TCR_Public/130210.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, February 10, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 40

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2006-NS1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class B Notes
AVALON CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $40.8MM Notes to 'Ba1'
BAMLL RE-REMIC 2011-07C1: Moody's Cuts A-3B Certs Rating to 'Ba1'
BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP24: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Notes to 'Csf'
BENEFIT STREET: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes

BUSINESS LOAN 2003-A: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC+'
CAPLEASE CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
COAST INVESTMENT 2002-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on $24MM Debt to B3
COLUMBUS PARK: Moody's Lifts Rating on $13-Mil. Notes to 'Baa1'
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1999-C2: Moody's Ups Rating on G Certs to B2

COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2013-LC6: Moody's Rates Class X-C Certs 'B3'
CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. F Certs to 'Csf'
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certs
CORNERSTONE CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC+'
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-TFL2: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 9 Cert. Classes

CREDIT SUISSE 2009-RR1: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-3C Cert's Rating to B1
DECO 8-UK: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. B-7 Certificates
DRYDEN XXIV: S&P Affirms 'B(sf)' Rating on Class F Notes
FIRST HORIZON: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to $100MM Preferred Stock

FORTRESS CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
FOUNDERS GROVE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC+'
GE CAPITAL 2002-3: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class O Certs.
GENESIS CLO 2007-1: Moody's Lifts Rating on USD40MM Notes to Ba3
GLACIER FUNDING: Moody's Ups Rating on $44MM Sr. Notes to 'Ba3'

GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. G Certs to 'CC'
GOLUB CAPITAL: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating to Class D Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Cl. X Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC10: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2013-KING: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating to E Notes

GTP COMMERCIAL 2012-2: Fitch Keeps 'BB-' Rating on Class C Certs
HARFORD 2005: Moody's Cuts Rating on USD8.65MM Bonds to 'B1'
HEWETT'S ISLAND: S&P Retains 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes
HIGHLAND PARK: S&P Lowers Rating on 4 Note Classes to 'D'
KENNECOTT FUNDING: Moody's Ups Rating on $23-Mil. Notes to Baa2

LB-UBS 2004-C8: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Four Cert. Classes
LCM XIII: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
LNR CDO IV: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 14 Certificate Classes
LNR CDO V: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 12 Note Classes
LONGFELLOW PLACE: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Cl. E Notes

GOLDMAN SACHS 2012-GC6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
JP MORGAN 2003-C1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class H Certs to 'C'
JP MORGAN 2004-LN2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 8 Certificate Classes
JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC12: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 Cert. Classes
MAGNOLIA FINANCE 2005-6: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. B Notes to B1

MALIBU LOAN: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on $57.20MM Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class L Notes to 'CCC-'
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-8: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 4 Certs to 'C'
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-HQ2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-IQ10: Moody's Cuts Rating on 5 Cert. Classes

MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP 21: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Certs to C
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-XLF: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to D
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C7: Moody's Rates Class G Certificates 'B2'
MOUNTAIN HAWK: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
NATIONSTAR AGENCY: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on 2 Note Classes

NAVIGATOR CDO: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
NOMURA ASSET 1998-D6: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Class B-3 Certs
OZLM FUNDING III: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Cl. D Notes
PPM AMERICA: Fitch Cuts Withdraws 'Dsf' on $8.8MM Class C Notes
PROMINENT CMBS: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'

SANDELMAN PARTNERS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC'
SCHOONER TRUST 2007-8: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. K Certs
SPRINGLEAF FUNDING: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class D Notes
SYMPHONY CLO IV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
SYMPHONY CLO V: S&P Retains 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

SYMPHONY CLO XI: S&P Assigns 'BB(sf)' Rating to Class E Notes
TIAA SEASONED: Fitch Lowers Rating on 3 Cert. Classes to 'C'
VITESSE CLO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B2L Notes to 'B+'
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-WHALE6: S&P Lowers Rating on K Certs to 'D'

* Moody's Takes Action on $222.6 Million of RMBS Transactions
* Moody's Takes Action on $615.6-Mil. Scratch and Dent Loans
* Moody's Lowers Four Cert. Classes From Two CMBS Transactions
* Moody's Lowers Ratings on 6 Notes From 2 CMBS Deals to 'D'
* S&P Affirms Ratings on 41 Tranches From 26 CDO Transactions

* S&P Lowers Rating on 314 Classes from 154 RMBS Transactions

                            *********


ABACUS 2006-NS1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed the rating of one class of notes issued by Abacus
2006-NS1, Ltd. The affirmation is due to the key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation and collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Abacus 2006-NS1, Ltd. is a static synthetic transaction backed by
a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing $537.3 million
notional balance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(90.2% of the reference obligation balance) and CRE CDO debt
(9.8%). As of the January 28, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate
issued notional balance of the transaction has decreased to $8.9
million from $225.8 million at issuance, due to redemption of
class A and C notes and writedowns to the underlying collateral.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 8,285 compared to 8,163 at last review. The current
distribution of Moody's rated referenced collateral and
assessments for non-Moody's rated referenced collateral is as
follows:

Ba1-Ba3 (5.6% compared to 4.9% at last review), B1-B3 (7.4%
compared to 9.7% at last review) and Caa1-C (87.0% compared to
85.4% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.8 years, compared to 5.7 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 0.9%, compared to
1.0% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to credit changes within the reference obligations.
Holding all other key parameters static, changing the current
ratings and credit assessments of the reference obligations by one
notch downward or by one notch upward does not result in any
rating changes to the rated notes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


AVALON CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $40.8MM Notes to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Avalon Capital Ltd. 3:

USD400,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2019
(current outstanding balance of USD196,167,911), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on August 11, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

USD50,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2019
(current outstanding balance of USD24,520,988), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on August 11, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

USD20,200,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2019,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 11, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf);

USD39,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2019,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 11, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf);

USD40,800,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due February 24, 2019
(current outstanding balance of USD31,641,183), Upgraded to Ba1
(sf); previously on August 11, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in August 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 42% or USD163.1 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated January 8, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 140.2%, 120.7% and
108.4%, respectively, versus July 2011 levels of 125.4%, 114.4%
and 106.8%, respectively. In addition, the trustee reported
weighted average recovery rate increased to 52.0% from 49.5% over
the same time period.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of USD336 million,
defaulted par of USD10.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.7% (implying a WARF of 2891), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 52.5%, and a diversity score of 44.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Avalon Capital Ltd. 3, issued in February 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2313)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +2
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3469)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: -1
Class C: -2
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


BAMLL RE-REMIC 2011-07C1: Moody's Cuts A-3B Certs Rating to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one class and downgraded one class of
Certificates issued by BAMLL Re-REMIC Trust 2011-07-C1, Commercial
Mortgage Certificate-Backed Certificates, Series 2011-07C1 ("BAMLL
Re-REMIC Trust 2011-07C1"). The affirmation is due to key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The downgrade is due to negative
credit migration of the underlying collateral and higher expected
losses on the underlying pool of loans. The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE Non-Pooled Re-REMIC)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-3A Certificate, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24,
2011 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan
31, 2012 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

BAMLL REMIC Trust 2011-07C1 is a Re-Remic Pass Through Trust
backed by $145.2 million, or 19.2% of the aggregate class
principal balance, of the super senior Class A3 commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) certificates issued by Credit
Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1.

On January 25, 2013, Moody's downgraded the Class A-3 Certificates
of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-1 due to
negative credit migration of the underlying collateral and higher
expected losses for the pool. Moody's rating action on the
Underlying Certificate reflected a cumulative base expected loss
of 17.9% of the current balance.

Updates to key parameters, including the constant default rate
(CDR), constant prepayment rate (CPR), weighted average life
(WAL), and weighted average recovery rate (WARR), did not
materially change the expected loss estimates of Class A3-A
resulting in an affirmation. The downgrade of Class A3-B was due
to deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
collateral.

Within the re-securitization, the weighted average life of the
Underlying Security is 3.6 years assuming a 0%/0% CDR/CPR. For
delinquent loans (30+ days, REO, foreclosure, bankrupt), Moody's
assumes a fixed WARR of 40% while a fixed WARR of 50% for current
loans. Moody's also ran a sensitivity analysis on the classes
assuming a WARR of 40% for current loans. This impacts the modeled
rating of the Certificates by 0 to 3 notches downward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

Moody's review incorporated the cash flow model, Structured
Finance Workstation (SFW), developed by Moody's Wall Street
Analytics.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

The methodological approach used in these ratings is as follows:
Moody's applied ratings-specific cash flow scenarios assuming
different loss timing, recovery and prepayment assumptions on the
underlying pool of mortgages that are the collateral for the
underlying CMBS transaction through Structured Finance Workstation
(SFW). The analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, tranche average life, current tranche balance and future
cash flows under expected and stressed scenarios. In each
scenario, cash flows and losses from the underlying collateral
were analyzed applying different stresses at each rating level.
The resulting ratings specific stressed cash flows were then input
into the structure of the re-securitization to determine expected
losses for each class. The expected losses were then compared to
the idealized expected loss for each class to gauge the
appropriateness of the existing rating. The stressed assumptions
considered, among other factors, the underlying transaction's
collateral attributes, past and current performance, and Moody's
current negative performance outlook for commercial real estate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP24: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Notes to 'Csf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes and affirmed 12 classes
of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2006-TOP24 (BSCMT 2006-
TOP24).

Sensitivity/Rating Drivers

The downgrades are primarily the result of higher than expected
losses on the Real Estate Owned (REO) $52.9 million Hilton
Tapatio. The asset, which had been REO since August 2010, was sold
in January 2013 for just under $21 million. While Fitch
anticipated the low sale price, recoveries to the trust ($5.1
million) were lower than expected; related fees and expenses
totaled $15.8 million which were not fully reported to Fitch at
the last review by the special servicer, C-III Asset Management
LLC.

The downgrade to class A-J and the Negative Rating Outlook on the
A-M classes reflect the reduced credit enhancement and the
thinness of the remaining classes.

Based on the portfolio as of the January 2013 distribution date,
Fitch's modeled losses are 5.9% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 10.6%, including losses
already incurred to date. Fitch has designated 37 loans (18.4%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes six loans (4.1%) currently
in special servicing.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $101.7 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'BBB-sf', RE 90%;
-- $28.8 million class B to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $13.4 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $0.7 million class E to 'Dsf' from 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class F to 'Dsf' from 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class G to 'Dsf' from 'Csf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $33.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $64.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $715.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $153.5 million class A-M at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $21.1 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full. Classes X-1 and X-2 were
previously withdrawn and Class P is not rated.


BENEFIT STREET: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Benefit
Street Partners CLO I Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO I LLC's
$415.30 million floating-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of Dec. 28, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of S&P's review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to S&P's effective date review are
generally based on the application of S&P's criteria to a
combination of purchased collateral, collateral committed to be
purchased, and the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P
by the collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions
about the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because
not all assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deem
necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Benefit Street Partners CLO I Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO I
LLC

Class                      Rating               Amount
                                               (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)             286.70
A-2                        AA (sf)               47.60
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                39.85
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)              23.15
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)               18.00


BUSINESS LOAN 2003-A: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A and B notes from Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust
2003-A (BLX 2003-A) to 'BB-(sf)' from 'BB+(sf)'and to 'CCC+(sf)'
from 'B+(sf)', respectively.  At the same time, S&P removed both
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where it
initially placed them on Oct. 4, 2012.

BLX 2003-A is an asset-backed securities transaction
collateralized primarily by a pool of small business development
loans that are not insured or guaranteed by any governmental
agency.  The vast majority of the loans are secured by first-lien,
multipurpose commercial real estate.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view of the diminished credit
enhancement available to support the notes as the transaction's
reserve account is empty and the rising concentration risk now
that only 13 loans remain.  Consequently, S&P downgraded the class
A and B notes to the rating levels that it believe are
commensurate with the stresses they can withstand.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review outstanding ratings and
take additional rating actions as appropriate.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2003-A

                        Rating
Class             To               From
A                 BB- (sf)         BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                 CCC+ (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg


CAPLEASE CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from Caplease CDO 2005-1 Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction, and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other classes from the same
transaction and removed them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the
transaction's liability structure and the credit characteristics
of the underlying collateral using our criteria for global CDOs of
pooled structured finance assets.

The global CDOs of pooled structured finance assets criteria,
which S&P published on Feb. 21, 2012, include revisions to its
assumptions on correlations, recovery rates, and default patterns
and timings of the collateral.  Specifically, correlations on
commercial real estate assets increased to 70%.  The criteria also
incorporate supplemental stress tests (a largest obligor default
test and a largest industry default test) in S&P's analysis.  The
downgrades of Classes C, D, and E reflect the results of the
largest obligor default test.  The largest obligor default test
assesses the ability of a rated CDO of pooled structured finance
liability tranche to withstand the default of a minimum number of
the largest credit or obligor exposures within an asset pool,
factoring in the underlying assets' credit quality.

According to the Jan. 23, 2013, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $161.7 million.  The transaction's liabilities
totaled $159.1 million, which is down from $300.0 million at
issuance, due primarily to amortization.  The transaction also
received $2.2 million of amortization in the subordinate notes as
part of scheduled principal payments.  The transaction's current
asset pool consists of the following:

   -- 26 whole loans/senior participations loans
      ($115.0 million, 71.1%).

   -- 10 classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities
      (CMBS)($37.9 million, 23.5%).

   --  16 subordinate loans ($8.8 million, 5.4%).

The loans are generally secured by retail or office properties
leased to a single tenant.

The trustee report noted one defaulted CMBS asset
($4.0 million, 2.5%).

S&P applied asset-specific recovery rates in its analysis of the
loan collateral ($123.8 million, 76.5%) in the transaction using
its updated methodology and assumptions for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS and S&P's global property evaluation methodology,
both published Sept. 5, 2012.

According to the trustee report, the transaction is passing its
principal coverage tests and interest coverage tests.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deem necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Caplease CDO 2005-1 Ltd
                  Rating
Class     To                    From
C         B- (sf)               BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D         CCC- (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
E         CCC- (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Caplease CDO 2005-1 Ltd
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A         BBB+ (sf)            BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B         BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg


COAST INVESTMENT 2002-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on $24MM Debt to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Coast Investment Grade 2002-1, Limited:

U.S. $246,900,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
2017 (current outstanding balance of $29,677,451.97), Upgraded to
A2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

U.S. $24,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
2017 (current outstanding balance of $25,858,678.65), Upgraded to
B3 (sf); previously on September 23, 2011 Confirmed at C (sf);

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S. $26,600,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
2017 (current outstanding balance of $30,159,577.56), Affirmed C
(sf); previously on September 23, 2011 Confirmed at C (sf);

U.S. $3,400,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes Due 2017
(current outstanding balance of $4,738,236.44), Affirmed C (sf);
previously on September 23, 2011 Confirmed at C (sf);

U.S. $6,800,000 Class D Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes Due 2017
(current outstanding balance of $9,880,548.19), Affirmed C (sf);
previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the Class A overcollateralization ratio since the
rating action in April 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A Notes
have been paid down by approximately 63% or $51 million since the
last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated
January 23, 2013, the Class A overcollateralization ratio is
reported at 130.67% February 2012 level of 120.42%. The January
2013 ratio does not consider the payment which occurred on the
January 2013 payment date.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action in April 2012. Based on the January 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 954
compared to 1773 in February 2012.

The rating of B3 on Class B notes also reflects Moody's loss
expectation on a security that is in default, as described in a
rating implementation guidance titled "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in November
2009.

Coast Investment Grade 2002-1, Limited , issued in May 2002, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
CLO and CBO tranches originated between 2000 and 2007.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Below-Investment-Grade assets notched up by 2 rating
notches:

Class A: +3
Class B: +3
Class C-1: 0
Class C-2: 0
Class D: 0

Moody's Below-Investment-Grade assets notched down by 2 rating
notches:

Class A: -2
Class B: -4
Class C-1: 0
Class C-2: 0
Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. Additionally, there is a large
concentration of tranches from CLO and CBO transactions which have
not yet begun to repay principal.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below (choose the ones that are applicable):

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from CLO and CBO tranches
continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may accelerate due to
optional redemptions of the underlying CLOs and CBOs.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels.


COLUMBUS PARK: Moody's Lifts Rating on $13-Mil. Notes to 'Baa1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Columbus Park CDO Ltd.:

  U.S. $19,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
  due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 4, 2011
  Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

  U.S. $19,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 4,
  2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  U.S. $12,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 4,
  2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  U.S. $13,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2020, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on August 4, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

  U.S. $288,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
  due 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 29, 2008
  Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from a higher weighted average spread (WAS)
compared to the level assumed at the last rating action in August
2011. Moody's modeled a WAS of 3.84% compared to 3.05% at the time
of the last rating action.

Additionally, the deal has benefited from an improvement in the
weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of the underlying portfolio.
Based on the latest trustee report dated January 8, 2013, the
portfolio WARR is 50.9% compared to the July 2011 level of 48.8%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $400.5 million,
defaulted par of $10.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.6% (implying a WARF of 2467), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 50.7%, and a diversity score of 61.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Columbus Park CDO Ltd., issued in April 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1974)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: +1
Class C: +3
Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2960)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: -1
Class B: -3
Class C: -2
Class D: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1999-C2: Moody's Ups Rating on G Certs to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed six classes of Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2 as
follows:

A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26, 1999 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2005 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2005 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 16, 2006 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

E, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

F, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

G, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to Ca
(sf)

X, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to B3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to increased subordination from amortization
and payoffs coupled with improved credit quality from defeased
loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on its
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced class and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.0% of the
current pooled balance compared to 0.8% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 8.1% of the original
pooled balance, the same as last review. Depending on the timing
of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2001, "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The pool has a Herf of 4, the same as last
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 23, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 79% to $163 million
from $775 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 18 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool. The conduit has ten loans and represents
43% of the pool. Eight loans, representing 57% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

The pool does not contain any loans on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $61 million (52% average loss severity), the same
as at last review. The pool does not contain any loans that are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% of the conduit loans. Moody's conduit
LTV is 58% compared to 60% at last review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.48X and 2.13X,
respectively, compared to 1.45X and 2.01X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance. Moody's
actual conduit DSCR is less than Moody's stressed conduit DSCR
because the conduit's current constant is greater than Moody's
stressed 9.25% rate.

The top three conduit loans represent 33% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Westin Denver Tabor Center Loan ($32 million -
- 19.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 430-room full-service
hotel located in downtown Denver, Colorado. The hotel is part of
an upscale mixed-use complex that includes a 570,000 square foot
(SF) office building and an urban mall. Performance has increased
since last review. A November 2012 Smith Travel Research (STR)
report indicates the property is competitive within its market as
the property's revenue per available room (RevPAR) penetration
rate is in excess of 100%. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 46%
and 2.58X, respectively, compared to 49% and 2.44X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Geneva Crossing Loan ($11
million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 123,000 SF
unanchored retail center located in Carol Stream, Illinois. The
property was 99% leased as of the October 2012, which is the same
as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and
1.25X, respectively, compared to 79% and 1.30X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Auerbach Retail Portfolio ($10
million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by two retail
properties located in California. As of November 2012, the
properties were 98% leased, the same as last review. The
portfolio's two largest tenants have 2018 and 2017 lease
expirations. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.38X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.35X at last review.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2013-LC6: Moody's Rates Class X-C Certs 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to fourteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by COMM 2013-LC6 Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-
LC6.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. X-C, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 70 fixed rate loans secured
by 99 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.75X is higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.06X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 98.5% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 107.1% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 23.6. The transaction's loan level diversity
is in-line with Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 25.5. The
transaction's property diversity profile is in-line with the
indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued
since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.1, which is in-line
with the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The transaction benefits from one loan, representing approximately
1.8% of the pool balance in aggregate, assigned an investment
grade credit assessment. Loans assigned investment grade credit
assessments are not expected to contribute any loss to a
transaction in low stress scenarios, but are expected to
contribute minimal amounts of loss in high stress scenarios.
Moody's also considers the creditworthiness of loans when
evaluating the effects of pooling among portfolio assets.
Generally, a loan's effect on the diversity profile of a portfolio
is inversely correlated with the loan's creditworthiness. As such,
high quality loans only marginally benefit a pool's diversity
profile when they are small, or marginally harm a pool's diversity
profile when they are large.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS
Transactions" published in April 2005. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.61
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1 which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, or 25%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Super Senior Aaa classes and the rated Aaa A-M class would
be Aaa, Aaa, and Aa1 and Aa1, Aa2, and A1, respectively. Parameter
Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time; rather they are designed to
provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might
change if key input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of, Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. F Certs to 'Csf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and affirmed 17 classes
of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2006-C4 (CSMC
2006-C4).

Sensitivity/Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 14.6% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 15.8%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $136.7 million (3.2% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 120 loans (60.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 30 specially serviced assets (12.4%).

