TCR_Public/120617.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, June 17, 2012, Vol. 16, No. 167

                            Headlines

ACCESS GROUP 2002-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B'
ALTERNATIVE LOAN 2007-9T1: S&P Cuts Rating on Class 2-A-22 to 'CC'
AMAC CDO: Loss Expectation Cues Fitch to Affirm All Ratings
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Lowers Rating on Four Certificate Classes
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLOD 2012-1: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes

C-BASS CBO VII: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on $14MM Class D Notes
C-BASS MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. M-2 Tranche
C-BASS MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on Cl. M-3 Tranche
CBA COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Note Classes
CENTEX HOME: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class BF RMBS to 'Ca'

CHASE FUNDING: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B-1 Tranche to 'Ba1'
CIT HOME: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Cl. MV-1 Tranche to 'B1'
CLOVERIE PLC: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Tranche 2007-4
CPS AUTO 2012-B: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class D Notes
CPS AUTO 2012-B: S&P Gives 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes

CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C2: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Cl. A-J CMBS
CREST G-STAR 2001-2: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Composite Notes
CWMBS INC 2003-J11: Moody's Lowers Rating on One Tranche to 'B3'
DUKE FUNDING VI: S&P Lowers Rating on Class X Notes to 'D'
FIRST UNION: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on $8.7MM Class M Certs.

GMAC COMMERCIAL: Higher Expected Losses Cue Fitch to Lower Ratings
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2006-FL4: Fitch Junks Rating on 5 Note Classes
G-STAR 2002-1: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Note Classes
GS MORTGAGE 1998-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 2 Securities
GS MORTGAGE 2007-EOP: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class L Certs.

GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ7: Moody's Rates Class F Certificates 'B2'
KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Fitch Junks Rating on 6 Cert. Classes
KIRKWOOD CDO 2004-1: Moody's Raises Rating on A Notes to 'Caa1'
KODIAK CDO I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 From 'BB' to 'BB-'
LANDMARK VIII: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes From Ba1

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2002-C7: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Certs. to 'Csf'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C5: S&P Cuts Rating on Class F to 'B+'
LEHMAN BROS 2006-LLF: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs. to 'BB-'
LONG GROVE: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Takes Action on $205MM in 2001-2004 RMBS

MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Expected Losses Cues Fitch to Cut Ratings
MORGAN STANLEY 1998-HF2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on $4MM Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-IQ: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2004: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 10 RMBS Class to 'C'
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: Fitch Keeps D Rating on 9 Note Classes

MORGAN STANLEY 2001-IQ: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on $15.2MM Certs
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL II: Moody's Ups Rating on B-1L Notes From 'Ba2'
MT WILSON: Moody's Ugprades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
NACM CLO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'

NEW CENTURY: Moody's Confirms 'Ca' Rating on Cl. M-5 RMBS Tranche
NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Lifts Cl. M-2 Tranche Rating to 'Caa1'
PARK PLACE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M-4 RMBS Tranche to 'Caa3'
PARTS PRIVATE: Deteriorating Performance Cues Fitch to Cut Ratings
PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B Certificates to 'Ba2'

RAMP SERIES 2002-RS2: Moody's Cuts Rating on M-I-2 Tranche to 'C'
SNAAC AUTO 2012-1: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class D Fixed Notes
SOUNDVIEW HOME: Moody's Cuts Rating on II-A-4 Tranche to 'Caa2'
SOUTH STREET 2000-1: Fitch Withdraws 'D' Rating on 5 Note Classes
VENTURE X: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to Class E Notes

VENTURE X: S&P Gives 'BB-' Rating on Class F Deferrable Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on 9 Cert. Classes
WAVE SPC 2007-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 4 Classes to 'D(sf)'

* Moody's Puts $378MM Resecuritized RMS on Review for Upgrade
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $49-Mil. Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Says US Comm'l Real Estate Prices Down 0.6% in April
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 9 Classes From 3 U.S. RMBS Re-REMIC Deals
* S&P Raises Ratings on 17 Tranches From 9 U.S. CDO Transactions

* S&P Takes Actions on 312 Classes from 22 US RMBS Transactions


                            *********


ACCESS GROUP 2002-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class B notes from Access Group Inc.'s series 2002-1, 2003-1, and
2004-1 issuances and removed them from CreditWatch negative, where
S&p placed them on Nov. 9, 2010. "At the same time, we affirmed
our ratings on the class A notes from the same series," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect the trust's collateral performance to
date, our views regarding future collateral performance, the
trust's structure, and the credit enhancement available. In
addition, our analysis incorporated cash flow modeling and
secondary credit factors such as credit stability, payment
priorities under certain scenarios, and sector- and issuer-
specific analysis," S&P said.

                           STRUCTURE

The liabilities in each series are composed of both taxable
floating-rate notes (FRNs) and auction-rate notes (ARS)--
approximately 54% and 46%. All of the class B notes are ARS. The
FRNs pay interest based on three-month-LIBOR and are intended to
pay down their principal based on predetermined principal
amortization schedules. If the auctions fail for the ARS, the
trust documents stipulate that the ARS pay interest at the maximum
auction rate defined as the lesser of:

-  LIBOR plus a margin of 1.50% with respect to any class of
    notes rated at least 'A-(sf)' by at least two rating agencies;

-  The 90-day T-bill rate plus a margin of 1.2% to 1.75%,
    depending on the rating;

-  A net loan rate, which is the weighted average return on the
    trust's student loans less expenses and interest on the FRNs
    expressed as a percentage of the average principal amount of
    the ARS notes; or

-  18%.

"At closing, the trust structure for all of the notes provided a
sequential principal payment waterfall with an initial senior
parity of 101.6% and a total parity of 98.1%. For the FRNs,
principal distributions are scheduled to be paid according to a
predetermined schedule. The series can use any excess cash to pay
down the ARS. If the assets do not generate enough cash to adhere
to the overall schedule, the principal distribution amount is
allocated first to the 2002-1 FRNs and second to the 2003-1 FRNs
until they meet the scheduled remaining principal amounts, and
lastly to the 2004-1 FRNs," S&P said.

"The structure also permits optional subordinate note redemptions
subject to a senior parity test of 105% and total parity of
100.5%. Since both parity numbers have not reached these
thresholds, principal is paid sequentially and has only been paid
to the class A notes," S&P said.

"All classes of notes within each series benefit from a
capitalized interest fund in the amount of the greater of 0.25% of
the principal amount of the notes then outstanding, or 0.15% of
the principal amount of the notes outstanding at issuance. The
capitalized interest fund is available to, among other things,
cover any shortfalls of interest if amounts available in the
collection fund are insufficient," S&P said.

                      TRUST PERFORMANCE

"The percentage of loans in the student loan portfolio that are in
nonpaying status (30-plus-days delinquent, deferment, forbearance,
and in-school or grace) are currently approximately 12% of the
total pool balance. As of March 2012, 30-plus-days delinquent
loans, loans in deferment, and loans in forbearance were
approximately 2.3%, 3.5%, and 6.3%. Recent historical numbers are
shown in table 1," S&P said.

Table 1
Collateral Performance Metrics
                          As of December 31st
                        2011     2010     2009
30+ days delinquent      3.4%     3.5%     4.7%
Deferment                3.7%     4.0%     6.7%
Forbearance              7.1%     7.3%     5.4%

"The senior parity level for the trust has increased since closing
(see table 2). As of the April 2012 servicer report, which covered
the first quarter of 2012, senior parity was 104.4%. The increases
in parity over the past few years are primarily due to the
scheduled principal paydowns of the FRNs. However, the total
parity has been trending flat at approximately 98%. There has not
been enough excess spread in the trust to build total parity
primarily due to the increased cost of funds on the ARS, even
though we have recently been experiencing a low interest rate
environment," S&P said.

Table 2
Parity
                          As of December 31st
                        2011     2010     2009
Senior parity           104.4%   103.8%   103.3%
Total parity             98.1%    98.1%    98.0%

"Due to a high amount of loan consolidations within the collateral
pool in the mid-2000s, the collateral is now composed of longer-
dated assets, which pay down principal on different amortization
schedules than originally anticipated. This has affected the
scheduled principal payments on the FRNs. The 2002-1 FRNs are
receiving their scheduled amortization payments and the 2003-1
FRNs are currently receiving quarterly principal payments, but not
in an amount sufficient to meet their amortization schedule. The
2004-1 FRNs are not receiving any principal payments at this time.
The 2003-1 and 2004-1 FRNs are behind in making their scheduled
principal payments because the trust is not receiving enough cash
at the speed and amount needed to meet all of the scheduled
payments. The trust documents stipulate that if scheduled
principal amortization payments are due on any of the FRNs, these
payments will be allocated first to the 2002-1 notes and 2003-1
notes prior to distributions of principal on any other notes," S&P
said.

The legal final maturities for the FRNs are listed in table 3.

Table 3
FRN Legal Final Maturities

                Current Outstanding ($)          Legal Final
Maturity
2002-1 A-2           44,277,000                        9/1/2025
2003-1 A-2           84,304,292                        12/27/2016
2004-1 A-1           50,721,165                        12/28/2015
2004-1 A-2           414,672,000                       9/26/2033

"To address the risk of failing to meet the near-term maturities
of the 2003-1 A-2 and 2004 A-1 notes, we ran a variety of cash
flow scenarios to test whether the trust assets will generate
enough cash to pay these notes in full by their legal final
maturity dates. The cash flow runs included different scenarios
testing for both various prepayment speeds and default
assumptions," S&P said.

                  CASH FLOW MODELING ASSUMPTIONS

S&P said it ran cash flows under various interest rate scenarios
and rating stress assumptions.  These are some of the major
assumptions S&P modeled:

-  Rating-dependent default scenarios in the 6% to 18% range;

-  A moderately front-loaded six-year default curve;

-  Rejected servicer claims for government guaranteed
    reimbursements at a rate of 1.25% to 2.50% of the claims
    submitted;

-  Special allowance payments and interest rate subsidy delays of
    two months;

-  Delay of U.S. DOE claim reimbursement on defaulted loans of
    630 days;

-  Two prepayment scenarios including 1) rating dependent
    prepayment speeds starting at approximately 3% CPR (constant
    prepayment rate, an annualized prepayment speed stated as a
    percent of the current loan balance) that ramp up 1% per year
    to a maximum rate of 5%-8% CPR, after which the applicable
    maximum rate was held constant, and 2) prepayments remaining
    flat at 2% CPR for the life of the transaction;

-  Deferment levels of 8% for four years;

-  Forbearance levels of 10% for three years; and

-  Auctions were failed for the life of each series and auction
    rate coupons were based on maximum rate definitions in the
    trust indentures.

