TCR_Public/121021.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, October 21, 2012, Vol. 16, No. 293

                            Headlines

AIRLIE LCDO II: S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
ALESCO PREFERRED IV: Moody's Lifts Rating on A-1 Notes From Ba1
APIDOS CLO X: S&P Gives 'BB(sf)' Rating on $19.75MM Class E Notes
CASCADE FUNDING I: S&P Cuts Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'CC'
CASTLE HOLDING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'Caa1'

CEDARWOODS CRE: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B Notes to 'Caa3'
CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'Ba2'
COMM 2004-LNB3: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Cl. J Certs. to 'C'
COMM 2012-CCRE3: Fitch Places Low B Ratings on Two Cert. Classes
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKN2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Certs. to 'C'

CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 Certs.
DISCOVER FINANCIAL: Fitch to Rate Preferred Stock 'B+'
GE CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class S Tranche to 'Caa2'
GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3' Rating on X Secs.
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Six Cert. Classes

HUDSON STRAITS: Moody's Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'Ba3'
ING IM CLO 2012-3: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Def Notes
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. J Certs to 'C'
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC16: Moody's Lowers Rating on A-J Certs to 'B3'
JP MORGAN 2007-LDP12: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Cl. X Certs.

JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 15 Note Classes
JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Fitch Puts Low B Ratings on Two Cert. Classes
JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Moody's Warns of Additional Risk on CMBS Pacts
JP MORGAN 2012-C8: S&P Gives 'BB-' Rating on Class G Certificates
LB COMMERCIAL 1999-C2: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Cl. K Certs.

LB-UBS 2002-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X-CL Certs. to 'Caa2'
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Nine Note Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: Moody's Cuts 2 Cert. Class Ratings to C
MORGAN STANLEY 2004-4: Moody's Cuts 1-A-8 Tranche Rating to Caa1
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 Cert. Classes

MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ13: Fitch Cuts Rating on Six Note Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Rates Two CMBS Classes 'B2'
NEWCASTLE CDO IV: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
POPULAR ABS: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A-3 Securities to 'Caa1'
PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Rating on Certs. for Upgrade

SPRINT CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Rating on $25MM Certs for Upgrade
STRATS 2004-2: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Rating for Upgrade
SYMPHONY CLO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
US CAPITAL V: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'Caa1'

* Moody's Cuts Ratings on $200MM Countrywide 2003-2004 RMBS
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 47 Tranches From 12 RMBS Deals
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 11 Classes From 10 CMBS Transactions
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Repackaged Securities to 'D'
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Debt Classes From 3 CDO Deals to 'D'

* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 26 Classes From 5 CMBS Deals


                            *********

AIRLIE LCDO II: S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on Airlie
LCDO II (Pebble Creek 2007-1) Ltd., a hybrid cash flow/synthetic
CDO managed by Airlie Opportunity Capital Management L.P. after
the class C and D notes received full principal payment at their
final principal payment date.

"We previously lowered our ratings on the class B and C notes to
'D (sf)' on Nov. 4, 2009, because the notes did not receive timely
interest payments," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Airlie LCDO II (Pebble Creek 2007-1) Ltd.

                     Rating
Class            To        From
B                NR        D (sf)
C                NR        D (sf)
D                NR        CC (sf)

NR-Not rated.


ALESCO PREFERRED IV: Moody's Lifts Rating on A-1 Notes From Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding IV, Ltd:

U.S. $195,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $134,566,582.92 ),
Upgraded to Baa3(sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1
(sf).

Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily a result of the improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in November 2010
and deleveraging of the Class A-1 Notes which resulted in an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios.

Moody's notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
1070 compared to 1848 as of the last rating action date. In
addition, Moody's notes that the Class A-1 notes have been paid
down by approximately 17.6% or $34.4 million since the last rating
action, due to diversion of excess interest proceeds and
disbursement of principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying
assets. As a result of this deleveraging, the Class A-1 notes' par
coverage improved to 140.02% from 133.87% since the last rating
action, as calculated by Moody's. Going forward, the Class A-1
notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest due to failure of the Class A Overcollateralization Test
and the proceeds from future redemptions of any assets in the
collateral pool.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $188.2 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $77.33 million, a weighted average
default probability of 22.92% (implying a WARF of 1070), Moody's
Asset Correlation of 20.52%, and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors that
are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the declaration of an Event of
Default, recent deal performance under current market conditions,
the legal environment, and specific documentation features. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Alesco Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. issued on May 18, 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of TruPS issued by
small to medium sized U.S. community banks that are generally not
publicly rated by Moody's. To evaluate the credit quality of bank
TruPS without public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive their credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data reported
as of Q2-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011 and "Using the Structured
Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February
2004.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8-5 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge. CDOROM v.2.8-5 is
available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical
models, upon return of a signed free license agreement.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 380 points from the
base case of 1070, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 120 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $39 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on all
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +4
Class A-2: +4
Class A-3: +4
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0
Class B-3: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: +0
Class A-2: +1
Class A-3: +1
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0
Class B-3: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as Moody's outlook on the banking
sector remains negative, although there have been some recent
signs of stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues
to decline in 2012 compared to 2011, 2010 and 2009, and some of
the previously deferring banks have resumed interest payment on
their TruPS.


APIDOS CLO X: S&P Gives 'BB(sf)' Rating on $19.75MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Apidos CLO X/Apidos CLO X LLC's $415.5 million
floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is an collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Oct. 18,
2012. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
    comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-secured
    term loans.

    The collateral manager's experienced management team.

    S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
    assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.28%-13.84%.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

    The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of which
    will lead to the reclassification of excess interest proceeds
    that are available prior to paying uncapped administrative
    expenses and fees; subordinated collateral management fees;
    collateral manager incentive fees; and subordinated note
    payments into principal proceeds for the purchase of
    additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

     http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1045.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
Apidos CLO X/Apidos CLO X LLC

Class               Rating          Amount
                                  (mil. $)
A                   AAA (sf)        291.50
B-1                 AA (sf)          20.00
B-2                 AA (sf)          25.50
C (deferrable)      A (sf)           36.00
D (deferrable)      BBB (sf)         22.75
E (deferrable)      BB (sf)          19.75
Subordinated notes  NR               46.50

NR-Not rated.


CASCADE FUNDING I: S&P Cuts Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'CC (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class A-1 notes from Cascade Funding CDO I
Ltd., a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by
high grade structured finance assets.

According to the notice of liquidation dated Oct. 15, 2012, the
trustee indicated that all the collateral was sold and liquidated.
Further, the proceeds of the sale of the collateral along with
other funds available will be insufficient to pay the class A-1
notes in full.

"We may further lower our rating on the class A-1 notes to 'D
(sf)' upon the receipt of the final note valuation report. Under
our criteria, we lower our rating on any rated note that realizes
a loss upon completion of the liquidation process to 'D (sf)',"
S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING LOWERED

Cascade Funding CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CC (sf)             CCC- (sf)

OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

Cascade Funding CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)


CASTLE HOLDING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following notes:

Issuer: Castle Holding Trust 1

Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Apr 6, 2012
Assigned B2

Underlying Securities: Texas Competitive Electric Holdings 2017
Term Loan

Class A-2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Apr 6, 2012
Assigned B2

Underlying Securities: Texas Competitive Electric Holdings 2017
Deposit L/C Loan

Issuer: Castle Holding Trust 2

Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Apr 6, 2012
Assigned B2

Underlying Securities : Texas Competitive Electric Holdings 2017
Term Loan

Ratings Rationale

The transactions are structured notes whose ratings are based on
the rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction. The rating action is the result of the change of
the rating of the above mentioned Underlying Securities issued by
Texas Competitive Electric Holdings Company LLC., which were
downgraded to Caa1 by Moody's on August 9, 2012.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the ratings are a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying securities.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


CEDARWOODS CRE: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B Notes to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
classes and affirmed the ratings of four classes of Notes issued
by Cedarwoods CRE CDO Ltd. The downgrades are due to deterioration
in underlying collateral performance as evidenced by transition in
Moody's weighted average rating factor (WARF), weighted average
recovery rate (WARR), and negative migration of interest and
principal coverage tests since last review. The affirmations are
due to key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Cedarwoods CRE CDO Ltd. is a static (the reinvestment period ended
in July 2011) cash CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (68.5% of the pool
balance), CRE CDO and Re-remic debt (23.6%), real estate
investment trust (REIT) debt (6.7%), asset backed securities (ABS)
(1.2%). As of the September 25, 2012 Note Valuation report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including Preference
Shares, has decreased to $365.8 million from $400.0 million at
issuance, as a result of the paydown directed to the Class A-1
Notes from principal repayment of collateral, sales of credit risk
securities, and the failing of principal coverage tests whereby
interest generated from defaulted assets is re-classified as
principal within the waterfall.

There are fifteen assets with par balance of $62.5 million (16.3%
of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the September 25, 2012 Note Valuation report,
compared to three defaulted securities totaling $9.1 million par
amount (2.1%) at last review. Moody's does expect significant
losses to occur from these defaulted interests once they are
realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 4,274 compared to 3,848 at last review. The
current distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments
for non-Moody's rated collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (1.9%
compared to 1.4%), A1-A3 (8.8% compared to 8.6%), Baa1-Baa3 (12.0%
compared to 15.4% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (12.5% compared to
11.6% at last review), B1-B3 (17.8% compared to 21.2% at last
review), and Caa1-Ca/C (47.0% compared to 41.8% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.8 years, compared to 4.6 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions.

Moody's modeled a fixed 12.5% WARR, compared to 13.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 10.1%, compared to 11.9% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 12.5% to 2.5% or up to 22.5% would result in modeled
rating movement on the rated Notes of 0 to 2 notches downward and
0 to 2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by CIFC Funding 2006-I B, Ltd

U.S. $224,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on October 25, 2011 Confirmed at
Aa1 (sf) ;

U.S. $75,000,000 Class A-1LR Variable Funding Notes Due 2020
(current funded amount of $68,400,000), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on October 25, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf) ;

U.S. $22,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 25, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

U.S. $22,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to A2 (sf); previously on October 25, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

U.S. $14,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf); previously on October 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

U.S. $16,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf); previously on October 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in December 2012. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, higher spread and diversity
levels compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
October 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2878 versus 3100, spread
of 3.86% versus 2.9%, and diversity of 83 versus 58 at the last
rating action. Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
collateral quality and overcollateralization ratio are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $396 million, no
defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of 20.19%
(implying a WARF of 2878), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.48% and a diversity score of 83. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

CIFC Funding 2006-IB, Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans with significant exposure to loans of middle
market issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2302)

Class A1LR: 0
Class A1L: 0
Class A2L: +1
Class A3L: +3
Class B1L: +3
Class B2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3454)

Class A1LR: 0
Class A1L: 0
Class A2L: -2
Class A3L: -2
Class B1L: -1
Class B2L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a number
of securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not provided the
necessary information to update the credit estimates in a timely
fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any default
probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated credit
estimates.


