TCR_Public/121007.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, October 7, 2012, Vol. 16, No. 279

                            Headlines

ANDERSON UNIV.: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on $43.3MM Revenue Bonds
ARBOR REALTY 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on 2 Sec. Classes
ARBOR REALTY 2005-1: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Sec. Classes to 'CCC'
ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf'  Rating on 4 Note Classes
ARES XII: Moody's Raises Rating on $35MM Class E Notes to 'Ba2'

ATWATER PUBLIC: Fitch Cuts Rating on $19.6MM Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
BAMLL COMMERCIAL: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Ratings to 2 Cert. Classes
BENEFIT STREET I: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on $18-Mil. Class D Notes
BUSINESS LOAN 2003-A: S&P Puts 'B+' Notes Rating on Watch Negative
CARBON CAPITAL: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B1'

CARLYLE CLO 2012-3: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on $33MM Class D Notes
CEDAR FUNDING: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $13.3-Mil. Class D Notes
CITIGROUP 2012-GC8: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating on Class F Certs.
COMM 2012-CCRE3: Fitch Issues Presale Report on Some Certificates
COMM 2012-CCRE3: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Cl. G Certs.

COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP3: Fitch Rates $4.4-Mil. Class N Notes 'Csf'
CREST EXETER: Fitch Affirms 'CCC(sf)' Rating on 2 Note Classes
DEUTSCHE BANK 2011-FL1: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 5 Cert. Classes
DUANE STREET: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba1'

FREMF MORTGAGE: Moody's Rates Two CMBS Classes '(P)Ba3'
GOLDMAN SACHS: Fitch Lowers Preferred Stock Rating to 'BB+'
GUAM POWER: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on $56.1MM Sr. Revenue Bonds
HALCYON 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB+'
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class C Notes From 'Ba1'

ING IM 2012-3: S&P Gives 'BB' Prelim Rating on Class E Def Notes
KEYCORP STUDENT: Fitch Keeps 'CC' Rating on Jr. Subordinate Notes
LB-UBS 2007-C2: Fitch Lowers Rating on 7 Certificate Classes
LCM XII: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Deferrable Notes
MMCAPS FUNDING: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to 'Caa1'

MORGAN STANLEY 2006-2: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Cl. III Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-10: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ10: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 CMBS to 'C'
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ13: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Notes to 'C(sf)'
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Fitch Issues Presale Report on 15 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Rates 2 CMBS Classes '(P)B2'
NATIONAL ABS 2012-1M: Fitch Rates AUD2 Million Class F Notes 'Bsf'
NEWCASTLE CDO VI: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Cl. I-MM Notes
OZLM FUNDING II: S&P Gives 'BB' Prelim. Rating on Class D Notes
PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'C'

RACE POINT IV: S&P Says 'CCC'-Rated Collateral Declined
REALT 2005-1: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on Cl. L Certificates
RFC CDO 2006-1: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'C(sf)'
SALOMON HOME: Moody's Cuts Rating on M-2 Securities to 'Ca'
SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-6: Fitch to Rate US42MM Class E Notes 'BB'

SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-6: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
SILVER CREEK: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC+'
SORIN REAL ESTATE: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class A1 Notes to Ba3
STEERS THAYER 2006-1: S&P Withdraws 'CCC+' Rating on Trust Cert.
SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on $49-Mil. Class M2 Notes

SVG DIAMOND II: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Two Note Classes
SYMPHONY CLO VI: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
TENZING CFO: Fitch Keeps Junk Rating on Two Notes Classes
TROPIC CDO II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A-3L Notes to 'Caa2'
TROPIC CDO IV: Moody's Raises Rating on $160-Mil. Notes to 'Ba2'

UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C3: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Cl. F Certs.
WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Fitch Gives Low-B Ratings to 2 Cert. Classes
WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Cl. F Certs.

* Fitch Lowers Rating on 336 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf'
* Fitch Affirms Rating on 4 Sec. Classes From 2 U.S. RE-REMICs
* Fitch Says Credit Quality of Speculative Debt Strengthens
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $1.2 Billion US Alt-A RMBS
* S&P Reinstates Ratings on Various Structured Finance Issues

* S&P Raises Ratings on 38 Classes From 12 CMBS Transactions
* S&P Raises Ratings on 25 Classes From 14 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 465 Classes From 79 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 227 Classes From 67 U.S. RMBS Transactions
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 139 Classes From 46 US RMBS Transactions


                            *********

ANDERSON UNIV.: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on $43.3MM Revenue Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the 'BB+' rating on approximately $43.3
million of the City of Anderson, Indiana Economic Development
Revenue Refunding and Improvement bonds issued on behalf of
Anderson University (AU).

The Rating Outlook is revised to Stable from Negative.

Security

The bonds are an unsecured general obligation of the university.
As additional security, there is a partially cash-funded $3.7
million debt service reserve fund.

Key Rating Drivers

RATING STABILIZATION: The revision of the Rating Outlook to Stable
from Negative reflects management's progress to-date in
stabilizing undergraduate enrollment. As enrollment underpins net
tuition and fees, AU's primary revenue source, this alleviates
some financial concerns noted in Fitch's last review.

IMPROVED OPERATING PERFORMANCE: Fitch believes several
programmatic changes that are currently underway will bode well
for continued enrollment stability, which will subsequently allow
the university to sustain the break-even to positive operating
results that underpin the 'BB+' rating.

NARROW FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY: AU's financial flexibility remains
constrained, as evidenced by its limited pricing flexibility, high
tuition discounting rate, and weak financial cushion.

MANAGEABLE DEBT LEVEL: The university has no additional borrowing
plans in the near term, which should allow the high level of
outstanding debt to moderate over time. AU is regularly able to
cover pro-forma maximum annual debt service (MADS) from operations
by at least 1x.

CREDIT PROFILE

Improved Operating Performance

AU remains heavily dependent on student revenues for operations
(79.8% in fiscal 2012), similar to many other private
universities. Undergraduate enrollment, which represents the bulk
of total headcount enrollment (typically around 80%), remained
effectively flat at 2,034 in fall 2012 relative to the prior two
years. Fitch views this trend of steadiness favorably and believes
it reflects well of the admissions team's ability to attract and
retain undergraduate matriculants.

Relative stability in fiscal 2012 undergraduate enrollment
supported the resumption of growth in net tuition and fee income,
which contributed to a healthy operating margin of 4.1%. While
AU's operating performance over the past five fiscal years has
been uneven, Fitch notes favorably that financial results have
been generally break-even to positive.

Narrow Financial Flexibility

A significant portion of student tuition is discounted annually
(39.4% in fiscal 2012) as a result of a competitive environment
and AU's high cost of attendance relative to its peer group.
Management has taken positive steps to curb increases in tuition
and fees and the tuition discounting rate. Nevertheless, Fitch
believes AU's already limited pricing flexibility and high tuition
discounting rate constrain the university's ability to materially
raise student-generated revenues without expanding the overall
enrollment level.

The university's financial flexibility is further restricted by
its thin level of balance sheet resources. Available funds as of
May 31, 2012, defined by Fitch as cash and investments not
permanently restricted, totaled $7.3 million. This covered fiscal
2012 operating expenses ($51.1 million) and pro-forma long-term
debt ($55.6 million, inclusive of outstanding bonds, notes, and
capital leases) by a weak 14.4% and 13.2%, respectively.

Fitch believes the narrow level of financial flexibility
underscores the importance of prudent financial management. As
such, Fitch expects management to undertake significant, permanent
budgetary adjustments in the event that AU's institutional size
shows any signs of material, lasting deterioration beyond its
existing level.

High Debt Burden Should Moderate

The university's debt burden is high, as pro-forma MADS of around
$6.2 million (inclusive of a bullet maturity on an outstanding
note) due in fiscal 2018 consumed 11.5% of fiscal 2012
unrestricted operating revenues. Partly offsetting the magnitude
of this burden is AU's ability to normally generate adequate MADS
coverage from operations (1.3x in fiscal 2012). Fitch expects AU's
debt burden to moderate over time, as outstanding obligations are
repaid and limited near-term capital needs are funded through
internal resources and fundraising.


ARBOR REALTY 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on 2 Sec. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed three classes of
Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2004-1, Ltd. / LLC (ARMSS
2004-1) reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 61%.
Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective views
regarding commercial real estate market value and cash flow
declines.

The upgrade reflects increased credit enhancement to the senior
class from continuing paydown of the capital structure.  Since
Fitch's last rating action, Class A has been paid down by an
additional $27.6 million primarily due the full payoff or removal
at par of four CDO assets.

ARMSS 2004-1 is a CRE collateralized debt obligation (CDO) managed
by Arbor Realty Collateral Management, LLC (Arbor).  As of the
August 2012 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO
was substantially invested as follows: B-notes (51%), whole
loans/A-notes (20%), preferred equity (14%), mezzanine debt (13%),
CMBS (0.2%), and cash (2%).  Approximately 7% of the pool is
currently defaulted while a further 53% are considered assets of
concern. Fitch expects significant losses on many of the assets as
they are highly leveraged subordinate positions.

The CDO exited its reinvestment period in April 2009.  As of the
August 2012 trustee report, all par value and interest coverage
test are in compliance.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 97% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 8.7% from, generally, year-end 2011 or trailing 12-
month first quarter 2012.  Modeled recoveries are average at
37.1%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
preferred equity position (12.1% of the pool) on a 230 property
multifamily portfolio located across 10 states.  As of Dec. 31,
2011, occupancy was 83%. The senior debt is currently in special
servicing.  Fitch modeled a full loss in its base case scenario on
this overleveraged position.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is related to an A-note and B-note (10.2%) secured by a portfolio
of six full and limited service hotels located in Daytona Beach,
FL.  The portfolio was previously in bankruptcy, and an Arbor
affiliate took title to the properties in February 2011.  While
new management has been installed at the properties, it is
expected to take time for performance at all six properties to
stabilize.  Fitch modeled a term default and a substantial loss on
these loan interests in its base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The
default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  The
breakeven rates for classes A and B are generally consistent with
the ratings listed below.

The Stable Outlook on class A generally reflects the class's
seniority in the capital stack and expectation of continued
further paydown over the near term.

The ratings for classes C and D are based on a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each classes credit enhancement.

Fitch upgrades the following class:

  -- $75.2 million class A to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $51.6 million class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $27.6 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 10%;
  -- $11.2 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.


ARBOR REALTY 2005-1: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Sec. Classes to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and affirmed five
classes of Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2005-1,
Ltd./LLC (ARMSS 2005-1) reflecting Fitch's base case loss
expectation of 41.7%.  Fitch's performance expectation
incorporates prospective views regarding commercial real estate
market value and cash flow declines.

The downgrades to classes C through F reflect Fitch's increased
base case expected loss of 41.7% from 37.8% at last review. ARMSS
2005-1 is a CRE collateralized debt obligation (CDO) managed by
Arbor Realty Collateral Management, LLC (Arbor).  As of the August
2012 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was
substantially invested as follows: whole loans/A-notes (53%), B-
notes (28%), mezzanine debt (12%), preferred equity (5%), CMBS
(2%), and cash (0.5%). Approximately 3.8% of the pool is currently
defaulted while a further 37.9% are considered assets of concern.

The CDO exited its reinvestment period in April 2011.  Since
Fitch's last rating action, class A-1 has been paid down by $44
million primarily due to the full payoff or removal at par of four
CDO assets, and the discounted payoff of another asset.  Realized
losses over the last year have totaled $5.8 million.  The combined
total of defaulted assets and assets of concern is 41.7% compared
to 30.2% at last rating action.  As of the August 2012 trustee
report, all par value and interest coverage tests were in
compliance.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 77.5% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 8.5% from, generally, year-end 2011 or trailing 12-
month first quarter 2012.  Modeled recoveries are better than
average at 46.2% due to the significant percentage of senior debt.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
B-note (6% of the pool) secured by a 43-story office building
located in downtown St. Louis, MO.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in August 2012 due to imminent default.  Loan
resolution discussions are ongoing.  Fitch modeled a full loss in
its base case scenario on this overleveraged position.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a preferred equity position (4.6% of the pool) on a 230-
property multifamily portfolio located across 10 states.  As of
Dec. 31, 2011, occupancy was 83%.  The senior debt is currently in
special servicing.  Fitch modeled a full loss in its base case
scenario on this overleveraged position.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The
default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  The
breakeven rates for classes A-1 through D are generally consistent
with the ratings listed below.

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-1 through D generally reflect the
classes' cushion in the modeling.

The ratings for classes E through H are based on a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class' credit enhancement.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

  -- $22.5 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable
     from Negative;
  -- $7.7 million class D to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable
     from Negative;
  -- $6.8 million class E to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $13.3 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

  -- $117.5 million class A-1 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.4 million class A-2 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $57 million class B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.9 million class G at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%
  -- $13.5 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.


ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf'  Rating on 4 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes issued by ARCap 2004-1
Resecuritization, Inc. (ARCap 2004-1).

Since Fitch's last rating action in October 2011, approximately
47.6% of the underlying collateral has been downgraded and 1.1%
upgraded.  Currently, 97.3% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade and 67.7% has a rating in the 'CCC'
category and below, compared to 97.1% and 56.5% at the last rating
action.  Over this time, the class A notes have received $8.3
million for a total of $19.9 million in principal paydowns since
issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.  Based on this analysis, the class A through C notes'
breakeven rates are generally consistent with the ratings assigned
below.

For the class D through K notes, Fitch analyzed the class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below).  Given the high probability of default of these assets and
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class D
notes have been affirmed at 'CCCsf', indicating that default is
possible.  Similarly, the class E and F notes have been affirmed
at 'CCsf', indicating that default is probable, and the class G
though K have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.

The Negative Outlook on the class A and B notes reflects the
increasing obligor concentration and the potential for adverse
selection as the portfolio continues to amortize. Fitch does not
assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

ARCAP 2004-1 is backed by 53 tranches from 14 commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) transactions and is considered a CMBS B-
piece resecuritization (also referred to as first loss commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation [CRE CDO]/ReREMIC) as
it includes the most junior bonds of CMBS transactions. The
transaction closed April 19, 2004.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

  -- $37,156,821 class A notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $30,600,000 class B notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $26,500,000 class C notes at 'CCCsf'
  -- $8,500,000 class D notes at 'CCCsf'
  -- $30,700,000 class E notes at 'CCsf';
  -- $13,600,000 class F notes at 'CCsf;
  -- $36,000,000 class G notes at 'Csf';
  -- $13,000,000 class H notes at 'Csf';
  -- $31,500,000 class J notes at 'Csf';
  -- $20,500,000 class K notes at 'Csf'.


ARES XII: Moody's Raises Rating on $35MM Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Ares XII CLO Ltd.:

  US$52,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due November 25,
  2020, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 3, 2011
  Upgraded to A1 (sf);

  US$42,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
  November 25, 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
  August 3, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  US$35,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
  November 25, 2020, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
  August 3, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); and

  US$35,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
  November 25, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $26,270,832),
  Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to
  B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2012. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, higher spread and higher
Diversity compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action
in August 2011. Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
collateral quality and overcollateralization ratios are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $675 million,
defaulted par of $3.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.64% (implying a WARF of 2486), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.97%, and a diversity
score of 58. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Ares XII CLO Ltd. issued in October 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1989)

Class A: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +2
Class D: +2
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2983)

Class A: 0
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities, which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below :

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.


ATWATER PUBLIC: Fitch Cuts Rating on $19.6MM Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and places on Rating Watch Negative the
following Atwater Public Financing Authority, California (the
authority) bonds issued on behalf of the City of Atwater,
California (the city):

  -- $19.6 million wastewater revenue bonds, series 2008 to 'BB'
     from 'A-'.

Security

The bonds are secured by installment payments made by the city to
the trustee as assignee of the authority.  The city's obligation
to make installment payments is secured by a pledge of gross
system revenues.  The bonds are also secured by a cash-funded debt
service reserve fund (DSRF), funded at the maximum amount
allowable by law and held with the trustee.

Key Rating Drivers

FINANCIAL UNCERTAINTY: The downgrade and Negative Watch primarily
relates to deficits and structural imbalances in the city's
general fund, water utility fund, and sanitation fund, which has
led to a rapid drawdown in pooled cash resources in recent months
to just $6.3 million at the end of Aug. 2012 (compared to $17.7
million reported in the fiscal 2011 audit).  Sewer system (the
system) pledged revenues are included in the city's pooled cash,
and while the amount of draws from system resources to support
non-system operations currently is unknown, it is clear to Fitch
by the city's drawdown of system funds that the city has viewed
these monies as available to support operating deficits from other
city funds.

DSRF DRAW POSSIBLE: Failure by the city council to bring
structural balance to the general fund, water utility fund, and
sanitation fund within the immediate future could ultimately
impair the city's ability to accumulate sufficient funds to make
sewer bond debt service payments without a draw on the DSRF.

WILLINGNESS TO PAY CONCERN: The downgrade and Negative Watch also
reflect the city's recent action to consider declaring a fiscal
emergency -- a possible prelude to the city entering into
confidential negotiations with creditors under California's A.B.
506 process and/or seeking Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection --
which calls into question the city's ultimate willingness to pay
system bonds.

POSSIBLE BOND ACCELERATION CONCERN: The downgrade and Negative
Watch further reflect the possibility that should the city
initiate the A.B. 506 process or vote to petition for Chapter 9
bankruptcy protection, which could occur at the city council's
Oct. 3 meeting, the trustee may declare an event of default
pursuant to the legal documents related to the bonds.  The
declaration of an event of default by the trustee could lead to
acceleration of the system bonds which the city would be unable to
pay given its limited resources and fiscal distress.

DECLINING COVERAGE LEVELS: Recent bond issuances have resulted in
narrow debt service coverage (DSC) levels, down from previously
strong DSC.  Furthermore, DSC dropped to near sum-sufficient in
fiscal 2011 including transfers out to other city funds.

HIGH DEBT, SLOW AMORTIZATION: The city's recent succession of debt
issuances to complete construction of a new wastewater treatment
plant in order to comply with environmental requirements has
resulted in high debt levels and slow amortization.

LIMITED SERVICE AREA AND RATE FLEXIBILITY: Rate increases to
support debt service on system bonds have resulted in monthly
charges that are substantially higher than surrounding
communities.  The service area's below-average income metrics and
high unemployment further challenge the city's ability to increase
rates in the future.

What Could Trigger A Downgrade

FAILURE TO ADDRESS BUDGET GAPS: Failure by the city council to
adopt measures that would bring about structural balance within
the general fund, water utility fund, and sanitation funds and
alleviate the pressure to draw on system cash resources would be
viewed as a significant weakness and failure of leadership to
protect bondholders.

BOND ACCELERATION: Declaration of an event of default by the
trustee of the bonds, which might lead to acceleration of the
bonds, would place severe credit pressure on the bonds.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SYSTEM: Fitch's ongoing review
will consider both future actions by the city that could
negatively affect the system as well as any developing external
system pressures.  Depending on the nature of the event(s), the
rating on the system bonds could deteriorate rapidly and
significantly from the current rating level.

CREDIT PROFILE

Financial Uncertainty Drives Negative Rating Action

Structural imbalances in the city's general fund, water fund and
sanitation funds over the last few years have eroded the city's
fiscal capacity and led to a sharp reduction in city pooled cash
resources since fiscal 2011, the city's last available audited
financial statements.  Further, the drawdown of pooled cash since
fiscal 2011 has negatively affected the system cash balances,
presumably to a significant degree.  For fiscal 2011, the city
reported total pooled cash of $17.7 million, of which system cash
equaled around 70% of these funds ($12.4 million).

Based on a city council agenda packet for Sept. 19 (the agenda
packet), the city's pooled cash was reduced to $8.8 million at the
end of fiscal 2012 (June 30) and declined further to $6.3 million
by Aug. 31.  Apart from the structural imbalances for fiscal 2013
in the general fund ($1 million), water fund ($720,000), and
sanitation funds ($600,000), the pooled cash position was
negatively affected by a $5 million draw to complete the system's
new wastewater treatment plant (WWTP).

While the system reportedly is generating positive cash flow and
prior city projections forecasted coverage of fiscal 2013 debt
service costs by 1.3x, the prior and potential future use of
system resources for non-system purposes could reduce actual
system margins for the year to minimal or even negative levels.
Currently, pooled cash balances are sufficient to meet a $2.1
million system debt service payment due Nov. 1, and the city
expects to deposit these monies with the trustee in the coming
days.  However, there are certain construction costs associated
with completion of the WWTP (operational since April 2012) and
city-wide personnel costs that without structural changes to funds
currently operating at a deficit, could deplete city pooled
resources over the near term.

The structural deficits in the general fund, water utility fund
and sanitation fund stem largely from declining revenues, rising
expenditures, and failure to raise rates in the water (for 20
years) and sanitation funds (for ten years).  For the general
fund, home values reportedly have dropped around 40% since the
2007 peak year, significantly reducing tax revenues.  In addition,
almost all other general fund revenues, with the exception of
sales taxes, have experienced declines over the last few years.

Willingness to Pay and Acceleration Concerns

The agenda packet included a recommendation to the city council to
declare a fiscal emergency and direct staff to take necessary
actions to balance the city's fiscal 2013 budget.  However, the
city council refrained from voting on the fiscal emergency
recommendation at the Sept. 19 meeting, instead deferring to take
up the matter on Oct. 3.  The city council's lack of leadership to
date in addressing budgetary issues to ensure adequate operations
and the use of system resources is a significant concern.

If the city council ultimately declares a fiscal emergency it is
possible that the confidential mediation process with creditors
pursuant to the state's A.B. 506 and/or a petition for Chapter 9
bankruptcy protection may follow in the event budgetary balance
cannot be reached or if measures to achieve budgetary balance are
not enacted expeditiously.  In the event the city enters into the
A.B. 506 process and/or files for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection,
negative rating action would likely ensue and may be significant
as Fitch would view such events as an impairment of the city's
willingness to pay.  Further, credit concerns would be heightened
in that a Chapter 9 filing would constitute an event of default
under the bond documents with a possible acceleration of the bonds
by the trustee; Fitch believes the trustee could possibly declare
an event of default followed by acceleration of the bonds with the
initiation of the A.B. 506 process as well.

Small and Strained Service Area

Atwater is located in northeast Merced County, in the central
portion of California's San Joaquin Valley.  With a population of
about 28,000, it is a small agricultural based community with a
federal prison at the site of the former Castle Air Force Base,
which closed in 1995.  The sewer system provides wastewater
collection, treatment, and disposal to the city's residents and to
the Town of Winton (population of about 9,000), a U.S.
penitentiary (inmate population of around 1,200), and Castle
Airport Aviation.

Typical of agricultural communities, unemployment levels (17.8%
for July 2012) are well above state and national averages while
income levels are below average.  The area has experienced a
significant slowdown in growth in the past several years as
exemplified by a sharp decline in connection fee revenues and city
assessed values.

Regulatory Issues Lead to Elevated Debt Profile

The system currently operates one WWTP.  The authority has issued
approximately $64 million in wastewater revenue bonds since 2008
-- nearly tripling outstanding system debt -- to construct a new
WWTP. The new WWTP was designed to comply with more stringent
requirements associated with the system's discharge permit,
including a move to tertiary treatment standards.  As a result of
the authority's recent debt issuances, system debt levels
are 3x-8x higher than Fitch's national medians.  In addition,
amortization of principal is very slow, with just 41% of principal
retired in 20 years.


BAMLL COMMERCIAL: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Ratings to 2 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
CMBS securities, issued by BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2012-CLRN, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2012-CLRN.

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-1A*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2A*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

* Interest Only Classes

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by
first lien commercial mortgage related to 47 extended stay hotel
properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's rating approach for securities backed by a single loan
compares the credit risk inherent in the underlying properties
with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings Moody's also considers a range
of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two
factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss in the event of default, which is largely
driven by the LTV of the underlying loan. Moody's Trust LTV Ratio
is 75.3%, and has been assigned a bottom dollar credit assessment
of Ba3 by Moody's. Moody's Total LTV ratio (inclusive of mezzanine
financing) of 112.3% is also considered when analyzing various
stress scenarios for the rated debt. The Moody's Trust Stressed
DSCR at a 9.25% constant is 1.54X and the Moody's Total Stressed
DSCR (inclusive of mezzanine financing) is 1.03X.

The loan is solely collateralized by extended-stay hotel
properties that are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted. In
assessing the benefit due to "crossing" for this transaction,
Moody's examined underlying diversity that resulted from asset
pooling. Moody's considered the Herfindahl score of the portfolio
by allocated loan amounts, as well as the diversity of property
locations. The properties underlying the loan are geographically
diverse and benefit from a Herfindahl score of 26. However,
significant correlations exist due to pooling within a single
property type. Lodging properties are more correlated than
properties of other commercial real estate sectors. Moody's expect
the underlying property performance to be more correlated than
most single borrower, multi-property transactions previously rated
by Moody's.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based Large Loan Model v.8.4
which derives credit enhancement level based on an adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratio. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0, which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Single Borrower CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.
Moody's believes that strong organizational documents at the SPE
level serve as a significant deterrent against SPE bankruptcy
filings, although certain provisions within these documents have
not been tested in court.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, or 25%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa classes would be Aa1, Aa2, or A1, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


BENEFIT STREET I: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on $18-Mil. Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Benefit Street Partners CLO I Ltd./Benefit Street
Partners CLO I LLC's $458.60 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by a revolving
pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior-secured
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Oct. 2,
2012. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting the excess spread), and cash flow structure,
    which can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
    Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
    using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
    comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-secured
    term loans.

    The collateral manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.3942% to 13.8391%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

    The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of which
    will lead to the reclassification of excess interest proceeds
    that are available prior to paying uncapped administrative
    expenses; incentive management fees; and subordinated note
    payments into principal proceeds for the purchase of
    additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
Benefit Street Partners CLO I Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO I
LLC

Class          Rating       Interest            Amount
                            rate                (Mil. $)
A-1            AAA (sf)     Three-month LIBOR     286.70
                            plus 1.50%

A-2            AA (sf)      Three-month LIBOR      47.6
                            plus 2.50%

B (deferrable) A (sf)       Three-month LIBOR      39.85
                            plus 3.50%

C (deferrable) BBB (sf)     Three-month LIBOR      23.15
                            plus 4.50%

D (deferrable) BB (sf)      Three-month LIBOR      18.00
                            plus 5.50%

Subordinated   NR           N/A                    43.30
notes


BUSINESS LOAN 2003-A: S&P Puts 'B+' Notes Rating on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on the class
A and B notes from Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2003-
A on CreditWatch negative. Business Loan Express Business Loan
Trust 2003-A is an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction that
is primarily collateralized by a pool of small business
development loans that are not insured or guaranteed by any
government agency.

The CreditWatch placements reflect the diminished credit
enhancement available to support the notes. The spread account is
currently failing to meet its account requirement.