            CASH FLOW MODELING RESULTS/RATING ACTIONS

The benefit of the existing trust enhancement was partially offset
by the limited available excess spread due to the maximum rate
definitions of the ARS notes.

"The downgrade of the class B notes reflects our view that, while
the trust currently has the capacity to meet its debt service
obligations, it is unlikely to repay the principal balances in
full at their legal final maturity dates, absent significant
consistent improvement in trust performance. The class B notes are
currently undercollateralized, as evidenced by the sub-par total
parity ratios. Accordingly, we lowered our ratings on the class B
notes to 'B (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)'," S&P said.

"However, the class A notes are supported by a senior parity level
of 104.4%, as the transaction is building toward its senior parity
threshold of 105%. Additionally, optional redemptions of class B
notes cannot occur until the series achieve total parity of
100.5%. Lastly, no releases of enhancement can be contemplated
unless the series realize total parity of 101%. The available
enhancement to the class A notes includes existing parity, which
continues to rise, and funds in the capitalized interest account.
Additionally, the results of our analysis of the near-term
maturities indicated that the (2004-1 A-1 and 2003-1 A-2 notes
paid in full before the legal maturity dates in table 3 in all of
our cash flow scenarios. Based on all of these factors, we
affirmed our 'AA+ (sf)' ratings on the class A notes," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of
these series to assess whether the credit enhancement available
remains adequate, in our view, to support the ratings on each
class under various stress scenarios," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Access Group Inc.
US$488.9 mil federal student loan asset-backed notes series 2002-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B          00432CAP6   B (sf)               BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Access Group Inc.
US$669.154 mil federal student loan asset-backed notes series
2003-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B          00432CBE0   B (sf)               BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Access Group Inc.
US$750 mil federal student loan asset-backed notes series 2004-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B          00432CBT7   B (sf)               BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

Access Group Inc.
US$488.9 mil federal student loan asset-backed notes series 2002-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        00432CAL5   AA+ (sf)
A-3        00432CAM3   AA+ (sf)
A-4        00432CAN1   AA+ (sf)

Access Group Inc.
US$669.154 mil federal student loan asset-backed notes series
2003-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        00432CAY7   AA+ (sf)
A-3        00432CAZ4   AA+ (sf)
A-4        00432CBA8   AA+ (sf)
A-5        00432CBB6   AA+ (sf)
A-6        00432CBC4   AA+ (sf)

Access Group Inc.
US$750 mil federal student loan asset-backed notes series 2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        00432CBM2   AA+ (sf)
A-2        00432CBN0   AA+ (sf)
A-3        00432CBP5   AA+ (sf)
A-4        00432CBQ3   AA+ (sf)
A-5        00432CBR1   AA+ (sf)


ALTERNATIVE LOAN 2007-9T1: S&P Cuts Rating on Class 2-A-22 to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on eight
classes from three transactions by raising them. "At the same
time, we corrected our ratings on two classes from two
transactions by lowering them," S&P said.

"Five of the corrected ratings were from Morgan Stanley Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-13. We previously lowered these ratings to 'D
(sf)' after the classes experienced write downs, as reported in
the January 2011 remittance report. We raised our ratings to 'CC
(sf)' on these classes to reflect the revised remittance reports
the trustee provided. The revised reports show that these classes
are not experiencing current or cumulative write downs as of the
May 2012 remittance period," S&P said.

"We incorrectly lowered our ratings on class II-A-16 from Wells
Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-8 Trust and classes A-3 and
A-4 from Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-15 Trust to
'CC (sf)' due to an error," S&P said.

"We incorrectly affirmed our 'CCC (sf)' ratings on class 2-A-22
from Alternative Loan Trust 2007-9T1 and class 2-A-1 from MASTR
Asset Securitization Trust 2006-2 on Feb. 16, 2010, and Aug. 11,
2011, respectively, due to an error. At that time, both ratings
should have been lowered to 'CC (sf)' based on the classes'
exchangeable schedules," S&P said.

"The corrected ratings take into account the exchangeable schedule
for these classes. All of the corrected ratings reflect our
analysis of the projected credit support relative to the projected
losses for these classes as of the May 2012 remittance report,"
S&P said.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS CORRECTED

Alternative Loan Trust 2007-9T1
Series 2007-9T1
                                    Rating
Class     CUSIP        Current      2/16/10     Pre-2/16/10
2-A-22    02150JDG4    CC (sf)      CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)


MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
                                    Rating
Class     CUSIP        Current      8/11/11     Pre-8/11/11
2-A-1     55274QBM6    CC (sf)      CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)


Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-13
                                    Rating
Class     CUSIP        Current      2/25/11     Pre-2/25/11
5-A-4     61756HBL3    CC (sf)      D (sf)      CCC (sf)
7-A-5     61756HBX7    CC (sf)      D (sf)      CCC (sf)
7-A-9     61756HCB4    CC (sf)      D (sf)      CCC (sf)
7-A-13    61756HCF5    CC (sf)      D (sf)      CCC (sf)
7-A-15    61756HCH1    CC (sf)      D (sf)      CCC (sf)


Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-8 Trust
                                    Rating
Class     CUSIP        Current      7/22/11     Pre-7/22/11
II-A-16   94986ABR8    CCC (sf)     CC (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Neg


Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-15 Trust
                                    Rating
Class     CUSIP        Current      2/22/10     Pre-2/22/10
A-3       949797AC8    CCC (sf)     CC (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/
                                                Watch Neg

A-4       949797AD6    CCC (sf)     CC (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/
                                                Watch Neg


AMAC CDO: Loss Expectation Cues Fitch to Affirm All Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms all classes of AMAC CDO Funding I.  The
rating affirmations reflect Fitch's base case loss expectation of
11.7%, an improvement from 17.5% at the 2011 review.

Fitch has also revised the Rating Outlook for class A-1 to
Positive from Stable and class A-2 to Stable and Negative The
Outlook revisions are based on the decrease in loss expectations
in the base case.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate market value
and cash flow declines.

The transaction is primarily collateralized by senior commercial
real estate (CRE) debt.  Most of this senior debt is secured by
stabilized multifamily properties that are lowly levered relative
to loans in other CRE collateralized debt obligation (CDOs).  The
transaction's base case loss expectation of 11.7% is well below
the loss expectations for typical CRE CDOs, which usually contain
subordinate debt including B-notes and mezzanine debt.
Consequently, the transaction's senior-most class maintains an
investment grade rating despite its relatively low credit
enhancement level of 36.9%.  Presently, there are no defaulted
loans in the pool.  Approximately 10% of the pool is considered a
Fitch Loan of Concern.

The class C and class D/E overcollateralization (OC) tests have
breached their respective covenants.  As a result, classes D and
below continue not to receive any interest proceeds as of the
April 2012 trustee report.  All excess interest (after class C) is
currently being redirected to redeem the class A notes.  As a
result of ongoing amortization payments as well as loan payoffs,
the class A balance has been reduced by approximately $10 million
since the last review.

AMAC CDO is a $361 million CRE CDO managed by C-III Asset
Management.  The transaction's five year reinvestment period ended
in November 2011.  As of the April 2012 trustee report and per
Fitch categorizations, the CDO was substantially invested as
follows:

  -- CRE whole loan/A-notes (96.8%);
  -- B-notes (2.6%); and
  -- Mezzanine loans (0.6%).

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 58.4% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario
(defined as the 'B' stress).  In this scenario, the modeled
average cash flow decline is 6.7% from generally year-end 2011
cash flows.  Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be high
relative to other CRE loan CDOs at 79.9%, due to the senior
position of the majority of the debt and relatively low overall
leverage.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss is a whole loan
(6%) secured by a 203,000 sf office property located in Bethpage,
NY.  A significant tenant vacated their space at lease maturity,
leaving cash flow low as a result.  The sponsor has re-leased a
large component of the space.  When all signed tenants are in
occupancy, the effective occupancy rate will be approximately 72%.
The sponsor continues to actively market the remaining available
space.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss is a B-note
(1.6%) secured by a 281,000 sf suburban office complex consisting
of two, four-story buildings built in 2000 and 2001.  The property
is located in Indianapolis, IN, approximately 15-miles northwest
of the CBD.  Although the property continues to demonstrate stable
performance, it remains highly leveraged.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions'.  The criteria applies stresses to property cash
flows and debt service coverage ratio tests to project future
default levels for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based
on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
defaults timing and interest rate stress scenarios as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  The
breakeven rates for classes A-1, A-2, and B pass the cash flow
model at the ratings listed below.

The ratings for classes C through F are based on a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class's credit enhancement.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Outlooks and
Recovery Estimates as indicated:

  -- $208,844,646 class A-1 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Positive from
     Stable;
  -- $50,000,000 class A-2 at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $20,000,000 class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $15,171,554 class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
  -- $12,671,259 class D-1 at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $6,161,510 class D-2 at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $6,415,535 class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $16,224,127 class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Lowers Rating on Four Certificate Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed 14 classes of Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2004-6 (BACM 2004-6).

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 11% of the remaining pool;
modeled losses of the original pool are at 6.6%, including losses
already incurred to date.  As of the May 2012 distribution date,
the pool's certificate balance has been reduced by 40.5% (to
$569.58 million from $956.59 million), of which 40.4% was due to
paydowns and 0.1% was due to realized losses.  Two loans,
representing 2.4% of the pool, have been defeased.

Fitch has designated 30 loans (66%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes five specially serviced loans (6.9%).