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 12.5% to $3.74 billion from
$4.22 billion at issuance. Three loans (0.3% of the pool) are
defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes E
through S. The top four loans represent approximately 40% of the
pool, ranging in size from 21.6% and 4.8%.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the largest loan in
the pool 11 Madison Avenue loan (21.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 2.2 million square foot, 29-story office tower
located in the Madison Square Park area of Manhattan, NY. The
property serves as the U.S. headquarters for Credit Suisse (rated
'A/F1', Outlook Stable by Fitch), which leases 81% of the space.
While occupancy remains stable at the property, cash flow
appreciation will be constrained by lower asking rates in the
market, relative to the rates considered at origination. The loan
was underwritten on an issuer basis to relatively tight margins,
and although the property continues to perform, Fitch expects the
loan may default at maturity as pro forma cash flow that was
considered at issuance will be difficult to achieve.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Babcock & Brown FX 3 - Sonterra loan (5.2%), which is
secured by 14 multifamily properties totaling 3,720 units. The
properties are located in Nevada, Texas, Maryland, Florida,
Virginia, and South Carolina. The loan transferred to special
servicing in February 2009 due to imminent default resulting from
deteriorating market conditions. In addition, the servicer
indicated that property inspections have revealed deferred
maintenance at some of the locations. Fitch expects losses upon
liquidation of the assets.

In total, there are currently 30 loans (12.4%) in special
servicing which consists of four loans (0.3%) in foreclosure,
three loans (0.5%) that are 60 days delinquent, eight loans (1.9%)
that are REO, two loans (0.5%) that are current and 13 loans
(9.3%) that are 90 days delinquent.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $427.3 million class A-M to 'BBB-sf' from 'Asf', Outlook
    Negative;
-- $26.7 million class B to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $64.1 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $48.1 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $48.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $1.8 billion class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $150 million class A-4FL at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $595.7 million class A-1-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $341.8 million class A-J at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $37.4 million class D at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $21.4 million class E at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $42.7 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $48.1 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%.
-- $48.1 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $27.9 million class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class S certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings on the interest-only class A-X, A-SP and A-Y certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class J Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 23 classes of Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust, series 2007-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates and changes the rating outlook to negative for
classes A-3 and A-1-A.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable loss expectations for the
underlying collateral pool relative to the previous review. Fitch
modeled losses of 17.48% for the remaining pool; expected losses
as a percentage of the original pool balance are at 20.0%,
including losses already incurred to date.

The revision of the outlook to classes A-3 and A-1-A to negative
is due to the ongoing concerns with the high percentage of loans
in special servicing and the uncertainty about the ultimate
disposition of those assets. Fitch will continue to monitor the
performance and valuation of the specially serviced loans, several
of which have A / B Note splits, and may take rating actions if
the recovery of the A Note proceeds is deemed unlikely or
valuations continue to decline.

Fitch has designated 85 loans (56.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 26 specially serviced loans (25.9%).

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 12.72% to
$2.94 billion from $3.37 billion at issuance, due to a combination
of paydown (7.85%) and realized losses (4.87%). Interest
shortfalls totaling $42.8 million are affecting classes T through
A-J.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is the City
Place (5.12% of the pool) loan. The loan is collateralized by a
731,886 square foot (sf) mixed use center located in West Palm
Beach, FL. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
April 2010 and a modification consisting of an A/B note structure
was completed in January of 2012. The A Note ($100 million) was
returned to the master servicer as of August 8, 2012 while the B
Note ($50 million) remains with the special servicer. The center,
a popular destination in the West Palm Community, is challenged by
a lower retail occupancy (88%) than at issuance (95%) and
declining cash flow. However, the tenant roster is stable for the
next few years with limited lease roll over until 2015.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is the specially
serviced loan, Savoy Park (7.2%). The loan is secured by a
multifamily complex consisting of 1,802 units, located in the
Harlem neighborhood of New York, NY. The loan was transferred to
the special servicer in July 2010 for imminent default. The loan
was assumed by the mezzanine lender and a loan modification was
completed in 2012. The modification includes an A/B Note split of
$160 million A Note and $50 million B Note, and extension to
December 11, 2017. The complex's occupancy rate had reached 96%
based on the latest servicer information and was projected to
return to the master servicer shortly.

The third largest contributor to Fitch's model losses is the CVI
Multifamily portfolio (5.65%), secured by 20 multifamily
properties consisting of 2,990 units located across seven
different metropolitan areas. A federal judge approved the sale
and assumption of debt during in 2012. The new ownership group
made a significant capital infusion upon securing the portfolio
and the loan was modified into an A/B Note split of a $141 million
A Note and $38.9 million B Note. The assumption included a paydown
of the A Note to $126.9 million and an extension to August 2016.
In addition, the new sponsors can sell and release properties
during the remaining loan term. Fitch will monitor the performance
of the assets as well as the progress of the sponsor's disposition
efforts.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Outlooks and Recovery
Estimates as indicated:

-- $31.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $85.1 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $758.0 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $1.3 billion class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $212.1 million class A-M at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $125.0 million class A-MFL at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $286.6 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE0% from RE100%;
-- $25.3 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0% from RE50%;
-- $37.9 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $33.7 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $21.1 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.5 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $33.7 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $37.9 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4.3 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, and S remain at 'Dsf' due to realized
losses. Fitch has previously withdrawn the ratings in the
interest-only classes A-SP and A-X.


CORNERSTONE CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C and D notes from Cornerstone CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) managed by Stone Tower Debt Advisors, LLC.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1-S, A-1-J,
A-2, and B notes, and S&P removed its ratings on all of the
classes of rated notes from CreditWatch, where it placed them with
positive implications on Oct. 29, 2012.

The upgrades reflect a marginal increase in the balance of the
total collateral backing the rated notes since S&P's January 2012
rating actions.  The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 4, 2013.

The amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's
asset portfolio remained stable since the time of S&P's last
rating action.  According to the January 2013, trustee report, the
transaction held $19.09 million in 'CCC' rated collateral, a
negligible drop from $19.90 million noted in the Nov. 25, 2011,
trustee report, which S&P's used for our January 2012 rating
actions.

According to the January 2013 trustee report, the transaction held
$2.75 million in underlying collateral obligations considered by
the transaction as defaulted.  This was an increase from
$0.18 million in defaulted obligations noted in the November 2011,
trustee report.

The total collateral balance -- designated by a combination of
principal proceeds and total par value of the collateral pool --
backing the rated liabilities has increased $4.37 million since
November 2011.  The increased collateral balance improved the
credit support available to the rated notes, and potentially
increased the available interest proceeds that the underlying
collateral generates.

Over the same time period, the transaction's class A, B, C, and D
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio tests have improved, and the
weighted average spread generated off of the underlying collateral
has also increased by 0.21%.

The transaction is currently passing its reinvestment O/C test --
which is the class D O/C ratio measured at a higher level (than
the class D O/C test) in the interest section of the waterfall.
The transaction is structured so that if it fails this test during
the reinvestment period (scheduled to end July 2014), the
collateral manager may reinvest an amount--equal to the lesser of
50.00% of the available interest proceeds and the amount necessary
to cure the test -- into additional collateral.  According to the
January 2013 trustee report, the reinvestment O/C test result was
103.44%, compared with a required minimum of 101.90%.

The ratings on the class D notes are currently driven by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test S&P introduced as part of its 2009 corporate criteria
update.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of
the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and will take rating
actions as it deem necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

Class                     November 2011     January 2013
                              Notional Balance (mil. $)
A-1-S                       462.50            462.50
A-1-J                       51.50             51.50
A-2                         34.50             34.50
B                           34.00             34.00
C                           24.00             24.00
D                           21.50             21.50

Coverage Tests, WAS (%)
Weighted average spread     3.67              3.88
A O/C                       117.90            118.43
B O/C                       111.02            111.52
C O/C                       106.62            107.11
D O/C                       102.97            103.44
A I/C                       789.18            1,000.40
B I/C                       699.91            872.04
C I/C                       600.56            740.46
D I/C                       487.79            591.85

O/C-Overcollateralization Test.
I/C-Interest Coverage Test.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Cornerstone CLO Ltd.
                   Rating       Rating
Class              To           From
A-1-S              AA+(sf)      AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
A-1-J              AA+(sf)      AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                AA-(sf)      AA-(sf)/Watch Pos
B                  A-(sf)       A-(sf)/Watch Pos
C                  BBB(sf)      BB+(sf)/Watch Pos
D                  CCC+(sf)     CCC-(sf)/Watch Pos


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-TFL2: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 9 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed nine classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-TFL2. Moody's rating action is
as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Confirmed at
A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. A-X-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations were due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the interest-only classes are consistent with the
expected credit performance of the referenced classes or loans,
and thus are affirmed.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the ratings of Classes A-X-
1 and A-X-2.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated March 21, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 41% to $718.2
million from $1.52 billion at securitization due to the payoff of
four loans, the liquidation of two loans, and partial paydowns of
the remaining two loans in the pool. Since last review, two loans
paid off. The pool is comprised of two floating-rate loans one
secured by a casino hotel (60% of the pooled balance) and the
other is secured by an office portfolio (40%).

Classes A-3 through L have experienced significant interest
shortfalls totaling $8.0 million as of the January 2013
distribution date. Moody's expects the interests shortfalls
associated the Resorts Atlantic City loan and the Bicayne Landing
loan to remain permanent. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Currently, there is one specially serviced loan, the Whitehall
Seattle Portfolio loan ($290.4 million, 40% of the pooled
balance).

The pool has experienced $290.4 million in losses since
securitization due to losses from the liquidation of both the
Resorts Atlantic City loan and the Biscayne Landing loan. Classes
F, G, H, J, K, and L have been wiped out.

Moody's weighed average pooled loan to value (LTV) ratio is 88%,
compared to over 92% at last review and 63% at securitization.
Moody's pooled stressed debt service coverage (DSCR) is 1.30X
compared to 1.24X to last review and 1.31X at securitization.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. Large
loan transactions have a Herf of less than 20. The pool has a Herf
of 2, compared to 3 at last review.

The largest loan in the pool is the Planet Hollywood loan ($427.8
million, 60% of the pooled balance) is collateralized by a 2,516
guestroom hotel and casino located on Las Vegas Boulevard in Las
Vegas, Nevada. The property hit hard times in the recession, but
was recapitalized by Harrah's Entertainment in 2010 and the loan
was modified. The property net cash flow has rebounded to $65.9
million for the trailing twelve month period ending September 2012
which is up due to a 1.6% increase in gaming revenue over year end
2011 which resulted in a 6% increase to the net cash flow over the
same time period. The property was appraised for $775 million in
September 2011. There is additional debt in the form of a
subordinate $94.4 million B-Note. Loan maturity is December 2013.
Moody's current pooled LTV is 97% and stressed DSCR is 1.50X.
Moody's current credit assessment is B3, the same as last review.

The pool's other loan is The Whitehall Seattle Portfolio loan
($290.4 million, 40% of the pooled balance) which transferred to
special servicing in December 2011 and is collateralized by eleven
office properties in Seattle, Washington. As of December 2012, the
occupancy was 58% which is down from 64% at last review and 92% at
securitization. The net cash flow has continued to decrease since
securitization. A March 2012 appraisal valued the portfolio at
$617 million. There is subordinate debt in the form of a $173.8
million B-Note and $430.2 million of mezzanine debt. The loan has
passed the April 2012 final maturity date and the borrower and
special servicer are currently in discussions. A receiver was
appointed in July 2012. Moody's current pooled LTV is 92% and
stressed DSCR is 1.00X. Moody's current credit assessment is B2,
the same as last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2009-RR1: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-3C Cert's Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed two classes and downgraded one class of
Certificates issued by Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp. CSMC Series 2009-RR1. The affirmations are due to
key transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate
with the existing ratings levels. The downgrade is due to negative
credit migration of the underlying collateral and higher expected
losses on the underlying pool of loans .The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE Non-Pooled ReREMIC)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-3A Certificate, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 17,
2009 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B Certificate, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3C Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2009-
RR1 is a Re-Remic Pass Through Trust backed by $160.0 million, or
21.1% of the aggregate class principal balance, of the super
senior Class A3 commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
certificates issued by Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-C1.

On January 25, 2013, Moody's downgraded the Class A-3 Certificates
of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-1 due to
negative credit migration of the underlying collateral and higher
expected losses for the pool. Moody's rating action on the
Underlying Certificate reflected a cumulative base expected loss
of 17.9% of the current balance.

Updates to key parameters, including the constant default rate
(CDR), constant prepayment rate (CPR), weighted average life
(WAL), and weighted average recovery rate (WARR), did not
materially change the expected loss estimates of Class A3-A and
A3-B resulting in an affirmation. The downgrade of Class A3-C was
due to deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
collateral.

Within the re-securitization, the weighted average life of the
Underlying Security is 3.55 years assuming a 0%/0% CDR/CPR. For
delinquent loans (30+ days, REO, foreclosure, bankrupt), Moody's
assumes a fixed WARR of 40% while a fixed WARR of 50% for current
loans. Moody's also ran a sensitivity analysis on the classes
assuming a WARR of 40% for current loans. This impacts the modeled
rating of the Certificates by 0 to 5 notches downward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

Moody's review incorporated the cash flow model, Structured
Finance Workstation (SFW), developed by Moody's Wall Street
Analytics.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

The methodological approach used in these ratings is as follows:
Moody's applied ratings-specific cash flow scenarios assuming
different loss timing, recovery and prepayment assumptions on the
underlying pool of mortgages that are the collateral for the
underlying CMBS transaction through Structured Finance
Workstation. The analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, tranche average life, current tranche balance
and future cash flows under expected and stressed scenarios. In
each scenario, cash flows and losses from the underlying
collateral were analyzed applying different stresses at each
rating level.

The resulting ratings specific stressed cash flows were then input
into the structure of the re-securitization to determine expected
losses for each class. The expected losses were then compared to
the idealized expected loss for each class to gauge the
appropriateness of the existing rating. The stressed assumptions
considered, among other factors, the underlying transaction's
collateral attributes, past and current performance, and Moody's
current negative performance outlook for commercial real estate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


DECO 8-UK: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in DECO 8 - UK Conduit 2 PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised and removed from CreditWatch negative our rating on
      the class A1 notes;

   -- Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative S&P's ratings
      on the class A2, B, C, and D notes;

   -- Lowered S&P's ratings on the class E and F notes; and

   -- Affirmed S&P's 'D (sf)' rating on the class G notes.

On Dec. 6, 2012, S&P placed ITS ratings on the class A1, A2, B, C,
and D notes on CreditWatch negative following an update to its
criteria for rating European commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transactions.

DECO 8 - UK Conduit 2 closed in April 2006 and was secured by a
portfolio of 22 mortgage loans and the senior tranches of three
mortgage loans.  The initial 22 loans were secured by 75 U.K.
commercial properties and 92,464 ground leases.  At present, the
transaction is backed by 10 loans with a securitized loan balance
of GBP505 million.  The legal final maturity date for the class A1
and A2 notes is April 2018, and is January 2036 for all other
classes of notes.

The Lea Valley loan (43.5% of the securitized loan pool balance)
has a securitized loan balance of GBP220.0 million and matures in
April 2016.  In January 2012, the borrower purchased and wrote-
down the subordinate debt on the portfolio, reducing the whole
loan balance by about GBP19 million.  The portfolio comprises 28
mixed use secondary assets, with 297 tenants located in England
and Wales.  The majority of the properties are from either whole
or significant parts of industrial estates dating from pre-war
units to those built in the 1980s or 1990s.  The weighted-average
lease term (WALT) is 2.52 years and the vacancy rate is 35%.

In S&P's view, the Lea Valley loan's recoverable proceeds have
deteriorated, given the secondary nature of the assets, the
decline in net operating income and WALT, and the capital
expenditure needed to maintain properties of this age and quality.
Although this loan remains current, S&P believes that refinancing
risk and the potential for principal losses have increased.

The Mapeley II loan (37.4% of the securitized loan pool balance)
matures in February 2016 and has a securitized loan balance of
GBP189.1 million.  The portfolio comprises 16 U.K. secondary
office properties.  At closing, 45% of the rents were due to break
or expire by 2011.  The current occupancy stands at 93.2%, with a
reported WALT of 5.7 years.  The largest asset in the portfolio is
the 246,000 square foot Microsoft office campus in Reading, which
provides 27% of the portfolio income on a lease that expires in
2025.  The most recent valuation was in 2012 for GBP134 million,
which is a 44% market value decline from the 2009 valuation of
GBP241 million.  At closing, the portfolio was valued at
GBP278 million.

As a result of tenant lease breaks, tenant insolvencies, and a
weakened rental market, cash flows have declined.  In S&P's
opinion, the secondary nature of the properties and the continued
deterioration of the regional office sector are likely to result
in increased susceptibility to vacancies, which would further
depress property values.  Although there are three years left to
develop and implement a sustainable strategy for the portfolio,
S&P believes that principal losses are likely to occur.
Furthermore, if the Mapeley loan is enforced, material swap
breakage costs would be due.  These costs would rank senior to
payments to the noteholders.

The Rowan UK loan matured in October 2010 and was subsequently
transferred to special servicing.  The loan is backed by four
multi-let office properties (two of which are in London, and the
other two in Reading and Kent) and an industrial property in
Maidenhead.  When the loan defaulted at maturity, the sponsor
decided not to inject equity or request a loan extension, and
appointed a law of property act (LPA) receiver.  According to the
special servicer, the LPA receiver has implemented asset
management plans, with staged asset sales planned once these
initiatives have taken place.  In S&P's opinion, principal losses
are expected on this loan.

The Fairhold loan (13% of the securitized loan balance) has a
securitized loan balance of GBP65.9 million and a whole loan
balance of GBP85.7 million.  It comprises a portfolio of 89,061
ground rent assets secured on predominantly U.K. residential
property.  The loan matured on Jan. 21, 2013, and will be
subsequently transferred into special servicing unless the
subordinated or junior lender remedies the event of default within
their cure periods, which are 28 days and five days, respectively
from the loan maturity date.  S&P believes that the whole loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio exceeds 100%.  Furthermore, there is a long-
dated interest rate swap in place, which matures in 2036.  This
could result in significant swap breakage costs in an enforcement
scenario.  These costs would rank senior to payments to the
noteholders.

The remaining loans are backed by U.K. properties.  S&P has
reviewed each loan based on reported data.  They range in size
from GBP5 million to GBP1 million, and have maturity profiles that
range from 2011 to 2016.  In S&P's view, the majority of the loans
are of below-average credit quality as they are highly leveraged
and backed by a combination of average-quality tenants, short
WALTs, and dated properties in secondary locations.  Some of these
loans have not been revalued since issuance and may have higher
LTV ratios than those reported by the servicer, and in S&P's
opinion, may therefore face refinancing difficulties at loan
maturity.

Under S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, the rating on the class A1
notes was previously constrained by the issuer credit rating on
Danske Bank A/S as liquidity facility provider.  As a result of a
standby drawing, this constraint no longer exists and S&P has
therefore raised to 'AA (sf)' from 'A (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative S&P's rating on the class A1 notes to reflect
this credit risk.

S&P considers that the risk of principal losses for the Lea Valley
and Mapeley II loans in particular, has greatly increased.
Consequently, S&P believes that the class A2, B, and C notes'
creditworthiness has deteriorated and the available credit
enhancement to these notes is no longer sufficient to support
their current rating levels.  S&P has therefore lowered and
removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class A2, B,
and C notes to reflect its view on expected recovery values.

S&P has lowered to the 'CCC' rating category its ratings on the
class D, E, and F notes as in the near to medium term, S&P expects
to see principal losses in this transaction as a result of the
potential workout and sale of the defaulted loans.  At the same
time, S&P has removed its rating on the class D notes from
CreditWatch negative, and has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the
class G notes due to expected principal losses.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                  Rating
               To               From

DECO 8 - UK Conduit 2 PLC
GBP630.131 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A1             AA (sf)         A (sf)

Ratings Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2             BB- (sf)        A (sf)
B              B (sf)          A- (sf)
C              B- (sf)         BBB- (sf)
D              CCC (sf)        BB (sf)

Ratings Lowered

E              CCC- (sf)        B- (sf)
F              CCC- (sf)        B- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

G              D (sf)


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Cl. B-7 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes of DLJ Commercial Mortgage
Corp., series 1999-CG2.

SENSITIVITY/RATING DRIVERS

Fitch modeled losses of 16.9% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 4.5%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $61.9 million (4% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
identified 10 loans (20.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes one specially serviced loan (3.6%).

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance was reduced to $45.2 million from $1.55 billion
at issuance. There are two defeased loans representing 1.7% of the
pool. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes B-6
through C.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a 25,251 square
foot (sf) retail property (4.1% of the pool) located in Lompoc,
CA. The debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) has been below 1.0x
over the past three years due to lower occupancy levels. Further,
the loan is exposed to rollover risk with 13% of tenant's leases
expiring before year end 2013. Fitch modeled the loan to default
in the term.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

-- $10.2 million class B-4 at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.5 million class B-5 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.4 million class B-6 at 'Csf'; RE 95%;
-- $83,456 class B-7 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Class B-8 remains at 'Dsf'; RE 0% and has been reduced to zero due
to realized losses. Class C, which is not rated by Fitch has been
reduced to zero from $31 million at issuance due to realized
losses.

