampa, FL (1.8%). The servicer
reported year-end (YE) 2011 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
0.72 times (x) with 96% occupancy rate, compared to a DSCR of
1.44x with 98.4% occupancy rate at issuance. Low DSCR was the
result of reduced revenue due to lower occupancy and significant
increase in operating expenses. The borrower was renovating units
before they were turned over to new tenants. The loan remains
current and with the master servicer.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced loan secured by a 101,286-sf office building in
Wauwatosa, WI. The loan transferred to the special servicer on
Aug. 21, 2009 due to servicer determination of imminent default.
As of July 31, 2012, the building is 69.3% occupied. A property
inspection on Aug. 6, 2012 revealed property to be in good
condition. However, weak financials continue to result from
occupancy issues. The borrower is currently seeking a modification
of the loan terms, with negotiations ongoing.

The largest loan in the pool, the Federal Center Plaza (30.4%), is
secured by two eight-story office buildings totaling 722,000-sf
located on Fourth Street between C and D streets in the
Washington, D.C. CBD. The General Service Administration (GSA)
lease (50% of total space) was set to expire on Jan. 2, 2013. The
borrower is in process of extending with GSA. According to the
borrower, the process has been slow due to Congressional pressure.

The loan remains current and with the master servicer as of the
January 2013 Remittance Report. Fitch expects no loss on the loan
as the loan per square foot is low at $174 per foot. However, the
refinance of the loan at its maturity of March 2013 may be delayed
due to the ongoing lease negotiations.

The second largest loan, Encino Place (9%), is secured by the fee-
simple interest in an 84,395-sf property located in Encino, CA.
The first two stories (57,206 sf) of the three-story property
consist of retail space, and the third story (27,189 sf) consists
of office space. Recent poor performance (DSCR is 1.05x as of
Sept. 30, 2012) is the result of reduced revenue due to lower
occupancy, combined with increased operating expenses, when
compared to underwriting. Occupancy has steadily declined since
2008 and rebound to 81% as of Sept. 30, 2012.

The third largest loan, 1801 North Military Trail, is secured by a
60,135-sf suburban office building in Boca Raton, FL. Poor
performance (DSCR is 0.93x as of Sept. 30, 2012) is the result of
reduced revenue due to decreased rents combined with increased R&M
expenses. Revenue reduced when tenant Hodgson Russ vacated upon
the lease expiration date of March 31, 2011. Competition could
prove problematic as well, due to the availability of vacancies at
other properties.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

-- $109.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $18.2 million class B at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $23.7 million class C at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $4.5 million class D at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $7.3 million class E at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $7.3 million class F at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $8.2 million class G at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $8.2 million class H at 'B-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $3.6 million class J at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $1.8 million class K at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $5.5 million class L at 'CCsf', RE 100%;
-- $1.8 million class M at 'CCsf', RE 90%.
-- $1.8 million class N at 'Csf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class O certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on
the interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP9: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on N Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades five and affirms six classes of Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2003-TOP9.

Sensitivity/Rating Drivers

The upgrades reflect a significant increase in credit enhancement
as a result of paydowns and stable performance of the underlying
collateral. Fitch has designated seven of the 18 loans remaining
as a Fitch Loan of Concern. The pool's aggregate principal balance
has been paid down by 91.3% to $93.7 million from $1 billion at
issuance with only 0.3% in realized losses. Interest shortfalls of
$424,693 are affecting the non-rated class. In addition, two loans
(1.5%) are defeased.

The largest loan of the pool is secured by a 258,685sf office
building located in Washington D.C. (41.5% of the pool). The
General Services Administration (GSA) is the sole tenant of the
property. However, in third quarter-2012, they downsized their
space and now occupy 84% of the property. The lease was extended
for two years to August 2014. The loan matures December 2014.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a 121,618 sf
neighborhood shopping center located in North Highlands, CA. The
center is anchored by Raley's grocery store (50% of GLA). The
property suffered from a decline in occupancy and a decrease in
rental rates in 2012. The rental rate decrease was due to a large
rent reduction for Raley's, which was agreed upon when the loan
was in special servicing in 2011. The loan has been modified with
an extended maturity to November 2016.

Fitch upgrades these classes and assigns the Rating Outlook as
indicated:

-- $16.2 million class C to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.1 million class D to 'AAsf' from 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14.8 million class E to 'Asf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.4 million class L to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; assigned Outlook
    Stable;
-- $2.7 million class M to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE 100%;

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $6.7 million class F at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.4 million class G at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.8 million class H at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4 million class J at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.
-- $5.4 million class K at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
--$2.7 million class N at 'CCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch does not rate the $7.4 million class O.

Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-
1. In addition, class A-1, A-2, B, and X-2 have been paid in full.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2011-C1
due to stable performance.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch's affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. There have been no delinquent or
specially serviced loans since issuance. The pool has experienced
no realized losses to date.
As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 1.9% to $1.52 billion from
$1.55 billion at issuance. No loans have defeased since issuance.

The largest loan in the transaction (15.5%) is secured by a 1.1
million square foot (sf) (435,219 sf owned) regional mall located
in Newark, DE. The mall is anchored by Macy's, JC Penney, Target,
and Nordstrom. Major tenants include Barnes & Noble (anchor
owned), Forever 21 (2.5%) net rentable area (NRA) and H&M (1.8%)
NRA. In-line tenants include Express/Express Men, Anthropologie,
Victoria's Secret, and Urban Outfitters. Total mall occupancy as
of Sept. 30, 2012 was 98%, compared to 94% at issuance. The most
recent servicer-reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of
third quarter 2012 was 2.67 times (x) up from 1.88x at issuance.
The loan sponsors are Prime Property Fund and General Growth
Properties.

The second largest loan in the pool (11.5%) is secured by a two-
building office complex consisting of 1.9 million sf located in
Chicago, IL. Major tenants are Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Association (12%), lease expiration in March 2024, Fox Television
Studios (5%), lease expiration December 2022, and Teng &
Associates (4%), lease expiration June 2017. There is limited
near-term rollover with 8% rolling in 2013. Additionally, less
than 15% rolls annually through 2020. The property is currently
79% leased, which compares to 73% at issuance. The most recent
servicer-reported DSCR as of third quarter 2012 was 1.99x up from
1.87x at issuance.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern is the eighth largest loan in
the deal (3.6%) and is secured by a 222,768 sf office building
located in the Westwood section of Los Angeles, CA. The property
has seen a decline in occupancy since issuance. The largest
tenants at issuance were Richardson & Patel (10.3%) NRA, with a
lease expiration in October 2011, Castle & Cook (10.2%), lease
expiration July 2015, and The Regency Club (8.2%), lease
expiration in June 2011. The most recent servicer-reported
occupancy as of September 2012 is 60% down from 70% at year-end
2011 and 84.2% at issuance. The most recent servicer-reported DSCR
as of September 2012 was 1.04x, down from 1.55x at issuance. Fitch
is awaiting an updated rent roll. Fitch will continue to closely
monitor this loan.

Fitch affirms these classes:

-- $58 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $597.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $105.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $404.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A 'at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $85.2 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.4 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.5 million class F at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.5 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class H, J, K, L, M and interest-only
class X-B certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C8: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
the Morgan Stanley Capital I, Inc. MSBAM 2013-C8 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $75,700,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $145,900,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $98,964,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $140,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $335,996,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $904,665,000c class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $108,105,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68,276,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $219,054,000b class PST 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,673,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $68,276,000a,c class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,363,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,914,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,802,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
  for class PST certificates, and class PST certificates may be
  exchanged for class A-S, class B and class C certificates.
c Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $21,336,000 class G or the $19,914,694
class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 54 loans secured by 62 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.14 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC and Bank
of America, National Association.

A detailed description of Fitch's rating analysis including key
rating drivers, stresses, rating sensitivity, analysis, model,
criteria application and data adequacy is available in Fitch's
presale report dated Jan. 29, 2013.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-8: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Morgan
Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C8's $1,137.9
million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-
C8.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 54 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $1,137.9 million, secured by the
fee and leasehold interests in 62 properties across 20 states.

