TCR_Public/120826.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, August 26, 2012, Vol. 16, No. 237

                            Headlines

ACA CLO 2006-1: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
ACCREDITED MORTGAGE: Moody's Lifts Rating on One Tranche to Caa1
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-BMB1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on L Certs.
BLACKROCK SENIOR: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
BNC MORTGAGE 2007-3: Moody's Lifts Rating on One Tranche to 'B1'

C-BASS 2003-RP1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M-1 Tranche to 'Caa2'
CALIFORNIA COUNTY TSA: MSA Payment Cues Fitch to Revise Ratings
CAPMARK VII: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Securities to 'C'
CARLYLE HIGH YIELD VIII: S&P Raises Rating on Class D From 'B+'
CARLYLE HIGH YIELD X: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'

CARRINGTON HOME: Moody's Upgrades Rating on One Tranche to 'Ca'
CITICORP RESIDENTIAL 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on A-4 Sec. to B2
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. K Certs.
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Tranches to Caa3
CORTS TRUST I: Moody's Lifts Rating on US$2.09MM Certs. From 'Ba1'

CORTS TRUST II: Moody's Lifts Rating on US$3.49MM From 'Ba1'
CORTS TRUST III: Moody's Lifts Rating on US$1MM Certs. From 'Ba1'
COMM 2007-C9: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Certs. to 'B3'
COMM 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Cl. F Certificates
COMM 2012-CCRE2: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on $23.12MM G Certs.

COMMERCIAL CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Rating on Seven Cert. Classes
CREST 2001-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on Class C Notes
CSFB HOME 2007-1: Moody's Raises Rating on 2-A-2 Tranche to 'Caa3'
CWABS 2005-10: Moody's Cuts Rating on One Tranche to 'Caa2'
CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches to 'C'

DEUTSCHE ALT-A: Moody's Lifts Cl. VII-A-2 Tranche Rating to 'Ca'
DEUTSCHE BANK 2011-LC3: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 17 Cert. Classes
EL MONTE: Fitch Keeps 'BB+' Rating on $19.1-Mil. Revenue Bonds
FIRST HORIZON: Moody's Cuts Ratings on One RMBS Tranche to 'Caa3'
FM LEVERAGED II: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'

GE CAPITAL 2001-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. G Cert. to 'Ba1'
GMACM MORTGAGE 2003-GH1: Moody's Confirms Caa1 Rating on B Tranche
GMAC-RFC: Moody's Corrects July 17 Rating Release
GS MORTGAGE 2007-GG10: Fitch Cuts Rating on Eight Cert. Classes
GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: Moody's Keeps 'B2' Rating on Class F Certs.

GSAA HOME 2005-6: Moody's Lifts Rating on M-1 Secs. to 'Caa3'
HALCYON LOAN 2012-1: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'Ca'
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP5: Fitch Junks Rating on 5 Cert. Classes
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC14: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. D Certs. to 'C'

JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC15: Moody's Cuts 'C' Rating on Class C Certs.
JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Loan Concerns Cue Fitch to Put Ratings on Watch
JP MORGAN 2010-C2: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on $2.8MM Cl. H Certs
JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on $16.7MM Certs.
JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on Class G Certs.

JP MORGAN 2012-FL2: Fitch Issues Presale Report on Secs. Trust
LEHMAN BROTHERS 2006-C3: Moody's Cuts Rating on H Certs. to 'C'
LEHMAN MORTGAGE 2006-6: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Tranches to Caa2
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Rating on Class F Certs. at 'C'
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Cert. Classes to 'C'

MERRILL LYNCH 2006-FF1: Moody's Lifts Rating on M-1 Secs. to 'B3'
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-XLF: Moody's Keeps 'Caa2' Rating on X-1 Certs
NEWCASTLE CDO V: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class V Notes
NEW CENTURY: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Tranches to 'Ca'
NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Rating on One Tranche to 'Caa2'

NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Upgrades Rating on One Tranche to 'Ca'
POPULAR ABS: Moody's Upgrades Rating on One Tranche to 'Caa2'
PUTNAM CDO 2002-1: S&P Keeps 'B+' Class A-2 Note Rating on Watch
RFC CDO 2006-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-2 Secs. to 'Ba1'
SANDELMAN REALTY: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 7 Note Classes

SLM STUDENT 2005-7: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Sub. Student Loan
SLM STUDENT 2008-1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Student Loan
SLM STUDENT 2008-2: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Student Loan
VALEO INVESTMENT: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'B1'
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes to 'C'

WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: Fitch Lowers Rating on 6 Cert. Classes
WAMU 2005-AR11: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
WELLS FARGO: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 Tranches to 'C'
ZOO HF 3: S&P Withdraws 'CC' Ratings on 2 Note Classes

* Fitch Downgrades Rating on 306 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf'
* Moody's Says VRDO Market Shrinks Due to Low Fixed Rates
* Moody's Says US CMBS Loss Severity Stable in Second Quarter
* Moody's Says New OTC Rules to Boost Eligible Collateral Demand
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $168-Mil. Option ARM RMBS

* Moody's Takes Action on $972MM RMBS Issued by SASCO
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 95 Interest-Only Bonds
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $575 Million Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $84-Mil. Scratch & Dent RMBS
* Moody's Outlines Single- Family Rental Securitizations Risks

* S&P Places Ratings on 26 Tranches From 15 CDOs on Watch Positive
* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 34 Tranches From 11 CDOs
* S&P Puts Ratings on 36 Tranches From 8 US CLO Deals on Watch


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ACA CLO 2006-1: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
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Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by ACA CLO 2006-1, Ltd.:

U.S. $21,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
July 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 15, 2011
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

U.S. $22,750,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due July
2018, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf);

U.S. $11,375,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due July
2018, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); and

U.S. $11,375,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due July
2018, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded
to B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the end of the deal's reinvestment period in July 2012. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, higher spread and higher
Diversity compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action
in August 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2666, WAS of 3.32%, and
Diversity of 82 compared to 2787, 2.93% and 70, respectively, at
the time of the last rating action. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported overcollateralization ratio are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $330 million,
defaulted par of $5.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.05% (implying a WARF of 2666), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.78%, and a diversity
score of 82. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

ACA CLO 2006-1, Ltd. issued in July 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2132)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +3
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3199)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: -1
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities, which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


ACCREDITED MORTGAGE: Moody's Lifts Rating on One Tranche to Caa1
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Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 2
tranches, upgraded the ratings on 4 tranches and confirmed the
ratings on 8 tranches from five subprime RMBS transactions issued
by Accredited. The collateral backing these transactions are
subprime residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-1

  Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
  Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
  Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-2

  Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
  Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. M-4, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-3

  Cl. A-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A1
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. M-3, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
  Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades/downgrades in the rating
action are a result of improving/deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in lower/higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions .

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294739

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-BMB1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on L Certs.
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Moody's Investors Service affirmed 16 classes of Banc of America
Large Loan, Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-BMB1.

Issuer: Banc of America Large Loan Trust 2007-BMB1

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. FMH-1, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. FMH-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.4. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 that uses the following
inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the published
methodology: original and current bond ratings and credit
assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up for
losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
presale report dated November 17, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 51% to $840 million
from $1.73 billion at securitization due to the payoff of eight
loans and principal pay downs associated with four loans. The
Certificates are collateralized by six floating-rate loans ranging
in size from 4% to 36% of the pooled trust mortgage balance.

The pool has experienced $10.9 million in losses due to the
liquidation of the Readers Digest loan in February 2012. Interest
shortfalls total $161,034. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Currently, three loans (22.3% of pooled balance) are in special
servicing. Specially serviced loans include the MSREF Hotel
Portfolio loan ($81.75 million, 10%); the Larkspur Portfolio loan
($75 million, 9%); and the Simply Self Storage loan ($30.4
million, 4%).

Moody's weighed average pooled loan to value (LTV) ratio is 78%
compared to 84% at last review and 68% at securitization. Moody's
pooled stressed DSCR is 1.41X, compared to 1.34X at last review
and 1.50X at securitization.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. Large
loan transactions generally have a Herf of less than 20. The pool
has a Herf of 4, compared to 6 at last review.

The three largest exposures represent 78% of the pooled balance.
The largest pooled exposure is the Stamford Office Portfolio loan
($301.5 million; 36% of the pooled balance) which is secured by
seven office properties totaling 1.7 million square feet located
in Stamford, Connecticut. As of June 2012, the properties were 87%
occupied with average in-place net rents of $39 per square foot.
According to CBRE Econometric Advisors, asking rents for Stamford
Class A properties are $37 per square foot with a vacancy rate of
17.2%. The loan was modified in 2010 and has an extended maturity
date of August 2013 with a 1-year extension remaining. The
collateral is encumbered with additional debt in the form of a
$98.5 million subordinate mortgage and $400 million of mezzanine
debt. Moody's current pooled LTV is 91% and stressed DSCR is
1.07X. Moody's current credit assessment is B2, compared to B1 at
last review.

The second largest pooled exposure is the Farallon MHC Portfolio
Loan which consists of a pooled portion of $238 million (28% of
the pool) and non-pooled portion of $54.7 million which supports
two non-pooled or rake classes. The loan is a 44% pari-passu
interest in a $670.8 million senior mortgage (part floating and
part fixed) which is secured by 180 cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted mobile home communities located throughout the
country totaling approximately 53,800 pad sites. There is an
additional $455.4 in a subordinate mortgage outside of the trust
for a total debt amount of $1.13 billion. The loan was modified in
April 2011 which included a loan extension through 2015 with an
option to extend 2 additional years, a capture of excess cash
flow, and a requirement for all net proceeds from sales to be
remitted to the lender. As of August 2012, 94 communities have
been released leading to principal payments. The floating rate
loan has paid down 25% since last review and 42% since
securitization. Moody's current pooled LTV is 62% and stressed
DSCR is 1.62X. Moody's current credit assessment for the pooled
balance is A1, compared to Aa2 at last review

The Blackstone Hawaii Hotel Portfolio loan ($113.9 million; 14%)
is the third largest loan in the pool and is secured by two hotels
located in Hawaii. The Marriott Wailea Beach Resort & Spa is a 546
key hotel located on Maui. According to Smith Travel Research, the
hotel has shown revenue per available room (RevPAR) increasing
6.7% for the trailing twelve month period ending May 2012, which
is slightly lower than other Maui hotels reporting RevPAR
increases of 8.9% for the same period. The Marriott Waikoloa Beach
Resort & Spa is a 555 key hotel located on the big island of
Hawaii. The cash flow for this property has been stressed.
According to Smith Travel Research, the hotel has shown revenue
per available room (RevPAR) decreasing 0.8% for the trailing
twelve month period ending May 2012, compared to other
Hawaii/Kauai hotels reporting RevPAR increases of 11.6% for the
same period. The net cash flow for the portfolio has been stable
from 2010 to 2011. The loan is secured by a subordinate mortgage
of $123 million. The final maturity date for the loan is June
2013. Since last review, the pooled balance has paid down 5%.
Moody's current pooled LTV is 58% and stressed DSCR is 1.95X.
Moody's current credit assessment is Baa3, compared to Ba1 last
review.


BLACKROCK SENIOR: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by BlackRock Senior Income Series II:

U.S.$16,600,000 Class B Second Priority Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 26,
2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

U.S.$38,900,000 Class C Third Priority Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
August 26, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

U.S.$23,900,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
August 26, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

U.S.$4,000,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed Rate
Deferrable Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
August 26, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

U.S.$5,000,000 Class 1 Composite Securities Due 2017 (current
rated balance of $2,886,130), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
August 26, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

U.S.$9,200,000 Class 2 Composite Securities Due 2017 (current
rated balance of $2,983,001), Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
August 26, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

U.S.$8,000,000 Class 3 Composite Securities Due 2017 (current
rated balance of $1,187,515), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
August 26, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

U.S.$1,500,000 Class 4 Composite Securities Due 2017 (current
rated balance of $66,854), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
August 26, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in August 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 38% or $158 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated June 29, 2012, the Class A/B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 134.22%, 117.21%, and
107.45%, respectively, versus June 2011 levels of 120.95%, 110.97%
and 104.77%, respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on Moody's calculation, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2525 compared to 2362
in August 2011.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes. Based on the June 2012 trustee report,
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes
currently make up approximately 7.6% of the underlying portfolio.
These investments potentially expose the notes to market risk in
the event of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

The rating upgrades also reflect a correction to Moody's modeling
of the rated balances for the Class 1, Class 2, Class 3 and Class
4 Composite Securities ("Combination Notes") in its cash flow
analysis. Due to an input error, previous rating actions were
based on rated balances for the Combination Notes that had been
modeled incorrectly. Moody's has reconciled the rated balances
with the trustee, and the model inputs have been adjusted. The
rating actions take into account the correct rated balances for
the Combination Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $360 million,
defaulted par of $2.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.68% (implying a WARF of 2525), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.66%, and a diversity
score of 52.The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

BlackRock Senior Income Series II, issued in June 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans and senior unsecured bonds.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011,
and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-
Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2020)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +2
Class D-1: +1
Class D-2: +1
Class 1: +2

Class 2: +2
Class 3: +2
Class 4: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3030)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -2
Class D-1: -1
Class D-2: -1
Class 1: -2
Class 2: -1
Class 3: -1
Class 4: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities, which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the bond/loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


BNC MORTGAGE 2007-3: Moody's Lifts Rating on One Tranche to 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on five
tranches and confirmed the rating on one tranche from five
subprime RMBS transactions issued by BNC Mortgage Loan Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2

Cl. A2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3

Cl. A2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades in the rating action are
a result of improving performance and/or structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
views on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an
increased use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its
previous view that loan modifications will only occur through the
end of 2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will
continue at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions .

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295652

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


C-BASS 2003-RP1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M-1 Tranche to 'Caa2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 1 tranche,
and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from two RMBS
transactions, backed by Scratch and Dent loans, issued by C-BASS.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Scratch and Dent pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The downgrade in the rating action is
a result of deteriorating performance and structural features
resulting in higher expected losses for the bond than previously
anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an
increased use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its
previous view that loan modifications will only occur through the
end of 2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will
continue at current levels until the end of 2013.

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

When assigning the final ratings to the bonds, in addition to the
methodologies described above, Moody's considered the volatility
of the projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions .

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS 2003-RP1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-SC1

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295850

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF247004


CALIFORNIA COUNTY TSA: MSA Payment Cues Fitch to Revise Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings revises the previous ratings on three classes of
tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds capital appreciation bonds
from California County Tobacco Securitization Agency (TSA) (Fresno
County Tobacco Asset Securitization Authority) series 2006, using
2011 data and criteria, due to a data input correction as follows:

  -- 2006A ratings revised to 'BBBsf' from 'BB-sf'; Rating Watch
     Negative;
  -- 2006B ratings revised to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf'; Rating Watch
     Negative;
  -- 2006C ratings revised to 'BB+sf' from 'Bsf'; Rating Watch
     Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these revised ratings based upon the
most recent MSA payment and Fitch's tobacco settlement criteria
updated in July 2012 as follows:

  -- 2006A affirmed at 'BBBsf'; removed from Watch Negative, and
     assigned Outlook Negative;
  -- 2006B affirmed at 'BBBsf'; removed from Watch Negative, and
     assigned Outlook Negative;
  -- 2006C affirmed at 'BB+sf'; removed from Watch Negative, and
     assigned Outlook Negative.

The rating revision relates to a data input error in Fitch's cash
flow modeling of the bonds.  In its last annual reviews of the
bonds, Fitch incorrectly understated the amount of the MSA payment
allocated to Fresno County by using Fresno's percentage (1.12%) of
the amount allocated to the state of California rather than
Fresno's percentage of the amount allocated to the cities and
counties in California (2.25%).  Fitch applied 1.12% to the dollar
amount allocated to the cities and counties, resulting in a
material understatement of the funds allocated to Fresno county.
The data input error was uncovered as part of Fitch's current
annual review of tobacco settlement transactions.  The data input
error is unique to this tobacco settlement transaction and does
not impact the analysis or ratings of other Fitch rated tobacco
settlement asset-backed bonds.

For the state of California, approximately 45% of the Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) payment is allocated to 58 counties,
with the percentage of funds each county receives based on
population as measured every 10 years by the U.S. Census Bureau.

The ratings are based on the level of stress each class is able to
withstand as indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The
model indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) payment percent change the trust
would be able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the
legal final date.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of
the MSA payment that the transaction has received in 2011, the
capital structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final
dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to
'BBB+sf' based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and
the executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of
a tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.


CAPMARK VII: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Securities to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings of two classes and affirmed the
ratings of nine classes of Notes issued by Capmark VII -- CRE Ltd.
The downgrades are due to increased under-collateralization and
deterioration in the par value tests since last review. The
affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Capmark VII -- CRE Ltd. is a static (the reinvestment period ended
in August 2011) cash CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of
whole loans (100.0% of the pool balance). As of the August 15,
2012 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $589.7
million from $1.0 billion at issuance, with the paydown directed
to the Class A-1 Notes, as a result of amortization of the
underlying collateral as well as interest reclassified as
principal due to the failure of the par value tests.

There are seven assets with a par balance of $107.2 million (24.9%
of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the August 15, 2012 Trustee report. While there
have been some realized losses on the underlying collateral to
date, Moody's expects more significant losses to occur on the
defaulted securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 8,863 compared to 8,759 at last review. The
current distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments
for non-Moody's rated collateral is as follows: Baa1-Baa3 (0.8%,
the same as that at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.0% compared to 2.5%
at last review), B1-B3 (9.1% compared to 13.7% at last review),
and Caa1-C (90.1% compared to 83.0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.9 years compared
to 1.6 years at last review. The current modeled WAL is based on
the assumption about extensions.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
53.6% compared to 53.4% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9%, the same as that at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
53.6% to 43.6% or up to 63.6% would result in average modeled
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notches downward
and 0 to 4 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


CARLYLE HIGH YIELD VIII: S&P Raises Rating on Class D From 'B+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2-a, B, C, and D note from Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII Ltd.
"At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the class A-1 and A-
2-b notes. We removed all these ratings from CreditWatch, where we
placed them with positive implications on June 18, 2012," S&P
said.

"The transaction is a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction managed by Carlyle Investment Management LLC. It is
still in its reinvestment phase, which ends May 21, 2013. The
portfolio credit quality has improved since the last rating
actions on Nov. 17, 2009," S&P said.

"Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII currently holds $2.06 million
defaulted assets and $34.73 million in 'CCC' rated securities per
the June 6, 2012 trustee report, which we used for our current
actions. This compares with $20.47 million in defaults and $43.46
million in 'CCC' rated securities as reflected in the Oct. 6,
2009, report, which we used for our Nov. 17, 2009, actions," S&P
said.

"The transaction also has an interest diversion mechanism that
diverts interest proceeds to acquire additional collateral if the
interest reinvestment test is not satisfied during the
reinvestment period. On the June 6, 2012, trustee report, the
interest reinvestment test was passing," S&P said.