COMM 2004-LNB3: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Cl. J Certs. to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed 12 classes of COMM 2004-LNB3, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2008 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Confirmed
at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Confirmed at
A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due primarily to higher expected losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans, coupled concerns about
potential increased interest shortfalls.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of the pool and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
approximately 5.6% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's cumulative base expected loss was approximately 5.3%.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to a Herf of 13 at Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 27, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 10, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to $888 million
from $1.34 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 77 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 56% of the pool. The pool includes three
loans with investment-grade credit assessments, representing 32%
of the pool. Nine loans, representing approximately 20% of the
pool, are defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Thirteen loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19 million (49% average loan loss
severity). Currently, three loans, representing 5% of the pool,
are in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is
the Beau Terre Office Building Loan ($34 million -- 4% of the
pool), which is secured by a 378,000 square foot Class B office
property located in Bentonville, Arkansas. The loan transferred
into special servicing in May 2010 due to imminent monetary
default. A foreclosure sale occurred in September 2011, and the
property is now real estate owned (REO). Occupancy was 45% in
February 2012 compared to 64% in March 2010, and 97% at
securitization. The special servicer is pursuing a leasing
opportunities for the property.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $25 million loss for all specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly-
performing loans representing 2% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $9 million loss
(55% expected loss severity based on a 70% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 95% and 21% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 91%, the same as at Moody's last full review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.35X and 1.12X, respectively, compared to 1.34X and 1.13X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Garden State
Plaza Loan ($130 million -- 15% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in a $520 million mortgage loan. The loan
is secured by a super-regional mall owned by Westfield in Paramus,
New Jersey. The mall anchors are Macy's, Nordstrom, JC Penney,
Neiman Marcus, and Lord and Taylor. As of year-end 2011 reporting,
the mall was 97% leased, the same as the prior year. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 1.58X,
respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.52X at last review.

The second-largest loan with a credit assessment is the 731
Lexington Avenue Loan ($97 million -- 11% of the pool), which
represents a participation interest in a $245 million senior
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 690,000 square foot office
condominium located within the East Side office submarket of
Midtown Manhattan. The property is 100% leased to media firm
Bloomberg, L.P. through February 2029. The property is also
encumbered by an $86 million B-Note, which is held outside the
trust. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and
2.31X, respectively, compared to A3 and 2.09X at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the Tysons Corner
Center Loan ($56 million -- 6% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in a $304 million mortgage loan. The loan
is secured by a three-level super-regional mall located in McLean,
Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C. The mall was 99% leased as
of year-end 2011 reporting compared to 96% at Moody's last review.
The loan sponsor is Macerich. The mall has been a consistent
strong performer and stands to benefit from the planned 2013
opening of an extension to the Washington Metro subway system. The
new Tysons Corner station will provide direct access to the
property. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
Aaa and 2.38X respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.29X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Centreville Square I & II Loan ($55
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 312,000 square
foot grocery-anchored retail center located in Centreville,
Virginia. The property, located 30 miles southwest of Washington,
D.C., was 87% leased as of March 2012. The anchor tenant is
Shopper's Food and Pharmacy, a regional discount grocery retailer
and a subsidiary of SuperValu, Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured
rating Caa1, stable outlook). The Shopper's lease for 47,000
square feet (15% of property NRA) expires in April 2013. An
automatic 5-year lease renewal will be triggered at the end of
October 2012 barring notice provided to the loan sponsor. While
renewal of the anchor tenant appears likely under the auto-renewal
scenario, Moody's analysis incorporates the risk of losing the
anchor. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 93% and 1.02X at last review.

The second-largest loan is the 3 Beaver Valley Loan ($37 million -
- 4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 263,000 square foot
Class A office building located in Wilmington, Delaware. The
property is 100% leased to a subsidiary of Farmers Insurance Group
(Moody's Insurance Financial Strength A2, stable outlook). The
tenant's lease expiration is co-terminus with loan maturity in
January 2015. Moody's analysis incorporated a lit/dark
calculation, using a 50% lit renewal probability to account for
the risk of the property going "dark" - or being vacant following
the lease expiration of the current single tenant. The lit/dark
analysis considers in the "dark" value current market rents, which
have fallen 7.4% since Moody's last review, according to CB
Richard Ellis Econometric Advisors. Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 87% and
1.12X at last review.

The third-largest loan is a multifamily portfolio ($34 million --
4% of the pool), secured by three-cross-collateralized apartment
properties located in suburban Buffalo, New York. The largest
property is the Williamstowne Apartments, a 528-unit complex
located in Cheektowaga, New York. The two remaining properties
have a combined 347 units and are located in Cheektowaga, and
Tonawanda, New York. Financial performance has been steady in
recent years, but lags performance at securitization. Portfolio
occupancy was 88% as of year-end 2011 reporting. Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and, 0.85X respectively, compared
to 109% and 0.94X at last review.


COMM 2012-CCRE3: Fitch Places Low B Ratings on Two Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the COMM 2012-CCRE3 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates:

  -- $68,444,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $155,419,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75,783,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $576,343,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $994,873,000c class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $118,884,000ab class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75,085,000ab class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $220,562,000ab class PEZ 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26,593,000ab class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26,592,000a class D 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $43,800,000a class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21,899,000a class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20,336,000a class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Class A-M, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged for
class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
exchanged for class A-M, class B and class C certificates.
c Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not expect to rate the $256,540,606 interest-only class
X-B or the $42,235,606 class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 74 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.25 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by Cantor Commercial Real Estate, German American
Capital Corporation and Ladder Capital Finance LLC.


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKN2: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Certs. to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
and affirmed three classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2002- CKN2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. C-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The rating of the IO Class, Class AX, is downgraded to align with
the expected credit performance of its referenced classes.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed principal classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. Approximately 60% of
the pool is in special servicing. Moody's utilized a loss and
recovery approach in analyzing the specially serviced loans to
determine an overall expected loss for the pool.

The rating of the IO Class, Class AY, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced residential co-op
loans and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.1% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 24.7%. The actual dollar amount
of cumulative base expected loss increased to $30.6 million from
$29.5 million at last full review. Realized losses have increased
from 3.9% of the original balance to 5.9% since the prior review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4 compared to 10 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Since over half of the pool is in special servicing, Moody's also
utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating this deal. In this
approach, Moody's determines a probability of default for each
specially serviced loan and determines a most probable loss given
default based on a review of recent third-party appraisals and/or
broker's opinions of value (if available), other information from
the special servicer and available market data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration servicer
advances to date and estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of
principal to the most senior class(es).

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 20, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 17, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to $124.24
million from $918.14 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 34% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
94% of the pool. One loan, representing 5% of the pool, has
defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
The pool also includes three loans, representing 0.6% of the pool,
which are secured by residential co-op loans and have a Aaa credit
assessment.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $54.0 million loss (57%
loss severity on average). Currently ten loans, representing 60%
of the pool, are in special servicing. The largest loan in special
servicing is the PNC Center Loan ($38.9 million -- 31.3%), which
is secured by a 498,000 square feet (SF) office building located
in downtown Cincinnati, Ohio. The loan transferred into special
servicing in March 2012 due to imminent payment default. The
largest tenant, PNC (50% of the net rentable area (NRA) has a
lease expiration in February 2014 but is negotiating an early
lease renewal and is planning to downsize to 29% of the NRA. The
borrower and special servicer are in discussions for a discounted
pay off. The remaining loans in special servicing are secured by a
mix of office, multifamily and retail properties.

The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $15.8 million
appraisal reduction for the specially serviced loans. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate loss of $45.5 million (43% expected loss on
average) for all of the specially serviced loans.

The only performing conduit loan is the Beaver Valley Mall Loan
($41.9 million -- 33.7% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 1.2 million SF regional mall (966,000 SF
of collateral) located approximately 35 miles northwest of
downtown Pittsburgh in Center Township, Pennsylvania. The mall is
anchored by Sears, J.C. Penney, Boscov's and Macy's (not part of
the collateral). The mall was 93% leased as of August 2012,
compared to 89% as of March 2011. Performance has remained stable.
The loan is on the servicer's watchlist because it passed it's
anticipated repayment date (ARD) in April 2012. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 96% and
1.04X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The ratings for the IO Classes, A-X and A-Y, are consistent with
the expected credit performance of their referenced classes and
thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
approximately 3.0% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's cumulative base expected loss was approximately 4.0%. Base
expected plus realized losses total 4% of the original deal
balance, essentially unchanged since Moody's last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 45 compared to a Herf of 20 at Moody's prior
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 27, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 17, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $1.07
billion from $1.62 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 213 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 25% of the pool. The pool includes 56
loans with an investment grade credit assessment, representing 20%
of the pool. Twenty-two loans, representing approximately 23% of
the pool, are defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Thirty-three loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $36 million (43% average loan loss
severity). Currently, four loans, representing 3% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Scripps Northridge Technology Plaza Loan ($13 million -- 1% of the
pool), which is secured by a 96,000 square foot Class A flex
property in San Diego, California. The property has suffered from
high vacancy since the departure of a major tenant in 2009. Year-
end 2011 occupancy was 61%. The current largest tenant occupies
approximately 25% of the property NRA under a lease that expires
in March 2013. The loan had been delinquent but was recently
brought current by the loan sponsor. The loan was returned to
performing status on September 21, 2012.

The remaining three specially-serviced loans are secured by a mix
of industrial and multifamily property types. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $6 million loss (20.6% expected loss overall) for all
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly-
performing loans representing 2% of the pool. Moody's analysis
attributes to these troubled loans an aggregate $11 million loss
(41% expected loss severity based on a 68% probability default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 87% and 42% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 84% compared to 83% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 10.2% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.34X, respectively, compared to
1.44X and 1.34X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Beverly Center
Loan ($90 million -- 9% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in the senior component of a $272 million
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by the leasehold interest in an
eight-story regional mall located in Los Angeles, California. The
loan is also encumbered by a $41 million B-Note which is held
outside the trust. The mall anchors are Bloomingdale's, Macy's and
Macy's Men's Store, all controlled by Macy's Inc. (Moody's senior
unsecured rating Baa3, stable outlook). The mall was 97% leased as
of June 2012. Financial performance has posted a steady decline
for the past two years, due in part to increases in ground rent
payments and property taxes. Moody's credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.39X, respectively, compared to A2 and
1.45X at last review.