"We will resolve the CreditWatch placement after we complete a
comprehensive analysis and committee review of the transaction. We
expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement within 90 days. We
will continue to monitor the transaction and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as we deem appropriate," S&P
said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2003-A
                       Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg     BB+ (sf)
B                   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg      B+ (sf)


CARBON CAPITAL: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed the ratings of seven classes of Notes issued by Carbon
Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd. The upgrade is due to
greater than expected amortization resulting in approximately
$88.3 million of paydown to the top three classes since last
review, which completely paid off the top two classes and paid
down 83% of Class C Notes. Additionally, Moody's expects
meaningful recovery from the current collateral assets even under
stressed economic scenarios. The affirmations are due to key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation and collateralized loan obligation
(CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. C, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. I, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Carbon Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd is a static cash CRE
CDO CLO transaction (the reinvestment period ended in September
2010) backed by a portfolio of whole loans (78.8% of current
collateral pool balance) and commercial mortgage backed securities
(21.2% of the pool balance). As of the September 21, 2012 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, has declined to $257.0 million from $455.0
million at issuance with the paydown directed to the Class A,
Class B, and Class C Notes, as a result of the combination of
principal repayment of collateral, resolution and sales of
defaulted collateral and credit risk collateral, and failing the
par value tests. The class A and B Notes have been retired.

There are three whole loan assets with a par balance of $67.1
million (78.8% of the current pool balance) that are considered
defaulted interest securities as of the September 21, 2012 Trustee
report. Moody's expects meaningful recovery from those defaulted
interest securities. To date the deal is undercollateralized by
$171.9 million due to realized losses and the restructuring of
collateral assets.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 8,623 compared to 7,898 at last review. The
current distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments
for non-Moody's rated collateral is as follows: Ba1-Ba3 (0.0%
compared to 5.6% at last review), B1-B3 (21.2% compared to 10.7%
at last review) and Caa1-Ca/C (78.8% compared to 83.7% at last
review).

Moody's estimated a WAL of 3.0 years compared to 2.5 years at last
review.

Moody's estimated a fixed 41.8% WARR compared to 31.2% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity). Since
there are only four assets remaining in the collateral pool, MAC
is not an relevant measure for this review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 41.8% to 31.8% or up to 51.8% would result in rating
movement on the rated Notes of 0 to 2 notches downward or 0 to 2
notches upward, respectively.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


CARLYLE CLO 2012-3: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on $33MM Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Carlyle
Global Market Strategies CLO 2012-3 Ltd./Carlyle Global Market
Strategies CLO 2012-3 LLC's $714.86 million floating-rate notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
    subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
    subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation criteria.

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

    The asset manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the rated notes, which we assessed using
    our cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
    assigned ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
    including LIBOR ranging from 0.34%-12.65%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2012-3 Ltd./Carlyle Global
Market
Strategies CLO 2012-3 LLC

Class                       Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A-1                         AAA (sf)               391.50
A-2                         AA (sf)                 52.50
B (deferrable)              A (sf)                  49.90
C (deferrable)              BBB (sf)                29.50
D (deferrable)              BB (sf)                 33.00
Combination securities(i)   AAp (sf)/NRi(ii)        99.00
Subordinated notes          NR                      59.46

(i)Composed of components representing an aggregate initial
principal amount of $50 million of class A-1 notes and $50 million
of class A-2 notes. (ii)The 'p' subscript indicates that the
rating addresses only the principal portion of the obligation.
'NRi' indicates the interest is not rated. NR--Not rated.


CEDAR FUNDING: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $13.3-Mil. Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Cedar
Funding Ltd./Cedar Funding Corp.'s $320.7 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Aug. 16,
2012.

"Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral. On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral. Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached. The 'effective date' for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents. Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an 'effective
date rating affirmation')," S&P said.

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date. The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction. This window
of time is typically referred to as a 'ramp-up period.' Because
some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets from the
new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may give
collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P said.

"For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, our ratings on the
closing date and prior to our effective date review are generally
based on the application of our criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to us by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect our assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines. This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased," S&P said.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio. Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation. In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P said.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Cedar Funding Ltd./Cedar Funding Corp.

Class                        Rating          Amount
                                           (mil. $)
A-1                          AAA (sf)        227.50
A-2                          AA (sf)          39.65
B (deferrable)               A (sf)           24.50
C (deferrable)               BBB (sf)         15.75
D (deferrable)               BB (sf)          13.30


CITIGROUP 2012-GC8: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating on Class F Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to thirteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust
2012-GC8, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2012-GC8.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 57 fixed rate loans secured
by 139 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.61X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.07X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 99.3% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio (inclusive of subordinated debt and debt-like preferred
equity) of 102.4% is also considered when analyzing various stress
scenarios for the rated debt.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.04, which is lower
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009. The low weighted average grade is indicative of the
strong market composition of the pool and the stability of the
cash flows underlying the assets.

The pool's small market percentage is 14.9% which is lower than
other multi-borrower deals rated by Moody's since the financial
crisis and implies that the assets in the pool are generally in
major markets. Properties situated in major markets tend to
exhibit more cash flow and capitalization rate stability over time
compared to assets located in smaller or tertiary markets.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is
20.0. The transaction's loan level diversity is at the lower end
of the band of Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 20.6. The
transaction's property diversity profile is lower than the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa class with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals. The transaction was structured with additional
subordination at class A-S to mitigate the potential increased
severity to class A-S.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.60
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship, and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0, which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 22%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa Super Senior class would be Aaa, Aaa, and Aa1,
respectively; for the most junior Aaa rated class A-S would be
Aa1, Aa2, and Aa3, respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time; rather they are designed to provide a quantitative
calculation of how the initial rating might change if key input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. Parameter
Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each scenario
from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint. Qualitative
factors are also taken into consideration in the ratings process,
so the actual ratings that would be assigned in each case could
vary from the information presented in the Parameter Sensitivity
analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


COMM 2012-CCRE3: Fitch Issues Presale Report on Some Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on COMM 2012-CCRE3
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $68,444,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $155,419,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75,783,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $576,343,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $994,873,000c class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $118,884,000ab class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75,085,000ab class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $220,562,000ab class PEZ 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26,593,000ab class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26,592,000a class D 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $43,800,000a class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21,899,000a class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20,336,000a class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Class A-M, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged for
  class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
  exchanged for class A-M, class B and class C certificates.
c Notional amount and interest only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 20, 2012.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$256,540,606 interest-only class X-B or the $42,235,606 class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 74 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.25 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending, L.P.,
German American Capital Corporation, and Ladder Capital Finance
LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.7% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 85.4%, and asset summary reviews
on 85.4% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.31 times (x), a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of
95.7%, and a Fitch debt yield of 9.7%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash
flow represents a variance of 7.9% to issuer cash flows.

The master servicer and special servicer will be Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association and Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC
Bank, National Association, rated 'CMS2' and 'CSS1', respectively,
by Fitch.


COMM 2012-CCRE3: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Cl. G Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
fourteen classes of CMBS securities, issued by COMM 2012-CCRE3,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-CCRE3.

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M**, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B**, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. PEZ**, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. C**, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

** Reflects Exchangeable Certificates

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 50 fixed rate loans secured
by 74 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.68X is higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.06X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 96.4% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 98.1% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 20.0. which is slightly below with other
multi-borrower pools rated by Moody's since 2009. The score is in-
line with previously rated conduit and fusion transactions but
higher than previously rated large loan transactions.

With respect to property level diversity, the pool's property
level Herfindahl score is 22.3. Eight loans (23% of the pool
balance) are secured by multiple properties. Loans secured by
multiple properties benefit from lower cash flow volatility given
that excess cash flow from one property can be used to augment
another's cash flow to meet debt service requirements. These loans
also benefit from the pooling of equity from each underlying
property.

Moody's grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to worst) and
considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The weighted average
grade for the pool is 2.12, which is better than the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions since 2009.

Four of the top ten loan exposures in the pool are represented by
regional malls. The concentration of regional malls (29.7% of the
pool balance) is high compared to other multi-borrower deals rated
by Moody's. Three of the four top 10 malls in the top 10 loan
exposures (Crossgates, Solano, Midland Park) are located in
smaller markets. Moody's Asset Quality Grade for the five malls
ranged from a low of 1.50 (8.25% capitalization rate, Crossgates)
to 3.00 (9.75% capitalization rate, Emerald Square). For
additional information on Moody's approach to analyzing malls
refer special report: "US CMBS: Growing Gap Between Strong and
Weak Malls."

In terms of waterfall structure, the transaction contains a unique
group of exchangeable certificates. Classes A-M((P) Aaa(sf)), B
((P) Aa3(sf)) and C ((P) A3(sf)) may be exchanged for Class PEZ
((P) A1(sf)) certificates and Class PEZ may be exchanged for the
Classes A-M, B and C. The PEZ certificates will be entitled to
receive the sum of interest distributable on the Classes AM, B and
C certificates that are exchanged for such PEZ certificates. The
initial certificate balance of the Class PEZ certificates is equal
to the aggregate of the initial certificate balances of the Class
A-M, B and C and represent the maximum certificate balance of the
PEZ certificates that may be issued in an exchange.

Moody's considers the probability of certificate default as well
as the estimated severity of loss when assigning a rating. As a
thick vertical tranche, Class PEZ has the default characteristics
of the lowest rated component certificate ((P) A3 (sf)), but a
very high estimated recovery rate if a default occurs given the
certificate's thickness. The higher estimated recovery rate
resulted in a provisional A1 rating, a rating higher than the
lowest provisionally rated component certificate.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.61
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5.0%, 14.5%, or 23.1%, the model-indicated rating for the
currently rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa2, A1,
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather
they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-
indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into
consideration in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that
would be assigned in each case could vary from the information
presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
Commercial Mortgage Leased-Backed Certificates 2000-CMLB1 as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2008
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2008
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2008
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of the three principal bonds are due to key
rating parameters, including WARF and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.8% of the current pooled balance. At last review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 5.7%. Moody's provides a current
list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
("CTL") financing methodology approach ("CTL" approach) . Under
Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates
is primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds. This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan. The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust. The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default. Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction. For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans,
Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in
its public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-8 to generate a portfolio
loss distribution to assess the ratings.

The other methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
conduit pool has a Herf of 43 compared to 45 at Moody's prior
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 5, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the September 21, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 40% to $287.4
million from $476.3 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 116 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 39%
of the pool. The entirety of the pool is backed by Credit Tenant
Lease (CTL) loans. Seventeen loans, representing 15% of the pool,
have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

One loan, representing 1% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in a $5.5 million loss (49% loss severity). There are
currently no loans in special servicing.

The largest exposures are: Autozone Inc. ($33.7 million - 12% of
the pool; senior unsecured rating: Baa2 - positive outlook), New
Albertson's, Inc. ($30.0 million - 10% of the pool; senior
unsecured rating: Caa1 - negative outlook) and Dollar General
Corp. ($27.8 million - 10% of the pool; senior unsecured rating:
Ba2 - positive outlook). Moody's has issued a public rating on
tenants securing loans representing 94% of the pool.

The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this
transaction is 1,823 compared to 1,565 at last review. WARF is a
measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The
bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within
the pool.


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP3: Fitch Rates $4.4-Mil. Class N Notes 'Csf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes and downgraded one class
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities, series 2002-CP3
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement that
offset expected losses of remaining pool.  The downgrade is due to
increased certainty of losses to the already distressed class.

Fitch modeled losses of 30.4% of the remaining pool; expected
losses of the original pool are at 3.42%, including 0.59% in
realized losses to date.

As of the September 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 90.1% to $83.1 million from $895.6 million.
Of the 10 loans remaining in the pool, seven (97%) are Fitch Loans
of Concern, of which six (92.3%) are specially serviced.  There
are no defeased loans.  Current cumulative interest shortfalls
totaling $4.5 million are affecting classes J through O.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is secured by a 266,825
square foot (sf) retail center (15.8%) located in Elyria, OH.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in April 2012 for
maturity default after the borrower was unable to refinance the
loan.  The property's anchor tenant, Walmart, vacated the property
prior to its lease expiration of August 2012, but continued to pay
rent.  The borrower was unable to re-lease the space.  The special
servicer reports that a receiver has been put in place and a deed-
in-lieu is in process. The property is currently 38% occupied.

The second largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is an
asset (13.7%) secured by a 91,917 sf office building located in
Troy, MI.  The loan transferred to special servicing in November
2010 and became real estate owned (REO) in October 2011.  The
special servicer is currently working on leasing up the property
before marketing it for sale in 2013.  The special servicer
reports that the property's occupancy is currently at 23%.

The third largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is a loan
(2.1%) secured by a 196-pad mobile home community located in San
Antonio, TX.  The loan transferred to special servicing when it
matured in March 2012.  The borrower has maintained the debt
service payments after maturity. The special servicer reports that
the borrower has a contract for sale of the property in which the
net proceeds would be applied to a discounted payoff.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns Recovery Estimates
as indicated:

  -- $2.2 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.6 million class G at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.1 million class H at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.9 billion class J at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $6.7 million class K at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $4.4 million class L at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.4 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch downgrades the following class and assigns Recovery
Estimates as indicated:

  -- $11.1 million class M to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E and A-SP have paid in full.
Fitch has previously withdrawn the ratings on the interest-only
class A-X.

Fitch does not rate class O.


CREST EXETER: Fitch Affirms 'CCC(sf)' Rating on 2 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes issued by Crest Exeter
Street Solar 2004-1, Ltd./Corp (Crest Exeter 2004-1) as a result
of increased credit enhancement to the notes due to repayment on
the underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in October 2011, approximately
15.1% of the underlying collateral has been downgraded and 5.4%
upgraded.  Currently, 57% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade and 24% has a rating in the 'CCC'
category and below, compared to 39.9% and 13.9% at the last rating
action.  Over this time, the class A-1 and A-2 notes have received
$16.5 million for a total of $178.8 million in principal paydowns
since issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.  Based on this analysis, the class A through D notes'
breakeven rates are generally consistent with the ratings assigned
below.

For the class E notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to
the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below).  Given the
high probability of default of these assets and expected limited
recovery prospects upon default, the class E notes have been
affirmed at 'CCCsf', indicating that default is possible.

The Stable Outlook on the class A and B notes reflects Fitch's
view that the transaction will continue to delever.  The Negative
Outlook on the class C and D notes reflects the potential for
adverse selection as the portfolio continues to amortize.  Fitch
does not assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.
Crest Exeter 2004-1 is a cash flow commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) which closed on April 29,
2004. The collateral is composed of 48.9% commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS), 27.2% commercial real estate loans
(CREL), 19.2% real estate investment trusts (REITs), and 4.7%
structured finance CDOs (SF CDOs).

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

  -- $69,803,761 class A-1 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17,369,011 class A-2 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8,377,070 class B-1 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $9,214,777 class B-2 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $1,675,414 class C-1 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $13,759,337 class C-2 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5,026,242 class D-1 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $11,371,872 class D-2 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3,769,681 class E-1 at 'CCCsf';
  -- $5,445,095 class E-2 at 'CCCsf'.


DEUTSCHE BANK 2011-FL1: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 5 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all rated classes of Deutsche Bank's
COMM 2011-FL1 floating-rate commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The affirmations are due to stable performance of the underlying
collateral since issuance.  As of the September 2012 distribution
date, the transaction's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 13% to $538.7 million from $619 million at issuance.
Currently there are no delinquent or specially serviced loans.
One of the pool's original seven floating rate loans, The Barton
Creek Resort & Spa, has paid in full since issuance.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $303.7 million class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $55.6 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $59.6 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $37.3 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.96 million class NH1 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes E, F, non-pooled class ESG1 and
interest-only class X.


DUANE STREET: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Duane Street CLO 1:

  U.S. $36,000,000 CLASS B SENIOR FLOATING RATE NOTES DUE 2017,
  Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded to A1
  (sf);

  U.S. $15,000,000 CLASS C DEFERRABLE MEZZANINE FLOATING RATE
  NOTES DUE 2017, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
  Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  U.S. $15,000,000 CLASS D DEFERRABLE MEZZANINE FLOATING RATE
  NOTES DUE 2017, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 15,
  2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  U.S. $5,000,000 CLASS Z-2 COMBINATION NOTES DUE 2017 (current
  rated balance of $3,151,775), Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
  on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 38.1% or $92.4 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
from August 2012, the Class A/B, Class C/D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 125.8%, 109.9% and
106.8%, respectively, versus June 2011 levels of 119.1%, 107.6%
and 105.2%, respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the August 2012 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2906
compared to 2378 in June 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $231.4 million,
defaulted par of $11.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.3% (implying a WARF of 2911), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 49.4%, and a diversity score of 47.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Duane Street CLO 1, issued in October 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011,
and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-
Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (3493)

Class A: 0
Class A2: 0
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1
Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF -20% (2328)

Class A: 0
Class A2: 0
Class B: +1
Class C: +3
Class D: +1
Class E: +2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

(1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

(2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

(3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


FREMF MORTGAGE: Moody's Rates Two CMBS Classes '(P)Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to four
classes of CMBS securities, issued by FREMF Mortgage Trust,
Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-KF01.

CMBS Classes

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Ratings were also assigned to three related classes of Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates (SPCs), Series K-F01.

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

* SPC Class represents a pass-through interest from its
  associated CMBS Class. CMBS Class A is a pass-through interest
  to SPC Class A, and CMBS Class X is a pass-through interest to
  SPC Class X. Ratings of the SPCs did not take into account the
  Freddie Mac guarantee.

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 80 floating rate loans
secured by 80 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral
and the structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
(1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and (2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

For FREMF 2012-KF01 the Moody's actual DSCR is 1.68X which is
higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X.
The Moody's Stressed DSCR of 0.88X is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 0.92X. Moody's Trust LTV
ratio of 110.4% is lower than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 110.6%.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
Herfindahl Index is 49. The transaction's loan level diversity is
higher than the band of Herfindahl scores found in most multi-
borrower transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property
level diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 49.
The transaction's loan and property diversity profile is higher
than what was observed in most multi-borrower transactions issued
since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.38, which is better
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.61
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, or 24%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa classes would be Aa1, Aa2, A1, respectively. Parameter
Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time; rather they are designed to
provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might
change if key input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of, Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


GOLDMAN SACHS: Fitch Lowers Preferred Stock Rating to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a rating of 'A' to senior guaranteed
trust securities issued by Vesey Street Investment Trust I.  These
ratings are based entirely on the ratings of parent guarantor, The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.  Because The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
fully and unconditionally guarantees the due and punctual payment
of the senior guaranteed trust securities, it is Fitch's view that
the senior guaranteed trust securities rank pari passu with
senior, unsecured obligations of the guarantor.  The sole assets
of Vesey Street Investment Trust I are junior subordinated notes
of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

Fitch has downgraded the APEX securities issued by Goldman Sachs
Capital III to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' as a result of Goldman Sachs
Capital III purchasing perpetual non-cumulative preferred stock of
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.  consistent with Fitch's criteria
'Rating Bank Regulatory Capital Securities' dated Dec. 15, 2011.

Fitch assigns the following rating:

Vesey Street Investment Trust I

  -- Senior guaranteed trust securities 'A'.

Fitch Downgrades the following rating:

Goldman Sachs Capital III

  -- Preferred stock downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.


GUAM POWER: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on $56.1MM Sr. Revenue Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the 'BBB-' rating assigned to Guam Power
Authority's (GPA or the authority) approximately $350 million of
senior revenue bonds 2012 Series A expected to be sold the week of
Oct. 1.

In addition, Fitch affirms the following ratings on outstanding
debt of the authority:

  -- $523.3 million senior revenue bonds at 'BBB-';
  -- $56.1 million subordinate revenue bonds at 'BB+'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Fitch's affirmation of the ratings follows its assignment of the
'BBB-' rating to the senior revenue bonds 2012 series A and
affirmation of outstanding parity bonds and subordinate lien bonds
on Sept. 24, 2012.  Since then, the authority has provided updated
disclosure that outlines what Fitch believes is a material change
in GPA's financial forecast through fiscal 2016.

On Sept. 25, 2012 the Guam Public Utility Commission's (PUC)
authorized the issuance of the 2012 series A bonds contingent on
GPA rolling back a 6% base rate increase that was adopted and
implemented in the latter part of fiscal 2012, and expected to
remain in place going forward.  However, the authority's initial
draft disclosure, which included a financial forecast through
fiscal 2016, reflected the Oct. 1, 2012 effectiveness of the 6%
rate hike as well as the issuance of the 2012 series A bonds,
which is designed to reduce debt service costs over the next
several years.

The elimination of the 6% base rate increase in fiscal 2013
weakens projected coverage of total debt service to a more narrow
1.1 times (x) from a previously anticipated 1.3x.  Management has
stated that future rate filings, if approved by the PUC, will be
sufficient to achieve the 1.3x all-in debt service coverage
reflected in fiscals 2014 - 2016 of the financial forecast.
However, Fitch remains concerned given past hindrances to gaining
timely rate relief from the PUC.  GPA's inability to achieve its
projected results would likely lead to downward pressure on the
ratings.


HALCYON 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
D notes from Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long
Secured/Short Unsecured 2007-1 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by Halcyon Loan Investors L.P. "In
addition, we affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, and C
notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect a marginal increase in the balance of the
total collateral backing the rated notes, and improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying assets since our January 2011
rating actions," S&P said.

"The amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's
asset portfolio declined since the time of our last rating action.
According to the Sept. 1, 2012, trustee report, the transaction
held $36.48 million in 'CCC' rated collateral, down from $56.31
million noted in the December 2010 trustee report, which we used
for our January 2011 rating actions," S&P said.

"Also, the collateral balance -- designated by a combination of
principal proceeds and total par value of the collateral pool --
backing the rated liabilities has increased $2.34 million since
December 2010. The increased collateral balance improved the
credit support available to the rated notes, and potentially
increases the available interest proceeds that the underlying
collateral generates," S&P said.

"Over the same time period, the transaction's class A/B, C, and D
overcollateralization ratio tests and weighted average spread have
also improved," S&P said.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance. In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with this rating action," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTION

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
2007-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To           From
D                  BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
2007-1 Ltd.

Class              Rating
A-1                AAA (sf)
A-2                AAA (sf)
B                  AA+ (sf)
C                  A+ (sf)


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class C Notes From 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO III, Ltd.:

US$14,800,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Notes Due August, 2017,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 30, 2011, Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf);

US$12,700,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Amortizing Senior Secured
Notes Due August, 2017 (current outstanding balance of
$1,693,342), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 30, 2011,
Upgraded to A1 (sf);

US$14,800,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Notes Due
August, 2017, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 30, 2011,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); and

US$14,800,000 Class C Deferrable Secured Notes Due August, 2017,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2011, Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in June 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes and Class B-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 48%
or $138 million and 55.6% or $2.1 million, respectively, since the
last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated
August 31, 2012, the overcollateralization ratios relating to the
Senior Notes (Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes), Class B-2
Notes, Class C Notes, and Class D Notes are reported at 131.4%,
120.4%, 111.1% and 104.1%, respectively, versus May 2011 levels of
118.1%, 112.6%, 107.5% and 103.3%, respectively.

Deleveraging of the Class B-1 Notes is due to the mandatory
payment of the "Class B-1 Principal and Interest Amount" on each
payment date. The Class B-1 Principal and Interest Amount consists
of interest due on the notes and a fixed amount of $423,333. On
the August 2012 payment date, the Class B-1 Notes was amortized in
the amount of $423,333 from interest proceeds.

Notwithstanding the benefits of the abovementioned deleveraging,
Moody's notes that the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
has deteriorated since the last rating action. Based on the August
2012 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 2,706 compared to 2,205 in May 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $203.3 million,
defaulted par of $18.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.71% (implying a WARF of 2,843) a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.79%, and a diversity
score of 47. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Hewett's Island CLO III, Ltd, issued in August 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (WARF 2,274)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: +3
Class C: +2
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (WARF 3,412)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: -1
Class B-1: -1
Class B-2: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) The deal is exposed to an unrated but short-dated asset whose
default probability was assessed using available information.
Actual performance of this asset and its default and recovery
characteristics over its remaining life may create additional
uncertainties.


ING IM 2012-3: S&P Gives 'BB' Prelim Rating on Class E Def Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to ING IM CLO 2012-3 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2012-3 LLC's $416.892
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 28,
2012. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation criteria.

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
    comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-secured
    term loans.

    The collateral manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.34%-13.84%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

    "The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of which
    will lead to the reclassification of excess interest proceeds
    that are available prior to paying uncapped administrative
    expenses; deferred senior, subordinated, and incentive
    management fees; hedge payments; and subordinated note
    payments into principal proceeds for the purchase of
    additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period,"
    S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
ING IM CLO 2012-3 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2012-3 LLC

Class                 Rating           Amount
                                     (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)        294.428
B                     AA (sf)          46.929
C (deferrable)        A (sf)           36.321
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)         20.571
E (deferrable)        BB (sf)          18.643
Subordinated notes    NR               49.086

NR--Not rated.


KEYCORP STUDENT: Fitch Keeps 'CC' Rating on Jr. Subordinate Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on all student loan notes
issued by KeyCorp Student Loan Trust's 2006-A (Group II).  The
Rating Outlook remains Stable on the senior notes and Negative on
the subordinate notes.

The pool consists of 100% private student loans, primarily Key
Alternative Loans originated to undergraduate students.  The pool
also includes a combination of graduate student loans,
consolidation loans, and CampusDoor loans marketed through the
direct to consumer channel.

Fitch's Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria, Private Student
Loan Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) Criteria, and 'Structured
Finance Recovery Estimates for Distressed Securities' were used to
review the transaction.

The affirmation on all of the student loan notes issued by KeyCorp
Student Loan Trust 2006-A (Group II) is based on a loss coverage
multiples commensurate with the notes' current ratings and are
based on the collateral performance data as of May 31, 2012.  The
Outlook remains Stable on the senior 2006-A notes.  The senior
parity has continued to rise due to the effect of deleveraging.
In Fitch's view, given the parity level of 139.39%, the senior
notes possess sufficient credit enhancement to absorb remaining
private student loan defaults Fitch estimates for this deal.

The Outlook remains Negative on the subordinate notes, as parity
levels have declined.  As of May 31, 2012, reported parity for the
subordinate and junior subordinate notes is 106.98%, and 96.47%,
respectively, down from 107.08% and 97.45% from the previous year.
Given the current cash release level is 104.5%, no cash has been
released from the trust.

A loss coverage multiple was determined by comparing projected net
loss amount to available credit enhancement.  Fitch used
historical vintage loss data provided by KeyCorp and proxy data to
form a loss timing curve representative of the private student
loan collateral pools.  After giving credit for seasoning of loans
in repayment, Fitch applied the trust's current cumulative gross
loss level to this loss timing curve to derive the expected gross
losses over the projected remaining life.

As the junior subordinate class C notes' current rating classifies
these notes as a distressed structured finance security, Fitch has
calculated a Recovery Estimate (RE) which represents Fitch's
calculation of expected principal recoveries, as a percentage of
current note principal outstanding.  The RE for the junior
subordinate class C notes was calculated to be approximately 5.00%
given Fitch's calculation of expected net recoveries and principal
balance of the notes as of the latest reporting period.

Credit enhancement consists of excess spread and
overcollateralization for the senior and subordinate notes, while
the senior notes also benefit from subordination provided by the
subordinate class B and junior subordinate class C notes.  The
junior subordinate notes are under-collateralized.  Its credit
enhancement is purely derived from future excess spread.