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit support available at
the current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII Ltd.
                     Rating
Class            To            From
A-1              AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2-a            AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2-b            AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                AA (sf)       A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                A (sf)        BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D                BBB (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


CARLYLE HIGH YIELD X: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the B, C,
and E notes from Carlyle High Yield Partners X Ltd. "At the same
time, we affirmed our ratings on the A-1, A-2A, A-2B, and D
notes," S&P said.

Carlyle High Yield Partners X is a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Carlyle Investment
Management LLC. It is still in its reinvestment phase, which ends
April 19, 2014. The portfolio credit quality has improved since
the last rating actions on Jan. 9, 2012.

"Carlyle High Yield Partners X had $1.85 million in the defaulted
securities based on the trustee report dated July 5, 2012, which
we used for our current actions. This compares to more than $3
million in such securities noted in the Dec. 6, 2011, report,
which we used for our Jan. 9, 2012, actions. In addition, the
weighted average spread has increased to 3.75% from 3.42%," S&P
said.

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit support available at
the current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Carlyle High Yield Partners X Ltd.
                   Rating
Class           To           From
B               AA (sf)      AA- (sf)
C               A (sf)       A- (sf)
E               BB (sf)      B+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Carlyle High Yield Partners X Ltd.
Class          Rating
A-1            AA+ (sf)
A-2A           AA+ (sf)
A-2B           AA+ (sf)
D              BBB (sf)


CARRINGTON HOME: Moody's Upgrades Rating on One Tranche to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on 7 tranches
and confirmed the ratings on 13 tranches from nine subprime RMBS
transactions issued by Carrington. The collateral backing these
transactions are subprime residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Carrington Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC4

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FRE1

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC2

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC3

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC5

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT2

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-RFC1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-FRE1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades in the rating action are
a result of improving performance and/or structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, our
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions .

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295649

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689

For more information, please see www.moodys.com.nc.'s
("SuperMedia") announcement that their Boards of Directors have
approved a definitive agreement that the companies will combine in
a merger. Moody's Investors Service said that the transaction does
not affect the ratings of both issuers.

The transaction, which must be approved by both companies'
shareholders and lenders, is expected to close in the fourth
quarter of 2012. The combined companies estimate annual expense
synergies of $150 to $175 million by 2015 as well as preserved tax
attributes of as much as $1.8 billion to improve cash flow.


CITICORP RESIDENTIAL 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on A-4 Sec. to B2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on two
tranches, upgraded the ratings on two tranches and confirmed the
ratings on 12 tranches from five subprime RMBS transactions issued
by Citicorp. The collateral backing these transactions are
subprime residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-1

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-2

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-3

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2007-1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2007-2

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades/downgrades in the rating
action are a result of improving/deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in lower/higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294873

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. K Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded two classes and affirmed nine
classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-FL3.

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2011 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to the payoff of four loans since last
review. The affirmations are due to key parameters, including
Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.4. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 that uses the following
inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the published
methodology: original and current bond ratings and credit
assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up for
losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
presale report dated November 17, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
pooled certificate balance decreased by approximately 83% to
$142.9 million from $845.8 billion at securitization due to the
payoff of fourteen loans and principal pay downs associated with
the two remaining loans. Since last review, the loan has paid down
55%. The Certificates are collateralized by two floating-rate
loans (7% and 93% of the pooled balance). The pool is comprised of
only hotel properties.

The pool has not experienced losses since securitization. There
are no loans in special servicing. As of the August remittance
report, there are no interest shortfalls to the pool however the
rake Class AVA had a shortfall totaling $4,424. Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including workout
and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs) and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's weighed average pooled loan to value (LTV) ratio is over
100%, compared to 89% at last review, and 59% at securitization.
Moody's pooled stressed DSCR is 1.01X compared to 1.47X at last
review and 1.95X at securitization.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. Large
loan transactions generally have a Herf of less than 20. The pool
has a Herf of 1, compared to 3 at last review.

The largest pooled exposure is the Fairmont Scottsdale Princess
loan ($133 million; 93.1% of the pool balance) which is secured by
a 651 room full-service hotel located in Scottsdale, Arizona. The
loan was modified in June 2011 which included a 64 month extension
until January 2014, a $7 million principal paydown to the A note
and a payoff of the $40 million mezzanine loan. According to Smith
Travel Research, RevPAR for the trailing twelve month (TTM) period
ending April 2012 was $145.41, up 7.9% from the RevPAR for the
same period in 2011 of $134.83 while RevPAR for Phoenix increased
5.8% for the same period. Moody's current LTV is over 100% and
stressed DSCR is 0.99X. Moody's current credit assessment is Caa3,
the same as last review.

The second largest loan in the pool is the Avalon Hotel loan
($9.85 million; 6.9% of the pool balance) which is secured by an
84 room boutique hotel in Beverly Hills, CA. The property was
originally built in 1949 as a luxury apartment house and community
center located four blocks from Rodeo Drive. According to Smith
Travel Research, RevPAR for the trailing twelve month (TTM) period
ending February 2012 was $134.71, down 3.5% from the RevPAR for
the same period in 2011 of $139.56. This is due in part for the
decreased occupancy during the recent renovation. According to the
year-to-date (YTD) February 2012 numbers, the RevPAR has increased
23% over the same period in 2011 compared to a 5% increase in the
Los Angeles market for the same period. The loan has modified been
modified with a final extended maturity date of January 2015.
Moody's current LTV is 93.8% and stressed DSCR is 1.27X. Moody's
current credit assessment for the pooled balance is B3, the same
as last review.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Tranches to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on 11 tranches
and confirmed the ratings on 12 tranches from 10 subprime RMBS
transactions issued by Citigroup. The collateral backing these
transactions are subprime residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL1

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE2

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. 2006-WMC1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT1

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades in the rating action are
a result of improving performance and/or structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294925

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


CORTS TRUST I: Moody's Lifts Rating on US$2.09MM Certs. From 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
certificates issued by CorTS Trust for Provident Financing Trust
I:

U.S.$2,090,823 8.50% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities
Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on May 21, 2010
Upgraded to Ba1

Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the $60,000,000
7.405% Capital Securities issued by Provident Financing Trust I
which were upgraded to Baa3 (hyb) by Moody's on August 16, 2012.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


CORTS TRUST II: Moody's Lifts Rating on US$3.49MM From 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
certificates issued by CorTS Trust II for Provident Financing
Trust I:

U.S.3,498,808 8.20% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities
Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on May 21, 2010
Upgraded to Ba1

Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the $96,861,000
7.405% Capital Securities issued by Provident Financing Trust I
which were upgraded to Baa3 (hyb) by Moody's on August 16, 2012.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


CORTS TRUST III: Moody's Lifts Rating on US$1MM Certs. From 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
certificates issued by CorTS Trust III for Provident Financing
Trust I:

U.S. 1,045,841 8.10% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities
Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on May 21, 2010
Upgraded to Ba1

Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the $28,600,000
7.405% Capital Securities issued by Provident Financing Trust I
which were upgraded to Baa3(hyb) by Moody's on August 16, 2012.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the rating is a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


COMM 2007-C9: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Certs. to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of twenty classes
and downgraded six classes of COMM 2007-C9 Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C9 as follows:

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. AM, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. AM-FL, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AJ-FL, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 2, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. XS, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on February 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on February 22, 2012
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The downgrades are due to higher than expected realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans. The
IO Classes, Class XS and XP, are affirmed since they are
consistent with the expected credit performance of their
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
8.3% of the current balance compared to 7.9% at last review. Base
expected loss plus realized losses to date totals 8.7% compared to
8.0% at last review. Moody's provides a current list of base
expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the
underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator version
1.1 which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator version
1.1 would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24, down from 27 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 29, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the August 10, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 6% to $2.72 billion
from $2.89 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 95 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 57% of
the pool. No loans have defeased and no loan has an investment
grade credit assessment.

There are 24 loans, representing 20% of the pool, on the master
servicer's watchlist, compared to 30 loans, representing 18% of
the pool, at last review. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization
resulting in an aggregate realized loss totaling $24.9 million
(average loss severity of 48%). As of August 10, 2012, there were
eight loans, representing 9% of the pool, in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Fashion Outlet of Las
Vegas Loan ($103.0 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which represents
the borrower's interest in retail center. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in January 2012 due to imminent default. On
August 14, 2012, the second largest loan in special servicing, the
Georgian Towers Loan ($67 million -- 2.5% of the pool) paid off in
full with no losses to the trust. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $55.7 million loss (33% expected loss) for the specially
serviced loans excluding the Georgian Towers loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 32 poorly
performing loans representing 24% of the pool and has estimated a
$108.2 million aggregate loss (16% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 96%
of the performing pool and partial year 2012 operating results for
76% of the performing pool. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 110%
compared to 116% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9.7% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 0.93X, respectively,
compared to 1.32X and 0.89X, respectively, at last full review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 26% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 60 Wall Street Loan ($285.0 million --
10.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.6 million square foot
(SF) office property located in New York, New York. This loan
represents a pari-passu interest in a $925.3 million first
mortgage loan. The property is 100% leased to Deutsche Bank
through 2022. The loan is interest-only throughout the entire ten-
year term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.79 X,
respectively, compared to 114% and 0.78X, respectively, at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Waterview Loan ($210 million --
7.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 630,000 SF office
property located in Rosslyn, Virginia. The property is 99% leased
to Corporate Executive Board through 2028. The loan is interest-
only throughout the entire ten-year loan term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 0.98X, respectively, compared to 95% and
0.97X last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the DDR Portfolio Loan ($221.3
million -- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 6.5 million SF
portfolio consisting of 52 cross-defaulted and cross-
collateralized retail properties located in ten states. This loan
represents a pari-passu interest in an $885.0 million first
mortgage loan. The portfolio was 86% leased as of December 2011
compared to 87% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
120% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 127% and 0.76X at last
review.


COMM 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Cl. F Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes of
COMM 2010-C1 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2010-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. XP-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XS-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XW-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XW-B, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of 10 CMBS classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The
ratings of the four IO Classes, XP-A, XS-A, XW-A and XW-B, are
consistent with the expected credit performance of its referenced
classes and are thus affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.0% of the current balance compared to 2.2% at last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessment in
the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the IO calculator would provide both a Baa3 (sf)
and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating
committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.4 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output. The rating
action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through a review utilizing MOST(R)
(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a proprietary program
that highlights significant credit changes that have occurred in
the last month as well as cumulative changes since the last full
transaction review. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs a
full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated September 15, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the July 12, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $840.3
million from $856.6 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 42 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 14.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
60% of the pool. There is one loan, which represents 6% of the
pool, with an investment-grade credit assessment.

One loan is on the master servicer's watchlist, representing 1.2%
of the pool. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated and there are currently no loans in
special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 1.2% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.5 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and 2011 operating
results for 100% of the pool, respectively. Excluding the troubled
loan, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 84% compared to 85%
at Moody's prior. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed conduit
DSCRs are 1.52X and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 1.55X and
1.22X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Liberty Mutual
Headquarters Loan ($48.4 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which is
secured by two inter-connected office buildings, totaling 426,900
square feet (SF) of net rentable area (NRA), located within the
Back Bay submarket of Boston, Massachusetts. The buildings have
been 100% owned and occupied by the Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company (100% of NRA; lease expiration December 2024) for over 50
years. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa
and 2.3X, the same as at securitization.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 28% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is Fashion Outlets of Niagara Falls
($119.9 million -- 14.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
525,663 SF fashion outlet center located in Niagara, New York. The
property is located approximately five miles east of the Niagara
Falls and the Canadian Border. For the trailing 12-month period
ending in September 2011, the property reported in-line sales of
$565 per square foot (PSF) compared to $508 at last review and
$487 at securitization. As of March 2012, the property was 94%
leased compared to 92.9% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 91% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 93% and 0.99X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Scottsdale Quarter Ground Lease
Loan ($68.2 million -- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by the
fee simple interest in approximately 14.5 acres of ground leased
land located in Scottsdale, Arizona. The ground lease has a term
of 99 years and rental payments escalate annually based on a
negotiated schedule. The leased fee interest responsible for the
ground rent payments is represented by a 529,664 SF mixed-use
development. The sponsor is Glimcher Realty Trust. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 96% and 0.89X, respectively, the same as at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Left Bank Loan ($46.6 million --
5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 282-unit multifamily
property located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Improvements also
include approximately 110,036 SF of ground-level office space and
10,853 SF of ground-level retail space. As of June 2012, the
multifamily units were 91% occupied compared to 95% last review.
The commercial units remain 100% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 93% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 91% and 1.04X at
last review.


COMM 2012-CCRE2: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on $23.12MM G Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
the COMM 2012-CCRE2 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

  -- $81,982,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $94,591,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $101,979,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100,000,000a class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $546,255,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1,055,270,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $77,629,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $52,834,000a class A-M-PEZ 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $37,341,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25,414,000a class B-PEZ 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25,549,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17,389,000a class C-PEZ 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23,120,000a class D 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $51,195,000a class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23,120,000a class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23,120,000a class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

(*) Notional amount and interest only.
(a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

Fitch does not rate the $265,882,967 interest-only class X-B, the
$105,000,000 class PEZ or the $39,634,967 class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 64 loans secured by 98 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.32 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by Cantor Commercial Real Estate, German American
Capital Corporation and Ladder Capital Finance.

A detailed description of Fitch's rating analysis including key
rating drivers, stresses, rating sensitivity, analysis, model,
criteria application and data adequacy is available in Fitch's
presale report dated Aug. 6, 2012.


COMMERCIAL CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Rating on Seven Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of Commercial Capital
Access One, series 3 (CCA One, series 3) commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates.

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement to the
remaining Fitch rated classes.  As of the August 2012 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
69% (including 7.2% in realized losses) to $134.1 million from
$433.7 million at issuance.  There are two loans in special
servicing (7.6%).

Of the remaining pool, 30% are multifamily properties that had
low-income housing tax credits at issuance.  Additionally, 16 of
the remaining 51 loans in the pool are covered by a SunAmerica
limited guaranty (29.8% by balance).  SunAmerica's parent company,
AIG, is rated 'BBB' with a Positive Outlook by Fitch.  The
guaranty requires Sun America to pay the special servicer an
amount equal to any realized losses arising from covered specially
serviced loans, or to purchase the covered loans directly from the
trust at par if they become distressed.  The two currently
specially serviced loans in the pool are not covered by the
SunAmerica guaranty.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $5 million class 3A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45.5 million class 3B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $43.4 million class 3C at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.5 million class 3D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.5 million class 3E at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $10.8 million class 3F at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $3.3 million class 3G at 'Dsf'; RE 10%.

Classes 3A-1 and 3X have been paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
class 3H.


CREST 2001-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded two classes and affirmed one
class of Notes issued by Crest 2001-1, Ltd. The upgrades are due
to the paydowns to the top two classes as well as improvement in
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) and weighted average
recovery rate (WARR). The affirmation is due to key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings level. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

US Class B-1 Second Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due 2034,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2009 Downgraded to A1
(sf)

US Class B-2 Second Priority Floating Rate Term Notes, Due 2034,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2009 Downgraded to A1
(sf)

US Class C Third Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due 2034,
Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011 Downgraded to Ca
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Crest 2001-1, Ltd. is a quarterly paying static CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (73.7% of the pool balance) and real estate
investment trust (REIT) debt (26.3%). As of the July 31, 2012
Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $80.4 million from
$500.0 million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class
B1 and B2 Notes. The Class A Notes have been fully paid off.

There are two assets with a par balance of $19.2 million (33.7% of
the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted securities
as of the July 31, 2012 Trustee report. 100% of these assets are
CMBS. There have been approximately $17 million of losses to the
underlying collateral to date and Moody's expects more losses to
occur from the defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 3,674 compared to 5,427 at last review. The
current distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments
for non-Moody's rated collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (18.4%
compared to 9.4% at last review), A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 3.6% at
last review), Baa1-Baa3 (35.8% compared to 26.2% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (12.2% compared to 6.9% at last review), and Caa1-C (33.7%
compared to 53.9% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.8 years compared
to 3.9 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
23.8% compared to 16.8% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 3.3% compared to 10.2% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
23.8% to 13.8% or up to 33.8% would not impact the current ratings
downward and would impact the current ratings by 0 to 1 notch
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


CSFB HOME 2007-1: Moody's Raises Rating on 2-A-2 Tranche to 'Caa3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on 12 tranches
and confirmed the ratings on two tranches from six subprime RMBS
transactions issued by Credit Suisse. The collateral backing these
transactions are subprime residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-1

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-2

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-3

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-4

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades in the rating action are
a result of improving performance and/or structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294871

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


CWABS 2005-10: Moody's Cuts Rating on One Tranche to 'Caa2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on five
tranches, upgraded the rating on one tranche and confirmed the
ratings on four tranches from nine subprime RMBS transactions
issued by Countrywide. The collateral backing these transactions
are subprime residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-10

Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on May 30, 2012 B2 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-10

Cl. 1-AF-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-5

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-9

Cl. 1-AF-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC2

Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-1

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-10

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-3

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades/downgrades in the rating
action are a result of improving/deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in lower/higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 9.0%
in April 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's forecasts a further
drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294924

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 9 tranches, upgraded 1
tranche and confirmed the ratings on 6 tranches from 6 RMBS
transactions issued by Countrywide. The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, Option ARM residential
mortgages. The actions impact approximately $357 million of RMBS
issued from 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-7

Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-16

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-36

Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-51

Cl. 1-A-2A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-3B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-61

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OA19

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-P, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Option ARM
pools originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of an upgrade, downgrades and
confirmations. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating
performance and structural features resulting in higher expected
losses for certain bonds than previously anticipated.

Moody's has upgraded the rating on Class A-4 bond from CWALT, Inc.
Mortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series 2006-OA19. Due to cash-
flow modeling inconsistencies, this tranche was not included in
the May 30, 2012 rating action in which Moody's placed a large
number of bonds on watch for possible upgrade. The modeling used
in the May 2012 action failed to take into account the correct
super seniority between Class A-4 and Class A-5, as reflected in
the amended PSA. The cash-flow modeling has now been corrected,
and the rating action reflects this change.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Option ARM pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Option ARM pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for
2006 and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below
76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan
fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for
the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294996

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174


DEUTSCHE ALT-A: Moody's Lifts Cl. VII-A-2 Tranche Rating to 'Ca'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded seven tranches from one
RMBS transaction issued by Deutsche Bank. The collateral backing
this deal primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable-rate Alt-A
residential mortgages. The actions impact approximately $35
million of RMBS issued from 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-AR2

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-IO, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. VI-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of upgrades. The upgrades
are due to significant improvement in collateral performance, and
rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to high prepayments.

Moody's has also upgraded the ratings on the Class 1-A-1 and Class
1-A-2 bonds. The modeling used in previous rating actions was
coded incorrectly with regards to loss reimbursement, such that
realized losses to Class 1-A-1 and Class 1-A-2 were not
reimbursed. The cash-flow modeling has been corrected, and the
rating actions reflect this change.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294974

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174


DEUTSCHE BANK 2011-LC3: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 17 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all ratings to Deutsche Bank Securities
DBUBS 2011-LC3 Mortgage Trust's Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, series 2011-LC3.