The remaining credit assessments are associated with 55
residential cooperative loans which represent $99 million in total
loan balance, or a 10% share of the overall pool. Moody's credit
assessment for this group of loans is Aaa.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 7% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Northfield Square Mall Loan ($26 million -
- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a regional mall located in
Bourbonnais, Illinois, approximately 50 miles southwest of
Chicago. The anchors are JC Penney, Carson Pirie Scott and a
multiplex theater. The mall was 89% leased in June 2012, compared
to 87% the prior year. Simon Property Group is the loan sponsor.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 1.05X at last review.

The second-largest loan is the Canterbury Apartments Loan ($23
million -- 2% of the pool). The loan is secured by a multifamily
property located in Nashua, New Hampshire, part of the Greater
Boston Area. Occupancy in June 2012 was 93%, up from 86% in July
2011, and up sharply from 80% in December 2010. Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to
97% and 1.03X at last review.

The third-largest loan is the Bristol Park at Encino Commons
Apartments Loan ($22 million -- 2% of the pool). The loan is
secured by a 321-unit multifamily property located in San Antonio,
Texas. Occupancy was 94% in June 2012, compared to 95% at Moody's
last review. The loan was removed from the master servicer's
watchlist in September due to improved DSCR from higher rents.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and, 0.76X
respectively, compared to 125% and 0.72X at last review.


DISCOVER FINANCIAL: Fitch to Rate Preferred Stock 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Discover Financial Service's non-
cumulative perpetual preferred stock issuance 'B+'.  The preferred
issuance will be callable after a period of five years and will be
structurally subordinate to subordinated debt.  Proceeds are
expected to be used for general corporate purposes, which may
include advances to subsidiaries, repayment of indebtedness,
and/or share repurchases.  Fitch expects to assign the issuance
100% equity credit.

Rating Drivers and Sensitivities

Discover's Stable Rating Outlook reflects the expectation for
earnings consistency, moderate portfolio growth, peer-superior
asset quality, and the maintenance of strong liquidity and risk-
adjusted capitalization.  While Discover will reduce capital
ratios to its targeted range over time, Fitch expects the bank to
do this in a prudent manner.

Increased revenue diversity, proven competitive positioning and
credit performance in non-card loan categories over time, enhanced
funding flexibility and/or further clarity on regulatory and
legislative issues, particularly as it relates to the student loan
sector, could support positive rating momentum.

Conversely, negative rating action could be driven by a decline in
earnings performance, resulting from a decrease in market share or
credit deterioration, a weakening liquidity profile, significant
reductions in capitalization, and legislative and/or regulatory
changes that alter the earnings prospects of the credit card and
student loan businesses.

Negative rating momentum could also be driven by an inability for
Discover to maintain its competitive position and earnings
prospects in an increasingly digitized payment landscape.  While
the company is focused on strategic acquisitions and alliances to
expand its online and mobile capabilities, competition from
technology companies and social networks, with access to
significant consumer data, is expected to intensify.

Discover is a leading credit card issuer and electronic payments
company that authorizes, processes, and guarantees the settlement
of cardholder transactions on the Discover, PULSE, and Diners Club
networks, and extends credit on a revolving basis to Discover
cardholders.  The company had $59.2 billion in loan receivables at
Aug. 31, 2012 and its stock is listed on the NYSE under the ticker
symbol DFS.

Fitch expects to assign the following rating:

Discover Financial Services

  -- Preferred Stock 'B+-'.

Existing ratings for Discover are as follows:

Discover Financial Services

  -- Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BBB';
  -- Short-term IDR 'F2';
  -- Viability Rating 'bbb';
  -- Senior debt 'BBB';
  -- Support '5'; and
  -- Support Floor 'NF'.

Discover Bank

  -- Long-term IDR 'BBB';
  -- Short-term IDR 'F2';
  -- Viability Rating 'bbb';
  -- Short-term Deposits 'F2';
  -- Long-term Deposits 'BBB+';
  -- Subordinated Debt 'BBB-';
  -- Support '5'; and
  -- Support Floor 'NF'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


GE CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class S Tranche to 'Caa2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches from two RMBS transactions backed by Subprime loans
issued by GE Capital.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.0% in September 2011 to 7.8% in September 2012.
Moody's expects unemployment rate to stay between 7.5% to 8.5% in
2013. Moody's expects housing prices to remain stable through the
remainder of 2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services Inc 1997-HE1

  S, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
  Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
  to Ba1 (sf)

  A5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
  to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services Inc 1999-HE1

  A6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 1999 Assigned
  Aaa (sf)

  A7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 1999 Assigned
  Aaa (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF302713

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3' Rating on X Secs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class of GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. 1998-C1 as follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
quality of its referenced classes. The IO class is the only
outstanding Moody's rated class in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
45.9% of the current balance compared to 41.2% at last review. The
base expected loss is higher on a percentage basis than at last
review because of paydownds. However, on a numerical basis the
cumulative base expected loss decreased to $77.1 million compared
to $81.6 million at last review. Moody's provides a current list
of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions
on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to 15 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Since over half of the pool is in special servicing, Moody's also
utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating this deal. In this
approach, Moody's determines a probability of default for each
specially serviced loan and determines a most probable loss given
default based on a review of recent third-party appraisals and/or
broker's opinions of value (if available), other information from
the special servicer and available market data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration servicer
advances to date and estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 20, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 17, 2012, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $167.97
million from $1.44 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 67% of the pool. Four loans, representing 12% of the pool,
have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

Three loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $8.5 million loss (12%
loss severity on average). Currently two loans, representing 69%
of the pool, are in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Senior Living Properties (SLP) Portfolio Loan
($112.2 million -- 66.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of 43 skilled nursing facilities located throughout
Texas. The loan was transferred to the special servicing in
October 2001 due to a decline in performance resulting from
changes in Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates. Although the
portfolio's net cash flow has been insufficient to cover operating
expenses and debt service payments for years, the deficit was
covered during the original loan term by an insurance surety bond
issued by ZC Specialty Insurance Company (ZC). The loan matured on
February 1, 2008 and the remaining balance of the surety bond,
approximately $70.0 million, was applied to reduce the outstanding
balance of the loan. The portfolio originally consisted of 74
properties, but 31 were liquidated in 2005 and 2006. The special
servicer entered into a modification with the borrower which
converted the loan to interest only payments and extended the
maturity date to August 2008. The maturity had been further
extended to August 2012. The remaining specially serviced loan,
representing 2% of the pool, is secured by a 53,000 square foot
office property located in Rocky Mount, North Carolina.

The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $60.0 million
appraisal reduction for the specially serviced loans. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate loss of $76.6 million (66% expected loss on
average) for the specially serviced loans.

The conduit component of the deal consists of eight loans
representing 20% of the pool. Moody's was provided with full year
2010 and 2011 operating results for the conduit. Moody's weighted
average LTV for the conduit is 52% compared to 44% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 14% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.75X and 2.40X,
respectively, compared to 2.68X and 3.20X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 12% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Nickelodeon Studio Center Loan
($9.85 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 72,000
square foot office building located in the Burbank submarket of
Los Angeles, California. The property is 100% leased to Viacom,
Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa1, stable outlook)
through January 2013. Viacom, Inc. has exercised its second 5-year
renewal option to extend the lease through January 2018. Moody's
valuation of this loan is based on a dark/lit analysis. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 53% and 2.04X, respectively, compared to
77% and 1.39X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Heathman Hotel Loan ($6.8 million -
- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 150-room full-service
luxury hotel located in the central business district of Portland,
Oregon. The hotel's occupancy rate and revenue per available room
(RevPAR) for the trailing 12 month period ending March 2012 were
76% and $120, respectively, compared to 72% and $108 in March
2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 2.14X,
respectively, compared to 57% and 2.08X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Santa Cruz Plaza Loan ($4.13 million
-- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 74,000 square foot
retail property located in Tucson, Arizona. As of July 2012, the
property was 94% leased. However, there is significant lease
rollover within the next 12 months. Property performance has
declined due to a drop in reimbursements. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 70% and 1.69X, respectively, compared to 58% and 2.06X at
last review.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Six Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes and affirmed 19 classes
of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-C1 due primarily to
increased loss expectations associated with the specially serviced
loans.

Fitch modeled losses of 14.8% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 14.3%, including losses
already incurred.  The pool has experienced $57.5 million (3.3% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated 31 loans (41.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 11 specially serviced assets (27.4%).

As of the October 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 23.8% to $1.32 billion from
$1.73 billion at issuance.  No loans have defeased since issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes E through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Design Center of the Americas loan (6.8% of the pool),
which is secured by a 789,725 square foot (sf) showroom property
located in Dania Beach, FL.  The loan was previously specially
serviced and was modified on Sept. 10, 2012.  Modification terms,
which have not yet been fully reported, include an extension of
the loan's maturity date until August 2017.  As of the July 2012
rent roll, the property is 47% occupied with an average rental
rate of $33.91 sf.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced BellSouth Tower loan (5.4%), which is secured by a 30-
story, 956,201 square foot (sf) office building located in
Jacksonville, FL.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2011 due to imminent monetary default as a result of the
largest tenant downsizing its space by 100,000sf.  The borrower
executed a lease in February 2012 with EverBank for 269,168 sf for
10 years.  The property is currently 65% occupied.  Per the
September 2011 rent roll, 32% of the space which is occupied by
the top three tenants at the property is set to expire in 2014.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Newburgh Mall loan (2.4%), which is secured by a 384,150
sf regional mall located in Newburgh, NY.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in November 2011 due to imminent
default. The borrower requested a loan modification as a result of
the weak economy which has impacted leasing at the mall. A
receiver has been appointed by the special servicer and the trust
is proceeding with foreclosure, while continuing negotiations with
the borrower. The property is currently 82% occupied.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (REs):

  -- $169.7 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $114.6 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'BBB-sf'; RE 85%;
  -- $36.1 million class B to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $19.1 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $12.7 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $21.2 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns or revises REs:

  -- $17 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $19.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $68.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $576.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $186.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.1 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $23.3 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $931,967 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $5.1 million class FNB-1 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.6 million class FNB-2 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.1 million class FNB-3 at 'CCCsf; RE 100%';
  -- $4.5 million class FNB-4 at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $2.4 million class FNB-5 at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $13.3 million class FNB-6 at 'CCCsf; RE 95%'.

Classes A-1, A-1D, and A-2 are paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the class Q certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the ratings
on the interest-only class XP and XC certificates.