Fitch affirms its ratings on the following KeyCorp Student Loan
Trust, 2006-A (Group II) notes:

  -- Senior class II-A-2 at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Senior class II-A-3 at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Senior class II-A-4 at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Subordinate class II-B at 'B+sf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Junior Subordinate class II-C at 'CCsf'.


LB-UBS 2007-C2: Fitch Lowers Rating on 7 Certificate Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes and affirmed 11 classes
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust (LBUBS) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-C2.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool, primarily due to increased losses on the existing
specially serviced loans which reflect the highly leverage debt
secured by several of the loans.  Fitch modeled losses of 18.4% of
the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 18.2%, including losses already incurred.  The pool has
experienced $116.4 million (3.3% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 50 loans (36.5% of
the current pool balance) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 21 specially serviced assets (27.3%).

As of the September 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 19.2% to $2.87 billion from
$3.55 billion at issuance.  There are currently no defeased loans.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes A-J through T.

The largest contributor to Fitch-expected losses is the specially-
serviced One Alliance Center loan (5.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a 20-story, 553,017-square foot (sf) class A office
building located in the Buckhead submarket of Atlanta, GA.  The
loan originally transferred to special servicing in May 2010 for
imminent default due to the significant near-term lease
expirations coupled with soft market conditions.  The June 2012
rent roll reported occupancy at 73.6%, a significant decline from
96% in June 2011 primarily due to the anticipated lease expiration
of S1 Corporation (previously 33% of the net rentable area [NRA])
in August 2011.

The loan had subsequently gone into payment default in September
2011, and is currently due for the February 2012 payment.  Based
on servicer provided financial statements, the property
experienced negative net operating income (NOI) for year to date
(YTD) June 2012, compared to NOI debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.36x for the same period in 2011.  A forbearance
agreement with the borrower expired in May 2012, which the
servicer has indicated they will not renew.  The servicer is
currently in process of reviewing recent market activity for an
updated valuation to further evaluate the exit strategy.

The next largest contributor to Fitch-expected losses is the
specially-serviced Duke Cleveland East Suburban Portfolio loan
(4.7%), which is secured by eight office properties containing
approximately 900,000sf, located in the Cleveland, OH metropolitan
statistical area (MSA).  The portfolio experienced cash flow
issues from occupancy declines, and transferred to special
servicing in July 2011 for payment default.  The servicer had
filed for foreclosure in May 2012, and a receiver has been
appointed.  Occupancy for the portfolio reported at 81% as of
August 2012, down from 86% in September 2011 and 95% at issuance.
Based on amortized debt service payments (scheduled to begin April
2012), the year-end (YE) 2011 NOI DSCR would calculate to 0.79x,
compared to 1.20x at issuance.  Based on interest-only payments
the YE 2011 NOI DSCR calculated to 0.93x, compared to YE 2010 at
1.27x, and YE 2009 at 1.47x.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-expected losses is the
specially-serviced Bethany Maryland Portfolio II loan (6.4%),
which is collateralized by three multifamily properties totaling
1,909 units located across the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria and
Baltimore MSA's.  The loan had initially transferred to the
special servicer in April 2009 due to imminent default as a result
of several sponsor-related entities filing bankruptcy, as well as
concerns over the portfolio performance.  The subject A-note has
been in payment default since the January 2012.  In addition, a
$32 million B-note which is held outside the trust has been in
payment default since the February 2010 payment date.  A receiver
was appointed and foreclosure was filed in April 2012, with a
foreclosure auction scheduled for September 2012.

Fitch downgrades the following classes, and assigns Recovery
Estimates (RE's) as indicated:

  -- $355.4 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'AAsf', Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $315.5 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf', RE 25%;
  -- $26.7 million class B to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $53.3 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $40 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $13.3 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $26.7 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Both classes A-M and A-J were previously on Rating Outlook
Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $521.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

  -- $51.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $71.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.3 billion class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $35.5 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $31.1 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $35.5 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $16.9 million class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificate has paid in full.  The balances for
classes L, M, N and the unrated classes P, Q, S and T have been
reduced to zero due to realized losses.  Fitch previously withdrew
the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP, X-W and X-CL
certificates.


LCM XII: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Deferrable Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to LCM XII
L.P./LCM XII LLC's $465.25 million floating-rate notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization of a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
    subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
    subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation criteria.

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

    The asset manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the rated notes, which we assessed using
    our cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
    assigned ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
    including LIBOR ranging from 0.34%-12.26%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

    The transaction's interest reinvestment test, a failure of
    which during the reinvestment period will lead to the
    reclassification of excess interest proceeds that are
    available prior to paying subordinated management fees,
    uncapped administrative expenses, and limited partnership
    certificate payments to principal proceeds for the purchase of
    collateral assets or, at the collateral manager's discretion,
    to reduce the balance of the rated notes outstanding
    sequentially.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/979.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

LCM XII L.P./LCM XII LLC
Class                       Rating        Amount (mil. $)
X                           AAA (sf)                 4.00
A                           AAA (sf)               321.25
B                           AA (sf)                 62.50
C (deferrable)              A (sf)                  35.75
D (deferrable)              BBB (sf)                23.75
E (deferrable)              BB (sf)                 18.00
L.P. certificates/equity    NR                      53.00

L.P.-Limited partnership.
NR-Not rated.


MMCAPS FUNDING: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by MMCapS Funding XIX, Ltd.:

US$220,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
January 12, 2038 (current balance of $208,430,427), Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf); previously on September 27, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2
(sf)

US$26,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
January 12, 2038, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on September
27, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of the improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the last rating action on
September 27, 2010.

Moody's notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio. As per Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
847 compared to 1582 as of the last rating action date. The total
par amount that Moody's treated as defaulted or deferring declined
to $142.5 million compared to $166.5 million as of the last rating
action date. As a result, the Class A1 notes' par coverage
improved to 121.62% from 108.7% since the last rating action, as
calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest trustee report dated
July 12, 2012, the Class A Principal Coverage Ratio, Class B
Principal Coverage Ratio, Class C Principal Coverage Ratio and
Class D Principal Coverage Ratio are reported at 111.3% (limit
151.8%), 99.83% (limit 133.3%), 76.75% (limit 106.2%) and 70.96%
(limit 103.7%), respectively, versus July 2010 levels of 105.72%,
93.32%, 72.15% and 66.89%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the Class A-1 notes have been paid down by
approximately $6.4 million or 3% since the last rating action, due
to diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying assets. Going
forward, the Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest due to the failure of the Class A
Principal Coverage Test.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In the
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $253.5 million, defaulted/deferring par of
$142.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 21.79%
(implying a WARF of 847), Moody's Asset Correlation of 18.62%, and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition
to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

MMCapS Funding XIX, Ltd., issued on July 12, 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks
companies that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q2-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8-5 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge. CDOROM v.2.8-5 is
available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical
models, upon return of a signed free license agreement.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 100 points from the
base case of 847, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 notes
is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the
WARF is decreased by 120 points, the model-implied rating of the
Class A-1 notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $6 million of bank TruPS. In the second
sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-timing
profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a large spike
in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on all rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus the
current model output, where a positive difference corresponds to
lower expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class B: +1
Class C: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class B: 0
Class C: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as Moody's outlook on the banking
sector remains negative, although there have been some recent
signs of stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues
to decline in 2012 compared to 2011, 2010 and 2009, and some of
the previously deferring banks have resumed interest payment on
their trust preferred securities.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-2: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Cl. III Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
class III and combination notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed
ACES SPC's series 2006-2, a synthetic corporate investment-grade
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction.

The rating withdrawals follow the full redemption and cancellation
of the notes.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2006-2
                               Rating
Class                     To          From
III                       NR          BB (sf)
Combination notes         NR          BBB- (sf)

NR-Not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-10: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class IB and IC notes from Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC 2006-10
To 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The lowered ratings follow recent credit events that affected the
transaction's underlying reference entities, which caused the
notes to incur partial principal losses.

                STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2006-10
                 Rating
Class           To   From
IB              D    CCC- (sf)
IC              D    CCC- (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ10: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 CMBS to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
and affirmed nine classes of Morgan Stanley I Trust 2006-HQ10
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HQ10 as
follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FX, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2010
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are due to higher than expected losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The ratings of the IO Classes, Class X-1 and X-2, are consistent
with the expected credit performance of their related referenced
classes and thus are affirmed

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.9% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8.1%. Realized losses have increased from
2.5% of the original balance to 3.3% since the prior review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit assessments; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type as defined in the
published methodology. The calculator then returns a calculated IO
rating based on both a target and mid-point. For example, a target
rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The
midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the
simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf)
rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating factor is 700,
the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1 would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and
Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29 compared to 30 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated October 27, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 14, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14% to $1.3 billion
from $1.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 110 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 46% of the pool. One loan, representing 6% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains three loans with investment grade credit
assessments, representing 16% of the pool.

Thirty-seven loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $48.5 million (66% loss severity on
average). Fifteen loans, representing 17% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the AZ Office/Retail Portfolio Loan ($72 million -- 5.6%
of the pool), which is secured by three cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted mixed use (retail and office) properties located
in Scottsdale, Arizona. As of June 2012, the portfolio was 80%
leased, the same as last review, compared to 84% at
securitization. The loan transferred to special servicing in March
2012 due to imminent payment default and is currently paid to
August 2012. At this time, the special servicer is gathering loan
and property specific information to in order to develop a
resolution strategy.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Kings Crossing
Shopping Centre Loan ($35.9 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 272,000 square foot retail center located in
Shreveport, Louisiana. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in September 2009 due to imminent payment default.
Foreclosure was filed in December 2009 and a receiver was
appointed in July 2011. A foreclosure sale occurred in August 2012
and the property is currently REO. The property was 56% leased as
of April 2012 due to two vacant anchor spaces which total over
59,000 square feet.

The remaining 11 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $86.8 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (41% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 14 poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $17.3 million loss (16% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 98%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 109% compared to 110% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.22X and 0.97X, respectively, compared to
1.23X and 0.96X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Waterside Shops
Loan ($120 million -- 9.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
265,664 square foot regional mall located in Naples, Florida. The
center is anchored by Nordstrom (which is not part of the
collateral for the loan), Saks Fifth Avenue, and Barnes & Noble.
As of July 2012, the property was 98% leased compared to 99% at
the prior review and securitization. Excluding the Apple store,
comparable inline sales for the trailing twelve months as of June
2012 were $642 psf compared to $621 psf in 2011. The most recent
reported NOI has increased since the prior review due to an
increase in base and percentage rent. Moody's credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.12X, respectively, compared to
Baa3 and 1.08X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Sony Pictures
Plaza Loan ($47.8 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a 328,847 square foot office building located in Culver City,
California. The property is 100% leased to Sony Pictures
Entertainment through 2027 with an early termination option
available in 2017. The loan is benefitting from amortization and
matures in September 2016. Moody's credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Baa1 and 1.67X, respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.70X
at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the Cherry Creek
Shopping Center Loan ($30 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is a
11% pari-passu interest in a first mortgage loan secured by the
borrower's interest in a 547,457 square foot regional mall located
in Denver, Colorado. The property is anchored by Neiman Marcus,
Saks Fifth Avenue, Macy's and Nordstrom, which are not part of the
collateral. The property was 92% leased as of June 2012 compared
to 94% at last review and 97% at securitization. Overall, property
performance has been stable. Moody's credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.20X, respectively, the same as last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the PPG Portfolio Loan ($102.9
million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is secured by seven cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted office properties located in
Arizona, Colorado, and Indiana. As of June 2012, the portfolio was
87%, the same as at last review. Portfolio performance has been
stable and the loan is benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.85X, respectively, compared to
116% and 0.84X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at Briargate Loan ($71.4
million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 225,922 square
foot luxury lifestyle center located in Colorado Springs,
Colorado. The property was 95% leased as of December 2011, the
same as at prior review. The property's performance decreased in
2010 due to the borrower providing rental credits to several of
the poorly performing tenants. The property's performance
rebounded in 2011 due to an increase in rental revenue. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.75X, respectively, compared
to 140% and 0.69X at last review.

The third largest loan is the One Bethesda Center Loan ($53.0
million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 171,436 square
foot office building located in Bethesda, Maryland. The property
was 99% leased as of May 2012 and has consistently been leased
above 98% since securitization. The property's largest tenant is
the Boston Consulting Group, which leases 20% of the net rentable
area (NRA) through December 2019. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 115% and 0.90X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.88X at
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ13: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Notes to 'C(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative three classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13
(MSCI 2007-HQ13).

The downgrades are due to further deterioration of performance,
most of which involves increased expected losses on loans in
special servicing.  Fitch modeled losses of 15% for the remaining
pool; expected losses as a percentage of the original pool balance
are at 17.7%, including losses already incurred to date (7%).

Fitch has designated 16 loans (32%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes five specially serviced loans (19.5%).  As of the
September 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by approximately 28.3% to $745.4 million
from $1 billion at issuance.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a 303,788 square foot
(sf) retail property (10.8%), located along the boardwalk in front
of Caesars Atlantic City, and adjacent to Bally's Park Place and
Trump Palace Casinos in Atlantic City, NJ.  The loan transferred
to the special servicer in October 2009 for payment default and
was foreclosed upon by the trust in October 2011.  The property,
which was completed in 2006, has not stabilized to original
expectations and recently failed to attract the minimum bid at an
auction sale.  Cash flow and occupancy continue to erode.  Fitch
expects a significant loss on this asset.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses is a 217,639 sf
mixed use property in Atlanta. GA (7%).  The property has
experienced a significant decline in occupancy over the past two
years due to market conditions.  Additionally, the property faces
significant roll over risk prior to maturity.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and removes the Rating
Watch Negative:

  -- $103.9 million class A-M to 'BBB-sf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $72.8 million class A-J to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 85%;
  -- $18.2 million class B to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

  -- $116.3 million class A-1A notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $55.4 million class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $334.5 million class A-3 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.7 million class C notes at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $16.9 million class D notes at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $13.0 million class E notes at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $2.9 million class F notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class G notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class H notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class J notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class K notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Class A-1 has repaid in full.  Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the class X notes.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Fitch Issues Presale Report on 15 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the Morgan Stanley
Capital I, Inc. MSBAM 2012-C6 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $67,000,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $236,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $72,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $411,447,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $98,306,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $50,557,000b class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $192,399,000b class PST 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $43,536,000b class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $884,753,000a,c class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $94,093,000a,c class X-B 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21,065,000a class D 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40,727,000a class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9,831,000a class F 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19,661,000a class G 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12,639,000a class H 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class PST Certificates, and class PST Certificates may be
exchanged for class A-S, class B and class C certificates.
c Notional amount and interest only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Oct. 1, 2012.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$144,650,393 interest-only class X-C or the $40,727,393 class J.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 61 loans secured by 76 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.123 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC and
Bank of America, National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 81.7% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 79.6%, and asset summary reviews
on 79.6% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.22x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 104.3%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 9.2%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 7.7% to issuer cash flows.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association and Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC
Bank, National Association, rated 'CMS2' and 'CSS1', respectively,
by Fitch.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Rates 2 CMBS Classes '(P)B2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
sixteen classes of CMBS securities, issued by Morgan Stanley Bank
of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C6.

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B*, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. PST*, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. C*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A**, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B**, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. X-C**, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

* Classes A-S, B, C, and PST are exchangeable classes.

** Class X-A, X-B, and Class X-C are interest-only classes.

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 61 fixed rate loans secured
by 76 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.61X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.03X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 101.0% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 101.7% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 25. The transaction's loan level diversity is
similar to Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 27. The
transaction's property diversity profile is similar to the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.03, which is lower
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 22%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aaa, Aa2, Aa3, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


NATIONAL ABS 2012-1M: Fitch Rates AUD2 Million Class F Notes 'Bsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned National ABS Trust 2012-1M (National
ABS) notes final ratings.  The transaction is a securitisation
backed by automotive and equipment lease receivables originated by
Medfin Australia Pty Limited (Medfin), a wholly-owned subsidiary
of National Australia Bank Limited (NAB; 'AA-'/Stable/'F1+').

  -- AUD75m Class A1 notes: 'F1+sf'
  -- AUD295m Class A2 notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- AUD8m Class B notes: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- AUD6m Class C notes: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  -- AUD4m Class D notes: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- AUD2.4m Class E notes: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- AUD2m Class F notes: 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- AUD7.6m Class G notes: not rated

The notes were issued by Perpetual Corporate Trust Limited as
trustee for National ABS Trust 2012-1M.  The latter is a legally
distinct trust established pursuant to a master trust and general
security deed.

The ratings of the Class A notes are based on the quality of
the collateral; the 7.5% credit enhancement provided by the
subordinate Class B, C, D, E, F and G notes and excess spread.
They also reflect a liquidity reserve account sized at 1% of the
aggregate amount of the notes at closing; the interest rate swap
arrangement the trustee has entered into with National Australia
Bank Limited ('AA-'/Stable/'F1+'); and Medfin Australia Pty
Limited's lease underwriting and servicing capabilities.

The ratings on the other classes of notes are based on all the
strengths supporting the Class A notes, excluding their credit
enhancement levels but including the credit enhancement provided
by each class of notes' respective subordinate notes.

As of August 31, 2012, Medfin's representative collateral
portfolio consisted of 10,846 leases totalling AUD396m with an
average contract size of AUD36,511.  The pool comprises chattel
mortgages, hire purchase and lease receivables backed by motor
vehicles (48.8%), medical equipment (20.4%), dental equipment
(12.8%) and furniture and fittings (17.5%) from healthcare
professionals across the country.

The portfolio consists of amortising principal and interest leases
with varying balloon amounts payable at maturity, and has a
weighted average balloon payment of 29.9% of the current lease
balance.  The main medical profession exposures in the transaction
pool include specialists (28.9%); dentists (22.7%); doctors (21%);
and pharmacists (5.1%).  More than 90% of both doctors and
dentists in the portfolio have greater than three years of private
practise experience.

Historical gross loss rates by quarterly vintage on equipment
leases range between 0% to 0.75% for automotive leases and from
0.1% to 1.75% for equipment lease.

Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity analysis is discussed in the
corresponding new issue report entitled "National ABS Trust 2012-
1M", available on www.fitchratings.com or by clicking on the above
link.  Included in a corresponding new issue appendix is a
description of the representations, warranties, and enforcement
mechanisms.


NEWCASTLE CDO VI: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Cl. I-MM Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class of
Notes issued by Newcastle CDO VI, Ltd. due to the key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
rating level. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. I-MM Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on
Feb 8, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Newcastle CDO VI, Ltd. is a static cash CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
including rake bonds (51.4% of the current collateral pool
balance), residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) (22.6%)
and REIT debt (26.0%). As of the September 17, 2012 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, has decreased to $332.9 million from $500.0
million at issuance, with the principal paydown directed to the
Class I-MM Notes. The paydowns are a result of regular
amortization and the failure of the par value tests.

There are sixteen assets with a par balance of $50.3 million
(24.1% of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the September 17, 2012 Trustee report, compared
to nineteen assets with a par balance of $56.2 million (22.6% of
the pool balance) at last review. Moody's expects significant
losses from those defaulted securities to occur once they are
realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 1,768, excluding defaulted securities,
compared to 2,240 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa- Aa3 (10.8% compared to 11.7% at
last review), A1- A3 (23.5% compared to 18.1% at last review),
Baa1-Baa3 (20.1% compared to 18.6% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (14.6%
compared to 12.4% at last review), B1-B3 (13.1% compared to 9.0%
at last review), and Caa1-C (17.9% compared to 30.1% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.5
years compared to 3.6 years at last review. The current WAL
reflects Moody's current assumption about extensions.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
26.1%, excluding defaulted securities, compared to 24.5% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 8.3% compared to 7.1% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
26.1% to 16.1% or up to 36.1% would result in modeled rating
movements on the rated Notes of 1 notch downward and 0 notch
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


OZLM FUNDING II: S&P Gives 'BB' Prelim. Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to OZLM Funding II Ltd./OZLM Funding II LLC's $481.90
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 28,
2012. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

    The collateral manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.3439%-12.6500%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
OZLM Funding II Ltd./OZLM Funding II LLC

Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. $)
A-1                   AAA (sf)        325.30
A-2                   AA (sf)          60.80
B (deferrable)        A (sf)           44.30
C (deferrable)        BBB (sf)         25.60
D (deferrable)        BB (sf)          25.90
Subordinated notes    NR               59.60

NR-Not rated.


PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of five classes
and downgraded the ratings of five classes of notes issued by
Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd. The downgrades are due to deterioration
in the par value ratios of the junior classes and the
deterioration in the interest coverage ratios since last review.
The affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized loan
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd. is a cash CRE CDO CLO transaction
backed by a portfolio of whole loans (59.4% of the pool balance),
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (13.1%), b-notes
(12.9%), mezzanine loans (11.6%), and CRE CDO (3.1%). As of the
September 25, 2012 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of
the transaction, including preferred shares, has declined to
$529.0 million from $1.0 billion million at issuance, with the
pay-down currently directed to the Class A2 Notes, as a result of
amortization and pay-off of the underlying collateral, and re-
direction of interest proceeds as principal due to the failure of
the par value tests. The par value ratios and the interest
coverage ratios have deteriorated since last review as a result of
realized losses and increased interest shortfalls, respectively,
on the underlying collateral. As of the September 25, 2012 Trustee
report, Class A1 is fully paid off.

There are 11 assets with a par balance of $163.0 million (44.6% of
the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted securities
as of the September 25, 2012 Trustee report. While there have been
realized losses on the underlying collateral to date, Moody's does
expect significant losses to occur on the defaulted securities
once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,977
compared to 8,903 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (1.1% compared to 0.8% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 0.8% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(1.6% compared to 3.6% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (3.8% compared to
3.2% at last review), B1-B3 (4.9% compared to 1.5% at last
review), and Caa1-C (88.6% compared to 90.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 5.0 years compared to 6.5 years at last
review. The current modeled WAL incorporates updated assumptions
about extensions on the loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 29.5% compared to 26.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9%, the same as that at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
29.5% to 19.5% or up to 39.5% would result in average modeled
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notches downward
and 0 to 4 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


RACE POINT IV: S&P Says 'CCC'-Rated Collateral Declined
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1B, A-2, C, and D notes from Race Point IV CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Sankaty Advisors
LLC. "In addition, we affirmed our ratings on the class A-1A and B
notes, and we removed our ratings on the class A-1B, A-2, B, C,
and D notes from CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive
implications on June 18, 2012," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect a marginal increase in the balance of the
total collateral backing the rated notes, and improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying assets since our December 2010
rating actions," S&P said.

"According to the Aug. 13, 2012, trustee report, the transaction
held $1.97 million in defaulted assets, down from $8.70 million
noted in the Nov. 15, 2010, trustee report, which we used for our
December 2010 rating actions," S&P said.

"Similarly, the amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the
transaction's asset portfolio declined during this period.
According to the August 2012 trustee report, the transaction held
$13.38 million in 'CCC' rated collateral, down from $38.99 million
noted in the November 2010 trustee report," S&P said.

"Also, the collateral balance--designated by a combination of
principal proceeds and total par value of the collateral pool--
backing the rated liabilities has increased $6.02 million since
November 2010. This increase in collateral balance directly
increases the credit support available to the rated notes, and
potentially increases the available interest proceeds and
principal proceeds that the underlying collateral generates. This
increases the likelihood that the rated notes will receive timely
payment of interest and/or ultimate payment of principal," S&P
said.

Over the same time period, the transaction's senior
overcollateralization ratio test and weighted average spread have
also improved.

"Standard & Poor's notes that the transaction is currently passing
its loss replenishment test. The transaction triggers this test if
the difference between the principal losses sustained in the
transaction over the principal gains (including any proceeds
previously used to cure the test) in the transaction--is a
positive number. The transaction is structured such that if it
fails this test, it will divert excess interest proceeds to the
principal account, which may be used to pay down the notes. The
transaction has not failed this test since the December 2010
rating actions. According to the August 2012 trustee report, the
loss replenishment amount result was -$13.55 million," S&P said.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance. In line with our criteria,
our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the
expected timing and pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon
default, under various interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.
In addition, our analysis considered the transaction's ability to
pay timely interest and/or ultimate principal to each of the rated
tranches. The results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in
our view, that all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate
credit enhancement available at the rating levels associated with
this rating action," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Race Point IV CLO Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To           From
A-1B               AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  AA (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C                  A+ (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Pos
D                  BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

Race Point IV CLO Ltd.

Class              Rating
A-1A               AAA(sf)


REALT 2005-1: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on Cl. L Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed 14 classes of Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-1 as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to increased credit support and overall
stable pool performance. The pool has paid down 9% since last
review and approximately 50% since securitization.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The ratings of the
IO Classes, XC-1 and XC-2, are consistent with the expected credit
performance of their referenced classes and are thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.5% of the current balance compared to 1.7% at last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000,
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessment in
the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13 compared to 15 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output. The rating
action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through a review utilizing MOST(R)
(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a proprietary program
that highlights significant credit changes that have occurred in
the last month as well as cumulative changes since the last full
transaction review. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs a
full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated November 2, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 50%
to $174.6 million from $347.5 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 38 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 66% of the pool. The pool contains two loans with
investment-grade credit assessments that represent 24% of the
pool. Five loans, representing 8% of the pool, have defeased and
are collateralized with Canadian Government securities.

Four loans are on the master servicer's watchlist, representing
19% of the pool. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not realized any losses since securitization.
Currently, there are no loans in special servicing. Moody's has
assumed a high default probability for one poorly performing loan,
representing 3% of the pool, and has estimated a $796,521 loss
(15% expected loss based on a 50% probability default) from this
troubled loan.

Excluding defeased loans, Moody's was provided with full year 2011
operating results for 90% of the pool. Excluding defeased and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 66%,
essentially the same as at Moody's prior. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Excluding defeased and troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed
conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.59X, respectively, compared to 1.59X
and 1.59X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Bayfield Mall
Loan ($24.9 million -- 14.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
443,351 square foot (SF) anchored community shopping center
located in Barrie, Ontario. The loan amortizes on a 25-year
schedule. The largest tenants include Canadian Tire (25% of the
net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration in February 2022); Telus
Communications (9% of the NRA; lease expiration in December 2014)
and Bowlerama (8% of the NRA; lease expiration in July 2016). As
of the February 2012, the property was 92% leased compared to 95%
last review. In 2011, base revenues slightly declined while
operating expenses increased. This was mitigated by a 3% increase
in amortization. The loan amortizes on a 25-year schedule. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.50X,
essentially the same as at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Desjardins Visa
Building Loan ($16.7 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 201,583 SF office building located in Montreal,
Quebec. The property is 94% leased to Visa Desjardins through
December 2017. The tenant has been in the property since 1993. The
loan has amortized 3% since last review. The loan is 100% recourse
to Allied Properties REIT, the sponsor. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.55X, essentially the
same as at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 24% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is 33 Isabella Street Loan ($23.5
million -- 13.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 416-unit
multifamily property located in Toronto, Ontario. As of June 2012,
the property was approximately 98% leased compared to 95% at last
review. The loan is on the watch list due to the Borrower having
secured a $3.5 million second mortgage on the property without
lender approval. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.06X,
essentially the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Fernbrae Manor Loan ($10.5 million
-- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 186-unit private
retirement residence located in Kelowna, British Columbia. As of
June 2012, the property was 79% leased compared to 95% at last
review. The decrease in revenue is partially mitigated by a 3%
increase in amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79%
and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.31X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Observatory Place Loan ($8.6 million
-- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 86,915 SF office and
retail property located in Richmond Hill, Ontario. As of December
2011, the property was 97% leased, essentially the same as at last
review. The loan has amortized approximately 3% since last review.
Performance remains stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 61%
and 1.6X, respectively, compared to 63% and 1.54X at last review.