Fitch's affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  As of the August 2012 distribution
date, the pooled collateral balance has been reduced by 2.2% to
$1.367 billion from $1.398 billion at issuance.  There have been
no delinquent or specially serviced loans since issuance.  Fitch
reviewed year-end (YE) 2011 operating statement analysis reports
(OSARs) and rent rolls for the top 10 loans in the transaction.

The largest loan in the pool (11.9%) is secured by a 1.19 million
square feet (sf) office property located in Houston, TX.  The
property is part of a larger four-building complex totaling 2.5
million sf.  The largest tenants are Plains Marketing (17%),
expiry June 2023; Thompson & Knight (8%), expiry August 2017;
Devon Energy (14%); expiry Jan 2020.  As of March 2012, the
property is 92% occupied with average rent $46 psf.  Per REIS, as
of the 2nd quarter 2012, the Houston Metro Office market vacancy
is 14.3% with asking rent of $24.51 sf.

The second largest loan in the pool (10.2%) is secured two 244-key
limited service hotels located in the Times Square submarket of
New York City.  The hotels are affiliated with Marriott
International and Starwood Hotel and Resorts brands.  As of March
2012, the Fairfield Inn & Suites is 87.74% occupied with an
average daily rate (ADR) of $183.17 and revenue per available room
(RevPAR) $160.71.  The Four Points By Sheraton is 84.63% occupied,
with ADR $170.78 and RevPAR $144.53.

The third largest loan in the pool (8.2%) is secured by a 219,371
sf, eight building office campus located in Menlo Park, CA.  The
property is located two miles from the Stanford University Campus.
The largest tenants are Kaiser Foundation (10%), 1% expiry May
2012 (no update available), 9% expiry June 2021; Benchmark Capital
Holding (5%); recently renewed their space for one year through
May 2013; August Capital Management (4%), expiry Sept. 2018 and
Blackstone Group (4%), expiry December 2016.  As of March 2012,
the property is 74.5% occupied with average rent $81 sf.

Fitch affirms the following classes and maintains the Stable
Outlooks:

  -- $66.8 million Class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $671.8 million Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $97.3 million Class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $112.1 million Class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $127.6 million Class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only Class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75.2 million Class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $54.2 million Class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  -- $73.4 million Class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.2 million Class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.2 million Class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $$137.4 million class PM-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class PM-X at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.9 million class PM-2 at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $28.9 million class PM-3 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.5 million class PM-4 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.9 million class PM-5 at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-B or the $50.7
million class G.  Classes PM-1 through PM-5 are secured by
Providence Place Mall on a stand-alone basis.


EL MONTE: Fitch Keeps 'BB+' Rating on $19.1-Mil. Revenue Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following El Monte Public Financing
Authority, California's (the authority) bonds and removed them
from Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $19.1 million lease revenue bonds (City Yard Project) series
     2010A & B at 'BB+';

  -- El Monte, California (the city) implied general obligation
     bond rating at 'BBB'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

SECURITY

The city has covenanted to budget and appropriate lease rental
payments, subject to abatement, for use of its public works yard
and its civic center complex from any available funds to the city.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

NO DSRF DRAW: The removal from Rating Watch Negative reflects
management's decision to pay August debt service on its lease
revenue bonds (LRBs) without tapping the LRB cash-funded debt
service reserve fund (DSRF) due to the timely receipt of
sufficient tax increment funds from the county.

FY11 UNQUALIFIED AUDIT RELEASED: The removal from Rating Watch
Negative also reflects the final release of an unqualified audit
for fiscal 2011.  The audit was delayed several months as
management needed time to deal with internal control deficiencies
that resulted in a qualified fiscal 2010 audit opinion.

MANAGERIAL CONCERNS REMAIN: The low 'BB+' LRB rating reflects
lingering concerns about management's intent in May to violate the
city's legal obligation to pay its LRB debt service from any
available source of funds if sufficient tax increment revenues had
not been received from the county.  Management has since changed
its stance but Fitch will monitor actual management practices for
some time before considering any positive rating action.  The low
rating also reflects Fitch's ongoing concerns about the quality,
timeliness and transparency of the city's financial disclosure
including the lack of an adopted budget for fiscal year 2013.

ADEQUATE FINANCIAL POSITION; PRESSURES REMAIN: The city benefits
from currently adequate liquidity and general fund reserve
positions and a property tax override levied in perpetuity that
helps fund pension costs.  Nonetheless, Fitch expects future
operations will be pressured by rising pension costs, significant
deferred wage increases and the loss of a temporary sales tax in
calendar 2014.

DIVERSIFIED TAX BASE; WEAK ECONOMIC INDICATORS: The city benefits
from its tax base maturity and its location within the large and
diverse Los Angeles regional employment market, and assessed value
(AV) has expanded modestly following one year of retraction.
However, unemployment is high, AV per capita is low, and income
and poverty levels are weaker than average.

WHAT COULD TRIGGER A RATING ACTION

DSRF DRAW: A draw from the bonds' DSRF, while not anticipated,
would trigger a downgrade.

FINANCIAL DETERIORATION: The city likely will need to enact
further significant expenditure reductions to prevent erosion of
its financial cushion over the next few years due to cost and
revenue pressures.  Although the city's financial cushion
currently appears adequate, the city's financial operations have
been subject to severe year-to-year variations.

CREDIT PROFILE

MANAGEMENT REVERSES POSITION ON DSRF DRAW
The city has covenanted to pay for debt service from any available
source, though the city has intended for its redevelopment agency
(RDA) and water and sewer enterprises to pay debt service per
cooperative agreements.  Management took the position in May,
which it has since reversed, that the city would not make its full
debt service payment if the county failed to remit sufficient tax
increment revenues to the RDA in a timely manner.

The concern stemmed from RDA dissolution complications (per AB 1X
26).  In the event of a related shortfall, the city would have
drawn from the LRB DSRF, which management and the city's attorney
considered an available source of revenue to the city per the bond
indenture.  Fitch believes this would have constituted a lease
default, and potentially could have led to severe repercussions,
including an interest rate hike to 12%, repossession of the leased
assets by the trustee, and acceleration of all remaining principal
payments and accrued interest.

Management reports the RDA ultimately received sufficient revenues
from the county to meet its Aug. 1 debt service payment and it
does not anticipate similar complications moving forward.
Management stated that debt service for the LRBs is contained on
the agency's recognized obligation payments schedule (ROPS), which
was approved by the state's department of finance.

Management further noted that its policy stance has shifted since
May, and that the city would adhere to its covenant to budget and
appropriate for debt service in the event of a potential tax
increment revenue shortfall, regardless of the cause of any such
shortfall.  Although Fitch views as positive management's policy
reversal, Fitch intends to monitor actual management practices for
some time before taking positive rating action.

RDA CASH FLOW TIMING ISSUES

The city's RDA is facing cash flow issues resulting from
dissolution legislation and is unable to fully pay both its tax
allocation bonds and its LRBs on a timely basis.  To date
management has fully paid the LRBs from tax increment,
necessitating a $564,000 draw from the TAB's DSRF, which was
subsequently replenished.  However, AB 1X 26 states that TABs have
a lien on tax increment revenues that is senior to all other debts
of the agency.  If the city begins paying its TABs on such a
basis, then there would be insufficient tax increment to pay debt
service on the LRBs, necessitating that the city find an alternate
source of liquidity or draw on the LRB DSRF.

Management noted that it plans on solving the agency's cash flow
gap permanently with asset sales or with surplus tax increment
revenues within the next year.  In the short term the city
expressed its intent to provide a cash flow loan or request one
from the county to ensure that both the LRBs and the TABs are
fully paid from tax increment.  Fitch remains concerned about the
city's ability to execute these plans in a timely manner.

FINANCIAL OPERATIONS IMPROVING; DISCLOSURE ISSUES REMAIN

The city released its finalized audit approximately 10 months
after the end of its fiscal year as it addressed deficient
internal controls that resulted in a qualified fiscal 2010 audit.
The internal control issues stemmed largely from delays in the
city's cash reconciliation process and inadequate documentation of
city loans to the RDA.  Further complications included a reduction
in key accounting personnel and deficient record-keeping and
accounting processes.  The fiscal 2011 unqualified audit suggests
that progress has been made though Fitch remains concerned about
the city's financial disclosure practices.

Fiscal 2011 marks the fourth year in the past five that included
fund balance re-statements.  Further, financial statements are
difficult to interpret due to a large number of interconnected
funds (loans to and from funds with negative fund balances).
Including internal service funds, nine funds have a combined
negative fund balance of over $5 million necessitating general
fund interfund loans of $6.1 million.  Although the audit notes
the aggregate amount of such loans to non-major governmental funds
from the general fund, Fitch must rely on un-audited
representations from management regarding the nature of such loans
and the likelihood and timing of repayments.  Based on recent
years' internal control issues, Fitch views this as a material
weakness.  Management noted that the majority of the aggregate
special fund deficit is due to funds spent in anticipation of
various grants that have since been received.  The fiscal 2011
internal service fund deficit stems from a $3.7 million deficit in
the city's self-insurance fund that has improved by $853,000 from
fiscal 2010.  Fitch remains concerned about the funds' ability to
repay the general fund in a timely manner and the potential impact
on general fund balances.

LIQUIDITY, GENERAL FUND CUSHION ADEQUATE BUT VULNERABLE
The fiscal 2011 audit reports the general fund produced a $1.6
million operating surplus (after transfers), raising the
unrestricted fund balance to $8.4 million (16.9% of expenditures
and transfers out).  The total fund balance fell to $27.3 million
(54.7%) from $106.2 million (225%) due mostly to a restatement
that effectively wrote off the general fund's receivable from its
now dissolved RDA.  The restatement has no impact on the bonds'
credit rating as Fitch did not view the receivable as an available
resource in prior reviews.

The fiscal 2011 audit also reports just $4 million of general fund
cash; however, overall liquidity is adequate with $20 million of
borrowable cash in the city's retirement fund.  The city levies a
property tax override as a fixed percentage of AV to pay for
pension costs and spends the proceeds a year in arrears, resulting
in a historically comfortable pool of internal borrowable
resources.  Fitch anticipates this resource will continue to be
available although with rising pension costs it could contract,
absent mitigating budget measures.  Management notes that tax
proceeds are currently just sufficient to meet annual CalPERS
costs.

Management estimates that in fiscal 2012 the general fund ran a
$1.5 million structural surplus, but that $1.5 million of one-time
expenditures related to legal expenses resulted in balanced
operations.  Fitch notes with some caution that city council has
not yet approved a budget for fiscal 2013 and is operating on a
60-day interim budget.  The city's finance department represents
that it has recommended a $50.5 million annual budget that would
result in a structural surplus, but would be balanced after one-
time expenses on capital.  The proposed budget includes $635,000
of savings from the elimination of a holiday, no wage increases,
the implementation of a two-tiered pension system, vacant
positions, and health care cost savings.

PRESSURES ESCALATE IN 2014

The city's five-year Measure GG 1/2-cent sales tax expires in
April 2014 and currently generates $3.8 million annually or 7.6%
of fiscal 2011 revenues.  If the sales tax measure is not extended
by voters the city could face substantial financial headwinds with
deferred wage increases on closed labor contracts (expiring Jan.
1, 2015) and backfill of lost grant funds.  The council approved a
sugary drink consumption tax to be included on the November ballot
and declared a fiscal emergency so that the voter approval
threshold could be lowered to just 50%.  Management maintains that
the fiscal emergency does not reflect short-term solvency, which
is consistent with the city's audited fund balance and borrowable
resources.  However, it does reflect significant budgetary
pressure.  The city does not have a revenue projection if the
measure passes, but also did not include the tax in its proposed
budget.

The city has not identified revenue measures beyond the sugary
drink tax to address financial pressures beginning in fiscal 2014.
However, management has cited various areas of remaining financial
flexibility.  These include the sale of the city's water system,
privatization of various public works functions, and outsourcing
of an aquatic center.  Management cites labor relations as strong,
and Fitch notes that the city's unions have provided material
concessions in prior years that may bode well for productive
negotiations in future years, if further concessions are required.

LOCAL ECONOMY STILL WEAK, BUT TAX BASE REMAINS RESILIENT

The local economy continues to show signs of weakness.  The June
unemployment rate was high at 13.7%.  This represents an
improvement from the prior year's rate of 15.4%, but stems more
from the city's 1.7% labor force contraction outpacing the 0.3%
employment expansion. Household income levels are low at 77% and
70% of county and state averages, respectively.  The 20.7% local
poverty rate exceeds the county and state averages of 15.7% and
13.7%, respectively.  The economy's bright spot is its mature tax
base, which fell 2.1% in fiscal 2011, but has since posted two
years of modest gains.  The tax base contains minimal
concentration among its top 10 taxpayers, which make up 4.6% of
AV.

AFFORDABLE DEBT; HIGH BUT CURRENTLY MANAGEABLE PENSION COSTS

The city's debt burden is moderate at $1,770 per capita, or 3.7%
of AV.  The general fund debt service obligation is currently low
and, if it were forced to carry the full costs of the 2010 LRBs,
would rise to a moderate 5.8% of total general fund revenues.
Carrying costs (debt service, pension costs, and OPEB
contributions), however, are high at 27.2%.  The city's previously
noted pension property tax rate override causes the city's high
carrying costs to be currently manageable, but they could become a
pressure point as escalating pension costs may begin to outstrip
growth in related pension tax revenues.


FIRST HORIZON: Moody's Cuts Ratings on One RMBS Tranche to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 16 tranches, from five
RMBS transactions issued by First Horizon. The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed rate Alt-A
residential mortgages. The actions impact approximately $151
million of RMBS issued from 2005 to 2006.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA1

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA10

Cl. I-A-3A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA7

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA1

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA4

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of downgrades.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294828

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174


FM LEVERAGED II: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by FM Leveraged Capital Fund II:

U.S. $34,935,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 17,
2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

U.S. $22,605,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2020, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on October 17,
2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

U.S. $20,550,000 Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on October 17,
2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2012. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive
"cushion" relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and
higher spread levels compared to the levels assumed at the last
rating action in October 2011. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported collateral quality and
overcollateralization ratio are stable since the last rating
action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $296 million,
defaulted par of $11 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.69% (implying a WARF of 2897), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.56%, and a diversity
score of 49. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

FM Leveraged Capital Fund II, issued in November 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2317)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +1
Class D: +2
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3476)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -2
Class D: -3
Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities, which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GE CAPITAL 2001-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. G Cert. to 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes,
and affirmed four classes of GE Capital Commercial Mortgage
Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-1 as follows:

Cl. G, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of Class G is due to concerns that this class may
experience interest shortfalls caused by specially serviced loans.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes K through H
are currently experiencing interest shortfalls. The downgrade of
the IO Class, Class X-1, is due to the decline in credit quality
of the referenced classes.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
47% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 23%. The current cumulative base expected
loss represents a higher percentage of the pool than at last
review because of significant paydowns. However, the dollar amount
of expected loss is less. At last review Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was $32 million compared to $28 million at this
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's review also utilized the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1 which
uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating
based on the published methodology: original and current bond
ratings and credit assessments; original and current bond balances
grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within
the transaction; and IO type as defined in the published
methodology. The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating
based on both a target and mid-point. For example, a target rating
basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint
rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple
average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating
factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the
CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO
indication for consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 14 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.4 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 1, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $60.6
million from $1.13 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to
25% of the pool. The pool does not include any defeased loans or
loans with investment grade credit assessments.

Three loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $44.7 million (30% loss
severity). Currently three loans, representing 60% of the pool,
are in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is
the Hawthorn Suites Loan ($15 million -- 25% of the pool), which
is secured by a 280 room extended stay hotel located in Atlanta,
Georgia. The loan was transferred to special servicing in April
2009. A moisture and mold issue at the property forced 43 rooms to
be put out of service for most of 2010. Remediation costs were
funded from the property's cash flow and the rooms were back in
service by the end of 2010. The property is currently being
marketed for sale.

The remaining two specially serviced properties are secured by a
retail and office property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $27
million loss for the specially serviced loans (73% expected loss
on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for
100% of the pool. Excluding special serviced loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 80% compared to 88% at Moody's prior
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 15% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.0%.

Excluding special serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.14X and 1.59X, respectively, compared to 1.09X and
1.29X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 31% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Roswell Corners Shopping Center Loan ($8.4
million -- 14% of the pool), which is secured by a 136,700 square
foot (SF) retail center located in suburban Atlanta. The property
is shadow anchored by Target. Major tenants at the collateral are
TJ Maxx (22% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration --
4/30/2015) and Staples (18% of the NRA; lease expiration --
2/28/2015). As of December 2011, the property was 100% leased, the
same as at the prior review and an increase from 92% at
securitization. Property performance has increased due to an
increase in base rental revenue, and the loan benefits from
amortization as it is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 46% and 2.22X, respectively, compared to 57% and 1.80X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Courtyard by Marriott - Manchester
Loan ($5.3 million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 90
room hotel located in Manchester, Connecticut. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to imminent
default, and was transferred back to the master servicer in June
2011 with a modification agreement extending the maturity date to
May 2014. Per the STAR Report, the property is performing in line
with the competitive set and has slight increases in RevPAR and
occupancy since last review. Despite the relatively stable
performance since last review, Moody's stressed the cash flow to
account for the potential variance in performance that this
property has historically shown, as well as the potential
refinance risk. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 126% and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 104% and 1.25X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the 524 Lamar Loan ($5.2
million -- 8.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 36,000 SF
office property located in downtown Austin Texas. The property is
100% leased to 10 tenants, essentially the same at last review.
Property performance has been stable and there is limited near
term lease roll over. The loan matures in January 2016. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.40X, respectively, compared to
87% and 1.31X at last review.


GMACM MORTGAGE 2003-GH1: Moody's Confirms Caa1 Rating on B Tranche
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of two
tranches issued by GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-GH1. This
transaction is backed by Scratch and Dent loans.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Scratch and Dent pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's ratings on the certificates take into account the cash
flow waterfall and trigger definitions described in the Indenture.
The cash flows in some recent periods have not been consistent
with Moody's interpretation of the transaction documents. In those
periods, Moody's calculated that the delinquency trigger should
have been failing and mezzanine certificates should not have
received principal payments as they did. Moody's has notified the
Trustee of this issue.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-GH1

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF292576

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF247004


GMAC-RFC: Moody's Corrects July 17 Rating Release
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a correction to the July 17, 2012
rating release of GMAC-RFC.

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 27
tranches, upgraded the ratings of five tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 13 tranches from 12 RMBS transactions, backed by
Scratch and Dent loans, issued by GMAC-RFC.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Scratch and Dent pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

The rating action constitute of a number of upgrades as well as
downgrades. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance and/or faster-than-expected pay-down on
certain bonds owing mainly to liquidations. The downgrades are
primarily due to deteriorating collateral performance.