The ratings reflect the credit support provided by the transaction
structure, S&P's view of the underlying collateral's economics,
the trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's relative
diversity, and our overall qualitative assessment of the
transaction.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

     http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1271.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C8

Class                      Rating                   Amount ($)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                 75,700,000
A-2                        AAA (sf)                145,900,000
A-SB                       AAA (sf)                 98,964,000
A-3                        AAA (sf)                140,000,000
A-4                        AAA (sf)                335,996,000
X-A                        AAA (sf)             904,665,000(i)
A-S                        AAA (sf)                108,105,000
B                          AA- (sf)                 68,276,000
PST(ii)                    A- (sf)                 219,054,000
C                          A- (sf)                  42,673,000
X-B(iii)                   AA- (sf)              68,276,000(i)
D(iii)                     BBB- (sf)                48,363,000
E(iii)                     BB (sf)                  19,914,000
F(iii)                     BB- (sf)                 12,802,000
G(iii)                     B (sf)                   21,336,000
H(iii)                     NR                       19,914,694

  (i) Notional balance.
(ii) Exchangeable certificates.
(iii) Non-offered certificates.
  NR - Not rated.


MORTGAGE CAPITAL 1998-MC2: Moody's Cuts Rating on X CMBS to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of an interest-
only class of Mortgage Capital Funding, Inc.,
Multifamily/Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
1998-MC2 as follows:

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade of the IO Class, Class X, is due to the decline in
credit performance of its reference classes as a result of
principal paydowns of higher quality referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.0% of the
current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 1.6% of the original pooled balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
assessments for the principal classes could decline below their
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected credit assessments of the referenced tranches may be
insufficient to support the current ratings of the interest-only
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012, "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published
in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance

As of the January 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $28.3
million from $1.0 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 19 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool. Eleven of the loans are cross-collaterized
and cross-defaulted and in total represent 50% of the pool.

Eight loans, representing 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $15.2 million. No loans are
currently in special servicing. Moody's has assumed a high default
probability for one poorly performing loan representing 2% of the
pool and has estimated an approximate $190,000 loss (30% expected
loss).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 95% of the pool's loans,
respectively. Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 55%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 18% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.4%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.02X and 2.64X, respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest exposure is the Reuben Portfolio ($14.3 million --
50.4% of the pool), which is comprised of 11 cross-collaterized
and cross-defaulted loans that are secured by 12 retail, office
and multifamily properties located in Columbus, Ohio. The
portfolio has amortized over 50% since securitization and all the
loans mature in March 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 57%
and 2.02X, respectively.

The second largest conduit loan is the K-Mart Kahului Loan ($4.9
million -- 17.4% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
property located in Maui, Hawaii. The property is fully leased to
K-Mart through February 2014, which coincides with the loan
maturity date. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.45X,
respectively.

The third largest conduit loan is the 3300 N. 27th Street Loan
($4.6 million -- 16.4% of the pool), which is secured by retail
property located in Lincoln, Nebraska. The property is fully
leased to Home Depot through October 2018. The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in March 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 48% and 2.24X, respectively.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL IV: Moody's Raises Cl. B-2L Notes' Rating to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd.:

USD21,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due March 15, 2018,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 3, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

USD15,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due March 15, 2018,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 3, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

USD13,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due March 15, 2018,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 3, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

USD12,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due March 15, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $11,280,993.56), Upgraded to Ba2
(sf); previously on April 3, 2012 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

USD134,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due March 15, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $85,067,837.22), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

USD75,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due March 15, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $44,326,106.90), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on December 28, 2005 Assigned Aaa (sf)

USD9,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due March 15, 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in April 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1L
and Class A-1LA Notes have been paid down by approximately 36% or
$47.3 million and 40% or $29.6 million, respectively, since the
last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated
January 3, 2013, the Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1L and Class
B-2L overcollateralization ratios are reported at 133.1%, 121.7%,
112.9% and 106.5%, respectively, versus March 2012 levels of
123.2%, 115.8%, 109.9% and 105.4%, respectively.

Moody's notes that the deal also benefited from an improvement in
the weighted average recovery rate of the underlying portfolio
since the last rating action in April 2012. Moody's modeled a
weighted average recovery rate of 50.9% versus 47.7% in April
2012.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the January 2013 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 8.2% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $192.6 million,
defaulted par of $3.2 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.76% (implying a WARF of 2899), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.86%, and a diversity
score of 52. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2319)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LA: 0

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +2

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3479)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LA: 0

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


MOUNTAIN HAWK I: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd./Mountain Hawk I CLO Corp.'s
$451.5 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior-secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash-flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.31%-12.53%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available prior to paying subordinated
      management fees, uncapped administrative expenses, hedge
      payments, and income note payments into principal proceeds
      for the purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1282.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd./Mountain Hawk I CLO Corp.

Class                Rating           Amount
                                    (mil. $)
A-1                  AAA (sf)         310.00
A-X                  AAA (sf)          10.00
B-1                  AA (sf)           40.00
B-2                  AA (sf)           10.00
C (deferrable)       A (sf)            29.00
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)          23.00
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)           29.50
Income notes         NR                49.75

NR-Not rated.


N-45O FIRST CBMS: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the ratings on N-45o First CMBS Issuer
Corporation, series 2003-1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement in light
of the pool's stable performance and significant concentration
with only five of the original 63 loans remaining, all but one of
which matures in the next 12 months. As of the January 2012
distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has paid down
85% to $85.8 million from $559.7 million at issuance. One of the
remaining loans (9.9%) is defeased, with a maturity date of March
2013. There are no specially serviced or delinquent loans as of
the January 2013 remittance report. All loans have a debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) above 1.25 times (x). The weighted average
loan to value (LTV) for the remaining loans is 67.2%. There are
currently no interest shortfalls or losses to any classes of this
transaction.

The largest loan in the pool, State Street Financial Centre (61.2%
of the pool), is secured by a 413,937 square foot (sf) office
building located in the financial district of Toronto, Ontario.
The A class building located on the eastern edge of the financial
core has numerous on-site and near-by amenities. A lease to
International Financial Data Services Inc. (representing 33% of
NRA) expires in October 2013. However, the tenant has a renewal
option and the high likelihood of renewal due to the tight market
supply was considered. According to CBRE, Class A office
properties in Toronto have a vacancy rate of 5.4%. The loan
matures September 2013.

The second largest loan in the pool, Zellers Centre (13.8%), is
the former industrial warehouse facility for Zellers stores; the
property is currently vacant. The loan matures February 2014. A
deterministic test was performed and any loss incurred on this
loan would not impact the ratings.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and Outlooks as indicated:

-- $4.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.4 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.8 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.6 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.1 million class F at 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $13.3 million class G.

Class IO was previously withdrawn and class A-1 is paid in full.


NEMUS FUNDING NO. 1: S&P Withdraws 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has withdrawn its credit
ratings on NEMUS Funding No. 1 PLC's class A, B, C, D, E, and F
notes.

The rating actions follow the cash manager's confirmation that
NEMUS Funding No. 1's class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes fully
repaid on Jan. 28, 2013.

S&P had placed its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes on
CreditWatch negative on Dec. 6, 2012, following an update to its
criteria for rating European commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transactions.

The scheduled maturity date of the class A, B, C, D, E, and F
notes was Jan. 28, 2013.  S&P has received confirmation from HSBC
Bank PLC (the calculation and reporting agent in this
transaction), that all of the classes of notes have fully repaid
on their scheduled maturity date.  S&P has therefore withdrawn its
ratings on the class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes.

NEMUS Funding No. 1 is a synthetic CMBS transaction.  It involves
payments to noteholders synthetically tied to the performance of a
reference pool of commercial property loans.  HSBC Bank originated
and serviced all of the reference loans.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
            To            From

Ratings Withdrawn

NEMUS Funding No. 1 PLC
GBP178.647 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A           NR             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
B           NR             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
C           NR             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
D           NR             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
E           NR             BB (sf)/Watch Neg
F           NR             B- (sf)

NR-Not rated.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL VI: Moody's Raises Cl. C Notes' Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Northwoods Capital VI Ltd.

USD402,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
March 16, 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 10,
2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf);

USD30,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
March 16, 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 10,
2011 Confirmed at A2 (sf);

USD49,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due March 16, 2021, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
August 10, 2011 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf);

USD43,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due March 16, 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
August 10, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread compared to the levels
assumed at the last rating action in August 2011. Moody's modeled
a weighted average spread of 4.10% compared to 2.80% at the time
of the last rating action. Additionally, the deal benefited from a
reduction in the weighted average life of the underlying portfolio
compared to the last rating action in August 2011.