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (8.3%) secured
by 496,895 square feet of a 750,377 square foot (sf) regional mall
located in Springfield, OH.  The loan was previously transferred
to special servicing in June 2010 for imminent default and was
subsequently modified.  The terms of the modification included the
bifurcation of the loan into an A-note and a B-note and the
extension of the loan's maturity date.  The loan has since
transferred back to the master servicer.  Fitch views the B-note
portion of the loan as a hope note.  As of year-end (YE) 2011,
occupancy at the property was stable at 87%.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (4.5%)
secured by a 171,365 sf office property located in Los Angeles,
CA.  For YE 2011, the debt service coverage ratio was 0.48 times,
on a net-operating income basis.  As of the March 2012 rent roll,
the property was 77% occupied.  The second largest tenant (16% of
the net rentable area) vacated the property when its lease expired
at the end of 2011.  Operating expenses at the property have been
higher than expected since the loan's inception.  YE 2011
operating expenses increased 14% when compared to YE 2010 and 144%
when compared to issuance.  The increase in operating expenses is
the result of an increase in real estate taxes and insurance
expenses.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially
serviced loan (2.8%) secured by a 359,462 sf mixed use property
located in Tustin, CA.  The property improvements include a 15-
building business park, a single tenant 60,000 sf building, and a
579 unit self storage facility.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in December 2011 for imminent default.  The
borrower indicated in a letter to the master servicer that they
would no longer be able to support operating shortfalls.  The
special servicer and the borrower continue to discuss loan workout
options.

Fitch has downgraded and revised Rating Outlooks on the following
classes as indicated:

  -- $9.6 million class E to 'BBB-sf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $14.3 million class F to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $9.6 million class G to 'B-sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $13.2 million class H to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 0%.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $89.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $237.4 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $56.2 million class A-J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.6 million class C at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.9 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6 million class J at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.8 million class K at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.8 million class L at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $3.6 million class M at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $3.6 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.8 million class O at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate class
P.  Fitch had previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
classes X-C and X-P.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLOD 2012-1: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 LLC's
$369.2 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization of a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior-secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

-  The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
    subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
    subordinated notes.

-  The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

-  The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

-  The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

-  The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

-  S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
    using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with
    the assigned ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
    including LIBOR ranging from 0.16%-13.80%.

-  The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

-  The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
    failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
    interest proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
    administrative expenses and fees, subordinated hedge and
    synthetic security termination payments, portfolio manager
    incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to principal
    proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral assets
    during the reinvestment period.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

  http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111639.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED
BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 LLC

Class                 Rating     Amount (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)             253.9
B                     AA (sf)               43.7
C (deferrable)        A (sf)                34.8
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)              19.4
E (deferrable)        BB (sf)               17.4
Subordinated notes    NR                    40.6

NR-Not rated.


C-BASS CBO VII: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on $14MM Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed one class of notes
issued by C-BASS CBO VII, Ltd./Corp. (C-BASS VII) as follows:

  -- $2,336,648 class B notes upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,000,000 class C notes upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $14,575,580 class D notes affirmed at 'CCCsf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.
Fitch also considered additional qualitative factors into its
analysis, as described below, to conclude the rating affirmations
for the rated notes.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2011, the credit quality
of the collateral has deteriorated with approximately 30.4% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 3.3 notches, and 5.8%
upgraded a weighted average of 3.2 notches.  Approximately 71% of
the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 57.5% rated in the 'CCC' category or lower, compared to 70.8%
and 57%, respectively, at last review.

The upgrade of the class B notes is due to the amortization of the
notes increasing credit enhancement which more than offset the
deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Since the last review,
the class B notes have received approximately $10.8 million of
principal repayment, or 82.2% of its previous outstanding balance.
A portion of the paydowns to the class B notes was due to interest
collected from defaulted assets in the portfolio. Fitch expects
these notes to be paid in full within the next one to two
distribution dates.

The amortization of the capital structure has also increased the
class C credit enhancement (CE) level significantly, providing
sufficient cushion for the notes to withstand potential further
negative migration in the portfolio.  Although the notes are
passing higher ratings than 'BBBsf' based on the cash flow
modeling results, concentration risk and potential adverse
selection remain a concern as the portfolio continues to amortize.
Only 42.5% of the portfolio is considered performing (rated above
'CCCsf'), with the five largest assets representing more than 59%
of the performing portfolio.

Fitch has maintained the Stable Outlook for the class B and class
C notes due to the expected stable future performance of the
classes, with cash flow modeling results displaying a cushion
above their current ratings in all scenarios.  Fitch does not
assign Rating Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or below.

The affirmation of the class D notes is due to amortization of the
class B notes offsetting the deterioration in the portfolio.  The
notes are likely to remain outstanding beyond a two year horizon,
exposing them to potential further negative migration.

C-BASS VII is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on July 30, 2003.  The portfolio is
currently monitored by NIC Management LLC, an affiliate of
Newcastle Investment Corp., who became the substitute collateral
manager for Credit-Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, LLC on
Feb. 10, 2011.  The portfolio is comprised of 75.3% residential
mortgage-backed securities, 15.8% commercial and consumer asset-
backed securities, and 8.9% SF CDOs from 1998 through 2003 vintage
transactions.


C-BASS MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. M-2 Tranche
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of two
tranches issued by C-Bass. The collateral backing the deals are
subprime loans that were originated before 2005.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these rating actions were "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities"
published in December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board still expects below-trend growth for the US
economy for 2012, with the unemployment rate remaining high,
between 8% and 9%, and home prices dropping another 1% from their
4Q 2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB2

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287654

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


C-BASS MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on Cl. M-3 Tranche
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of one tranche
from C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3 backed by Subprime loans.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board still expects below-trend growth for the US
economy for 2012, with the unemployment rate remaining high, above
7.5% through 2013, and home prices dropping another 1% from their
4Q 2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB3

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF288969

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


CBA COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms all classes of CBA Commercial Assets, LLC,
series 2004-1.

As of the May 2012 distribution date, the transaction's balance
has been reduced by 66.7% to $34 million from $102 million at
issuance.  The transaction is collateralized by 103 small balance
commercial loans secured by multifamily, retail, office,
industrial, and mixed use properties.  The loans are smaller than
typical CMBS loans with an average loan size of $330,277.  Fitch
does not receive updated operating information on the loans.

The transaction has experienced higher than average delinquencies
and realized losses to date.  As of the May 2012 distribution
date, 24.9% of the underlying loans are delinquent; with 15 loans
(14.7%) in special servicing.  The pool has experienced 6.7% in
realized losses. Fitch modeled losses of 2.6% of the remaining
pool.  Fitch assumed a 70% loss severity for those loans already
delinquent.  The loss severity assumption is based upon the
average loss experienced on recent dispositions of loans in the
pool.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Recovery
Estimate (RE) as indicated:

  -- $13.5 million class A-1 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.9 million class A-2 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.2 million class A-3 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.9 million class M-1 at 'Csf'; RE 100%;
  -- $3.6 million class M-2 at 'Csf'; RE 50%;
  -- $3.7 million class M-3 at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Class M-5 remains at 'Dsf'; RE 0% due to realized losses.  Classes
M-4, M-6, M-7, and M-8 are not rated by Fitch.  Fitch had
previously withdrawn the rating of the interest-only class I/O.


CENTEX HOME: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class BF RMBS to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from one RMBS
transaction backed by Subprime loans issued by Centex Home Equity
Loan Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast. The unemployment rate fell
from 9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-D

Cl. MF-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287685

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


CHASE FUNDING: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B-1 Tranche to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one
tranche, confirmed the ratings of three tranches, and reinstated
the ratings of two tranches issued by Chase Funding Loan
Acquisition Trust 2003-C2. The collateral backing this RMBS
transaction primarily consists of first-lien, subprime mortgages.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's has also reinstated the ratings of the Class IA-X and IIA-
X interest-only tranches, which were withdrawn on May 28, 2009 due
to an internal administrative error.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board still expects below-trend growth for the US
economy for 2012, with the unemployment rate remaining high, above
7.5% through 2013 and home prices dropping another 1% from their
4Q 2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Chase Funding Loan Acquisition Trust 2003-C2

Cl. IA, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IIA, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IA-X, Reinstated to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IIA-X, Reinstated to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287649

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


CIT HOME: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Cl. MV-1 Tranche to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches
from CIT Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-2, backed by Subprime loans.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 76. For
example, for a pool with 75 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining above 7.5% and home prices dropping
another 1% from the levels seen in 4Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CIT Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-2

Cl. AV, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. MV-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287672

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


CLOVERIE PLC: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Tranche 2007-4
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
notes issued by Cloverie PLC's series 2007-4, 2007-8, 2007-17,
2007-19, and 2007-29, which are synthetic corporate investment-
grade collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions.

The rating withdrawal follows the repurchase and cancellation of
the notes.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Cloverie PLC Series 2007-4
                   Rating
Class            To      From
Tranche 2007-4   NR      CCC- (sf)

Cloverie PLC Series 2007-8
                  Rating
Class            To      From
Tranche 2007-8   NR      CCC- (sf)

Cloverie PLC Series 2007-17
                      Rating
Class              To      From
Tranche 2007-17    NR      CCC- (sf)

Cloverie PLC Series 2007-19
                   Rating
Class            To      From
Tranche 2007-19  NR      CCC- (sf)

Cloverie PLC Series 2007-29
            Rating
Class    To      From
Notes    NR      CCC- (sf)


NRgNot rated.