In addition, Moody's has corrected the rating on the Class A-I-IO
tranche issued by RAMP Series 2004-SL2 Trust. Due to an internal
administrative error, this tranche was initially misclassified and
thus not included in the February 22, 2012 rating action on
certain RMBS interest-only securities.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on scratch and dent pools with fewer than 100
loans, Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate
based on strength of the collateral, number of loans remaining in
the pool and the level of current delinquencies in the pool. For
scratch and dent, Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency
rate of 11% for standard transactions and 3% for strongest prime-
like deals. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76, this
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer than
76. For example, for a standard pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 11.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 9.0%
in April 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's forecasts a further
drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-GH2

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GH1

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAAC 2006-SP2 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2004-SP1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2004-SP2 Trust

Cl. A-I, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-II-PO, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2004-SP3 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-II, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-I-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-II-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-SP1 Trust

Cl. A-I-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-I-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-II-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-II-9, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-III-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-III-6, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-III-7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-III-9, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-IV-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-IV-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-IV-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-IV-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-SP2 Trust

Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-I-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-SP3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-SP3 Trust

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-SL1 Trust

Cl. A-I-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Cl. M-I-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Confirmed at A3 (sf)

Cl. M-I-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-I-6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-I-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-SL2 Trust

Cl. A-III, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-IV, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-I-IO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF292163

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF247004


GS MORTGAGE 2007-GG10: Fitch Cuts Rating on Eight Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 8 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust series 2007-GG10, commercial mortgage pass through
certificates.  The downgrades reflect both an increase in expected
losses on the specially serviced loans as well as continued
underperformance of many of the larger loans not in special
servicing.

Many of the loans have been in special servicing for a number of
years as anticipated resolutions have not occurred.  These
unresolved specially serviced loans have resulted in additional
trust expenses and a significant increase in interest shortfalls
from approximately $50 million in August 2011 to approximately $83
million as of the August 2012 distribution date.  Resolved
specially services loans consist primarily of loans modified with
A/B structures where Fitch deems the B-Notes unlikely to be
recovered.

Additionally, while many of the performing larger loans have
institutional quality borrowers, these loans continue to show
declines in net operating income (NOI) or fail to show performance
improvement from stressed levels.  The downgrades to classes A-4,
A1-A and A-M reflect an expectation of significant credit
enhancement erosion, as realized losses are not expect to impact
these classes.

Fitch modeled losses of 20.8% of the remaining pool. Fitch has
designated 86 loans (60.4% of the pool balance) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes 41 specially serviced loans (23.4%).
Fitch expects classes D through S may be fully depleted from
losses associated with the specially serviced assets.  As of the
August 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by approximately 8.8% to $6.9 billion
from $7.56 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are affecting
classes A-J through S.

The largest contributor to losses, the Two California Plaza loan
(6.8%), is secured by a 1,329,810 square foot (sf) office property
located in downtown Los Angeles, CA.  Maguire Properties is the
loan sponsor.  At issuance, the loan was underwritten to a
stabilized cash flow based on the expectation that below market
leases expiring during the term of the loan would be re-signed at
higher rates, providing for potential upside in future cash flows.
One of the largest tenants at the property filed bankruptcy and
vacated its space in mid-2009.  The largest tenant downsized its
space in 2010 leaving the property approximately 80% occupied. As
of March 2012, the property was 78% occupied.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in December 2010.  A receiver
is in place and the special servicer is pursuing foreclosure.

The second largest contributor to losses is the Shorenstein
Portland Portfolio (10.1%).  The largest loan in the pool is
secured by a portfolio of 46 office buildings encompassing
3,882,036 sf located throughout greater Portland, OR.  As of March
2012, the portfolio was 78.9% occupied, which is slightly lower
than with occupancy levels for the past several years.  This
figure marks a 15% occupancy decrease from underwriting.  The
decline in occupancy has affected operating income with YE 2011
NOI 16% lower than YE 2010.  The borrower is projecting additional
occupancy and revenue declines for 2012 due to a soft leasing
market and lower prevailing rental rates.

The third largest contributor to loss is the 119 West 40th Street
loan (2.3%), which is secured by a 22-story, 333,901 sf office
building located in Midtown Manhattan, New York.  At issuance, the
loan was underwritten to a stabilized cash flow based on the
expectation that below market leases expiring during the loan term
and the yet to be completed building upgrades would provide upside
in future cash flows.

The loan transferred to the special servicer in June 2009 for
imminent default after the debt service reserves posted at
issuance were depleted and the property had failed to achieve
positive cash flow.  Cost overruns associated with building
renovations resulted in uncompleted construction at the property,
including the main lobby, and caused tenants to withhold rents.  A
receiver is in place and all of the construction is now complete.
Occupancy was 73% as of April 2012.  The receiver is working with
a local broker to market and re-brand the property.  The special
servicer and the borrower are in negotiations about a possible
modification.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Rating Outlooks to the following classes:

  -- $3,661 million class A-4 to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $485 million class A-1A to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $756.3 million class A-M to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

  -- $94.5 million class C to 'CCsf ' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $56.7 million class E to 'Csf ' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $75.6 million class F to 'Csf ' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $75.6 million class G to 'Csf ' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $104 million class H to 'Csf ' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $340.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $246.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $70.8 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $519.9 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $75.6 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $56.7 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $94 .5 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $75.6 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $37.8 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $18.9 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $28.4 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $18.9 million class O at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $18.9 million class P at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $18.9 million class Q at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the $3.5 million
class S.  Fitch withdrew the ratings of the interest only class X.


GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC5: Moody's Keeps 'B2' Rating on Class F Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 12
classes of GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-GC5, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC5 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of the 10 principal and interest bonds are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The ratings of the two interest-only bonds, Classes X-A and X-B,
are consistent with the expected credit performance of their
referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.4% of the current balance, which is similar to Moody's loss
expectation at securitization. Moody's provides a current list of
base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 23, which is the same as at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. This is Moody's first full-
review since securitization. The initial Pre-Sale Report was
released on September 20, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the August 10, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.73 billion
from $1.75 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 74 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 53% of
the pool. Three loans, representing 5% of the pool, have
investment grade credit assessments. The pool does not contain any
defeased, liquidated or specially serviced loans.

One loan, representing 1% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full or partial year
2011 operating results for 100% of the conduit, respectively. The
conduit portion of the pool excludes the three loans with credit
assessments. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 92%, which is
the same as at securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.56X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.56X and 1.10X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Museum Square
Loan ($58 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
553,000 square foot (SF) class B+ office located in the Miracle
Mile submarket of Los Angeles, California. The property was 86%
leased as of March 2012 compared to 81% in June 2011. The
property's average occupancy over the past five years is 92%.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 1.73X,
respectively, the same as at securitization.

The other two loans with credit assessments, the ARCT Wal-Mart &
Sam's Portfolio Loan and the Alhambra Renaissance Center Loan,
each represent less than 1% of the pool. Both have a Baa3 credit
assessment, the same as at securitization.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the Park Place Mall Loan ($197 million --
11.4% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in
a 1.06 million SF dominant super-regional mall in Tucson, Arizona.
Sears, Dillard's and Macy's anchor the mall and own their own
spaces. The largest collateral tenant is an 18-screen movie
theatre. March 2012 total mall and in-line occupancy were 97% and
92%, respectively, compared to 97% and 93% in July 2011. In-line
sales for the trailing twelve months ending March 2012 were $462
PSF compared to $450 PSF in June 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 94% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 96% and 0.96X at
securitization.

The second largest conduit loan is the 1551 Broadway Loan ($180
million -- 10.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 26,000 SF
single tenant retail property and a 15,000 SF LED sign located in
the Bow Tie area of Manhattan's Times Square district. The
property and LED sign are leased to AE Outfitters, Inc. a fully
owned subsidiary of American Eagle Outfitters, Inc. through
February 2024. The location generated 2010 annual sales of $1,855
per square foot, which is considered very strong. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 90% and 0.93X compared to 88% and 0.96X at
securitization.

The third largest conduit loan is the Copper Beech Portfolio Loan
($118 million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by four
cross-defaulted and cross-collateralized student housing complexes
in Virginia, West Virginia, Texas and Pennsylvania. The collateral
consists of 3,052 beds in 1,063 units (2.87 beds per unit on
average). The portfolio only contained one vacant unit as of March
2012. The average monthly rent is $1,362 per unit or $475 per bed.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.08X compared to 89%
and 1.07X at securitization.


GSAA HOME 2005-6: Moody's Lifts Rating on M-1 Secs. to 'Caa3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded 24 tranches,downgraded two
tranches and confirmed the ratings on one tranche from seven RMBS
transactions issued by Goldman Sachs. The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
Alt-A residential mortgages. The actions impact approximately
$988.4 billion of RMBS issued from 2005 to 2006.

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-6

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-8

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-9

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1A2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2A2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2A3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2A4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-11

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2A1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3A2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 3A5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-MTR1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-18

Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of upgrades. The upgrades
are due to significant improvement in collateral performance, and
rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to high prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility and 3)
bonds that financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.3% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294443

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174


HALCYON LOAN 2012-1: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Halcyon
Loan Advisors Funding 2012-1 Ltd./Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding
2012-1 LLC's $322.0 million floating-rate notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization of a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

-  The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
    subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
    subordinated notes.

-  The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation criteria.

-  The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

-  The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

-  The asset manager's experienced management team.

-  S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed using
    its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
    assigned ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
    including LIBOR ranging from 0.34%-12.65%.

-  The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

     http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111767.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2012-1 Ltd./Halcyon Loan Advisors
Funding 2012-1 LLC

Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)               230.00
A-2                     AA (sf)                 32.00
B (deferrable)          A (sf)                  30.00
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                15.00
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)                 15.00
Subordinated notes      NR                      36.88

NR-Not rated.


HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'Ca'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded 11 tranches and confirmed
the ratings on six tranches from five RMBS transactions issued by
Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust. The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable-rate Alt-A and Option
ARM residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-PO, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-11

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-15

Cl. 2-A1A1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A1A2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3-A1A1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3-A1A2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-3A, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-3B, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6

Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A/Option
ARM pools originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of upgrades and
confirmations. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility and 3)
bonds that financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A/Option ARM pools with fewer than 100
loans, Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate
based on vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the
level of current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A/Option ARM
pools, Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10%
for 2005, 19% for 2006 and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.20 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

Bonds insured by financial guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflect the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a result, the rating
on the security is the higher of 1) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating, which is
what the rating of the security would be absent consideration of
the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's uses in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have financial guaranty, described
earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294879

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

Alt-A

http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174

Option ARM

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF225686


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP5: Fitch Junks Rating on 5 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades five classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Series Corp. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-LDP5.

The downgrades are the result of increased loss expectations
primarily from the specially serviced loans. Fitch modeled losses
of 6.99% of the remaining pool; losses to date based on the
original pool balance are 0.40%.  Fitch designated 35 loans
(19.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include 11 specially
serviced loans (8.41%).  In addition, Fitch has been notified by
the servicer that the DRA-CRT Portfolio II (3.86%), has recently
transferred to the special servicer for imminent maturity default.

As of the August 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 18.9% (including 0.4% of
realized losses) to $3.403 billion from $4.197 billion at
issuance.  Interest shortfalls are affecting classes L through NR.
Three loans in the pool (0.9%) are currently defeased.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is the
specially-serviced real estate owned (REO) Hanover Mall (2.4% of
the pool) located in Hanover, MA.  The 706,005 square foot (sf)
regional mall was built in 1971 and is located 25 miles south of
Boston, MA.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
November 2009 for imminent payment default and foreclosure of the
property was completed in February 2010 after unsuccessful
negotiations with the sponsor.  The special servicer continues to
work on releasing the in-line space and anticipates the opening of
a new junior anchor space in late 2012.

The second largest contributor to Fitch's model losses is a
526,245 sf office complex (2.7%), located in Irving, TX.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer in March 2012 due to a
covenant default.  NEC is the sole tenant and their lease expires
five months after the loan's maturity in October 2015.  They have
provided notice of their intention to downsize their footprint by
50% at that time.

The third largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is an
office property (0.9% of the pool) consisting of two buildings
connected on the upper floors totaling 289,279 sf, in Southfield,
MI.  Occupancy is currently 68% after a major tenant, Metropolitan
Life Insurance downsized to 63,000 sf.  The sponsor is actively
marketing the vacant space and leasing activity has marginally
improved with prospective tenants showing interest.

Fitch downgrades the following classes as indicated:

  -- $52.5 million class F to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $52.5 million class H to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE95%;
  -- $42 million class J to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE0%;
  -- $26.2 million class L to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE0%;
  -- $15.7 million class N to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE0%.

In addition, Fitch affirms the following classes and revises
Outlooks and Recovery Estimates as indicated:

  -- $200.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $171.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.4 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $95.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $298.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $419.7 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $299 million class A-J at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.2 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $73.5 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $42 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21 million class E at 'BBBsf' ; Outlook Stable;
  -- $36.7 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $63 million class K at 'CCCsf'; RE0%;
  -- $15.7 million class M at 'CCsf'; RE0%;
  -- $5.2 million class O at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $5.2 million class P at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $10.5 million class Q at 'Csf'; RE0%.

Class A-1 and A-2FL have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate class
NR or any of the rake classes HG-1 through HG-5.  The ratings on
classes X-1 and X-2 were previously withdrawn.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC14: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. D Certs. to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed the ratings of 10 CMBS classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-CIBC14 as follows:

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher realized losses and anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the eight principal bonds are due to the key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The ratings of the IO Classes, Class X-1 and X-2, are consistent
with the expected credit performance of their referenced classes
and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.0% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8.8%. The pool's cumulative realized losses
have increased by $84.1 million since last review. Moody's current
base expected loss plus cumulative realized losses is 12.7% of the
original pool balance as compared to 10.1% at last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24 compared to 28 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated August 17, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the August 13, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to $2.2 billion
from $2.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 168 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
48% of the pool. The pool contains two loans with investment grade
credit assessments that represent 19% of the pool. One loan,
representing 0.1% of the pool, has defeased and is collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Forty-three loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $150.5
million (37% average loss severity) compared to $66.3 million at
last review. Twenty nine loans, representing 19% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Colony Line II Loan ($158.6 million -- 7.2%), which is
secured by eight cross-defaulted and cross-collateralized loans
secured by eight properties located in Georgia, Illinois, Texas
and Virginia. The collateral consists of four industrial
properties, two multifamily properties and two office properties.
The portfolio was 86% leased as of March 2012, essentially the
same as at last review. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in March 2012 due to maturity default. Three loans which
had maturity in March 2012 did not pay off. The other five loans
have maturity in 2013/2014. The borrower is interested in a one-
year extension.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Avion Business
Park Portfolio Loan ($93.1 million -- 4.2%) which is secured by
seven suburban office properties located in Chantilly, Virginia.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in October 2010 and
is now REO. The servicer has recognized a $30.5 million appraisal
reduction for this loan.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
commercial and multifamily property types. The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $102.8 million appraisal reduction for 18
of the 29 specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $135.0 million loss (32% expected loss based on an 63%
probability of default) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 23 poorly
performing loans representing 9% of the pool and has estimated a
$38.6 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes C through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $13.6
compared to $10.9 million at last review. Moody's anticipates that
the pool will continue to experience interest shortfalls because
of the high exposure to specially serviced and troubled loans.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided full year 2011 operating results for 97% of
the pool's loans, excluding specially serviced and defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 96% compared to 98% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to
the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.1X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 1.07X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Houston Galleria
Loan ($290 million -- 13.1%), which represents a 50% pari-passu
interest in a $580 million first mortgage secured by a 2.3 million
square foot (SF) super-regional mall located in Houston, Texas.
The center is anchored by Macy's, Neiman Marcus, Nordstrom and
Saks Fifth Avenue. The property was 93% leased as of December
2011, which is similar to the last review and securitization. Year
2011 in-line tenant sales were $980 per SF, compared to $959 at
last review. Performance has improved due to higher revenues. The
loan is interest only for the entire term. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 1.35X, respectively,
compared to Baa2 and 1.29X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Patrick Henry
Building Loan ($120 million --5.0%), which is secured by a 520,000
SF office building located in Washington, DC. The property is 100%
leased to the U.S. Department of Justice until August 2015. The
loan matures in January 2016. Moody's is concerned about the
refinance risk if the tenant doesn't re-new the lease; however,
the risk is mitigated by the performance of the Washington DC
office market. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR
are Baa3 and 1.38X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.35X at
last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14.2% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Ballantyne Corporate Park Loan
($217.0 million -- 9.8%). The loan is secured by 20 cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted properties located in
Charlotte, North Carolina. Two of the properties are hotels with a
total of 208 rooms and the remaining 18 properties are offices
with a total of 1.65 million SF. The offices' weighted average
occupancy was 87% as of December 2011 compared to 89% at last
review. The hotels' 2011 Revenue per available room (RevPAR) and
occupancy were $126 and 73%, respectively. Although, the revenue
has been stable performance has declined due to higher expenses.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.97X, respectively,
compared to 96% and 1.07X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Chartwell II Portfolio Loan
($64.8 million -- 2.9%), which is secured by three senior housing
properties totaling 499 units. Two of the properties are located
in Colorado, while the third is located in Temple, Texas. The
portfolio's occupancy was 85% as of March 2012, essentially the
same as at last review. Performance has declined due to lower
revenues. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.26X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 510 Fifth Avenue Loan ($31.4
million -- 1.4%), which is secured by a 61,000 SF office/retail
property located in New York, New York. The property was 91%
leased as of March 2012. Performance is inline with the
expectations. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 0.97X,
respectively, the same as at last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC15: Moody's Cuts 'C' Rating on Class C Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed 10 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
CIBC15 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to an increase in realized and expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans. The downgrade
of one of the interest only bonds, Class X-1, is due to the
decline in the credit profile of its reference tranches.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The rating of the IO Class X-2, is consistent with the expected
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
13.6% of the current pooled balance compared to 11.3% at last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects healthier
growth in the US and US growth decoupling from the recessionary
trend in the euro zone, while a mild recession is expected in
2012. Downside risks remain significant, although they have
moderated compared to earlier this year. Major downside risks
include an increase in the potential magnitude of the euro area
recession, the risk of an oil supply shock weighing negatively on
consumer purchasing power and home prices, ongoing and policy-
induced banking sector deleveraging leading to a tightening of
bank lending standards and credit contraction, financial market
turmoil continuing to negatively impact consumer and business
confidence, persistently high unemployment levels, and weak
housing markets, any or all of which will continue to constrain
growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26, which is the same as at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 22, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the July 12, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to $1.9 billion
from $2.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 116 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
44% of the pool. One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool,
has been defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government
Securities. The pool does not contain any loans with an investment
grade credit assessment.