Moody's notes that the deal also benefited from an improvement in
the weighted average recovery rate of the underlying portfolio
since the last rating action in August 2011. Moody's modeled a
weighted average recovery rate of 48.27% versus 46.52% in August
2011.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in August 2011. The Class A,
Class B and Class C overcollateralization ratios are reported at
140.8%, 126.4% and 116.0%, respectively, versus July 2011 levels
of 137.0%, 123.1% and 112.9%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $608 million, no
defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of 24.19%
(implying a WARF of 3431), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.27%, and a diversity score of 39. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Northwoods Capital VI Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability adjustments. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) as
described in Moody's Ratings Implementation Guidance "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions",
October 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2745)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4118)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence on July 16th and at what pace. Deleveraging
may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates. Moody's also conducted tests to assess
the collateral pool's concentration risk in obligors bearing a
credit estimate that constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT VIII: Moody's Ups Rating on $16MM Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners VIII, Ltd.:

U.S.$18,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
September 15, 2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 22,
2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

U.S.$22,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
September 15, 2017, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 22,
2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

U.S.$22,400,000 Class D Secured Floating Rate Notes due September
15, 2017, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

U.S.$16,500,000 Class E Secured Floating Rate Notes due September
15, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $15,348,673), Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf);

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

USD318,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
September 15, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $182,007,201),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

USD25,000,000 Class A-2 Revolving Senior Secured Floating Rate due
September 15, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $14,308,742),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 43% or $146.7 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated December 31, 2012, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class
E overcollateralization ratios are reported at 137.0%, 124.0%,
113.3% and 107.0%, respectively, versus May 2011 levels of 121.7%,
114.5%, 108.2% and 104.3%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $293.7 million,
no defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of 14.31%
(implying a WARF of 2421), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.66%, and a diversity score of 41. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Octagon Investment Partners VIII, Ltd., issued in August 2005, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans, with some exposure to corporate bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1937)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2905)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Octagon
Investment Partners XV Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners LLC's
$516.176 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
       collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.31%-11.67%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification up to 50%
      of excess interest proceeds that are available prior to
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
      subordinated hedge termination payments, portfolio manager
      incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to principal
      proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral assets
      during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1317.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Octagon Investment Partners XV Ltd./Octagon Investment Partners
LLC
Class                Rating          Amount
                                   (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)        318.75
B-1                  AA (sf)          15.50
B-2                  AA (sf)          46.25
C (deferrable)       A (sf)           38.75
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)        22.185
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)         21.565
Subordinated notes   NR              53.676

NR-Not rated.


OZLM FUNDING: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to OZLM
Funding III Ltd./OZLM Funding III LLC's $583.25 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.305%-12.813%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1277.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OZLM Funding III Ltd./OZLM Funding III LLC

Class                      Rating           Amount
                                          (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)        396.500
A-2A                       AA (sf)          59.875
A-2B                       AA (sf)          19.000
B (deferrable)             A (sf)           47.375
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)         30.500
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)          30.000
Subordinated notes         NR               70.000

NR-Not rated.


RACE POINT VIII: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Race
Point VIII CLO Ltd./Race Point VIII CLO Corp.'s $468.5 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by a revolving
pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured
loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.3005% to 13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available prior to paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees, subordinated
      hedge termination payments, portfolio manager incentive
      fees, and subordinated note payments to principal proceeds
      for the purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period and to reduce the balance of the rated
      notes outstanding, sequentially, after the reinvestment
      period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1310.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Race Point VIII CLO Ltd./Race Point VIII CLO Corp.

Class                   Rating                 Amount
                                              (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                 4.00
A                       AAA (sf)               310.00
B                       AA (sf)                 58.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                  43.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                26.50
E (deferrable)          BB- (sf)                27.00
Subordinated notes      NR                      53.25

NR-Not rated.


RADAMANTIS (ELOC 24): S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Radamantis (European Loan Conduit No. 24) PLC's class B, C, D, and
E notes.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class
A and G notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the credit quality of
the two remaining underlying loans in the pool under S&P's updated
criteria for European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions, and reflect S&P's view that the current available
credit enhancement levels on the class B and lower notes is
insufficient  under its various stress scenarios to maintain
the current ratings on these notes.

    WESTFERRY CIRCUS LOAN (57.20% OF THE POOL BY LOAN BALANCE)

The loan is secured by a single, modern office property in the
Canary Wharf area of London Docklands.  It is a well-located,
good-quality asset that was constructed in 2001.  The entire
property is let to Morgan Stanley UK Group under a full repairing
and insuring lease, providing a remaining weighted-average lease
term of 13.6 years.  S&P considers the property to be over rented.

The loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2012, a few
days before defaulting.  This loan has been enforced and fixed-
charged receivers appointed over the property.  S&P understands
that discussions between the receivers and one potential purchaser
are ongoing.

The property was last valued in 2006, at GBP145.00 million.  In
January 2013 the special servicing reported a securitized loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio of 65.44%, and a securitized interest coverage
ratio (ICR) of 1.58x.

As the property has not been revalued since closing, S&P considers
that the reported LTV ratio is unlikely to adequately reflect the
current property value.  Although in S&P's opinion it thinks that
the property value is likely to have declined, S&P do not
anticipate principal losses.

    SOUTH QUAY PLAZA LOAN (42.80% OF THE POOL BY LOAN BALANCE)

This loan is backed by a predominantly office-use premises,
together with an ancillary retail arcade, known collectively as
South Quay Plaza.  The property is considered to be in a
reasonable London Docklands location, close to Canary Wharf.

The main tenant within the building is Financial Ombudsman Service
Ltd., which provides 43.50% of the current rental income, under a
lease expiring in 2014.  The current remaining weighted-average
lease term of the asset is 2.45 years.

The loan was transferred on October 2012 to special servicing
following the borrower's failure to repay the loan balance at
maturity.  S&P understands that discussions between the special
servicer and the borrower are continuing.

The property was last valued in 2005, at GBP126.50 million.  In
January 2013, the special servicer reported an LTV ratio of
56.12%, and an ICR of 5.79.

As the property has not been revalued since closing, S&P considers
that the reported LTV ratio is unlikely to adequately reflect the
current property value.  Although in S&P's opinion it thinks that
the property value is likely to have declined, S&P do not
anticipate principal losses.

                         CASH FLOW REVIEW

According to the October 2012 cash manager report, the class D
notes experienced interest shortfalls.  While this was repaid on
the January 2013 payment date, given the recent transfer of the
South Quay Plaza loan to special servicing, S&P believes that the
current level of excess funds  may not be sufficient to absorb
potential additional fees or expenses.

                        COUNTERPARTY REVIEW

The maximum rating achievable for this transaction under S&P's
2012 counterparty criteria is constrained to its long-term rating
on the liquidity facility provider Lloyds TSB Bank PLC
(A/Negative/A-1).

                          RATING ACTIONS

Although S&P believes that the class A notes continue to be
adequately protected to achieve high ratings, S&P's rating remains
constrained by counterparty considerations.  Therefore, S&P has
affirmed its rating on the class A notes.

S&P considers that the available credit enhancement levels to the
class B, C, D, and E notes are no longer sufficient to cover
asset-credit risk at their current rating levels.  Additionally,
the class C, D, and E notes have become more vulnerable, to
various degrees, to interest shortfalls, in S&P's opinion.  As a
consequence, S&P has lowered its ratings on these four classes of
notes.

The class G notes experienced interest shortfalls in the past and
NAI has been applied.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its rating on the
class G notes.