The class A-1A, A-1B, A-2, A-3, A-4, B-1, B-2, and B-3 notes have
paid in full. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class S certificates.


DRYDEN XXIV: S&P Affirms 'B(sf)' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Dryden
XXIV Senior Loan Fund/Dryden XXIV Senior Loan Fund LLC's
$476.5 million floating-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of Nov. 7, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents. Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of S&P's review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to us by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P noted.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Dryden XXIV Senior Loan Fund/Dryden XXIV Senior Loan Fund LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
X                          AAA (sf)                        3.0
A                          AAA (sf)                      316.5
B (deferrable)             AA (sf)                        58.5
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                         43.5
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                       23.5
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                        21.5
F (deferrable)             B (sf)                         10.0


FIRST HORIZON: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to $100MM Preferred Stock
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B' rating to the $100 million Series
A non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock issuance by First
Horizon National Corp (FHN).

The offering is priced at 6.20% with the proceeds being used for
general corporate purposes.

Sensitivity/Rating Drivers

In accordance with Fitch's rating criteria, the offering's rating
is notched five down from FHN's viability rating of 'bbb-'.


FORTRESS CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Fortress Credit Funding VI L.P.'s $149.77 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Sept. 21,
2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to S&P's effective date review are
generally based on the application of S&P's criteria to a
combination of purchased collateral, collateral committed to be
purchased, and the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P
by the collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions
about the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because
not all assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, S&P performs quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with its criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  S&P's analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
S&P's supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discuss S&P's
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time S&P issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deem
necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Fortress Credit Funding VI L.P.

Class                   Rating                Amount
                                             (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA(sf)                96.90
A-2                     AA(sf)                 17.17
B (deferrable)          A(sf)                  15.215
C (deferrable)          BBB(sf)                 9.86
D (deferrable)          BBB-(sf)                2.21
E (deferrable)          BB(sf)                  8.415


FOUNDERS GROVE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from Founders Grove CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Tall Tree
Investment Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P lowered its
rating on the class D notes.  In addition, S&P removed all five
ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive
implications on Oct. 29, 2012.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Dec. 20,
2012.  The upgrades reflect a large paydown on the Class A-1 and
A-2 notes since S&P's February 2012 rating actions.  The downgrade
stemmed from the application of the largest obligor default test.

According to the December 2012 trustee report, the transaction
held $2.71 million (1.60% of total collateral) in underlying
collateral obligations considered defaulted by the transaction.
This was a marginal increase from $1.58 million (0.63% of total
collateral) in defaulted obligations noted in the Jan. 12, 2012,
trustee report, which S&P used for its February 2012 rating
actions.

The amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's
asset portfolio has declined in par since the time of S&P's last
rating action but has remained at a stable 7.30% of total
collateral balance over the period.  According to the December
2012 trustee report, the transaction held $12.40 million in 'CCC'
rated collateral, down from $18.36 million noted in the January
2012 trustee report.

The transaction has exposure to long-dated assets (assets maturing
after the stated maturity of the CLO), which is resulting in a
haircut on the overcollateralization (O/C) ratio calculations.
According to the December 2012 trustee report, the balance of
collateral with a maturity date after the stated maturity of the
transaction totaled $2.49 million, constituting 1.49% of the total
portfolio.  When calculating the O/C ratios, a portion of the
long-dated securities is haircut from the numerator of the ratio.
The balance of long-dated securities has increased from zero since
January 2012.  S&P's analysis took into account the potential
market value and settlement related risk arising from the
potential liquidation of the remaining securities on the legal
final maturity date of the transaction.

Post-reinvestment-period principal amortization has resulted in
$79.12 million in paydowns to the class A-1 and A-2 notes since
S&P's last rating action.

The changes in the long-dated assets, defaulted obligations, and
'CCC' rated collateral--in combination with the paydown on the
class A-1 and A-2 notes--have led to varied effects on the O/C
ratios in the transaction.  Since S&P's last rating action, the
transaction's class A/B and C O/C ratio tests have improved, while
the class D O/C ratio has marginally dropped.  All coverage tests
remain in compliance with their minimum requirements.  Based on
the December 2012 trustee report, the class D O/C ratio was
103.66% compared with the required minimum of 102.60%.  In
addition, the weighted-average spread generated from the
transaction's underlying collateral increase by 0.29%.

The ratings on the class D notes are currently constrained at
'CCC+ (sf)' by the application of the largest obligor default
test, a supplemental stress test S&P introduced as part of its
2009 corporate criteria update.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash-flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash-flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash-
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with this rating action," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deem necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

Class                       January 2012     December 2012
Notional Balance (Mil. $)
A-1                          42.91           24.97
A-2                         146.33           85.15
B                            20.10           20.10
C                             6.60            6.60
D                            25.12           25.12

Coverage Tests, WAS (%)
Weighted average spread       3.34             3.63
A/B O/C                     119.70           128.91
C O/C                       116.04           122.69
D O/C                       103.94           103.66
A/B I/C                     621.39           811.60
C I/C                       589.22           743.08

O/C-Overcollateralization test.
I/C-Interest coverage test.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Founders Grove CLO Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To           From
A-1                AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                  A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                  CCC+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


GE CAPITAL 2002-3: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class O Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms three classes of GE Capital Commercial
Mortgage Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2002-3.

SENSITIVITY/RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement as a result
of paydown, stable performance of the underlying collateral, and a
concentrated deal with only seven loans remaining. Fitch has
designated one loan as a Fitch Loan of Concern. The pool's
aggregate principal balance has been paid down by 96.7% to $38.3
million from $1.2 billion at issuance with only 0.2% in realized
losses. Interest shortfalls of $858,000 are affecting the non-
rated class P.

The seven remaining loans consist of one with a 10-year term, two
with 12-year loan terms, and the remaining four have anticipated
repayment dates between 2018 and 2020. Four are collateralized by
a single tenant Walgreens and three by multifamily properties.

The largest loan of the pool is secured by Carroll's Creek Landing
Apartments (68.7% of the pool), a 288 unit multifamily complex
located in Arlington, WA 20 miles north of Seattle. The complex
has an agreement with the U.S. Navy that provides subsidized and
preferred housing to the service men and women located at the
nearby installation. The complex has a unique offering of
townhomes and has no direct competitors within a nine-mile radius.
Occupancy fluctuates due to ship deployments but the most recent
reported occupancy was 90% as of fourth quarter 2012.

The second largest loan is collateralized by Walgreens - Mount
Pleasant (8.1%), a 14,490 square foot (sf) single tenant retail
building in SC. The site is located in a residential and
commercial area along a major thoroughfare, US Highway 17, next to
a larger community shopping center. The building is a pad site
built specifically to Walgreens specifications with the drug store
having long term leasing rights in excess of 30 years. The site
was fully occupied and in good condition as of the last servicer
inspection.

The third largest loan is secured by 132 unit multifamily complex,
Greens at Broken Arrow - Phase II, located in Broken Arrow
(Tulsa), OK. The subject has outperformed the broader market and
its comp. set for a number of years. The last servicer provided
information listed third quarter end 2012 performance metrics at
100% occupancy with a 3.29x debt service coverage ratio.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

-- $8.5 million class M at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.8 million class N at 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.9 million class O at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, and X-2 have
repaid in full. Fitch does not rate the $15.2 million interest-
only class P. The rating on class X-1 was previously withdrawn.


GENESIS CLO 2007-1: Moody's Lifts Rating on USD40MM Notes to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Genesis CLO 2007-1 Ltd.:

  USD70,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due October 10, 2014, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
  April 25, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

  USD50,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  Due October 10, 2014, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April
  25, 2012 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  USD40,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  Due October 10, 2014, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April
  25, 2012 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  USD1,570,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  October 10, 2014 (current outstanding balance of $43,639,156),
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 20, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
  (sf);

  USD110,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  October 10, 2014, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 20,
  2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in April 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 84.7% or $240.8 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated January 4, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 196.9%, 155.5%,
135.2% and 122.4%, respectively, versus April 2012 levels of
147.7%, 129.0%, 118.3% and 111.0%, respectively. Moody's notes the
reported January overcollateralization ratios do not reflect the
January 10, 2013 payment of $109.2 million to the Class A Notes.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a large
number of investments in securities that mature after the maturity
date of the notes. Based on its calculation, securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 60% of the underlying portfolio compared to 43.4% of
the portfolio at the time of the last rating action. These
investments potentially expose the notes to market risk in the
event of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $400.5
million, defaulted par of $40.3 million, a weighted average
default probability of 13.00% (implying a WARF of 3313), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.54%, and a
diversity score of 38. The default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Genesis CLO 2007-1 Ltd., issued in October 2007, is a balance
sheet collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2650)

Class A: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: +1
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3976)

Class A: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: -1
Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The deal has built up exposure to a large
number of long-dated assets by participating in amend-to-extend
activities. The presence of assets that mature beyond the CLO's
legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on those
assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon liquidation
at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation
value (depending on the extent to which the asset's maturity lags
that of the liabilities) and the asset's current market value. In
consideration of the large size of the deal's exposure to long-
dated assets, which increase its sensitivity to the liquidation
assumptions used in the rating analysis, Moody's ran different
scenarios considering a range of liquidation value assumptions.
However, actual long-dated asset exposure and prevailing market
prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the extent
of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates. Moody's also conducted tests to assess
the collateral pool's concentration risk in obligors bearing a
credit estimate that constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.


GLACIER FUNDING: Moody's Ups Rating on $44MM Sr. Notes to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Glacier Funding CDO I Limited:

  U.S. $44,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2039 (current outstanding balance of $43,402,216),
  Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 18, 2010 Downgraded to
  Caa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  U.S. $43,500,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2039, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 18, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf);

  U.S. $9,000,000 Class C Fourth Priority Mezzanine Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2039 (current outstanding balance of $10,591,220),
  Affirmed C (sf); previously on November 14, 2008 Downgraded to
  C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating upgrade is the result of
deleveraging of the senior notes since the rating action in May
2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been fully paid
down since the last rating action and the Class A-2 Notes started
amortizing in December 2012. The deal declared an "Event of
Default" on August 10, 2009, and subsequently declared
acceleration on July 14, 2010. Due to the acceleration, all excess
interest and principal proceeds will continue to deleverage the
senior notes before paying the junior notes.

Glacier Funding CDO I, Limited, issued in March 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a diversified
portfolio of RMBS, CMBS and SF CDOs originated from 2002 to 2004.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.

Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. Among the uncertainties in the residential
real estate property market are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model
output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa rated assets notched up by 2 rating notches:

Class A-2: +1
Class B: 0
Class C: 0

Moody's Caa rated assets notched down by 2 rating notches:

Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. G Certs to 'CC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed six classes of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.'s commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 1998-C1.

SENSITIVITY/RATING DRIVERS:

The downgrade reflects the increased expectation of losses from
updated valuations and disposition plans for the largest specially
serviced loan. The affirmation of class F is due to high credit
enhancement and likelihood of repayment. In addition, one loan
payoff (2.8% of the pool) is expected by the February 2013
distribution date.

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 90.8% to $132.7 million from
$1.44 billion at issuance. Seven loans remain, two of which (86.8%
of the pool) are in special servicing. The pool has experienced
$8.7 million (0.6% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date. There is one defeased loan (0.03% of the pool) in
the pool. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes G
through N.

The largest remaining loan is the specially-serviced Senior Living
Properties Portfolio (84.4% of the pool), which is currently
secured by 43 healthcare properties located in Texas. The
Portfolio originally consisted of 87 properties located in both
Illinois and Texas and experienced extensive operating losses
beginning in 2000. Operating losses were a result of lower
revenues due to changes in the Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement
rates. The loan transferred to special servicing in 2001 and
subsequently 30 properties located in Illinois were liquidated in
2005 and 2006. The borrower plans on selling the remaining assets
in the portfolio and complete a discounted payoff of the loan. A
broker has been engaged to market and sell the properties and the
maturity of the loan has been extended to Aug. 1, 2013. Based on
recent valuations of the properties and increasing fees and
expenses as the pool takes longer to liquidate, Fitch expects
significant losses upon disposition of the assets.

The other asset in special servicing is a real estate owned (REO)
53,343 sf office property (2.3% of the pool) located in Rocky
Mount, NC.

Fitch downgrades the following class:

-- $32.4 million class G to 'CCsf' from 'BBsf', RE 50%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $4.7 million class F at 'A-sf', Outlook Negative;
-- $25.2 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $14.4 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $25.2 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $14.4 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $10.8 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%.

Class A-1, A-2, B, C, D and E certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class N certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


GOLUB CAPITAL: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Golub Capital Partners CLO 15 Ltd./ Golub Capital
Partners CLO 15 LLC's $452.0 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is an CLO securitization backed by a revolving
pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 4,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria (see "Update
      To Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash
      Flow And Synthetic CDOs," published Sept. 17, 2009).

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.3439%-12.6500%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which would lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1280.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Golub Capital Partners CLO 15 Ltd./Golub Capital Partners CLO 15
LLC

Class              Rating          Amount
                                   (mil. $)(i)
A-1                AAA (sf)        296.00
A-2                AA (sf)         56.00
B (deferrable)     A (sf)          40.50
C (deferrable)     BBB (sf)        20.50
D (deferrable)     BB (sf)         39.00
Subordinated       NR              61.20

NR--Not rated. N/A--Not applicable.

The analysts would like to thank Hector Campos for his analytical
contributions to this presale report.


GS MORTGAGE 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Cl. X Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes of
GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates 2010-C1.

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio,
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the interest-
only class is consistent with the expected credit performance of
its referenced classes, and thus is affirmed.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated March 28, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 11, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 4% to
$756.9 million from $788.5 million at securitization due to
amortization. The Certificates are collateralized by 23 mortgage
loans. The top five loans represent 50% of the pooled balance. All
loans are fixed rate loans. The trust has not experienced losses
or interest shortfalls since securitization.

Moody's weighted average LTV for the pooled trust mortgage balance
is 69%, the same as last review and down slightly from 71% at
securitization. Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for the pooled trust mortgage balance is 1.52X compared to
1.53X at last review and 1.45X at securitization.

The largest loan in the pool is collateralized by 660 Madison
Avenue ($95.4 million, 12.6% of the pool), a 264,000 square foot
retail property 100% leased to Barneys NY in Manhattan's Plaza
District submarket. The property is located on Madison Avenue
between East 60th Street and East 61st Street, a premier shopping
destination notable for high end retailers. The property serves as
Barneys flagship store with the tenant on a lease until 2019.
Moody's current pooled LTV is 64% and stressed DSCR is 1.40X.
Moody's current credit assessment is Baa1, compared to Baa2 last
review.

The second largest loan in the pool is the Mall at Partridge Creek
loan ($80.1 million, 10.6%) secured by a lifestyle center in
Clinton, Michigan. The mall is 600,000 square feet and located 33
miles north of downtown Detroit. Anchor tenants, Nordstrom and
Parisian, are not part of the loan collateral. The center is
managed by Taubman Centers. As of September 2012, the center was
86% occupied. In-line sales for the trailing twelve month period
were September 2012 were $414 per square foot. Moody's current
pooled LTV is 78% and stressed DSCR is 1.38X. Moody's current
credit assessment is Ba3, compared to B1 at last review.

The Burnsville Center loan ($79.1 million, 10.5%) is the third
largest loan in the pool. Located in Burnsville, Minnesota, the
center was built in 1977 and comprises 1.1 million square foot
regional mall, 523,692 square feet of which is collateral for the
loan. Mall anchors include Macy's, Sears, JC Penney, Dicks
Sporting Goods and Gordmans. The improvements for Macy's, Sears,
and JC Penney are not part of the collateral. As of October 24,
2012, the mall was 97% occupied. The mall is managed by CBL &
Associates and is not the dominant mall in the area. In-line sales
reported at securitization for the trailing twelve month period
ending March 2010 were $337 per square foot. Moody's current
pooled LTV is 69% and stressed DSCR is 1.41X. Moody's current
credit assessment is Baa3, the same as at last review.



GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC10: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company's GS Mortgage Securities Trust,
series 2013-GC10 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $53,438,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,275,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $110,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $300,475,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81,379,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $656,352,000(*) class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54,785,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $103,126,000(*) class X-B 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,380,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,746,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34,376,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22,558,000 class E 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16,114,000 class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $26,855,941 class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 61 loans secured by 93 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$859.4 million as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Citigroup Global Market Realty Corp., Goldman
Sachs Commercial Mortgage Capital, L.P., Archetype Mortgage
Capital, and MC-Five Mile Capital.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-KING: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating to E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2013-KING's
$498.5 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
Series 2013-KING.

The note issuance is a CMBS securitization backed by the fee and
leasehold interest in Kings Plaza, a 1.2 million-sq.-ft. regional
mall located in Brooklyn, N.Y., of which 872,741 sq. ft. serves as
collateral for the loan.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 5,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflects S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsors' and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loans' terms, and
the transaction's structure.   S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 84.6% and an ending LTV
ratio of 72.4%.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

      http://www.standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1283.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2013-KING

Class       Rating         Amount ($)     LTV (%)

A           AAA (sf)      279,802,000     47.5
X-A         AAA (sf)      279,802,000*    N/A
X-B         A- (sf)       103,085,000*    N/A
B           AA- (sf)       58,906,000     57.5
C           A- (sf)        44,179,000     65.0
D           BBB- (sf)      54,194,000     74.2
E           BB- (sf)       61,422,358     84.6

* Notional balance.
N/A - Not applicable.


GTP COMMERCIAL 2012-2: Fitch Keeps 'BB-' Rating on Class C Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the GTP commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2012-1 and 2012-2 as follows:

-- $100 million 2012-1 class A at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $114 million 2012-2 class A at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $41 million 2012-2 class B at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $27 million 2012-2 class C at 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable.

The affirmations are due to the stable performance of the
collateral since issuance.

SENSITIVITY/RATING DRIVERS

As part of its review, Fitch analyzed the financial and site
information provided by the master servicer, Midland Loan
Services. As of January 2013, aggregate annualized run rate net
cash flow increased 1.5% from issuance to $32.5 million. The Fitch
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.21 times (x)
remained the same since issuance.

The tenant type concentration is stable. At issuance total revenue
contributed by telephony tenants was 98.5%. Lease revenues from
telephony tenants have more stable income characteristics than
other tenant types due to the strong end-use customer demand for
wireless services.

The certificates represent beneficial ownership interest in the
cellular sites, primary assets of which are 1,177 wireless
communication sites leased to 2,116 cellular tower tenants. As of
the January 2013 distribution date, the aggregate principal
balance of the notes remains unchanged at $282 million since
issuance.

The series 2012-1 class A and series 2012-2 class A notes are
interest only for the first year and subsequently amortize by 6%
of the total principal amount through year five. No other
principal will be required to be paid prior to the anticipated
repayment date of the applicable series, which is in March 2017
for 2012-1 class A and March 2019 for the remaining classes.


HARFORD 2005: Moody's Cuts Rating on USD8.65MM Bonds to 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded to B1 from Baa1 RUR DNG the $8,650,000 of
outstanding Harford (County of) MD Multifamily Housing Revenue
Bonds (GNMA Collateralized - Affinity Old Post Commons Apartments)
2005.

Rating Rationale

The bonds are being downgraded based on an asset-to-debt level
below 1.00x and no solution presented by the Trustee to address
the current shortfall.

Strengths:

  GNMA security that guarantees full and timely payment on the
  underlying mortgage loan.

Challenges:

  Weaker than anticipated fund balances.

What Could Change the Rating - UP

  Addition of funds to raise the asset-to-debt ratio.

What Could Change the Rating - DOWN

  Continued decline in asset-to-debt ratio.

U.S. Bank Trustee Contact:

  William G. Keenan, Account Manager
  732-321-3961

The principal methodology used in this rating was US Stand-Alone
Housing Bond Programs Secured by Credit Enhanced Mortgages
published in December 2012.


HEWETT'S ISLAND: S&P Retains 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of notes from Hewett's Island CLO IV Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction.  At the same
time, Standard & Poor's lowered its ratings on two other classes
of notes and affirmed its rating on one class.  In addition,
Standard & Poor's removed all six ratings from CreditWatch with
positive implications, where they were placed on Oct. 29, 2012.

This transaction has been in its amortization phase since the
reinvestment period ended in May 2012.  The upgrades reflect the
partial paydown of $69.46 million to the Class A notes since S&P's
April 2011 rating actions.  Because of this and other factors, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios increased for each class of
notes.