HUDSON STRAITS: Moody's Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Hudson Straits CLO 2004:

U.S. $25,250,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2016 , Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
December 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

U.S. $23,500,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
December 21, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

U.S. $1,500,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
December 21, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

U.S. $12,100,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2016 (current balance of U.S. $9,051,971),
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on December 21, 2011 Upgraded to
B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in December 2011. Moody's notes that the Class
A-1 and A-2 Notes have been paid down by approximately 95% or $90
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated October 4, 2012 Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class
E Principal Coverage Ratios are reported at 230.33%, 155.77%,
117.97% and 108.44%, respectively, versus December 2011 levels of
155.98%, 130.34%, 112.10% and 106.69%, respectively. The October
2012 Coverage Ratios do not consider the payments which were made
on the October 15, 2012 Payment Date.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the October 2012 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2862
compared to 2596 in December 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $121.7 million,
defaulted par of $2.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.34% (implying a WARF of 3219), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 51.07%, and a diversity
score of 27. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Hudson Straits CLO 2004, issued in July 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2575)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D-1: +2
Class D-2: +2
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3862)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D-1: -2
Class D-2: -2
Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


ING IM CLO 2012-3: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Def Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to ING IM
CLO 2012-3 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2012-3 LLC's $416.892 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
    subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
    subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation criteria.

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
    comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-secured
    term loans.

    The collateral manager's experienced management team.

    S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed using
    its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
    assigned ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
    including LIBOR ranging from 0.34%-13.84%.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

    The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of which
    will lead to the reclassification of excess interest proceeds
    that are available prior to paying uncapped administrative
    expenses; deferred senior, subordinated, and incentive
    management fees; hedge payments; and subordinated note
    payments into principal proceeds for the purchase of
    additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED
ING IM CLO 2012-3 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2012-3 LLC

Class                 Rating           Amount
                                     (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)        294.428
B                     AA (sf)          46.929
C (deferrable)        A (sf)           36.321
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)         20.571
E (deferrable)        BB (sf)          18.643
Subordinated notes    NR               49.086

NR - Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. J Certs to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
and affirmed ten classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-LDP2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher than expected realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
8% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 7%. Moody's provides a current list of base
expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.1,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 55 compared to 74 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 26, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 17, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $1.9 billion
from $2.9 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 224 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 34%
of the pool. There are no loans that have defeased or have
investment grade credit assessments.

Fifty-one loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $115.9 million (37% loss severity).
Currently 17 loans, representing 13% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the CityPlace
Corporate Center Loan ($115 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is
secured by five office buildings totaling 789,000 square feet
(SF), a 50,000 SF mixed use property and a 28,000 SF retail
building. The properties are located in Creve Coeur, Missouri. The
loan transferred to special servicing in April 2012 for maturity
default. The portfolio's weighted average occupancy as of December
2011 was 92% compared to 93% at last review. A proposal has been
submitted for a two-year extension of the loans maturity date.

The remaining 16 specially serviced properties are secured by a
mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $86 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (35% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 25 poorly
performing loans representing 11% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $35 million loss (17% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 95%
of the pool. Excluding special serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 95% compared to 101% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.14X, respectively, compared to
1.40X and 1.06X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 13% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Shops at Canal Place Loan ($90.0 million -
- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured by 215,000 SF of retail in a
2.15 million SF mixed use complex located in New Orleans,
Louisiana. The property includes a 438 room Wyndahm Hotel and a 32
story office property, neither of which are part of the
collateral. The property was severely damaged by fire and looting
immediately following Hurricane Katrina and was closed until
February 2006. The main anchor of the retail space is Saks Fifth
Avenue, which leases about 50% of the retail space and expires in
2019. The property was 92% leased as of June 2012 compared to 93%
at last review. The property is stable and has improved and is
higher than at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
120% and 0.77X, respectively, compared to 135% and 0.68X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Hutchinson Metro Center Loan ($83.5
million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 424,000 SF
office building located in the Bronx, New York. The property was
100% leased as of June 2012, essentially the same as at last
review, and compared to 79% at securitization. The property is
stable and performance is higher than at securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 0.94X, respectively, compared
to 103% and 0.95X at last review.

The third largest loan is the LXP-Bank of America Loan ($73.9
million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 637,500 SF
class B office building located in Brea, California. The property
is 100% leased to Bank of America throughout 2019. Bank of
America's lease had expired in July 2012, and it renewed for an
additional seven years. The loan matures in May 2013. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.89X, respectively, compared to
111% and 0.88X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC16: Moody's Lowers Rating on A-J Certs to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 19 classes and
downgraded the ratings of two classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-CIBC16 as follows:

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The downgrades are due to weaker credit support resulting from
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans. The IO Classes, Class X-1 and X-2, are affirmed
since they are consistent with the expected credit performance of
their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
11.2% of the current balance compared to 9.5% at last review. Base
expected loss plus realized losses to date total 11.6% compared to
10.5% at last review. Moody's provides a current list of base
expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the
underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24, up from 23 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated November 3, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 14% to $1.86 billion
from $2.15 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 110 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
54% of the pool. No loans have defeased and there are no loans
with an investment grade credit assessment.

There are presently 30 loans, representing 20% of the pool, on the
master servicer's watchlist. According to the servicer, one
additional loan representing 11% of the pool will be added to the
watchlist in October 2012. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization
resulting in an aggregate realized loss totaling $39.9 million
(average loss severity of 12%). There are 11 loans, representing
12% of the pool, currently in special servicing. The largest loan
in special servicing is the REPM Portfolio Loan ($85.6 million --
4.6% of the pool), which is secured by ten separate industrial
buildings totaling 1.6 million square feet (SF) and located in
eight states. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
April 2011 due to imminent payment default. The loan's waterfall
structure was recently modified and the loan is pending return to
the master servicer. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $96.9
million loss (42% expected loss on average) for all of the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 15 poorly
performing loans representing 24% of the pool and has estimated an
$66.5 million aggregate loss (14% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 96%
of the performing pool and partial year 2012 operating results for
67% of the performing pool. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 100%
compared to 105% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.9% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.32X and 1.05X, respectively,
compared to 1.28X and 0.98X at last full review. Moody's actual
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 28% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the One and Two Prudential Plaza Loan ($205.0
million -- 11.0% of the pool), which is secured by two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted Class A high-rise office
buildings located in the East Loop office submarket of Chicago,
Illinois. The buildings total 2.2 million SF and are Gold LEED
Certified. This loan represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a
$410 million first mortgage loan. The property was 85% leased as
of June 2012 compared to 86% at last review. The loan will be
added to the servicer's watchlist in October 2012 due to concerns
about declining occupancy and lack of adequate reserves for
upcoming tenant capital costs. Baker & McKenzie vacated its leased
premises totaling 230,000 SF prior to its November 2012 lease
expiration and Integrys has announced that it will vacate 261,000
SF upon lease expiration May 2014. According to the servicer, the
initial leasing reserves established at securitization are
depleted and the on-going contributions to the reserve accounts
are insufficient to meeting future leasing capital costs. The loan
is interest only throughout the term. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 128% and 0.72X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.79X
at last review.

The second largest loan is the RREEF Silicon Valley Office
Portfolio ($197.8 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a multi- property office portfolio located across California.
This loan represents a pari-passu interest in a $553.8 million
first mortgage loan. Numerous properties were released since last
review, reducing the outstanding principle balance. The loan is
interest only throughout the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 108% and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.79X
at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Prime Retail Outlets
Portfolio Loan ($108.7 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is
secured by three outlet centers totaling 780,000 SF. The
properties are located in Lee, Massachusetts; Gaffney, South
Carolina and Calhoun, Georgia. The properties were 93% leased as
of December 2011 compared to 89% at last review. Financial
performance has steadily improved since 2009. The loan has also
amortized 5% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 78% and 1.31X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.25X at last
review.


JP MORGAN 2007-LDP12: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Cl. X Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed six classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2007-LDP12 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-LDP12 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade is due to higher expected losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the five principal and interest bonds are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
11.7% of the current pooled balance compared to 9.1% at last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also utilized the IO calculator ver1.1, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 41 compared to 46 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated November 17, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 17, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 12% to $2.2
billion from $2.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 145 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 40%
of the pool. One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool, has
defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government Securities.

The pool no longer contains any loans with credit assessments. The
AT&T-Cleveland, OH Loan ($29 million -- 1.3%) previously had a
credit assessment, however due to a decline in performance it is
now analyzed as part of the conduit pool. The loan is secured by a
459,000 square foot (SF) office property located in Cleveland,
Ohio. The property was 100% leased to AT&T (Moody's senior
unsecured rating A2, stable outlook) on a NNN lease expiring in
September 2019. However, the lease contained reduction clauses,
which AT&T exercised. The property is now 55% leased, on the
servicer's watchlist and was unable to refinance by its August
2012 anticipated repayment date. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
98% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 53% and 1.85X at last
review.

Thirty-six loans, representing 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated at a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $67 million (37%
average loss severity). Thirteen loans, representing 14% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Hard Rock Hotel -- Chicago Loan ($70 million
-3.1%), which is secured by a 381 room full service hotel located
in Chicago, Illinois. The loan transferred to special servicing in
May 2012 after the borrower acknowledged it would be unable to
refinance the loan ahead of its August 2012 maturity. The borrower
submitted a discounted payoff (DPO) proposal, which was rejected
by the special servicer. The loan was appraised for a value in
excess of its loan balance in July 2012. The special servicer is
pursuing foreclosure, while the borrower attempts to secure
additional equity that is needed to obtain a refinance.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $48 million appraisal
reduction for four of the 13 specially serviced loans, while
Moody's has estimate aggregate $112 million loss (37% expected
loss) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 24 poorly
performing loans representing 24% of the pool and has estimated a
$97 million aggregate loss (19% expected loss based on a 33%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 93% and 63% of the conduit, respectively.
The conduit portion of the pool excludes specially serviced,
troubled and defeased loans. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 108% compared to 111% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.42X and 0.99X,
respectively, which is the same as at last review Moody's actual
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Plaza El Segundo Loan ($162
million -- 7.3%), which is secured by a 382,000 SF power/lifestyle
community center located in El Segundo, California. Major tenants
include Whole Foods, Best Buy and Dick's Sporting Goods. The
property was 97% leased as of June 2012 compared to 92% at last
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.73X,
respectively, compared to 129% and 0.72X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the Sawgrass Mills Loan ($150 million -
- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 2 million SF regional
mall located in Sunrise, Florida. The loan represents a pari-passu
interest in an $850 million first mortgage loan. Anchor tenants
include Super Target and Wannado. The property was 96% leased as
of March 2012 compared to 93% as of December 2011. Performance has
improved primarily due to increases in base rental revenue and
percentage rents. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 0.96X,
respectively, compared to 95% and 0.91X, at last full review.

The third largest loan is the 111 Massachusetts Avenue Loan ($90
million -- 4.1%), which is secured by a 255,000 SF office property
located in Washington, DC. The property was 95% leased as of July
2012 compared to 97% at last review. Almost all of the space is
leased to GSA tenants with lease expirations in 2015 and 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.83X, respectively,
compared to 113% and 0.82X at last full review.


JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 15 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 16 classes and removed from Rating
Watch Negative 15 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Mortgage Securities
Trust, series 2008-C2.  The downgrades reflect an increase in
expected losses on the specially serviced loans, escalating
interest shortfalls, and continued underperformance of many of the
larger loans not in special servicing.

Many of the loans have been in special servicing for a number of
years as anticipated resolutions have not occurred.  These
unresolved specially serviced loans have resulted in additional
trust expenses and a significant increase in interest shortfalls
from approximately $21.5 million in August 2011 to approximately
$35.6 million as of the September 2012 distribution date.  The
shortfalls currently impact classes A-M though T.

The downgrades to classes A-3, A-4, A-4FL, A-SB, and A1-A reflect
the expected reduction in credit enhancement as well as a concern
that interest shortfalls could affect these classes prior to class
repayment.  While these classes are senior in the waterfall,
limited amortization occurs monthly and only roughly $35 million
in principal payoffs are expected to occur prior to 2014.
According to Fitch's global criteria for rating caps, Fitch will
not assign or maintain 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' ratings for notes that it
believes have a high level of vulnerability to interest shortfalls
or deferrals, even if permitted under the terms of the documents
(for more information please see the full report titled 'Criteria
for Rating Caps in Global Structured Finance Transactions', dated
Aug. 2, 2012, at www.fitchratings.com).

In addition to the concern with interest shortfalls, based on
current loss expectations on loans in special servicing, the
erosion of credit enhancement will be significant upon the
disposition of these assets.  Additionally, while a number of the
performing larger loans have institutional quality borrowers,
these loans continue to show declines in net operating income
(NOI) or fail to show performance improvement from stressed
levels.  Fitch's rating actions are in line with stressed model
assumptions.

Fitch modeled losses of 22.4% of the remaining pool.  Fitch has
designated 28 loans (46.4% of the pool balance) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes six specially serviced loans (23.9%).
Fitch estimates that classes B through T may be fully depleted
from losses associated with the specially serviced assets.  As of
the August 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by approximately 10.3% to $1.045 billion
from $1.17 billion at issuance.

The largest specially serviced asset, The Shops at Dos
Lagos (12%), is comprised of a 345,847 square foot (sf)
lifestyle/entertainment retail center built in 2006/2007.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in October 2008 for monetary
default after the borrower indicated the property was
significantly impacted by the downturn in the economy.  The
special servicer has foreclosed on the property and continues to
work to stabilize the tenant base, increase foot traffic, and
improve visibility to the center in an effort to stabilize value.
As of September 2012, occupancy was reported at 68%.  The special
servicer plans to market the property beginning in late 2012, with
a target closing date for the first quarter of 2013.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Westin
Portfolio (9.8%), which is comprised of the 487-room Westin La
Poloma in Tucson, AZ, with a 27-hole Jack Nicklaus golf course and
spa, and the 412-room oceanfront Westin Hilton Head, in Hilton
Head, SC.  The loan transferred to special servicing in October
2008 due to monetary default.  The properties were significantly
impacted by the recession and its impact on business and leisure
travel. In 2010, special servicing responsibilities were
transferred from Midland Loan Services to LNR Partners, Inc.

The borrower filed for bankruptcy in November 2010, and the
process continues to face delays.  As of August 2012, the special
servicer was still working through the bankruptcy process.
Property values, as well as each respective market where the
hotels are located, remain stressed, and it is uncertain as to
whether the properties will experience any additional improvement
in value.

Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative the
following classes and assigns outlooks and recovery estimates as
indicated:

  -- $54.4 million class A-SB to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $354.6 million class A-4 to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $145 million class A-FL to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $61 million class A-1A to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $116.5 million class AM to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 100%;

  -- $61.2 million class AJ to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;

  -- $14.6 million class B to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $14.6 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $10.2 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $10.2 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $13.1 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $11.7 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $16 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $14.6 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $14.6 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

In addition, Fitch downgrades the following class:

  -- $105.2 million class A-3 to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $8.7 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.4 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $5.8 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.4 million class P at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $2.9 million class Q at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $1.7 million class T at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full.


JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Fitch Puts Low B Ratings on Two Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2012-C8:

  -- $76,634,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $189,227,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $426,122,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $103,623,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $897,898,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $102,292,000ab class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $56,829,000ab class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $44,043,000ab class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $203,164,000ab class EC 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35,518,000a class D 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32,676,000a class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15,628,000a class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17,049,000a class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged for
  class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
  exchanged for class A-S, class B and Class C certificates.
* Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $36,938,989a class NR or the
$238,681,989*a interest-only class X-B.


JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Moody's Warns of Additional Risk on CMBS Pacts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Investors in a new commercial mortgage backed securities
transaction should consider several risks highlighted in a new
report from Moody's Investors Service, "US CMBS: J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8 Under-Enhanced
Relative to Assigned Ratings."

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8, a
US CMBS conduit transaction, will likely close on or about October
18, 2012. Based on a review of publicly available information,
Moody's believes that all classes of this transaction, with the
exception of Classes A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-SB, lack sufficient
credit enhancement relative to the ratings four other rating
agencies have assigned it.

The biggest deficiency in enhancement is at the lower end of the
investment-grade spectrum: According to Moody's, Classes D and E,
the two lowest investment-grade classes, would more likely merit
ratings two notches below the assigned ratings, with Class E
falling into speculative-grade.

Moody's report also presents an alternative analysis of six loans
that constitute 17% of the pool balance. "Four of these six loans
are for retail properties in secondary or tertiary markets with
high tenant concentrations and upcoming lease expirations," says
Tad Philipp, Moody's Director of Commercial Real Estate Research.
"Based on our analysis, not a single one of these loans merits
investment-grade consideration, whether on a standalone or a
diversified pool basis."

Moody's is also concerned that valuations based on currently low
market cap rates understate long-term refinancing risk. Much of
the credit risk in commercial real estate lending consists of the
potential for default at loan maturity, and refinancing risk will
increase substantially when interest rates normalize. "Current
market capitalization rates are appropriate for analyzing the
credit of a loan maturing in ten days, but not for analyzing the
risk of one maturing in ten years," says Nick Levidy, Managing
Director of Moody's CMBS Group.


JP MORGAN 2012-C8: S&P Gives 'BB-' Rating on Class G Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8's $1.14
billion commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2012-
C8.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 43 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $1.14 billion, secured by the fee
interest in 78 properties, the fee/leasehold in five properties,
and the leasehold interest in one property.

"The ratings reflect our view of the credit support provided by
the transaction structure, our view of the economics of the
underlying collateral, the trustee-provided liquidity, the
relative diversity of the collateral pool, and our overall
qualitative assessment of the transaction. Standard & Poor's
determined that the collateral pool has, on a weighted average
basis, a debt service coverage of 1.56x, and beginning and ending
loan-to-value ratios of 82.4% and 70.0%, respectively, based on
Standard & Poor's values," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8

Class       Rating          Amount
                               ($)
A-1         AAA (sf)    76,634,000
A-2         AAA (sf)   189,227,000
A-3         AAA (sf)   426,122,000
A-SB        AAA (sf)   103,623,000
X-A(i)      AAA (sf)   897,898,000
X-B         NR         238,681,989
A-S         AAA (sf)   102,292,000
B           AA (sf)     56,829,000
C           A (sf)      44,043,000
EC(ii)      A (sf)     203,164,000
D           BBB+ (sf)   35,518,000
E           BBB- (sf)   32,676,000
F           BB (sf)     15,628,000
G           BB- (sf)    17,049,000
NR          NR          36,938,989

(i) Notional balance.
(ii)Exchangeable certificates with notional balance linked to the
    sum of the class A-S, B, and C certificates.
NR - Not rated.


LB COMMERCIAL 1999-C2: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Cl. K Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 1999-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations of the three principal bonds are due to key
rating parameters, including WARF and base expected loss,
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.1% of the current pooled balance. At last review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 6.8%. Moody's provides a current
list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
("CTL") financing methodology approach ("CTL" approach) . Under
Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates
is primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds. This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan. The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust. The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default. Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction. For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans,
Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in
its public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-8 to generate a portfolio
loss distribution to assess the ratings.

The other methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 13, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 17, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $14.7
million from $892.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 12 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
92% of the pool. The pool originally included two loans with
credit assessments, 120 conduit loans and 12 CTL loans. Due to
paydowns, the entirety of the pool now consists of CTL loans.

There are currently no loans on the master servicer's watchlist or
in the special servicing.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $23.4 million (23% loss severity
on average). Due to realized losses, classes L, M, N and P have
been eliminated entirely and class K has experienced a 26%
principal loss.

The CTL loans are secured by 12 properties leased to four tenants.
The exposures are CVS/Caremark Corp. (Moody's senior unsecured
rating Baa2 - positive outlook; 71% of the pool), Rite Aid
Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured rating Caa2/Caa3 - stable
outlook; 14% of the pool), Walgreen Co. (Moody's senior unsecured
rating Baa1 - negative outlook; 11% of the pool), and McDonald's
Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured rating A2 - stable outlook;
4% of the pool).

The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this
pool is 1,210 compared to 1,213 at last review. WARF is a measure
of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-
dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within the
pool.


LB-UBS 2002-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X-CL Certs. to 'Caa2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded three classes, downgraded one
class and affirmed four classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-C1 as follows:

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2006 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2006 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2006 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. S, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to increased credit support and defeasance.
The pool has paid down by 90% since last review. One loan,
representing 58% of the pool, is defeased and matures in January
2013.

The downgrade of the IO class, Class X-CL, is due to a decline in
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of its referenced
classes.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Excluding the defeased loan, the
majority of the pool is in special servicing. Moody's utilized a
loss and recovery approach in analyzing the specially serviced
loans to determine an overall expected loss for the pool.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.2% of the current balance compared to 2.1% at last review. The
base expected loss is higher on a percentage basis than at last
review because of the significant paydown. However, on a numerical
basis the cumulative base expected loss declined to $3.1 million
from $10.7 million at last review. Moody's provides a current list
of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions
on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessment in
the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2 compared to 14 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Since a majority of the pool is in special servicing, excluding
the defeased loan, Moody's also utilized a loss and recovery
approach in rating this deal. Under this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced
loan and determines a most probable loss given default based on a
review of recent third-party appraisals and/or broker's opinions
of value (if available), other information from the special
servicer and available market data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration servicer advances to date
and estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then recognizes the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output. The rating
action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through a review utilizing MOST(R)
(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a proprietary program
that highlights significant credit changes that have occurred in
the last month as well as cumulative changes since the last full
transaction review. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs a
full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated November 10, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 17, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $50.0
million from $1.24 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 58% of the pool. One loan, representing 58% of the
pool, is secured by U.S. Government securities. The maturity date
for these securities is January 11, 2012.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated since securitization,
generating a loss of $16.1 million (34% average loss severity).
Currently, there are five loans in special servicing, representing
16% of the pool. All of the specially serviced loans have passed
their maturity dates.