RFC CDO 2006-1: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'C(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one, downgraded two, and affirmed eight
classes of RFC CDO 2006-1, Ltd./LLC (RFC 2006-1) reflecting
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 66.4%.  Fitch's performance
expectation incorporates prospective views regarding commercial
real estate market value and cash flow declines, and factors in
concerns regarding the outsourced third party management of the
collateralized debt obligation (CDO).

The upgrade to class A-1 reflects an increase in credit
enhancement due to significant paydowns since the last rating
action.  The transaction has paid down by $131.8 million (22% of
the original transaction balance) since the last rating action,
totaling $347.5 million (58%) since issuance.  The paydowns were
due to asset repayments, asset disposals, and interest diversion
as a result of the failure of all overcollateralization (OC)
tests.  Five loans and one commercial mortgage-backed security
(CMBS) bond paid off in full.  In addition, approximately $22.8
million is currently held as principal cash.  The Stable Outlook
on class A-1 reflects the class' senior position in the capital
stack.

Since Fitch's last rating action and as of the September 2012
trustee report, two CMBS bonds and one mezzanine loan have
realized losses totaling $27.2 million.  Defaulted assets and
Fitch Loans of Concern have increased to 52.1% and 15.3%,
respectively, compared to 31.9% and 11.4%, respectively, at the
last rating action.  The weighted average rating of the CMBS bonds
has remained the same at 'CCC+/CCC'.

As of the September 2012 trustee report and per Fitch
categorizations, the CDO was substantially invested as follows:
39.5% whole loan/A-notes, 27.8% CMBS, 21.4% mezzanine loans, 9.7%
principal cash, and 1.6% B-notes.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 80.5% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 10.5% from, generally, third-quarter 2012.  Fitch
estimates that average recoveries will be low at 17.5%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is the
modeled loss on the CMBS portion of the collateral (27.8% of the
pool), where the majority of the ratings are speculative grade.

The second largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (15%) secured by a 72-room boutique hotel located
in the Times Square area of New York City.  Performance has
improved since the last rating action, but remains significantly
below underwritten expectations.  Fitch modeled a significant loss
in its base case scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine position (8.6%) secured by interests in a 575-room
full-service hotel located in Tucson, Arizona.  Fitch modeled a
full loss on this highly-leveraged position in its base case
scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to 'Surveillance Criteria
for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The CMBS
bonds were analyzed in Fitch's Portfolio Credit Model according to
'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.

The ratings for classes A-2 through K are based on a deterministic
analysis which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class' credit enhancement, as well as the likelihood for OC
tests to cure.

RFC 2006-1 is a commercial real estate CDO.  The transaction
exited its reinvestment period in April 2011.  The CDO's asset
manager is Realty Finance Corp. (RFC).  As stated in a public
press release in February 2011, RFC entered into an agreement to
outsource its asset management functions for the CDO to Waldron H.
Rand & Company, P.C. (Waldron).  Waldron is an accounting firm
with real estate experience and its capabilities are consistent
with the current ratings assigned to the notes of the transaction.
The transaction was formerly known as CBRE Realty Finance CDO
2006-1, Ltd./LLC.

Fitch has upgraded the following class:

  -- $27.5 million class A-1 to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

  -- $9 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $10.5 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $33 million class A-2 at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $34.5 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $15 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 15%;
  -- $13.5 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $13.5 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.5 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $24 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $20.3 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%.


SALOMON HOME: Moody's Cuts Rating on M-2 Securities to 'Ca'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches from Salomon Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-WMC1,
backed by Subprime loans.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in August 2011 to 8.1% in August 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Salomon Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-WMC1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2002
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF299863

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-6: Fitch to Rate US42MM Class E Notes 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Santander Drive Auto Receivables
Trust 2012-6 as follows:

  -- $348,800,000 class A-1 notes 'F1+sf';
  -- $329,150,000 class A-2 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $141,260,000 class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $151,840,000 class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $169,490,000 class C notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $109,460,000 class D notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $42,370,000 class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity analysis are discussed in
the presale report titled 'Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust
2012-6', dated Oct. 1, 2012, which is available at
'www.fitchratings.com' or by clicking on the link below.

Key Rating Drivers:

Consistent Credit Quality: The credit quality of 2012-6 is
representative of the subprime market and is similar to 2012-4 and
2012-5 (not rated [NR] by Fitch).  The weighted average (WA) Fair
Isaac Corp. (FICO) score is 598 and the internal loss forecasting
score (LFS) is 576.  Used vehicles total 70.6%, the WA loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio is 115%, and WA seasoning totals 12 months.

Consistent Credit Enhancement Structure: The cash flow
distribution is a sequential-pay structure.  Initial hard credit
enhancement (CE) is 44.0% for the class A notes.  The reserve
totals 2.00% (non-declining), and initial overcollateralization
(OC) is 8.50% (both of the initial pool balance), growing to a
target of 15.0% (of the current pool balance).  CE levels are
identical to 2012-5 (NR), but are slightly lower than 2012-4 for
the class B and C notes.

Stable Portfolio/Securitization Performance: Losses on Santander
Consumer USA, Inc.'s (SCUSA) portfolio and 2010-2011
securitizations declined from prior years supported by the
economic rebound and strong used vehicle values elevating recovery
rates.

Stable Corporate Health: SCUSA recorded solid financial results in
2011 and early 2012 and has been profitable since 2007.  Fitch
rates Santander, the majority owner of SCUSA, 'BBB+/F2' with a
Negative Rating Outlook.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: SCUSA demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter, and servicer,
evidenced by historical portfolio delinquency, loss experience,
and securitization performance.  Fitch deems SCUSA capable to
service 2012-6.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of SCUSA would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.


SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-6: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-
6 (SDART 2012-6). This is the sixth public subprime transaction of
the year for Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SCUSA).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-6

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)P-1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of SCUSA as
servicer.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities," published in
May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2012-6 pool
is 14.0% and the Aaa level is 46.0%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of SCUSA's portfolio vintage performance as
well as performance of past securitizations, and current
expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the a Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the presence of the investment
grade rated parent, Banco Santander (Baa2 rating under review for
possible downgrade /P-2 rating under review for possible
downgrade). In addition, the securitization documents include a
provision that requires the appointment of a back-up servicer in
the event that the rating on Banco Santander is downgraded below
Baa3.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 19.0%, 25.0% or
29.0%, the initial model output for the Class A notes might change
from Aaa to Aa1, A1, and Baa1, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.5%, 19.0% or
22.0%, the initial model output for the Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to Aa2, A2, and Baa2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.5%, 16.5% or
20.0%, the initial model output for the Class C notes might change
from A1 to A2, Baa2, and Ba2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.25%, 16.0% or
18.5%, the initial model output for the Class D notes might change
from Baa2 to Baa3, Ba3, and B3 respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.25%, 15.5% or
16.5%, the initial model output for the Class E notes might change
from Ba2 to Ba3, B3, and
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Additional research including a pre-sale report for this
transaction is available at www.moodys.com. The special reports,
"Updated Report on V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities for
Structured Finance Securities" and "V Scores and Parameter
Sensitivities in the U.S. Vehicle ABS Sector" are also available
on moodys.com.


SILVER CREEK: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, and C notes from Silver Creek Funding Ltd., a
U.S. hybrid collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that
is managed by Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC (see list).
Hybrid CLOs are corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions that combine elements of both cash flow and synthetic
CDOs.

"The transaction's portfolio modification period ended in February
2011. Since then, the reference obligations have started to
amortize, and as a result the retained calculation amount, has
been reduced by more than $240 million. The upgrades reflect
improvements in the level of collateralization available to the
tranches as a result of the amortization of the reference
obligations, as well as a decrease in the amount of defaulted
assets held in the portfolio since our December 2010 rating
actions. There are currently no defaulted assets held in the
portfolio," S&P said.

"The rating actions on the B-1, B-2, and C notes were driven by
the application of the largest obligor test, a supplemental stress
test we introduced as part of our corporate CDO criteria update,"
S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Silver Creek Funding Ltd.

                       Rating
Class               To           From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
B-1                 B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)
B-2                 B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)
C                   CCC+ (sf)    CCC- (sf)


SORIN REAL ESTATE: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class A1 Notes to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed the ratings of six classes of Notes issued by Sorin Real
Estate CDO I Ltd. The upgrade is due to greater than expected
amortization from the underlying collateral since last review. The
affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Class A1 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Class A2 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Affirmed at Ca (sf);
previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes, Affirmed at Ca (sf);
previously on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Class C Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed at C (sf);
previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Class D Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed at C (sf);
previously on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Class E Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed at C (sf);
previously on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Class F Fixed Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed at C (sf);
previously on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Sorin Real Estate CDO I Ltd. is a currently static (the
reinvestment period ended in September 2010) cash CRE CDO
transaction collateralized by a portfolio of commercial mortgage
backed securities, including rake bonds (CMBS) (44.9% of the pool
balance), asset backed securities (ABS) (21.0%), CDO (18.8%), b-
note (14.5%), whole loan (0.5%) and mezzanine loan (0.3%). As of
the September 9, 2012 Note Valuation report, the aggregate Note
balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, has
decreased to $220.1 million from $403.0 million at issuance, with
the pay-down directed to the Class A1 Notes, as a result of
principal repayment and sale of collateral as well as failure of
the par value tests.

There are 16 assets with a par balance of $52.7 million (26.4% of
the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted securities
as of the August 30, 2012 Monthly Trustee report. While there have
been realized losses on the underlying collateral to date, Moody's
does expect significant losses to occur on the defaulted
securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,086
compared to 4,708 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (12.5% compared to 12.6% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.2% compared to 2.8% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(23.0% compared to 19.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (11.8% compared
to 6.7% at last review), B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 13.5% at last
review), and Caa1-C (52.5% compared to 45.4% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.5 years compared to 2.2 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 16.2% compared to 20.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.7% compared to 11.8% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
16.2% to 6.2% or up to 26.2% would result in the modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward and 0 to
1 notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. Commercial real estate property values
are continuing to move in a positive direction along with a rise
in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will
not be evident until the volume of investment activity steadily
increases for a significant period, non-performing properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are
abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with eight straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Slow recovery in the office sector continues with
minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is closely
tied to employment, where growth remains slow and employers are
considering decreases in the leased space per employee. Also,
primary urban markets are outperforming secondary suburban
markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be mixed
with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak demand
for new space and lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending resulting in increased sales. Across all property
sectors, the availability of debt capital continues to improve
with robust securitization activity of commercial real estate
loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario maintains its
forecast of relatively robust growth in the US and an expectation
of a mild recession in the euro area for 2012. Downside risks
remain significant, and elevated downside risks and their
materialization could pose a serious threat to the outlook. Major
downside risks include: a deeper than expected recession in the
euro area; the potential for a hard landing in major emerging
markets; an oil supply shock; and material fiscal tightening in
the US given recent political gridlock. Healthy but below-trend
growth in GDP is expected through the rest of this year and next
with risks trending to the downside.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


STEERS THAYER 2006-1: S&P Withdraws 'CCC+' Rating on Trust Cert.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
trust certificates from STEERS Thayer Gate CDO Trust's series
2006-1 and series 2006-4, two synthetic corporate investment-grade
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions.

"We withdrew the ratings following our receipt of the termination
notices from the trustee," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

STEERS Thayer Gate CDO Trust, Series 2006-1
              Rating
Class        To      From
Trust Cert   NR      CCC+ (sf)

STEERS Thayer Gate CDO Trust, Series 2006-4
               Rating
Class        To      From
Trust Cert   NR      CCC- (sf)

NR-Not rated.



SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on $49-Mil. Class M2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on the following
seven classes of floating- and fixed-rated secured notes issued by
SVG Diamond Private Equity plc (SVG), a securitization of existing
limited partnership interests and future commitments to private
equity funds, which is managed by SVG Advisers Ltd.:

  -- EUR40,000,000 class A1 upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $55,000,000 class A2 upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- EUR58,500,000 class B1 upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $26,300,000 class B2 upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- EUR15,000,000 class C affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- EUR40,000,000 class M1 affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $49,000,000 class M2 affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Increase in portfolio net asset value (NAV);
  -- Increase in overall credit enhancement through class A
     principal amortization;
  -- Adequate near term liquidity relative to unfunded
     commitments.

Net Asset Value & Credit Enhancement

Between Oct. 31, 2011 and Aug. 31, 2012, the market value of SVG's
invested portfolio increased by 6% to EUR338.4 million from
EUR319.4 million, according to the respective trustee reports, as
the fund continued its rebound from mid-2009 valuation lows
following cost cutting and balance sheet strengthening of
underlying portfolio companies.  The NAV performance of the
transaction has been in line with Fitch's expectations since the
October 2011 review.  Credit enhancement (subordination) levels
for all classes of notes have increased due to partial
amortization of the class A notes and the increased NAV.  The
class A note balance has been reduced by approximately 70%
following the March and September 2012 semi-annual payment dates.

Liquidity Profile

According to the Aug. 31, 2012 trustee report, SVG's unfunded
commitment exposure was reduced by EUR33.7 million from the prior
review to an outstanding balance of EUR86.1 million.  This amount
is currently covered by cash/liquid investments of EUR112.8
million.  SVG's cash reserve accounts have now been built up to a
point where they have replaced the fund's liquidity facilities.
Minimum reserves are sized at 78.57% of unfunded commitments and
six months of senior expenses.  The increase in reserve account
amounts reflects the strong performance of the fund's incoming
cash flow distributions from its underlying private equity funds.

Ratings Approach

The ratings assigned to the class A, B and C notes address the
likelihood that investors will receive timely payment of interest
and ultimate repayment of principal.  The ratings assigned to the
class M notes address the likelihood that investors will receive
ultimate payment of interest and principal.

In addition to the analytical approach outlined in the criteria
report titled 'Rating Market Value Structures' dated Aug. 15,
2012, Fitch undertook additional analysis specific to the SVG
transaction and its underlying collateral.  Specifically, Fitch's
loss assumptions were based on historically observed peak-to-
trough losses from venture capital and buyout valuation indices.
The index data included the 2000-2002 time period (tech bubble),
when venture capital had significantly higher valuation increases
and suffered material subsequent losses.  For buyout funds, these
index data included the 2005-2007 time period, when leverage and
valuations for buyout transactions increased significantly leading
up to the financial crisis, and were subsequently followed by
material mark-to-market losses during the 2007-2009 time period.

Based on observed historical price declines, as well as the
transaction's portfolio composition and vintage diversification, a
base-line loss assumption of approximately 33% was applied to all
classes of notes and subtracted from their current levels of
credit enhancement.  The remaining credit enhancement was then
compared to different rating stresses to determine the
appropriateness of existing ratings.  The loss assumptions were
increased (decreased) from these levels when evaluating higher
(lower) rated securities.  Going forward, Fitch will track actual
gains or losses from portfolio investments on an ongoing basis and
adjust its base case loss assumptions accordingly.

Transaction Profile

SVG is a securitization of existing limited partnership interests
and new commitments to private equity funds.  Due to SVG having
recently entered its amortization period, the fund does not
currently have the ability to enter into new commitments but may
fund remaining undrawn commitments.

As of Aug. 31, 2012, approximately 98% of the portfolio was
invested in buy-out funds while the remaining 2% was invested in
venture capital funds.  The transaction was invested in 63 funds
managed by 42 managers, with fund vintages ranging from 1993-2008,
and over 50% invested in funds of a 2005 or later vintage.  As of
the same date, the portfolio was meeting all of its
diversification guidelines in terms of exposure to individual
managers, funds, vintages and currencies.

Investment Adviser

SVG is managed by SVG Advisers Ltd (SVG).  Headquartered in London
with offices in Boston, MA and Singapore, SVG is a wholly owned
subsidiary of SVG Capital plc.  Established in 2001, SVG is a
global alternative asset manager focused exclusively on private
equity investments.  As of June 30, 2012, SVG had private equity
funds under management and commitments of EUR3.4 billion.  SVG has
45 employees including 16 investment professionals with over 100
years of total private equity experience.  SVG is authorized and
regulated by the Financial Services Authority in the UK and is a
registered broker-dealer and a member of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. in the U.S. SVG is also registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Rating Sensitivity and Surveillance

Going forward, the assigned ratings may be sensitive to material
changes in the values of the underlying private equity fund
investments and the impact these have on SVG's overall NAV and
liquidity relative to the rated liabilities.  Furthermore, ratings
may be influenced by the rate at which unfunded commitments are
drawn, the rate at which gains (or losses) on existing private
equity investments are realized, overall economic conditions, and
Fitch's assessment of how these factors may influence performance
for a given point in time as well as on a going-forward basis.  A
material adverse deviation from Fitch guidelines for any key
rating driver could cause the rating to be lowered by Fitch.  For
additional information about Fitch ratings guidelines for market
value structures, please review the criteria referenced below,
which can be found on Fitch's website.

Fitch seeks monthly portfolio holdings information and semi-annual
financial statements for the fund from The Bank of New York Mellon
(trustee) and SVG Advisers, Ltd., respectively, to conduct
surveillance against ratings guidelines and maintain its ratings.


SVG DIAMOND II: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Two Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following seven classes of
floating- and fixed-rated secured notes issued by SVG Diamond
Private Equity II plc (SVG II):

  -- Eur55,000,000 class A-1 affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $71,600,000 class A-2 affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Eur76,500,000 class B-1 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40,000,000 class B-2 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $47,800,000 class C affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Eur43,000,000 class M-1 affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  -- $20,300,000 class M-2 affitmed at 'CCCsf'.

SVG II is a securitization of existing limited partnership
interests and future commitments to private equity funds that is
managed by SVG Advisers Ltd.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Continued stabilization of the fund's net asset value (NAV)
     from 2009 lows;
  -- Adequate near-term liquidity relative to unfunded
     commitments.

Net Asset Value

The affirmations reflect a stabilized NAV since Fitch's last
review in October 2011, as well as adequate near-term liquidity
relative to unfunded commitments.  Between Oct. 31, 2011 and Aug.
31, 2012, the market value of SVG II's invested portfolio
increased by 5% to Eur436.7 million from Eur417.1 million,
according to the respective trustee reports, as the fund continued
its rebound from mid-2009 valuation lows following cost cutting
and balance sheet strengthening of underlying portfolio companies.
The NAV performance of the transaction has been in line with
Fitch's expectations since the October 2011 review.

Liquidity Profile

According to the Aug. 31, 2012, trustee report, SVG II's unfunded
commitment exposure was reduced by Eur31.3 million from the prior
review to an outstanding balance of Eur78.5 million.  This amount
is currently covered by cash / liquid investments of Eur35.98
million and undrawn liquidity facilities of Eur108.3 million.
Fitch will continue to monitor SVG II's cash position going
forward to determine if ratings on any of the above-referenced
notes could be affected due to increased capital call activity
and/or weak distribution performance.

The liquidity facilities expire on the September 2024 final
maturity date of the notes and are currently cash collateralized
due to a downgrade event of the facilities provider (Banque AIG,
London Branch) on Sept. 15, 2008.  Amounts may be borrowed under
the facility to fund the payment of senior expenses or fund
capital calls provided that the remaining undrawn balance
available under the facility would be sufficient to cover senior
expenses arising over a six-month period subsequent to the payment
of the capital call.  SVG II has drawn Eur13.9 million from the
liquidity facility to date, according to the Aug. 31, 2012 trustee
report.

Rating Approach

The ratings on the notes address the likelihood that investors
will receive timely payment of interest on the classes A and B
notes, ultimate payment of interest on the classes C and M notes
and ultimate repayment of principal on all classes of notes.  The
liquidity facility as noted above has been structured to ensure
timely payment of interest and expenses on the class A and B
notes.

In addition to the analytical approach outlined in the criteria
report entitled 'Rating Market Value Structures' dated Aug. 15,
2012, Fitch undertook additional analysis specific to the SVG II
transaction and its underlying collateral.  Specifically, Fitch's
loss assumptions were based on historically observed peak-to-
trough losses from venture capital and buyout valuation indices.
The index data included the 2000-2002 time period (tech bubble),
when venture capital had significantly higher valuation increases
and suffered material subsequent losses. For buyout funds, these
index data included the 2005-2007 time period, when leverage and
valuations for buyout transactions increased significantly leading
up to the financial crisis, and were subsequently followed by
material mark-to-market losses during the 2007-2009 time period.

Based on observed historical price declines, as well as the
transaction's portfolio composition and vintage diversification, a
base-line loss assumption of approximately 38% was applied to all
classes of notes and subtracted from their current levels of
credit enhancement.  The remaining credit enhancement was then
compared to different rating stresses to determine the
appropriateness of existing ratings.  Going forward, Fitch will
track actual gains or losses from portfolio investments on an
ongoing basis and adjust its base case loss assumptions
accordingly.

Transaction Profile

SVG II is a securitization of existing limited partnership
interests and new commitments to private equity funds.  Due to a
decline in NAV, SVG II entered into an Early Amortization Erosion
Event in March 2009 whereby the re-investment period was
terminated prior to its scheduled date of March 2011.  As such,
the fund does not currently have the ability to enter into new
commitments but may fund remaining unfunded commitments.  As of
Aug. 31, 2012, approximately 84% of the portfolio was invested in
buy-out funds while 13% was invested in mezzanine-focused funds
and 3% was invested in venture capital funds.  The transaction was
invested in 75 funds managed by 52 managers, with vintages ranging
from 1976-2008, and over 81% invested in funds of a 2005 or later
vintage.  As of the same date, the portfolio was meeting all of
its diversification guidelines in terms of exposure to individual
managers, funds, vintages and currencies.

Investment Adviser

SVG II is managed by SVG Advisers Ltd (SVG). Headquartered in
London with offices in Boston, MA and Singapore, SVG is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of SVG Capital plc.  Established in 2001, SVG is
a global alternative asset manager focused exclusively on private
equity investments.  As of June 30, 2011, SVG had private equity
funds under management and commitments of Eur3.4 billion.  SVG has
45 employees including 16 investment professionals with over 100
years of total private equity experience.  SVG is authorized and
regulated by the Financial Services Authority in the UK and is a
registered broker-dealer and a member of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. in the U.S.  SVG is also registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Rating Sensitivity And Surveillance

Going forward, the assigned ratings may be sensitive to material
changes in the values of the underlying private equity fund
investments and the impact these have on SVG II's overall NAV and
liquidity relative to the rated liabilities.  Furthermore, ratings
may be influenced by the rate at which unfunded commitments are
drawn, the rate at which gains (or losses) on existing private
equity investments are realized, overall economic conditions, and
Fitch's assessment of how these factors may influence performance
for a given point in time as well as on a going-forward basis.  A
material adverse deviation from Fitch guidelines for any key
rating driver could cause the rating to be lowered by Fitch.  For
additional information about Fitch ratings guidelines for market
value structures, please review the criteria referenced below,
which can be found on Fitch's website.

Fitch seeks monthly portfolio holdings information and semi-annual
financial statements for the fund from The Bank of New York Mellon
(trustee) and SVG Advisers, Ltd., respectively, to conduct
surveillance against ratings guidelines and maintain its ratings.


SYMPHONY CLO VI: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, C, and D notes from Symphony CLO VI Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Symphony Asset
Management LLC. "At the same time, we affirmed our rating on the
class A-1 notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our performance review of the
transaction and primarily an increase in credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since our January 2012 rating actions, when
we raised our ratings on four classes of notes. The amount of
defaulted obligations held in the transaction's portfolio declined
since the last rating action, for which we referenced the November
2011 trustee report. As of August 2012, the transaction held $1.4
million in defaulted assets, down from $2.4 million in November
2011. We also observed that debts issued by obligors with ratings
in the 'CCC' category decreased to $12.5 million, down from $19.1
million in the November 2011 report," S&P said.

"The transaction is still in its reinvestment period, which is
scheduled to end as of the October 2012 payment date. As there
have not been any pay downs, the transaction's
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have not changed significantly
since the time of our last rating actions," S&P said.

"We will continue to review our ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in our view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Symphony CLO VI Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                   To           From
A-2                     AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)
B                       A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
C                       BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
D                       BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

Symphony CLO VI Ltd.

Class                   Rating
A-1                     AA+ (sf)


TENZING CFO: Fitch Keeps Junk Rating on Two Notes Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of floating- and fixed-
rate notes issued by Tenzing CFO, S.A., a securitization of
existing limited partnership interests and future commitments to
private equity funds, which is managed by Vedanta Capital:

  -- US$55,000,000 class A affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- US$16,000,000 class B1 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- EUR21,000,000 class B2 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- US$33,000,000 class C affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- US$8,500,000 class D1 remains at 'CCCsf';
  -- EUR10,000,000 class D2 remains at 'CCCsf'.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Stabilization of the fund's net asset value from 2009 lows;
  -- Improving asset coverage ratios;
  -- Adequate near term liquidity relative to unfunded
     commitments.

Asset Coverage Ratios

The affirmations reflect improving asset coverage since Fitch's
last review in October 2011, as well as adequate near-term
liquidity relative to unfunded commitments.  Between June 22, 2011
and June 22, 2012, asset coverage tests for all four outstanding
liability tranches have passed with increasing cushion, reflecting
an overall increase in net asset value for the fund during the
period.  During the period, class A coverage increased to 5.77
times (x) from 4.76x, class B coverage increased to 2.91x from
2.58x, class C coverage increased to 2.10x from 1.95x and class D
coverage increased to 1.78x from 1.68x. Asset coverage tests
insure timely payment of interest on the rated notes.  The
improvement in asset coverage is attributed primarily through
partial amortization of the class A notes during the December 2011
pay period.  The improvement is counterbalanced by the fundamental
risks of private equity as an asset class, which include valuation
volatility and uncertain cash flow timing and deal activity.

Liquidity Profile

According to the June 22, 2012, trustee report, Tenzing's unfunded
commitment exposure was reduced by $13.3 million from the prior
review to an outstanding balance of $30.5 million.  This amount is
currently covered by cash / liquid investments of $16.2 million
and a $71.2 million liquidity facility.  The liquidity facility
expires on the December 2018, the maturity date of the notes, and
is renewed on a yearly basis, subject to certain terms, such as
adequate asset coverage. Amounts may be borrowed under the
facility to fund the payment of senior expenses or fund capital
calls.  Tenzing may draw on the liquidity facility amounts up to
50% of the outstanding balance on the rated notes in order to make
interest payments on the debt as long as the asset coverage tests
are in compliance.  Tenzing has not drawn on the liquidity
facility as of June 22, 2012.