CPS AUTO 2012-B: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-B. This is
the second senior/subordinated transaction of the year for
Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (CPS).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-B

Class A Notes, rated (P) A2 (sf);

Class B Notes, rated (P) Baa3 (sf);

Class C Notes, rated (P) Ba3(sf);

Class D Notes, rated (P) B2 (sf);

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, the experience and expertise of CPS as
servicer, and the backup servicing arrangement with Aa3-rated
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities," published in
May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the underlying
pool is 14.0%. The loss expectation was based on an analysis of
CPS' portfolio vintage performance as well as performance of past
securitizations, and current expectations for future economic
conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is
Medium/High versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the
Medium/High assessment for Governance due to the unrated
sponsor/servicer.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 18.5%, 23% or 28%,
the initial model output for the Class A notes might change from
A2 to A3, Baa3, and Ba3, respectively. If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 15%, 17.5% or 19%,
the initial model output for the Class B notes might change from
Baa3 to Ba1, B1, and B3, respectively. If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 14.5%, 16% or 17%,
the initial model output for the Class C notes might change from
Ba3 to B1, B3, and Caa1, respectively. If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 14.25%, 16% or 17%,
the initial model output for the Class D notes might change from
B2 to B3,
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


CPS AUTO 2012-B: S&P Gives 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-B's $141.5 million
asset-backed notes series 2012-B.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securitization backed by
subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 11,
2012. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-  The availability of approximately 34.5%, 27.8%, 21.2%, and
    20.6% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes
    based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including excess
    spread). "These credit support levels provide coverage of more
    than 2.3x, 1.75x, 1.45x, and 1.15x our 13.00-13.50% expected
    cumulative net loss range for the class A, B, C, and D notes.

-  The expectation that, under a moderate stress scenario of
    1.75x S&P's expected net loss level, the ratings on the class
    A, B, and C notes will not decline by more than two rating
    categories during the first year, all else being equal. This
    is consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria, which
    outlines the outer bound of credit deterioration equal to a
    two-category downgrade within the first year for 'A', 'BBB',
    and 'BB' rated securities.

-  The credit enhancement underlying each of the preliminary
    rated notes, which is in the form of subordination,
    overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread
    for the class A, B, C, and D notes.

-  The timely interest and principal payments made to the
    preliminary rated notes under S&P's stressed cash flow
    modeling scenarios, which S&P believes are appropriate for the
    assigned preliminary ratings.

-  The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
    loans securitized in this transaction.

-  The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,
    which include performance triggers.

-  The transaction's legal structure.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description ,of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-B

Class   Rating    Type          Interest      Amount
                                rate        (mil. $)
A       A (sf)    Senior        Fixed        120.275
B       BBB (sf)  Subordinate   Fixed          8.490
C       BB (sf)   Subordinate   Fixed          7.075
D       B+ (sf)   Subordinate   Fixed          5.660


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C2: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Cl. A-J CMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction. "In addition, we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on
five other classes and our 'CCC- (sf)' rating on one class. We
also withdrew our rating on one class from the same transaction,"
S&P said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the credit
characteristics of the remaining collateral in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.
The downgrades reflect actual credit support erosion from
liquidations associated to eight assets that resulted in
cumulative losses to the trust totaling $88.5 million to date, as
well as further credit support erosion that we anticipate will
occur upon the eventual resolution of 11 ($180.2 million, 14.5%)
of the 12 ($180.7 million, 14.6%) specially serviced assets," S&P
said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class A-X interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria.  Furthermore, we withdrew our rating on
the A-SP interest-only class following the reduction of this
class' notional balance to zero, as noted in the May 2012 trustee
remittance report," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.27x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 101.7%. We further stressed the assets' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.96x
and an LTV ratio of 131.7%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 70.7% and 41.6%. The DSC and LTV
calculations we noted above exclude 11 ($180.2 million, 14.5%) of
the 12 ($180.7 million, 14.6%) special serviced assets and 12
($76.3 million, 6.1%) defeased loans. We separately estimated
losses for the excluded specially serviced assets and included
them in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity
figures," S&P said.

                     CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the May 17, 2012, trustee remittance report, 12 ($180.7
million, 14.6%) assets in the pool were with the special
servicers, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital). The
reported payment status of the specially serviced assets as of the
May 2012 trustee remittance report is: eight ($35.5 million, 2.9%)
are real estate-owned (REO), two ($6.9 million, 0.6%) are in
foreclosure, one ($137.8 million, 11.1%) is 90-plus-days
delinquent, and one ($500,216) is 30 days delinquent. Appraisal
reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $139.7 million were in effect
for nine of the specially serviced assets. Details of the two
largest specially serviced assets are set forth," S&P said.

"The Tri-County Mall loan is the largest specially serviced loan
and is the largest loan in the pool with a whole-loan balance of
$146.5 million. The whole loan consists of a $137.8 million pooled
balance and an $8.7 million non-pooled junior participation that
is not rated by Standard & Poor's. The total current trust
exposure is $148.5 million. The loan is secured by 1.1 million
sq.-ft. of $1.3 million sq.-ft. regional mall in Springdale, Ohio,
a suburb of Cincinnati. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer, CWCapital, on Aug. 13, 2009, due to monetary default.
The reported payment status of the loan is 90 plus days
delinquent. According to CWCapital, it will proceed with
foreclosure while still evaluating alternative workout strategies.
An ARA of $119.3 million is in effect against the trust portion of
this loan. We expect a significant loss upon the resolution of
this loan," S&P said.

"The Five Star Plaza asset ($13.5 million, 1.1%) is the second-
largest asset with the special servicer and has a total trust
exposure of $15.5 million. The collateral is a 133,451-sq.-ft.
retail property in Rocklin, Calif., within the Sacramento
metropolitan statistical area. The loan was transferred to
CWCapital on Feb. 18, 2010, due to monetary default and became REO
on Nov. 28, 2011. An ARA of $9.1 million is in effect for this
loan. According to CWCapital, the property is currently being
marketed for lease. The occupancy was 53% as of April 2012. We
expect a significant loss upon the resolution of this asset," S&P
said.

"The 10 remaining assets with the special servicer have individual
balances that represent less than 0.6% of the total pool balance.
ARAs totaling $11.3 million are in effect against seven of these
assets. We estimated losses for nine of these assets, arriving at
a weighted average loss severity of 44.7%.  The remaining asset
was recently transferred to the special servicer," S&P said.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

"As of the May 17, 2012, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had a trust balance of $1.24 billion, down from $1.60 billion
at issuance. The pool currently includes 135 loans and eight REO
assets, down from 168 loans at issuance. The master servicer,
KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets Inc. (KeyCorp), provided
financial information for 86.3% (by balance) of the nondefeased
loans in the pool, the majority of which is full-year 2011 data
(78.7%)," S&P said.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.21x for the pool based
on the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.27x
and 101.7%, which exclude the 11 ($180.2 million, 14.5%) of the 12
($180.7 million, 14.6%) specially serviced assets for which we
separately estimated losses and 12 ($76.3 million, 6.2%) defeased
loans. Thirty-four loans ($249.1 million, 20.1%), including four
of the top 10 loans secured by real estate in the pool, are on the
master servicers' combined watchlist. Thirty-one ($268.5 million,
21.6%) loans have a reported DSC below 1.10x, 23 ($214.7 million,
17.3%) of which have a reported DSC below 1.00x," S&P said.

          SUMMARY OF TOP 10 LOANS SECURED BY REAL ESTATE

"The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $596.6 million (48.0%), which
includes the non-pooled junior participant loan. Using servicer-
reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.05x
for nine of the top 10 loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for
the top 10 loans were 1.10x and 115.4%. These figures exclude the
Tri-County Mall loan, which we discussed above. Four of the top 10
loans ($246.2 million, 20.8%) in the pool are on the master
servicers' combined watchlist," S&P said.

"The SP-Portfolio loan ($80.7 million, 6.5%), the third-largest
loan in the pool, consists of six cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted loans secured by six office properties totaling 676,029
sq. ft. all located in the Chicago central business district. Four
of the six loans, which represent $55.1 million of the portfolio,
are on the master servicers' combined watchlist due to a low
reported DSC. The reported DSC and occupancy for the entire
portfolio as of the year ended Dec. 31, 2011, was 0.95x and
93.4%," S&P said.

"The Washington Mutual Irvine Campus loan ($55.4 million, 4.5%),
the fifth-largest loan in the pool, is on the master servicers'
combined watchlist due to the modification of the loan and a low
reported DSC. The loan is secured by four low rise office
buildings totaling 414,597 sq. ft. in Irvine, Calif. This loan was
modified and returned to the trust on March 25, 2011. The
modification terms included a $47.8 million principal-write off,
as well as an interest-only period and loan term extension. The
principal write-off of this loan resulted in a $44.5 million
realized loss to the trust. The occupancy was 12.9%, according to
the October 2011 rent roll," S&P said.

"The Yorktown Apartments & Bluffs of Berkshire Apartments loan
($40.9 million, 3.2%), the six-largest loan in the pool, consists
of two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by a
565-unit multifamily property in Houston (Yorktown) and a 382-unit
garden-apartment complex in Austin, Texas (Bluffs of Berkshire).
The Bluffs of Berkshire loan is on the master servicers' combined
watchlist due to a low reported DSC, which was 0.94x for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2011. The combined DSC and occupancy for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2011, was 1.11x and 85.8%," S&P said.