The amortization of the underlying assets has led to a more
concentrated portfolio.  S&P's downgrades of the Class C, D-1, and
D-2 notes reflect the application of the largest obligor default
test, a supplemental stress test S&P introduced as part of its
September 2009 corporate criteria update.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings currently assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating
actions as it deem necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd.
                Rating
Class        To          From
A            AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B            AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
C            A+ (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Pos
D-1          BB+  (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D-2          BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
E            CCC+ (sf)   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos


HIGHLAND PARK: S&P Lowers Rating on 4 Note Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from Highland Park CDO I Ltd. (Highland Park), a U.S.
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transaction, and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on three
other classes from this transaction and removed them from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the transaction's liability structure and the credit
characteristics of the underlying collateral using its criteria
for rating global CDOs backed by pooled structured finance (SF)
assets.  S&P also considered the amount of defaulted assets in the
transaction and their expected recoveries in its analysis.  S&P
lowered its ratings on Classes C through F to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' to reflect its expectation that the classes are unlikely to
be repaid in full.

S&P's CDO of SF criteria include revisions to S&P's assumptions on
correlations, recovery rates, default patterns, and timings of the
collateral.  Specifically, correlations on commercial real estate
assets increased to 70%.  The criteria also incorporate
supplemental stress tests (a largest obligor default test and
a largest industry default test) in S&P's analysis.

According to the Dec. 31, 2012, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $461.2 million, which includes $15.0 million in
future funding obligations on one asset, and the transaction's
liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled
$535.6 million.  This is down from $600.0 million in liabilities
at issuance.  The transaction's current asset pool includes the
following:

   -- 29 CMBS tranches ($138.4 million, 30.0%).

   -- Nine real estate bank loans ($99.2 million, 21.5%).

   -- 11 whole loans ($80.6 million, 17.5%).

   -- Five CDO tranches ($30.0 million, 6.5%).

   -- Eight subordinate interest loans ($26.4 million, 5.7%).

   -- Three real estate investment trust securities
      ($26.0 million, 5.6%).

   -- Cash ($22.7 million, 4.9%).

   -- Seven common stocks and liquidating trusts
      ($20.5 million, 4.4%).

   -- One synthetic security ($17.3 million, 3.8%).

The trustee report noted 22 defaulted CMBS and CRE CDO securities
($126.4 million, 27.4%) and eight defaulted loans ($32.0 million,
6.9%).  The defaulted loan assets are as follows:

   -- Ginn-LA Conduit Lender real estate bank loans
      ($13.0 million, 2.8%).

   -- The Tutwiler Hotel LLC whole loan ($11.5 million, 2.5%).

   -- The HE Capital Asante LLC whole loan and PIK
      ($5.7 million, 1.2%).

   -- The November 2005 Land Investors LLC subordinate interest
      loan and PIK ($1.7 million, 0.4%).

In addition, Standard & Poor's determined four loans
($5.6 million, 1.2%) and seven common stocks and liquidating
trusts ($20.5 million, 4.4%) to be credit impaired.  The credit-
impaired assets include the November 2005 Land Investors LLC whole
loan ($5.0 million, 1.1%) as well as all paid-in-kind (PIK) loans,
common stocks, and liquidating trusts not listed as defaulted by
the trustee ($21.1 million, 4.6%).

Standard & Poor's estimated a 31.7% weighted-average asset-
specific recovery rate for the loans noted as defaulted by the
trustee.  S&P based the recovery rates on information from the
collateral manager, special servicer, and third-party data
providers.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant loss to
those assets deemed credit impaired due to the speculative nature
of their recoveries.

"We credit-impaired the November 2005 Land Investors LLC whole
loan due to our understanding that no collateral is left securing
the loan other than approximately $5.0 million of cash withheld
from the bankruptcy auction to be distributed pro rata to the
lenders.  We credit-impaired the remaining PIK, common stocks, and
liquidating trust assets because of the uncertainty surrounding
the recoveries and the timing of their recoveries. Standard &
Poor's anticipates a significant loss on all of these assets," S&P
said.

"We applied asset-specific recovery rates in our analysis of eight
performing loans ($45.0 million, 9.8%) using our criteria and
property evaluation methodology for U.S. and Canadian CMBS and our
CMBS global property evaluation methodology, both published
Sept. 5, 2012.  It is our understanding that the JER CCP Dry Creek
LLC B Participation loan paid-off after the most recent payment
period.  In our analysis, we treated the loan as such and assumed
a corresponding pay-down of the Class A-1 balance.  We also
considered qualitative factors, such as the near-term maturities
of the loans and refinancing prospects," S&P added.

According to the Dec. 31, 2012, trustee report, the deal is
failing all overcollateralization coverage tests and passing all
interest coverage tests.

In addition, S&P's analysis considers the prior cancellations of
subordinate notes.  According to the March 31, 2010, trustee
report, certain subordinate notes were canceled before they were
repaid through the transaction's payment waterfall.  S&P's ratings
reflect its assessment of any risks and credit stability
considerations regarding the subordinate note cancellations.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions it determine necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Highland Park CDO I Ltd.
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
C         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
D         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
E         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
F         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Highland Park CDO I Ltd.
                     Rating
A-1       B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2       CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
B         CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


KENNECOTT FUNDING: Moody's Ups Rating on $23-Mil. Notes to Baa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Kennecott Funding Ltd.:

U.S.$13,325,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
January 13, 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 10,
2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

U.S.$30,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
January 13, 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 10,
2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

U.S.$35,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
January 13, 2018, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on August 10,
2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

U.S.$23,000,000 Class D-1 Secured Floating Rate Notes Due January
13, 2018, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

U.S.$7,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due January 13,
2018, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S.$100,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rates Notes Due
January 13, 2018 (current outstanding balance of $43,661,600.53),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 10, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

U.S.$253,175,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rates Notes
Due January 13, 2018 (current outstanding balance of
$103,033,165.41), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 10, 2011
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in August 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
and Class A-2A Notes have been paid down by approximately 56.3% or
$56.3 million and 59.3% or $150.1 million, respectively, since the
last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated
January 3, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 138.8%, 123.4% and
112.6%, respectively, versus July 2011 levels of 129.1%, 118.7%
and 110.9%, respectively. Moody's notes the reported January
overcollateralization ratios do not reflect the January 14, 2013
payments of $24.6 million to the Class A-1 Notes and $65.6 million
to the A-2A Notes.

Moody's notes that the deal also benefited from improvements in
the weighted average spread and recovery rate of the underlying
portfolio since the last rating action in August 2011. Moody's
modeled a weighted average spread and recovery rate of 4.76% and
49.68%, respectively, versus 3.85% and 48.00% in August 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $305.7 million,
defaulted par of $4.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.29% (implying a WARF of 3448), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.68%, and a diversity
score of 34. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Kennecott Funding Ltd., issued in January 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2759)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2A: 0
Class A-2B: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +2
Class D-1: +2
Class D-2: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4139)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2A: 0
Class A-2B: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -1
Class D-1: -1
Class D-2: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.


LB-UBS 2004-C8: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Four Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C8 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2011 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2011 Upgraded to B2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on the rating agency's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The
rating of the IO Class, Class X-CL, is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.3% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
9.4%. Realized losses have increased from 1.4% of the original
balance to 2.5% since the prior review. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
Class X-CL.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis.

Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf)
and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit
assessments is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is
based on the credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13 compared to 15 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 15, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 54% to $597 million
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 53 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 49% of the pool. Five loans, representing 23% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains one loan with an investment grade credit
assessment, representing 18% of the pool.

Seven loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $32.3 million (12% loss severity on
average). Six loans, representing 11% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan was
originally known as the Hunt Retail Portfolio and is currently
real estate owned (REO). The collateral originally consisted of 11
retail properties, but 10 of the properties have been sold. The
sale proceeds were used to pay down the loan amount, which is
currently $20.5 million or 59% of its original balance of $34.5
million. The only remaining collateral is a 42,000 square foot
(SF) retail property located in Missouri City, Texas which was 55%
leased as of November 2012. Based on the most recent remittance
statement cumulative advances on this loan were approximately $1.6
million. Moody's estimates a large loss on the remaining loan
balance of $20.5 million.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Antioch
Distribution Center Loan ($18.6 million -- 3.1% of the pool),
which is secured by a 666,600 SF warehouse/distribution center
that was built in 1954 and located in Antioch, California. The
loan was transferred to special servicing in August 2011 due to
imminent maturity as a result of high vacancy at the property and
the loan was transferred to REO in August 2012. As of November
2012, the property was 80% leased, however, 22% of the net
rentable area (NRA) was leased to a temporary tenant that vacated
in January 2013, which caused the occupancy to decrease to 59%.
The special servicer indicated it is discussing strategies to
lease up the property.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $39.2 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (62% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $4.4 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 95% of the pool's non-specially
serviced and non-defeased loans, respectively. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 95%
compared to 94% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.25X and 1.09X, respectively, compared to
1.29X and 1.10X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is The Grace Building Loan
($107.9 million -- 18.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.5
million SF office building located in the Midtown submarket of New
York City. The loan represents a 33% pari-passu interest in a
$323.6 million loan. A $27.7 million B Note, which is held outside
the trust, also encumbers the property. The property was 96%
leased as of June 2012, which is the same as last review.
Brookfield Office Properties and Swig Equities are the loan
sponsors. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
A3 and 1.46X compared to A3 and 1.44X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 14% of the outstanding pool
balance. The largest loan is the DRA/Equity One Florida Portfolio
Loan ($35.8 million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by two
grocery anchored retail and one office property located in Broward
and Palm Beach County, Florida. The portfolio was originally
referred to as the Gehr Florida Portfolio, however, DRA & Equity
One purchased the portfolio for $53 million in August 2008 and
assumed the loan as part of the transaction. The portfolio was 78%
leased as of June 2012, which is the same as last review. The loan
matures in November 2014 and there is near-term rollover risk in
that the two largest tenants in the portfolio, representing 23% of
the portfolio's NRA, have lease expirations prior the loan
maturity date. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.91X,
compared to 106% and 0.92X at last review.

The second largest loan is the North Haven Pavilion Loan ($23.7
million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 150,000 SF
retail center located in North Haven, Connecticut. The property
was 99% leased as of September 2012, which is the same as last
review, and has no rollover in 2013. The collateral is shadow
anchored by a Target, while major collateral tenants include
Sports Authority (36% of the NRA; lease expiration in October
2019) and Michael's Stores (16% of the NRA; lease expiration in
February 2014). The loan is benefitting from amortization and
matures in November 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101%
and 1.02X, compared to 103% and 1.00X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Parkridge Six Loan ($21.4 million --
3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 160,000 SF office
building located in Littleton, Colorado. The property is fully
leased to Aurora Loan Services through July 2016, which is less
than two years after the loan maturity date of October 2014. In
June 2012 Nationstar Mortgage LLC purchased the entire Master
Servicing division from Aurora, including the processes,
technology and files. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's
stressed the value of this property utilizing a lit/dark analysis.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.81X compared to 101%
and 1.01X at last review.


LCM XIII: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to LCM XIII L.P./LCM XIII LLC's $467.0 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 5,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria (see "Update To
      Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
      And Synthetic CDOs," published Sept. 17, 2009).

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      preliminary rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash
      flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the assigned
      preliminary ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
      including LIBOR ranging from 0.31%-12.26%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest reinvestment test, a failure of
      which during the reinvestment period will lead to the
      reclassification of excess interest proceeds, (that are
      available prior to paying subordinated management fees)
      uncapped administrative expenses, and limited partnership
      (L.P.) certificate payments to the principal proceeds for
      the purchase of collateral assets or, at the asset manager's
      discretion (subject to the majority consent of the L.P.
      certificates), to sequentially reduce the balance of the
      rated notes outstanding.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1281.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

LCM XIII L.P./LCM XIII LLC


Class                      Rating                   Amount
                                                   (mil. $)
X                          AAA (sf)                  3.25
A                          AAA (sf)                322.5
B                          AA (sf)                  52.5
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                   45.0
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                 22.5
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                  21.25
Combination notes(i)       A- (sf) (pNRi)           20.0(ii)
Subordinated notes
(L.P. certificates)        NR                       52.0

NR - Not rated
(i)  The combination notes' principal comprises $12 million of
      class C and $8 million of class D note principal.
(ii)  Each component of the combination notes is included in (not
      in addition to) the respective principal amount of the class
      C and D notes.


LNR CDO IV: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 14 Certificate Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed all classes of Notes issued by LNR CDO IV Ltd.
The affirmations are due to key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and re-remic
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. B-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. F-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

LNR CDO IV Ltd is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio
of 100.0% commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS). As of the
December 28, 2012 note valuation report, the collateral par amount
is $507.4 million, representing a $1.1 billion decrease since
securitization primarily due to realized losses on the collateral
pool.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,542
compared to 8,745 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows:

Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 1.5% at last review), A1-A3 (2.7%
compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 5.1%
at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (8.0% compared to 4.1% at last review),
B1-B3 (2.0% compared to 1.2% at last review), and Caa1-C (87.3%
compared to 88.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.8 years, compared to 5.2 years at
last review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 2.8% compared to 3.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0% compared to 100.0% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. However, in
light of the performance indicators noted above, Moody's believes
that it is unlikely that the ratings are sensitive to further
change.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock, albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


LNR CDO V: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 12 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by LNR CDO V Ltd.
The affirmations are due to key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and re-remic
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

LNR CDO V Ltd is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio
of 100.0% commercial mortgage backed securities. As of the
December 27, 2012 note valuation report, the collateral par amount
is $82.5 million, representing a $678.7 million decrease since
securitization primarily due to realized losses on the collateral
pool.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,000,
the same as last review. The current distribution of Moody's rated
collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated collateral is as
follows: Ca-C (100.0%, the same as last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.9 years, compared to 7.3 years at
last review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of zero, the same as last review.

Moody's MAC was not applicable to this review as all of the
collateral has a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,000, which was the same
as last review. As such, no loss distribution adjustment is
necessary.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. However, in
light of the performance indicators noted above, Moody's believes
that it is unlikely that the ratings are sensitive to further
change.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock, albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


LONGFELLOW PLACE: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Longfellow Place CLO Ltd./Longfellow Place CLO LLC's
$463.0 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 6,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (not counting the excess spread), and cash flow
      structure, which can withstand the default rate projected
      by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods
      outlined in its corporate collateralized debt obligation
      (CDO) criteria (see "Update To Global Methodologies And
      Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,"
      Sept. 17, 2009).

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.3523%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
      administrative expenses, incentive management fees, and
      subordinated note payments into principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1288.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Longfellow Place CLO Ltd./Longfellow Place CLO LLC

Class                   Rating           Amount
                                       (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)         325.00
B                       AA (sf)           52.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)            41.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)          23.00
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)           22.00
F (deferrable)          NR                15.50
Subordinated notes      NR                36.50

NR-Not Rated.


GOLDMAN SACHS 2012-GC6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Goldman Sachs Commercial
Mortgage Capital, L.P. (GSMS) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2012-GC6 due to stable performance since
issuance.

Sensitivity/Rating Drivers

Performance has remained stable. There have been no delinquent or
specially serviced loans since issuance. As of the January 2013
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 1% to $1.14 billion from $1.15 billion at issuance.

The largest loan of the pool (10.79%) is secured by 404,865 square
feet (sf) of an 876,848-sf regional mall located in Reno, NV. The
property is anchored by Macy's North, Macy's South, Sears, and JC
Penney. Macy's South is the only anchor included in the
collateral. As of September 2012, the performance was in-line with
issuance.

The second largest loan (8.75%) is secured by 10 manufactured
housing communities (MHCs) and two recreational vehicle (RV)
communities located across six states. As of September 2012, the
servicer reported occupancy is 61%. However, Fitch's review of the
available rent rolls indicates that the occupancy percentage is
actually closer to 91%. Thus, both the occupancy and debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) remain in-line with figures from issuance.

The fourth largest loan (5.15%), secured by a 1,337-unit, 45-
building garden-style apartment complex located in Griffith, IN,
is on the servicer watchlist due to damage sustained in a recent
fire. As of January 2013, 23 units remain down due to damage from
the blaze, and the estimated completion date for the repairs is
March 31, 2013. The loan remains current and with the master
servicer.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $54.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $82.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $570.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $89.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $119.8 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $916.4 million class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $63.5 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $44.7 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $49.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $21.6 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $11.5 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G and class X-B certificates.


JP MORGAN 2003-C1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class H Certs to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed six classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2003-C1 as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2011 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due primarily to interest shortfalls and the
accelerated timing of expected losses impacting the deal. Moody's
is especially concerned about the performance of the largest
conduit loan, the Prince George's Metro Center IV Loan. This loan
is likely to contribute to interest shortfalls in the near-to
medium-term as the loan maturity date approaches and the property
faces the possible loss of its single, Aaa-rated tenant.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is downgraded to reflect
the credit performance of its referenced classes following the
recent paydown of its most highly-rated referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 16% of the current deal balance compared to 3% at
last review. The sharp rise base expected loss as a percentage of
the current balance primarily reflects the large paydown since
last review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
remained unchanged from its prior review, at 7.9% of the
securitized balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and
the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans,
the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could
decline below the current levels. If future performance materially
declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and the
priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the
current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
Class X-1.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10 compared to a Herf of 12 at Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 2, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 14, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to $137 million
from $1.07 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 21 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 77% of the pool. The pool contains no
loans with investment-grade credit assessments. Three loans,
representing approximately 9% of the pool, are defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Ten loans, representing 65% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eight loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $85 million (71% average loan loss
severity). Currently, five loans, representing 19% of the pool,
are in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is
the 200-220 West Germantown Pike Loan ($14 million -- 10% of the
pool), which is secured by a 115,000 square foot office property
in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Philadelphia. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to
monetary default. The trust acquired the asset via a foreclosure
sale in March 2011, and the property is now REO. Property
occupancy and performance had declined sharply in 2010 following
the departure of the former lead tenant, which occupied nearly 40%
of the overall net rentable area (NRA). The servicer is working to
stabilize the property before marketing it for sale. As of year-
end 2012 reporting, the property was 73% leased, up from 45% in
March 2011.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of retail and office property types. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $14 million loss (54% expected loss) for all specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly-
performing loan, representing 3% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to this troubled loan an expected loss in the range of
20%.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 92% and 85% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 78% compared to 76% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 18% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.72%.

Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.52X, respectively, compared to
1.51X and 1.47X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 41% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Prince George's Metro Center IV Loan ($23
million -- 17% of the pool), which is secured by a 178,000 square
foot Class A office property in Hyattsville, Maryland, a suburb of
Washington, DC. The property was built in 2002 expressly for the
US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS leased the
property under a long-term lease which expired on December 31,
2012. The US Government (Moody's senior unsecured rating Aaa,
negative outlook) currently occupies the property on a short-term
lease extension. The loan has a scheduled maturity date of March
12, 2013. Moody's considers this loan to have considerable
refinance risk, given the uncertainty surrounding the extension of
the government lease. Mitigating factors which help to support the
underlying value of the property include the property's age and
its proximity to a station on the Washington area subway network.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 126% and 0.82X,
respectively, compared to 103% and 0.99X at last review.

The second-largest loan is the Pasadena Office Building Loan ($17
million -- 13% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 138,000
square foot property in Pasadena, California. The property is 100%
leased to two tenants, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services, and the Southern California School
of Culinary Arts. The L.A. County lease (53% of property net
rentable area (NRA)) is set to expire on November 1, 2014. Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 51% and 2.01X, respectively,
compared to 53% and 1.96X at last review.

The third-largest loan is the Mark IV Las Vegas Loan ($16 million
-- 12% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 451,000 square foot
office property in Las Vegas, Nevada. The property is leased to a
diverse tenant base, with the largest tenant occupying
approximately 7% of property NRA. The property was 81% leased as
of September 2012, down from 88% at year-end 2010 reporting. The
loan is fully-amortizing. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR
are 57% and, 1.82X respectively, compared to 55% and 1.89X at last
review.


JP MORGAN 2004-LN2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 8 Certificate Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
and affirmed five classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-LN2 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due primarily to higher expected losses from
specially-serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 8.2% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 7.8%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss figure climbed to 9.1% of the
original securitized balance from 8.5% at Moody's last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X-1.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 51 compared to a Herf of 45 at Moody's prior
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 2, 2013.

Deal Performance

As of the January 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $842 million
from $1.25 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 137 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 23% of the pool. The pool contains no
loans with investment-grade credit assessments. Twelve loans,
representing approximately 13% of the pool, are defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Thirty-one loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $44 million (51% average loan loss
severity). Currently, nine loans, representing 11% of the pool,
are in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is
the Countryside Apartments Loan ($22 million -- 3% of the pool),
which is secured by a 1970-era apartment complex in St. Louis,
Missouri. The property contains over 700 units and was 66% leased
as of January 1, 2013, up from 55% in November 2012. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to maturity
default. The property is now REO. The servicer will continue its
efforts to increase property performance before marketing the
asset for sale.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of retail and industrial property types. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $44 million loss (47% expected loss) for all specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly-
performing loans representing 5% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $8 million loss
(20% expected loss severity based on a 50% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 97% and 93% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 87% compared to 89% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11.0% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.3%.