Radamantis (European Loan Conduit No. 24) closed in August 2006
with notes totaling GBP493.5 million.  The transaction originally
comprised four loans.  However, two have since been repaid with
GBP394,604 of losses allocated to the class G notes as net accrued
interest (NAI) amounts.  The two remaining loans are secured
against commercial property in the London Docklands area.  The
notes have a legal final maturity date of October 2015 and a
current reduced balance of GBP165.89 million.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating           Rating
            To               From

Radamantis (European Loan Conduit No. 24) PLC
GBP493.525 Million Commercial Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

B           BBB+ (sf)        A (sf)
C           BBB- (sf)        A- (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)         BBB+ (sf)
E           B- (sf)          BB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A           A (sf)
G           D (sf)


RBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to RBS
Commercial Funding Inc. 2013-SMV Trust's $295.0 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-SMV.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $295.0 million commercial mortgage loan,
secured by the fee interest in the Shops at Mission Viejo, a 1.16
million-sq.-ft. super-regional shopping mall located in Mission
Viejo, Calif., and the accompanying leases, rents, and other
income.  Of the total mall square footage, 931,054 sq. ft. will
serve as the loan's collateral.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the transaction's structure, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, the underlying
collateral's historical and projected performance, and the
sponsor's and manager's experience, among other factors.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1270.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

RBS Commercial Funding Inc. 2013-SMV Trust

Class       Rating            Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)         179,000,000
X-A         AAA (sf)      179,000,000(i)
X-B         A (sf)         56,000,000(i)
B           AA (sf)           28,000,000
C           A (sf)            28,000,000
D           BBB- (sf)         37,000,000
E           BBB- (sf)         13,000,000
F           BB+ (sf)          10,000,000
R           NR                       N/A

(i) Notional balance.
  NR - Not rated.
  N/A - Not applicable.


REGATTA II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Regatta
II Funding L.P./Regatta II Funding LLC's $371.0 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is intended to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.30%-12.81%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest reinvestment test, a failure of
      which during the reinvestment period will lead to the
      reclassification of excess interest proceeds that are
      available prior to paying subordinated management fees,
      uncapped administrative expenses, and limited partnership
      certificate payments to principal proceeds for the purchase
      of collateral assets or, at the collateral manager's
      discretion, to reduce the balance of the rated notes
      outstanding sequentially.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1320.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Regatta II Funding L.P./Regatta II Funding LLC

Class                  Rating         Amount (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                256.50
A-2                    AA (sf)                  43.00
B (deferrable)         A (sf)                   32.00
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 20.00
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  19.50
L.P. certificates      NR                       43.95

NR-Not rated.


RESI FINANCE: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Five Loan Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four tranches
and affirmed the ratings of ten tranches, backed by synthetic
prime jumbo loans, issued by RESI Finance Limited Partnership. The
actions impact approximately $898 million of RMBS issued in 2004.

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-A/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-A

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. B4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. B5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed at
Ca (sf)

Cl. B6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B9, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B10, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Class A2 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Class A3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Class A4 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Class A5 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

These synthetic transactions provide the owner of a sizable pool
of mortgages (the "Protection Buyer") credit protection through a
credit default swap with the issuer (the "Protection Seller") of
the notes. The reference portfolios of these transactions include
prime conforming and nonconforming fixed-rate and adjustable-rate
mortgages purchased from various originators. The actions are a
result of the recent performance review of Prime pools originated
before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance
and structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the
Home Affordable Modification Program to 2013 and an increased use
of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view
that loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012.
It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at
current levels until the end of 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


RESIDENTIAL REINSURANCE: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class 5 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'B+(sf)' rating on Residential Reinsurance 2011 Ltd.'s
(Res Re 2011) Series 2011-1 Class 5 notes and its 'BB(sf)' rating
on Residential Reinsurance 2012 Ltd.'s (Res Re 2012) Series 2012-1
Class 5 notes and removed each series from CreditWatch Negative,
where they were placed Nov. 6, 2012.

Residential Reinsurance is an ongoing natural peril catastrophe
bond program (since 1997) sponsored by United Services Automobile
Association (USAA; AA+/Negative/-).  Each class of notes covers
losses from hurricane, earthquake, severe thunderstorm, winter
storm, and wildfire on an annual aggregate basis.  The current
risk period began on June 1, 2012, and ends on May 31, 2013.

S&P had lowered its rating on the Res Re 2011 Class 5 notes, and
kept the ratings on each class on CreditWatch with negative
implications on Nov. 15, 2012, due to a loss estimate notice
related to Catastrophe Series 90 (Hurricane Sandy) submitted by
USAA to Res Re 2011 and 2012.

At that time, there had been two covered events -- Catastrophe
Series 77 (a central and northeast U.S. wind and hail tornado that
occurred on June 6) and Catastrophe Series 83 (a central and
northeast U.S. wind and hail tornado that occurred on June 28) --
that generated estimated covered losses.  These events plus the
losses from Sandy decreased the amount of future losses necessary
to trigger an event payment and in S&P's view, increased the risk
associated with these bonds.  Since Nov. 15, the estimate of
ultimate net losses from Sandy has been updated.  In addition, the
covered loss amount from Catastrophe 77 has increased and the loss
estimate from Catastrophe Series 78 (a Texas wind and hail tornado
that occurred on June 11) was updated so that it now exceeds the
franchise deductible amount.  The ultimate net loss from this
event will be added to the total losses covered by the notes.

The attachment points are $1.365 billion for the Res Re 2011 notes
and $1.571 billion for the Res Re 2012 notes during the current
annual risk period.  The current estimate of covered losses from
the four events is less than the total loss estimate S&P had on
Nov. 15, assuming the high point estimates from Hurricane Sandy.

S&P has received from AIR Worldwide Corp. (the reset and
calculation agent) updated probabilities of attachment for each
class of notes for the remaining risk period, using each of the
loss estimates listed above.  The current ratings reflect these
results.  S&P is not aware of any additional or potential covered
events since Sandy.  If the covered losses through the end of the
current risk period do not reach the attachment point on the Res
Re 2011 notes, S&P could raise the rating.  Depending on the
modeled results at the time of the reset, S&P could raise the
rating by one notch.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed, Removed From CreditWatch Negative
                                     To       From
Residential Reinsurance 2011 Ltd.
  Series 2011-1 Class 5 Notes        B+(sf)   B+(sf)/Watch Neg

Residential Reinsurance 2012 Ltd.
  Series 2012-1 Class 5 Notes        BB(sf)   BB(sf)/Watch Neg


RESTRUCTURED ASSET 2002-10-TR: Moody's Cuts Certs Rating to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its rating of the following
certificates issued by Restructured Asset Certificates with
Enhanced Returns, Series 2002-10-TR Trust:

Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced Returns, RACERS
Series 2002-10-TR, RACERS Series 2002-10-TR Certificates,
Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 23, 2009 Downgraded to
Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the certificates
is primarily because the rating of the Reference Obligation,
$14,000,000 of Class C-1 of Coast Investment Grade 2002-1, Limited
has been downgraded to C. The transaction is a repackaged security
whose rating is based primarily upon the transaction's structure
and the credit quality of the Reference Obligation, Swap
Counterparty and Underlying Asset.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is based on the credit quality of the
Reference Obligation, Swap Counterparty and Underlying Asset.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


SALOMON BROTHERS 1999-C1: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. X CMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes of
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through, Series 1999-C1 as follows:

Cl. G Certificate, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2007
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. X Certificate, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the principal class is due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement level for the affirmed class
is sufficient to maintain its current rating.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.3% of the
current pooled balance compared to 5.0% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.1% at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to 22 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance

As of the January 18, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $51
million from $735 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 34 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans, excluding
defeasance, representing 50% of the pool. There are no loans with
credit assessments. The pool contains six loans, representing 30%
of the pool, that have defeased and are collateralized with US
Government bonds.

Eleven loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $20 million (64% average loss
severity). Two loans, representing 4% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is
OfficeMax-American Fork loan ($1.4 million -- 4.3% of the pool),
which is secured by a 23,500 square foot (SF) single tenant retail
property located in American Fork, Utah. The loan transferred to
special servicing in August 2012 because OfficeMax, the sole
tenant, did not renew its lease which expired at the end of 2012.
OfficeMax did not vacate on the lease expiration date and
according to the special servicer indicated it wants an extension.
The loan matured on February 18, 2013. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $761 thousand loss for the specially serviced loans
(34.5% expected loss).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated a
$551 thousand aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% of the pool's non-defeased loans.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 53% compared to 56% at
last review. The conduit portion of the pool excludes specially
serviced, troubled and defeased loans. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.84X and 2.89X,
respectively, compared to 1.64X and 2.41X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Centrepointe Apartments Loan ($5 million --
10.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 361 unit apartment
complex located in Colton, California. The property was 95% leased
as of December 2012 compared to 96% at last review. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 50% and 2.05X, respectively, compared to 64%
and 1.59X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 605 & Firestone Shopping Center
Loan ($4.8 million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
50,000 SF retail center located in Norwalk, California. The
property was 91% leased as of September 2012 compared to 83% at
last review. The property's two largest tenants, occupying 47% of
the NRA, both had October 2011 lease expirations. The tenants
remain in place on month to month terms. Moody's stressed the
property's net cash flow to account for the lease renewal
uncertainty. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 1.25X at last review.