"The Newport & Sunchase & Benchmark loan ($27.4 million, 2.2%),
the eighth-largest loan in the pool, consists of three cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by three
multifamily properties totaling 738 units located in Tampa, Fla.,
Bradenton, Fla. And Irving, Texas. The Sunchase Apartments loan
($7.9 million) located in Bradenton, Fla., is on the master
servicers' combined watchlist due to a low reported DSC, which was
0.81x for the year ended Dec. 31, 2011. The combined DSC and
occupancy for the three properties was 1.07x and 85.0% for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2011," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's stressed the remaining assets in the pool
according to its current criteria, and the analysis is consistent
with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C2

             Rating
Class  To              From           Credit enhancement (%)
A-MFL  BBB (sf)       A-  (sf)               18.82
A-MFX  BBB (sf)       A-  (sf)               18.82

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C2

Class    Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
A-3      AAA (sf)                            31.82
A-AB     AAA (sf)                            31.82
A-4      AAA (sf)                            31.82
A-1-A    AAA (sf)                            31.82
A-J      CCC- (sf)                            9.89
A-X      AAA (sf)                              N/A

RATING WITHDRAWN

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C2
             Rating
Class  To           From           Credit enhancement (%)
A-SP   NR           AAA (sf)                          N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


CREST G-STAR 2001-2: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Composite Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A, B-1, B-2, C, and composite notes from Crest G-Star 2001-2
Ltd., a cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities. "In addition, we
removed our ratings on the A, B-1, B-2, and composite notes from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with negative implications on
March 19, 2012," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2, C, and composite
notes reflect our belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

              STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Crest G-Star 2001-2 Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
A                 A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B-1               CCC+ (sf)   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B-2               CCC+ (sf)   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Composite notes   CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

RATING AFFIRMED

Crest G-Star 2001-2 Ltd.
Class             Rating
C                 CC (sf)


CWMBS INC 2003-J11: Moody's Lowers Rating on One Tranche to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 40
tranches, upgraded the ratings of two tranches and confirmed the
ratings of four tranches from nine RMBS transactions, backed by
Alt-A loans, issued by Countrywide.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The downgrades are due to
deteriorating performance of the pools and/or structural features
resulting in higher expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting interest
structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the seniors to
tail-end losses. In its current approach, Moody's captures this
risk by running each individual pool through a variety of loss and
prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)
(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street
Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction. As
such, Moody's has withdrawn the rating of CWMBS, Inc. Alternative
Loan Trust 2002-16.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.1% in April 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2002-13

Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2002
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2002-14

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2002
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2002-16

Cl. A-8, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Nov 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass Through Certificates 2003-13

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-16

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-33

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-12, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-J11

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 3-X, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 4-X, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-J12

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-4CB

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-A-5, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-5CB

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287689

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


DUKE FUNDING VI: S&P Lowers Rating on Class X Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class X notes from Duke Funding High Grade VI Ltd. to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' and the class A-1 notes from Orchid Structured
Finance CDO II Ltd. to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'. "Both
transactions are collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by
structured finance assets. Simultaneously, we removed the ratings
from CreditWatch, where we placed them with negative implications
on March 19, 2012," S&P said.

"On May 25, 2012, we received notice for Duke Funding High Grade
VI Ltd. indicating that the transaction had liquidated. According
to the May 29, 2012, final note valuation report, the proceeds
from liquidation were insufficient to pay down the class X
noteholders in full. As a result, we lowered our rating to 'D
(sf)', which is in line with our criteria," S&P said.

"On May 22, 2012, Standard & Poor's received notice of proposed
liquidation for Orchid Structured Finance CDO II Ltd. The notice
further indicated that no payments would be made on the upcoming
distribution date. It stated that all proceeds from the liquidated
collateral would be held until the liquidation is completed, at
which time the transaction will make a final payment. According
to the May 1, 2012, trustee report, the transaction currently
holds collateral with a par value of $90.17 million, $60.36
million of which is considered defaulted, with a class A principal
coverage ratio of 18.59% (vs. the requirement of 105.00%). We
lowered our rating on the $85.78 million class A-1 notes to 'CC
(sf)' based on our review of the underlying collateral and the
unlikelihood of ultimate payment of principal to the notes," S&P
said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTION

Duke Funding High Grade VI Ltd.

                Rating
Class        To         From
X            D (sf)     CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Orchid Structured Finance CDO II Ltd.
                Rating
Class        To         From
A-1          CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

OTHER RATINGS OUTSTANDING

Duke Funding High Grade VI Ltd.
Class        Rating
A-1LA        D (sf)
A-1LB        D (sf)
A-2L         D (sf)
A-3L         D (sf)
B-1L         D (sf)

Orchid Structured Finance CDO II Ltd.
Class        Rating
A-2          D (sf)
A-3          D (sf)
B            D (sf)


FIRST UNION: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on $8.7MM Class M Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class of First Union National Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1999-C4.

The rating upgrade is due to increased credit enhancement as a
result of paydown and defeasance.  As of the May 2012 distribution
date, the pools certificate balance has been reduced 95.6%
(including 2% in realized losses) to $38.9 million from $885.7
million at issuance.  There are 11 of the original 156 loans
remaining in the transaction. Seven loans (45.8% of pool balance)
are fully defeased.

Fitch modeled losses of 10.43% of the remaining pool; expected
losses of the original pool are at 2.48%, including losses
realized to date.  Out of the four non-defeased loans (54.2%),
Fitch has identified three as Loans of Concern (49.7% of pool
balance), which includes one asset in special servicing (18.9%).
Fitch expects that losses associated with the specially serviced
loan to be absorbed by class M.

The specially serviced asset, which is the second largest in the
pool (18.9%), is secured by a 190 unit multifamily complex in
Jonesboro, GA.  The loan had transferred to special servicing in
October 2009 due to maturity default.  A receiver was appointed in
May 2010, and the property was foreclosed on in July 2010.  The
special servicer continues working to stabilize and market the
property for sale.  The servicer reported occupancy as of June
2012 at 92%.

The largest loan in the pool (28.4%) is a Fitch Loan of Concern.
The loan is secured by a 215,860 square foot (sf) retail center in
Ashwaubenon, WI.  The loan had previously transferred to special
servicing in 2009 due to maturity default.  The loan returned back
to the master servicer in March 2011 after receiving a
modification.  The modification included an extension of it's
maturity and interest only period to August 2012 and a reduction
in interest rate.  The servicer reported a slight improvement in
occupancy, currently at 75% versus 63% in March 2011, due to the
lease up of approximately 50% of a previously vacated 46,000 sf
(21% net rentable area [NRA]) anchor space.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the three non-specially serviced
and non-defeased loans by applying a minimum 5% reduction to 2011
fiscal year end (YE) net operating income.  Fitch also applied an
adjusted market cap rate between 9% and 10% to determine value.

The three non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans also
underwent a refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-
year amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  All
three of the loans are considered to pay off at maturity, and
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) above 1.25
times (x).  Of the 11 remaining loans in the pool, one (28.4%) is
scheduled to mature in 2012, one (2.4%) in 2014, seven (36.31%) in
2016, and one (10.4%) in 2019.

Fitch upgrades the following class:

  -- $1.5 million class G to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirms the following classes and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

  -- $11.1 million class H at 'Asf '; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.2 million class J at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.6 million class K at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.9 million class L at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $8.7 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 70%.

Class N is not rated by Fitch. Due to realized losses, class N has
been reduced to $0 from $17.7 million at issuance.  Classes A-1,
A-2, B, C, D, E and F have paid in full.

Fitch had previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
class IO.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Higher Expected Losses Cue Fitch to Lower Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgraded one class and affirmed nine classes of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.'s mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2001-C1.

The downgrade is due to higher expected losses on specially
serviced loans, as well as increased concentration, and adverse
selection of the remaining pool.

Fitch modeled losses of 40.27% of the remaining pool.  All nine
(100%) of the remaining loans are in special servicing.  Four
assets (79.80%) are real-estate owned (REO).  As of the May 2012
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced 90.64% to $80.9 million from $864.1 million at issuance.
Realized losses to date are 5.13% of the original pool balance.
As of the May 2012 remittance, interest shortfalls are affecting
class G through P and total $6.9 million.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a REO
property (19.2% of the pool balance) located in Grand Rapids, MI.
The 315,202 square foot (sf) 17 story office property was built in
1993 within the central business district (CBD).  The servicer-
reported occupancy was 56% as of March 2012.  Varnum, the largest
tenant, occupying 112,936 sf of the net rentable area (NRA) is
evaluating alternate options before committing to renew their
lease which expires in early 2013.  The special servicer continues
to market the vacant space and recently listed the property for
sale.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is REO The
Village on Lorna Shopping Center (12.5%).  The property is located
in Hoover, AL and was formerly anchored by Food World.  As of
March 31, 2012, the property had an occupancy rate of 44%.  The
special servicer has been working to increase occupancy and retain
the current tenants.  The building will be listed for sale
shortly.

The third-largest contributor to modeled losses, the REO
Providence Office Center (11.9% of the pool), is a 94,238 sf two-
building office complex located in Norristown, PA.  The collateral
was transferred to the special servicer in April 2010 for monetary
default.  The property is being marketed for lease and a number of
prospects have shown interest but a serious offer has not been
submitted.  The property received a low bid that was rejected and
the property continues to be marketed for sale.

Fitch has downgraded the following class and assigned a recovery
estimate as indicated:

  -- $13 million class G to 'CCCsf', RE100% from 'Bsf'.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

  -- $4.2 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.3 million class E at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $13 million class F at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $25.9 million class H at 'Csf'; RE5%;
  -- $6.5 million class J at 'Csf'; RE0%.

Classes K, L, M and N remain at 'Dsf'; RE0%; due to realized
losses.

Class A-1, A-2, A-3 and the interest-only class X-2 have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate class P.  Class X-1 and O was
previously withdrawn.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2006-FL4: Fitch Junks Rating on 5 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five non-pooled classes, upgraded two
pooled classes, and affirmed 14 classes of Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corporation (GCCFC), series 2006-FL4.
Downgrades to the non-pooled classes associated with the 260 East
161st Street and 2600 West Olive Avenue loans were due to
increased loss expectations on those loans.  Upgrades to two of
the senior classes reflect higher credit enhancement levels due to
principal paydown.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 70% of the pool is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 14.4% from generally year-end 2011 servicer-reported
financial data, or from recent appraised values.  To determine a
sustainable Fitch cash flow and stressed value, Fitch analyzed
servicer-reported operating statements and rent rolls, updated
property valuations, and comparisons with properties' competitive
sets.  Fitch estimates average recoveries on the pooled loans will
be approximately 80% in the base case.

The transaction is collateralized by seven assets, which includes
three loans secured by hotels (68.3% of the pooled and non-pooled
trust balance), two loans by office properties (17.6%), one real
estate owned (REO) regional mall (12.3%), and one loan by a
multifamily/condominium project (1.8%).  All of the original final
maturity dates, including all extension options, have passed.
Each of the remaining loans has been further extended through a
modification and/or forbearance, with the exception of one asset
(12.3% by scheduled loan balance) that has been REO since 2009.
Of the remaining loans, 19.4% are scheduled to mature in 2013,
with 68.3% scheduled to mature in 2014.

With respect to the pooled classes, four loans were modeled to
take a loss in the base case: PGA National Resort and Spa (33.8%
of the pooled trust balance), Northwest Plaza (11%), 260 East
161st Street (8.5%) and 2600 West Olive Avenue (7%).  The 10
junior non-pooled component classes have all either incurred or
are expected to incur losses.