The master servicer has recognized approximately $866,000 in
appraisal reductions for two of the loans in special servicing.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $2.49 million loss (31% expected
loss on average) loss for all of the specially serviced loans.

The sole conduit loan is the Sprint Building Loan ($13.2 million -
- 26.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 102,0000 square foot,
office building located in the Altamonte Springs sub-market of
Orlando, Florida. The property is 100% leased to SPRINTCOM INC.
through November 30, 2016. The loan is on the servicer's watch
list because it passed its anticipated repayment date (ARD) in
March 2012. The borrower was not successful in refinancing the
loan prior to the ARD. The final maturity date is March 11, 2032.
The loan is now accruing an additional 2% of deferred interest and
is being cash managed by the master servicer. Due to the single
tenant exposure, Moody's valuation of this property incorporates a
lit/dark analysis. CBRE Economic Advisors reports that the
Altamonte Spring sub-market vacancy is approximately 24% and that
asking gross rents are approximately $16.0 per square foot. This
is significantly below the property's in-place rent of $22 per
square foot. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.24X,
respectively, compared to 72% and 1.50X.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Nine Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades nine classes and affirms five classes of
ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2006-1.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses mainly
attributed to updated values on specially serviced loans.  Fitch
modeled losses of 10% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 9.4%, including already realized
losses of 3.4%.  The Negative Outlooks reflect the continued
downward momentum of appraisals for specially serviced loans and
occupancy issues at some of the larger properties.

As of the September 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased 38.2% to $1.32 billion from $2.14
billion at issuance.  Fitch has designated 25 loans (23.6%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, including seven (13.1%) specially serviced
loans. Cumulative interest shortfalls in the amount of $6.2
million are affecting classes K through Q.

The largest contributor to modeled losses (4.2% of the pool)
consists of a portfolio of five medical office buildings and one
surgical center totaling 323,013 square feet (sf) located in
Texas, Arizona and Missouri.  Servicer-reported year-end (YE) 2011
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) declined to 0.54x from 1.53x at
YE2010.  The decline in performance is primarily due to decreased
occupancy at the medical offices and reduced revenue at the
surgical center.  In addition, the loan started to amortize in
March 2011 which also affected the cash flow.  As of the August
2012 rent roll, the portfolio was 78.5% occupied, compared to
81.3% at YE2011.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses (2.2%) consists
of two office properties totaling 323,526 sf located in suburban
Atlanta, GA.  The portfolio has been underperforming since YE2009
due to the loss of several large tenants at lease expirations.
The servicer-reported YE2011 portfolio DSCR was 0.68x with 71%
occupancy rate, compared to a DSCR of 1.21x with 75% occupancy
rate at issuance.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses (3%) is a 394,578
sf office building located in Hyattsville, MD.  The property is
99.5% occupied by a GSA tenant. Loan was transferred to special
servicing in March 2012 due to the borrower's failure to fund a
reserve following the non-renewal of the GSA tenant that expired
in September 2012.  The loan was modified in February 2012 and
returned to the master servicer in June 2012.  The GSA tenant has
negotiated a new three-year lease which is being finalized.  The
servicer-reported second quarter 2012 DSCR was 0.9x, compared to a
DSCR of 1.14x at YE2011.

Fitch downgrades and revises Rating Outlooks and Recovery
Estimates (RE) to the following classes:

  -- $82.1 million class A-J to 'BBB-sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;
  -- $100 million class AN-FL to 'BBB-sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;
  -- $50.9 million class B to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE70%;
  -- $21.4 million class C to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE0%;
  -- $29.5 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%';
  -- $16.1 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%';
  -- $24.1 million class F to 'Csf'from 'CCsf';RE0%;
  -- $9.6 million class H to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 million class J to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE0%.

Fitch also affirms the following classes:

  -- $64 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $489.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $211.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $214.2 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE0%.

Classes K,L,M,N and P are affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%, as the classes
have been reduced to zero due to losses.  Class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-
3FL, A-3B have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the zero balance
class Q.  Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the Interest-only
class X.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: Moody's Cuts 2 Cert. Class Ratings to C
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
and affirmed six classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-TOP11
as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2011 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the five principal bonds are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.5% of the current pooled balance compared to 2.8% at last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's  analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also utilized the IO calculator ver1.1, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 41 compared to 45 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated November 3, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 13, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 45% to $662
million from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 145 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 30%
of the pool. Twenty-two loans, representing 18% of the pool, have
been defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
Securities. Five loans, representing 19% of the pool, have
investment grade credit assessments.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated at a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $5 million (8% average
loss severity). Five loans, representing 5% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Crown Point Corporate Center Loan ($15 million -- 2.2%
of the pool), which is secured by a 129,000 square foot (SF)
office property located in Gaithersburg, Maryland. The property
was 67% leased as of July 2012. The property's three largest
tenants have all either received or requested a rent rate or space
reduction. The property became REO in July 2012 after the borrower
surrendered it via a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. The servicer
intends to stabilize the asset before marketing it for sale. The
property was appraised in excess of the loan amount in February
2012.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $9 million appraisal
reduction for three of the five specially serviced loans, while
Moody's analysis estimates a $16 million aggregate loss (49%
expected loss) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated a
$7 million aggregate loss (18% expected loss based on a 54%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 94% and 55% of pool, excluding defeased
loans. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 61% compared to 64%
at Moody's prior review. The conduit portion of the pool excludes
specially serviced, troubled and defeased loans as well as the
five loans with credit assessments. Moody's net cash flow reflects
a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available
net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.98X and 1.99X,
respectively, compared to 1.93X and 1.87X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance. Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR are similar because the conduit loans'
average loan constant is close to Moody's 9.25% stressed rate.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Center Tower Loan
($58 million - 8.7%), which is secured by a 462,000 SF office
building located in Costa Mesa (Orange County), California. The
property is currently on the watchlist for low occupancy. The
property has had trouble retaining tenants at lease expiration. It
was 73% leased as of July 2012 compared to 82% at last review.
Only 3% of the leases expire in 2012-13. The loan has benefited
from a 16-year amortization schedule and has paid down 22% since
securitization. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3
and 1.69X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.70X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the 516 West 34th
Street Loan ($22 million - 3.3%), which is secured by a 264,000 SF
office building located in the Midtown Manhattan submarket of New
York City. The property is owned by and 100% occupied by Coach
Inc. Coach has committed to approximately 750,000 SF in Related
Companies' nearby Hudson Yards development. The Hudson Yards
project is not expected to be completed until 2015, which is when
Coach's lease at the collateral expires. Moody's valuation is
based on a cash flow analysis using market rent and vacancy.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A1 and 1.90X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 1.91X at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the Rexmere Village MHC
Loan ($19 million - 2.9%), which is secured by a 774-pad
manufactured housing community located in Davie, Florida. The loan
is currently on the watchlist for some deferred maintenance
issues. The property was 97% leased as of March 2012, which is the
same as at last review. Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 1.78X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and
1.85X at last review.

The fourth loan with a credit assessment is the ITT Gilfillan
Building Loan ($15 million - 2.3%), which is secured by two
single-story industrial-flex buildings totaling 278,000 SF located
in Van Nuys, California. The buildings are 100% leased to ITT
Industries Inc. through January 2023. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 2.18X, respectively,
compared to Aa3 and 2.35X at last review.

The fifth loan with a credit assessment is the 9401 Wilshire
Boulevard Loan ($13 million -- 2.0%), which is secured by a
128,000 SF office building located in Beverly Hills, California.
The property was 91% leased as of July 2012, which is the same as
at last review. Property performance has improved due to higher
base rents. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR
are Aa3 and 2.20X, respectively, compared to A2 and 2.01X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 6% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Monterey Pines Apartments Loan
($16 million - 2.5%), which is secured by a 286-unit garden style
apartment complex in San Jose, California. The property was 96%
leased as of March 2012 compared to 93% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.45X, respectively, compared to
74% and 1.38X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Bisso Corporate Center Loan ($13
million -- 2.0%), which is secured by a 141,000 SF office building
located in Concord, California. The property was 57% leased after
Tickets.com vacated at its December 2011 lease expiration. The
property's second largest tenant, T-Mobile, will be vacating at
its July 2013 lease expiration, which will drop occupancy to 29%
if the borrower is unable to attract new tenants. Moody's has
assigned a high probably of default for this loan. The low
occupancy and declining property cash flow will make it difficult
for the property to refinance ahead of its July 2013 loan
maturity. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 126% and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 74% and 1.47X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Chinoe Creek Apartments ($13
million -- 1.9%), which is secured by a 356-unit garden style
apartment complex located in Lexington, Kentucky. The property is
94% leased as of June 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 72%
and 1.40%, respectively, compared to 72% and 1.36X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-4: Moody's Cuts 1-A-8 Tranche Rating to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche,
and downgraded the ratings of 16 tranches from Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying Alt-A pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrade on Cl. 1-A-13 is due to
faster pay-down of the bond than previously anticipated.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance of the
pools resulting in higher expected losses for the bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 7.8% in October 2012. Moody's expects a
further drop to 7.5% from 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-13, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-P, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF302772

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes and
downgraded 11 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HQ8 as
follows:

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The IO Class, Class X, is affirmed since it is consistent with the
expected credit performance of the referenced classes. The
downgrades are due to higher than expected realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
7.9% of the current balance compared to 8.0% at last review. Base
expected loss plus realized losses to date totals 9.4% compared to
7.9% at last review. Moody's provides a current list of base
expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the
underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 56, down from 60 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated November 3, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 14, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 20% to $2.19 billion
from $2.73 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 232 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 30%
of the pool. There are four loans that have defeased and are
backed by U.S. Government securities. These loans represent less
than 1% of the current pool balance. There are no loans with an
investment grade credit assessment.

There are 79 loans, representing 36% of the pool, on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization resulting in an aggregate realized loss totaling
$83.1 million (average loss severity of 61%). There are 18 loans,
representing 10% of the pool, currently in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $114.0 million loss (52%
expected loss on average) for all of the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
$9.9 million aggregate loss (10% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 99%
of the performing pool and partial year 2012 operating results for
77% of the performing pool. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 103%
compared to 105% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.8% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.04X, respectively,
compared to 1.28X and 1.01X at last full review. Moody's actual
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Portfolio Loan
($164.5 million -- 7.5%), which is secured by four Ritz-Carlton
hotel properties located in New York City (2) and Washington, D.C.
(2). The portfolio originally included a Boston property which
paid-off in January 2007 resulting in a pay down of 125% of its
allocated loan amount. The loan represents an 87% participation
interest in a $188.9 million loan. The hotel portfolio was
impacted by the downturn in the tourism industry, but performance
has been improving. The loan amortizes on a 226-month schedule for
its first seven years and then converts to a 331-month schedule
thereafter, and has amortized 5% since Moody's last full review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.16X, respectively,
compared to 93% and 0.92X at last review.