Proposed Transaction Amendments

The affirmations also contemplate a proposed amendment to reduce
the liquidity facility by 10%.  In Fitch's opinion, a reduction in
the facility size will benefit noteholders by decreasing costs.
Furthermore, unfunded commitments will still be covered by more
than 2x with the proposed facility reduction.  Fitch will continue
to monitor Tenzing's cash position going forward to determine if
ratings on any of the above-referenced notes could be affected due
to increased capital call activity and/or weak distribution
performance.

Fitch has also been notified of a proposal to amend the long term
senior unsecured debt rating of the Counterparty Ratings Criteria
from 'A+' to 'BBB+' under the Liquidity Facility Agreement as a
result of Moody's downgrade of BNP Paribas (BNPP), the Liquidity
Facility Provider, on June 21, 2012.  BNPP is rated by Fitch, with
a rating of 'A+/F1+', Outlook Stable as of Dec. 15, 2011.  Fitch
does not expect the Downgrade Event and remedies proposed (if any)
by BNPP to have any impact on the ratings of the notes in these
transactions since BNPP remains an eligible counterparty for these
transactions, as defined in Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for
Structured Finance Transactions', dated May 30, 2012.  Should BNPP
be downgraded below Fitch's relevant eligibility threshold, as
described in then applicable criteria, Fitch will determine
whether the remedies effective at that time sufficiently mitigate
the transaction's exposure in the context of then current notes'
ratings and remaining facility terms.

Fitch is not a party to the transaction and therefore does not
provide consent or approval to changes in its terms, as that
remains the sole preserve of the transaction parties.  Fitch
expects to be notified by the trustee when or if the proposed
amendments are executed either in part or in their entirety.

Rating Approach

The ratings on the notes address the likelihood that investors
will receive timely payment of interest on the class A, ultimate
payment of interest on classes B, C and D notes, and ultimate
repayment of principal on all classes of notes.  A third-party
liquidity facility has been structured to ensure timely payment of
interest and expenses on all classes of notes, with the exception
of class E, which is not rated by Fitch.

In addition to the analytical approach outlined in the criteria
report entitled 'Rating Market Value Structures' dated August 15,
2012, Fitch undertook additional analysis specific to the Tenzing
transaction and its underlying collateral.  Specifically, Fitch's
loss assumptions were based on historically observed peak-to-
trough losses from venture capital and buyout valuation indices.
The index data included the 2000-2002 time period (tech bubble),
when venture capital had significantly higher valuation increases
and suffered material subsequent losses.  For buyout funds, these
index data included the 2005-2007 time period, when leverage and
valuations for buyout transactions increased significantly leading
up to the financial crisis, and were subsequently followed by
material mark-to-market losses during the 2007-2009 time period.

Based on observed historical price declines, as well as the
transaction's portfolio composition and vintage diversification, a
base-line loss assumption of approximately 37% was applied to all
classes of notes and subtracted from their current levels of
credit enhancement.  The remaining credit enhancement was then
compared to different rating stresses to determine the
appropriateness of existing ratings.  For example, at a 'BBB'
stress level, Fitch assumed a loss of approximately 39% for buyout
funds and approximately 51% for venture capital funds originated
in 2005 and later.  The loss assumptions were increased
(decreased) from these levels when evaluating higher (lower) rated
securities.  Going forward, Fitch will track actual gains or
losses from portfolio investments on an ongoing basis and adjust
its base case loss assumptions accordingly.

Transaction Profile

Tenzing is a securitization of existing limited partnership
interests and new commitments to private equity funds.  The
transaction entered its amortization period in December 2010 and
does not currently have the ability to enter into new commitments.

As of June 22, 2012, approximately 60% of the portfolio was
invested in buy-out funds while the remaining 40% was invested in
venture capital funds.  The transaction was invested in 38 funds,
with vintages ranging from 1992-2008, and over 65% invested in
funds of a 2005 or later vintage.  As of the same date, the
portfolio was meeting all of its diversification guidelines in
terms of exposure to individual vintages and fund types.

Investment Adviser

Tenzing is managed by Vedanta Capital (Vedanta).  Headquartered in
New York, NY, Vedanta was established in 2006 as a private equity
specialist firm focused on technology-based investments. As of
June 30, 2012 Vedanta managed approximately $600 million in total
commitments and employed 12 professionals.

Rating Sensitivity and Surveillance

Going forward, the assigned ratings may be sensitive to material
changes in the values of the underlying private equity fund
investments and the impact these have on Tenzing's overall NAV and
liquidity relative to the rated liabilities.  Furthermore, ratings
may be influenced by the rate at which unfunded commitments are
drawn, the rate at which gains (or losses) on existing private
equity investments are realized, overall economic conditions, and
Fitch's assessment of how these factors may influence performance
for a given point in time as well as on a going-forward basis.  A
material adverse deviation from Fitch guidelines for any key
rating driver could cause the rating to be lowered by Fitch.  For
additional information about Fitch ratings guidelines for market
value structures, please review the criteria referenced below,
which can be found on Fitch's website.

Fitch seeks quarterly fund information and quarterly investor
reports for the fund from The Bank of New York Mellon (trustee)
and Vedanta, respectively, to conduct surveillance against ratings
guidelines and maintain its ratings.


TROPIC CDO II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A-3L Notes to 'Caa2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Tropic CDO II Ltd.:

  U.S. $145,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2034
  (current balance of $106,802,007), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
  previously on March 6, 2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  U.S. $50,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2034,
  Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2012 Downgraded to
  B1 (sf);

  U.S. $35,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2034,
  Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on August 17, 2011 Downgraded
  to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result the improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the last rating action in March
2012.

Moody's notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
1216 compared to 1549 as of the last rating action date. The total
par amount that Moody's treated as defaulted or deferring declined
to $129.75 million from $152.57 million as of the last rating
action date. As a result of the increase in performing par, the
Class A1-L notes' par coverage, as calculated by Moody's, has
improved to 171.93% from 146.27% since the last rating action.
Based on the latest trustee report dated July 2012, the Senior
Coverage Test and Subordinate Coverage Test are reported at 95.74%
(limit 120.00%) and 67.10% (limit 104.00%), respectively, versus
January 2012 levels of 88.6% and 62.17%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the Class A1-L notes have been paid down
by approximately 2.8% or $3 million since the last rating action,
as a result of diversion of excess interest proceeds. Going
forward, the Class A-1L notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest due to failure of the Senior Coverage
Test.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par and of $183.63 million, defaulted/deferring par
of $129.57 million, a weighted average default probability of
24.63% (implying a WARF of 1216), Moody's Asset Correlation of
19.40%, and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers the structural protections in
the transaction, the risk of triggering an Event of Default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Tropic CDO II, Ltd., issued on October 15, 2003, is a collateral
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities (TruPS).

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks
that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To evaluate the
credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to
derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk
for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC
financial data reported as of Q2-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8-5 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge. CDOROM v.2.8-5 is
available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical
models, upon return of a signed free license agreement.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 244 points from the
base case of 1216, the model-implied rating of the Class A1-L
notes is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if
the WARF is decreased by 243 points, the model-implied rating of
the Class A1-L notes is one notch better than the base case
result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $28.5 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults.

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1L: +3
Class A-2L: +3
Class A-3L: +2
Class A-4L: 0
Class A-4: 0
Class B-1L: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1L: +1
Class A-2L: +1
Class A-3L: +1
Class A-4L: 0
Class A-4: 0
Class B-1L: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as Moody's outlook on the banking
sector remains negative, although there have been some recent
signs of stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues
to decline in 2012 compared to 2011, 2010 and 2009, and some of
the previously deferring banks have resumed interest payment on
their trust preferred securities.


TROPIC CDO IV: Moody's Raises Rating on $160-Mil. Notes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Tropic CDO IV Ltd.:

US$160,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2035
(current balance of $133,907,984), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on January 7, 2011 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily a result of the improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the last rating action in
January 2011.

Moody's notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
1621 compared to 2148 as of the last rating action in January
2011. In addition, the total par amount that Moody's treated as
defaulted or deferring declined to $145 million compared to $156
million as of the last rating action date due to improvement in
the credit quality and the financial ratios of the banks . As a
result of the increase in performing par, the implied Class A-1L
Notes' par coverage improved to126.2% from 112% since the last
rating action, as calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest
trustee report dated July 16, 2012, the Senior Principal Coverage
ratio, Class A-3 Principal Coverage ratio, and Class B Principal
Coverage ratio are reported at 106.55% (limit 140%), 87.68% (limit
112%), and 63.43% (limit 103%), respectively, versus October 2010
levels of 98.63%, 81.70% and 59.61%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the Class A-1L Notes have been paid down
by approximately 5% or $7 million since the last rating action, as
a result of diversion of excess interest proceeds. Going forward,
the Class A-1L Notes will continue to benefit from the diversion
of excess interest due to failure of the Senior Principal Coverage
ratio.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par and principal proceeds of $169 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $145 million, a weighted average
default probability of 30.79% (implying a WARF of 1621), Moody's
Asset Correlation of 16.12%, and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors that
are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of triggering an Event of
Default, recent deal performance under current market conditions,
the legal environment, and specific documentation features. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Tropic CDO IV, Ltd., issued on November 18, 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data received as of Q2-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8-5 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge. CDOROM v.2.8-5 is
available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical
models, upon return of a signed free license agreement.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 324 points from the
base case of 1621, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1L
Notes is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if
the WARF is decreased by 162 points, the model-implied rating of
the Class A-1L Notes is one notch better than the base case
result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $32 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on all
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1L: +3
Class A-2L: +4
Class A-3L: 0
Class A-4: 0
Class B-1L: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1L: 0
Class A-2L: 0
Class A-3L: 0
Class A-4: 0
Class B-1L: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as Moody's outlook on the banking
sector remains negative, although there have been some recent
signs of stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues
to decline in 2012 compared to 2011, 2010 and 2009, and some of
the previously deferring banks have resumed interest payment on
their trust preferred securities.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C3: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Cl. F Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
twelve classes of CMBS securities, issued by UBS-Barclays
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2012-C3. Moody's assigned a
provisional rating to Class EC certificates with an exchangeable
feature on September 14, 2012. However, Class EC certificates are
not being issued at closing.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest Only Classes

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 85 fixed rate loans secured
by 113 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
(1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and (2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.60X is higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.10X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 99.0% is higher than the average
Moody's CMBS 2.0 but lower than the 2007 conduit/fusion
transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV ratio, (inclusive
of subordinated debt) of 100.0% is also considered when analyzing
various stress scenarios for the rated debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 29.2, which is in-line with other multi-
borrower pools rated by Moody's since 2009. The score is in-line
with previously rated conduit and fusion transactions but higher
than previously rated large loan transactions.

With respect to property level diversity, the pool's property
level Herfindahl score is 31.4. Sixteen loans (21.7% of the pool
balance) are secured by multiple properties. Loans secured by
multiple properties benefit from lower cash flow volatility given
that excess cash flow from one property can be used to augment
another's cash flow to meet debt service requirements. These loans
also benefit from the pooling of equity from each underlying
property.

Moody's grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to worst) and
considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The weighted average
grade for the pool is 2.50, which is in-line with the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.61
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5.0%, 14.3%, or 22.8%, the model-indicated rating for the
currently rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa2, A1,
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather
they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-
indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into
consideration in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that
would be assigned in each case could vary from the information
presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Fitch Gives Low-B Ratings to 2 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigned the following ratings to Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-LC5 Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates effective Sept. 28, 2012, the closing date of
the transaction:

  -- $81,143,000 Class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $156,188,000 Class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $556,683,000 Class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100,000,000 Class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1,018,538,000a* Class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $118,138,000a* Class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
  -- $124,524,000 Class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $76,630,000 Class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $41,508,000 Class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $49,490,000a Class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20,754,000a Class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23,946,000a Class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.
a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

Fitch does not rate the $46,298,194 Class G.

Since the published presale, the capital structure of the
transaction was revised by the issuer reflective of the classes
above.  The principal balance of the portfolio is unchanged;
however, classes A-FX and A-FL were eliminated from the
transaction and as a result Fitch's prior ratings for these
classes have been withdrawn.  Additionally, the class X-B was
modified to reference the notional amount of the sum of the
principal balances of the classes B and C certificates.  As a
result, Fitch has revised the rating of Class X-B to 'A-sf' which
is reflective of Fitch's rating of the class C certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Cl. F Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to 12 classes of
CMBS securities, issued by Well Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-LC5.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 70 fixed rate loans secured
by 124 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.75X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.12X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 98.6% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%.

Moody's considers both loan level diversity and property level
diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to loan
level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is
23.2. The transaction's loan level diversity is in-line with the
band of Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 30.0. The
transaction's property diversity profile is higher than the
indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued
since 2009.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa (sf) class with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals. The transaction was structured with additional
subordination at class A-S to mitigate the potential increased
severity to class A-S.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.3, which is in-line
with the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship, and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0, which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5.1%, 16.2%, and 28.7%, the model-indicated rating for the
currently rated Aaa (sf) Super Senior class would be Aaa (sf), Aaa
(sf), and Aa1 (sf), respectively; for the most junior Aaa (sf)
rated class A-S would be Aa1, Aa1, and A1, respectively. Parameter
Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time; rather they are designed to
provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might
change if key input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


* Fitch Lowers Rating on 336 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 336 distressed bonds in 147 U.S. RMBS
transactions to 'Dsf'.  The downgrades indicate that the bonds
have incurred a principal write-down. Of the bonds downgraded to
'Dsf', all classes were previously rated 'Csf', 'CCsf', or
'CCCsf'.  All ratings below 'Bsf' indicate a default is expected.
As part of this review, the Recovery Estimates of the defaulted
bonds were not revised.  Additionally, the review only focused on
the bonds which defaulted and did not include any other bonds in
the affected transactions.

Of the 336 classes affected by these downgrades, 201 are Prime,
100 are Alt-A, and 30 are Subprime.  The remaining transaction
types are other sectors.  The majority of the bonds (68.1%) have a
Recovery Estimate of 50%-90%, which indicates that the bonds will
recover 50%-90% of the current outstanding balance, while 17.8%
have a Recovery Estimate of 0%.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions can be found at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'Fitch
Downgrades 336 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf' in 147 U.S. RMBS
Transactions'.  These actions were reviewed by a committee of
Fitch analysts.  The spreadsheet provides the contact information
for the performance analyst.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's assignment of Recovery
Estimates (REs) to the transactions.  The Recovery Estimate scale
is based upon the expected relative recovery characteristics of an
obligation.  For structured finance, Recovery Estimates are
designed to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis.


* Fitch Affirms Rating on 4 Sec. Classes From 2 U.S. RE-REMICs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes from two U.S. RMBS
Manufactured Housing (MH) Resecuritization Trusts (RE-REMICs).
These Re-REMICs are collateralized with underlying MH transactions
from the 1995-2000 vintages.

Fitch's rating actions are as follows:

Asset-Backed Securities Corp. 2004-CNF1

  -- A-2 (00081WAH4) affirmed at 'Csf/RE 100%'.

Lehman Manufactured Housing Asset-Backed Trust 1998-1

  -- I-A1 (525170BB1) affirmed at 'Asf'; Rating Outlook Stable;
  -- II-A1 (525170BD7) affirmed at 'Dsf/RE 100%';
  -- II-A2 (525170BE5) affirmed at 'Dsf/RE 95%'.

The Re-REMIC rating actions reflect the recently completed MH
sector rating review.  Additional information regarding the MH
rating actions is available in Fitch's Oct. 2, 2012 press release
titled 'Fitch Takes Various Actions on 134 U.S. Manufactured
Housing RMBS Deals'.

The outstanding classes in Lehman Manufactured Housing Asset-
Backed Trust 1998-1 and Asset-Backed Securities Corp. 2004-CNF1 do
not have additional enhancement provided by their Re-REMIC
structures and are considered direct pass thru structures.  As a
result, the Re-REMIC ratings directly reflect the lowest rating on
the underlying classes that correspond to each class.

Fitch did run cash flow analysis on the Re-REMICs to determine the
Recovery Estimates for the distressed classes.  The same projected
base-case and rating-stressed loss and cash flow assumptions that
were used for the underlying transaction analysis were used for
the respective Re-REMIC transactions.  For further information on
the analysis that was run on the underlying MH transactions please
refer to Fitch's Oct. 2, 2012 press release 'Fitch Takes Various
Actions on 134 U.S. Manufactured Housing RMBS Deals'.


* Fitch Says Credit Quality of Speculative Debt Strengthens
-----------------------------------------------------------
Credit quality for U.S. speculative grade debt issuers continued
to strengthen even in the absence of leverage improvements, as
detailed by Fitch Ratings in its latest installment of the
'Leveraged Finance Stats Quarterly - Second Quarter 2011'.

Favorable capital market conditions for the majority of 2012, have
allowed issuers to reduce interest costs, improve maturity
profiles, and bolster liquidity positions.

Continued leverage improvements for both 'BB' and 'B' rated
issuers has become increasingly more challenging over the last two
quarters.  Declining leverage levels for 'BB' and 'B' rated
issuers have started to flatten at 3.2x and 4.9x, respectively.

Earning generation remains difficult as minimal top-line growth
persists and continued cost cutting remains difficult.  In 2011,
minor improvements in top-line growth and stable margins have
contributed to higher EBITDA levels and decreased leverage.
Through the first two quarters of 2012, EBITDA growth has been
moderate and absolute debt levels remain unchanged.

Debt financing rates for 'BB' and most 'B' speculative grades
borrowers remains attractive.  This has allowed issuers to
refinance and reprice their capital structures at more favorable
rates.  Interest coverage has remained relatively flat through
2012 for both 'BB' and 'B' rated issuers at 5.1x and 2.8x,
respectively.  While interest cost savings has yet to take effect
in current coverage metrics, improvements should begin to be fully
realized in 2013.

Issuers have also been able to push out their maturity profiles.
In the second quarter, issuers in the portfolio reduced aggregate
2013 maturities by 19% and 2014 maturities decreased by 6% from
the first quarter of 2012.  Lower rated issuers that have not
addressed near-term refinancing risks could be at risk should the
current tone in the market change.

Liquidity has remained strong for most issuers, as memories of a
credit crunch have left issuers with a focus on maintaining ample
liquidity.  Aggregate FCF for the portfolio has improved to $7.7
billion in the second quarter from $4.6 billion the year prior.
On average, 'BB' rated issuers have approximately 82% available on
their revolving credit facilities (versus 75% for 'B' rated
issuers).

Overall stable credit profiles for most high-yield issuers should
allow a buffer to withstand a prolonged period of weak economic
growth.  The absence of organic top-line growth paired with
favorable credit conditions could encourage issuers to pursue
growth opportunities via acquisition.


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $1.2 Billion US Alt-A RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 46
tranches and upgraded the ratings of two tranches from 11 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM loans, issued by
miscellaneous issuers.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
and Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating action constitute of a number of downgrades as well as
upgrades. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance, and/ or rapid build-up in credit
enhancement due to high prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In its current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's
Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and
the structural nuances of the transaction

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.1% in August 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-22CB

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-25CB

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-27CB

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-36CB

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-38

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-2CB

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust
Series 2003-1

CL. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

CL. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

CL. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

CL. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Loan
Trust, Series 2004-2

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR4

Cl. 2-A2A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-11

Cl. 2-A1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 3-A1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 3-A2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF299878

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


* S&P Reinstates Ratings on Various Structured Finance Issues
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services reinstated its ratings on the
securities listed below. "On Sept. 29, 2012, we withdrew these
ratings due to an error," S&P said.

"The rating on Straight A Funding LLC was reinstated on Sept. 30,
2012. The ratings on Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited Series
2009-1, 2009-2, Series 2009-6, Series 2009-8, Series 2009-10,
Series 2009-13, Series 2009-14, and Series 2009-17, LVII
Resecuritization Trust 2009-1 Resecuritization Notes and
Certificates, Series 2009-1 and Grantor Trust Certificates, Series
2009-1 were reinstated on Oct. 1, 2012. The ratings on Bank of
Aland PLC's Covered Bond Program, Dutch Mortgage Portfolio Loans
VI B.V., Galena CDO II (Ireland) PLC, and Residential Mortgage
Securities 23 PLC were reinstated on Oct. 2, 2012," S&P said.

RATING ACTIONS

Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
Series 2009-2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1                     AAA (sf)             NR
A2                     BBB (sf)             NR
B                      BB (sf)/Watch Neg    NR

Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
Series 2009-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A2                     BBB (sf)             NR
B                      CCC (sf)             NR

Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
Series 2009-6
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1                     AAA (sf)             NR
A2                     AA (sf)              NR
A3                     A (sf)               NR
A4                     BBB (sf)             NR
A5                     BB+ (sf)             NR
A6                     BB- (sf)             NR
A7                     B- (sf)              NR

Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
Series 2009-10
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1                     AAA (sf)             NR
A2                     AA (sf)              NR
A3                     A (sf)               NR
A4                     BBB (sf)             NR
A5                     BB+ (sf)             NR
A6                     BB (sf)              NR
A7                     BB- (sf)             NR

Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
Series 2009-14
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A3                     A (sf)               NR
A4                     BBB (sf)             NR
A5                     BB+ (sf)             NR
A6                     BB (sf)              NR
A7                     BB- (sf)             NR
B                      B- (sf)              NR

Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
Series  2009-8
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1                     AAA (sf)             NR
A2                     AA (sf)              NR
A3                     A (sf)               NR
A4                     BBB (sf)             NR
A5                     BB+ (sf)             NR
A6                     BB (sf)              NR
A7                     BB- (sf)             NR

Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
Series  2009-13
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A3                     A (sf)               NR
A4                     BBB (sf)             NR
A5                     BB+ (sf)             NR
A6                     BB (sf)              NR
A7                     BB- (sf)             NR
B                      CCC (sf)             NR

Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
Series  2009-17
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1                     CC (sf)              NR
A2                     CC (sf)              NR
A3                     CC (sf)              NR
A4                     CC (sf)              NR
A5                     D (sf)               NR
A6                     D (sf)               NR
A7                     D (sf)               NR
B                      D (sf)               NR
C                      D (sf)               NR

Bank of Aland PLC Covered Bond Program
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
                       AA (sf)/Stable       NR

Dutch Mortgage Portfolio Loans VI B.V.
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
Senior A               AAA (sf)             NR

Galena CDO II (Ireland) PLC
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1U10-B               B+ (sf)              NR

LVII Resecuritization Trust 2009-1
Resecuritization Notes and Certificates Series 2009-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        502449AB7   AAA (sf)             NR
M-1        502449AG6   AA+ (sf)             NR
M-2        502449AH4   A (sf)               NR
M-3        502449AJ0   BBB+ (sf)            NR
M-4        502449AK7   BBB (sf)             NR
M-5        502449AL5   BB (sf)              NR
M-6        502449AM3   B (sf)               NR
M-7        502449AN1   CCC (sf)             NR
M-8        502449AP6   CCC (sf)             NR

LVII Resecuritization Trust 2009-1
Grantor Trust Certificates Series 2009-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
P-1        502449AQ4   AA+p (sf)            NR
P-2        502449AR2   AA+p (sf)            NR
P-3        502449AS0   AA+p (sf)            NR

Residential Mortgage Securities 23 PLC
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A                      AAA (sf)             NR

Straight-A Funding LLC
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
                       A-1+ (sf)            NR


* S&P Raises Ratings on 38 Classes From 12 CMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on 38
classes from 12 commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions, and removed 28 of them from CreditWatch with
positive implications and two of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications. "Concurrently, we lowered our ratings on 26
classes from six CMBS transactions and removed 18 of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. Finally, we affirmed our
ratings on 15 classes from four CMBS transactions and removed 10
of them from CreditWatch with positive implications. The
CreditWatch resolutions are related to CreditWatch placements that
occurred on Sept. 5, 2012," S&P said.

"The rating actions on the principal and interest certificates
follow our analysis of the transactions using our recently updated
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions," S&P said.

"Our rating actions on the interest-only (IO) certificates reflect
our current criteria for rating IO securities," S&P said.

"The upgrades on the principal and interest certificates reflect
Standard & Poor's expected available credit enhancement for the
affected tranches, which we believe is greater than our most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the most
recent rating levels. The upgrades also reflect our views
regarding the current and future performance of the collateral
supporting the respective transactions. We raised our rating on
class A-AB from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series
2008-C1 to 'AAA (sf)' to reflect the results of our cash flow
analysis. This analysis reflected the recent disposition of the
450 Lexington Avenue loan, which was the second-largest loan in
the pool at origination. Our cash flow analysis indicates that
this class should receive its full repayment of principal due
to time tranching, as described in 'U.S. CMBS 'AAA' Scenario Loss
And Recovery Application,' published July 21, 2009," S&P said.

"The downgrades on the principal and interest certificates reflect
our expected available credit enhancement for the affected
tranches, which we believe is less than our most recent estimate
of necessary credit enhancement for the most recent rating levels.
The downgrades also reflect our views regarding the current and
future performance of the collateral supporting the transactions,"
S&P said.