The primary contributor to loss under the 'B' stress is the
specially serviced Northwest Plaza, an REO asset consisting of an
approximately 1.7 million square foot (sf) regional mall and an
attached 12-story, 153,000 sf office building located in St. Ann,
MO.  The loan transferred to special servicing in October 2008 for
payment default and in September 2009, the property became REO.
Following a failed redevelopment effort, the interior of the mall
was shuttered in December 2010.  The last information available on
the property indicated that the mall was only 8% occupied by
several tenants with exterior access, with the attached office
building 49% occupied.  Within the past 12 months, a new, local
broker was engaged to market and sell the property and it is now
under contract with closing slated for mid-July.  However, Fitch
modeled no recoveries on both the pooled and nonpooled trust
assets.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

  -- $770,025 class N-E161 to 'Csf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $1.4 million class N-2600 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $2 million class O-2600 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $1.3 million class P-2600 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $1.7 million class Q-2600 to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch upgrades the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

  -- $35.4 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised
     to Stable from Positive;
  -- $30.7 million class C to 'AAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook revised
     to Stable from Positive.

Fitch affirms the following class and revises the Rating Outlook
as indicated:

  -- $11.3 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable
     from Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises REs as indicated:

  -- $53.1 million class A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.7 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15 million class G at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $17.6 million class H at 'CCsf'; RE 70%;
  -- $14.2 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $7.2 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $5.1 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $2 million class N-NZH at 'Dsf'; RE 85%;
  -- $1.6 million class N-NW at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $894,510 class O-NW at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $956,200 class P-NW at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $1.2 million class Q-NW at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

In addition, the following classes originally rated by Fitch have
paid in full: A1, N-MET, O-MET, N-LAX, N-SCR, O-SCR, N-PDS, O-PDS,
N-WYN, N-HAP, O-HAP, P-HAP, N-CPH, O-CPH, P-CPH, Q-CPH, S-CPH, N-
LJS, N-LDC, O-LDC, P-LDC, N-444, O-444, and X-1.


G-STAR 2002-1: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed three classes issued
by G-Star 2002-1, Ltd./Corp. (G-Star 2002-1) as a result of
significant delevering of the capital structure.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2011, approximately 27%
of the collateral has been downgraded and 15.9% has been upgraded.
Currently, 64.6% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 38.9% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and
below.  Over this period, the class A-1MM notes received $28.6
million and the class A-2 notes have received $15.7 million in
paydowns.  The paydowns are due to principal repayments from the
underlying collateral as well as the redirection of interest
proceeds due to the failure of the class B principal coverage
test.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.  The class A-2 and B notes are passing above their
current ratings.  The upgrade to the class A-2 notes is due to the
amortization of the notes increasing the credit enhancement which
more than offsets the deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
However, an upgrade to the class B notes is not warranted given
the concentration risk and potential adverse selection as the
portfolio continues to amortize.

For the class C notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to
the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below).  Given the
high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class C
notes have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.

The Stable Outlook on the class A-2 notes reflects Fitch's
expectation that the notes will continue to delever.  Fitch does
not assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

G-Star 2002-1 is a cash flow commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO) which closed on April 16, 2002.  The
collateral is composed of 18 assets from 14 obligors of which
95.4% commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) and 4.6% real
estate investment trusts (REIT).

Fitch has taken the following actions as indicated:

  -- $13,965,326 class A-2 upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative;
  -- $15,759,835 class B-FL affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  -- $18,702,403 class B-FX affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  -- $12,710,681 class C affirmed at 'Csf'.


GS MORTGAGE 1998-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 2 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation II 1998-C1, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The affirmation is due to sufficient credit enhancement to the
remaining investment grade class.  The pool has become more
concentrated, with 44 remaining loans from the original 323 at
issuance.  Of the remaining loans, 13 loans (20.2%) are defeased.
Fitch identified 11 (42.6%) Loans of Concern, of which two (21.5%)
are specially serviced.

As of the May 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 89.9% to $115.3 million from $1.8 billion.
The expected losses of the original pool are at 4.72%, which
includes 3.87% to date.  In addition, cumulative interest
shortfalls totaling $7.7 million are affecting classes H through
K.

The largest contributor to losses is a real estate owned (REO)
asset secured by a 296,735 square foot (SF) shopping center
located in Queensbury, NY.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2008 due to imminent default and became REO in
March 2012 via a deed-in-lieu.

The second contributor to losses is a loan secured by a 211,089 SF
office building located in San Juan, PR.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2011 for imminent default.  The
property has been suffering from poor performance since 2008 due
to declining occupancy.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns Recovery Estimate
(RE) as indicated:

  -- $23.2 million class G at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $44.2 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 55%;
  -- Class J at 'Dsf'; RE0%.

Fitch does not rate classes F and K.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, and E have paid in full.

Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
class X.


GS MORTGAGE 2007-EOP: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class L Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS
Mortgage Securities Corp. II's series 2007-EOP, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

"The affirmations follow our analysis of the transaction, which
included our revaluation of the collateral securing the
transaction's sole $4.82 billion floating-rate interest-only (IO)
mortgage loan, and a review of the deal structure and liquidity
available to the trust. Our adjusted valuation on the collateral,
using a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.90%, yielded an
intrust stressed loan-to-value ratio of 102.7%," S&P said.

The mortgage loan was transferred to the special servicer, Bank of
America N.A. (BofA), on May 21, 2010, after the borrower requested
a modification and extension of the loan and concerns surrounding
the borrower's ability to refinance the mortgage loan by its Feb.
1, 2012, final maturity date. According to BofA, the loan was
modified on Dec. 22, 2010, and returned to the master servicer,
also BofA on Feb. 1, 2011. The terms of the modification
include, but are not limited to:

-  The addition of two one-year extension options following the
    initial maturity date, providing a fully extended maturity
    date of Feb. 1, 2014;

-  The borrower will pay an additional interest rate spread
    pursuant to a schedule ranging from 105 to 175 basis points
    that will be allocated to the pooled certificateholders in a
    manner contemplated by the amended trust and servicing
    agreement (TSA);

-  The borrower paid all fees associated with the modification
    including special servicing fees and has agreed to pay all
    future workout fees;

-  The borrower paid $50.0 million in amortization during the
    2011 calendar year and will pay an additional $75.0 million
    per year for the 2012 and 2013 calendar years;

-  As additional collateral for the loan, the borrower has
    pledged approximately $350.0 million in CMBS bonds. All
    principal and interest received on bonds will be used to pay
    down the mortgage loan balance; and

-  Approximately $424.0 million in mezzanine financing was
    repaid.

"The affirmed 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X IO certificate
reflects our current criteria," S&P said.

"We based our analysis of the collateral, in part, on a review of
the borrower's operating statements for the trailing-12-months
(TTM) ended Dec. 31, 2011, as well as the borrower's rent rolls as
of Feb. 29, 2012. BofA reported a debt service coverage of 3.97x
for the portfolio for year-end 2011, and overall occupancy was
87.4% according to the February 2012 rent rolls. The one-month
LIBOR rate was 0.239% (according to the June 6, 2012, trustee
remittance report). Based on the reported historical financial
data, the portfolio performance has been stable with reported
overall occupancies ranging from 82.0% (2009) to 85.0% (year-end
2011)," S&P said.

As of the June 6, 2012, trustee remittance report, the mortgage
loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $4.82 billion, which is
currently secured by 94 office properties totaling 34.1 million
sq. ft. in nine U.S. states. Since issuance, 40 office properties
were fully released from the collateral pool, resulting in a $1.94
billion paydown of the senior loan balance. The top five
geographic concentrations are: Boston (34.8% of net rentable area
{NRA}), Northern California (32.6% of NRA), Southern California
(16.8% of NRA), Manhattan (4.1% of NRA), and New Orleans (3.6% of
NRA). The floating-rate IO loan matures on Feb. 1, 2013, and has
one one-year extension option remaining. Details of the current
collateral for the mortgage loan are:

-  First mortgage liens on 78 office properties totaling 23.5
    million sq. ft.;

-  Cash flow pledges of the borrower's joint venture interests in
    10 office properties totaling 7.6 million sq. ft.;

-  Equity pledges of the borrower's joint venture interests in
    three properties totaling 1.7 million sq. ft.; and

-  Other collateral including covenants to apply proceeds and
    collateral note assignments with respect to three properties
    totaling 1.3 million sq. ft.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-EOP

Class             Rating
A-1               AAA (sf)
A-2               AAA (sf)
A-3               AAA (sf)
B                 AAA (sf)
C                 AA+ (sf)
D                 AA (sf)
E                 A+ (sf)
F                 BBB+ (sf)
G                 BBB (sf)
H                 BBB- (sf)
J                 BB+ (sf)
K                 BB (sf)
L                 B- (sf)
X                 AAA (sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ7: Moody's Rates Class F Certificates 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to thirteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by GS Mortgage Securities Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-GCJ7.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 79 fixed rate loans secured
by 175 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.42X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.09X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 97.8% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 101.4% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 33.9. The transaction's loan level diversity
is at the higher end of the band of Herfindahl scores found in
most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009. With respect
to property level diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl
Index is 40.2. The transaction's property diversity profile is
higher than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa class with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals. The transaction was structured with additional
subordination at class A-S to mitigate the potential increased
severity to class A-S.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.5, which is higher
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.60
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, or 23%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa2, A1, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of, Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Fitch Junks Rating on 6 Cert. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven and affirmed four classes of
Key Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 10.4% of the remaining
transaction balance; expected losses of the original pool are at
9.1%, including losses already incurred to date (2.4%).  Fitch has
designated 30 loans (28.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes five specially serviced loans (5%).

As of the May 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced by 34.9% to $154.5 million from $237.5
million at issuance.  There are 113 of the original 155 loans
remaining in the transaction.  The average loan size for the
transaction is $1.4 million.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying
cap rates ranging from 8.1%-10.5% to determine loan values and
losses.