Excluding troubled and specially-serviced loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.36X, respectively, compared to
1.44X and 1.30X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 13% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Chesapeake Square Loan ($67 million -- 8%
of the pool), which is secured by an 800,000 square foot, Simon-
sponsored regional mall in Chesapeake, Virginia. The mall anchors
are Target, Macy's, Sears, and JC Penney. The mall lost anchor
Dillard's in 2010, though a portion of that space was absorbed by
discount retailer Burlington Coat Factory. The loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist for low DSCR. Nevertheless, mall
performance in 2011 showed improvement over the prior year. Total
mall occupancy was 87% as of June 30, 2012. Moody's current LTV
and stressed DSCR are 125% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to
137% and 0.79X at last review.

The second-largest loan is the Embassy Suites -- BWI Airport Loan
($20 million -- 2% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 251-key
all-suite hotel adjacent to Thurgood Marshall Baltimore Washington
International Airport, in Linthicum, Maryland. The loan is on the
watchlist for low occupancy and low DSCR. Full-year 2011 occupancy
fell to 67% from 77% the prior year. The loan is current and
benefits from amortization. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR
are 121% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 81% and 1.50X at
last review.

The third-largest loan is the Plaza Mobile Estates Loan ($20
million -- 2% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 237-pad,
manufactured housing community in Santa Ana, California. The
housing units are of a double-wide configuration. The property was
94% leased as of September 2012. Overall, property performance has
been stable and/or improving since securitization. Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 59% and, 1.51X respectively, compared to
61% and 1.47X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC12: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 Cert. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
and affirmed nine classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-CIBC12 as follows:

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3A2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to an increase in realized losses and
higher anticipated losses from troubled loans and loans in special
servicing.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.6% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
4.7%. Realized losses have increased from 5.0% of the original
balance to 5.6% since the prior review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Class X-1.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in the analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 53 compared to 60 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 14, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 38% to $1.3 billion
from $2.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 144 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 31%
of the pool. Five loans, representing 2% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Thirty-three loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $119 million (40% loss severity on
average). Loan modifications and principal writedowns have
contributed an additional $3 million in realized losses, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $122 million. Eleven loans,
representing 8% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the LXP-ISS Loan ($40.6
million -- 3.0%), which is secured by three office buildings
containing a total of 289,000 square feet (SF) located in Atlanta,
Georgia. The buildings are currently 100% leased to Internet
Security System (ISS) through May 2013. IBM (Moody's senior
unsecured rating Aa3, stable outlook) acquired ISS in 2006. The
loan transferred to special servicing in April 2012 due to
imminent default from the tenant renewing its lease at a below
market rent at only two of three buildings, which represent more
than a 70% reduction from the current in-place rent. Due to the
decrease in both rent and occupancy, the rental revenue of the
property will decrease significantly upon the start of the new
lease. The loan matures in May 2013, one month before the new
lease terms take effect.

The remaining ten specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $50.5 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (52% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for ten poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $14.3 million loss (19% expected loss on average) from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 95% and 79% of the pool's non-specially
serviced and non-defeased loans, respectively. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 93%
compared to 90% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.46X and 1.10X, respectively, compared to
1.50X and 1.13X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15.3% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Universal Hotel Portfolio Loan
($100 million -- 7.4%), which is a pari passu interest in a $400
million first mortgage loan secured by three full service hotel
properties. The three hotels are all located in Orlando, Florida
and total 2,400 guest rooms. The properties are also encumbered by
a $50 million B-note which secures a rake bond that is not rated
by Moody's. After hitting its trough in 2009, the portfolio has
had an upward trend in performance with double digit growth in
revenue per available (RevPar) in both 2010 and 2011. As of
November 2012, the trailing-twelve month RevPAR was at $195, which
is 12% greater than at securitization. The three hotels were all
constructed between 1999 and 2002. All are considered luxury
hotels and are located within Orlando's Universal Theme Park. The
loan is interest only throughout its entire term and matures in
July 2015. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and
1.56X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.50X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Promenade at Westlake Loan ($67.5
million -- 5.0%), which is secured by a 202,000 SF retail center
located in Thousand Oaks, California. The property was 95% leased
as of October 2012 compared to 96% leased at last review. Property
performance increased in 2011 due to an increase in rental revenue
and should continue to increase in 2012 due to increased rental
rates. The loan is benefitting from amortization and matures in
July 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.00X,
respectively, compared to 93% and 0.96X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Fort Steuben Mall Loan
($39.5 million -- 2.9%), which is secured by a 690,000 SF regional
mall in Steubenville, Ohio. The largest tenant is Wal-Mart Super
Store (31% of the NRA, expiration date of August 2027); other
anchors include Sears, JC Penney and Dick's Sporting Goods. The
mall is shadow anchored by Macy's (not part of the collateral). As
of September 2012, the total mall and collateral was 91% and 89%
leased, respectively. The property is subject to rollover risk
with three out of the four largest collateral anchors
(representing 33% of the NRA) having lease expirations prior to
the loan maturity date of July 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 127% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.83X at
last review.


MAGNOLIA FINANCE 2005-6: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. B Notes to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded the rating of one class of Notes issued by
Magnolia Finance II plc Series 2005-6 due to negative credit
migration in the underlying referenced collateral as evidenced by
the Moody's weighted average rating factor (WARF) and recovery
rate (WARR). The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Magnolia Finance II Series 2005-6 is a static synthetic CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps on
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool
balance). As of the January 25, 2013 investor report, the
aggregate issued Note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, has decreased to $75.3 from $307.0 million at
issuance. The reduction in the Note balance is due to optional
full redemption of Class A and partial redemption of Class B.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 119 compared to 57 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated referenced collateral and assessments for non-
Moody's rated referenced collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (85.1%
compared to 87.9% at last review), A1-A3 (7.4% compared to 8.6% at
last review), Baa1-Baa3 (3.7% compared to 2.9% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (3.1% compared to 0.0% at last review) and Caa1-C (0.7%
compared to 0.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.2 years compared to 2.7 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying reference obligations and associated
loans.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 64.5% compared to 65.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 15.3% compared to 11.2% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to credit changes within the reference obligations.
Holding all other key parameters static, changing the current
ratings and credit assessments of the reference obligations by one
notch downward or by one notch upward affects the model results by
approximately 1 notch downward and 2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock, albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


MALIBU LOAN: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on $57.20MM Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the $57,200,500 of notes issued by
Malibu Loan Fund, Ltd. at 'CCCsf'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's analysis of both the market value
(MV) and the credit risk of the portfolio. Given the exposure to
both risks, the tranches are generally rated to the lower of the
two indicative levels.

The notes' rating was primarily determined by comparing the credit
risk of the portfolio to the current credit enhancement available
to the notes. The credit risk of the portfolio was analyzed using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM), as described in Fitch's
Corporate CDO criteria. PCM projects the portfolio's loss rates
(due to default and recovery) that may be experienced under
various rating stresses. The credit enhancement of the notes,
which measures the amount of realized losses that can occur before
the notes are undercollateralized, was then compared to the PCM's
loss rates. Based on Fitch's PCM analysis, the credit enhancement
to the notes of approximately 4.2% falls below the portfolio's
'CCCsf' rating loss rate. Due to the presence of excess spread in
the transaction and the manager's ability to infuse cash into the
transaction, however, Fitch views the credit risk to be consistent
with a 'CCCsf' rating.

The MV risk was analyzed by comparing the distance-to-trigger
(DTT) metric of 11.7% to advance rate (AR) ranges, which is in
line with a 'B' stress. As of the trustee report dated Dec. 31,
2012, the net collateral value (NCV) of the eligible collateral
account was reported to be approximately $69.2 million. The NCV is
equal to the sum of the MV of the eligible collateral and the
unrealized MV gains or losses of the reference portfolio. The DTT
metric indicates the price decline stress that would occur before
triggering a termination event, which occurs when the NCV falls
below $27 million (the termination threshold). The trigger is
structured 'inside the tranche', such that the transaction may
unwind with a substantial loss to the rated notes if breached.

The AR ranges are based on Fitch's analysis of the market
dislocation experienced in 2007-2008, and represent a peak-to-
trough decline. The worst case peak-to-trough price decline
observed in loans during that timeframe was approximately 15%,
which Fitch viewed as a 'BB' stress. Fitch's analysis of the MV
risk begins with a categorization of portfolio loan assets based
on the seniority level of the loan and/or their market price,
which is then used to determine the AR thresholds under various
rating stresses. A senior secured first lien loan priced above 85%
of par would be classified as Category 2, and the AR applied to a
Category 2 asset under a 'BB' stress would be 85%. A covenant-
light loan or a loan that is priced between 70% and 85% of par
would be classified as Category 3, in which an AR of 73% would
apply in a 'BB' stress.

A loan that is priced below 70% of par would be classified as
Category 4, and an AR of 51% would apply in a 'BB' stress. Fitch
also assumed that price declines under a 'B' stress would be
approximately half of the observed 'BB' stress, implying that the
price decline for a Category 2 asset would be approximately 7.5%.
Therefore, the ARs for Category 2, 3, and 4 assets would be 92%,
85% and 75%, respectively, under a 'B' stress. This analysis is
further supplemented in Fitch's May 2008 commentary, 'Fitch
Update: Application of Revised Market Value Structure Criteria to
TRR CLOs'.

Based on Fitch's classification of the portfolio assets, Malibu's
portfolio is composed of the following:

--83.6% Category 2 assets;
--14.8% Category 3 assets;
--1.6% Category 4 assets.

The weighted average AR of the current portfolio (as of the
Dec. 31, 2012 trustee report) is approximately 90.7% under a 'B'
stress, which corresponds to an MV decline of 9.3%. Based on
Fitch's classification of the assets, the DTT of 11.7% falls
within Fitch's 'B' stress for the structure. In addition,
sensitivity to MV risk still remains high, as the amount of long-
dated assets is 25.2%. The increased exposure to long-dated assets
implies potential MV risk upon the maturity of the program.

The manager has made multiple infusions of cash collateral to
increase Malibu's cushion to its distribution threshold - a
mechanism that traps excess spread generated from the reference
portfolio to invest in additional collateral. The manager had
injected amounts up to approximately $165.3 million in cash on
multiple occasions to avoid breach of the distribution threshold
during the credit crisis.

Malibu Loan Fund, Ltd. is a synthetic total rate of return
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) with an MV termination
trigger. The transaction closed on Sept. 30, 2005 and is managed
by Aegon USA Investment Management. The notes began to experience
negative net asset value coverage in 2008, but subsequently
benefited from cash infusions which were designed to increase the
distance to the distribution and termination thresholds. In May
2012, the transaction was amended and the maximum permitted
aggregate notional amount of Malibu Loan Fund was lowered from
$700 million to $400 million, in addition to lowering the rated
note balance from $110.8 million to $57 million. The transaction
remains in its reinvestment period until November 2014.


MERRILL LYNCH 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class L Notes to 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Merrill Lynch Floating Trust's series 2006-1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications, where S&P placed them
on Dec. 18, 2012.

The lowered ratings follow S&P's analysis of the transaction,
which included its revaluation of the remaining two floating-rate
mortgage loans, the transaction structure, interest shortfalls,
and liquidity available to the trust.  S&P also considered losses
that it anticipates will occur upon the eventual resolution of the
two specially serviced loans ($97.1 million, 100%).

S&P placed its ratings on classes K and L on CreditWatch with
negative implications on Dec. 18, 2012, because of interest
shortfalls to these classes as reflected in the Dec. 17, 2012,
trustee remittance report.  The interest shortfalls were a result
of a nonrecoverable determination made by the master servicer,
KeyBank Real Estate Capital (KeyBank), on Dec. 12, 2012, on the
Royal Holiday Portfolio loan, the larger of the two remaining
loans in the trust.  According to the December 2012 trustee
remittance report, interest not advanced from the nonrecoverable
determination totaled $143,975 and resulted in all of the
outstanding classes in the trust shorting interest.

The downgrade on class K reflects reduced liquidity in the trust
and the susceptibility of this class to interest shortfalls
because of the nonrecoverable determination on the larger of the
two remaining loans, the Royal Holiday Portfolio loan
($65.0 million, 67.0%).  Interest shortfalls totaling $161,961
were reported in the Jan. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report,
primarily comprising special servicing fees of $12,701 and
interest not advanced of $148,830.  Interest shortfalls in this
period were partly offset by a principal curtailment of $936,607
on the smallest loan, the Crowne Plaza Hotel San Antonio loan.
Excluding the unscheduled principal curtailment, all of the
outstanding classes in the trust would have experienced interest
shortfalls, as depicted in the Dec. 17, 2012, trustee remittance
report.  If this class experiences interest shortfalls for an
extended period of time, S&P may further lower the rating on this
class.

S&P lowered its rating on class L because of interest shortfalls
that it believes will continue in the near term.  Class L has
incurred interest shortfalls for two consecutive months.  If this
class continues to experience interest shortfalls for an extended
period, S&P may further lower the rating on this class to 'D
(sf)'.

As of the Jan. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
consisted of two floating-rate interest-only loans indexed to one-
month LIBOR, both of which are currently with the special
servicers.  The one-month LIBOR rate was 0.209% according to the
January 2013 trustee remittance report.

The Royal Holiday Portfolio loan, the larger of the two remaining
loans in the trust, has a trust balance of $65.0 million (67.0%)
and whole-loan balance of $103.0 million.  The total reported
exposure in the trust is $75.2 million.  The loan is secured by
six full-service hotel properties totaling 1,501 rooms in various
cities in Mexico.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Feb. 11, 2010, because the loan became delinquent.
The special servicer, CT Investment Management Co. LLC (CT),
indicated that the borrower filed for bankruptcy in Mexico while
the special servicer filed suit on behalf of the lender to seek
payment under the loan's recourse guaranty. CT stated that it
expects a lengthy (at least two years) litigation process.  CT
also informed S&P that updated operating statements for the
collateral properties are unavailable at this time and the special
servicer is in the process of ordering an updated appraisal.  The
most recent appraisal value reported by the special servicer was
$131.1 million as of Nov. 30, 2011.  Based on the information
provided to S&P to date, it expects a minimal loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

The Crowne Plaza Hotel San Antonio loan, the smaller of the two
remaining loans in the trust, has a trust balance of $32.1 million
(33.0%) and a whole-loan balance of $58.1 million.  The total
reported exposure in the trust is $32.1 million.  The loan is
secured by a 410-room full-service hotel in San Antonio, Texas.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 6, 2012,
for a technical default after failing a performance test, as well
as imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on June 11, 2012.
The special servicer for this loan, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage
LLC, is currently pursuing various workout strategies, including
foreclosure.  The year-to-date (YTD) Nov. 30, 2012, operating
statements, reported occupancy of 70.5%, an average daily rate of
$104.85, and revenue per room of $73.88.  KeyBank reported a 3.39x
debt service coverage for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012.
The July 12, 2012, appraisal valued the property at $43.0 million.
S&P based its analysis, in part, on a review of the borrower's
operating statements for the YTD Nov. 30, 2012, and calendar years
2011, and 2010.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a 9.25%
capitalization rate, yielded an in-trust stressed loan-to-value
ratio of 84.1%.  S&P expects a minimal, if any, loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Merrill Lynch Floating Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-1
              Rating
Class     To                    From
K         BB (sf)               BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
L         CCC- (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg



ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-8: Fitch Lowers Ratings on 4 Certs to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 10 and affirmed 13 classes of ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2007-8, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

rating sensitivities

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch-modeled losses across
the pool due to further deterioration of loan performance, most of
which involves significantly higher losses on the specially
serviced loans resulting from updated valuations, as well as
continued underperformance for several loans in the top 15. Fitch
modeled losses of 18.4% of the remaining pool; modeled losses on
the original pool balance total 19.6%, including losses already
incurred. Modeled losses on the original pool have increased from
15.8% at Fitch's last rating action.

The Negative Outlook on classes A-3 and AM reflects the
uncertainty and timing surrounding the workout of many of the
specially serviced assets and the possibility for further
underperformance on loans in the top 15. The Negative Outlook on
the multifamily-directed classes A-1A and AM-A reflects the
possibility for continued underperformance of the multifamily
collateral in the pool. The multifamily collateral comprises 32.1%
of the pool and includes the largest loan in the pool (15.9%),
which is currently in special servicing. A significant portion of
the multifamily collateral is either in special servicing or is
classified as a Fitch Loan of Concern (totaling 25.4%).

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 14.2% to $2.09 billion from
$2.44 billion at issuance. Approximately $252.1 million (10.4%)
were principal paydowns and approximately $93.9 million (3.9%)
were realized losses. No loans have defeased since issuance.
Cumulative interest shortfalls total $20.1 million and are
currently affecting classes AJ through T. There is a lack of
upcoming loan maturities as 93% of the pool mature in 2017 or
later.

Fitch has identified 68 loans (54.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 12 specially serviced assets (23.5%). Eight (5.5%)
of the loans in special servicing are classified as in foreclosure
(1.2%) or real-estate owned (REO: 4.3%). Four of the top 15 loans
(26.7%) are or have been in special servicing, including one loan
(6.6%) which has been modified and returned to the master
servicer. Thirteen of the top 15 loans (38.1%) have Fitch loan-to-
values greater than 90%. These loans may experience difficulties
at the time of refinancing.

The largest contributors to modeled losses are three (23.2%) of
the top 15 loans in the pool, two (18.4%) of which are specially
serviced.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Empirian
Multifamily Portfolio Pool 2 loan (15.9%). The loan transferred to
special servicing in December 2010 for imminent default. The loan
was originally secured by a portfolio of 73 multifamily properties
(totaling 6,892 units) located across eight states. As of October
2012, the reported portfolio occupancy was 76.3%. Current
portfolio cash flow is estimated to be down by greater than 30%
since issuance.

In August 2012, the lender foreclosed upon 14 of the properties
(1,218 units) in the portfolio, all of which are located in
Georgia. In December 2012, the lender foreclosed upon another
property (101 units) located in Westland, MI. The lender is
continuing to pursue foreclosure, while discussions with the
borrower continue regarding potential alternatives for the
remainder of the portfolio. A recent appraisal from January 2013
indicates a value significantly below the total loan exposure
amount. Fitch will continue to monitor the foreclosure progress on
the remainder of the portfolio.

The next largest contributor to modeled losses is the Executive
Hills Portfolio loan (4.8%). The loan is secured by a portfolio of
nine office properties, all of which are located in the Kansas
City MSA. Five of the properties are located in Overland Park, KS
and four are located in Kansas City, MO. The submarkets that the
properties are located in reported high vacancies ranging from
13%-16%, according to REIS as of the fourth quarter 2012.

Portfolio performance has been suffering with declining occupancy.
As of September 2012, the portfolio occupancy was 65.8%, down from
79.4% at year-end (YE) 2011 and 92.3% at issuance. The individual
properties have occupancies ranging from 0% to 95.7%. One property
is fully vacant, while another is below 10% occupied.
Approximately 45% of the portfolio square footage rolls prior to
the loan's July 2017 maturity. According to the September 2012
rent roll, upcoming lease rollovers for the next three years
include: 2013 (7.4%), 2014 (4.9%), and 2015 (7.8%).

The portfolio's debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), on a net
operating income (NOI) basis remains below 1.0x, significantly
down from the 1.65x reported at issuance. For the first nine
months of 2012, the NOI DSCR was 0.97x compared to 0.82x and 0.98x
at YE 2011 and YE 2010, respectively.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is the Towers at
University Town Center loan (2.5%). The loan was transferred to
special servicing in July 2010 for delinquent payments. The asset
is a 224 unit student housing property located in Hyattsville, MD.
The asset became REO in October 2012. As of July 2012, the
property was 92% occupied. A receiver and a new property manager
are both in place for the asset.

Fitch has downgraded and revised Rating Outlooks as indicated:

--$655.8 million class A-3 to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook to
   Negative from Stable;
--$627.4 million class A-1A to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook to
   Negative from Stable;
--$126.9 million class AM to 'Bsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Negative;
--$116.6 million class AM-A to 'Bsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Negative;
--$109.4 million class AJ to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
--$100.6 million class AJ-A to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
--$12.7 million class B to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
--$39.6 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
--$27.4 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
--$9.1 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes as
indicated:

--$103.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$65.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
--$18.3 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
--$21.3 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
--$33.5 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
--$21.7 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  --$0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
--$0 class S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
class T. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only
class X.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-HQ2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of five classes,
affirmed three classes and downgraded three classes of Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-HQ2 as follows:

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2012 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2012 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of the principal classes are due to increases in
credit enhancement levels resulting from paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 91% since last review.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The downgrades of the principal classes are primarily due to
concerns about increased interest shortfalls and the timing of
expected losses.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1 is downgraded based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.4% of
the current balance compared to 1.5% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 1.9%, down from 2.0% at last
review, of securitized balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used for
rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
Class X-1.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis.

Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf)
and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit
assessments is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is
based on the credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 6, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 14, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $70.5
million from $931.6 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 20% of the pool. There is one defeased loan,
representing 4% of the pool, which is secured by U.S. Government
Securities.