Forty loans, representing 35% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $52 million (94% average loss
severity). A loan was modified with a $20 million principal write-
down, which increased the deal's current cumulative realized
losses to $73 million. Sixteen loans, representing 21% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Midwest Retail Portfolio Loan ($79 million --
4.1% of the pool), which is is secured by 13 retail properties
located in Nebraska (12) and South Dakota (1). The loan was
originally transferred to special servicing in August 2009 after
the borrower requested relief due to a decline in property cash
flow. While in special servicing, the borrower acquired the
mezzanine debt at a substantial discount to its $10 million
outstanding balance. The loan was returned to the master service
in February 2011, but was returned to special servicing in June
2011 to continue loan modification discussions. The loan remains
in special servicing and modification discussions are ongoing.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $158 million appraisal
reduction for 13 of the 16 specially serviced loans and three
loans on the watchlist that were previously in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $187 million loss for 15 of the
16 specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 15 poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated a
$37 million aggregate loss (24% average expected loss based on a
44% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full or partial year
2011 operating results for 94% and 95% of the conduit,
respectively. The conduit portion of the pool excludes specially
serviced, troubled and defeased loans. Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 104% compared to 102% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.26X and 0.99X,
respectively, compared to 1.27X and 1.02X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes F through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $14
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced and troubled loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs), extraordinary trust expenses, loan modifications that
include either an interest rate reduction or a non-accruing note
component, and non-recoverability determinations by the servicer
that involve a clawback for previously made advances.

The top three conduit loans represent 24% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Warner Building Loan ($293 million -- 15.3% of the
pool), which is secured by a 602,000 square foot (SF) Class A
office building located four blocks from the White House in
Washington, DC. The largest tenant was Howrey LLP, which leased
49% of the net rentable area (NRA). Howrey declared bankruptcy in
March 2011 and has dissolved. The property is only 49% leased as
of January 2012. According to CBRE Econometric Advisors, the
vacancy rate in the submarket is approximately 9%. The property
benefits from strong sponsorship, a partnership between Vornado
Realty Trust and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board. Moody's
analysis accounted for the expertise of the sponsors, the strength
of the submarket and quality of the asset to offset most of the
tenancy risk present at this review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 128% and 0.72X, respectively, compared to 120% and 0.76X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Greenway Portfolio Loan ($112
million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by eight office and
office flex properties located in Middleton, Wisconsin. The
portfolio was 87% leased at 2011 year-end compared to 85% as of
March 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.87X,
respectively, compared to 121% and 0.83X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Scottsdale Plaza Resort Loan ($60
million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 404-unit full-
service hotel located in Scottsdale, Arizona. The sponsor, John W.
Dawson, has owned the property since 1976. Property performance
has been below break-even, but the loan is current because the
sponsor has been funding operating shortfalls. Property
performance declined sharply due to the global economic downturn.
Recent performance has improved; 2011 total revenue per available
room (RevPAR) increased 5% to $125. However, performance is still
well below expectations at securitization. Moody's has identified
this loan as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
240% and 0.47X, compared to 421% and 0.27X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2008-C2: Loan Concerns Cue Fitch to Put Ratings on Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 15 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Mortgage
Securities Trust, series 2008-C2 on Rating Watch Negative.
Additionally, two senior AAA and five distressed classes are
affirmed.

The Negative Watch reflects continued concerns surrounding the
loans in special servicing, most notably the first and third
largest loans in the pool, The Shops at Dos Lagos (11.4%) and the
Westin Portfolio (9.4%), respectively.  Efforts to stabilize and
improve performance at the properties have proven to be
challenging, and anticipated progress in the workout of these
assets has not materialized.

As of the August 2012 remittance period, there are six loans (23%)
in special servicing (inclusive of The Shops at Dos Lagos and the
Westin Portfolio).  The transaction has realized losses of 2.1% to
date, an increase from 1.3% at the last rating action which has
caused the class T notes to experience a principal loss.

Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch status within the next
several months following a complete review of the transaction
including updated valuation details and collateral/workout
discussions with the loan servicers.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

  -- $44.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $105.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.7 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.4 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $5.8 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.4 million class P at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $2.9 million class Q at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has downgraded the following class as indicated:

  -- $1.7 million class T to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has placed the following classes on Rating Watch Negative as
indicated:

  -- $54.5 million class A-SB 'AAAsf';
  -- $354.6 billion class A-4 'AAAsf';
  -- $145 million class A-FL 'AAAsf';
  -- $64 million class A-1A 'AAAsf';
  -- $116.5 million class AM 'BBsf';
  -- $61.2 million class AJ 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;
  -- $14.6 million class B 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $14.6 million class C 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $10.2 million class D 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $10.2 million class E 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $13.1 million class F 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $11.7 million class G 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $16 million class H 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $14.6 million class J 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $14.6 million class K 'CCsf; RE 0%.


JP MORGAN 2010-C2: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on $2.8MM Cl. H Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 11 classes of JP Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial mortgage pass through
certificates, series 2010-C2.

The affirmations are due to stable performance of the collateral
and sufficient credit enhancement to the Fitch rated classes.  As
of the August 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 2.5% to $1.07 billion from $1.1 billion at
issuance.

There are currently 30 loans collateralized by 47 properties.
Currently there are no loans in special servicing or defeased.

The largest loan (15.9%) in the pool is Arizona Mills, which is
collateralized by a 1.2 million square foot (sf) regional mall
located in Tempe, AZ, near Phoenix.  The property is anchored by
J.C. Penney Outlet, Harkin Theaters, Burlington Coat Factory and
Sports Authority.  Occupancy as of March 2012 was reported at 94%
with a reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.18x at
year-end (YE) 2011.  At issuance, rollover risk was a concern as
approximately 33% of the net rentable area (NRA) is expiring
through 2012. However, several tenants have lease extension
options and have renewed including the two largest tenants, J.C.
Penney Outlet and Harkin Theaters. These tenants renewed to 2017
and 2020, respectively.  Additionally, the loan is low levered
with an amortizing structure.  The loan sponsors are Simon
Property Group and Taubman Realty.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $238.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $243.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $390.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $872.5 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $37.2 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $53.7 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $33 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.5 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.8 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.8 million class H at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-B and the $22
million class NR.


JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on $16.7MM Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all 11 classes of JPMCC's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2011-C5.

The affirmations reflect stable portfolio performance since
issuance.  Fitch has not designated any loans as Fitch Loans of
Concern, nor have there been any specially serviced or delinquent
loans.  As of the August 2012 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 0.75%.

The largest loan in the pool (14.2%) is secured by a 792-room
full-service hotel located in Chicago, IL.  Property amenities
include 45,000 square feet (sf) of meeting space, four
restaurants, a junior Olympic-size swimming pool and spa and
fitness facilities.  The revenue per available room (RevPAR) is
$142.47 for 2011, compared to $138.30 at issuance.

The second-largest loan in the pool (9.8%) is secured by a
portfolio of 119 SunTrust bank retail branches and two single-
tenant office buildings.  The portfolio is part of a larger 218-
property portfolio.  The properties are located across seven
states and range in size from 1,110 sf to 78,308 sf.

The third largest loan in the pool (7.5%) is secured by a 323,832
sf portion of a 974,316 sf enclosed regional mall located in
Asheville, NC.  The collateral was 95% occupied as of March 2012,
the same as at issuance.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $42 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $199.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $405.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $65.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $86.2 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $51.5 million class B at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $39.9 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $65.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.9 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9 million class F at 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.7 million class G at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate class NR or X-B.


JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on Class G Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
CMBS securities, issued by JPMCC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-
C5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C5
as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The ratings of the IO Classes, Class X-A and X-B, are consistent
with the expected credit performance of their referenced classes
and thus are affirmed.

This is Moody's first full review of JPMCC 2011-C5 since
securitization. Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base
expected loss of 2.3% of the current pooled balance. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects healthier
growth in the US and US growth decoupling from the recessionary
trend in the euro zone, while a mild recession is expected in
2012. Downside risks remain significant, although they have
moderated compared to earlier this year. Major downside risks
include an increase in the potential magnitude of the euro area
recession, the risk of an oil supply shock weighing negatively on
consumer purchasing power and home prices, ongoing and policy-
induced banking sector deleveraging leading to a tightening of
bank lending standards and credit contraction, financial market
turmoil continuing to negatively impact consumer and business
confidence, persistently high unemployment levels, and weak
housing markets, any or all of which will continue to constrain
growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool's loan level Herf is 18, which is the same as at
securitization. This score is within the band of Herf scores found
in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009. The pool's
property level Herf score is 25. Eight loans (31% of the pool) are
secured by multiple properties. Loans secured by multiple
properties benefit from lower cash flow volatility given that
excess cash flow from one property can be used to augment
another's cash flow to meet debt service requirements. Because of
the higher property level herf, and the benefit the pool receives
from the pooling of equity from each underlying property, Moody's
did not use the large loan methodology.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. This is Moody's first full
review of this transaction. The initial Pre-Sale Report was
released on September 13, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the July 17, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.02 billion
from $1.03 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 44 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 62% of
the pool. The pool does not contain any defeased loans, loans with
credit assessments, liquidated loans, loans on the master
servicer's watchlist or loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one loan and
has estimated a $3 million aggregate loss (25% expected loss based
on a 50% probability default) from the troubled loan. The loan is
the Bayport Commons Loan ($13 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which
is secured by a 97,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in
Tampa, Florida. The loan is current, but the location is on Best
Buy's store closure list. If the borrower is unable to find a
replacement tenant then occupancy will decline to 61% after Best
Buy vacates.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full or partial year
2011 operating results for 100% and 87% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 93% compared to 94% at
securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 9% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.66X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.65X and 1.12X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 32% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the InterContinental Hotel Chicago Loan ($145 million --
14.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 792-unit luxury full-
service hotel is Chicago, Illinois' "Magnificent Mile" area. The
hotel's 2011 revenue per available room (RevPAR) increased by 9%
to $142. The loan has an initial 24-month interest only period,
but will begin to amortize on a 30-year amortization schedule in
August 2013. Strategic Hotel Funding, a InterContinental
subsidiary, is the loan's sponsor. The sponsor bought out its
equity partner in conjunction with this loan in a transaction that
valued the hotel at $288 million or $364,000 per key. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.13X, which is the same as at
securitization.

The second largest loan is the SunTrust Bank Portfolio I Loan
($100 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by 119
SunTrust Banks, Inc. (senior unsecured rating of Baa1, stable
outlook) retail branches and two single-tenant office buildings
located in nine southeast U.S. states. The largest concentrations
are in Florida (40), Georgia (22) and North Carolina (21). The
properties are part of a 218 property Master Lease between the
sponsor, Inland American REIT, and SunTrust. The initial Master
Lease term ends in December 2017, but there are extension options
extending 40 years. At securitization the appraiser noted that the
Master Lease rent payments are above market terms. Moody's
stressed the portfolio's vacancy to account for both single tenant
exposure and above market rent. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
71% and 1.37X, which is the same as at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Asheville Mall Loan ($77 million --
7.5% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in
a 974,000 SF regional mall located in Asheville, North Carolina.
The mall is anchored by Dilliard's, Macy's, Sears, Belk and Barnes
& Noble. The sponsor, CBL & Associates, has owned the mall since
1998 and has spent close to $40 million in capital improvements
during its holding period. The in-line space was 95% leased as of
March 2012 and has historicaly been in excess of 94% leased.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.10X, respectively,
compared to 96% and 1.05X at securitization.


JP MORGAN 2012-FL2: Fitch Issues Presale Report on Secs. Trust
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on J.P. Morgan's J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-FL2.
Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $345,025,000a class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $466,250,000*a class X-EXT 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $41,963,000a class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $34,968,000a class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $34,969,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9,325,000a class E 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.
aPrivately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Aug. 22, 2012.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$466,250,000 interest-only class X-CP.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are six loans secured by 14 commercial
properties having an aggregate pooled principal balance of
$466,250,000 as of the cutoff date.  The loans were originated by
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 94.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 100% of the pool and asset
summary reviews of 100% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.61 times, a Fitch stressed loan-to value (LTV) of
60.5%, and a Fitch debt yield of 15.7%.  Fitch's aggregate net
cash flow represents a variance of 6.5% to issuer cash flows.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be KeyCorp Real
Estate Capital Markets Inc, rated 'CMS1' and 'CSS2+' by Fitch.


LEHMAN BROTHERS 2006-C3: Moody's Cuts Rating on H Certs. to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine and
affirmed sixteen classes of Lehman Brothers-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Inc., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
C3 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-CP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. FTH-1, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. FTH-2, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. FTH-3, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. FTH-4, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The ratings of the
IO Classes, Class XCL and XCP, are consistent with the expected
credit performance of their referenced classes and thus are
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.8% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 9.0%. Realized losses have
increased from 1.6% of the original balance to 2.4% since the
prior review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected
losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 28 compared to 30 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 8, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the July 17, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to $1.39
billion from $1.70 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 103 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
49% of the pool. One loan, representing 0.1% of the pool, has
defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government securities,
compared to 0% at last review. Two loans, representing 11% of the
pool, have investment grade credit assessments.

Thirty-six loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $41.1 million loss (19%
loss severity on average). Currently eight loans, representing 10%
of the pool, are in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Eastpoint Mall Loan ($90.7 million -- 6.8% of
the pool), which is secured by a 850,000 square foot (SF) regional
mall located in Baltimore, Maryland. The loan sponsor is Thor
Equities. The loan was transferred to special servicing in June
2010 due to imminent default and the foreclosure sale took place
in May 2012. The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by
a mix of property types. The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $102.7 million appraisal reduction for the specially
serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $77.5
million (65% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 10 poorly
performing loans representing 10% of the pool and has estimated a
$31.2 million loss (24% expected loss based on a 61% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 100% and 93% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 100% compared to 104% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
8.9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.03X, respectively, compared to
1.31X and 0.98X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Station Place II
Loan ($98.2 million -- 7.3%), which is secured by a built-to-suit
office building built in 2005 with a total of 362,000 SF located
in the Capitol Hill submarket of Washington, DC. The property is
100% leased to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission through
January 2020. The loan has an anticipated repayment date (ARD) in
February 2016. Performance has been stable. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.03X, respectively,
compared to A3 and 1.04X at last full review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the 623 Fifth
Avenue Loan ($53.1 million -- 4.0%), which is secured by a 351,000
SF Class A office building located in New York City. The property
is encumbered by a $36.4 million subordinate non-pooled B-Note
which is held in the trust and secures rake classes FTH-1, FTH-2,
FTH-3, FTH-4 and FTH-5. The property was 85% leased as of December
2011, compared to 94% leased as of December 2010. However, the
decline in occupancy was offset by an increase in rental revenue
and reimbursements. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are A2 and 1.89X, respectively, compared to A2 and 1.90X at
last full review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 888 Seventh Avenue Loan ($145.9
million -- 10.9%), which is a pari-passu interest in a $291.8
million first mortgage loan. The property is also encumbered by a
$26.8 million subordinate note. The loan is secured by a 908,000
SF office building located in New York City. The property was 91%
leased as of December 2011, compared to 96% at last review.
Despite the decline in occupancy, property performance improved as
a result of an increase in rental revenue and reimbursements and a
decline in operating expenses. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
81% and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.07X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Marriott Hotel - Orlando Airport
Loan ($57.9 million -- 4.3%), which is secured by a 486-room full
service hotel built in 1983 and located in Orlando, Florida.
Property performance improved due to an increase in occupancy and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) to 84% and $97, respectively,
compared to 73% and $70 at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 126% and 0.92X, respectively, compared to 142% and 0.82X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the 1 Allen Bradley Loan ($52.7 million
-- 3.9%), which is secured by a triple-net single-tenant office
property located in Mayfield Heights, OH. The property is 100%
leased to Rockwell Automation (Moody's senior unsecured rate of
A3, stable outlook) through November 2020. Property performance
has been stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 139% and 0.7X,
respectively, compared to 140% and 0.7X at last review.


LEHMAN MORTGAGE 2006-6: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Tranches to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 15 tranches, upgraded 10
tranches and confirmed the ratings on one tranche from nine RMBS
transactions issued by Lehman. The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate Alt-A
residential mortgages. The actions impact approximately $400.6
million of RMBS issued from 2005 to 2007.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-6

Cl. 4-A13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A16, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AP, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain;
previously on Jan 14, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust 2006-17

Cl. WF-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. WF-3-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-1

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3-A2A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A2B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 3-AIO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-3

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 3-A2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-4

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30,
2012 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-6

Cl. 3-A2B, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-8

Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-20

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2007-11

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of downgrades and upgrades.
The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The upgrades are due to significant improvement in collateral
performance, and rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to high
prepayments.

In addition, Moody's is placing the Class A-P tranche from Lehman
Mortgage Trust 2006-6 on review uncertain due to mismatch between
the bond balance and the reported Collateral Group P balance in
the trustee remittance report. The final action on the tranche
will be resolved once clarification is obtained on the bond
collateral balance.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility and 3)
bonds that financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

Bonds insured by financial guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflect the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a result, the rating
on the security is the higher of 1) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating, which is
what the rating of the security would be absent consideration of
the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's uses in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have financial guaranty, described
earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.3% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294620

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Rating on Class F Certs. at 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two and affirmed
five classes of Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, 2001-Canada 5 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2001
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Confirmed
at A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to increased credit support due to
amortization. The pool has paid down by 19% since Moody's last
full review. The affirmations are due to key parameters, including
Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The rating of the IO class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.4% of the current pooled balance compared to 10.8% at last
review. Base expected loss plus realized losses to date totals
5.3% compared to 3.5% at last review. Moody's provides a current
list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects: an overall downward revision of real growth
forecasts since last quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced
banking sector deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank
lending standards and credit contraction; financial market turmoil
continuing to negatively impact consumer and business confidence;
persistently high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets
resulting in a further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7, which is the same as at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.4. The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 1, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 87% to $31.9
million from $248.7 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from
less than 3% to 51% of the pool. There are no defeased loans or
loans with investment grade credit assessments.

One loan, representing 20% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.2 million (89% average loss
severity). There are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full year 2011
operating results for 100% of the conduit pool. The conduit
portion of the pool excludes specially serviced, troubled and
defeased loans. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 54%
compared to 52% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.74X and 2.26X,
respectively, compared to 1.72X and 2.16X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 81% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the York Mills Gardens Loan ($16.4
million -- 51.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 90,000 square
foot (SF) retail center located in Toronto, Ontario. The largest
tenants at the center are Longo's, Roger's Video and TD Canada
Trust. The property was 88% leased as of February 2012, compared
to 97% at last review. Despite a decline in occupancy, the loan
has amortized 24% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 54% and 1.80X, respectively, compared to 58% and 1.67X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Plaza Group-Landsdowne Place Loan
($6.5 million -- 20.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 200,000
SF retail center located in Saint John, New Brunswick. As of
February 2012, the property was 51% leased compared to 68% at last
review. The loan is currently on the watchlist due to low
occupancy, while the borrower is actively marketing the vacant
space. The loan has amortized 23% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.29X, respectively, compared to
57% and 1.91X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 4500 Sheppard Avenue Loan ($3.2
million -- 9.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 143,000 SF
industrial property located in Scarborough, Ontario. As of May
2012, the property was 93% leased, essentially the same as at last
review. The loan has amortized 25% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 26% and 4.20X respectively, compared to
36% and 3.0X at the last review.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Cert. Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed the ratings of 11 classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust 2006-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AM, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. AJ, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher realized and expected losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. The rating of the IO
Class, Class X, is consistent with the expected credit performance
of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
12% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 10%. Realized losses have increased from
1.2% of the original balance to 2.3% since the prior review.
Moody's provides a current list of base losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 36 compared to 38 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 15, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the August 13, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $1.22
billion from $1.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 117 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8.5% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 41.5% of the pool. There are no loans that have
defeased and no loans with investment grade credit assessments.