The third largest loan is Randolph Village Apartments ($3.7
million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 130 unit
apartment building in Silver Spring, Maryland. The property is
100% leased as of October 2012 as compared to 99% at June 2011.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.84X, respectively,
compared to 51% at 2.01X at last review.


SEAWALL 2006-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of all classes of Notes issued by
Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. and Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2. The
affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
Synthetic) transactions.

Issuer: Seawall 2006-1, Ltd.

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C-1, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Seawall SPC - Series 2005-2

Cl. C-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps on commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool balance). As
of the January 18, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate issued Note
balance of the transaction, was $290.0 million, the same as that
at issuance.

Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2 is a direct pass-through of the Class
C-2 (Reference Class) from the Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. As of the
January 18, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate issued Note balance
of the transaction, was $11.0 million, the same as that at
issuance. Since the ratings of Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2 are
linked to the rating of the Reference Class, any credit action on
the Reference Class may trigger a review of the ratings of Seawall
SPC -- Series 2005-2.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 6 compared to 4 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated reference obligations and assessments for non-
Moody's rated reference obligations is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (96.6%
compared to 100% at last review) and A1-A3 (3.4% compared to 0.0%
at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.1 years compared to 2.1 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 74.0% compared to
74.7% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 69.5% compared to 66.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes within the reference obligation pool.
Holding all other key parameters static, changing the current
ratings and credit estimates of the reference obligations by one
notch downward or by one notch upward affects the model results by
approximately 1.1 to 1.5 notches downward and 0.9 to 1.2 notches
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012. The methodology
used in rating Interest-Only Security was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for Seawall
2006-1, Ltd.'s rating of Classes X.


SEMPER FINANCE 2006-1: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'A- (sf)' its credit
ratings on Semper Finance 2006-1 Ltd.'s class A+, A, B, and C
notes.  S&P subsequently withdrew its ratings on all classes of
notes.

Semper Finance 2006-1 is a synthetic, partially funded German
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  Its
purpose is to transfer the credit risk associated with a pool of
commercial mortgage loans secured mainly on multifamily real
estate in eastern Germany.  The loans were originated by
Hypothekenbank Frankfurt AG or its predecessors.  The issuer's
payment obligations under the notes are secured against "lettres
de gage publiques" (covered bonds) issued by Hypothekenbank
Frankfurt International S.A., the note collateral provider.  As
such, S&P's ratings on the CMBS notes are linked to the higher of
the rating on the lettres de gage publiques and the rating on
the collateral provider.

In May 2012, S&P withdrew its ratings on the lettres de gage
publiques, at the request of the issuer, Hypothekenbank Frankfurt
International.  Due to an administrative error, S&P did not at
that time lower its ratings on the class A+, A, B, and C notes
to 'A- (sf)', which was the maximum rating that the note
collateral provider (Hypothekenbank Frankfurt International) could
support.  S&P has lowered its ratings on the class A+, A, B, and C
notes to 'A- (sf)' to correct this error.

On Dec. 28, 2012, S&P withdrew its ratings on Hypothekenbank
Frankfurt and its core subsidiary, Luxembourg-based Hypothekenbank
Frankfurt International S.A., at the issuer's request.  As a
result of these events, the issuer's obligation is no longer
supported by either a rated counterparty or rated collateral.

S&P understands from the servicer that no action will be taken by
the issuer to provide replacement support in the form of rated
collateral or a rated counterparty.  S&P has therefore withdrawn
its ratings on all classes of notes in Semper Finance 2006-1.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating           Rating
            To               From

Semper Finance 2006-1 Ltd.
EUR465.6 Million Floating-Rate Credit Linked Notes

Ratings Lowered And Subsequently Withdrawn

A+          A- (sf)          AAA (sf)
            NR               A- (sf)

A           A- (sf)          AAA (sf)
            NR               A- (sf)

B           A- (sf)          AAA (sf)
            NR               A- (sf)

C           A- (sf)          AA (sf)
            NR               A- (sf)

Ratings Withdrawn

D           NR               BBB (sf)
E           NR               BB (sf)
F           NR               BB- (sf)

NR-Not rated.


SEMPER FINANCE 2007-1: S&P Withdraws 'B' Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'A- (sf)' its credit
ratings on Semper Finance 2007-1 GmbH's class A1+, A2, B, and C
notes.  S&P subsequently withdrew its ratings on all classes of
notes.

Semper Finance 2007-1 is a synthetic, fully funded German
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  Its
purpose is to transfer the credit risk associated with a pool of
small mortgage loans (each a reference claim and together the
reference pool) secured predominately on commercial properties in
Germany.  All loans in the reference pool were originated by
Eurohypo AG or its predecessors.  The issuer's payment obligations
under the notes are secured against "lettres de gage publiques"
(covered bonds) issued by Hypothekenbank Frankfurt International
S.A., the note collateral provider.  As such, S&P's ratings on the
CMBS notes are linked to the higher of the rating on the lettres
de gage publiques and the rating on the collateral provider.

In May 2012, S&P withdrew its ratings on the lettres de gage
publiques, at the request of the issuer, Hypothekenbank Frankfurt
International.  Due to an administrative error, S&P did not at
that time lower its ratings on the class A1+, A2, B, and C notes

to 'A- (sf)', which was the maximum rating that the note
collateral provider (Hypothekenbank Frankfurt International) could
support.  S&P has lowered its ratings on the class A1+, A2, B, and
C notes to 'A- (sf)' to correct this error.

On Dec. 28, 2012, S&P withdrew its ratings on Hypothekenbank
Frankfurt and its core subsidiary, Luxembourg-based Hypothekenbank
Frankfurt International S.A., at the issuer's request.  As a
result of these events, the issuer's obligation is no longer
supported by either a rated counterparty or rated collateral.

S&P understands from the servicer that no action will be taken by
the issuer to provide replacement support in the form of rated
collateral or a rated counterparty.  S&P has therefore withdrawn
its ratings on all classes of notes in Semper Finance 2007-1.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating           Rating
            To               From

Semper Finance 2007-1 GmbH
EUR994.2 Million Floating-Rate Credit Linked Notes

Ratings Lowered And Subsequently Withdrawn

A1+          A- (sf)          AAA (sf)
             NR               A- (sf)

A2           A- (sf)          AAA (sf)
             NR               A- (sf)

B            A- (sf)          AAA (sf)
             NR               A- (sf)

C            A- (sf)          AA (sf)
             NR               A- (sf)

Ratings Withdrawn

D           NR               BBB (sf)
E           NR               BB+ (sf)
F           NR               BB- (sf)
G           NR               B (sf)

NR-Not rated.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Fitch to Assign 'BB' Rating to Class B-4 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2013-3 as
follows:

-- $187,065,000 class A-1 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $187,065,000 class A-2 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $187,066,000 class A-3 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $187,065,000 class A-IO1 notional certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $187,065,000 class A-IO2 notional certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $561,196,000 class A-IO3 notional certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $11,404,000 class B-1 certificate 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,904,000 class B-2 certificate 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,102,000 class B-3 certificate 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,001,000 non-offered class B-4 certificate 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

The non-offered class B-5 certificate will not be rated.


SILVERLEAF FINANCE: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class G Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
Class A, B, C, D, E, F, and G notes from Silverleaf Finance VI LLC
Series 2008-A.  These notes are collateralized by vacation
ownership interval (timeshare) loans.

The rating withdrawals follow the complete principal paydown of
the notes on Jan. 24, 2013.

RATING WITHDRAWN

Silverleaf Finance VI LLC
Series 2008-A

                     Rating
Class             To        From
A                 NR (sf)   AAA (sf)
B                 NR (sf)   AA (sf)
C                 NR (sf)   A (sf)
D                 NR (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
E                 NR (sf)   BBB (sf)
F                 NR (sf)   BBB- (sf)
G                 NR (sf)   BB+ (sf)

NR-Not rated.