"The affirmations on the principal and interest certificates
reflect our expected available credit enhancement for the affected
tranches, which we believe will remain consistent with the most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the current
rating levels. The affirmed ratings also acknowledge our
expectations regarding the current and future performance of the
collateral supporting the respective transactions," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow a detailed review of the performance of
the collateral supporting the relevant securities and transaction
structures. This review was similar to the review we conducted
before placing 744 U.S. and Canadian CMBS ratings on CreditWatch
following the release of our updated ratings criteria for these
transactions, but was more detailed with respect to collateral and
transaction performance," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-LS1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-1A   AA+(sf)    A(sf)/Watch Pos          31.74
A-4B   AA+(sf)    A(sf)/Watch Pos          31.74
A-4BF  AA+(sf)    A(sf)/Watch Pos          31.74
A-SM   AA-(sf)    A-(sf)/Watch Pos         28.28

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-M    BBB-(sf)   BBB+(sf)/Watch Neg       19.73
A-J    B+(sf)     BB(sf)/Watch Neg         13.30
B      B(sf)      BB-(sf)/Watch Neg        12.14
C      B-(sf)     B+(sf)/Watch Neg         10.98
D      B-(sf)     B(sf)/Watch Neg          10.08
E      CCC+(sf)   B-(sf)/Watch Neg          9.18


City Center Trust 2011-CCHP
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
C      AA+(sf)    A(sf)/Watch Pos          38.09
D      AA-(sf)    BBB+(sf)/Watch Pos       17.36
E      A-(sf)     BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos          --


Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-1-A  A(sf)      A+(sf)/Watch Neg         29.48
A-3    A(sf)      A+(sf)/Watch Neg         29.48
A-AB   AAA(sf)    A+(sf)/Watch Neg         29.48
A-M    BB(sf)     BBB(sf)/Watch Neg        19.00
A-J    CCC+(sf)   BB(sf)/Watch Neg         12.19
B      CCC(sf)    BB-(sf)/Watch Neg        11.14


FREMF 2011-K13 Mortgage Trust
Multifamily mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      A+(sf)     AA-(sf)/Watch Neg         7.58


FREMF 2011-K701 Mortgage Trust
Freddie Mac structured pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      A-(sf)     A+(sf)/Watch Neg         10.08
C      BBB(sf)    A-(sf)/Watch Neg          7.56


J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2009-IWST
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      AA+(sf)    AA+(sf)/Watch Pos        17.80
C      AA(sf)     A+(sf)/Watch Pos          9.01
D      A+(sf)     BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos          --


J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-FL1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
C      A+(sf)     A(sf)/Watch Pos           9.50
D      BBB(sf)    BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos          --
MH     BBB-(sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg           --


J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-HSBC
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      AA+(sf)    AA(sf)/Watch Pos         28.33
C      AA(sf)     A(sf)/Watch Pos          21.20


J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-WLDN
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
C      A+(sf)     A(sf)/Watch Pos             --


LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-M    BBB-(sf)   BBB(sf)/Watch Neg        17.81
A-J    B (sf)     B+(sf)/Watch Neg         10.27
B      CCC+(sf)   B(sf)/Watch Neg           8.76
C      CCC(sf)    B-(sf)/Watch Neg          7.53


Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2008-TOP29
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-4    AA(sf)     A+(sf)/Watch Pos         27.48
A-4FL  AA(sf)     A+(sf)/Watch Pos         27.48


Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2011-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      AA+(sf)    AA(sf)/Watch Pos         19.29
C      A+(sf)     A(sf)/Watch Pos          13.45
D      BBB(sf)    BBB(sf)/Watch Pos         7.87
E      BBB-(sf)   BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos        6.60
F      BB+(sf)    BB+(sf)/Watch Pos         5.71
G      BB(sf)     BB(sf)/Watch Pos          4.70
H      BB-(sf)    BB-(sf)/Watch Pos         3.81
J      B+(sf)     B+(sf)/Watch Pos          2.79
K      B(sf)      B(sf)/Watch Pos           1.90
L      B-(sf)     B-(sf)/Watch Pos          1.27


Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2012-Star
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      AA(sf)     AA(sf)/Watch Pos         22.27
C      AA-(sf)    A(sf)/Watch Pos          15.15
D      A(sf)      BBB(sf)/Watch Pos         9.25


UBS-BAMLL Trust 2012-WRM
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      AA+(sf)    AA(sf)/Watch Pos         21.20
C      AA(sf)     A(sf)/Watch Pos          12.53
D      A(sf)      BBB(sf)/Watch Pos         3.13
E      A-(sf)     BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos          --


WFDB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-BXR
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
C      AA(sf)     A(sf)/Watch Pos          16.72
D      AA-(sf)    BBB(sf)/Watch Pos        12.13
E      A+(sf)     BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos        9.07
F      A-(sf)     BB(sf)/Watch Pos            --

RATING ACTIONS

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-LS1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-J    B-(sf)     B+(sf)                   11.86
B      CCC(sf)    B(sf)                    10.28
C      CCC(sf)    B-(sf)                    8.84
D      CCC-(sf)   CCC(sf)                   7.69


City Center Trust 2011-CCHP
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      AAA(sf)    AA(sf)                   60.21


Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
C      CCC-(sf)   B-(sf)                   10.09
D      CCC-(sf)   CCC(sf)                   8.65


FREMF 2011-K701 Mortgage Trust
Freddie Mac structured pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
X2     AA-(sf)    AAA(sf)                    N/A


J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-WLDN
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
X-B    A+(sf)     A(sf)                      N/A


LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
D      CCC-(sf)   CCC+(sf)                  6.70


Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2008-TOP29
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-M    BBB+(sf)   BBB(sf)                  17.10


Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2012-Star
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
X-B    AA-(sf)    A(sf)                      N/A


UBS-BAMLL Trust 2012-WRM
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
X-B    A-(sf)     BBB-(sf)                   N/A


WFDB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-BXR
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
B      AA+(sf)    AA(sf)                   24.37
X-B    A-(sf)     BB(sf)                     N/A
X-C    A-(sf)     BB(sf)                     N/A

RATINGS AFFIRMED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class  To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-2    AAA(sf)    AAA(sf)                  28.77
A-2FL  AAA(sf)    AAA(sf)                  28.77
A-AB   AAA(sf)    AAA(sf)                  28.77
E      CCC-(sf)   CCC-(sf)                  5.74
X      AAA(sf)    AAA(sf)                    N/A

N/A - Not Applicable.


* S&P Raises Ratings on 25 Classes From 14 RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 315
classes from 59 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions and removed 256 of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications and 49 of them from CreditWatch with
developing implications. "We also raised our ratings on 25 classes
from 14 transactions and removed six of them from CreditWatch with
positive implications and 10 of them from CreditWatch developing.
We also affirmed our ratings on 263 classes from 62 transactions
and removed 42 of them from CreditWatch negative, 11 from
CreditWatch developing, and four from CreditWatch positive. We
also withdrew our ratings on 30 classes from 18 transactions.
Twenty-seven of the withdrawn ratings were on CreditWatch negative
and one of them was on CreditWatch positive," S&P said.

The complete ratings list is available for free at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_RMBS_RA_10_2_12.pdf

The transactions in this review were issued between 2003 and 2007
and are backed by adjustable- and fixed-rate Alternative-A (Alt-A)
and negatively amortizing (Neg-am) mortgage loans secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

"On Aug. 15, 2012, we placed our ratings on 406 classes from 60
transactions within this review on CreditWatch negative, positive,
or developing, along with ratings from a group of other RMBS
securities after implementing our recently revised criteria for
surveilling pre-2009 U.S. RMBS ratings. CreditWatch negative
placements accounted for approximately 78% of the Alt-A
CreditWatch actions and 72% of the Neg-am actions. CreditWatch
developing placements accounted for approximately 18% of the Alt-A
CreditWatch actions and 24% of the Neg-am CreditWatch actions.
CreditWatch positive placements accounted for approximately 4% of
the Alt-A CreditWatch actions and 3% of the Neg-am CreditWatch
actions. We completed our review using the new methodology and
assumptions and the rating actions resolve some of the CreditWatch
placements; an overview of the directional change of the
CreditWatch resolutions is," S&P said:

                              3 or fewer       More than 3
From         Affirmations      notches           notches
                             Up      Down      Up      Down
Watch Pos          4          3        0        3        0
Watch Neg         42          0       50        0       206
Watch Dev         11          5       41        5        8

"The high percentage of CreditWatch negative placements reflected
our projection that remaining losses for certain transactions will
increase. We have raised our projected losses for the Alt-A 2005
vintage to 18.75% of the outstanding balance as of June 2012, up
7% from our previous projection of 17.50%. We project that
remaining losses for the Alt-A 2006 vintage will slightly decrease
to 29.25% of the remaining outstanding balance, down from our
previous projection of 30.75%. We also project that remaining
losses for the Alt-A 2007/2008 vintage will decrease to 28.75% of
the remaining outstanding balance, down from 35.75%. We have
increased our projected losses for the Neg-am 2005 vintage to
33.50% of the outstanding balance, up 30% from our previous
projection of 25.75%. We project that remaining losses for the
Neg-am 2006 vintage will increase to 44% of the outstanding
balance, up 11% from our previous projection of 39.75%. Lastly, we
have slightly decreased our projected losses for the Neg-am
2007/2008 vintage to 42.50% of the outstanding balance, down from
our previous projection of 43.50%," S&P said.

Increases in projected losses resulted from one or more of these
factors:

--  An increase in S&P's default and loss multiples at higher
    investment-grade rating levels;

-- A substantial portion of nondelinquent loans (generally
    between 8% and 19% for Alt-A and between 11% and 34% for Neg-
    am) now categorized as reperforming (many of these loans have
    been modified) and having a default frequency of between 30%
    and 45%;

-- Increased roll-rates for 30- and 60-day delinquent loans;

-- An overall continued elevated level of observed loss
    severities. S&P used deal- or shelf-specific loss severities
    for the majority of the transactions within this review: 73%
    of the Alt-A and 36% of the Neg-am transactions had loss
    severities that were greater than the default loss severity
    for its respective cohort.

"In line with those factors, we revised our remaining loss
projections for all of the transactions in this review from our
previous projections. As a result of a majority of these
transactions having increased loss projections, 50% of the rating
actions in this review were downgrades and most of the remaining
actions were affirmations," S&P said.

"Despite the increase in remaining projected losses for a majority
of the transactions, we upgraded 25 classes from 14 Alt-A
transactions. Ten of these classes are the most senior tranches
outstanding in their transactions. Our decisions primarily
reflected the structural mechanics of these transactions, namely
situations where cumulative loss triggers embedded in the deals
have failed, causing principal to be distributed sequentially,
which helps prevent credit support erosion and increases the
likelihood that these tranches will receive their full share of
principal payments prior to the realization of our projected
losses," S&P said.

"We rated all of the upgraded classes in an investment-grade
category. The upgrades are primarily due to actual credit support
levels that are above our loss projections at the corresponding
stress scenarios," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on 263 classes from 62 transactions and
removed 42 of them from CreditWatch negative, 11 of them from
CreditWatch developing, and four of them from CreditWatch
positive. Of these, we rate 204 classes 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)'.
We believe that the projected credit support for these classes
will remain insufficient to cover the revised projected losses.
Conversely, the affirmations for classes with ratings above 'CCC'
reflect our opinion that the credit support for these classes will
remain sufficient to cover the revised projected losses," S&P
said.

"We lowered our ratings on 315 classes from 59 transactions. Of
the lowered ratings, we downgraded 242 classes out of investment-
grade, including 19 that we downgraded to 'CCC (sf)'. Another 172
ratings remain at investment-grade after being lowered. The
remaining downgraded classes already had speculative-grade ratings
prior to 's actions. We downgraded four classes to 'D (sf)' due to
observed principal write-downs," S&P said.

"Senior tranches accounted for the bulk of the lowered ratings
(287); the remaining downgrades affected mezzanine classes.
Contrary to the characteristics that distinguished the upgrades
and affirmations highlighted, these downgraded tranches generally
did not exhibit either a high priority in payment or a short
projected life," S&P said.

"The downgrades were primarily due to significantly greater
lifetime loss projections and, to a lesser degree, eroded credit
support caused by additional principal distributions to supporting
classes that were caused by extended liquidation curves. In
particular, nine Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust
transactions in this review have a life-long pro rata principal
pay structure that inherently deteriorates credit support over the
life of the transaction. Increases in lifetime loss projections
were primarily driven by increased loss severities and loans
classified as reperforming, which caused an increase in our
projected default rates on nondelinquent loans. Ratings that we
lowered but that remain at investment-grade were primarily driven
by our increased stress multiples applied to ratings 'A (sf)' and
above," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on class I-A-1 from Bear Stearns Alt-A
Trust 2004-7, class II-A-4 from Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2004-11,
and class A-2 from Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust
2005-AR1 due to interest shortfalls in accordance with our
interest shortfall criteria," S&P said.

"We also lowered the class I-A, II-A, and III-M-1 certificates
from American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-1 and class 6-A-
1 and 6-A-2-2 certificates from Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust
2005-10 due to 'tail risk'. The respective structures are backed
by small remaining populations of mortgage loans. We address tail
risk in transactions by conducting additional loan-level analysis
that stresses the loan concentration risk within the applicable
transactions," S&P said.

"We withdrew our ratings on 27 classes from 15 transactions in
accordance with our interest-only criteria because the referenced
classes no longer sustained ratings above 'A+ (sf)'," S&P said.

"In accordance with our counterparty criteria, we considered any
applicable hedges related to these securities when performing
these rating actions and resolving the CreditWatch placements,"
S&P said.

Subordination, overcollateralization (when available), and excess
interest as applicable generally provide credit support for these
Alt-A and Neg-am transactions. Some classes may also benefit from
bond insurance. In these cases, the long-term rating on the class
reflects the higher of the rating on the bond insurer and the
underlying credit rating on the security without the benefit of
such bond insurance.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

              http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 465 Classes From 79 RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 465
classes from 79 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions and removed 369 of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications, 61 from CreditWatch with developing
implications, and one of them from CreditWatch with positive
implications resulting from updated analysis on loss severity, as
well as S&P's assessment of the potential for tail risk associated
with the transaction. "We also raised our ratings on 29 classes:
we removed 11 from CreditWatch developing and four from
CreditWatch positive. We also affirmed our ratings on 276 classes
from 75 transactions and removed 18 of them from CreditWatch
negative, 25 from CreditWatch developing, and five from
CreditWatch positive. We withdrew our ratings on 27 classes from
17 transactions and removed 25 of them from CreditWatch negative.
We withdrew 23 ratings in accordance with our current interest-
only criteria and withdrew four ratings because they have been
paid in full," S&P said.

The complete list of rating actions is available for free at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_RMBS_RA_10_1_12.pdf

The transactions in this review were issued between 1993 and 2008
and are backed by adjustable- and fixed-rate prime jumbo mortgage
loans secured primarily by first liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

"On Aug. 15, 2012, we placed our ratings on 519 classes from 75 of
these transactions on CreditWatch negative, positive or
developing, along with ratings from a group of other RMBS
securities due to the implementation of our recently revised
criteria for surveilling pre-2009 U.S. RMBS ratings. CreditWatch
negative placements accounted for approximately 57% of the prime
jumbo CreditWatch actions, CreditWatch developing placements
accounted for approximately 36%, and CreditWatch positive
placements accounted for approximately 7%. We completed our review
on these transactions using the revised assumptions, and these
rating actions resolve some of the CreditWatch placements," S&P
said.

                            3 or fewer       More than 3
From       Affirmations      notches           notches
                            Up      Down     Up        Down
Watch Pos      5            2       1        2         0
Watch Neg      18           0       165      0         204
Watch Dev      25           8       57       3         4

"The high percentage of CreditWatch negative placements reflect
our projection that remaining losses for the pre-2005 vintage will
increase to 4.25% of the outstanding balance as of June 2012, up
31% from our previous projection of 3.25%. We also project that
remaining losses for the prime 2005 vintage will decrease to 8.25%
of the remaining outstanding balance, down from our previous
projection of 8.50%. We also project that remaining losses for
prime 2006 vintage will increase to 12.75% from 12.25%. Lastly, we
project that remaining losses for the prime 2007/2008 vintage will
decrease to 13.25% of the June 2012 outstanding balance from our
previous projection of 14.25%. We may have placed our ratings on
CreditWatch negative for certain structures that had reduced
forecasted losses due to an increased multiple of loss coverage
for certain investment-grade rated tranches as set forth in our
revised criteria," S&P said.


S&P increased its projected lifetime and remaining losses in 68 of
the 87 reviewed transactions. The increased projected losses
resulted from one or more of these factors:

- An increase in S&P's default and loss multiples at higher
   investment-grade rating levels;

- An increased portion of nondelinquent loans (generally between
   1% and 8%) are now categorized as reperforming (many of these
   loans have been modified) and have a default frequency of 25%
   or 30%; and

- S&P's extended liquidation curves, which eroded projected
   credit support prior to when it would be needed.

"As part of our analysis, we analyzed 12 CHL Mortgage Pass-Through
Trust transactions from the 2003-2007 vintages in this review. The
collateral backing these transactions consists mostly of hybrid
adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) loans having five- 10-year
interest-only (IO) periods and 30 year fixed-rate loans. On
average, these transactions' pool balances have been reduced to
approximately 26.05% of their original principal balances. The
'AAA (sf)' credit enhancement percentages (as of the August 2012
distribution date) range from 0% for series 2007-10, series 2007-
18, and series 2007-HY5 since these deals have some classes which
have taken principal write-downs, to 14.65% (series 2003-46).
Total delinquencies averaged 20.49% for the CHL deals we reviewed,
with series 2003-54 having the lowest percentage of delinquent
loans (11.64%) and series 2004-HY6 having the greatest (29.90%).
Cumulative losses to date for the 12 deals average 2.41% of the
respective original principal balances. Series 2003-46 has the
lowest percentage of cumulative losses (0.29%) and series 2007-HY5
has the greatest percentage of cumulative losses (8.31%). We used
the pre-2005 shelf-level loss severity of 45.16% for eight of the
CHL deals. We used post-2005 shelf-level loss severities of
53.05% for series 2005-13 and 51.99% for series 2007-18 and
structure level loss severities of 56.93% for series 2007-10 and
50.04% for series 2007-HY5," S&P said.

"By applying the revised criteria, we increased our projected
losses for 10 of the 12 deals, resulting in our lowering of 47
ratings: 26 of the lowered ratings were from the investment grade
category, six of which were lowered to speculative grade ratings,"
S&P said.

"We reviewed four JP Morgan Mortgage Trust transactions from 2004-
2006. The loans in these transactions consist of hybrid ARM loans
with some having five- or 10-year IO periods. On average, these
transactions have paid down to less than 36% of their original
pool balances. Total delinquencies range from 3.36% (series 2006-
A2) to 13.93% (series 2005-A8) and averaged 8.84%. Serious
delinquencies (90-plus days, loans in foreclosure, and REOs)
ranged from 2.56% (series 2006-A2) to 10.61% (series 2005-A8) and
averaged 6.93% of the current balances. In addition, cumulative
losses for these transactions ranged from 0.15% (series 2006-A2)
to 3.38 %( series 2005-A8) and averaged 1.25% of the original pool
balances. We lowered the ratings on 11 'AAA (sf)' classes: three
to 'AA+ (sf)' and eight to 'A+ (sf)'. These transactions have
experienced an average increase in projected remaining losses of
5.77% from the projections noted in our previous criteria. Due to
the limited amount of liquidations experienced by each individual
deal, we analyzed all but one transaction using vintage default
severities of 40.00% and 45.00%. For series 2005-A8, we used a
shelf level severity rate of 46.89%," S&P said.

"We reviewed our ratings on four RMBS transactions issued by
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust from 2002-2003
vintages. The collateral backing these transactions primarily
comprises 10- year interest-only (IO) loans. On average, these
transactions' pool balances have been reduced to approximately
8.80% of their original principal balances. As of the August 2012
distribution period, total delinquencies ranged from 12.96%
(series 2002-AR5) to 18.53% (series 2003-AR1) and averaged 16.57%
of the current balances. Serious delinquencies ranged from 2.69%
(series 2002-AR2) to 16.37% (series 2003-AR1) and averaged 10.6%
of the current balances. In addition, cumulative losses for these
transactions ranged from 0.61% (series 2003-AR1) to 1.07% (series
2002-AR5) and averaged 0.72% of the original pool balances. We
used the pre-2005 default loss severity of 40% for all four
transactions. By applying the revised criteria, we increased our
projected losses for all four transactions, resulting in our
lowering of 11 'AAA (sf)' ratings: we lowered four to 'AA+ (sf)
and seven to 'A+ (sf)'. Additionally we withdrew one 'AAA (sf)'
rating due to our current IO criteria," S&P said.

"We reviewed our ratings on five RMBS transactions issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust from 2004-2007 vintages. The collateral
backing these transactions consists mostly of hybrid ARM loans
having five- or 10-year interest-only (IO) periods. On average,
these transactions' pool balances have been reduced to
approximately 16.15% of their original principal balances. As of
the August 2012 distribution period, total delinquencies range
from 4.86% (series 2004-11) to 22.87% (series 2007-1) and averaged
14.81% of the current balances. Serious delinquencies ranged from
2.10% (series 2002-9) to 17.32% (series 2007-1) and averaged
10.93% of the current balances. In addition, cumulative losses for
these transactions ranged from 0.04% (series 2002-9) to 4.96%
(series 2007-1) and averaged 1.29% of the original pool balances.
We used the pre-2005 shelf-level loss severity of 45.37% for four
transactions. For series 2007-1 we used a shelf level loss
severity of 50.68%. By applying the revised criteria, we increased
our projected losses for all five transactions, resulting in our
lowering of 14 'AAA (sf)' ratings: we lowered seven to 'AA+ (sf)',
six to 'A+ (sf)' and one to 'B+ (sf)'. Additionally we withdrew
six 'AAA (sf)' ratings due to our current IO criteria," S&P said.

"We reviewed our ratings on eight structures from seven RMBS
transactions issued by Structured Asset Securities Corp. from
2003-2005 vintages. The collateral backing these transactions
consists mostly of 15- or 30-year fixed-rate loans. On average,
these transactions' pool balances have been reduced to
approximately 24.69% of their original principal balances. As of
the August 2012 distribution period, total delinquencies range
from 4.22% (series 2003-20) to 15.53% (series 2005-14 structure
14) and averaged 10.39% of the current balances. Serious
delinquencies ranged from 3.62% (series 2003-20) to 9.07% (series
2003-37A) and averaged 6.81% of the current balances. In addition,
cumulative losses for these transactions ranged from 0.15% (series
2003-20) to 1.92% (series 2005-14) and averaged 1.02% of the
original pool balances. Due to the limited amount of liquidations
experienced by each individual deal, we analyzed seven of these
structures using the vintage loss severity of 40%. For structure
14 from Structured Asset Securities Corp. series 2005-14, we used
an actual loss severity of 46.06%. By applying the revised
criteria, we increased our projected losses for all transactions
except for structure 14 from Structured Asset Securities Corp.
series 2005-14, resulting in our lowering of 30 'AAA (sf)'
ratings: we lowered 14 to 'AA+ (sf)', 11 to 'A+ (sf)', and five to
'BBB+ (sf)'," S&P said.

"We have reviewed our ratings on 10 RMBS transactions issued by
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Trust. The loans in these transactions
consist of 30-year fixed and hybrid ARM loans. Some of the hybrid
ARM loans contained five- or 10-year IO periods. The balances of
these transactions have been reduced to less than 52% of their
original principal balances. As of the August 2012 distribution
period, total delinquencies ranged from 4.42% (series 2003-AR6) to
28.88% (series 2007-HY3 grp 5) and averaged 14.71% of the current
pool balances. Serious delinquencies (90-plus days, loans in
foreclosure, and REOs) ranged from 2.97% (series 2004-S3) to
24.67% (series 2007-HY3 grp 5) and averaged 11.50% of the current
balances. In addition, cumulative losses for these transactions
ranged from 0.03% (series 2003-AR6) to 8.83%(series 2007-HY3 grp
5) and averaged 3.63% of the original pool balances.  We lowered
the ratings on 24 'AAA (sf)' classes: 13 to 'AA+ (sf)' and 11 to
'A+ (sf)'. Our ratings on class 1-A-2 from WaMu Mortgage Pass-
Through Trust series 2004-S2 and class 1-A-3 from and WaMu
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust series 2004-S3 will remain 'AAA (sf)'
because we expect the class to be paid in full within the next
year. These transactions have experienced an average decrease in
projected remaining losses of -1.29% from the projections noted in
our previous criteria. Due to the limited amount of liquidations
experienced by each individual deal, we analyzed all but four of
these transactions using a pre-2005 shelf level average severity
of 42.04%. For series 2007-HY1 (group 3) the 2006 shelf level
severity of 48.40% was used while we used the 2007 shelf level
severity of 50.28% for series 2007-HY3 (group 3). For series 2005-
AR10, 2006-AR18 (structure 4), 2007-HY1 (structures 6 and 7) &
2007-HY3 (structures 4 and 5), we used actual deal level severity
rates 42.40%, 49.13%, 51.75%, 45.07%, 47.10% and 53.18%," S&P
said.

"We reviewed our ratings on 15 structures from 13 RMBS
transactions issued by Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities
Trust. The loans in these transactions consist of 30-year fixed-
rate and hybrid ARM loans. Some of the hybrid ARM loans contained
five-, seven- or 10-year IO periods. The balances of these
transactions have been reduced to less than 40% of their original
principal balances. As of the August 2012 distribution period,
total delinquencies ranged from 1.89% (series 2004-F) to 14.82%
(series 2008-1) and averaged 7.65% of the current pool balances.
Serious delinquencies ranged from 1.03% (series 2004-F) to 10.90%
(series 2008-1) and averaged 5.94% of the current balances. In
addition, cumulative losses for these transactions ranged from
0.04% (series 2003-K) to 3.11% (series 2005-AR15) and averaged
1.18% of the original pool balances. We lowered the ratings on 45
'AAA (sf)' classes: 16 to 'AA+ (sf)', five to 'AA- (sf)', 21 to
'A+ (sf)' and three to 'BBB+ (sf)'. Our rating on class III-A-3
from Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-K Trust will
remain 'AAA (sf)' because we expect the class to be paid in full
within the next year. These transactions have experienced an
average increase in projected remaining losses of 13.24% from the
projections noted in our previous criteria. Due to the limited
amount of liquidations experienced by each individual deal, we
analyzed nine of these structures using a pre-2006 shelf level
average severity of 35.48%. We used the 2006 shelf level average
severity of 49.34% on one additional structure, and used the 2008
shelf level severity of 46.77% on two other structures. For series
2005-AR1 (structure 1), series 2005-AR15 and 2005-AR16, we used
actual deal level severity rates of 47.52%, 38.00% and 37.70%,"
S&P said.

"An additional 32 transactions from various issuers were also
analyzed as part of this review. These transactions include: two
from Banc of America Funding Trust, four from Bear Stearns, one
from Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, two from Citigroup Mortgage
Loan Trust, three from Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc., three
from CSFB, one from First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities
Trust, two from First Horizon Mortgage Pass Through Trust, two
from Fannie Mae, one from Fund America Investors Corp. II, one
from GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust, two from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust,
two from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, two from RFMSI,
one from Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, and three
from Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust," S&P said.

"In cases where a structure contained less than 100 loans or was
approaching 100 loans remaining, we also addressed tail risk by
conducting additional loan-level analysis that stresses the loan
concentration risk within the specific pool. We may calculate loss
severities at the loan level using assumptions, such as market-
value declines published in the 2009 RMBS Criteria, instead of
using pool-level assumptions. Because we developed our loss
severity assumptions using an aggregate sample set of data, we
applied a 1.2x adjustment factor to the loss severity assumption
for each loan when calculating loan level loss severities to
account for potential variation between actual and calculated loss
severities when a loan is liquidated. The loss severity used in
our analysis is equal to the higher of the calculated loss
severity and 20%. We use a 20% minimum loss severity to mitigate
potential information risk differences between the actual property
profile and condition and the reported estimated value using a
housing price index. Finally, we apply a 50% minimum loss severity
to the largest remaining loan balance if the calculated amount is
lower. The final rating assigned to each class will be the lower
of the rating derived by applying our revised surveillance
criteria and the rating derived by applying our tail risk
criteria," S&P said.

"Some of the transactions in this review have failed their current
delinquency triggers, which can impact the allocation of principal
to its classes. However, the payment priority of the deals that
failed these triggers may allow for additional allocation of
principal to the subordinate classes if they begin passing their
delinquency triggers again. In these instances, according to our
criteria, we lowered the ratings to 'AA+ (sf)' even though some of
these classes pass our 'AAA (sf)' stress scenario," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on 228 classes in the 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC
(sf)' categories. We believe that the projected credit support for
these classes will remain insufficient to cover the revised base-
case projected losses to these classes," S&P said.