Thirty-nine loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $16.6 million (59% loss severity). Additional
losses of $19.3 million have been applied to the bonds due to
expenses from modification adjustments and appraisal reductions,
and therefore the aggregate bond level losses represent $35.9
million. Currently 12 loans, representing 12% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Mall
at Whitney Field Loan ($72.6 million -- 6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 665,000 square foot (SF) mall located in Leominster,
Massachusetts. The non collateral anchors are J.C. Penny, Macy's,
and Sears. The loan was transferred to special servicing in April
2009 for imminent default and became real estate owned (REO) in
October 2010. As of July 2012, the inline space was 88% leased.
The property will be marketed for sale beginning in the third
quarter of 2012.

The remaining 11 specially serviced properties are secured by a
mix of property types. The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $80.5 million in appraisal reductions for 10 of the
specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $90
million loss (58% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 21 poorly
performing loans representing 16% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $30 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 93%
of the pool. Excluding special serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 104% compared to 107% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 12% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.05X, respectively, compared to
1.24X and 1.03X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 21% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the California Market Center Loan
($103.2 million -- 8.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.9
million SF office/design showroom building located in downtown Los
Angeles, California. The property was 100% occupied as of December
2011. The property has a diverse tenant mix within the apparel and
gift markets. Despite the stable occupancy, property performance
has declined mainly due to a decrease in base rents. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to 82%
and 1.25X at last review.

The second largest loan is the RLJ Hotel Portfolio Loan ($92.6
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which represents an 18.9% pari passu
interest in a $489.9 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by 43 hotels located in eight states. The portfolio
includes a variety of limited and full service flags and totals
5,427 guest-rooms. The portfolio's RevPAR for December 2011
increased to $71 from to $66 at last review, and the majority of
the portfolio has a RevPAR penetration rate in excess of 100. The
loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to low debt service
coverage. While still underperforming the expectations from
securitization, the portfolio has improved since last review due
to an overall increase in revenues. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 122% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to 139% and 0.82X at
last review.

The third largest loan is the Embassy Suites -- San Diego Loan
($67.3 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 337
room full-service hotel located in downtown San Diego, California.
Property performance has declined slightly due to a decrease in
revenues from both rooms and food and beverage. Although the loan
is on the master servicer's watchlist due to low debt service
coverage, the property is performing inline with levels at
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123% and 0.97X,
respectively, compared to 119% and 1.0X at last review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2006-FF1: Moody's Lifts Rating on M-1 Secs. to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
tranches and confirmed the ratings on eight tranches from five
subprime RMBS transactions issued by Merrill Lynch.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-AR1

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3B, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-FF1

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-NC1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades in the rating action are
a result of improving performance and/or structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
views on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an
increased use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its
previous view that loan modifications will only occur through the
end of 2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will
continue at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295653

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-XLF: Moody's Keeps 'Caa2' Rating on X-1 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two non-pooled
or rake classes and affirmed the rating of one notional interest
only class of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Commercial Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-XLF. Moody's rating action is as
follows:

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. N-LAF, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. O-LAF, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades were due to the partial paydown of the Lafayette
Estates Loan. The affirmations is due to key parameters, including
Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.4. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 that uses the following
inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the published
methodology: original and current bond ratings and credit
assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up for
losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
presale report dated October 13, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
trust aggregate certificate pooled balance has decreased by 97% to
$39.3 million from $1.6 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by two mortgage loans that are 14%
and 86% of the pool.

Moody's does not rate the remaining pooled principal classes.
Moody's does rate the notional interest only Class X-1 and two
non-pooled or rake classes associated with the Lafayette Estates
loan.

The pool has experienced $41.1 million of losses to date and has
interest shortfalls totaling $1.53 milloin as of the August 2012
distribution date. Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Currently one loans is in special servicing, the ResortQuest Loan
($34 million pooled balance and $4 million non-pooled balance, 86%
of the pooled balance) which is secured by a 307-key full service
hotel in Kauai, Hawaii. This loan transferred to special servicing
in January of 2009 due to imminent default. In October of 2010,
the loan was modified and extended through November 2015. The
hotel has been reflagged and is being operated by a Marriott
Courtyard franchise. Smith Travel Research reports an increase in
performance with a 35% increase in Revenue per Available Room for
the Trailing Twelve month period ending June 2012 of $54.19 over
the same period ending June 2011. However, the hotel received
storm damage prior to the expected return to the master servicer
and is currently working on repairing the damage. The non-pooled
component secures the rake Class RQK.

The Lafayette Estates Loan ($5.3 million pooled balance and $2.5
million non-pooled balance) is secured by the borrower's interest
in a co-op conversion multifamily complex located in the Bronx,
New York. As of July 2012, 1,196 or 64% of the original 1,872
units have been sold. The remaining 676 units are still available
and currently being marketed for sale. The loan has paid down 87%
since securitization. The non-pooled component secures the N-LAF
and O-LAF rake classes. There is an additional $1.7 million B note
outside of the trust. Moody's current LTV on the pooled loan is
16% and on the non-pooled loan is 29%. Moody's current credit
assessment for the pooled loan is Aaa, the same as last review.


NEWCASTLE CDO V: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class V Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of all classes of Notes issued by
Newcastle CDO V, Ltd. due to key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-REMIC) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Class I Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on
Sep 9, 2011 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Class II Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed at B3 (sf);
previously on Sep 9, 2011 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Class III Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf);
previously on Sep 9, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Class IV-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf);
previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Class IV-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf);
previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Class V Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed at C (sf);
previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Newcastle CDO V, limited is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(47.1%), REIT debt (25.2%), asset backed securities (ABS) (17.0%)
and CMBS rake bonds (10.7%). As of the July 31, 2012 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $324.0 million from $500.0 million at issuance, with
the paydown directed to the Class I Notes, as a result of the
combination of principal repayment of collateral and failing of
the par value tests.

There are fifteen assets with a par balance of $45.0 million
(15.2% of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the July 31, 2012 Trustee report, compared to
fifteen defaulted securities totaling $41.8 million par amount at
last review. Three of these assets (50.4% of the defaulted
balance) are CMBS and twelve assets (49.6%) are ABS. Moody's does
expect significant losses to occur from these defaulted securities
once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 3,337 compared to 3,002 at last review. The
current distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments
for non-Moody's rated collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (4.2%
compared to 3.7% at last review), A1-A3 (3.1% compared to 2.7% at
last review), Baa1-Baa3 (25.9% compared to 29.8% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (25.0%, the same as at last review), B1-B3 (12.3% compared
to 10.2% at last review), and Caa1-C (29.5% compared to 28.6% at
last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.1
years compared to 3.6 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
17.5% compared to 18.4% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 7.7% compared to 10.4% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
17.5% to 12.5% or up to 22.5% would result in average modeled
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch downward and
0 to 1 notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


NEW CENTURY: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Tranches to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on seven
tranches and confirmed the ratings on six tranches from five
subprime RMBS transactions issued by New Century Home Equity Loan
Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-C

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2c, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2d, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-D

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2d, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades in the rating action are
a result of improving performance and/or structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
views on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an
increased use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its
previous view that loan modifications will only occur through the
end of 2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will
continue at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions .

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295651

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Rating on One Tranche to 'Caa2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded three tranches, upgraded
seven tranches and confirmed the ratings on three tranches from
four RMBS transactions issued by Nomura Asset Acceptance
Corporation. The collateral backing these deals primarily consists
of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate Alt-A residential
mortgages. The actions impact approximately $106.7 million of RMBS
issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AP2

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR2

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. III-A-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IV-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR4

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of upgrades, downgrades,
and confirmations.

The upgrades are due to significant improvement in collateral
performance, and rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to high
prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for 2006
and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76,
this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer
than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20 to 2.0 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.3% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294749

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174



NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Upgrades Rating on One Tranche to 'Ca'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches, upgraded the ratings of two tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 14 tranches from five deals issued by NovaStar trusts.
The collateral backing the transactions are subprime residential
mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-3

Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-4

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-1

Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades in the rating action are
a result of improving performance and/or structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295018

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


POPULAR ABS: Moody's Upgrades Rating on One Tranche to 'Caa2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches and confirmed the ratings of eight tranches from four
deals issued by Popular trusts. The collateral backing the
transactions are subprime residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-1

Cl. AV-1A, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AV-1B, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-4

Cl. AF-5, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-A

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-B

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades in the rating action are
a result of improving performance and/or structural features
resulting in lower expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on subprime pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For subprime pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for
2006 and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below
76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan
fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for
the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.80
to 1.8 for current delinquencies that range from 10% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295737

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


PUTNAM CDO 2002-1: S&P Keeps 'B+' Class A-2 Note Rating on Watch
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned ratings to the class
A-1LT-f, A-1LT-g, and A-1LTh notes from Putnam Structured Product
CDO 2002-1 Ltd., a cash flow high-grade structured finance
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).

"We received confirmation that the terms of these notes have been
converted to long-term. These notes are pari passu with all the
other long-term notes active in the transaction. We, therefore,
rate them 'A (sf)' and placed them on CreditWatch with negative
implications, which is the current rating for the other long-term
notes in the transaction," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

      http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1LTf      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LTg      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LTh      A (sf)/Watch Neg

OTHER RATINGS OUTSTANDING

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1LTa      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LTb      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LTc      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LTd      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LTe      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LTi      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LTj      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2         B+ (sf)/Watch Neg


RFC CDO 2006-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-2 Secs. to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two and
affirmed the ratings of eight classes of Notes issued by RFC CDO
2006-1, Ltd. (f/k/a CBRE Realty Finance CDO 2006-1, LTD.). The
upgrades are due to greater than expected amortization resulting
in approximately $123.9 million of paydown to the top class since
last review. Additionally, the underlying collateral performance
has been relatively stable as evidenced by transition in Moody's
weighted average rating factor (WARF) and weighted average
recovery rate (WARR) since last review. The affirmations are due
to key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation and collateralized loan
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

RFC CDO 2006-1, Ltd. is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of A-Notes and whole loans (45.8% of the pool balance),
B-Notes (10.0%), commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(25.1%), and mezzanine loans (19.1%). As of the July 25, 2012
payment date, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction,
including Preferred Shares, has decreased to $303.1 million from
$600 million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class
A-1 Notes, as a result of the combination of principal repayment
of collateral, resolution and sales of impaired collateral, and
failing the par value tests. Currently, the transaction is under-
collateralized by $41.7 million (6.9% of original aggregate Note
balance, compared to 4.9% at last review) primarily due to
realized losses.

There are eighteen assets with par balance of $122.4 million
(46.8% of the current pool balance) that are considered impaired
interests as of the July 25, 2012 payment date, compared to
twenty-one impaired interests totaling $159.4 million par amount
at last review. Moody's does expect significant losses to occur
from these impaired interests once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated credit assessments for the non-Moody's rated
collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default
probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-
dollar WARF of 6,388 compared to 6,876 at last review. The current
distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-
Moody's rated collateral is as follows: A1-A3 (1.9% compared to
3.6% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (5.1% compared to 6.4% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (15.8% compared to 9.0% at last review), B1-B3
(9.8% compared to 4.3% at last review), and Caa1-Ca/C (67.4%
compared to 76.7% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.0 years compared
to 2.3 at last review. The current WAL is based on the assumption
about extensions.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed 32.7%
WARR compared to 37.9% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 12.4%, compared to 10.7% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 32.7% to 22.7% or up to 42.7% would result in average
modeled rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 4 notches
downward and 0 to 5 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


SANDELMAN REALTY: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 7 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two classes
eand affirmed the ratings of nine classes of Notes issued by
Sandelman Realty CRE CDO I, Ltd.  The upgrades are due to
improvement in par value tests as well as decrease in defaulted
securities compared to last review.  The affirmations are due to
the key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2011
  Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2011
  Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2011
  Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. C, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010
  Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

  Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

  Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Sandelman Realty CRE CDO I, Ltd. is a currently static
(reinvestment period ended in March 2012) cash CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of a-notes and whole loans (37.4% of the
pool balance), commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(34.6%), b-notes (8.8%), mezzanine loans (8.4%), CRE CDO (7.4%)
and rake bonds (3.4%). As of the July 18, 2012 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $ 383.3 million from $507.0 million at
issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class A-1 Notes. In
addition to the paydown, the Note balance has also decreased as a
result of cancellation of junior Notes.

There are three assets with a par balance of $66.7 million (16.4%
of the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted
securities as of the July 18, 2012 Trustee report, compared to
twelve defaulted securities totaling $137.2 million par amount at
last review. While there have been limited realized losses on the
underlying collateral to date, Moody's does expect moderate losses
to occur on the defaulted securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 5,650 compared to 6,252 at last review. The
current distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments
for non-Moody's rated collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (2.2%
compared to 11.2% at last review), A1-A3 (5.5% compared to 5.8% at
last review), Baa1-Baa3 (12.5% compared to 6.2% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (13.1% compared to 0.2% at last review), B1-B3 (6.6%
compared to 2.2% at last review), and Caa1-C (60.1% compared to
74.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.6 years compared
to 3.1 years at last review. The current WAL assumption is based
on the assumption about extensions.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
28.8% compared to 41.0% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 9.6% compared to 11.2% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
28.8% to 18.8% or up to 38.8% would result in average modeled
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 4 notches downward
and 0 to 3 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


SLM STUDENT 2005-7: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Sub. Student Loan
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior and subordinate student loan
notes issued by SLM Student Loan Trust 2005-7 at 'AAAsf' and
'BBsf', respectively.  The Rating Outlook for the senior notes,
which is tied to the sovereign rating of the U.S. government,
remains Negative.  The Rating Outlook for the subordinate notes
remains Stable.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the notes based on the sufficient
level of credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor
stresses.  Credit enhancement for the senior and subordinate notes
consists of overcollateralization and projected minimum excess
spread, while the senior notes also benefit from subordination
provided by the class B notes.

Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2005-7:

  -- A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.


SLM STUDENT 2008-1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Student Loan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior and subordinate student loan
notes issued by SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-1 at 'AAAsf' and
'BBsf', respectively.  The Rating Outlook for the senior notes,
which is tied to the sovereign rating of the U.S. government,
remains Negative.  The Rating Outlook for the subordinate notes
remains Stable.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the notes based on the sufficient
level of credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor
stresses.  Credit enhancement for the senior and subordinate notes
consists of overcollateralization and projected minimum excess
spread, while the senior notes also benefit from subordination
provided by the class B notes.

Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-1:

  -- A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.


SLM STUDENT 2008-2: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Student Loan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior and subordinate student loan
notes issued by SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-2 at 'AAAsf' and
'BBsf', respectively.  The Rating Outlook for the senior notes,
which is tied to the sovereign rating of the U.S. government,
remains Negative.  The Rating Outlook for the subordinate notes
remains Stable.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the notes based on the sufficient
level of credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor
stresses.  Credit enhancement for the senior and subordinate notes
consists of overcollateralization and projected minimum excess
spread, while the senior notes also benefit from subordination
provided by the class B notes.

Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-2:

  -- A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.


VALEO INVESTMENT: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Valeo Investment Grade CDO II:

$13,750,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Subordinated Notes Due
June 1, 2013 (current balance is $11,163,625.78), Upgraded to B1
(sf); previously on January 6, 2012 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);

$9,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Subordinated Notes Due June
1, 2013 (current balance is $7,307,100.51), Upgraded to B1 (sf);
previously on January 6, 2012 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and/or an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in January 2012. Moody's notes that the Class B
Notes have been paid down by approximately 19% or $4.3 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated July 24, 2012, the Class B overcollateralization test is
reported at 118.6% (test limit is 101.1%), versus December 2011
levels of 112.53%.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the July 2012 trustee report, securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 40.8% of the underlying portfolio, but includes one
security for which the issuer can exercise a put prior to the
maturity date of the notes. These investments potentially expose
the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time
of the notes' maturity.

Additionally, the transaction has only five performing assets
remaining in the portfolio, which is concentrated in two
investment grade corporate bonds comprising about 51% of the
portfolio par, an investment grade CBO tranche rated Ba3 (sf)
representing approximately 23% of the collateral, and a Caa1-rated
bond representing approximately 20% of the collateral.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $22.56 million,
defaulted par of $4.15 million, a weighted average default
probability of 2.52% (implying a WARF of 1895), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 26.83%, and a diversity score of 3.

Valeo Investment Grade CDO II, Limited, issued in May 2001, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
corporate bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. This publication incorporates rating criteria that
apply to both collateralized loan obligations and collateralized
bond obligations.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011. Due to the deal's low
diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its
analysis of this transaction by assessing the ratings impact of,
and the deal's sensitivity to, jump-to-default by certain large
obligors.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1516)

Class B: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2274)

Class B: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, including uncertainties relating to
credit conditions in the general economy. CBO notes' performance
may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment strategy and
behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of CBO
documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded
ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the bond market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CBO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially when they experience jump to default. Due to
the deal's low diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's
supplemented its typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis
with individual scenario analysis.



WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes
and downgraded eight classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
C7 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2006 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2006 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2008 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2008 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2008 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher realized and expected losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The IO Class, Class X-C, was affirmed since it is consistent with
the expected credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.7% of the current balance compared to 5.4% at last review. Base
expected loss plus realized losses to date totals 6.9% compared to
4.3% at last review. Moody's provides a current list of base
expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a
range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit
enhancement levels are selected based on loan level diversity,
pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations within the
pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the
underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar
credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and the IO type corresponding to an IO type as
defined in the published methodology. The calculator then returns
a calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 would provide
both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by
the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 34, down from 35 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 29, 2011.

Deal Performance

Since the July 16, 2012 distribution date, two loans totalling
$9.2 million paid off. Including those two loan paydowns, the
transaction's aggregate certificate balance has decreased 35% to
$659.3 million from $1.01 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are now collateralized by 95 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten
loans, excluding defeasance, representing 34% of the pool.
Thirteen loans, representing 24% of the pool, have defeased and
are secured by U.S. government securities. There are no loans with
an investment grade credit assessment.