The second largest loan is the COPT Office Portfolio Loan ($108.5
million -- 5.0%), which is secured by ten crossed suburban office
properties totaling 597,482 square feet (SF) and located in
Columbia and Annapolis Junction, Maryland. Performance has
improved since last review despite a slight decline in occupancy
to 93% as of year-end 2011 versus 95% at last review. The loan is
interest-only for its entire ten-year term and matures in January
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.88X,
respectively, compared to 118% and 0.85X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Flournoy Portfolio Loan ($92.9
million -- 4.2%), which is secured by four multifamily properties
with a total of 1,397 units located in Texas (2), Tennessee, and
Kansas. Three of the properties are on the servicer's watchlist
due to low DSCR; however, performance of those properties has
improved since last review. The loan had a 36-month interest-only
period and is now amortizing on a 360-month schedule maturing in
January 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.83X,
respectively, compared to 123% and 0.77X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ13: Fitch Cuts Rating on Six Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes and affirmed seven
classes of Morgan Stanley Capital (MSCI) Trust, series 2007-IQ13,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.  The downgrades are
a result of an increase in expected losses on specially serviced
loans, as well as a higher loss expectation on the now largest
specially serviced loan.

Fitch modeled losses of 10.4% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 11.8%.  The pool has
experienced $56 million (3.5% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 38 loans (34.3%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 11 specially serviced
assets (12%).

As of the September 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 19.8% to $1.31 billion from
$1.64 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(3.6% of the pool) have defeased since issuance.  Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes E through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the 75-101 Federal
Street loan (16% of the pool), which is secured by two
interconnected, class A office buildings comprising 811,687 square
feet (sf) in Boston's financial district.  As of June 2012,
occupancy for the building was 81% in-line with occupancy at year-
end 2011 (YE 2011), and slightly improved from occupancy of 79% at
YE 2010.  Net operating income (NOI) has increased 13% from YE
2010 to YE 2011; however, NOI is still down 12% since issuance and
cashflow is only slightly higher than debt service with DSCR of
1.02x at June 2012 and 1.05x at YE 2011.  The loan is current as
of September 2012.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-
serviced 1.2 million-sf, regional mall(6.8%) in Hazelwood, MO, a
suburb of St. Louis.  The mall offers a mix of value-oriented and
entertainment tenants.  The loan transferred to special servicing
in October 2011 due to the borrower's inability to secure
financing by the loan's maturity date.  A deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure was signed in August 2012.  Approximately 33% of the
NRA is scheduled to expire by the end of 2013.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-
serviced a suburban office property (1.10) in Annapolis, MD
totaling 72,052 sf.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 due to imminent default and became real-estate owned
in October 2011.  The servicer renewed the largest tenant
occupying 39% of the NRA until 2016. The property is 91% occupied
as of June 2012.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

  -- $149.6 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf', RE 85%;
  -- $16.4 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $16.4 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $14.3 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $18.4 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $14.3 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

  -- $283.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Stable Outlook;
  -- $83.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Stable Outlook;
  -- $64 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Stable Outlook;
  -- $448.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf; Stable Outlook;
  -- $163.9 million class A-M at 'AAsf'; Stable Outlook
  -- $32.8 million class B at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $8.7 million class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class O and P certificates and maintains
the 'Dsf, RE 0%' rating on classes J, K, L, M and N.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X and
X-Y certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Rates Two CMBS Classes 'B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to sixteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C6.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) *

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf) *

Cl. PST, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf) *

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf) *

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) **

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf) **

Cl. X-C, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf) **

* Classes A-S, B, C, and PST are exchangeable classes.

** Class X-A, X-B, and Class X-C are interest-only classes.

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 61 fixed rate loans secured
by 76 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate

typically depends on the expected frequency, severity, and timing
of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of qualitative
issues as well as the transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.61X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.03X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 101.0% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 101.7% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 25. The transaction's loan level diversity is
similar to Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 27. The
transaction's property diversity profile is similar to the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.03, which is lower
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 22%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aaa, Aa2, Aa3, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


NEWCASTLE CDO IV: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
classes and affirmed the rating of one class of Notes issued by
Newcastle CDO IV, Ltd. due to improvement in the underlying
collateral as evidenced by the Moody's weighted average rating
factor (WARF). The affirmation is due to key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
rating level. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Class I-MM Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
Dec 15, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Class II-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on Dec 15, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Class II-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on Dec 15, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Class III-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf);
previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Class III-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf);
previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Class IV-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Class IV-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Class V Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed at C (sf);
previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Newcastle CDO IV, Ltd. is a static cash CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(49.1% of the pool balance), real estate investment trust (REIT)
debt (18.4%), rake bonds (17.9%), asset backed securities
primarily in the form of sub-prime residential mortgage backed
securities (9.3%) and b-notes (5.3%). As of the September 17, 2012
Note Valuation report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $203.7
million from $450.0 million at issuance, with the paydown directed
to the Class I Notes, as a result of regular amortization of the
underlying collateral and failure of the par value tests.
Additionally, there have been partial cancellations to Class III-
FX and Class IV-FL. In general, holding all key parameters static,
the junior note cancellations results in slightly higher expected
losses and longer weighted average lives on the senior Notes,
while producing slightly lower expected losses on the mezzanine
and junior Notes. However, this does not cause, in and of itself,
a downgrade or upgrade of any outstanding classes of Notes.

There are two assets with a par balance of $3.5 million (1.9% of
the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted securities
as of the September 17, 2012 Note Valuation report. While there
have been realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect significant losses to occur on the defaulted
securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and
Moody's asset correlation (MAC). These parameters are typically
modeled as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for
managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,271,
compared to 1,394 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa- Aa3 (2.8% compared to 2.3% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 0.2% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(47.6% compared to 45.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (29.8% compared
to 30.6% at last review), B1-B3 (17.7% compared to 16.2% at last
review), and Caa1-C (2.1% compared to 4.8% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.2 years, the same as at last review.
The current WAL is based on the assumption about extensions.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 18.9% compared to 20.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 19.2% compared to 20.7% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
18.9% to 8.9% or up to 28.9% would result in modeled rating
movements on the rated Notes of 0 to 1 notch downward and 0 to 2
notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


POPULAR ABS: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A-3 Securities to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches and confirmed the ratings of four tranches from four
deals issued by Popular trusts. The collateral backing the
transactions are subprime residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-2

  Cl. AV-1A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
  Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. AV-1B, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
  Baa2 (sf)

Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-5

  Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  Cl. MV-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-6

  Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-D

  Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The downgrades in the rating action
are a result of deteriorating performance and structural features
resulting in higher expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on subprime pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For subprime pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for
2006 and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below
76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan
fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for
the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.80
to 1.8 for current delinquencies that range from 10% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's  central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.0% in September 2011 to 7.8% in September 2012.
Moody's expects unemployment rate to stay between 7.5% to 8.5% in
2013.  Moody's expects housing prices to remain stable through the
remainder of 2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF302716

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

   http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Rating on Certs. for Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade the
rating of the following certificates issued by PPLUS Trust Series
SPR-1:

U.S $42,515,000 PPLUS Trust Series SPR-1 7.00% Trust Certificates,
B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on August
10, 2012 Confirmed at B3

Rationgs Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of $43,297,000 6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint
Capital Corporation whose B3 rating was placed on review for
upgrade by Moody's on October 15, 2012.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the rating on the
note.


SPRINT CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Rating on $25MM Certs for Upgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade the
rating of the following certificates issued by Corporate Backed
Trust Certificates, Sprint Capital Note-Backed Series 2003-17:

US $25,000,000 Principal Amount of 7.00% Class A-1 Certificates
due 2028, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
on August 10, 2012 Confirmed at B3

Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of $25,455,000 6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint
Capital Corporation whose B3 rating was placed on review for
upgrade by Moody's on October 15, 2012.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


STRATS 2004-2: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Rating for Upgrade
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade the
rating of the following certificates issued by Structured
Repackaged Asset-Backed Trust Securities ("STRATS") Trust for
Sprint Capital Corporation Securities, Series 2004-2:

U.S. $38,000,000 6.500% STRATS, Series 2004-2, Class A-1
Certificates, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on August 10, 2012 Confirmed at B3

Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of $38,000,000 6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint
Capital Corporation whose B3 rating was placed on review for
upgrade by Moody's on October 15, 2012.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the rating on the
note.


SYMPHONY CLO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Symphony CLO I, Ltd.:

U.S. $60,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Revolving Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf);

U.S. $250,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

U.S. $15,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

U.S. $22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf);

U.S. $21,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf);

U.S. $13,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to
B1 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2012. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from a lower WARF and shorter WAL compared
to the levels assumed at the last rating action in September 2011.
Based on the latest trustee report dated September 13, 2012, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2551 compared to 2889
in August 2011. Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
overcollateralization ratios are stable since the last rating
action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of approximately
$409.2 million, defaulted par of about $0.7 million, a weighted
average default probability of 15.03% (implying a WARF of 2714), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.65%, and a
diversity score of 52. The default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Symphony CLO I, Ltd., issued in November 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2172)

Class A-1A: 0
Class A-1B: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class B: +3
Class C: +2
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3257)

Class A-1A: 0
Class A-1B: 0
Class A-2: -2
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities, which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below :

Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds will
commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.


US CAPITAL V: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by U.S. Capital Funding V, Ltd.:

U.S.$193,000,000 Class A-l Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2040
(current balance of $107,251,048.21), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on November 3, 2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf);

U.S.$30,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2040,
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on November 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios as well
as the improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio since the last rating action in November 2010.

Moody's notes that the the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 29% or $43.6 million since the last rating action,
due to diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying assets. As a
result of this deleveraging, the Class A-1 Notes' par coverage
improved to 130.7% from 117.8% since the last rating action, as
calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest trustee report dated
October 3, 2012, the Senior Principal Coverage Ratio, Senior
Subordinate Principal Coverage Ratio, and Mezzanine Principal
Coverage Ratio are reported at 82.7% (limit 114.2%), 61.2% (limit
103.1%) and 56.7% (limit 102.6%), respectively, versus October
2010 levels of 86.4%, 68.1% and 63.9%, respectively. Going
forward, the Class A-1 Notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the proceeds from future
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

Moody's also notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
1045 compared to 2496 as of the last rating action date. The total
par amount of securities that Moody's treated as defaulted or
deferring declined to $144.4 million compared to $148.9 million as
of the last rating action date.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $142 million,defaulted/deferring par of $144.4
million, a weighted average default probability of 25.3% (implying
a WARF of 1045), Moody's Asset Correlation of 23.7%, and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 13.8%. In addition
to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

US Capital Funding V, Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities and senior secured bank loans.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks and senior secured bank loans. As Bank TruPS are generally
not publicly rated by Moody's, to evaluate their credit quality,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q2-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8-5 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge. CDOROM v.2.8-5 is
available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical
models, upon return of a signed free license agreement.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 300 points from the
base case of 1045, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 Notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 300 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 Notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $17 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on all
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +1
Class A-2: +3
Class A-3: +3
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2A: +1
Class A-3: 0
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as Moody's outlook on the banking
sector remains negative, although there have been some recent
signs of stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues
to decline in 2012 compared to 2011, 2010 and 2009, and some of
the previously deferring banks have resumed interest payment on
their trust preferred securities.