Seven loans, representing 49% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $6.8 million loss (53% loss severity on
average). There are currently three loans, representing 20% of the
pool, in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is
the 200 SW Michigan Building Loan ($7.2 million - 10.2% of the
pool), which is secured by an 83,000 square foot (SF) office
property located in Seattle, Washington. The loan transferred to
special servicing in November 2012 as the result of maturity
default on November 1, 2012. The borrower is requesting a loan
extension to allow time to determine if the largest tenant will
vacate in June 2013. As of September 2012, the property was 60%
leased.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Arlington Green
Executive Center Loan ($4.9 million - 6.9% of the pool). The loan
is secured by a 62,300 SF office property located in Arlington
Heights, Illinois. The loan transferred to special servicing in
February 2012 as the result of payment default. A receiver was
appointed in October 2012. A foreclosure sale is projected for
July 2013. As of September 2012, the property was 50% leased.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Salisbury
Professional Center Loan ($2.2 million - 3.2% of the pool). The
loan is secured by a 38,800 SF office property located in
Jacksonville, Florida. The loan transferred to special servicing
in December 2012 as the result of maturity default on December 1,
2012. The borrower was unable to secure refinancing and has
requested a loan extension or modification. As of September 2012,
the property was 90% leased.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $7.9 million loss for all of the
specially serviced loans (56% expected loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 65% of the loans respectively.
Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's weighted average LTV
is 93% compared to 81% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 1.47X and
1.33X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 48% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 408-420 Fulton Street Loan ($14.3
million -- 20.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 59,700 SF
retail property located in downtown Brooklyn, New York. As of
December 2012, the property was 100% leased. The largest tenants
are Apogee and McDonalds. The loan has a scheduled maturity date
of April 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.32X,
the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Valley View Center Loan ($10.9
million -- 15.4% of the pool) which is secured by a 95,700 SF
retail center located in Yorba, Linda California. The largest
tenants are Sprouts and Chase Bank. As of September 2012 the
property was 97% leased. The loan matured in January 2013. The
loan is on the watchlist due to its upcoming maturity date.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 122% and 0.81X, respectively,
compared to 108% and 0.92X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Olympic Gateway Center Loan ($8.51
million -- 12.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 142,300 SF
retail property located in Aberdeen, Washington. The largest
tenants are Ross Dress for Less, Big 5 Corporate Store and Acre
Corporation Services. As of September 2012, the property was 86%
leased. The loan is on the watchlist due to a decline in occupancy
and upcoming maturity date. The loan has a scheduled maturity date
of January 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.94X,
respectively, compared to 95% and 1.05X last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-IQ10: Moody's Cuts Rating on 5 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of one class,
downgraded five classes and affirmed ten classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-IQ10 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations for the nine principal and interest bonds are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The downgrades for the four principal and interest bonds are due
to an increase in expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

The rating of the IO Classes, Class X-1 and X-Y, are consistent
with the expected credit performance of each security's referenced
classes and thus are affirmed.

Moody's is correcting the rating for Morgan Stanley Capital I
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
IQ10's Cl. X-2 (CUSIP: 617451AH2) to Aaa(sf) from Ba3(sf). As part
of the rating action announced on February 22, 2012, Cl. X-2 was
downgraded to Ba3(sf) due to an incorrect interest-only bond type
classification. The classification has now been corrected, and
this rating action reflects that change.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.0% of the
current pooled balance compared to 8.9% at last review. Moody's
based expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.9% of the
original pooled balance compared to 7.3% at last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The
Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of Classes X-1,
X-2 and X-Y.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis.

Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf)
and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit
assessments is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is
based on the credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
assessments in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25 compared to 26 at Moody's prior review.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 11, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 31% to $1.06
billion from $1.55 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 189 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 45%
of the pool. Two loans, representing 1% of the pool, have been
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government Securities.
The pool contains 70 residential cooperative loans, representing
11% of the pool, that have a Aaa credit assessment.

Forty loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $49 million (33% average loss
severity). Two loans, representing less than 4% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loans is the Cortana Mall ($31M -- 2.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 350,000 square foot (SF) portion of a 1.4 million SF
class B regional mall located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The
property became real estate owned (REO) in February 2011. The in-
line space is only 55% leased as of October 2012. The servicer has
recognized a $17 million appraisal reduction for this property and
is currently marketing it for sale.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $22 million appraisal
reduction for both specially serviced loans, while Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $35 million loss (87% average expected
loss).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 12 poorly
performing loans representing 13% of the pool and has estimated an
$18 million aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 55%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 98% and 72% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 83%
compared to 89% at Moody's prior review. The conduit portion of
the pool excludes specially serviced, troubled and defeased loans
as well as the residential cooperative loans with credit
assessments. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 13% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.29X,
respectively, compared to 1.48X and 1.19X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool. The largest
loan is the 1875 K Street Loan ($85 million -- 8.0% of the pool),
which is secured by a 188,000 SF Class A office building located
in Washington D.C. The property was 80% leased as of October 2012
compared to 95% at last review. The property's second largest
tenant, 16% of the net rentable area, vacated at its September
2012 lease expiration. Moody's valuation is based on a stabilized
occupancy level and market rent. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
124% and 0.74X, respectively, compared to 122% and 0.75X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the L-3 Communications Loan ($78
million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured by an eight
building office/industrial complex totaling 901,000 SF located in
Salt Lake City, UT. The complex has been fully leased since
securitization. Performance has improved due to an increase in
rents. Moody's utilized a Lit/Dark analysis for this loan as the
largest tenant, L-3 Communications, occupies 83% of the NRA with
lease expirations staggered from 2015-2019. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.17X, respectively, compared to 88% and
1.13X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Central Mall Forth Smith Loan ($55
million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by a regional mall
totaling 861,000 SF (collateral is 738,000 SF) located in Fort
Smith, Arkansas. The property is the only regional mall within a
55 mile radius. The property was 92% leased as of September 2012,
which is the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 95% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 100% and 1.03X at
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP 21: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Certs to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 17 classes and
downgraded two classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust,
Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-TOP21 as
follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2012 Downgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmation of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.1% of the
current balance compared to 3.8% at last review. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012. The Interest-Only
Methodology was used for the rating of Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22 compared to 23 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST  (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 3, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 14, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to $1.01
billion from $1.38 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 104 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool. The pool includes five loans,
representing 6% of the pool, with investment-grade credit
assessments. The pool contains one defeased loan, representing
less than 1% of the pool, which is secured by U.S. Government
Securities.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $13.2 million loss (45% loss severity on
average). There is currently one loan, representing less than 1%
of the pool in special servicing. The loan is secured by an office
property located in West Lake Village, California.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $777,000 loss for all of the
specially serviced loans (50% expected loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 90% of the loans respectively.
Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's weighted average LTV
is 89% compared to 91% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.20X, respectively, compared to 1.60X and
1.18X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 30% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Monmouth Mall Loan ($132.7
million -- 13.1% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.4 million square foot (SF) regional mall located
in Eatontown, New Jersey. The property is also encumbered by a
$27.1 million junior loan which secures non-pooled classes MMA and
MMB. The mall is anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney and Lord &
Taylor. Boscov's, a former anchor tenant comprising 261,000 SF,
vacated the center three years ago, although its lease does not
expire until April 2018. As of September 2012, the inline space
was 86% leased compared to 84% at last review. The loan had a 60-
month interest-only period and is now amortizing on a 360-month
schedule maturing in September 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
for the A-note are 85% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 80%
and 1.15X at last review.

The second largest loan is the SBC-Hoffman Estates Loan ($88.1
million -- 8.7% of the pool) which is secured by a 1.7 million SF
office complex located approximately 25 miles northwest of Chicago
in Hoffman Estates, Illinois. The complex is 100% leased to SBC
Services Inc. through August 2016. The lease is guaranteed by AT&T
Corporation. The loan is structured as a pari passu note with a
total balance of $172.7 million. The loan had an anticipated
repayment date (ARD) in December 2010. Since last review, the loan
balance has decreased by 8% due to hyper-amortization. Moody's
utilized a Lit/Dark analysis to reflect potential cash flow
volatility due to the single tenant exposure. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.17X, respectively, compared to 96% and
1.07X, respectively, at last review.

The third largest loan is the InTown Suites Portfolio - Roll Up
Loan ($83.8 million -- 8.3% of the pool), which is secured by 30
extended-stay hotels totaling 3,791 rooms. The hotels are located
in 25 cities and 17 states. RevPAR for the 12-month period ending
June 2012 was $182 compared to $167 in 2011. The loan is
amortizing on a 300-month schedule maturing in November 2015 and
has paid down 16% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 79% and 1.59X, respectively, compared to 88% and 1.45X at
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-XLF: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 2007-XLF, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three other classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades and affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the
transaction, which included its revaluation of the three remaining
loans in the trust, the transaction structure, interest
shortfalls, and liquidity available to the trust.  In addition,
S&P considered the losses that it anticipates will occur upon the
eventual resolution of the two specially serviced loans
($152.6 million, 52.4% of the pooled trust balance).

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes G and H to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls that it believes will remain
outstanding in the near term.  Classes G and H both have
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for five consecutive
months.  Class F has accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
for four months.  If the accumulated interest shortfalls continue
to remain outstanding for an extended period of time, S&P may
further lower the rating on class F to 'D (sf)'.

As of the Jan. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
consisted of three mortgage loans indexed to one-month LIBOR.  The
one-month LIBOR rate was 0.209% according to the January 2013
trustee remittance report.  Two of the three remaining loans
($152.6 million, 52.4% of the pooled trust balance) are with the
special servicers, Midland Loan Services Inc. (Midland) and
CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital).

S&P based its analysis for the remaining three loans, in part, on
a review of the borrower's operating statements for the available
trailing-12-months ended 2012, the years ended Dec. 31, 2011,
Dec. 31, 2010, and December 2009, and the borrower's 2013 budget.
Details on the three remaining loans are as follows:

The Crowne Plaza Times Square loan is the largest remaining loan
in the pool and is secured by a 770-room full-service hotel in
Manhattan.  The collateral also includes 180,328 sq. ft. of office
space and 42,121 sq. ft. of retail space.  The loan has a trust
balance of $138.6 million (47.6% of the pooled trust balance) and
a whole-loan balance of $170.7 million.  In addition, the
borrower's equity interests in the property secure two mezzanine
loans totaling $84.7 million.  According to the master servicer,
also Midland, the loan was modified and extended for two years on
Dec. 16, 2011, and has a one-year extension option remaining.  As
part of the loan modification, the senior portion of the whole-
loan received a $10.0 million principal payment.  The borrower's
year-to-date (YTD) June 30, 2012, operating statements reported
occupancy of 92.8%, average daily rate (ADR) of $259.47, and
revenue per room (RevPAR) of $240.83.  Midland reported a debt
service coverage (DSC) of 2.67x for the annualized six- months
ended June 30, 2012.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a blended
capitalization rate of 8.28%, yielded an in-trust stressed loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio of 127.1%.

The HRO Hotel Portfolio (HRO) loan, the second-largest remaining
loan in the pool, is the largest loan with the special servicer,
CWCapital.  The loan is secured by five full-service hotels
totaling 1,910 rooms throughout the U.S..  The loan has a whole-
loan balance of $144.1 million that is split into a $131.0 million
senior pooled component (45.0% of the pooled trust balance) and
a $13.1 million subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to
the 'HRO' certificates (not rated by Standard & Poor's).  In
addition, the borrower's equity interests in the properties secure
three mezzanine loans totaling $127.7 million.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 4, 2012, for imminent
maturity default (the loan matured on Oct. 9, 2012).  CWCapital
stated that it is currently pursuing various workout strategies,
including a loan modification and foreclosure.

The borrower's YTD Sept. 30, 2012, operating statements reported
occupancy of 67.7%, an ADR of $109.47, and RevPAR of $74.60.
Midland reported a DSC of 5.40x for the annualized nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2012.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a
capitalization rate of 9.25%, yielded an in-trust stressed LTV
ratio of 182.1%.  Based on the information the special servicer
provided, S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan.

The Le Meridien Cancun loan, the smallest remaining loan in the
transaction, is the other loan with the special servicer.  The
loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $21.6 million (7.4%)
and is secured by a 213-room full-service hotel in Cancun, Mexico.
According to the master servicer, the loan was modified and
extended in 2011.  In conjunction with the loan modification, a
new intercreditor agreement was created and eliminated the rights
of the original subordinate noteholders.  The loan was transferred
back to the special servicer, Midland, on July 30, 2012, due to a
technical default.  The loan has two one-year extensions
remaining, but according to Midland, the borrower was unable to
exercise its extension option due to the technical default.
Midland informed S&P that it expects these technical issues to be
resolved over the next 30 days, which will allow the borrower to
exercise one of the two remaining extension options.  Midland
stated that once the loan is extended, it intends to transfer the
loan back to the master servicer.  Midland's YTD Sept. 30, 2012,
operating statement reported occupancy of 27.00%, an ADR of
$261.16, and RevPAR of $70.51.  Midland reported that the
property's cash flow was not sufficient to cover DSC for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2011.  S&P's adjusted valuation yielded an in-trust
stressed LTV ratio of 134.8%.  Based on the information the
special servicer provided, S&P expects a moderate loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-XLF
                Rating
Class    To                From
D        BB+ (sf)           BBB (sf)
E        CCC (sf)           BBB- (sf)
F        CCC- (sf)          BB+ (sf)
G        D (sf)             BB (sf)
H        D (sf)             B- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-XLF

Class           Rating
A-2             AA+ (sf)
B               A+ (sf)
C               BBB+ (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C7: Moody's Rates Class G Certificates 'B2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to fifteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C7 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. PST, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 64 fixed rate loans secured
by 123 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.69X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.03X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 100.4% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is 22.
The transaction's loan level diversity is similar to Herfindahl
scores found in most multi-borrower transactions issued since
2009. With respect to property level diversity, the pool's
property level Herfindahl Index is 24. The transaction's property
diversity profile is similar to the indices calculated in most
multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.01, which is lower
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Interest-Only
Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.61
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 22%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


MOUNTAIN HAWK: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd./Mountain Hawk I CLO Corp.'s
$451.5 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 5,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash-flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria (see "Update
      To Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash
      Flow And Synthetic CDOs," published Sept. 17, 2009).

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash-flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.31%-12.53%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available prior to paying subordinated
      management fees, uncapped administrative expenses, hedge
      payments, and income note payments into principal proceeds
      for the purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1282.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd./Mountain Hawk I CLO Corp.

Class                Rating           Amount
                                     (mil. $)
A-1                  AAA (sf)         310.00
A-X                  AAA (sf)          10.00
B-1                  AA (sf)           40.00
B-2                  AA (sf)           10.00
C (deferrable)       A (sf)            29.00
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)          23.00
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)           29.50
Income notes         NR                49.75

NR-Not rated.


NATIONSTAR AGENCY: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Nationstar Agency Advance Funding Trust's
$900 million servicer advance receivables-backed notes series
2013-VF1, 2013-T1, and 2013-T2.

The trust's note issuance is an RMBS securitization of servicer
advance receivables made on Freddie Mac-backed U.S. residential
mortgage loans (and potential Fannie Mae-backed loans).

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the likelihood that the
recoveries on the servicer advances, together with the reserve
fund and the overcollateralization, will be sufficient under S&P's
rating stresses, as outlined in its criteria, to meet the
scheduled interest and ultimate principal payments due on the
securities according to the obligations' terms.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1259.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Nationstar Agency Advance Funding Trust

Class             Rating   Type      Interest rate      Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1-VF1 VFN       AAA (sf) Floating  1 mo. LIBOR+1.20  530.918
A-1-T1 term notes AAA (sf) Fixed     0.997             177.296
A-2-T2 term notes AAA (sf) Fixed     1.892              88.987
B-1-VF1 VFN       AA (sf)  Floating  1 mo. LIBOR+1.75   32.756
B-1-T1 term notes AA (sf)  Fixed     1.246               9.597
B-2-T2 term notes AA (sf)  Fixed     2.487               4.853
C-1-VF1 VFN       A (sf)   Floating  1 mo. LIBOR+3.25   17.837
C-1-T1 term notes A (sf)   Fixed     1.743               4.850
C-2-T2 term notes A (sf)   Fixed     3.228               2.348
D-1-VF1 VFN       BBB (sf) Floating  1 mo. LIBOR+3.75   18.849
D-1-T1 term notes BBB (sf) Fixed     2.734               4.953
D-2-T2 term notes BBB (sf) Fixed     4.212                2.40
E-1-T1 term notes BB (sf)  Fixed     4.458               1.547
E-2-T2 term notes BB (sf)  Fixed     5.926               0.887
F-1-T1 term notes B (sf)   Fixed     5.926               1.757
F-2-T2 term notes B (sf)   Fixed     7.385               0.525

VFN - Variable-funding notes.


NAVIGATOR CDO: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its ratings
on three classes of notes from Navigator CDO 2003 Ltd., a cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction, and removed
the classes from CreditWatch with positive implications, where
they were placed on Oct. 29, 2012.

This transaction currently is in its amortization phase; the
reinvestment period ended in May 2007.  S&P's current upgrades
reflect the complete paydown of the class B notes as well as
partial paydowns of $16.4 million and $7.7 million to the class C-
1 and C-2 notes, respectively, because of S&P's March 2012 rating
actions.  Because of this and other factors, overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios increased for each class of notes.

S&P's rating on the class D notes reflects the application of the
largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test S&P
introduced as part of its September 2009 corporate criteria
update.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings currently assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Navigator CDO 2003 Ltd.

                Rating
Class        To         From

C-1          AAA (sf)   A (sf)/Watch Pos
C-2          AAA (sf)   A (sf)/Watch Pos
D            BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


NOMURA ASSET 1998-D6: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Class B-3 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms Nomura Asset Securities Corp.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-D6.

Sensitivity/Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to stable pool performance. Fitch modeled
losses of 2.66% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 2.67%, including losses already
incurred. The pool has experienced $87.5 million (2.35% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Additionally,
no loans are delinquent or in special servicing.

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool has paid down
88% to $447.4 million from $3.7 billion at issuance and
approximately 45% of the transaction is defeased. Fitch has
identified 13 Loans of Concern (11%).

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $88.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.8 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37.2 million class B-2 at 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable;
-- $37.2 million class B-3 at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable.

The $5.6 million class B-5 remains at 'Dsf/RE0%' and the fully
depleted class B-6 remains at 'Dsf/RE0%'.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A-2, A-CS1, and A-3 have been paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the $158.2 million class B-1; the $65.1
million class B-4; the fully depleted class B-7; or the fully
depleted B-7H certificates.

Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class
PS-1. (For additional information on the withdrawal of the rating
on class PS-1, see 'Fitch Revises Practice for Rating IO & Pre-
Payment Related Structured Finance Securities', dated June 23,
2010.)


OZLM FUNDING III: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to OZLM Funding III Ltd./ OZLM Funding III LLC's
$583.25 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 4,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (not counting excess spread), and cash flow
      structure, which can withstand the default rate projected
      by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods
      outlined in its corporate collateralized debt obligation
      (CDO) criteria

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.305%-12.813%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1277.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OZLM Funding III Ltd./OZLM Funding III LLC

Class                      Rating           Amount
                                          (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)        396.500
A-2A                       AA (sf)          59.875
A-2B                       AA (sf)          19.000
B (deferrable)             A (sf)           47.375
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)         30.500
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)          30.000
Subordinated notes         NR               70.000


PPM AMERICA: Fitch Cuts Withdraws 'Dsf' on $8.8MM Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn one class of notes
issued by PPM America High Grade CBO I, Ltd./Corp. (PPM HG I) as
follows:

-- $8,800,262 class C notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
    rating withdrawn.

The downgrade and withdrawal are due to a failure to repay the
rated balance of the notes on the maturity date in January 2012.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs'. Fitch did not utilize the
Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) or a cash flow model in this analysis
due to the transaction reaching its maturity date.


PROMINENT CMBS: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Prominent CMBS Conduit No. 2 Ltd.

The rating actions follow the allocation of losses to the class D,
E, and F notes on the October 2012 payment date, and the
application of S&P's updated European commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) criteria.

Prominent 2 is a U.K. CMBS transaction in which the payments under
the notes are synthetically linked via credit default swaps to the
payments under five loans.  The loans in turn are backed by office
and retail assets in England and Wales.

Three of the transaction's original five loans have experienced
credit events.

                          ROADE ONE LOAN

A bankruptcy credit event notice was issued for the Roade One loan
on Aug. 10, 2011.  All of the properties backing the loan have
since been sold.  On the October 2012 payment date, the issuer
allocated GBP34.74 million of losses to the class D, E, and F
notes.  The outstanding balance of the class E and F notes was
reduced to zero and the outstanding principal balance on the class
D notes was reduced by GBP6.8 million to GBP13.2 million.