There are twenty loans, representing 17% of the pool, on the
master servicer's watchlist, compared to seventeen loans,
representing 19% of the pool, at last review. The watchlist
includes loans which meet certain portfolio review guidelines
established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly
reporting package. As part of its ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization resulting in an aggregate realized loss totaling
$5.8 million (average loss severity of 1%). There are currently
four loans, representing 17% of the pool, in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Regency Square Mall
Loan ($42.8 million -- 6.5% of the pool), which represents a 50%
participation interest in an $85.7 million first mortgage loan.
The loan's sponsor is General Growth Properties, Inc. and the mall
collateral includes Belk and J.C. Penney. Sears and Dillards own
their stores and are excluded from the loan's collateral. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in April 2012 due to imminent
default. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $48.6 million loss
(44% expected loss) for the four specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 10% of the pool and has estimated a
$9.3 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 92%
of the performing pool and partial year 2012 operating results for
50% of the performing pool. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 78%
compared to 81% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.9% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.78X and 1.30X, respectively,
compared to 1.47X and 1.24X, respectively, at last full review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 10% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Hollywest at Western, LLP Loan
($23.2 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 120,000
SF grocery anchored retail center (Hollywest Promenade) located in
Los Angeles, California and a 30,000 SF single tenant retail
center (99 Cents Only Store) located in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Property financial performance remains relatively stable. The loan
also benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
91% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.17X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Morrocroft Village Shopping Center
Loan ($22.6 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 120,000 SF strip shopping center located
in Charlotte, North Carolina. The center is anchored by Harris
Teeter and Joseph A Bank. The loan is currently on the watchlist
due to the property's lower financial and occupancy performance
directly attributable to a formerly vacant Border's Books store at
this location. Moody's considers this loan to be a potential
default risk and has identified it as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.66X, respectively, compared to
156% and 0.59X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Falls Village Shopping Center Loan
($19.6 million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by an
182,000 SF anchored retail center located in Raleigh, North
Carolina. Anchor tenants include TJ Maxx, Home Goods and Dollar
Tree. Based on recent leasing efforts, property performance is
stabilizing and the loan benefits from amortization. Moody's
considers this loan to be a potential default risk and has
identified it as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 123% and 0.79X, respectively, compared to 137% and 0.71X at
last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: Fitch Lowers Rating on 6 Cert. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, 2005-C22 commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses,
primarily due to decline in performance and/or valuations of the
specially serviced assets.  Fitch modeled losses of 13.9% of the
remaining pool.  Fitch expected losses of the original pool
balance is 13.4%, including 1.7% realized losses to date.

As of the July 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 15.6% to $2.14
billion from $2.53 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are
affecting classes E through Q with cumulative unpaid interest
totaling $17.2 million.  Fitch has designated 21 loans (19.5%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, including 13 specially serviced assets
(16.7%).

The largest contributor to modeled losses (6.7%) is an 826-room
full-service hotel located a quarter of a mile east of the Las
Vegas Strip.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
March 2010 for imminent default due to declining property
performance as a result of decreased tourism and travel in the Las
Vegas market.  The special servicer is pursuing foreclosure.  A
receiver was appointed in Oct. 2011.  Servicer reported trailing-
twelve-month (TTM) occupancy as of May 2012 was 80.5%, with an
average daily rate (ADR) of $85.3 and revenue per room (RevPAR) of
$68.65.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses (2.1%) is a
508,976 square foot (sf) regional mall located in Lake Wales, FL.
The loan was originally sponsored by GGP, and the asset became
real estate owned (REO) on Nov. 1, 2010 through a deed in lieu of
foreclosure.  As of May 2012, the servicer reported overall
property occupancy was 83% with the inline space only 56%
occupied.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses (1.9%) consists of
a portfolio of seven office buildings totaling 299,220 sf in
Phoenix, AZ.  The portfolio is 75% occupied, with five of the
buildings 100% leased to single tenants, and two of the buildings
fully vacant.  The asset became REO in October 2011 through
foreclosure.

Fitch has downgraded the ratings and revised Recovery Estimates
(RE) for the following classes:

  -- $22.2 million class B to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $31.7 million class C to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $25.3 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $47.5 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $31.7 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $28.5 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the ratings and revised the Outlooks for the
following classes:

  -- $18.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $132.3 million class A-PB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $941 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $64.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.
  -- $253.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $152 million class A-J at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $28.5 million class H at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $34.8 million class J at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $15.8 million class K at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $12.7 million class L at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $12.7 million class M at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $6.3 million class N at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $6.3 million class O at 'Csf'; RE0%;
  -- $9.5 million class P at 'Csf'; RE0%.

The $1.9 million class Q is not rated by Fitch.  Class A-1 and A-2
have paid in full.  Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating on
the interest-only class IO.


WAMU 2005-AR11: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded 20 tranches from eight RMBS
transactions issued by Washington Mutual. The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable-rate
Option ARM residential mortgages. The actions impact approximately
$2.4 billion of RMBS issued from 2005 to 2006.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR6
Trust

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR11

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-1B3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR13

Cl. A-1A1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1A2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1A3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR2

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR9

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR1

Cl. 2A-1A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR3

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR8

Cl. 1-A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-1B2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1B3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Option ARM
pools originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of upgrades. The upgrades
are due to significant improvement in collateral performance.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Option ARM pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Option ARM pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for
2006 and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below
76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan
fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for
the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20
to 1.8 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.3% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294822

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF225686



WELLS FARGO: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 Tranches to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 19 tranches, upgraded 19
tranches and confirmed the rating on one tranche from 11 RMBS
transactions issued by Wells Fargo. The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable-rate prime
Jumbo residential mortgages. The actions impact approximately $2.1
billion of RMBS issued from 2005 to 2007.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR12 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. II-A-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-11, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR13 Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR14 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR16 Trust

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. III-A-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR2 Trust

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR4 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR7 Trust

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR19 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-8, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-IO, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR6 Trust

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. V-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VII-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR8 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-AR10 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Prime jumbo
pools originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of upgrades and downgrades.
The upgrades are due to significant improvement in collateral
performance, and rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to high
prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The action taken on the class A-7 bond in Wells Fargo Mortgage
Backed Securities 2006-AR19 also reflects correction of a coding
error in Moody's cash flow model. As a result of the error, this
bond was incorrectly placed on watch for upgrade during the
previous rating review. The error has been fixed, and the correct
model was used for the current rating action.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility and 3)
bonds that financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 3.5% for 2005, 6.5%
for 2006 and 7.5% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 3.54%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.20
to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

Bonds insured by financial guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflect the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a result, the rating
on the security is the higher of 1) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating, which is
what the rating of the security would be absent consideration of
the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's uses in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have financial guaranty, described
earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.3% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294740

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF196023


ZOO HF 3: S&P Withdraws 'CC' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on all
remaining classes from Zoo HF 3 plc, a U.S. collateralized fund
obligation (CFO) transaction backed by a diversified pool of hedge
funds. The market often refers to this investment vehicle type as
a "fund of funds."

"We withdrew the rating on the class C note following its full
paydown on Aug. 14, 2012. We withdrew the 'CC' ratings on the
class D and E notes at the request of the collateral manager," S&P
said.

"The class A and B notes issued by Zoo HF 3 were paid down in full
in the February 2012 payment period and the ratings were withdrawn
in February 2012," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Zoo HF 3 plc
                      Rating
Class              To         From
C                  NR         BB+ (sf)
D                  NR         CC (sf)
E                  NR         CC (sf)

NR-Not rated.



* Fitch Downgrades Rating on 306 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 306 distressed bonds in 178 U.S. RMBS
transactions to 'Dsf'.  The downgrades indicate that the bonds
have incurred a principal write-down.  Of the bonds downgraded to
'Dsf', all classes were previously rated 'Csf', 'CCsf', or
'CCCsf'.

As part of this review, the Recovery Estimates of the defaulted
bonds were not revised.  Additionally, the review only focused on
the bonds which defaulted and did not include any other bonds in
the affected transactions.

Of the 306 classes affected by these downgrades, 179 are Prime, 76
are Alt-A, and 46 are Subprime.  The remaining transaction types
are other sectors.  The majority of the bonds (60.8%) have a
Recovery Estimate of 50%-90%, which indicates that the bonds will
recover 50%-90% of the current outstanding balance, while 22.9%
have a Recovery Estimate of 0%.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions can be found at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'Fitch
Downgrades 306 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf' in 178 U.S. RMBS
Transactions'.  These actions were reviewed by a committee of
Fitch analysts.  The spreadsheet provides the contact information
for the performance analyst.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's assignment of Recovery
Estimates (REs) to the transactions.  The Recovery Estimate scale
is based upon the expected relative recovery characteristics of an
obligation.  For structured finance, Recovery Estimates are
designed to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis.


* Moody's Says VRDO Market Shrinks Due to Low Fixed Rates
---------------------------------------------------------
The multi-year trend of contraction in the variable rate demand
obligation (VRDO) market continued through the first half of 2012,
extending a trend that began in 2009, says Moody's Investors
Service in a new report on how the sector has performed so far
this year and how it may fare in the future.

"Issuers in all sectors of the municipal market are reevaluating
the role of VRDOs and associated derivatives in their capital
structures with many opting for less-complicated traditional
fixed-rate debt to take advantage of historically low interest
rates," said Moody's VP-Senior Credit Officer Thomas Jacobs, a co-
author of the report.

At the same time, issuers and investors are evaluating changes in
bank credit quality and navigating a greater concentration among
bank VRDO support providers, according to Moody's. Market share by
European bank facility providers has continued to erode as issuers
and investors sought reduced exposure to the ongoing European debt
crisis.

"The global banking sector is adjusting to a period of prolonged
economic weakness and new regulatory requirements that are
limiting trading activities and increasing capital and liquidity
requirements," said Jacobs.

VRDO new issuance has slipped to historical lows and is
concentrated among larger issues, says the rating agency in its
report, "Low Interest Rates and Bank Credit Challenges Shape
Smaller VRDO Market."

"While the broader municipal market saw a 42% rebound in debt
issuance in the first seven months of this year, issuance of bank-
supported VRDOs decreased by 5% from the historically low issuance
in the same period last year," said Moody's VP-Senior Analyst
Robert Azrin, a report co-author. "Based on activities in the
sector so far this year, we anticipate little change through the
start of 2013 in the absence of catalysts that would suggest a
reversal."

Issuers were proactive in rotating out of letters of credit (LOCs)
and standby bond purchase agreements (SBPAs) supported by weaker
banks, including those whose short-term ratings have been lowered
to P-2, according to Moody's. Issuers seeking substitutes for
expiring facilities are competing with those trying to exit P-2-
rated bank facilities."

Further changes in the VRDO market are expected as banks evaluate
and adjust their lending practices in response to the 2015
implementation of the liquidity coverage requirement included in
Basel III international banking supervision standards.


* Moody's Says US CMBS Loss Severity Stable in Second Quarter
-------------------------------------------------------------
The historical weighted average loss severity for all conduit
loans backing commercial mortgage-backed securities in the US that
were liquidated for a loss was unchanged at 40.5% in second-
quarter 2012, says Moody's Investors Service in "US CMBS Loss
Severities Q2 2012 Update." Excluding loans with de minimis losses
(defined as losses of less than 2%), the historical weighted
average loss severity was 52.3%, a negligible increase from 52.2%
the previous quarter.

From July 1, 2011 to June 15, 2012, $15.2 billion of CMBS loans
were liquidated, up $700 million over the same period the previous
year, says Moody's.

Loss severities have been generally higher among smaller loans,
which have a limited ability to absorb fixed costs, says Moody's.

Loans with an original loan size between $1 million and $10
million both make up the highest number of liquidated loans and
also have the highest loss severity, at 46.1%. Loans over $10
million have a lower weighted average loss severity, at 36.6%.

Loans backed by manufactured housing and mobile home properties
had the highest weighted average loss severity, at 46.9%, while
loans backed by self-storage properties had the lowest weighted
average loss severity, at 32.8%.

Of the 10 MSAs with the highest dollar losses, New York had the
lowest severity, at 24.5%, while Detroit has the highest, at
58.3%.

"New York and Los Angeles, the two largest MSAs in CMBS, have
outperformed on loss severity, with their lower loss severity
leading to losses that are less than half of their proportionate
share of liquidated loans," says Keith Banhazl, a Moody's Vice
President and Senior Credit Officer.

Among the ten loans with the highest dollar losses, four were
secured by malls. Their weighted average severity was 94.6%. Loans
secured by properties whose business model is no longer viable can
be expected to generate significant losses.

The troubled 2006-08 vintages accounted for approximately 52% of
the loans liquidated in the second quarter by count and 70% by
balance, says Moody's. The vintages with the highest loss
severities are 2008, at 56.0%, 2006, at 48.5%, and 2007, at 46.3%.
These vintages constitute 56.9% of CMBS collateral and 73.4% of
delinquent loans.

Moody's quarterly US CMBS Loss Severities report tracks loan loss
severities upon liquidation and cumulative deal losses in US
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) conduit and fusion
transactions. This quarterly report details loss severities across
the 1998 through 2008 vintages based on liquidations that took
place from January 1, 2000 to June 15, 2012.

This report is available to Moody's subscribers at:

                       http://is.gd/06EHaW


* Moody's Says New OTC Rules to Boost Eligible Collateral Demand
----------------------------------------------------------------
New over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives regulations will likely
cause a surge in demand for liquid, high-quality government
securities that are eligible as collateral to meet these
requirements, says Moody's Investors Service in a new Special
Comment published on Aug. 22.

Increased collateral requirements for derivatives transactions
will result in a sounder credit environment for the market as a
whole; however, Moody's says that lower yields on government
securities resulting from their increased demand from regulatory
requirements may lead to a shift in bond and money market fund
allocations into riskier, lower credit-quality investments to seek
higher yields.

The new report is entitled "Managed Funds: New OTC Regulations
Will Boost Demand for Eligible Collateral".

Moody's says that the regulations require central clearing for
standardised derivatives and global standards on margins for
uncleared trades. As the new regulations come into effect by the
end of 2012, the demand for government securities will increase
and exert downwards pressure on yields, which will lower returns
for the funds that are mandated to invest in these securities.

Moody believes that the new regulations will exacerbate conditions
that are already exerting pressure on yields, such as (i)
government benchmark yields have fallen, some to negative
territory, with a flight to quality; (ii) the supply of higher-
rated investment-grade corporate, supranational and agency bonds
remains limited; and (iii) the use of higher credit-quality
corporate and agency bonds as eligible collateral is beginning to
be seen in the market, although the level of usage remains low.


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $168-Mil. Option ARM RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded two tranches, upgraded
seven tranches and confirmed the ratings on five tranches from
five RMBS transactions issued by Bella Vista, ChaseFlex, Chevy
Chase and TBW. The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate Alt-A and Option
ARM residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bella Vista Mortgage Trust 2005-1

Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Bella Vista Mortgage Trust 2005-2

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ChaseFlex Trust Series 2006-1

Cl. A-2-A, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2-B, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2005-B

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30,
2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1I, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30,
2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2I, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-NA, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30,
2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. IO, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. NIO, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-4

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A/Option
ARM pools originated on or after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The rating action consists of a number of upgrades, downgrades and
confirmations. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance. The downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance and structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for certain bonds than previously
anticipated.

Moody's has also confirmed the rating on the Class 1-A-1 bond from
Bella Vista Mortgage Trust 2005-1. This tranche was erroneously
placed on watch in May 2012 due to cash-flow modeling
inconsistencies. The modeling used in the May action was coded
incorrectly with regard to the calculation of the amount available
for interest payments. The cash-flow modeling has been corrected,
and the action reflects this change.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility and 3)
bonds that financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A/Option ARM pools with fewer than 100
loans, Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate
based on vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the
level of current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A/Option ARM
pools, Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10%
for 2005, 19% for 2006 and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.20 to 1.8 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to bonds, in addition to the
approach described above, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

Bonds insured by financial guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflect the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a result, the rating
on the security is the higher of 1) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating, which is
what the rating of the security would be absent consideration of
the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's uses in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have financial guaranty, described
earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294820

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF225686

http://v3.moodys.com/page/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174


* Moody's Takes Action on $972MM RMBS Issued by SASCO
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 3
tranches, upgraded the ratings on 13 tranches and confirmed the
ratings on 10 tranches from 14 subprime RMBS transactions issued
by SASCO. The collateral backing these transactions are subprime
residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2006-W1

Cl. A4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-NC1

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-NC2

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-WF1

Cl. A3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-WF2

Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-BC6

Cl. A3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A4, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-WF1

Cl. M1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-WF3

Cl. A3, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-BC1

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-BC2

Cl. A2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-BC3

Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-WF1

Cl. A3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2006-BC5

Cl. A3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades/downgrades in the rating
action are a result of improving/deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in lower/higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications As a result of an extension of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased
use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous
view that loan modifications will only occur through the end of
2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will continue
at current levels until the end of 2013.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions .

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF294901

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 95 Interest-Only Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed 92 tranches from 57 deals
and downgraded three tranches from three RMBS transactions backed
by Jumbo, Alt-A, Option ARMs, Subprime, and Scratch and Dent,
Resecuritizations, and Manufactured Housing issued between 1995
and 2007 due to the application of a global methodology for rating
structured finance IO securities.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5

Cl. 1AX, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9

Cl. AX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-38

Cl. 2-A3, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2007-9

Cl. AXP, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR6
Trust

Cl. X, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR15

Cl. X, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR19

Cl. X, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR1

Cl. X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR15

Cl. 1X-PPP, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2X-PPP, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR3

Cl. X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-OA4

Cl. 1X-PPP, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2X-PPP, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2005-AR1 Trust

Cl. X-4, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2006-AR1 Trust

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2007-OA4 Trust

Cl. X-PPP, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-5

Cl. X-P, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. CB-6, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-6

Cl. CB-8, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-F

Cl. 1-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Bella Vista Mortgage Trust 2005-1

Cl. I-A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. B-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-11

Cl. 3-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 4-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB1

Cl. 2-A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-4

Cl. 1-A-29, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-70, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-UP2

Cl. S-1, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-04

A-13IO, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 7,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-4

A-11IO, Current Rating: Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 7,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-6A

Cl. 2-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-14

Cl. 2-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 3-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 4-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-16

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-17

Cl. 1-X-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 1-X-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 1-X-3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 2-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-24

Cl. 1-A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 2-A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. II-A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-36

Cl. I-A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-38

Cl. X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-51

Cl. 2-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 3-X-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 3-X-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 4-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 1-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-56

Cl. 1-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 2-X-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 2-X-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 3-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 4-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-J6

Cl. 1-A-7, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OA9

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-AL1

Cl. X-P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-OA11

Cl. X-P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac IMSC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-HOA1

Cl. AXPP, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-1

A-10IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-5

Cl. II-X, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS1

Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS4

Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-RS1

Cl. 2-A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. 3-A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 14, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 4-A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 14, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR10

Cl. A-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR14

Cl. B-X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR4

Cl. A-X-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6

Cl. A-X-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract
Senior/Subordinate Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-B

Cl. A-IOC, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2007-15N

Cl. 4-A1IA, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1IB, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1IC, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1ID, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1IF, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1IG, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1IH, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Luminent Mortgage Trust 2006-1

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QR1 Trust

Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2005-QO5 Trust

Cl. X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2007-QH8 Trust

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2007-QH9 Trust

Cl. X, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2007-QS1 Trust

Cl. I-A-V, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: SASCO FHA/VA, Series 1998-RF3

Cl. A-IO, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-13

Cl. A-IO, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-18

Cl. MX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B1X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B3X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B5X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-14

Cl. 1-AX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 2-AX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

In the action Moody's has corrected the ratings on all of the
affected tranches due to an internal administrative error, these
tranches were not included in the February 22, 2012 rating action
on certain RMBS interest-only securities. The methodologies used
in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities" published in December 2008.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 9.0%
in April 2011 to 8.2% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a further
drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to drop
another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Notional balances of Option ARM IOs are linked to either a single
pool, multiple pools, single tranche or multiple tranches and
contain a principal-only (PO)component. The balance of the PO
component increases based on the amount of deferred interest
allocable to the IO class. Option ARM IOs ratings are based on the
WARF rating of the IO component rating using this methodology and
the principal-only (PO) component rating using the RMBS
methodology for Option ARMs.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295745


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $575 Million Subprime RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 3
tranches, upgraded the ratings on 4 tranches and confirmed the
ratings on 5 tranches from eight subprime RMBS transactions issued
by Ameriquest, Argent and Washington Mutual. The collateral
backing these transactions are subprime residential mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R2

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R5

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R7

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2005-W3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2005-W5

Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Trust 2006-W3

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMABS Series
2006-HE1 Trust

Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Subprime
pools originated after 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The upgrades/downgrades in the rating
action are a result of improving/deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in lower/higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, our
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

Small Pool Volatility

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on subprime pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For subprime pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2005, 19% for
2006 and 21% for 2007. Once the loan count in a pool falls below
76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan
fewer than 76. For example, for a 2005 pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account for
the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.80
to 1.8 for current delinquencies that range from 10% to greater
than 50% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 9.1% in June 2011 to 8.2% in June 2012. Moody's
forecasts a further drop to 7.8% by the end of 2Q 2013. Moody's
expects housing prices to remain stable through the remainder of
2012 before gradually rising towards the end of 2013. Performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer activity
such as modification-related principal forgiveness and interest
rate reductions. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can also impact the performance
of these transactions .