"Of the 465 classes lowered, we downgraded 68 to speculative-grade
from investment-grade. Of the classes we downgraded to
speculative-grade from investment-grade, we lowered 53 ratings to
'BB+ (sf)', 'BB (sf)', 'BB- (sf)', B+ (sf)', 'B (sf)' or 'B- (sf)'
and lowered 15 to 'CCC (sf)'. Additionally, we lowered 293 ratings
that remain at investment-grade. The remaining 104 classes that we
downgraded already had speculative-grade ratings before we
downgraded them," S&P said.

"Lastly, we withdrew our ratings on 27 classes from 17
transactions: we withdrew 23 in accordance with our IO criteria
because the referenced classes no longer sustained ratings above
'A+ (sf)', and we withdrew four ratings because the classes have
been paid in full," S&P said.

"In accordance with our counterparty criteria, we considered any
applicable hedges related to these securities when performing
these rating actions and resolving the CreditWatch placements,"
S&P said.

Subordination generally provides credit support for these prime
jumbo transactions.

               STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 227 Classes From 67 U.S. RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 227
classes from 67 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions and removed 182 of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications and 41 of them from CreditWatch with
developing implications. "We also raised our ratings on two
classes from two transactions and removed one of them from
CreditWatch with positive implications and one of them from
CreditWatch with developing implications. We also affirmed our
ratings on 263 classes from 67 transactions and removed 69 of them
from CreditWatch negative, 11 of them from CreditWatch developing,
and two of them from CreditWatch positive," S&P said.

"The transactions in this review were issued between 2001 and 2004
and are primarily backed by adjustable- and fixed-rate subprime
mortgage loans secured by first liens on one- to four-family
residential properties. One transaction, Bear Stearns Asset-Backed
Securities Trust 2003-SD2, is backed by reperforming loans.
However, our methodology and assumptions for reviewing
transactions backed by reperforming loans is, for the most part,
the same as that for subprime transactions," S&P said.

On Aug. 15, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on 307 classes from all
of the transactions within this review on CreditWatch negative,
positive, or developing, along with ratings from a group of other
RMBS securities due to the implementation of the rating agency's
recently revised criteria for surveilling pre-2009 U.S. RMBS
ratings.  S&P completed its review of the transactions herein
using the revised assumptions and these rating actions resolve
some of the CreditWatch placements. The directional movements of
the CreditWatch resolutions within this review are as follows:

                              3 or fewer       More than 3
From         Affirmations      notches           notches
                             Up      Down      Up      Down
Watch Pos          2          1        0        0        0
Watch Neg         69          0       35        0      147
Watch Dev         11          1       41        0        0

"In line with the updated criteria, we revised our remaining loss
projections for all of the transactions in this review from our
previous projections. The remaining projected loss increases
ranged from a low of an 11% increase for Aames Mortgage Trust
2002-2 to a high of a 188% increase for Asset Backed Securities
Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-HE1. As a result of these
increases in remaining projected losses, there are a large number
of downgrades in this review," S&P said.

The increase in projected losses resulted from one or more of
these factors:

-- An increase in S&P's default and loss multiples at higher
    investment-grade rating levels.

-- A substantial portion of non-delinquent loans (generally
    between 15% and 30%) now categorized as reperforming (many of
    these loans have been modified) and having a default frequency
    of 45%.

-- Increased roll-rates for 30- and 60-day delinquent loans.

-- Application of a high prepayment/front end stress liquidation
    Scenario.

-- A continued elevated level of observed severities.

"Despite the increase in remaining projected losses, we upgraded
two classes from two transactions; the M-2 class from Aames
Mortgage Trust 2002-2 was raised to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' and
the M-3 class from Home Equity Asset Trust 2004-4 was raised to
'BB- (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)'. The upgrades are primarily due to the
additional credit enhancement provided by excess interest that is
caused by the lengthened liquidation timelines," S&P said.

"We are affirming 69 ratings at 'AAA (sf)' from 27 different
transactions. In general, these classes are currently receiving
principal and a large percentage (87%, on average) of their
original principal balance has been repaid. In addition, these
classes have high credit enhancement-to-loss multiples with an
average of 2.53 (not counting excess interest)," S&P said.

The affirmations at the 'AA (sf)' category (five classes from five
deals) generally reflect classes that have a first or second
payment priority.

"We affirmed eight ratings on eight deals at the 'BB'/'B'
categories. The anticipated losses are stable enough within these
transactions such that the projected credit support is sufficient
to maintain the ratings on these classes," S&P said.

"Lastly, we affirmed our ratings on 180 additional classes in the
'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' rating categories. We believe that the
projected credit support for these classes will remain
insufficient to cover the revised projected losses to the
collateral backing these classes," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on 227 classes from 67 transactions. Of
the lowered ratings, we downgraded 83 classes out of investment-
grade, including 13 that we downgraded to 'CCC (sf)'. Another 61
ratings remain at investment-grade after being lowered. The
remaining downgraded classes already had speculative-grade ratings
prior to being lowered," S&P said.

"Mezzanine and other subordinate tranches accounted for the bulk
of the lowered ratings (188); the remaining downgrades affected
senior classes. Contrary to the characteristics that distinguished
the upgrades and affirmations highlighted above, these downgraded
tranches did not necessarily exhibit either a high priority in
payment or short-projected average life," S&P said.

"In accordance with our counterparty criteria, we considered any
applicable hedges related to these securities when performing
these rating actions and resolving the CreditWatch placements,"
S&P said.

Subordination, overcollateralization (when available) and excess
interest generally provide credit support within these subprime
transactions.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Aames Mortgage Trust, Series 2002-2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        00253CHV2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        00253CHW0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        00253CHX8   A+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        00253CHY6   BB+ (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Aames Mortgage Trust, Series 2003-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M1         86359A6M0   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M2         86359A6N8   B+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Dev
M3         86359A6P3   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

ABFC 2003-OPT1 Trust, Series 2003-OPT1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        04542BDD1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1A       04542BDE9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        04542BDG4   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        04542BDH2   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        04542BDJ8   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        04542BDK5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-HE3
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        004421BE2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        004421BH5   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        004421BJ1   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-FM1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        004421BR3   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        004421DA8   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE3
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        004421HQ9   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        004421HR7   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        004421HS5   BB (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        004421HT3   B- (sf)              B (sf)/Watch Dev

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-IN1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        004421FD0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        004421FG3   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        004421FH1   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        004421FJ7   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-RM2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        004421JX2   BBB- (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        004421JY0   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-7
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          03072SHQ1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        03072SHR9   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        03072SHS7   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-13
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AV-1       03072SND3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-5       03072SMR3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-6       03072SMS1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        03072SNE1   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        03072SNF8   B- (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        03072SNG6   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       03072SPX7   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B       03072SPD1   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        03072SPG4   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        03072SPH2   B- (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        03072SPJ8   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        03072SPK5   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        03072SPL3   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-FR1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-5        03072SQN8   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-6        03072SQP3   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-7        03072SQQ1   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        03072SQR9   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        03072SQS7   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        03072SQT5   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        03072SQU2   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R3
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       03072SRA5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B       03072SPY5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        03072SQB4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        03072SQC2   BB+ (sf)             AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        03072SQD0   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R7
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        03072STB1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        03072STE5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-6        03072STT2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        03072STG0   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        03072STH8   BBB- (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        03072STJ4   B- (sf)              A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        03072STK1   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        03072STL9   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-6        03072STM7   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R10
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        03072SVL6   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        03072SVP7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-5        03072SVQ5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        03072SVR3   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        03072SVS1   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        03072SVT9   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        03072SVU6   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC3
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          86358RN60   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M1         86358RN94   B- (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC8
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         86359ACU5   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A3         86359ACW1   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M1         86359ACZ4   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M3         86359ADB6   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W8
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        040104DQ1   A- (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        040104DR9   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        040104DS7   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W5
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AV-2       040104HD6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AV-3B      040104HT1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-5       040104HK0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-6       040104HL8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        040104HM6   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        040104HN4   B- (sf)              BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        040104HP9   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        040104HQ7   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Asset Backed Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2004-HE7
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         04541GLY6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A2         04541GLZ3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A4         04541GMB5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M1         04541GMC3   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M2         04541GMD1   B- (sf)              A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M3         04541GME9   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M4         04541GMF6   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M5         04541GMG4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2003-HE6
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         04541GFX5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A2         04541GFY3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A3-B       04541GGM8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M1         04541GGB2   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M2         04541GGC0   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2004-HE1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M1         04541GHL9   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M2         04541GHM7   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M3         04541GHN5   B- (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Neg
M4         04541GHP0   B- (sf)              BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M5         04541GHQ8   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2003-HE2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M1         04541GDS8   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M2         04541GDT6   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M3         04541GDU3   BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)/Watch Neg
M4         04541GDV1   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2004-HE8
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M1         04541GMN9   BB- (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M2         04541GMP4   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD2,
Series 2003-SD2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        07384YLH7   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A       07384YLJ3   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
III-A      07384YLK0   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B-1        07384YLL8   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)/Watch Neg
B-2        07384YLM6   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-A, Series 2004-A
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AF-4       152314HY9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-5       152314HZ6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-6       152314JA9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        152314JD3   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        152314JE1   B- (sf)              A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        152314JF8   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        152314JG6   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        152314JH4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-B, Series 2004-B
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AF-5       152314JP6   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-6       152314JQ4   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        152314JV3   B+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        152314JW1   B- (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        152314JX9   CCC (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        152314JY7   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        152314JZ4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

CHEC Loan Trust 2004-1, Series 2004-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        162765AC5   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        162765AD3   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        162765AE1   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        162765AF8   B+ (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        162765AG6   B- (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        162765AH4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-OPT1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       17307GJE9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B       17307GJF6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        17307GJG4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        17307GJH2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        17307GJJ8   AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Dev
M-3        17307GJK5   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        17307GJL3   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        17307GJM1   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust, Series 2004 BC4
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      126673KT8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-2      126673KU5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-3      126673KX9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        126673KY7   B+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        126673KZ4   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        126673LA8   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

CWABS, Inc., Series 2003-3
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-5      126671C95   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-6      126671D29   BBB (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-2      126671D45   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A        126671D52   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        126671D60   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

CWABS, Inc., Series 2003-5
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AF-5       126671R24   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-6       126671R32   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
MF-1       126671R40   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
MF-2       126671R57   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

CWABS, Inc., Series 2004-4
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A        1266715E2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A          1266715J1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        1266715K8   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        1266715L6   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        1266715M4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

CWABS, Inc., Series 2004-5
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A        1266716B7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A        1266716C5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A        1266716D3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-3      1266716G6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-4      1266716H4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A          1266716J0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        1266716K7   BBB- (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        1266716L5   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        1266716M3   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        1266716N1   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

CWABS, Inc., Series 2004-6
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      126673AW2   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-2      126673AX0   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-3      126673BA9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-4      126673BB7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-5      126673BR2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        126673BC5   A+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        126673BD3   BBB- (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        126673BE1   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        126673BF8   B+ (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        126673BG6   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-6        126673BH4   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
M-7        126673BJ0   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF1, Series 2002-FF1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-2      32027NAP6   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-FF2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        32027NHH7   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        32027NHJ3   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev
M-3        32027NHK0   B+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        32027NHL8   B- (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust. Series 2004-FF7
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         32027NKV2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A5         32027NKZ3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M1         32027NLA7   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M2         32027NLB5   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M3         32027NLC3   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

GSAMP Trust, Series 2004-FM1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        36228FZK5   A- (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        36228FZL3   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        36228FZM1   B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B-1        36228FZN9   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

GSAMP Trust, Series 2004-FM2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        36228FN28   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        36228FN36   BB+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        36228FN44   B (sf)               B+ (sf)/Watch Dev
B-1        36228FN51   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Home Equity Asset Trust, Series 2004-4
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        437084CS3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        437084CZ7   A- (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        437084DA1   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        437084DB9   BB- (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Dev
M-4        437084DC7   B- (sf)              B (sf)/Watch Dev

Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        542514FD1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        542514FE9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        542514EU4   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        542514EV2   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        542514EW0   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        542514EX8   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        542514EY6   BB- (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-6        542514EZ3   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-7        542514FA7   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust, Series 2003-OPT1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        57643LAL0   AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Dev
M-3        57643LAM8   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust, Series 2004-OPT2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        57643LFG6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        57643LEV4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        57643LEW2   A- (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        57643LEX0   B+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        57643LEY8   B- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        57643LEZ5   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        57643LFA9   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-6        57643LFB7   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev
M-7        57643LFC5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series, Series 2004-WMC4
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        59020UDG7   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Pos
M-3        59020UDH5   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2004-WMC3
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        59020UCP8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Pos
M-3        59020UCQ6   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B-1        59020UCR4   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2004-WMC5
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        59020UMF9   AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Dev
M-2        59020UMG7   A+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        59020UMH5   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        59020UMJ1   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        59020UMK8   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-6        59020UML6   BB- (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B-1        59020UMM4   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
B-2        59020UMN2   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust, Series 2003-NC5
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        61746RBC4   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        61746RBD2   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust, Series 2004-HE4
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        61746RGK1   B- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust, Series 2004-HE5
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        61746RHE4   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        61746RHF1   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        61746RHG9   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        64352VFQ9   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        64352VFR7   B (sf)               B+ (sf)/Watch Dev
M-3        64352VFS5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        64352VFW6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        64352VFX4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        64352VFZ9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        64352VGA3   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        64352VGB1   BBB- (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        64352VGC9   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        64352VGD7   BB- (sf)             AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        64352VGE5   B- (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-6        64352VGF2   CCC (sf)             A- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-7        64352VGG0   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-8        64352VGH8   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-9        64352VGJ4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

New Century Home Equtiy Loan Trust, Series 2003-6
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        64352VFD8   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        64352VFE6   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2002-3
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FCF9   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        68389FCG7   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        68389FCZ5   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        68389FDA9   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        68389FDB7   B+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        68389FDC5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        68389FES9   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        68389FET7   B- (sf)              B (sf)/Watch Dev
M-3        68389FEU4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       68389FFB5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B       68389FFC3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        68389FFF6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        68389FFG4   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        68389FFH2   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        691215AE7   BB (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg

RASC Series 2001-KS2 Trust
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-II       76110WLR5   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

RASC Series 2001-KS3 Trust
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-I-5      76110WMB9   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
A-I-6      76110WMC7   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
A-II       76110WME3   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

RASC Series 2003-KS6 Trust
                       Rating               Rating
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-I        76110WSN7   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-II       76110WSP2   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

RASC Series 2004-KS5 Trust
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-I-4      76110WYC4   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-I-5      76110WYD2   B+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-I-6      76110WYE0   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-I-1      76110WYF7   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-II-1     76110WYM2   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev
M-I-2      76110WYG5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-2
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          759950AG3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        759950AH1   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2004-OP1
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        81375WAB2   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        81375WAC0   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        81375WAD8   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-5
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M2         86358EJF4   A+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M3         86358EJG2   BB- (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-21HE
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      881561NW0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-3      881561NY6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-S        881561NZ3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-1      881561NQ3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-M-1      881561PA6   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-9HE
                       Rating               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        881561JW5   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        881561JY1   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B-1        881561KC7   D (sf)               CC (sf)
N          881561KF0   D (sf)               CC (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Aames Mortgage Trust 2002-2
Series      2002-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        00253CHZ3   CCC (sf)
B          00253CJA6   CC (sf)

Aames Mortgage Trust 2003-1
Series      2003-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M4         86359A6Q1   CCC (sf)
M5         86359A6R9   CC (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-FM1
Series      2003-FM1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        004421BS1   CC (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE1
Series      2003-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        004421DB6   CC (sf)
M-3        004421DC4   CC (sf)
M-4        004421DD2   CC (sf)
M-5        004421DE0   CC (sf)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE3
Series      2004-HE3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        004421HU0   CCC (sf)
M-6        004421HV8   CC (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-IN1
Series      2004-IN1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        004421FK4   CCC (sf)
M-5        004421FL2   CCC (sf)
M-6        004421FM0   CCC (sf)
B          004421FN8   CC (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-RM2
Series      2004-RM2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        004421JZ7   CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2003-7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        03072SHT5   CCC (sf)
M-4        03072SHU2   CC (sf)
M-5        03072SHV0   CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2003-13
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        03072SNH4   CCC (sf)
M-5        03072SNJ0   CC (sf)
M-6        03072SNK7   CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-R2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        03072SPM1   CC (sf)
M-6        03072SPN9   CC (sf)
M-7        03072SPP4   CC (sf)
M-8        03072SPQ2   CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-FR1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        03072SQV0   CCC (sf)
M-6        03072SQW8   CC (sf)
M-7        03072SQX6   CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-R3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        03072SQE8   CCC (sf)
M-4        03072SQF5   CC (sf)
M-5        03072SQG3   CC (sf)
M-6        03072SQH1   CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-R7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-7        03072STN5   CCC (sf)
M-8        03072STP0   CC (sf)
M-9        03072STQ8   CC (sf)
M-10       03072STR6   CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-R10
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        03072SVV4   CCC (sf)
M-6        03072SVW2   CC (sf)
M-7        03072SVX0   CC (sf)
M-8        03072SVY8   CC (sf)

Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust
Series      2002-BC3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M2         86358RP27   CCC (sf)

Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust
Series      2002-BC8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M2         86359ADA8   CC (sf)

Argent Securities Inc.
Series      2003-W8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        040104DT5   CCC (sf)
M-5        040104DU2   CC (sf)

Argent Securities Inc.
Series      2004-W5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        040104HR5   CCC (sf)
M-6        040104HS3   CC (sf)
M-7        040104HV6   CC (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE7
Series      2004-HE7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M6         04541GMH2   CCC (sf)
M7         04541GMJ8   CCC (sf)
M8         04541GMK5   CC (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-
HE6
Series      2003-HE6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M3         04541GGD8   CCC (sf)
M4         04541GGE6   CCC (sf)
M5         04541GGF3   CC (sf)
M6         04541GGG1   CC (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2003-HE2
Series      2003-HE2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M5         04541GDW9   CCC (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-HE8
Series      2004-HE8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M3         04541GMQ2   CCC (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD2
Series      2003-SD2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-3        07384YLN4   CC (sf)
B-4        07384YMH6   CC (sf)
B-5        07384YMJ2   CC (sf)

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-A
Series      2004-A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B          152314JJ0   CC (sf)

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-B
Series      2004-B
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-6        152314KA7   CCC (sf)
M-7        152314KB5   CC (sf)

CHEC Loan Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-6        162765AJ0   CCC (sf)
M-7        162765AK7   CCC (sf)
M-8        162765AL5   CC (sf)
M-9        162765AM3   CC (sf)
B-1        162765AN1   CC (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-OPT1
Series      2004-OPT1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-6        17307GJN9   CCC (sf)
M-7        17307GJP4   CCC (sf)
M-8        17307GJQ2   CC (sf)
M-9        17307GJR0   CC (sf)
M-10       17307GJS8   CC (sf)
M-11       17307GJT6   CC (sf)
M-12       17307GJU3   CC (sf)

CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2004 BC4
Series      2004-BC4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        126673LB6   CCC (sf)
M-5        126673LC4   CC (sf)
M-6        126673LD2   CC (sf)
M-7        126673LE0   CC (sf)
M-8        126673LF7   CC (sf)
B          126673LG5   CC (sf)

CWABS, Inc.
Series      2003-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        126671D78   CCC (sf)
M-3        126671D86   CCC (sf)
M-4        126671D94   CC (sf)
M-5        126671E28   CC (sf)
M-6        126671E36   CC (sf)

CWABS, Inc.
Series      2003-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
MV-2       126671S72   CC (sf)
MF-3       126671R65   CCC (sf)
MV-3       126671S80   CC (sf)
MF-4       126671R73   CC (sf)
MV-4       126671S98   CC (sf)
MF-5       126671R81   CC (sf)
BF         126671R99   CC (sf)

CWABS, Inc.
Series      2004-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        1266715N2   CCC (sf)
M-5        1266715P7   CCC (sf)
M-6        1266715Q5   CC (sf)
M-7        1266715R3   CC (sf)
B          1266715S1   CC (sf)

CWABS, Inc.
Series      2004-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        1266716P6   CCC (sf)
M-6        1266716Q4   CCC (sf)
M-7        1266716R2   CC (sf)
B          1266716S0   CC (sf)

CWABS, Inc.
Series      2004-6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-8        126673BK7   CCC (sf)
B          126673BL5   CC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF1
Series      2002-FF1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        32027NAR2   CC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF2
Series      2004-FF2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        32027NHM6   CCC (sf)
M-6        32027NHN4   CC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF7
Series      2004-FF7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M4         32027NLD1   CCC (sf)
M5         32027NLE9   CCC (sf)
M6         32027NLF6   CC (sf)
M7         32027NLG4   CC (sf)
M8         32027NLH2   CC (sf)
M9         32027NLJ8   CC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2004-FM1
Series      2004-FM1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        36228FZP4   CCC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2004-FM2
Series      2004-FM2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-3        36228FN77   CCC (sf)
B-4        36228FN93   CC (sf)

Home Equity Asset Trust 2004-4
Series      2004-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        437084DD5   CCC (sf)
M-6        437084DE3   CC (sf)
B-1        437084DF0   CC (sf)

Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-8        542514FB5   CCC (sf)
M-9        542514FC3   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-OPT1
Series      2003-OPT1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        57643LAN6   CC (sf)
MV-5       57643LAP1   CC (sf)
MF-5       57643LAR7   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2
Series      2004-OPT2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-8        57643LFD3   CCC (sf)
M-9        57643LFE1   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2004-WMC5
Series      2004-WMC5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-3        59020UMP7   CCC (sf)
B-4        59020UMQ5   CC (sf)
B-5        59020UMR3   CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC5
Series      2003-NC5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        61746RBE0   CCC (sf)
B-1        61746RBF7   CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE4
Series      2004-HE4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        61746RGL9   CCC (sf)
M-3        61746RGM7   CCC (sf)
B-1        61746RGN5   CC (sf)
B-2        61746RGP0   CC (sf)
B-3        61746RGQ8   CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE5
Series      2004-HE5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-1        61746RHH7   CCC (sf)
B-2        61746RHJ3   CC (sf)
B-3        61746RHK0   CC (sf)

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        64352VFT3   CCC (sf)
M-5        64352VFU0   CC (sf)
M-6        64352VFV8   CC (sf)

New Century Home Equtiy Loan Trust 2003-6
Series      2003-6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        64352VFF3   CCC (sf)
M-4        64352VFG1   CC (sf)
M-5        64352VFH9   CC (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3
Series      2002-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        68389FCH5   CCC (sf)
M-2        68389FCJ1   CC (sf)
M-3        68389FCK8   CC (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        68389FEV2   CCC (sf)
M-5        68389FEW0   CC (sf)
M-6        68389FEX8   CC (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2
Series      2004-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        68389FFJ8   CCC (sf)
M-4        68389FFK5   CC (sf)
M-5        68389FFL3   CC (sf)
M-6        68389FFM1   CC (sf)

Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        691215AF4   CCC (sf)
B-1        691215AG2   CC (sf)
B-2        691215AH0   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2001-KS2 Trust
Series      2001-KS2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-I-5      76110WLL8   CCC (sf)
A-I-6      76110WLM6   CCC (sf)
M-I-1      76110WLN4   CC (sf)
M-II-1     76110WLS3   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2001-KS3 Trust
Series      2001-KS3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-I-1      76110WMF0   CC (sf)
M-II-1     76110WMJ2   CCC (sf)
M-II-2     76110WMK9   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2003-KS6 Trust
Series      2003-KS6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        76110WSQ0   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2004-KS5 Trust
Series      2004-KS5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-II-2     76110WYN0   CC (sf)
M-I-3      76110WYH3   CC (sf)

Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-2
Series      2002-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        759950AJ7   CC (sf)

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2004-OP1
Series      2004-OP1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-1        81375WAE6   CCC (sf)
B-2        81375WAF3   CC (sf)
B-3        81375WAG1   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-5
Series      2004-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M4         86358EJH0   CCC (sf)
M5         86358EJJ6   CCC (sf)
M6         86358EJK3   CC (sf)
M7         86358EJL1   CC (sf)
M8         86358EJM9   CC (sf)

Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-21HE
Series      2004-21HE
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-M-2      881561PB4   CCC (sf)

Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-9HE
Series      2004-9HE
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        881561JZ8   CCC (sf)
M-2        881561KA1   CC (sf)
M-3        881561KB9   CC (sf)


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 139 Classes From 46 US RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 139
classes from 46 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions and removed 99 of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications and 28 of them from CreditWatch with developing
implications. "We also raised our ratings on 28 classes from 20
transactions and removed 18 of them from CreditWatch with positive
implications and eight of them from CreditWatch with developing
implications. We also affirmed our ratings on 295 classes from 72
transactions and removed six of them from CreditWatch negative, 23
of them from CreditWatch developing, and 13 of them from
CreditWatch positive. We also withdrew our rating on a class and
removed it from CreditWatch positive because it was paid in full,"
S&P said.

"The transactions in this review were issued between 2003 and 2007
and are backed by a mixture of adjustable- and fixed-rate subprime
and 'scratch-and-dent' mortgage loans secured primarily by first
liens on one- to four-family residential properties," S&P said.

"On Aug. 15, 2012, we placed our ratings on 196 classes from 71 of
the transactions within this review on CreditWatch negative,
positive or developing, along with ratings from a group of other
RMBS securities due to the implementation of our recently revised
criteria for surveilling pre-2009 U.S. RMBS ratings. CreditWatch
negative accounted for approximately 57% of the actions,
CreditWatch developing accounted for approximately 36%, and
CreditWatch positive accounted for approximately 7%. We completed
our review of these transactions using the revised assumptions and
these rating actions resolve some of the CreditWatch placements,"
S&P said.

                              3 or fewer       More than 3
From Watch   Affirmations      notches           notches
                             Up      Down      Up     Down
Watch Pos         13          8        0       10        0
Watch Neg          6          0       34        0       65
Watch Dev         23          6       27        2        1

"The high percentage of CreditWatch negative placements reflect
our projection that remaining losses for the subprime pre-2005
vintage will increase to 29.75% of the outstanding balance as of
June 2012, up 51% from our previous projection of 19.75%. We also
project that remaining losses for the subprime 2005 vintage will
increase to 43% of the outstanding balance as of June 2012, up 36%
from our previous projection of 31.50%. Additionally, we project
that remaining losses for the subprime 2006 vintage will increase
to 52.50% of the remaining outstanding balance, up from our
previous projection of 44.75%. Lastly, we project that remaining
losses for the subprime 2007/2008 vintage will increase slightly
to 50.75% of the June 2012 outstanding balance from our previous
projection of 49.00%," S&P said.

The increase in projected losses resulted from one or more of
these factors:

    An increase in our default and loss multiples at higher
    investment-grade rating levels;

    A substantial portion of nondelinquent loans (generally
    between 25% and 50%) now categorized as reperforming (many of
    these loans have been modified) and having a default frequency
    of 45% or 50%;

    Increased roll-rates for 30- and 60-day delinquent loans;

    Application of a high prepayment/front end stress liquidation
    scenario; and

    "A continued elevated level of observed severities. In our
    ratings analysis for all of the transactions within this
    review, we used the severities observed from within each
    transaction, with 57% of them showing a higher severity than
    the default severity of 75% used for these subprime cohorts,"
    S&P said.