                          CAVENDISH LOAN

A failure to pay credit event notice was issued for the Cavendish
loan on Sept. 21, 2011, following failure to repay the loan at
maturity.  All of the properties backing the loan have since been
sold.  On Jan. 14, 2013, the credit protection payment due from
the issuer was GBP7.944 million plus an amount equal to the swap
counterparty's aggregate payments to the issuer made between
Jan. 14, 2013 and the cash settlement date (to be confirmed).  As
a result, the class D notes' outstanding principal will be reduced
by at least GBP7.9 million on the cash settlement date.

                         AMBASSADOR LOAN

The Ambassador loan represents the senior portion of a whole loan.
The outstanding securitized balance is GBP90.93 million, and the
loan is interest-only.  The whole loan is secured by a mixed-use
portfolio, initially comprising 12 retail assets and four U.K.
office assets.  The loan experienced a bankruptcy credit event in
August 2011 and the servicer subsequently broke the hedging
arrangement and incurred swap break costs of GBP18.2 million.

To date, the parties have sold 10 assets; of these, one asset is
under offer, four properties are on the market, and the remaining
property is undergoing dilapidation work prior to being brought to
market.  The combined realized sale proceeds from the sold assets
are GBP28.72 million, compared with a value of GBP34.68 million in
June 2011.  The remaining six assets have a reported value of
GBP29.1 million, as of June 2011.  In S&P's opinion, significant
losses on this loan appear likely.

                          LAVINCINO LOAN

The Lavincino loan represents the senior portion of a whole loan.
The outstanding securitized balance is GBP98.2 million.  The whole
loan matures in December 2013.  A multi-let asset located in
Oxford Street, London, secures the loan.  The loan is currently
performing and has a reported securitized interest coverage ratio
(ICR) of 1.68x.  The reported securitized loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio is 58.4%, based on a December 2006 valuation of
GBP168 million.

S&P believes that a whole loan refinancing by 2013 may be
difficult to achieve due to the level of debt to be refinanced.

                          COLOMBINA LOAN

The Colombina loan represents the senior portion of a whole loan.
The outstanding securitized balance is GBP121.9 million.  The
whole loan matures in April 2014 and is secured by a multi-let
asset located on the north bank of the River Thames.  The loan is
currently performing and has a reported securitized ICR of 1.75x.
The reported securitized LTV ratio is 62.5%, based on a March 2007
valuation of GBP195 million.

                         RATING RATIONALE

Following the loss allocation to the class D, E, and F notes on
the October 2012 payment date, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' its ratings on the class D, E, and F notes.

In S&P's opinion, recovery of full principal on the class A, B,
and C notes is increasingly unlikely in light of the expected
losses on the Ambassador loan.  S&P considers that there is at
least a one in two chance of principal losses on these classes of
notes in the near to medium term.  S&P has therefore lowered to
'CCC- (sf)' its ratings on the class A, B, and C notes.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17-G7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class    Rating        Rating
         To            From

Prominent CMBS Conduit No. 2 Ltd.
GBP454.3 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A        CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)
B        CCC- (sf)    CCC+ (sf)
C        CCC- (sf)    CCC (sf)
D        D (sf)       CCC- (sf)
E        D (sf)       CCC- (sf)
F        D (sf)       CCC- (sf)


SANDELMAN PARTNERS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on one class
from Sandelman Partners CRE CDO I Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction, and removed
it from CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same time,
Standard & Poor's lowered its ratings on two additional classes
from the same transaction and removed them from CreditWatch
negative.

The upgrade reflects significant paydowns to the Class A-1 notes,
which increased credit enhancement available to the notes.
According to the Jan. 23, 2013, remittance report, the Class A-1
notes had paid down to $31.3 million after having received roughly
$13.2 million on the most recent distribution date.  The paydowns
are a result of amortization as well as interest diversion due to
past coverage test failures.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the underlying collateral's credit
characteristics based on S&P's criteria for rating global CDOs
backed by pooled structured finance (SF) assets.  S&P also
considered the amount of defaulted assets in the transaction and
their expected recoveries in our analysis.

S&P's CDO of SF criteria include revisions to its assumptions on
correlations, recovery rates, and default patterns and timings of
the collateral.  Specifically, correlations on commercial real
estate assets increased to 70%.  The criteria also include
supplemental stress tests (largest obligor default test and
largest industry default test) in S&P's analysis.

According to the Jan. 18, 2013, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $262.2 million, and the transaction's
liabilities totaled $250.2 million, down from $507.0 million at
issuance due to amortization and prior subordinate note
cancellations.  The transaction's current asset pool included
the following:

   -- 17 CMBS (commercial mortgage backed securities) tranches
      ($85.4 million, 32.6%);

   -- Four senior participation loans ($76.6 million, 29.2%);

   -- Three junior participation loans ($54.8 million, 20.9%); and

   -- Three CDO (collateralized debt obligation) tranches
      ($45.3 million, 17.3%).

The trustee report noted three defaulted assets in the pool,
comprising two Marriott Sawgrass senior participations
($42.3 million, 16.1%) and the Spanish Peaks senior note
($24.4 million, 9.3%).  S&P credit-impaired the Spanish Peaks
subordinate note ($25.8 million, 9.8%) because the senior note is
in default.  S&P estimated a weighted-average recovery of 27.7%
for the defaulted and credit-impaired assets based on information
from the collateral manager, special servicer, and third-party
data providers.

S&P applied asset-specific recovery rates in its analysis of the
three performing loans ($38.9 million, 14.8%) using its criteria
and property evaluation methodology for U.S. and Canadian CMBS and
S&P's CMBS global property evaluation methodology.

According to the Jan. 18, 2012, trustee report, the deal is
passing all overcollateralization coverage tests and interest
coverage tests.

S&P's analysis also considered the prior cancellations of
subordinate notes in the transaction.  Certain subordinate notes
were canceled before they were repaid through the transaction's
payment waterfall.  S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of any
risks and credit stability considerations regarding the
subordinate note cancellations.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it determine necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Sandelman Partners CRE CDO I Ltd.
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A-1       A+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Sandelman Partners CRE CDO I Ltd.
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A-2       BB- (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B         CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg


SCHOONER TRUST 2007-8: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. K Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 15 classes of
Schooner Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-8 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations for the 13 principal and interest bonds are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The ratings of the IO Classes, Classes XP and XC, are consistent
with the credit performance of their referenced classes and thus
are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
2.3. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario is for continued
below-trend growth in US GDP over the near term, with consumer
spending remaining soft in the US. Hurricane Sandy may skew near-
term economic data but is unlikely to have any long-term
macroeconomic effects. Primary downside risks include: a deeper
than expected recession in the euro area accompanied by deeper
credit contraction; the potential for a hard landing in major
emerging markets, including China, India and Brazil; an oil supply
shock; albeit abated in recent months; and given recent political
gridlock, excessive fiscal tightening in the US in 2013 leading
the US into recession. However, the Federal Reserve has shown
signs of support for activity by continuing with quantitative
easing.

The methodologies used in this rating were "CMBS: Moody's Approach
to Rating Fusion Transactions" published on April 19, 2005, "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published on May 26,
2000 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012. The Interest-Only
Methodology was used for the rating of Classes XP and XC.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22 compared to 26 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated February 2, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the January 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to $420.7
million from $518.1 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 54 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
57% of the pool. The pool includes two loans with investment-grade
credit assessments, representing 11% of the pool.

There are four loans currently on the master servicer's watchlist
representing 10% of the pool. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

The pool has experienced no losses since securitization and there
are currently no loans in special servicing. Moody's has assumed a
high default probability for two poorly performing loans
representing 4% of the pool and has estimated an aggregate $2.4
million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability of
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 94%
of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 90%, compared
to 89% at the prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.39X and 1.13X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is The Atrium on Bay
Pooled Interest A-Note ($38.7 million -- 9.2%), which is secured
by a 1.05 million square foot (SF) office/retail complex located
in the central business district of Toronto, Ontario. The loan
represents a 33% pari passu interest in a $116 million first
mortgage. A $74 million B-note held outside the trust also
encumbers the property. The property was 97% leased as of April
2012. The largest tenant is the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
(CIBC) which leases 36% of the net rentable area (NRA). The
servicer indicated that CIBC has agreed to extend its lease by ten
years. The property was sold in June 2011 by Hines Real Estate
Investments to H&R REIT Properties. Property performance has
remained stable since last review. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.79X, the same as last
review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the 107 Woodlawn Road
West Loan ($8.5 million -- 2.0%), which is secured by a 618,400 SF
industrial property located in Guelph, Ontario. The property is
100% leased to Synnex Canada, a distributor of technology products
to resellers, through February 2019. The loan is amortizing on a
15 year schedule and has paid down by 8% since last review and 29%
since origination. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are A2 and 2.02X, respectively, compared to A2 and 1.88X at
last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23.7% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Londonderry Mall Loan ($48
million -- 11.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 777,032 SF
regional shopping center located in Edmonton, Alberta. The loan
represents a 67% pari passu interest in a $72.0 million first
mortgage. As of December 2011, the property was 99% leased
compared to 90% in December 2010 and 92% in December 2009. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 0.98X, compared to 85% and 1.08X
at last review.

The second largest loan is the Mega Centre Cote-Vertu Loan ($26
million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 277,477 SF
anchored retail center located in Montreal, Quebec. Property
performance has suffered since last review due to a decline in
occupancy. This has driven NOI downward with occupancy decreasing
to 67% as of January 2013 compared to 87% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.82X, respectively, compared
to 103% and 0.89X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Atrium II Loan ($25.5 million --
6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 110,090 SF office
building located in Calgary, Alberta. Over half of the tenant base
is linked to energy exploration. Occupancy improved from 84% at
last review to 100% as of March 2012. Overall property performance
has declined since 2010 due to tenant renewals at lower rates.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.83X, respectively,
compared to 113% and 0.86X at last review.


SPRINGLEAF FUNDING: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Springleaf Funding Trust 2013-A's $604.30 million
asset-backed notes series 2013-A.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securitization backed by
personal consumer loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 4,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 38.5%, 32.3%, 29.3%, and
      24.7% credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess
      spread. These credit support levels are sufficient to
      withstand stresses commensurate with the ratings on the
      notes based on S&P's stressed cash flow scenarios.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate, or 'BBB', stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within two rating categories of S&P's preliminary
      'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a two-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'A (sf)' through 'BB (sf)' rated securities
      under moderate stress conditions

   -- The timely interest and full principal payments expected to
      be made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios
      appropriate to the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The characteristics of the pool being securitized.

   -- The operational risks associated with Springleaf Finance
      Corp.'s decentralized business model.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1278.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Springleaf Funding Trust 2013-A

Class   Rating    Type         Interest      Amount
                               rate        (mil. $)(i)
A       A (sf)    Senior       Fixed         500.00
B       BBB (sf)  Subordinate  Fixed          46.35
C       BB (sf)   Subordinate  Fixed          21.53
D       B (sf)    Subordinate  Fixed          36.42

(i) The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
     pricing date.

NR-Not rated.


SYMPHONY CLO IV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from Symphony CLO IV Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) managed by Symphony Asset Management LLC.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A and E notes,
and removed its ratings on the class B, C, and D notes from
CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive implications on
Oct. 29, 2012.

The upgrades reflect a marginal increase in the balance of the
total collateral backing the rated notes since our December 2011
rating actions.  The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 8, 2013.

The amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's
asset portfolio declined since the time of S&P's last rating
action.  According to the January 2013, trustee report, the
transaction held $13.21 million (3.20% of total collateral) in
'CCC' rated collateral, down from $17.00 million (4.13% of total
collateral) noted in the Nov. 7, 2011, trustee report, which S&P
used for its December 2011 rating actions.  When calculating the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios, the numerator of the ratio is
cut by a portion of the 'CCC' rated collateral that exceeds the
threshold specified in the transaction documents.  This threshold
has not been in breach since our last rating action.

Over the same period, the balance of underlying collateral
obligations considered by the transaction as defaulted has
remained stable.  According to the January 2013, trustee report,
the transaction held $3.07 million, or 0.74% of total collateral,
in defaulted collateral obligations.  This was a negligible
increase from $2.46 million, or 0.60% of total collateral, in
defaulted obligations noted in the November 2011, trustee report.

The total collateral balance -- designated by a combination of
principal proceeds and total par value of the collateral pool --
backing the rated liabilities has increased $1.97 million since
November 2011.  The increased collateral balance improved the
credit support available to the rated notes, and potentially
increased the available interest proceeds that the underlying
collateral generates.

Over the same period, the transaction's class A/B, C, D, and E O/C
ratio tests have improved, and the weighted average spread
generated off of the underlying collateral also increased by
0.27%.

The transaction is currently passing its interest reinvestment
test -- which is the class E O/C ratio measured at a higher level
(than the class E O/C test) in the interest section of the
waterfall.  The transaction is structured so that, if it fails
this test, the collateral manager may reinvest an amount, equal to
the lesser of 60.00% of the available interest proceeds and the
amount necessary to cure the test, into additional collateral
obligations.  The transaction has not failed this test over the
period since the December 2011 rating actions.  According to the
January 2013 trustee report, the interest reinvestment test result
was 107.48%, compared with a required minimum of 102.60%.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of
the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings assigned to the
notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to
support them and take rating actions as it deems necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

Class                     November 2011     January 2013
                             Notional Balance (mil. $)
A                           300.00            300.00
B                           32.00             32.00
C                           24.00             24.00
D                           12.50             12.50
E                           13.00             13.00

Coverage Tests, WAS (%)
Weighted Average Spread     3.98              4.25
A/B O/C                     123.24            123.50
C O/C                       114.93            115.18
D O/C                       111.03            111.27
E O/C                       107.25            107.48
A/B I/C                     850.33            1,113.13
C I/C                       724.45            937.70
D I/C                       619.04            790.42
E I/C                       497.43            624.27

O/C - Overcollateralization Ratio.
I/C - Interest Coverage Ratio.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Symphony CLO IV, Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To           From
A                  AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)
B                  AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                  A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                  BBB (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
E                  BB (sf)      BB (sf)


SYMPHONY CLO V: S&P Retains 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the Class
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from Symphony CLO V Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Symphony Asset
Management LLC.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's removed these
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive
implications on Oct. 29, 2012.  In addition, Standard & Poor's
affirmed its rating on the transaction's Class D notes.

The upgrades reflect improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying assets since S&P's February 2012 rating actions.  The
affirmed rating reflects S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating level.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 3, 2013.

According to the January 2013 trustee report, the transaction held
$2.04 million in underlying collateral obligations considered by
the transaction as defaulted.  This was an increase from
$1.09 million in defaulted obligations noted in the Jan. 4, 2012,
trustee report, which S&P used for its February 2012 rating
actions.

Offsetting the slight increase in defaulted obligations, the
amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's asset
portfolio declined since the time of S&P's last rating action.
According to the January 2013 trustee report, the transaction held
$12.59 million in 'CCC' rated collateral, down from $18.29 million
noted in the January 2012 trustee report.  When calculating the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios, the trustee haircuts from the
numerator of the ratio a portion of the 'CCC' rated collateral
that exceeds the threshold specified in the transaction documents.
This threshold has not been in breach since S&P's last rating
action.

Over the same time period, the total par balance of the underlying
Collateral -- designated by a combination of principal proceeds
and total par value of the collateral pool -- has remained
essentially unchanged.  The transaction's Class A, B, C, and D O/C
ratio tests have remained stable, and the weighted-average spread
generated off of the underlying collateral has increased only
slightly to 4.39% from 4.26%.

The transaction is currently passing its reinvestment O/C test --
which is the Class D O/C ratio measured at a higher level (than
the Class D O/C test) in the interest section of the waterfall.
The transaction is structured so that if it fails this test during
the reinvestment period, which is scheduled to end January 2015,
the collateral manager may reinvest an amount equal to the lesser
of 100.00% of the available interest proceeds and the amount
necessary to cure the test into additional collateral.  The
transaction has not failed this test since the February 2012
rating actions.  According to the January 2013 trustee report, the
reinvestment O/C test result was 109.05% compared with a required
minimum of 105.60%.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash-flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash-flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, as well as recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest and/or ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.
The results of the cash-flow analysis demonstrated, in our view,
that all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the now-current ratings," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deem necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

Class                       January 2012      January 2013
                              Notional balance (Mil. $)
A-1                         311.30            311.30
A-2                         25.00             25.00
B                           16.00             16.00
C                           14.00             14.00
D                           12.24             12.24

                               Coverage tests (%)
A O/C                       123.19            122.75
B O/C                       117.59            117.18
C O/C                       113.10            112.70
D O/C                       109.44            109.05
A I/C                       506.92            607.53
B I/C                       453.34            541.44
C I/C                       396.52            471.39
D I/C                       337.65            399.18

O/C-Overcollateralization test.
I/C-Interest coverage test.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Symphony CLO V Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To           From
A-1                AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                A+ (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                  BBB (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D                  BB (sf)      BB (sf)


SYMPHONY CLO XI: S&P Assigns 'BB(sf)' Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Symphony CLO XI L.P./Symphony CLO XI LLC's $737.0 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (not counting excess spread), and cash flow
      structure, which can withstand the default rate projected
      by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by
      Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods
      outlined in its corporate collateralized debt obligation
      (CDO) criteria (see "Update To Global Methodologies And
      Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,"
      published Sept. 17, 2009).

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.3439%-12.6500%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1268.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Symphony CLO XI L.P./Symphony CLO XI LLC

Class                  Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)               494.50
B-1                    AA (sf)                 72.00
B-2                    AA (sf)                 24.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                  64.00
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                42.50
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                 40.00
Subordinated notes     NR                      90.50

NR-Not rated.


TIAA SEASONED: Fitch Lowers Rating on 3 Cert. Classes to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes and affirmed 11 classes
of TIAA Seasoned Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2007-C4
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

SENSITIVITY/RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses
primarily due to lower values on the newly transferred specially
serviced assets. Fitch modeled losses of 7.9% of the remaining
pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total 4.7%,
including losses already incurred. The pool has experienced $11.5
million (0.6% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 14 loans (16.4%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, seven of which are specially serviced (12.6%).

As of the January 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 47.5% to $1.1 billion from
$2.09 billion at issuance. There are no defeased loans in the
pool. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes P
through T.

The largest contributor to expected losses consists of two pari-
passu notes that are secured by two phases of a shopping center in
Algonquin, IL (8.2% of the pool, collectively). The loans, which
are cross collateralized and cross defaulted, were transferred to
special servicing in August 2009 due to imminent default. The
Phase I loan was modified and both loans returned to the master
servicer as corrected mortgage loans in September 2010.
Ultimately, both loans were transferred back to special servicing
in June 2012 due to imminent default. The loans are now over 90
days delinquent. The special servicer rejected a discounted payoff
offer from the borrower, and a foreclosure complaint was recorded
in December 2012. The servicer-reported second-quarter (2Q) 2012
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) for Phase I and Phase II were
0.67x and 0.89x, respectively. As of October 2012, Phase I was
84.2% occupied, compared to 97% at issuance; Phase II was 100%
occupied, compared to 89.8% at issuance.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 184,991
square foot (SF) office property in King of Prussia, PA (1.4%).
The loan transferred to special servicing in December 2010 due to
imminent default. The property became real estate owned (REO) in
March 2012 through a deed-in-lieu transaction. Currently the
property is 21% occupied, and the servicer is marketing the
property for sale.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a 117, 936 SF
office property in White Plains, NY (1.1%). The loan transferred
to special servicing in June 2009 for imminent default. A loan
modification closed in June 2011, splitting the loan into a $7.5
million interest-only A-note and a $4.2 million zero interest B-
note. Fitch expects zero recovery on the $4.2 million B-note. The
loan returned to the master servicer in January 2012.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $18.3 million class D to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.7 million class F to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.9 million class G to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 65%;
-- $13.1 million class H to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 0%;
-- $23.5 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.8 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.8 million class L to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $611.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $78.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $227.5 million class A-J at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.5 million class B at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28.8 million class C at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.2 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.9 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.6 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.9 million class P at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.6 million class Q at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.6 million class S at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class T certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


VITESSE CLO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B2L Notes to 'B+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
B2L notes from Vitesse CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Crescent Capital Group LP.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A1L, A1LR,
A2L, A3L, and B1L notes.

The downgrade to the class B2L notes reflects the application of
S&P's largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test
that S&P introduced as part of its 2009 corporate criteria update.
This test assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient credit
enhancement (not counting excess spread) to withstand specified
combinations of underlying asset defaults based on the ratings on
the underlying assets, with a flat recovery of 5%.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A1L, A1LR, A2L, A3L, and B1L
notes to reflect the availability of credit support at the current
rating levels.

The affirmations reflect very little change in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the notes.  The
trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the January 2013
monthly report:

   -- The senior class A O/C ratio was 124.13%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 124.10% in January 2011;

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 113.94%, compared with a reported
      ratio of 113.92% in January 2011;

   -- The class B-1L O/C ratio was 108.51%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 108.49% in January 2011; and

   -- The class B-2L O/C ratio was 105.19%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 105.15% in January 2011.