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295640

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198689


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $84-Mil. Scratch & Dent RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 16
tranches, confirmed the ratings of three tranches, upgraded the
rating of one tranche, and placed the ratings of seven tranches on
watch for downgrade from 12 RMBS transactions, backed by Scratch
and Dent loans issued by Ocwen, BlackRock, SACO and Salomon
Brothers. Eighteen tranches remain on watch for downgrade.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Scratch and Dent pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The rating action constitute of a
number of downgrades. The downgrades are primarily due to
deteriorating collateral performance. The affected transactions
are backed by small balance re-performing distressed loans. In
addition, these transactions have a shifting interest structure
whereby the subordinate certificates are receiving a portion of
principal thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available to
the most senior certificates in the structure.

In the rating actions, four A-WAC and Class A-P tranches from four
deals were placed on watch for downgrade and seven A-WAC and A-P
tranches from seven deals remain on watch for downgrade. These
tranches have separate principal-only (PO) and interest-only (IO)
components. The PO components are linked to the arrearage pool. In
most of these transactions, based on the reported arrearage pool
balance, the PO components are under-collateralized. Based on
Moody's interpretation of the transaction documents, the PO
tranches should not be under-collateralized. As a result, these
bonds are being placed on watch for downgrade pending trustee
confirmation of the enhancement and principal waterfall for these
tranches.

The final ratings on the A-P and A-WAC tranches will also consider
the risk to future cashflows associated with the IO components
based on the published methodology "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published on February
22, 2012.

Moody's has also corrected the rating on the Class B-1X tranche
from BlackRock Capital Finance L.L.C. 1996-R1 pursuant to the
methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. Due
to an internal administrative error, this tranche was incorrectly
downgraded as part of the February 22, 2012 rating action on
certain RMBS interest-only securities.

In addition, the rating action on Salomon Brothers Mortgage
Securities VII, Inc., Series 1997-HUD1 class IO reflects the
application of the global methodology for rating structured
finance IO securities. Due to an internal administrative error,
this tranche was not included in the February 22, 2012 rating
action on certain RMBS interest-only securities.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility and 3)
bonds that financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on scratch and dent pools with fewer than 100
loans, Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate
based on strength of the collateral, number of loans remaining in
the pool and the level of current delinquencies in the pool. For
scratch and dent, Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency
rate of 11% for standard transactions and 3% for strongest prime-
like deals. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76, this
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan fewer than
76. For example, for a standard pool with 75 loans, the adjusted
rate of new delinquency is 11.1%. Further, to account for the
actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's multiplies
the rate calculated above by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for
current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to greater
than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final adjusted rate
of new delinquency to project delinquencies and losses for the
remaining life of the pool under the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in July 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: BlackRock Capital Finance L.L.C.1997- R1

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. WAC, Affirmed at A1 (sf); Remains Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2012 A1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BlackRock Capital Finance L.L.C. Series 1997-R2

Cl. 1-B1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-PO, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl AP, Affirmed at B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2012 B1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-B1, Affirmed at B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2012 B3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-B1, Affirmed at B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BlackRock Capital Finance L.L.C., Series 1996-R1

Cl. B-1X, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ocwen Residential MBS Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1998-R3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-WAC, Affirmed at B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 24, 2011 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Ocwen Residential MBS Corporation Series 1998-R1

Cl. A-WAC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Mar 26, 1998 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl B1, Affirmed at B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on April 19 2012 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ocwen Residential MBS Corporation Series 1998-R2

Cl. X-F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. P-F, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 1998
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B1-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. AP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Jun 29, 1998 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B2-A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ocwen Residential MBS Corporation Series 1999-R1

Cl. B2-F, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 19, 2012 A2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-A, Affirmed at A1 (sf); Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 24, 2011 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. B1-F, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 1, 2006 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. AP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); Remains Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Inc. Series 1999-3

Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on May 14, 1999 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-B-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 1999
Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. 2-B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-WAC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 14, 1999 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc., Series
1997-HUD1

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept 10, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sept 10, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-WAC, Affirmed at B1 (sf); Remains Under Review For Possible
Downgrade; previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc. Series
1997-HUD2

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 25, 1997
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-WAC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); Remains Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2012 Aaa (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BlackRock Capital Finance L.L.C. Series 1997-R3

Cl. A-WAC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); Remains Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ocwen Residential MBS Corporation, Series 1999-R2

Cl. AP, Affirmed at B2 (sf); Remains Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF295009

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at: Excel:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF247004


* Moody's Outlines Single- Family Rental Securitizations Risks
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has outlined the main types of risks
that securitizations backed by cash flows from single-family
rental properties would present. These are the risks related to
the performance of an operator or manager of the properties and
those posed by the variability of cash flows from the rental and
ultimate sale of the properties. The lack of historical data on
the single-family rental market is another concern, says Moody's,
in a new report "Key risks in single-family rental securitizations
will be operator's performance and cash flow variability."

Moody's says that market interest in launching so-called real
estate owned (REO) to rental securitizations has increased over
the past several months, driven in part by the sizable inventory
of REO properties held by government sponsored entities (GSEs),
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) trusts and various
financial institutions.

"Numerous real estate market participants have asked how we would
analyze the credit quality of these securitizations," says Kruti
Muni, a Moody's Vice President and co-author of the report. "No
one has yet presented a specific transaction or deal structure to
us, therefore, we have not yet completed development of a formal
methodology."

Moody's says the transactions would likely incorporate two key
structural elements: first, an operator or manager that will be in
charge of renting, maintaining and ultimately selling the
underlying properties in the transaction and, second, having the
rental and then the sale of the properties as sources of cash
flow.

"The risk that an operator could fail to perform its duties would
be one of the key risks these transactions would present," says
Moody's Muni. "The presence of a manager that actively handles all
aspects of the properties would be similar to what is present in
cell tower or container lease asset-backed securities (ABS)."
Moody's also notes that the securitization will also likely
benefit if the operator is the sponsor with its economic interests
aligned with those of investors.

Moody's report describes the potential risks in single family
rental securitizations as relates to both sources of cash flows.
"Rental rates can decline in weak markets , leaving rental income
insufficient to cover expenditures and meet ongoing liabilities,"
says Moody's Muni. "Another concern is the possibility that
proceeds from the sale of properties will be insufficient to repay
the noteholders' principal. "

As with any new type of securitization, the lack of historical
data is a concern for Moody's. "Despite the wide availability of
information on property prices for single-family residences,
including sales in distressed markets, there is little historical
data on the single-family rental market, " says Moody's Muni.

Additional considerations for Moody's in evaluating such deals, if
they are proposed, would be the substantial ongoing expenses the
property owner would face regardless of the amount of their rental
income, which will demand provisions for maintaining liquidity,
and questions regarding which legal entity actually owns the
properties - the borrower or the transaction itself.


* S&P Places Ratings on 26 Tranches From 15 CDOs on Watch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 26
tranches from 15 corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions on CreditWatch positive. "At the
same time, we placed one tranche rating from one corporate-backed
synthetic CDO transaction on CreditWatch negative. The rating
actions followed our monthly review of synthetic CDO
transactions," S&P said.

"The CreditWatch positive placements reflect the seasoning of the
transactions, the rating stability of the obligors in the
underlying reference portfolios over the past few months, and the
synthetic rated overcollateralization (SROC) ratios that had risen
above 100% at the next highest rating level. The CreditWatch
negative placement reflects an SROC ratio that fell below 100% due
to recent credit events in the underlying reference portfolio,"
S&P said.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Archstone Synthetic CDO II SPC
                              Rating
Class                 To                     From
A-1                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
A-2                   A (sf)/Watch Pos       A (sf)
D-2                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)

Credit and Repackaged Securities Ltd.
Series 2006-4
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

Credit Default Swap
US$10 mil HSBC Bank USA NA - The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation
Limited
Series 227212/227229/227230
                             Rating
Class                To                    From
Tranche              BBsrp (sf)/Watch Pos  BBsrp (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 3
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1-ELMS                  A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 6
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1A-$LMS                 A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)

Mistletoe ORSO Trust 3
                                 Rating
Class                    To                    From
5 Cr Link                CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2005-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
III A                    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
III B                    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
III C                    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
III D                    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2006-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
III                      BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                    From
A1-$LS                   B- (sf)/Watch Pos     B- (sf)
A3-$LMS                  CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC+ (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1-$FMS                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
A1-$LS                   BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
A1A-$LS                  BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
A1B-$LS                  B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
A3-$LMS                  B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)
A3A-$LMS                 B- (sf)/Watch Pos   B- (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 4
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A3-YLS                   CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 8
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A3-ELS                   B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)

North Street Referenced Linked Notes 2005-9 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
D                        AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AA+ (sf)

REVE SPC
Series 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, & 40
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Series 40                B (sf)/Watch Neg    B (sf)

Rutland Rated Investments
Series 2006-2 (28)
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1A-L                    B- (sf)/Watch Pos   B- (sf)

Strata Trust Series 2007-7
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 34 Tranches From 11 CDOs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 34
tranches from 11 U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions, and removed them from CreditWatch negative, backed
by pools of structured finance (SF) securities, including
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). "The downgraded tranches have a
total issuance amount of $2.68 billion. At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on 46 tranches from 19 transactions. In
addition, we removed 24 of these affirmed ratings from CreditWatch
with negative implications," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect the application of our updated
criteria for ratings CDOs backed predominantly by pools of SF
securities (see related criteria and research section) The updated
criteria include changes to the parameters used for SF securities
within our CDO Evaluator credit model, including an increase in
the assumptions used for default probability, correlation, and
industry classification. In addition, the criteria updates our
assumptions on SF assets, including lower recovery rate
parameters, different maturity assumptions, and the addition of
supplemental stress tests the largest obligor and the largest
industry default tests) and additional default patterns," S&P
said.

"In addition to the application of the updated criteria, our
rating actions reflect general credit deterioration in the
portfolio backing the affected notes. Some of the SF CDO
transactions' underlying credit quality has deteriorated, as
evidenced by the increased levels of defaulted and 'CCC' rated
obligations that the transactions hold in their portfolios from
the time of our last review," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on the 46 tranches to reflect our opinion
that the current credit support available is commensurate with
current rating levels," S&P said.

              STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

      http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ACTIONS

Arroyo CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   BBB(sf)             BBB(sf)/ Watch Neg
C-1                 CCC-(sf)            CCC(sf)/ Watch Neg
C-2                 CCC-(sf)            CCC(sf)/ Watch Neg

Commodore CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   CCC-(sf)            CCC-(sf)/ Watch Neg

Coronado CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Type II             CCC-(sf)            CCC(sf)/ Watch Neg

Crest Clarendon Street 2002-1, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   AAA(sf)             AAA(sf)/ Watch Neg
B-1                 BBB+(sf)            A(sf)/ Watch Neg
B-2                 BBB+(sf)            A(sf)/ Watch Neg
C                   CCC+(sf)            BB+(sf)/ Watch Neg
D                   CCC-(sf)            CCC+(sf)/ Watch Neg

Crest Dartmouth Street 2003-1, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   AAA(sf)             AAA(sf)/ Watch Neg
B-1                 A+(sf)              A+(sf)/ Watch Neg
B-2                 A+(sf)              A+(sf)/ Watch Neg
C                   BB+(sf)             BBB(sf)/ Watch Neg
D                   CCC-(sf)            CCC+(sf)/ Watch Neg

E*Trade ABS CDO I, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 B(sf)               B(sf)/ Watch Neg

E*Trade ABS CDO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1                  B-(sf)              BB+(sf)/ Watch Neg

Fairfield Street Solar 2004-1, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 B+(sf)              BBB+(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-2a                BBB-(sf)            A+(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-2b                B+(sf)              BBB+(sf)/ Watch Neg
B-1                 B-(sf)              BB+(sf)/ Watch Neg
B-2                 B-(sf)              BB+(sf)/ Watch Neg
C-1                 CCC(sf)             BB-(sf)/ Watch Neg
C-2                 CCC(sf)             BB-(sf)/ Watch Neg
D-1                 CCC-(sf)            B(sf)/ Watch Neg
D-2                 CCC-(sf)            B(sf)/ Watch Neg
E-1                 CC(sf)              CCC+(sf)/ Watch Neg
E-2                 CC(sf)              CCC+(sf)/ Watch Neg
F                   CC(sf)              CCC(sf)/ Watch Neg

Gemstone CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BB+(sf)             BBB-(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-3                 BB+(sf)             BBB-(sf)/ Watch Neg
B                   CCC-(sf)            CCC-(sf)/ Watch Neg

Glacier Funding CDO II, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1NV               BB+(sf)             BB+(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-1V                BB+(sf)             BB+(sf)/ Watch Neg

Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   BB-(sf)             BB-(sf)/ Watch Neg

MWAM CBO 2001-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   AA(sf)              AA(sf)/ Watch Neg

Pacific Shores CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   BBB+(sf)            BBB+(sf)/ Watch Neg

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2001-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1MM-a             AA(sf)              AA(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-1MM-b             AA(sf)              AA(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-1SS               AA(sf)              AA(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-2                 A(sf)               A(sf)/ Watch Neg
B                   B+(sf)              B+(sf)/ Watch Neg
C-1                 CCC-(sf)            CCC-(sf)/ Watch Neg
C-2                 CCC-(sf)            CCC-(sf)/ Watch Neg

Putnam Structured Product Funding 2003-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LT-a             CCC(sf)             B(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-1LT-b             CCC(sf)             B(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-1LT-c             CCC(sf)             B(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-2                 CCC-(sf)            CCC-(sf)/ Watch Neg

RFC CDO II Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BB-(sf)             BBB(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-2                 CCC-(sf)            B(sf)/ Watch Neg
B-1                 CC(sf)              CCC(sf)/ Watch Neg
B-2                 CC(sf)              CCC(sf)/ Watch Neg
C                   CC(sf)              CCC-(sf)/ Watch Neg

Saturn Ventures I, Ltd.

                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 AA(sf)              AA(sf)/ Watch Neg
A-2                 CCC+(sf)            BB-(sf)/ Watch Neg

Senior ABS Repack Trust
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 B(sf)               B(sf)/ Watch Neg

Stack 2004-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   BB+(sf)             BB+(sf)/ Watch Neg

TIAA Structured Finance CDO II, Limited
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BB(sf)              BB+(sf)/ Watch Neg


RATINGS AFFIRMED

Commodore CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
A                   BB+

Coronado CDO Ltd.
                    Rating
A-1                 B(sf)
A-2                 B(sf)
B-1                 CC
B-2                 CC

E*Trade ABS CDO III Ltd
                    Rating
A2                  CC

Gemstone CDO Ltd
                    Rating
C                   CC

Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 Ltd
                    Rating
B                   CC
C                   CC
D                   CC

Pacific Shores CDO Ltd.
                    Rating
B-1                 CC
B-2                 CC
C                   CC

Putnam Structured Product Funding 2003-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   CC
C                   CC

RFC CDO II Ltd
                    Rating
D                   CC

E                   CC
F                   CC

Saturn Ventures I, Ltd
                    Rating
A-3                 CC

Stack 2004-1 Ltd
                    Rating
C                   CC
D                   CC

TIAA Structured Finance CDO II, Limited
                    Rating
A-2                 CC


OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

Commodore CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
C                   D

Coronado CDO Ltd.
                    Rating
C-1                 D
C-2                 D

E*Trade ABS CDO I, Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   D
C-1                 D
C-2                 D
Compo Secs          D
Pref Shrs           D

E*Trade ABS CDO III Ltd
                    Rating
B                   D
C                   D
Pref Shrs           D

Gemstone CDO Ltd
                    Rating
D-1                 D
D-2                 D
E                   D

Glacier Funding CDO II, Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 D
B                   D
C                   D
D                   D
Pref Shrs           D


Saturn Ventures I, Ltd
                    Rating
B                   D

Stack 2004-1 Ltd
                    Rating
B                   D

TIAA Structured Finance CDO II, Limited
                    Rating
B                   D
C-1                 D
C-2                 D


* S&P Puts Ratings on 36 Tranches From 8 US CLO Deals on Watch
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 36
tranches from eight U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.

The affected tranches are from CLO transactions backed by
securities issued by corporate obligors. These tranches had an
original issuance amount of $1.12 billion.

"The affected transactions are CLO transactions, and the
CreditWatch placements reflect the continued improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying obligors, including a reduced
number of defaults and an improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying loans that collateralize these CLOs," S&P said.

"Although the default rate on the S&P LSTA Loan Index went down
slightly during July to 1.04% by principal amount, the U.S. high
yield default rate was at 2.7%, up from 2.6%. This is the same
rate as earlier in the year. Although the high yield rate
increased, these rates are still below the historical average
of 4.5%. CLOs that are collateralized by these loans continue to
benefit from relatively better loan performances. We attribute a
large part of the improved performance among CLOs to significant
pay downs to the rated notes as many of the CLOs' reinvestment
periods ended in the last several months," S&P said.

"We will resolve the CreditWatch placements after we complete a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review for each of
the affected transactions. We expect to resolve these CreditWatch
placements within 90 days. We will continue to monitor the CDO
transactions we rate and take rating actions, including
CreditWatch placements, as we deem appropriate," S&P said.

              STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

      http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Castle Garden Funding
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-4                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B-1                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
B-2                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C-1                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
C-2                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D-1                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
D-2                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Copper River CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-1B                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-2A                AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-2B                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
C                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
E                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

Franklin CLO VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
E                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

Galaxy IV CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
C                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
D Fixed Notes       BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
D Floating Notes    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

Granite Ventures II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)
D                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

Magnetite V CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Maps CLO Fund I LLC
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
D-1                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
D-2                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Mountain Capital CLO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-3F                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-3L                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B-1L                BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)




                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
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A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via
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                  *** End of Transmission ***