SLM PRIVATE 2007-A: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the subordinate and junior
subordinate notes issued by SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust
2007-A.  At the same time, Fitch has affirmed the senior notes
issued by SLM Private Education Loan Trust 2007-A and all
outstanding classes of notes issued by SLM Private Credit Student
Loan Trust 2005-B, 2006-B and 2006-C.  The Rating Outlook for
these ratings has been revised to Negative from Stable.
Furthermore, Fitch has affirmed the ratings issued by SLM Private
Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-A, and the Outlook remains
Positive. Fitch used its 'Global SF Criteria' and 'U.S. Private SL
ABS Criteria' to review the transaction.

The downgrades on the ratings issued by SLM Private Credit Student
Loan Trust 2007-A reflect insufficient loss coverage multiples to
support existing ratings. Fitch estimates the remaining defaults
to range approximately from 14%-16% on the trust. Losses have been
accumulating at a faster pace over the last several quarters. In
addition, the class C-2 notes are auction rate securities which
could decrease the future amount of excess spread. Furthermore,
cumulative realized losses as of the December 2012 distribution
date are 14.12% and are likely to breach the cumulative loss
trigger within the next two years which would cause all principal
payments to be directed to the class A notes.

The affirmation on the class A notes issued by SLM Private
Education Loan Trust 2007-A reflects sufficient loss coverage
multiples to support the existing rating and the high probability
that the transaction will breach the cumulative loss trigger and
senior parity will increase significantly as the class A notes
receive all principal payments until paid in full.

The affirmation on the outstanding notes issued by SLM Private
Education Loan Trust 2005-B, 2006-A, 2006-B and 2006-C reflects
sufficient loss coverage multiples to support the existing rating.
Fitch estimates remaining defaults for the 2005-B, 2006-B and
2006-C trusts to range from 8%-12% and for the 2006-A trust 4%-6%.
Current parity levels are sufficient to cover the projected
remaining defaults at the current rating levels.

The Negative Outlook is driven by an increase in projected default
levels in excess of Fitch's initial expectations. In addition, the
Outlooks reflect Fitch's negative view on the private student loan
sector in general.

The Positive Outlook on the rating issued by SLM Private Education
Loan Trust 2006-A is due to lower remaining projected defaults
than the other trusts and credit enhancement that is sufficient to
cover the remaining defaults even as the trust releases excess
cash.

Fitch projected future losses and derived loss coverage multiples
based on the latest performance data. The projected net loss
amounts were compared to available credit enhancement to determine
the loss multiples appropriate for each rating category. Credit
enhancement consists of a combination of excess spread,
overcollateralization, and subordination.

The collateral securing the notes are private student loans
originated to undergraduate, graduate, law, Med and MBA students
under the Signature and EXCEL programs. In addition, the 2007-A
trust is comprised of direct-to-consumer loans and private
consolidation loans. The private student loans are intended to
assist individuals in financing their undergraduate or graduate
education beyond FFELP limits.

Fitch takes these actions:

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2007-A:
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class B downgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'A+sf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;
-- Class C-1 downgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;
-- Class C-2 downgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2005-B:
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class B affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative from
    Stable;
-- Class C affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to Negative from
    Stable.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-A:
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Positive;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Positive;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Positive;
-- Class B affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Positive;
-- Class C affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Positive.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-B:
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class B affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class C affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable.

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-C:
-- Class A-2 Paid in Full;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class B affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable;
-- Class C affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable.


SPRINGLEAF FUNDING: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Springleaf Funding Trust 2013-A's $604.30 million asset-backed
notes series 2013-A.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securitization backed by
personal consumer loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 38.6%, 32.4%, 29.4%, and
      24.8% credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.
      These credit support levels are sufficient to withstand
      stresses commensurate with the ratings on the notes based on
      S&P's stressed cash flow scenarios.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate, or 'BBB', stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within two rating categories of S&P's 'A (sf)', 'BBB
      (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings.  These potential rating
      movements are consistent with S&P's credit stability
      criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a two-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'A (sf)' through 'BB (sf)' rated securities
      under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The timely interest and full principal payments expected to
      be made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios
      appropriate to the assigned ratings.

   -- The characteristics of the pool being securitized.

   -- The operational risks associated with Springleaf Finance
      Corp.'s decentralized business model.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1278.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Springleaf Funding Trust 2013-A

Class   Rating    Type         Interest      Amount
                               rate         (mil. $)
A       A (sf)    Senior       Fixed         500.00
B       BBB (sf)  Subordinate  Fixed          46.35
C       BB (sf)   Subordinate  Fixed          21.53
D       B (sf)    Subordinate  Fixed          36.42


STONE TOWER: Moody's Ups Rating on $20MM Cl. A-3L Notes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Stone Tower CDO, Ltd.:

U.S. $37,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes, Due 2040
(current balance of $34,025,947), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
on March 30, 2012 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

U.S. $44,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2040,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on March 30, 2012 Upgraded to Baa2
(sf);

U.S. $20,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2040,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 30, 2012 Upgraded to B1
(sf).

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following class of notes:

U.S. $24,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due January 29,
2040 (current balance of $17,435,102), Affirmed Caa3 (sf);
previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating upgrade is the result of
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit improvement is observed primarily through an increase
in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios due to note
paydowns, including payment in full of the Class A-1LA Notes.
Based on the latest trustee report dated January 2013, the Senior
Class A and Class A overcollateralization test ratios are reported
at 163.86% and 132.53%, respectively, versus March 2012 levels of
147.36% and 124.91%, respectively. Additionally, the Class A-1LB
Notes are benefitting from the diversion of excess interest
proceeds as a result of the continuing Class B
Overcollateralization Test failure.

Stone Tower CDO, Ltd., issued in December 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
CLOs originated in 2004.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.

Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model. The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs backed by
CLOs, there exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating
both on a transaction-specific and on a macroeconomic level. CLO
notes' performance may be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss, assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Ba1 and below rated assets notched down by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-1LB: -1

Class A-2L: -2

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -2

Moody's Ba1 and below rated assets notched up by 2 rating notches:

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: +2

Class A-3L: +2

Class B-1L: +3


SYMPHONY CLO III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Symphony CLO III, Ltd.:

USD22,700,000 Class A-1b Senior Notes Due May 15, 2019, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

USD75,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Revolving Notes Due May 15, 2019,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Confirmed at
Aa1 (sf)

USD1,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due May 15, 2019, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

USD24,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due May 15, 2019, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

USD22,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due May 15, 2019,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

USD18,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due May 15, 2019,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

USD11,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due May 15, 201,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

USD204,300,000 Class A-1a Senior Notes Due May 15, 2019, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in May 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher spread levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in May
2013. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2797 compared to 3022 at the time
of the last rating action and a weighted average spread of 3.82%
compared to 2.94% at the time of the last rating action. In
addition, the weighted average recovery rate has increased since
the last rating action. Moody's modeled a recovery rate of 49.95%
compared to 47.89% at the time of the last rating action. In
addition, the deal's overcollateralization ratios have been stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $407 million,
defaulted par of $4.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.53% (implying a WARF of 2797), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.95%, and a diversity
score of 53. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Symphony CLO III, Ltd, issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2238)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3356)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: -1

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


TCW GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating to 'AAA (sf)'
on the class A-1 notes issued by TCW Global Project Fund III Ltd.,
a cash flow CDO managed by EIG Management Co. LLC and
collateralized by project finance securities.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class revolving, A-2, B-1, B-2 and C
notes.

The upgrade mainly reflects paydowns to the class revolving notes
and a subsequent improvement in the credit support available to
the notes since May 2011, when S&P affirmed its ratings on all of
the notes.  Since that time, the transaction has paid down the
class revolving notes by approximately $464 million.  These
paydowns have left the class revolving notes at 34.86% of their
original balance.

The upgrade also reflects an improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the notes,
primarily because of the aforementioned paydowns.  The trustee
reported the following O/C ratios in the December 2012 quarterly
report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 140.3% compared with a reported
      ratio of 120.8% in February 2011;

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 123.9% compared with a reported
      ratio of 113.2% in February 2011; and

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 113.4% compared with a reported
      ratio of 107.8% in February 2011.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the class revolving, A-2, B-
1, B-2, and C notes reflect the availability of credit support at
the current rating levels.  The actions incorporate S&P's criteria
for rating corporate CDO transactions including its application of
the largest-obligor default test, one of the two supplemental
tests that S&P introduced as part of its revised corporate CDO
criteria.