* Moody's Cuts Ratings on $200MM Countrywide 2003-2004 RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 18
tranches from four RMBS transactions, backed by Prime Loans,
issued by Countrywide.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-29

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB3

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-3

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-24, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-25, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-26, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB4

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Prime jumbo
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The rating action consists of a number of downgrades.The
downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
interest-only securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) Small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools
originated before 2005, Moody's first applies a baseline
delinquency rate of 3.0%. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.75 to 2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.8% in September 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house
prices to drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before
gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS
continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any
change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these
transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF302780

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 47 Tranches From 12 RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 47
tranches from 12 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM
loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A and
Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving principal payments, and
thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available to the senior
bonds. In its current approach, Moody's captures this risk by
running each individual pool through a variety of loss and
prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)
(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street
Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for (1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications (2) small pool volatility and
(3) bonds that financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A and Option ARM pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate
based on vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the
level of current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option
Arm pools, Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of
10% for 2004, 5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan
count in a pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is
increased by 1% for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a
2004 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is
10.1%. Further, to account for the actual rate of delinquencies in
a small pool, Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a
factor ranging from 0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that
range from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate of new delinquency to
project delinquencies and losses for the remaining life of the
pool under the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 9%
in April 2011 to 7.8% in September 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2004
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2004
Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2004
Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2004
Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2004
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-13

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AX-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR5

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. I-M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-10

Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. AP, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-18XS

Cl. A7, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2002-17

Cl. 1-A7, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2002
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. 1-AP, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2002
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-PAX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2002
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2002
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2002
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. 2-AX, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-17A

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-10

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-5H

Cl. A4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-IO1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-IO2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-AR3

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF303589

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 11 Classes From 10 CMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes from 10 commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions and removed 10 of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where S&P placed them on Sept. 5, 2012. "In
addition, we affirmed our ratings on six classes from six
transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications," S&P said.

"The lowered ratings follow our recently updated criteria for
rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions, which applies a credit
enhancement minimum equal to 1% of the transaction or loan amount
to address the potential for unexpected trust expenses that may be
incurred during the life of the loan or transaction. These
potential unexpected trust expenses may include servicer fees,
servicer advances, workout or corrected mortgage fees, and
potential trust legal fees," S&P said.

"We downgraded 11 classes from 10 deals to 'BB+ (sf)' because
neither the loan nor the transaction documents include mechanisms
to cover unexpected potential trust expenses and the respective
transactions compose exclusively of investment-grade rated
classes," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on six classes from six transactions
because either the respective loans have a subordinate B note that
is sufficient to absorb the potential trust expenses; our analysis
reflects that the respective loan or transaction currently
composes exclusively of investment-grade rated classes and the
most subordinate class is currently in a 'BB' rating category; or
in the case of the A-3 class in 5400 Westheimer Court Depositor
Corp.'s series 2003, the rating is dependent on the corporate
credit rating of Spectra Energy Capital LLC (BBB+/Stable/A-2)and
it is our understanding that any potential fees would be paid
under the guaranty," S&P said.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue Plaza Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates FB 2005-1
               Rating
Class      To         From
F          BB+(sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg

American Tower Trust 1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
              Rating
Class      To         From
F          BB+(sf)    BBB+(sf)/Watch Neg

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-3
              Rating
Class      To         From
UH-J       BB+(sf)    BBB+(sf)/Watch Neg

Banc of America Large Loan Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2006-BIXI
              Rating
Class      To         From
L-CP       BB+(sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C3
              Rating
Class      To         From
622-F      BB+(sf)    BBB-(sf)/Watch Neg

Four Times Square Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, 2006-4TS
              Rating
Class      To         From
C          BB+(sf)    AA(sf)/Watch Neg

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C3
              Rating
Class      To         From
S-AFR-4    BB+(sf)    BBB-(sf)/Watch Neg

HVB Mortgage Capital Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-FL1
              Rating
Class      To         From
K          BB+(sf)    A+(sf)/Watch Neg

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1
              Rating
Class      To         From
CM-3       BB+(sf)    BBB-(sf)/Watch Neg

N-45 First CMBS Issuer Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-2
              Rating
Class      To         From
D          BB+(sf)    A-(sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS LOWERED
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C3
              Rating
Class      To         From
622-E      BB+(sf)    BBB-(sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

5400 Westheimer Court Depositor Corp 2003
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
              Rating
Class      To         From
A-3        BBB+ (sf)   BBB+(sf)/Watch Neg

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-2
              Rating
Class      To         From
HS-E       BB+ (sf)   BB+(sf)/Watch Neg

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-3
              Rating
Class      To         From
SS-D       BBB- (sf)  BBB-sf)/Watch Neg

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2007-BBA8
              Rating
Class      To         From
MS-7       BB(sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Neg

COMM 2006-FL12
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Rating
Class      To         From
IP3        BBB-(sf)   BBB-(sf)/Watch Neg

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2006-TFL2
              Rating
Class      To         From
SV-K       BBB-(sf)    BBB-(sf)/Watch Neg


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Repackaged Securities to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term ratings
on three repackaged securities to 'D' from BBB'. "We subsequently
withdrew all three ratings," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings to 'D' because the securityholders have
received less than the full principal and interest payment. The
payment shortfalls resulted from swap termination fees that were
made to each swap counterparty in conjunction with the early
redemption of the underlying assets and the redemption of the
securities," S&P said.

"We subsequently withdrew our ratings because the securities are
no longer outstanding," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS
                                 Ratings
                            To   Interim     From

STRATS Trust for, JP Morgan Chase Capital XVII Securities Series
2005-2, due
Aug. 1, 2035
                            NR    D          BBB

STRATS Trust for, JP Morgan Chase Capital XVII Securities Series
2005-5, due
Aug. 1, 2035
                            NR    D          BBB

Treasury Indexed LinkED Securities (TILES) series 2005-1, due Aug.
1, 2035
                            NR    D          BBB

NR - Not rated.


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Debt Classes From 3 CDO Deals to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on three classes from three synthetic corporate collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transactions.

The lowered ratings follow recent credit events on the
transactions' underlying reference entities, which caused the
notes to incur partial principal losses.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Signum Platinum III Ltd. Series 2007-01
Series 2007-01
                              Rating
Class                   To           From
Notes                   D (sf)       CC (sf)

M-2 SPC
Series 2005-J
                              Rating
Class                   To           From
FRN                     D (sf)       CCC- (sf)

Omega Capital Investments II PLC
Series 31
                              Rating
Class                   To           From
A-1E                    D (sf)       CCC- (sf)


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 26 Classes From 5 CMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on six
classes from the COMM 2007-C9 transaction, removing two from
CreditWatch with positive implications and from CreditWatch with
developing implications. "Concurrently, we lowered our ratings on
16 other classes from four other commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transactions and removed 14 of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. Finally, we affirmed our
ratings on four classes from two transactions and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications. The CreditWatch
resolutions are related to our Sept. 5, 2012, CreditWatch
placements," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect Standard & Poor's expected available credit
enhancement for the affected tranches, which we believe is greater
than our most recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for
the most recent rating levels. The upgrades also reflect our views
regarding the current and future performance of the collateral
supporting the respective transactions," S&P said.

The upgrades of the "E57-1" and "E57-2" raked classes in the COMM
2007-C9 transaction reflect S&P's analysis of the $15.5 million
junior nonpooled portion of the 135 East 57th Street loan and
follows S&P's recently updated criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions. "We upgraded the two classes to 'BB-
(sf)' and 'B+ (sf)'. The raked certificates derive 100% of their
cash flows from the junior nonpooled portion of the loan," S&P
said.

"The downgrades reflect our expected available credit enhancement
for the affected tranches, which we believe is less than our most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the most
recent rating levels. The downgrades also reflect our views
regarding the current and future performance of the collateral
supporting the respective transactions," S&P said.

"The affirmations reflect our expected available credit
enhancement for the affected tranches, which we believe will
remain consistent with the most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the current rating levels. The affirmed
ratings also acknowledge our expectations regarding the current
and future performance of the collateral supporting the respective
transactions," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow a detailed review of the performance of
the collateral supporting the relevant securities and transaction
structures. This review was similar to the review we conducted
before placing 744 U.S. and Canadian CMBS ratings on CreditWatch
following the release of our updated ratings criteria for these
transactions, but was more detailed with respect to collateral and
transaction performance," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Cobalt CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From                Credit enhancement (%)
A-M    BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg                19.57
A-J    B- (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Neg                 11.31
B      B- (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg                  9.14
C      B- (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg                  8.06

COMM 2007-C9
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
         Rating
Class  To          From            Credit enhancement (%)
A-1A   AA   (sf)   A (sf)/Watch Pos               30.72
A-4    AA   (sf)   A (sf)/Watch Pos               30.72
AM     BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)                      20.17
AM-FL  BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)                      20.17
E      B+   (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg               8.71
F      B    (sf)   B (sf)/Watch Neg                7.92
G      B    (sf)   B (sf)/Watch Neg                7.00
E57-1  BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Dev                N/A
E57-2  B+  (sf)   B  (sf)/Watch Dev                N/A

Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-GG11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
          Rating
Class   To          From             Credit enhancement (%)
A-M     BB (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Neg               19.25
A-J     B- (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Neg               10.67
B       CCC (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg                 9.85

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
         Rating
Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-M    B+  (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg            18.96
A-MFL  B+  (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg            18.96
A-J    B-   (sf)  BB- (sf)/Watch Neg            12.78
B      B-   (sf)  B+ (sf)/Watch Neg            11.45
C      B-   (sf)  B (sf)/Watch Neg              9.98
D      B-   (sf)  B (sf)/Watch Neg              8.66
E      B-   (sf)  B (sf)/Watch Neg              7.48
F      CCC  (sf)  B-(sf)                        6.30
G      CCC  (sf)  B-(sf)                        4.98

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
         Rating
Class  To         From               Credit enhancement (%)
A-M    BB- (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg               18.15




                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Carmel
Paderog, Meriam Fernandez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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