The largest contributor to losses (3% of pool balance) is a 41,341
square feet (sf) office property located in Tacoma, WA.  The
property has experienced a severe decline in occupancy as a result
of several tenants vacating the property.  The property was 50.2%
occupied as of January 2012.  The loan remains current.
The next largest contributor to losses (0.9%) is an industrial
property located in Kent, OH.  The property has suffered declines
in performance as a result of low occupancy due to tenant
vacancies and increased expenses.  The loan remains current.

Fitch downgrades the following classes, including revising the
Outlooks and assigning Recovery estimates (RE) as indicated:

  -- $5.3 million class B notes to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;
  -- $5.6 million class C notes to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 20%;
  -- $4.8 million class D notes to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $2.1 million class E notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $1.8 million class F notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $1.2 million class G notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $1.2 million class H notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes, including revising the
Outlooks and assigning REs as indicated:

  -- $72.5 million class A-2 notes at 'Asf'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;
  -- $59.5 million class A-1A notes at 'Asf; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;
  -- $0.5 million class J notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- Class K notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the class X notes.  Fitch
does not rate the class L, R, and LR notes. Class A-1 has paid in
full.


KIRKWOOD CDO 2004-1: Moody's Raises Rating on A Notes to 'Caa1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Kirkwood CDO 2004-1:

U.S.$82,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due December 30,
2044 (current balance of $32,227,854), Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);
previously on September 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A Notes and the
termination of four Credit Default Swaps (CDS) since the rating
action in September 2010. Moody's notes that the Class A Notes
have been paid down by approximately 20% or $8.1 million since the
last rating action. Four CDS reached their scheduled termination
date on March 20, 2012 thereby reducing the risk associated with
these CDS. There are currently four CDS outstanding with a
maturity date of March 20, 2015.

The proceeds of the offering of the notes has been invested by the
Issuer in U.S. dollar denominated collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs) and structured finance CDOs. The Class A notes have been
amortizing from the principal proceeds received from the
underlying collateral. There are currently 6 CLOs which are
providing the cash flow to the deal, all of which were upgraded in
2011 and 2012 with the lowest rating being Aa3.

Moody's analysis also accounts for the risk of an early
termination event due to a default of MBIA Insurance Corporation,
the Credit Default Swap Insurer. On December 19, 2011 Moody's
placed MBIA Insurance Corporation's insurance financial strength
rating of B3 on review for possible downgrade.

Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 issued in December 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of CLOs and
synthetic exposure to corporate securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.8.

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model. For a description
of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the CDOROM user's
guide on Moody's website.

Moody's analysis of transaction is subject to uncertainties, the
primary sources of which include complexity, governance and
leverage. Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics
of the structure, it remains a simplification of the complex
reality. Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time in
default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b) variations
in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities. Given the tranched nature of liabilities, rating
transitions in the reference pool may have leveraged rating
implications for the ratings of the liabilities, thus leading to a
high degree of volatility. All else being equal, the volatility is
likely to be higher for more junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe. Should macroeconomics conditions evolve,
the ratings will change to reflect the new economic developments.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are given in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the base case, where
higher notches correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-
versa:

* Moody's reviews a scenario consisting of reducing the maturity
   of the CDS by six months, keeping all other things equal.

Class A: +2
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: 0

* Market Implied Ratings ("MIRS") are modeled in place of the
   corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default
   probability of the reference entities in the portfolio. The
   gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating
   is an indicator of the extent of the divergence in credit view
   between Moody's and the market.

Class A: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: 0


KODIAK CDO I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 From 'BB' to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
tranches from Kodiak CDO I Ltd. and three tranches from Kodiak CDO
II Ltd., both U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions collateralized mostly by trust preferred securities
(TruPs) issued by mortgage REITs and structured finance (SF)
assets. "Simultaneously, we affirmed our ratings on the other 17
tranches in these two transactions," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect our methodology and assumptions for
rating CDO transactions backed by pools of structured finance
assets, which we applied to these transactions because their
collateral portfolios include exposure to commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS). The updated criteria include changes to
correlation between SF assets and lower recovery rate parameters
for cash SF assets depending on the economic scenario applicable
to each rating level," S&P said.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Kodiak CDO I Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                    To             From
A-1                      BB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)
A-2                      BB- (sf)       BB (sf)

Kodiak CDO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                    To             From
A-2                      BB- (sf)       BB+ (sf)
A-3                      B- (sf)        B (sf)
E                        CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Kodiak CDO I Ltd.
Class                    Rating
B                        CCC+ (sf)
C                        CCC- (sf)
D-1                      CCC- (sf)
D-2                      CCC- (sf)
D-3                      CCC- (sf)
E-1                      CC (sf)
E-2                      CC (sf)
F                        CC (sf)
G                        CC (sf)
H                        CC (sf)

Kodiak CDO II Ltd.
Class                    Rating
A-1                      BB+ (sf)
B-1                      CCC (sf)
B-2                      CCC (sf)
C-1                      CCC- (sf)
C-2                      CCC- (sf)
D                        CCC- (sf)
F                        CC (sf)


LANDMARK VIII: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes From Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.:

U.S.$ 34,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2020 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 12, 2011
Upgraded to A3 (sf);

U.S.$ 26,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2020 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 12,
2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

U.S.$ 8,000,000 Composite Obligations Due 2020 Notes (current
rated balance of $4,917,878), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
August 12, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in October 2012. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive
"cushion" relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from a lower WARF and
higher spread levels compared to the levels assumed at the last
rating action in August 2011. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $479 million, $12
million defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of
22.59% (implying a WARF of 2994), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.05%, and a diversity score of 75. The default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Landmark VIII CLO Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011,
and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-
Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -20% (2396)

Class A-1: +0
Class A-2: +0
Class B: +1
Class C: +2
Class D: +2
Class E: +1
Composite Obligations: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3593)

Class A-1: -0
Class A-2: -0
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -1
Composite Obligations: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity
score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered
spread, coupon and diversity levels higher than the covenant
levels due to the large difference between the reported and
covenant levels.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2002-C7: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Certs. to 'Csf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage, series 2002-C7, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The downgrades are the result of an increase in Fitch expected
losses on the specially serviced loans.  Fitch modeled losses of
2.5% of the remaining pool; expected losses of the original pool
are at 2.3%, including losses already incurred to date.

Fitch has designated 13 loans (9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which include six specially serviced loans (3.3%).  Fitch expects
losses associated with the specially serviced assets to impact
class T.

As of the May 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by approximately 48% to $613
million from $1.19 billion at issuance.  Twenty-nine loans
representing 40% of the pool have defeased.  Interest shortfalls
are affecting classes P through U with cumulative unpaid interest
totaling $1.1 million.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses (1.4%) is a 95,527
square feet (sf) retail center located in Houston, TX.  The
property became a real estate owned (REO) asset in June 2011 and
was 46.8% occupied as of April 2012.  The occupancy is expected to
increase significantly when a newly signed lease for 22.2% of the
property becomes effective in September 2012.  Fitch expects
losses upon liquidation of the asset based on recent property
valuations obtained by the servicer.

The second largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses (2.2%) is a
107,188 sf office property in San Diego, CA.  The most recent
servicer reported year-end (YE) 2011 debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) is 0.81 times (x).  Occupancy at the property declined to
54% as of YE 2009 due to a large tenant (20,783 sf; 19% GLA) that
left at lease expiration.  Occupancy has since improved
significantly due to the signing of new leases in 2010 and 2012.
Based on the rent roll dated March 1, 2012, the property is 81.4%
leased.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes, revised ratings
outlooks and revised/assigned Recovery estimates (RE) as
indicated:

  -- $7.4 million class M to 'BBB-sf' from BBBsf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;
  -- $5.9 million class N to 'BBsf' from 'BB+sf'; Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $8.9 million class P to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.5 million class Q to 'Csf' from 'CCsf; RE0%;
  -- $3 million class S to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised ratings
outlooks as indicated:

  -- $357.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $56.4 million class A-1b at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.8 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.8 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.8 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.8 million class E at ''AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.8 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.8 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.3 million class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.9 million class J at 'AA'sf ; Outlook to Stable from
     Positive;
  -- $11.9 million class K at 'A+sf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Positive;
  -- $19.3 million class L at 'BBB+sf; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.5 million class T at 'Dsf'; RE0%'.

Fitch does not rate class U.  Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 have paid
in full.  Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating of the
interest only classes X-CL and X-CP.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C5: S&P Cuts Rating on Class F to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes and affirmed its ratings on eight other classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C5 (LB-UBS 2005-C5), a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "In
addition, we raised our ratings on three classes and affirmed our
ratings on five other classes of commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from 1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue
Plaza Trust's series FB 2005-1 (FB 2005-1), also a U.S. CMBS
transaction," S&P said.

"Our rating actions on LB-UBS 2005-C5 follow our analysis of the
credit characteristics of the collateral remaining in the pool,
the deal structure, and the liquidity available to the trust. The
downgrades on the LB-UBS 2005-C5 classes reflect credit support
erosion that we anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution
of the six assets ($90.2 million, 5.3%) that are with the special
servicer," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
in the LB-UBS 2005-C5 transaction reflect subordination and
liquidity support levels that are consistent with the outstanding
ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class X-CL and
X-CP interest-only (IO) certificates in the same transaction and
the class X IO certificate in the FB 2005-1 transaction based on
our current criteria," S&P said.

"Our raised and affirmed ratings on the classes from the FB 2005-1
transaction reflect our analysis of the transaction, which
included our revaluation of the two office collateral securing the
two fixed-rate loans, 1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue
Plaza loans, in the pool, and a review of the loans and
transaction structure and available liquidity. The upgrades also
considered the improved operating performance of the office
collateral and amortization of the two whole-loan balances. Our
adjusted valuation on the two office properties, using an 8.0%
capitalization rate, yielded a stressed loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
of 57.3% on the whole-loan balance. The whole loans secured by two
office properties known as 1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park
Avenue Plaza are participated in both the LB-UB 2005-C5 and FB
2005-1 transactions. The FB 2005-1 certificates derive 100% of
their cash flow from the participated interests," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information for the LB-UBS
2005-C5 transaction, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.36x and a LTV ratio of 103.1%. We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 0.84x and an LTV ratio of 141.8%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
71.5% and 44.0%. The DSC and LTV calculations exclude six ($90.2
million, 5.3%) assets with the special servicer and one defeased
loan ($36,495). We separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the May, 17, 2012, trustee remittance report for LB-UBS
2005-C5, six assets ($90.2 million, 5.3%) in the pool were with
the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR). The reported payment
status of the specially serviced assets as of the most recent
trustee remittance report is: three are real estate owned (REO;
$66.7 million, 3.9%), two are in foreclosure ($21.3 million,
1.3%), and one is 90-plus-days delinquent ($2.2 million, 0.1%).
Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $44.5 million are in
effect for the six specially serviced assets. Details of the two
largest specially serviced assets, one of which is also atop 10
asset, are as set forth," S&P said.