S&P applies the supplemental tests to address event risk and model
risk that may be present in rated transactions.  The largest-
obligor default test assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement (excluding excess spread) to withstand
specified combinations of underlying asset defaults based on the
ratings on the underlying assets, with a flat recovery.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings it
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED

TCW Global Project Fund III Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-1           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

TCW Global Project Fund III Ltd.

Class         Rating
Revolving     AAA (sf)
A-2           A+ (sf)
B-1           BB+ (sf)
B-2           BB+ (sf)
C             B+ (sf)


TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             TCW Global Project Fund III Ltd.
Coissuer:           TCW Global Project Fund III Inc.
Collateral manager: EIG Management Co. LLC
Underwriter:        Citigroup Inc.
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


TRAPEZA CDO II: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-1B Notes to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the Class
A-1B notes from Trapeza CDO II LLC and the Class A-1A and A-1B
notes from Trapeza CDO III LLC.  The two deals are U.S.
collateralized bond obligation (CBO) transactions backed by
trust preferred securities (TruPs) issued by financial
institutions.  Both transactions are managed by Trapeza Capital
Management.

The upgrades reflect paydowns to the senior notes and an
improvement in the credit support available to the notes in both
transactions since S&P last upgraded the notes in mid-2012.  Last
year's upgrade followed an update to S&P's criteria for rating
CDOs backed by bank TruPs.  Since then, the Trapeza CDO II LLC
transaction has paid down its Class A-1B notes by approximately
$14 million, leaving the note's balance at 70.02% of the original
amount.  Through the same period, the Trapeza CDO III LLC
transaction has paid down its Class A-1A notes by approximately
$30 million, leaving the note's balance at 11.65% of its original
amount.

The upgrades also reflect an improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to the notes since the time
of the last actions, mainly due to the aforementioned paydowns.
The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the December 2012
monthly report for the Trapeza CDO II LLC transaction:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 175.86% compared with a reported
      ratio of 140.96% in April 2012.

   -- The class C/D O/C ratio was 77.78% compared with a reported
      ratio of 71.65% in April 2012.

The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the January 2013
monthly report for the Trapeza CDO III LLC transaction:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 117.66% compared with a reported
      ratio of 108.66% in April 2012.

   -- The class C/D O/C ratio was 70.57% compared with a reported
      ratio of 69.47% in April 2012.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deem necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Trapeza CDO II LLC
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1B          BBB+ (sf)    BB+/Watch Pos (sf)

Trapeza CDO III LLC
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1A          A+ (sf)      BBB-/Watch Pos (sf)
A-1B          BB+ (sf)     B+/Watch Pos (sf)


TROPIC CDO I: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class A-3L Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes of notes issued by Tropic
CDO I, Ltd./Corp. as follows:

-- $51,228,367 class A-2L notes to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf';
    Outlook revised to Negative from Stable;

-- $42,000,000 class A-3L notes to 'Dsf' from 'Bsf'.

The rating downgrades reflect the heightened risk of a possible
interest shortfall to the class A-2L notes and the partial default
in the payment of interest to the class A-3L notes.

Tropic I entered an Event of Default on Jan. 24, 2013 due to the
partial default in the payment of interest to the class A-3L
notes. The default was the result of a decrease in interest
proceeds following the redemption of one performing issuer. While
the redemptions by performing issuers pay down the CDO notes, the
resulting reduction of the CDO's cost of funding is exceeded by
the reduction of the interest proceeds. The A-2L notes coupon is
three-month LIBOR(3mL) plus 90 basis points (bps) while the coupon
of the asset that redeemed since Fitch's last rating action on
Aug. 31, 2012 is 3mL + 325 bps. There have been no new deferrals
since the last Fitch action and only one cure which subsequently
redeemed. The credit quality of the performing issuers remained
stable.

With an increasingly concentrated portfolio of only 13 performing
issuers, the possibility of one additional deferral or redemption,
whereby decreasing interest proceeds available, could adversely
affect timely interest payments on the class A-2L notes. As such,
the notes have been downgraded to 'BBsf' and the Rating Outlook
has been revised to Negative to reflect the risk of interest
shortfall.

The non-deferrable class A-3L notes are not expected to receive
their full periodic interest amount due going forward and
accordingly, have been downgraded to 'Dsf'.

Tropic CDO I, Ltd./Corp. is a trust preferred collateralized debt
obligation (TruPS CDO), which closed April 23, 2003. The portfolio
is composed of bank (95.9%) and insurance (4.1%) trust preferred
securities.


UBS-BB 2013-C5: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class F CMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
fourteen classes of CMBS securities, issued by UBS-BB 2013-C5,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C5.

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf) **

Cl. X-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf) *

Cl. X-B, Assigned (P)A2 (sf) *

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf) **

Cl. EC, Assigned (P)A2 (sf) **

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf) **

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

** Reflects Exchangeable Certificates

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 81 fixed rate loans secured
by 122 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR; and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.96X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.07X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 95.7% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 96.5% is also considered
when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is
17.3., which is slightly lower than Herfindahl scores found in
most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009. With respect
to property level diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl
Index is 20.0, which is also slightly lower than the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.
Both Herfindahl scores, however, are significantly impacted by the
presence of the two largest loans in the pool, which account for
27.6% of the pool balance. The two loans, identified as Santa
Anita Mall and Valencia Mall, are of relatively low leverage as
they are assigned a Moody's LTV's of 81.3% and 84.2%,
respectively. Excluding these two properties, the pool's loan
level and property level Herfindahl scores are 26.9 and 46.4,
respectively.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa class with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals. The transaction was structured with additional
subordination at class A-S to mitigate the potential increased
severity to class A-S.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.17, which is higher
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

In terms of waterfall structure, the transaction contains a unique
group of exchangeable certificates. Classes A-S((P) Aaa (sf)), B
((P) Aa3 (sf)) and C ((P) A3 (sf)) may be exchanged for Class EC
((P) A2 (sf)) certificates and Class EC may be exchanged for the
Classes A-S, B and C. The EC certificates will be entitled to
receive the sum of interest distributable on the Classes A-S, B
and C certificates that are exchanged for such EC certificates.
The initial certificate balance of the Class EC certificates is
equal to the aggregate of the initial certificate balances of the
Class A-S, B and C and represent the maximum certificate balance
of the EC certificates that may be issued in an exchange.

Moody's considers the probability of certificate default as well
as the estimated severity of loss when assigning a rating. As a
thick vertical tranche, Class EC has the default characteristics
of the lowest rated component certificate ((P) A3 (sf)), but a
very high estimated recovery rate if a default occurs given the
certificate's thickness. The higher estimated recovery rate
resulted in a provisional A2 (sf) rating, a rating higher than the
lowest provisionally rated component certificate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Classes X-A1,
and X-B1.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.62
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship, and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver_1.1, which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 22%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa Super Senior class would be Aaa, Aaa, and Aa1,
respectively; for the most junior Aaa rated class A-S would be
Aa1, Aa3, and A1, respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time; rather they are designed to provide a quantitative
calculation of how the initial rating might change if key input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. Parameter
Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each scenario
from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint. Qualitative
factors are also taken into consideration in the ratings process,
so the actual ratings that would be assigned in each case could
vary from the information presented in the Parameter Sensitivity
analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-WHALE 6: Moody's Keeps Caa2 Rating on 3 CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-WHALE 6. Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-1B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the
two IO Classes, Class X-1B and X-2, are consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GPD
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000, and "Rating Caps for CMBS in the Tail Period" published
in October 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Classes X1-B
and X-2.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports, Servicer
Reports, and Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's
also performs a full transaction review that involves a rating
committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction review is
summarized in a press release dated March 15, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 17, 2013 Payment Date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has not changed since last review.
The one remaining loan in the pool was transferred to special
servicing on May 25, 2010 due to imminent default but remains
current. The loan has matured after two years of forbearance
period (July 9, 2012).

The pooling and servicing agreement for the transaction prohibits
loans being extended beyond the date which is five years prior to
the Rated Final Distribution Date (October 2017), and the deal is
currently in its tail period. The special servicer completed the
foreclosure sale in October 2012.