"In line with the factors, we revised our remaining loss
projections for all of the transactions in this review from our
previous projections. The remaining projected loss increases
ranged from a low of 0.83% for Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-4 to a
high of 146% for RAMP Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1," S&P
said.

"Despite the increase in remaining projected losses, we upgraded
28 classes from 20 transactions. In general, the upgrades reflect
two general trends we've seen in these types of transactions," S&P
said:

    The transactions have failed their cumulative loss trigger,
    resulting in the permanent sequential payment of principal to
    its classes, thereby locking out any principal payments to
    lower rated subordinate classes, which prevents credit support
    erosion; and

    Certain classes have a first priority in interest and
    principal payments driven by the occurrence of the first
    bullet.

"All of the upgrades affected classes from transactions issued in
2003 and 2005 through 2007 and were originally rated in an
investment-grade category. Nine of the upgraded classes from five
transactions have substantial current subordination and/or
overcollateralization credit support combined with either a first
or second priority in interest and principal payments. They have
been upgraded to 'AAA (sf)' or 'AA+ (sf)'. The remaining classes,
from 16 transactions, have sufficient credit support to absorb
expected remaining losses and have been upgraded to 'B- (sf)' or
higher," S&P said.

"For certain transactions, we took into consideration specific
performance characteristics that, in our view, may add a layer of
volatility to our loss assumptions when they are stressed at the
rating as suggested by our cash flow models. In these
circumstances, we either limited the extent of our upgrades
or affirmed our ratings on the classes of the transactions in
order to buffer against this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability. In general, the bonds that were affected reflect
these," S&P said:

    Historical interest shortfalls;
    Low priority in principal payments;
    Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline;
    High proportion of re-performing loans in the pool;
    Long-expected remaining life; and
    Weak hard-dollar credit support.

The five 'AAA (sf)' affirmations from two transactions affect
bonds that reflect these:

    Have more than sufficient credit support to absorb expected
    remaining losses; and
    Benefit from permanently failing cumulative loss triggers.

The six affirmations from six transactions in the 'AA (sf)' and 'A
(sf)' categories reflect these:

    Classes that are currently in first, second, or third payment
    priority; and
    Permanently failing cumulative loss triggers.

"In addition, we affirmed the ratings on 31 classes from 21
transactions in the 'BBB (sf)' through 'B (sf)' rating categories.
The projected credit support on these particular bonds remained
relatively in line with prior projections," S&P said.

"Lastly, we affirmed our ratings on 253 additional classes in the
'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' rating categories. We believe that the
projected credit support for these classes will remain
insufficient to cover the revised projected losses to these
classes," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on 139 classes from 46 transactions. Of
the lowered ratings, we downgraded ratings on 38 classes out of
investment-grade, including seven that we downgraded to 'CCC
(sf)'. Of the classes whose ratings we downgraded out of
investment-grade, seven classes from seven transactions were in
'AAA (sf)' or 'AA (sf)' rating categories prior to 's actions. For
a certain number of these downgrades from 'AAA (sf)' or 'AA (sf)'
to speculative-grade, the actions reflect significant increases to
our updated loss severities for the specific transactions. Another
39 ratings remain at investment-grade after the downgrade. The
remaining downgraded ratings were of classes that already had
speculative-grade ratings prior to being lowered," S&P said.

"Mezzanine tranches accounted for less than half of the lowered
ratings (59); the remaining downgrades affected senior classes.
Contrary to the characteristics that distinguished the upgrades
and affirmations highlighted above, all of these tranches whose
ratings were lowered did not exhibit either a high priority in
payment or a short-projected average life," S&P said.

"We withdrew our rating on a single class because it was paid in
full," S&P said.

"In accordance with our counterparty criteria, we considered any
applicable hedges related to these securities when performing
these rating actions and resolving the CreditWatch placements,"
S&P said.

Subordination, overcollateralization (when available), and excess
interest generally provide credit support for these subprime
transactions.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1
Series     2005-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       004375CN9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B       004375CP4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2C       004375CS8   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        004375CT6   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        004375CU3   B+ (sf)              A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        004375CV1   B- (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        004375CW9   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP1
Series     2006-OP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       00442PAA8   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B       00442PAB6   B+ (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2C       00442PAE0   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2D       00442PAF7   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE3
Series     2006-HE3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        07387UHQ7   BB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Dev
A-3        07387UHR5   BB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Dev

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE1
Series     2007-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-1A-1    07389UAN9   BBB+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-1
Series     2006-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          07384YUT1   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        07384YUU8   B (sf)               B (sf)/Watch Pos

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-3
Series     2006-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        07388GAB7   BBB+ (sf)            A- (sf)/Watch Dev
A-3        07388GAC5   BBB+ (sf)            A- (sf)/Watch Dev

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-SD1
Series     2006-SD1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          07384YVF0   A- (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M-1        07384YVG8   B- (sf)              CC (sf)

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
Series     2006-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A2         055682AB4   A+ (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Dev

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
Series     2006-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A3         055683AC0   BBB+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Pos

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2
Series     2007-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A2         05569QAB0   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
Series     2007-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A2         05568QAB1   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev
M2         05568QAG0   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1
Series     2006-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        144531FL9   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        144531FM7   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        144531FN5   B- (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        144531FP0   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-A
Series     2006-A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AV-3       15231AAC0   BB+ (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
AV-4       15231AAD8   BB+ (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        15231AAE6   B- (sf)              B (sf)/Watch Dev

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series     2005-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        17307GQQ4   AAA (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Dev
M-3        17307GQR2   B (sf)               B+ (sf)/Watch Dev

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-CB4
Series     2005-CB4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AF-3       12489WMB7   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-4       12489WMC5   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        12489WMD3   A+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        12489WME1   BB+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        12489WMF8   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev
M-4        12489WMG6   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT1
Series     2005-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        17307GNR5   AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Dev
M-2        17307GNS3   B- (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        17307GNT1   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        17307GNU8   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        17307GNV6   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2005-AB1
Series     2005-AB1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        126673XR8   B- (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        126673XS6   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        126673XT4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-1
Series     2005-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AF-4       126673WB4   BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-5A      126673WC2   B (sf)               A- (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-5B      126673XN7   B (sf)               A- (sf)/Watch Dev
AF-6       126673WD0   B (sf)               A- (sf)/Watch Neg
MF-1       126673WE8   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
MV-2       126673WY4   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
MV-3       126673WZ1   BBB- (sf)            AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
MV-4       126673XA5   BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
MV-5       126673XB3   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg
MV-6       126673XC1   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-BC2
Series     2005-BC2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        126673E99   AAA (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Pos
M-3        126673D66   AA+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Dev
M-4        126673D74   BBB+ (sf)            AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        126673F23   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-26
Series     2006-26
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-2      12668HAC4   BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-8
Series     2006-8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A        045427AS0   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-9
Series     2006-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-AF-2     12666RAB6   BB+ (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC1
Series     2006-BC1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A        126670XM5   B+ (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-2      126670XP8   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-3      126670XQ6   BB- (sf)             A- (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        126670XR4   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-A
Series     2003-A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        268668BS8   BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2        268668BU3   B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-A
Series     2005-A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          268668EK2   B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)/Watch Dev

FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4
Series     2005-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AV1        30246QBQ5   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AV2-4      30246QBU6   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        30246QBX0   D (sf)               CC (sf)
M-4        30246QBY8   D (sf)               CC (sf)
M-5        30246QBZ5   D (sf)               CC (sf)
M-6        30246QCA9   D (sf)               CC (sf)
M-7        30246QCB7   D (sf)               CC (sf)
M-8        30246QCC5   D (sf)               CC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF1
Series     2005-FF1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       32027NQE4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B       32027NQF1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2C       32027NQU8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        32027NQL8   BB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Dev

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF5
Series     2005-FF5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        32027NRT0   AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        32027NRU7   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        32027NRV5   BB+ (sf)             AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF2
Series     2006-FF2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A4         32027NA27   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-FF12
Series     2005-FF12
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        32027NXS5   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2B       32027NXU0   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2C       32027NXV8   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        32027NXW6   B- (sf)              B (sf)/Watch Dev

First NLC Trust 2005-1
Series     2005-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          32113JAA3   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M1         32113JAB1   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M2         32113JAC9   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev
M9         32113JAK1   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E
Series     2005-E
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      35729PMY3   B- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-3      35729PNB2   CCC (sf)             A- (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-4      35729PNC0   CCC (sf)             A- (sf)/Watch Neg
M1         35729PND8   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-1
Series     2006-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      35729PNX4   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A-3     35729PPA2   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev
II-A-4     35729PPB0   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-2
Series     2006-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1A1        3623415N5   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
1A2        3623415P0   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
2A2        3623415R6   BBB+ (sf)            A- (sf)/Watch Dev
2A3        3623415S4   B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
2A4        362334AA2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg
2A5        362334AB0   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

GSAMP Trust 2007-HSBC1
Series     2007-HSBC1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        362429AA0   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        362429AB8   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        362429AC6   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        362429AD4   B+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-4        362429AE2   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-4
Series     2006-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      437084VJ2   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev
2-A-3      437084VM5   BB+ (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos
2-A-4      437084VN3   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-NC1
Series     2006-NC1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        40430HEQ7   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A       40430HER5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-HE1
Series     2006-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        46626LGE4   BB+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1
Series     2007-CH1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AF-2       46630LAC8   BBB+ (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Pos
AF-3       46630LAD6   B- (sf)              CCC (sf)
AV-1       46630LAS3   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AV-3       46630LAU8   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AV-4       46630LAV6   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AV-5       46630LAW4   AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Dev
MV-1       46630LAX2   BBB+ (sf)            BBB+ (sf)/Watch Dev
MV-2       46630LAY0   BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos
MV-3       46630LAZ7   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Pos
MV-4       46630LBA1   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Pos

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3
Series     2007-CH3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        46630XAC2   A+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH4
Series     2007-CH4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        46630CAB0   BB+ (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Dev
M-7        46630CAM6   D (sf)               CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Aquisiton Trust 2007-CH5
Series     2007-CH5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        46631KAB1   AA+ (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Pos

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM1
Series     2006-AM1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        57643LQB5   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        57643LQC3   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        57643LQF6   D (sf)               CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE1
Series     2006-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        57643LQT6   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        57643LQU3   B+ (sf)              BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-HE2
Series     2007-HE2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        57646LAA1   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Pos

Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-5
Series     2007-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A1       59025RAT4   NR                   A (sf)/Watch Pos

Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-H1
Series     2007-H1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A1       59025TAA1   B+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Dev
2-A1       59025TAD5   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
Series     2005-HE2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1A       59020UR72   AAA (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1B       59020UR80   AA+ (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2C       59020US30   AA+ (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-HE1
Series     2005-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        59020UUW3   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
B-2        59020UVA0   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE1
Series     2005-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        65536HBC1   AAA (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Dev
M-2        65536HBD9   AA+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Pos
M-3        65536HBE7   A+ (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Dev
M-4        65536HBF4   BB+ (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Dev
M-5        65536HBG2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-FM1
Series     2006-FM1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        65536HBT4   BB+ (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Dev
II-A-3     65536HBW7   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev
II-A-4     65536HBX5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-HE1
Series     2006-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        65536HCQ9   A+ (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Dev
A-4        65536HCR7   A- (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M-1        65536HCS5   B- (sf)              B (sf)/Watch Dev

NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2007-1
Series     2007-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2A1      669971AB9   B+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev
A-2A2      669971AS2   B+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev

Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-2
Series     2005-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-3        691215AZ0   AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Dev
M-4        691215BA4   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-5        691215BB2   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg

Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-2
Series     2006-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        69121PDC4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev
A-2B       69121PDE0   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev
A-2C       69121PDF7   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-E
Series     2006-E
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        73316TAB8   B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        73316TAC6   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        73316TAD4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RAAC Series 2007-SP2 Trust
Series     2007-SP2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        74919XAD4   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev

RAMP Series 2006-EFC2 Trust
Series     2006-EFC2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        749238AC5   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev
A-4        749238AD3   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

RASC Series 2005-AHL3 Trust
Series     2005-AHL3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        76110W6L5   BB+ (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        76110W6M3   BB (sf)              B (sf)/Watch Pos

RASC Series 2006-EMX2 Trust
Series     2006-EMX2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        75406AAB5   BB+ (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        75406AAC3   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Pos

RASC Series 2006-KS2 Trust
Series     2006-KS2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        75406BAC1   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        75406BAD9   BBB (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        75406BAE7   BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust
Series     2006-KS3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-I-3      76113ABH3   BBB+ (sf)            BBB+ (sf)/Watch Dev
A-I-4      76113ABJ9   BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Dev
A-II       76113ABK6   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        76113ABL4   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

RASC Series 2006-KS4 Trust
Series     2006-KS4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        75406EAC5   BB+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        75406EAD3   BB (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        75406EAE1   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2
Series     2005-OP2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        81375WHA7   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2C       81375WGT7   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        81375WGU4   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        81375WGV2   B- (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-2
Series     2006-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        83611MNE4   BBB+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Dev
A-4        83611MNF1   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Dev
M-1        83611MNH7   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-EQ1
Series     2006-EQ1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        83612JAB0   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT3
Series     2006-OPT3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      83611MPE2   BBB (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A-3     83611MPH5   B+ (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A-4     83611MPJ1   B+ (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-
OPT1
Series     2006-OPT1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         86359UAA7   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A4         86359UAD1   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A5         86359UAE9   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A6         86359UAF6   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series 2006-HE1
Trust
Series     2006-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        92925CEP3   BB+ (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Pos
II-A-3     92925CES7   BB+ (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Pos
II-A-4     92925CET5   B- (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Dev

Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset Backed Securities 2006-1 Trust
Series     2006-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        9497EUAC1   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        9497EUAD9   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        9497EUAH0   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        9497EUAJ6   B- (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        9497EUAK3   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Dev

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1
Series     2005-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        004375CX7   CCC (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP1
Series     2006-OP1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        00442PAG5   CCC (sf)
M-2        00442PAH3   CC (sf)
M-3        00442PAJ9   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE3
Series     2006-HE3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        07387UHS3   CCC (sf)
M-2        07387UHT1   CCC (sf)
M-3        07387UHU8   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE1
Series     2007-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
II-1A-2    07389UAP4   CCC (sf)
II-1A-3    07389UAQ2   CCC (sf)
II-2A      07389UAR0   CCC (sf)
II-3A      07389UAS8   CCC (sf)
II-M-1     07389UAT6   CCC (sf)
II-M-2     07389UAU3   CC (sf)
II-M-3     07389UAV1   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-1
Series     2006-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        07384YUV6   CCC (sf)
M-3        07384YUW4   CC (sf)
M-4        07384YUX2   CC (sf)
M-5        07384YUY0   CC (sf)
M-6        07384YUZ7   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-3
Series     2006-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        07388GAD3   CCC (sf)
M-2        07388GAE1   CC (sf)
M-3        07388GAF8   CC (sf)
M-4        07388GAG6   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-SD1
Series     2006-SD1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        07384YVH6   CC (sf)
M-3        07384YVJ2   CC (sf)
M-4        07384YVK9   CC (sf)

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
Series     2006-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         055682AA6   CCC (sf)
A3         055682AC2   CCC (sf)
A4         055682AD0   CCC (sf)

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
Series     2006-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         055683AA4   CCC (sf)
A4         055683AD8   CCC (sf)
A5         055683AE6   CCC (sf)

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2
Series     2007-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         05569QAA2   CCC (sf)
A3         05569QAC8   CCC (sf)
A4         05569QAD6   CCC (sf)
A5         05569QAE4   CCC (sf)
M1         05569QAF1   CC (sf)

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
Series     2007-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         05568QAA3   CCC (sf)
A3         05568QAC9   CCC (sf)
A4         05568QAD7   CCC (sf)
A5         05568QAE5   CCC (sf)
M1         05568QAF2   CC (sf)

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1
Series     2006-OPT1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        144531FQ8   CCC (sf)
M-4        144531FR6   CCC (sf)
M-5        144531FS4   CC (sf)

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-A
Series     2006-A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        15231AAF3   CCC (sf)
M-3        15231AAG1   CCC (sf)
M-4        15231AAH9   CC (sf)
M-5        15231AAJ5   CC (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series     2005-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        17307GQS0   CC (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-CB4
Series     2005-CB4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        12489WMH4   CCC (sf)
M-6        12489WMJ0   CC (sf)
B-1        12489WMK7   CC (sf)
B-2        12489WML5   CC (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT1
Series     2005-OPT1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-6        17307GNW4   CCC (sf)
M-7        17307GNX2   CC (sf)
M-8        17307GNY0   CC (sf)

CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2005-AB1
Series     2005-AB1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        126673XU1   CC (sf)
M-4        126673XV9   CC (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-1
Series     2005-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
MF-2       126673WF5   CCC (sf)
MF-3       126673WG3   CCC (sf)
MF-4       126673WH1   CC (sf)
MF-5       126673WJ7   CC (sf)
MF-6       126673WK4   CC (sf)
MF-7       126673WL2   CC (sf)
MF-8       126673WM0   CC (sf)
MV-7       126673XD9   CCC (sf)
MV-8       126673XE7   CC (sf)
BV         126673XM9   CC (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-BC2
Series     2005-BC2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-6        126673F31   CCC (sf)
M-7        126673F49   CC (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-26
Series     2006-26
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        12668HAA8   CCC (sf)
2-A-3      12668HAD2   CCC (sf)
2-A-4      12668HAE0   CCC (sf)
M-1        12668HAF7   CCC (sf)
M-2        12668HAG5   CC (sf)
M-3        12668HAH3   CC (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-8
Series     2006-8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-A-3      045427AC5   CCC (sf)
2-A-4      045427AD3   CCC (sf)
M-1        045427AE1   CCC (sf)
M-2        045427AF8   CC (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-9
Series     2006-9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-AF-3     12666RAC4   CC (sf)
1-AF-4     12666RAD2   CC (sf)
1-AF-5     12666RAE0   CC (sf)
1-AF-6     12666RAF7   CC (sf)
MF-1       12666RAG5   CC (sf)
2AV        12666RAR1   CCC (sf)
3AV-3      12666RAU4   CC (sf)
3AV-4      12666RAV2   CC (sf)
MV-1       12666RAW0   CC (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC1
Series     2006-BC1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        126670XS2   CCC (sf)
M-3        126670XT0   CCC (sf)

EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-A
Series     2003-A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        268668BW9   CC (sf)
M-2        268668BY5   CC (sf)
B          268668CA6   CC (sf)

EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-A
Series     2005-A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        268668EM8   CC (sf)
M-2        268668EP1   CC (sf)

FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4
Series     2005-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        30246QBV4   CCC (sf)
M-2        30246QBW2   CC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF1
Series     2005-FF1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        32027NQM6   CCC (sf)
M-3        32027NQN4   CC (sf)
B-1        32027NQP9   CC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF5
Series     2005-FF5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        32027NRW3   CCC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF2
Series     2006-FF2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         32027NZX2   CCC (sf)
A5         32027NA35   CCC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-FF12
Series     2005-FF12
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        32027NXX4   CCC (sf)
M-3        32027NXY2   CC (sf)
M-4        32027NXZ9   CC (sf)

First NLC Trust 2005-1
Series     2005-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M3         32113JAD7   CCC (sf)
M4         32113JAE5   CCC (sf)
M5         32113JAF2   CCC (sf)
M6         32113JAG0   CCC (sf)
M7         32113JAH8   CCC (sf)
M8         32113JAJ4   CC (sf)

Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E
Series     2005-E
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M2         35729PNE6   CC (sf)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-2
Series     2006-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        3623415T2   CC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2007-HSBC1
Series     2007-HSBC1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-5        362429AF9   CCC (sf)
M-6        362429AG7   CCC (sf)
M-7        362429AH5   CCC (sf)

Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-4
Series     2006-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        437084VR4   CC (sf)

HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-NC1
Series     2006-NC1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        40430HES3   CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-HE1
Series     2006-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        46626LGT1   CCC (sf)
A-4        46626LGF1   CCC (sf)
M-1        46626LGG9   CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1
Series     2007-CH1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
AF-4       46630LAE4   CCC (sf)
AF-5       46630LAF1   CCC (sf)
AF-6       46630LAG9   CCC (sf)
MV-5       46630LBB9   CCC (sf)
MV-6       46630LBC7   CCC (sf)
MV-7       46630LBD5   CCC (sf)
MV-8       46630LBE3   CCC (sf)
MV-9       46630LBF0   CC (sf)
MV-10      46630LBG8   CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3
Series     2007-CH3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1A       46630XAA6   CCC (sf)
A-1B       46630XAB4   CCC (sf)
A-3        46630XAD0   CCC (sf)
A-4        46630XAE8   CCC (sf)
A-5        46630XAF5   CCC (sf)
M-1        46630XAG3   CCC (sf)
M-2        46630XAH1   CCC (sf)
M-3        46630XAJ7   CC (sf)
M-4        46630XAK4   CC (sf)
M-5        46630XAL2   CC (sf)
M-6        46630XAM0   CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH4
Series     2007-CH4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        46630CAA2   CCC (sf)
A-3        46630CAC8   CCC (sf)
A-4        46630CAD6   CCC (sf)
A-5        46630CAE4   CCC (sf)
M-1        46630CAF1   CCC (sf)
M-2        46630CAG9   CCC (sf)
M-3        46630CAH7   CCC (sf)
M-4        46630CAJ3   CC (sf)
M-5        46630CAK0   CC (sf)
M-6        46630CAL8   CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Aquisiton Trust 2007-CH5
Series     2007-CH5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        46631KAA3   CCC (sf)
A-3        46631KAC9   CCC (sf)
A-4        46631KAD7   CCC (sf)
A-5        46631KAE5   CCC (sf)
M-1        46631KAF2   CCC (sf)
M-2        46631KAG0   CCC (sf)
M-3        46631KAH8   CCC (sf)
M-4        46631KAJ4   CC (sf)
M-5        46631KAK1   CC (sf)
M-6        46631KAL9   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM1
Series     2006-AM1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        57643LQD1   CCC (sf)
M-2        57643LQE9   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE1
Series     2006-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        57643LQV1   CCC (sf)
M-2        57643LQW9   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-HE2
Series     2007-HE2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        57646LAN3   CCC (sf)
A-3        57646LAB9   CCC (sf)
A-4        57646LAC7   CCC (sf)
M-1        57646LAD5   CCC (sf)
M-2        57646LAE3   CC (sf)
M-3        57646LAF0   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-4
Series     2007-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        59025CAA8   CCC (sf)
2-A2       59025CAC4   CCC (sf)
2-A3       59025CAD2   CCC (sf)
2-A4       59025CAE0   CCC (sf)

Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-5
Series     2007-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        59025RAW7   CCC (sf)
2-A2       59025RAU1   CCC (sf)
2-A3       59025RAV9   CCC (sf)
M-1        59025RAG2   CCC (sf)
M-2        59025RAX5   CC (sf)
M-3        59025RAH0   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-H1
Series     2007-H1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A2       59025TAB9   CCC (sf)
1-A3       59025TAC7   CC (sf)
2-A2       59025TAE3   CCC (sf)
2-A3A      59025TAF0   CC (sf)
2-A3B      59025TAW3   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
Series     2005-HE2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        59020US48   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-HE1
Series     2005-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        59020UUY9   CC (sf)
B-1        59020UUZ6   CC (sf)
M-2        59020UUX1   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-MLN1
Series     2006-MLN1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        59023AAA4   CCC (sf)
A-2B       59023AAC0   CCC (sf)
A-2C       59023AAD8   CCC (sf)
A-2D       59023AAE6   CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1
Series     2007-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        61751QAB1   CCC (sf)
A-3        61751QAC9   CCC (sf)
A-4        61751QAD7   CCC (sf)

Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE1
Series     2005-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-6        65536HBH0   CC (sf)

Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-FM1
Series     2006-FM1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        65536HBY3   CC (sf)

Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-HE1
Series     2006-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        65536HCT3   CC (sf)

NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2007-1
Series     2007-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1A       669971AA1   CCC (sf)
A-2B       669971AC7   CCC (sf)
A-2C       669971AD5   CCC (sf)
A-2D       669971AE3   CCC (sf)

Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-2
Series     2005-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-6        691215BC0   CC (sf)

Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-2
Series     2006-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        69121PDG5   CC (sf)

RAAC Series 2007-SP2 Trust
Series     2007-SP2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        74919XAE2   CCC (sf)
A-3        74919XAF9   CCC (sf)
M-1        74919XAG7   CC (sf)

RAMP Series 2006-EFC2 Trust
Series     2006-EFC2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1S       749238AE1   CCC (sf)
M-2S       749238AF8   CC (sf)
M-3S       749238AG6   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2005-AHL3 Trust
Series     2005-AHL3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        76110W6N1   CCC (sf)
M-2        76110W6P6   CC (sf)
M-3        76110W6Q4   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2006-EMX2 Trust
Series     2006-EMX2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        75406AAD1   CCC (sf)
M-2        75406AAE9   CC (sf)
M-3        75406AAF6   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2006-KS2 Trust
Series     2006-KS2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        75406BAF4   CCC (sf)
M-3        75406BAG2   CCC (sf)
M-4        75406BAH0   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust
Series     2006-KS3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        76113ABM2   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2006-KS4 Trust
Series     2006-KS4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        75406EAF8   CCC (sf)
M-3        75406EAG6   CC (sf)

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2
Series     2005-OP2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        81375WGW0   CCC (sf)
M-4        81375WHC3   CCC (sf)
M-5        81375WHD1   CCC (sf)
M-6        81375WHE9   CC (sf)
B-1        81375WGX8   CC (sf)

Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-2
Series     2006-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-2        83611MNJ3   CCC (sf)
M-3        83611MNK0   CC (sf)
M-4        83611MNL8   CC (sf)
M-5        83611MNM6   CC (sf)

Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-EQ1
Series     2006-EQ1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-3        83612JAC8   CCC (sf)
A-4        83612JAD6   CCC (sf)
M-1        83612JAE4   CC (sf)

Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT3
Series     2006-OPT3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        83611MPK8   CC (sf)
M-2        83611MPL6   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-
AM1
Series     2006-AM1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         86359XAA1   CCC (sf)
A4         86359XAD5   CCC (sf)
A5         86359XAE3   CCC (sf)
M1         86359XAF0   CC (sf)
M2         86359XAG8   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-
OPT1
Series     2006-OPT1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M1         86359UAG4   CCC (sf)
M2         86359UAH2   CC (sf)

Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series 2006-HE1
Trust
Series     2006-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        92925CEU2   CC (sf)
M-2        92925CEV0   CC (sf)

Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset Backed Securities 2006-1 Trust
Series     2006-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        9497EUAL1   CCC (sf)
M-5        9497EUAM9   CC (sf)
M-6        9497EUAN7   CC (sf)



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Carmel
Paderog, Meriam Fernandez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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