The transaction is expected to exit its reinvestment period later
this month, after which S&P anticipates seeing pay downs to the
senior notes.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Vitesse CLO Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A1L           AAA(sf)     AAA(sf)
A1LR          AAA(sf)     AAA(sf)
A2L           AA(sf)      AA(sf)
A3L           A(sf)       A(sf)
B1L           BBB-(sf)    BBB-(sf)
B2L           B+(sf)      BB-(sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Vitesse CLO, Ltd.
Coissuer:           Vitesse CLO Corp.
Collateral manager: Crescent Capital Group LP
Underwriter:        Bear Stearns Cos. LLC
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-WHALE6: S&P Lowers Rating on K Certs to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
K commercial mortgage pass-through certificates to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC+ (sf)' from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2005-WHALE6, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The lowered rating follows S&P's analysis of the transaction,
which included its revaluation of the remaining real estate owned
(REO) 230 Peachtree asset, interest shortfalls and liquidity
available to the trust, and losses that S&P anticipates will occur
upon the eventual resolution of the REO asset.

The downgrade of class K reflects accumulated interest shortfalls
that S&P believes will remain outstanding in the near term.  Class
K has accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for five
consecutive months.  In addition, based on S&P's revaluation of
the REO asset and information provided to S&P by the special
servicer, S&P anticipates a moderate loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

As of the Jan. 17, 2013, trustee remittance report, the trust
consisted of the REO 230 Peachtree asset, a 414,768-sq.-ft. class
A office building in Atlanta, Ga.  The asset has a trust balance
of $18.0 million.  In addition, there is a subordinate B note
totaling $10.0 million held outside the trust.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on May 25, 2010, and the
property became REO on Oct. 2, 2012.  The special servicer,
NorthStar Finance Realty Corp. (NorthStar), stated that the
property was 53.4% occupied as of Sept. 30, 2012, and is currently
generating sufficient cash flow to cover debt service on the
$18.0 million trust balance.  NorthStar informed S&P that it plans
to list the property for sale shortly.  The most recent appraisal
dated as of Nov. 1, 2012, valued the property at $15.4 million.

S&P based its analysis, in part, on a review of the borrower's
operating statements for the year-to-date Sept. 30, 2012, the
year-end 2011 and 2010, and the Sept. 30, 2012, rent roll.  The
property reported declining revenue due to decreased occupancy
over the past four years, which the special servicer primarily
attributed to the property's older vintage and increased
competition from the suburban office market in a depressed
downtown submarket in Atlanta.  S&P's adjusted valuation, using a
7.0% capitalization rate, yielded an in-trust stressed loan-to-
value ratio of 121.8%.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* Moody's Takes Action on $222.6 Million of RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 39 tranches and affirmed
17 tranches from five RMBS transactions backed by Alt-A loans,
issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2003-5

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-1

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-1, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2002-QS13 Trust

A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

A-7, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

A-8, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

A-7A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

A-V, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS2 Trust

Cl. A-I-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. CB, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-23XS

Cl. 1-A3A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3C, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3D, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2012 Upgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions reflect recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The actions on RALI 2004-QS2 reflect a correction in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow model used by
Moody's in rating this transaction. The prior model accounted for
recoveries twice, when they should have been accounted for only
once. The model has been corrected, and this rating actions
reflect that change.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
interest-only securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004, 5% for 2003
and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.50
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.8% in December 2012. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $615.6-Mil. Scratch and Dent Loans
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of five
tranches, downgraded the rating of 20 tranches, and affirmed the
rating of 49 tranches from 12 transactions, backed by Scratch and
Dent loans.

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance review of these
deals and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools.

The rating actions constitute of a number of upgrades and
downgrades. The upgrades on five tranches are due to an increase
in the credit enhancement that is provided by subordination,
overcollateralization, and excess spread.

The majority of the downgrades are primarily due to the weak
interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism. Moody's caps the
ratings of tranches with weak interest shortfall reimbursement at
A3 as long as they have not experienced any shortfall.

The tranches downgraded do not have interest shortfalls but in the
event of an interest shortfall structural limitations in the
transactions will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls even
if funds are available in subsequent periods. Missed interest
payments on mezzanine tranches can only be made up from excess
interest and in many cases after the overcollateralization is
built to a target amount. In these transactions where
overcollateralization is already below target due to poor
performance, any missed interest payments to mezzanine tranches is
unlikely to be paid.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an
increased use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its
previous view that loan modifications will only occur through the
end of 2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will
continue at current levels until the end of 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-3

Cl. A2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M3, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M4, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2012 Confirmed at
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M5, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2012 Confirmed at
B1 (sf)

Cl. M6, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-BO1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2009 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE4

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. A, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012 Downgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)*

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2007 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse Mortgage Capital Trust 2006-CF1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 24, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-CF1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2005 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-SD2

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2009 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 4, 2009 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 4, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 4, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2008 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2008
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2008 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2008
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 19, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Truman Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2008 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Issuer: Truman Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2012 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 27, 2007 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: Truman Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2009
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)


* Moody's Lowers Four Cert. Classes From Two CMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from two
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions
because of current and potential interest shortfalls.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
S&P lowered its ratings on two of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because it expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  The two classes that S&P
downgraded to 'D (sf)' have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for nine and 11 months.  The recurring interest
shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily because
of one or more of the following factors:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced assets;

   -- The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
      has made nonrecoverable advance declarations; and

   -- Special servicing fees.

S&P's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts based on
appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using recent Member
of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  S&P also considered
servicer non-recoverable advance declarations and special
servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring
interest shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each respective transaction's terms.  Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER
amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding
which classes from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D
(sf)'.  This is because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut
is highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

Servicer non-recoverable advance declarations can prompt
shortfalls due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery
of previously made advances deemed non-recoverable, or the failure
to advance trust expenses when non-recoverable declarations have
been determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited
to, property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

S&P details the four downgraded classes from the two U.S. CMBS
transactions below.

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11

S&P lowered its ratings on the class G, H and J certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11.  S&P lowered its rating
to 'D (sf)' on class J to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for nine months.  S&P lowered its ratings on classes G
and H to reflect reduced liquidity support available to these
classes and the potential for these classes to experience interest
shortfalls in the future relating to the specially serviced
assets.  According to the Jan. 14, 2013, trustee remittance
report, the interest shortfalls totaling $54,105 resulted
primarily from interest reduction due to non-recoverability
determinations ($38,517) for the specially serviced Hamstra Square
asset; ASER amounts ($6,638) from an ARA of $1.4 million related
to one ($4.6 million, 0.8%) of the five assets ($33.8 million,
5.9%) that are currently with the special servicer, C-III Asset
Management LLC;  special servicing fees ($7,283); and workout fees
($1,755).

        WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1

S&P lowered its rating on the class G certificate to 'D (sf)' from
WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1 to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 11 months.
According to the Jan. 23, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
interest shortfalls resulted primarily from ASER amounts ($16,691)
related to 12 ($14.7 million, 4.3%) of the 20 assets (
$18.3 million, 5.4%) that are currently with the special servicer,
KeyBank Real Estate Capital; interest not advanced ($6,189) due to
non-recoverability determinations for the 3219 Greenpoint Avenue
and 433 Jefferson Avenue loans; special servicing fees ($3,769);
and workout fees ($1,963).  In addition, according to the
Jan. 2013 trustee remittance report, the master servicer recouped
advances of $96,906 related to an asset that liquidated this
period.  The current reported interest shortfalls totaled $129,496
and have affected all classes subordinate to and including class
D.  Excluding the one-time servicer's advances reimbursement, S&P
expects interest shortfalls on classes D, E, and F to be repaid.
As of the Jan. 23, 2013, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$3.2 million were in effect for 12 ($14.7 million, 4.3%) of the
20 specially serviced assets.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                           Reported
       Rating    Rating       Credit     Interest shortfalls
Class  To        From     enhancement(%) Current  Accumulated
G      BB(sf)    BBB-(sf)      5.31            0           0
H      CCC-(sf)  CCC(sf)       3.24            0           0
J      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)      2.72      (15,243)     51,646

WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                           Reported
         Rating              Credit    Interest shortfalls
Class  To        From  enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
G      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)    0.05    40,406    269,541




* Moody's Lowers Ratings on 6 Notes From 2 CMBS Deals to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from two
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions due
to interest shortfalls.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
S&P lowered its ratings on six of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because S&P expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Those six classes have
had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between six and 10
months.  The recurring interest shortfalls for the respective
certificates are primarily due to one or more of the following
factors:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced assets;

   -- The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
      has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

   -- Special servicing fees; and

   -- Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
      modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  S&P
also considered special servicing fees that are likely, in its
view, to cause recurring interest shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each respective transaction's terms.  Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER
amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding
which classes from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D
(sf)'.  This is because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut
is highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
and legal expenses.

S&P details the seven downgraded classes from the two U.S. CMBS
transactions below.

              GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10

S&P lowered its ratings on the class A-J, B, C, and D
certificates.  S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes B,
C, and D to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
between six and 10 months.  S&P lowered its rating on class A-J to
'CCC- (sf)' to reflect reduced liquidity support resulting from
the interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust.  The
interest shortfalls resulted primarily from ASER amounts
($3.2 million, exclusive of reported ASER recoveries) related to
28 ($1.25 billion, 18.2%) of the 35 assets ($1.49 billion, 21.7%)
that are currently with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset
Management LLC; interest rate reductions ($1.1 million) due to
modifications on seven loans; interest not advanced ($309,988) due
to nonrecoverability determinations for the National Plaza I, II &
III loan and the 1051 Perimeter Drive loan; special servicing fees
($325,472); and workout fees ($47,456).  As of the Jan. 11, 2013,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $690.7 million were in effect for
32 assets, 28 of which generated ASER amounts totaling
$3.2 million.  The current reported interest shortfalls totaled
$4.5 million and have affected all of the classes subordinate to
and including class A-J.

            LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2

S&P lowered its ratings on the class A-J, B, and C certificates to
'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
for nine months.  The interest shortfalls resulted primarily from
ASER amounts ($1.4 million, exclusive of reported ASER recoveries)
related to 14 ($579.5 million, 20.2%) of the 24 assets
($802.4 million, 28.0%) that are currently with the special
servicer, ORIX Capital Markets LLC; interest not advanced
($267,640) due to nonrecoverability determinations for the Central
Florida Business Park asset, Cornerstone Office Orlando asset, and
The Strand asset; and special servicing fees ($166,847).  As of
the Jan. 17, 2013, remittance report, ARAs totaling $371.0 million
were in effect for 21 assets, 14 of which generated ASER amounts
totaling $1.4 million.  The current reported interest shortfalls
totaled $1.8 million and have affected all of the classes
subordinate to and including class A-J.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-GG10
                                           Reported
         Rating           Credit       Interest shortfalls
Class  To        From  enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
A-J    CCC-(sf)  B-(sf)    12.24        425,113   1,023,021
B      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf) 11.14        364,974   1,685,448
C      D (sf)    CCC (sf)   9.76        456,218   3,389,808
D      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)  8.94        273,726   2,781,826

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C2
                                           Reported
         Rating              Credit    Interest shortfalls
Class  To        From  enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
A-J    D (sf)    CCC- (sf)   9.71       499,057   4,471,502
B      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)   8.78       124,004   1,116,037
C      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)   6.92       249,297   2,243,671


* S&P Affirms Ratings on 41 Tranches From 26 CDO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
tranches from one corporate-backed collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
41 tranches from 26 corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions
and removed three of them from CreditWatch with positive
implications.

The downgrades are from tranches that had experienced principal
losses due to losses from credit events.  The affirmations are
from synthetic CDOs that had synthetic rated overcollateralization
(SROC) ratios above 100% at their current rating levels or had
enough remaining subordination to support their current rating.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 5
                              Rating
Class                    To            From
A1-$LMS                  BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2006-37
                                  Rating
Class                    To                  From
IIIA                     D (sf)              CCC- (sf)
IIIB                     D (sf)              CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
US$75 mil Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2006-35
                                  Rating
Class                    To               From
I                        B- (sf)          B- (sf)/Watch Pos

REVE SPC
EUR5 mil Series 26 Dryden XVII Notes of Series 2008-1 Class B
                                Rating
Class                    To               From
B                        B (sf)           B (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED


Calibre 2004-XI Ltd.
Class                    Rating
Single Tra               CCC-p (sf)

Capstan Master Trust
Series 1
Class                    Rating
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)

Capstan Master Trust
Series 2
Class                    Rating
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)

Capstan Master Trust
Series 3
Class                    Rating
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)

Capstan Master Trust
Series 4
Class                    Rating
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)

Credit Default Swap
US$2 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref. No. NDG8F
Class                    Rating
Notes                    AAAsrp (sf)

Credit Default Swap
US$975 mil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio, CDS Reference # N9QT8
Class                    Rating
Tranche                  AAAsrp (sf)

Galena CDO II (Cayman Islands) Ltd.
Class                    Rating
A-1U10                   CCC- (sf)

Ghisallo Ltd.
Class                    Rating
A                        CCC+ (sf)

Marvel Finance 2007-1 LLC
Class                    Rating
IA                       BB+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2006-13

Class                    Rating
A                        A- (sf)
II                       CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2006-37
Class                    Rating
IA                       CCC- (sf)
IB                       CCC- (sf)
II                       CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2007-19
Class                    Rating
A                        CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2005-1
Class                    Rating
Jr Sup Sr                AA+ (sf)
I A                      A+ (sf)
II A                     A+ (sf)
II B                     A+ (sf)
III A                    BB (sf)
III B                    BB (sf)
III C                    BB (sf)
III D                    BB (sf)
IV A                     B (sf)
IV B                     B (sf)
V B                      CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2006-10
Class                    Rating
IA                       CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2007-3
Class                    Rating
IA                       CCC- (sf)
IB                       CCC- (sf)
IC                       CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2007-9
Class                    Rating
IIA                      CCC- (sf)

Mt. Kailash Series II
Class                    Rating
Cr Link Ln               CCC- (sf)

Repacs Trust Series 2007 Rigi Debt Units
Class                    Rating
Debt Units               CCC- (sf)

Steers Lasso Trust Series 2007-1
Class                    Rating
Tranche                  BB+ (sf)

Steers Lasso Trust Series 2007-A
Class                    Rating
Tranche                  BB (sf)

Strata Trust Series 2007-5
Class                    Rating
Notes                    CCC- (sf)

White Knight Investment Trust
Class                    Rating
1                        B- (sf)


* S&P Lowers Rating on 314 Classes from 154 RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 314
classes from 154 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions and removed 142 of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications, one from CreditWatch with positive
implications, and 147 from CreditWatch with developing
implications.  S&P also raised its ratings on 18 classes from 15
transactions and removed one from CreditWatch negative and 12 from
CreditWatch developing.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on 734
classes from 237 transactions and removed 84 from CreditWatch
negative, six from CreditWatch positive, and 186 from CreditWatch
developing.  Furthermore, S&P withdrew its ratings on 19 classes
because they were supported by mortgage pools containing less than
20 loans or in accordance with S&P's interest-only (IO) criteria.

The complete list of rating actions is available in "U.S. RMBS
Classes Affected By The Feb. 4, 2013, Rating Actions," published
on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal.  The list is also
available on the Standard & Poor's web site

The transactions in this review were issued between 1995 and 2007
and are backed by a mix of adjustable- and fixed-rate subprime and
"scratch-and-dent" loans secured primarily by first liens on one-
to four-family residential properties.

On Aug. 15, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on 598 classes from 213
of the transactions within this review on CreditWatch negative or
developing, along with ratings from a group of other RMBS
securities due to the implementation of S&P's recently revised
criteria for surveilling pre-2009 U.S. RMBS ratings.  S&P
completed its review of the transactions herein using the revised
assumptions and these rating actions resolve some of the
CreditWatch placements.  The directional movements of the
CreditWatch resolutions within this review are as follows:

                              3 or fewer       More than 3
From Watch   Affirmations      notches           notches
                             Up      Down      Up      Down
Watch Pos          6          0        1        0        0
Watch Neg         84          1       64        0       78
Watch Dev        186          9       82        3       65

* S&P withdrew its ratings on an additional 19 classes, which were
also on CreditWatch.

The high percentage of CreditWatch negative placements reflected
S&P's projection that remaining losses for the majority of the
subprime transactions will increase.  S&P may have placed its
ratings on CreditWatch negative for certain structures that had
reduced forecasted losses due to an increased multiple of loss
coverage for certain investment-grade rated tranches as set forth
in S&P's revised criteria.

The increase in projected losses resulted from one or more of the
following factors:

   -- An increase in our default and loss multiples at higher
      investment-grade rating levels;

   -- A substantial portion of nondelinquent loans (generally
      between 20% and 50%) now categorized as reperforming (many
      of these loans have been modified) and have a default
      frequency of 45% or 50%;

   -- Increased roll rates for 30- and 60-day delinquent loans;

   -- Application of a high prepayment/front end stress
      liquidation scenario; and

   -- A continued elevated level of observed severities.

In line with the factors described above, S&P increased its
remaining loss projections for the majority of the transactions in
this review from its previous projections.  The remaining
projected losses ranged from an increase of .01% (to 32.09% from
32.08%) for C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-SP2 to an increase of 406.93% (to 15.36% from 3.03%) for
Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2001-SB1.

S&P lowered its ratings on 314 classes from 154 transactions.  Of
the lowered ratings, S&P lowered its ratings on 87 classes out of
investment-grade, including 19 that S&P lowered to 'CCC (sf)' or
lower.  Of the classes S&P downgraded out of investment-grade, 20
classes from 10 transactions had ratings in the 'AAA (sf)'
categories before today's actions.  Some of the downgrades to
speculative-grade from 'AAA (sf)' reflect significant increases
to S&P's updated loss severities for the related transactions.
Another 150 ratings remain at investment-grade after being
lowered.  S&P' rated the remaining classes with lowered ratings in
the speculative-grade category before the rating actions.  Of the
ratings lowered, 14 reflected the application of S&P's interest
shortfall criteria.

Despite the increase in remaining projected losses, S&P upgraded
18 classes from 15 transactions.  In general, the upgrades reflect
two general trends S&P has seen in these types of transactions:

   -- The transactions have failed their cumulative loss
      triggers, resulting in the permanent sequential payment of
      principal to their respective classes, thereby locking out
      any principal payments to lower-rated subordinate classes,
      which prevents credit support erosion; and

   -- Certain classes have a first priority in interest and
      principal payments driven by the occurrence of the above.

All of the upgrades affected classes from transactions issued in
2002 through 2007 and were originally rated in an investment-grade
category.  All of the raised ratings have sufficient projected
credit support to absorb the projected remaining losses associated
with those rating stresses.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in S&P's view, may add a layer of volatility
to its loss assumptions when they are stressed at the rating as
suggested by its cash flow models.  In these circumstances, S&P
either limited the extent of its upgrades or affirmed its ratings
on those classes in order to buffer against this uncertainty and
promote ratings stability.  In general, the bonds that were
affected reflect the following:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;

   -- Low priority in principal payments;

   -- Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline;

   -- High proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;

   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities; and

   -- Weak hard-dollar credit support.

The 77 'AAA (sf)' ratings from 42 transactions that S&P affirmed
affect bonds that:

   -- Have more than sufficient credit support to absorb the
      projected remaining losses associated with this rating
      stress; and

   -- Benefit from permanently failing cumulative loss triggers.

The 84 affirmations from 53 transactions in the 'AA (sf)' and 'A
(sf)' categories affect classes that:

   -- Are currently in first, second, or third payment priority;
      and

   -- Benefit from permanently failing cumulative loss triggers.

In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 131 classes from 86
transactions in the 'BBB (sf)' through 'B (sf)' rating categories.
The projected credit support on these particular bonds remained
relatively consistent with prior projections.

S&P affirmed its ratings on 442 additional classes in the 'CCC
(sf)' or 'CC (sf)' rating categories.  S&P believes that the
projected credit support for these classes will remain
insufficient to cover the revised projected losses to these
classes.

S&P withdrew its ratings on five classes in accordance with its IO
criteria because the referenced classes no longer sustain ratings
above 'A+ (sf)'.  S&P withdrew 14 other ratings because the
classes are within structures or transactions that are backed by
less than 20 loans outstanding.

Standard & Poor's believes that the liquidation of one or more of
the loans in transactions with a small number of remaining loans
may have an adverse effect on the stability of S&P's outstanding
ratings.  Therefore, in cases where a structure contained fewer
than 100 loans or was approaching 100 loans remaining, S&P
addressed tail risk by conducting additional loan-level analysis
that stressed the loan concentration risk within the specific
pool.  In accordance with S&P's counterparty criteria, it
considered any applicable hedges related to these securities when
performing these rating actions.

Subordination, overcollateralization (when available), and excess
interest generally provide credit support for the reviewed
transactions.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com






                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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