As of the current Payment Date, there are outstanding interest
shortfalls totaling $10,350 and cumulative loss of $3,750
affecting Class K.

The 230 Peachtree Loan ($18 million - 100% of the trust balance)
is secured by a 414,768 square foot Class A office building
located in downtown Atlanta, GA. The building was completed in
1965 and renovated in 1997. The collateral consists of office,
ground floor retail and below grade parking.

The property's net cash flow (NCF) for the trailing twelve month
period ending September 2012 was approximately $1.8 million.
According to the rent roll dated September 2012, the building is
53% leased. An updated appraisal dated November 1, 2012 valued the
property at $15.4 million, down from a February 20, 2012 appraisal
which valued the property at $16.7 million. The decrease in value
reflects stressed Atlanta office market conditions and lease
rollover at the property.

Moody's trust LTV ratio is over 100%. Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the trust is 1.02X.


* Moody's Cuts Ratings on 29 Tranches of 4 Wells Fargo RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 29 tranches
and affirmed the ratings of 20 tranches from four RMBS
transactions issued by Wells Fargo. The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
Prime Jumbo residential mortgages. The actions impact
approximately $535 million of RMBS issued in 2003 and 2004.

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-N Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-2, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-4, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-6 Trust

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-8, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-9, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-11, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-PO, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-K Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-12, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-J Trust

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-2, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-3, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Prime jumbo
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance and structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for certain bonds than previously
anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools
originated before 2005, Moody's first applies a baseline
delinquency rate of 3.0%. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated is multiplied by a factor ranging from
0.75 to 2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5%
to greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 36 Tranches of Alt-A Loans
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of two tranches,
downgraded the rating of seven tranches, and affirmed the rating
of 27 tranches from six transactions, backed by Alt-A loans.

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance review of these
deals and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools. The upgrades on two tranches are due to an increase in the
credit enhancement that is provided by subordination,
overcollateralization, and excess spread.

The majority of the downgrades are primarily due to the weak
interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism. Moody's caps the
ratings of tranches with weak interest shortfall reimbursement at
A3 as long as they have not experienced any shortfall. The
tranches downgraded do not have current interest shortfalls but in
the event of an interest shortfall, structural limitations in the
transactions will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls even
if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on mezzanine tranches can only be made up from excess
interest and in many cases after the overcollateralization is
built to a target amount. In these transactions where
overcollateralization is already below target due to poor
performance, any missed interest payments to mezzanine tranches is
unlikely to be paid.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004, 5% for 2003
and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.50
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-5

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-6

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 16, 2008 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2008
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-3

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2005 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-11

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-9

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. 1-A-6, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)


* Moody's Takes Action on 84 RMBS Tranches Issued 2003 and 2004
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 13
tranches and affirmed the ratings of 71 tranches from six RMBS
transactions issued by miscellaneous issuers, backed by Prime
loans, and issued between 2003 and 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2004-6

Cl. IA-3, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. IA-6, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. IA-7, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2012 Confirmed at
A2 (sf)

Cl. IA-10, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. IA-PO, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. IIA-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. IIA-PO, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-23

Cl. II-A-1, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-1, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. VIII-A-1, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-6, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-7, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-11, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-15, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-18, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-19, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-21, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-P, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-8, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. II-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

CL. III-A-3, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

CL. III-A-4, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

CL. III-A-5, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

CL. III-A-6, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

CL. III-A-8, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

CL. III-A-9, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

CL. III-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

CL. D-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

CL. D-P, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa1 (sf)

CL. III-P, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

CL. D-B-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

CL. D-B-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. VII-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. VIII-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-AR1

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J1

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
Caa2, Outlook Developing on Nov 19, 2012)

Cl. A-8, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
Caa2, Outlook Developing on Nov 19, 2012)

Cl. A-12, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
Caa2, Outlook Developing on Nov 19, 2012)

Cl. A-13, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
Caa2, Outlook Developing on Nov 19, 2012)

Cl. A-20, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J3

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-9, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2003-S14

Cl. IA-1, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. IA-2, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Confirmed at
A1 (sf)

Cl. IA-4, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. IA-5, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. IIA-7, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. IIA-8, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. IIA-9, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. IIA-10, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-7, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-8, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-9, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-10, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2012 Confirmed
at A1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Prime jumbo
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance and structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for certain bonds than previously
anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
interest-only securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility 3)
bonds that financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools
originated before 2005, Moody's first applies a baseline
delinquency rate of 3.0%. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.75 to 2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Bonds insured by financial guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflect the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a results, the
rating on the security is the higher of 1) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating,
which is what the rating of the security would be absent
consideration of the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's
uses in determining the underlying rating is the same methodology
for rating securities that do not have financial guaranty,
described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $17.7MM of Credit Suisse Alt-A RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of two tranches
and affirmed the rating of four tranches from two transactions,
backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Credit Suisse First Boston in
2002 and 2004.

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance review of these
deals and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools.

The rating actions constitute of a number of confirmations and
affirmations. The confirmations on the two tranches are due to the
strong interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism in the
subordinated tranches. Previously, Moody's had placed these two
tranches on review for downgrade due to the interest shortfall
reimbursement risk. However, per the pooling and servicing
agreement these mezzanine tranches do not have a subordinated
interest shortfall reimbursement.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004, 5% for 2003
and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.50
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-10

I-M-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

I-M-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2012 Confirmed at
Baa2 (sf)

I-B, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Confirmed at Ca
(sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR3

Cl. VI-M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-M-2, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. VI-M-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)


* Wind-Down of TARP's CPP May Impact TruPS CDOs, Fitch Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch believes steps taken by the U.S. Treasury to wind down
TARP's largest bank program could lead to incremental cures in
some Fitch-rated CDOs collateralized by bank-issued trust
preferred securities (TruPS CDOs). Fitch estimates there are
currently 109 issuers across Fitch-rated TruPS CDOs that remain
participants in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). At its peak,
Fitch estimates this exposure reached 208 issuers. By comparison,
only 218 of the 707 banks that originally used CPP remained in the
program as of December 2012.

The Treasury intends to wind down the remaining CPP investments
over the next year through a series of repayments, restructurings,
and sales, which include auctioning investments in banks that are
not expected to pay in the near future. With the dividend step-up
from 5% to 9% five years after issuance, banks have a strong
incentive to exit the CPP.

"Securities issued under CPP are considered junior to TruPS and,
to the extent a bank is deferring on its TruPS interest, it may be
limited in its ability to distribute payments to securities issued
under the CPP program. We believe the Treasury's intent and the
incentives described above will likely lead to an acceleration in
the pace of banks' exits from the program, which in turn may have
implications for CPP recipients held across TruPS CDOs that are
currently deferring on their TruPS," Fitch says.

"Although based on a relatively small number of observations,
across Fitch's CDO universe, 12 previously deferring former CPP
participants were able to cure their deferrals and exit the CPP
program. Nine out of these 12 cured their TruPS interest within a
year prior to exiting the CPP program. In addition to these 12
issuers, seven cured their TruPS but remain in the CPP program.
Conversely, only four of the 45 currently deferring issuers that
received CPP funds have exited the program. Of these four issuers,
two cured their TruPS prior to or at the time of their CPP exit
only to re-defer shortly after. The remaining 41 deferring issuers
remaining in the CPP program collectively represent $1.3 billion
in notional value across Fitch-rated TruPS CDOs."


* U.S. CREL CDO Delinquencies Drop 12.7% in January, Fitch Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Delinquencies on U.S. CREL CDOs began 2013 lower, according to the
latest index results from Fitch Ratings.

Following a sharp spike late last year, CREL CDO late-pays fell
for a second straight month to 12.7% last month (from 13.4% in
December). New delinquent assets in January consisted of only two
term defaults, one matured balloon loan, and one credit impaired
security.

The largest new delinquency is a term default on a B-note and
mezzanine debt backed by a 410,000 sf Atlanta office building.
Property cash flow declined significantly after the largest tenant
(37% of NRA) vacated the property at the end of October 2012.

In January, asset managers reported approximately $50 million in
realized principal losses from the disposal of several assets. The
largest reported loss was a 33% realized loss on the discounted
sale of a 350,000 sf REO office property located in San Diego, CA.
Foreclosure occurred in December 2011, and the loss was
anticipated at last rating action for the transaction.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Carmel
Paderog, Meriam Fernandez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


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