"The TAG Portfolio asset ($53.4 million, 3.1%) is the seventh-
largest asset in the LB-UBS 2005-C5 pool and the largest asset
with the special servicer. The asset consists of three class A
office buildings built between 1989 and 2000, totaling 404,524 sq.
ft. Two of the office buildings are located on adjacent sites in
Downers Grove, Ill., and one building is in Dulles, Va. The total
reported exposure on the properties was $55.5 million. The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on April 15, 2010, due to
imminent default, and the properties became REO on Nov. 29, 2011.
LNR indicated that the properties are currently 31.0% occupied,
the Loudon property is under contract and pending sale, and
leasing efforts are ongoing for Corridors I and II. An ARA of
$28.7 million is in effect against the asset. Standard & Poor's
expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this
asset," S&P said.

"The Centre at Lake in the Hills loan ($14.8 million, 0.9%) is
secured by a 99,451-sq.-ft. retail property in Lake in the Hills,
Ill. The total reported exposure on the loan was $16.3 million.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on May 19, 2011,
due to delinquent payments. LNR stated that it is pursuing
foreclosure. The reported DSC was 1.19x as of year-end 2010 and
reported occupancy was 79.0% as of January 2012. An ARA of $5.1
million is in effect against the loan. We expect a moderate loss
upon the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P said.

"The four remaining assets with the special servicer in LB-UBS
2005-C5 have individual balances that represent less than 0.6% of
the total trust balance. ARAs totaling $10.7 million are in effect
against these assets. We estimated losses for all of these assets,
arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 45.0%," S&P said.

                     TRANSACTION SUMMARY

"As of the May, 17, 2012, trustee remittance report for LB-UBS
2005-C5, the collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of
$1.72 billion, down from $2.34 billion at issuance. The pool
comprises 100 loans and three REO assets, down from 115 loans at
issuance. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells
Fargo), provided financial information for 95.5% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool, most of which reflected full-year
2010 and partial- or full-year 2011 data," S&P said.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.37x for the loans in
the LB-UBS 2005-C5 pool based on the servicer-reported figures.
Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.36x and 103.1%. Our adjusted
figures exclude six ($90.2 million, 5.3%) assets with the special
servicer and one defeased loan ($36,495). We separately estimated
losses for the excluded specially serviced assets and included
them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity
figures. To date, the transaction has experienced $1.4 million in
principal losses from eight assets. Twenty-seven loans ($397.9
million, 23.1%) in the pool are on the master servicer's
watchlist, including two of the top 10 assets. Nineteen loans
($196.7 million, 11.4%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, 10
of which ($86.7 million, 5.0%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.00x," S&P said.

                      SUMMARY OF TOP 10 ASSETS

"The top 10 assets in LB-UBS 2005-C5 have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $1.02 billion (59.5%). Using servicer-reported numbers,
we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.37x for nine of the top
10 assets. The remaining top 10 asset ($53.4 million, 3.1%) is
with the special servicer. In addition, two other top 10 assets
($194.4 million, 11.4%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for nine of the top 10 assets,
excluding the specially serviced asset, were 1.33x and 106.8%,
respectively. Details of the two top 10 assets with the master
servicers are set forth," S&P said.

"The Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio loan is the third-largest
asset in the LB-UBS 2005-C5 pool and the largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist. The loan has a pooled trust balance
of $162.4 million (9.4%) and a whole loan balance of $508.5
million. The loan is secured by a portfolio of 64 hotels totaling
9,443 rooms in 29 U.S. states. The loan appears on Wells Fargo's
watchlist due to a low reported DSC. The reported DSC and
occupancy for the loan were 1.12x and 66.0%, respectively, for
year-end 2011, up from year-end 2010 of 0.94x and 62.9%," S&P
said.

"The Sandpiper Apartments loan ($32.0 million, 1.9%) is the 10th-
largest asset in the LB-UBS 2005-C5 pool and the second-largest
loan on the master servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by a
488-unit multifamily property in Las Vegas. The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC. The
reported DSC and occupancy for the loan were 1.07x and 89.8%,
respectively, for year-end 2011, up from year-end 2010 of 0.82x
and 74.0%," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the LB-UBS 2005-C5
pool according to its criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with our lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P
said.

           1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS AND PARK AVENUE
                   PLAZA TRUST SERIES FB 2005-1
                    STAND-ALONE CMBS TRANSACTION

"As of the May 10, 2012, trustee remittance report for FB 2005-1,
the collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $548.7
million. The pool comprises a participated interest in two fixed-
rate loans, the 1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue Plaza
loans," S&P said.

"We based our analysis of the FB 2005-1 transaction, in part, on a
review of the borrower's operating statements for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2011, the year ended Dec. 31, 2010, the borrower's 2012
budgets, and the borrower's March 27, 2012, rent rolls for the two
office collateral securing the 1345 Avenue of the Americas and
Park Avenue Plaza loans. Our analysis of the two loans also
considered rent escalations over the lease terms for tenants in
the two office properties rated investment grade by Standard &
Poor's. Details on the two fixed-rate loans are as set forth," S&P
said.

"The larger of the two loans, the 1345 Avenue of the Americas
loan, has a whole-loan balance of $679.0 million that consists of
a senior A, subordinate B, and subordinate C notes. The senior A
note totaling $462.5 million is further divided into five pari
passu notes, of which note 1-A1 ($21.3 million) is in the Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-TOP20 (BSCMS
2005-TOP20) transaction, note 1-A2 ($21.3 million) is in the LB-
UBS 2005-C5 transaction, and notes 1-A3 and 1-A4 ($338.4 million
in aggregate) are in the FB 2005-1 transaction. The B note
totaling $116.5 million, which is subordinate to the A notes, is
split into three pari passu pieces, of which notes 1-B1 and 1-B2
totaling $98.0 million is in the FB 2005-1 transaction. The C note
totaling $100.0 million, which is subordinate to the A and B
notes, is divided into four pari passu notes," S&P said.

"The whole loan matures on Aug. 8, 2025, and amortizes on a 30-
year schedule. The amortization amount is used to paydown the note
1-A1 ($21.3 million) and note 1-A2 ($21.3 million) balances only.
The first two and the last three years of the loan term is IO. The
whole loan is secured by a 1,896,140-sq.-ft. office property in
midtown Manhattan. The master servicer, Wells Fargo, reported a
DSC of 2.19x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2011, and
occupancy was 99.9% according to the March 2012 rent roll. Our
adjusted valuation, using an 8.0% capitalization rate, yielded a
stressed LTV ratio of 67.1% on the whole loan balance," S&P said.

"The other loan, the Park Avenue Plaza loan, has a whole-loan
balance of $231.1 million that consists of a senior A note and a
subordinate B note. The senior A note totaling $228.9 million is
further split into five pari passu notes, of which note 1-A1 ($9.4
million) is in BSCMS 2005-TOP20, note 1-A2 ($9.4 million) is in
LB-UBS 2005-C4, and notes 1-A3 and 1-A4 ($111.0 million in
aggregate) are in FB 2005-1. The subordinate B note totaling $2.2
million is split into three pari passu pieces, of which notes 1-B1
and 1-B2 totaling $1.3 million are in the FB 2005-1 transaction.
In addition, the equity interests in the borrower of the whole
loan secure mezzanine debt totaling $85.0 million. The whole loan
matures on Sept. 8, 2025, amortizes on a 315-month schedule, and
is IO for the first 30 months and the last three years of the loan
term. The amortization amount is used to paydown the note 1-A1
($9.4 million) and note 1-A2 ($9.4 million) balances only. The
whole loan is secured by a 1,136,807-sq.-ft. office property in
midtown Manhattan. Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 2.53x for the
year-end 2011, and occupancy was 99.8%, according to the March
2012, rent roll. Our adjusted valuation, using an 8.0%
capitalization rate, yielded a stressed LTV ratio of 40.1% on the
whole loan balance," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
            Rating
Class    To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
A-J      BBB (sf)    A- (sf)                        16.28
B        BBB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)                      15.09
C        BB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)                       13.21
D        BB (sf)     BBB- (sf)                      11.51
E        BB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)                       10.14
F        B+ (sf)     BB (sf)                         8.44

RATINGS RAISED

1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue Plaza Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series FB 2005-1
            Rating
Class    To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
D        AAA (sf)    AA (sf)                        6.50
E        AAA (sf)    A+ (sf)                        3.14
F        A+ (sf)     A (sf)                         0.00

RATINGS AFFIRMED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class      Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-3        AAA (sf)                   40.82
A-AB       AAA (sf)                   40.82
A-4        AAA (sf)                   40.82
A-1A       AAA (sf)                   40.82
A-M        A+ (sf)                    27.19
G          CCC- (sf)                   6.91
X-CL       AAA (sf)                     N/A
X-CP       AAA (sf)                     N/A

1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue Plaza Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series FB 2005-1
Class      Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-2        AAA (sf)                   18.10
A-3        AAA (sf)                   18.10
B          AAA (sf)                   13.36
C          AAA (sf)                    8.32
X          AAA (sf)                     N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


LEHMAN BROS 2006-LLF: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs. to 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Lehman Bros. Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-LLF C5,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
"Concurrently, we affirmed our ratings on eight other classes from
the same transaction," S&P said.

"Our raised and affirmed ratings follow our analysis of the
transaction, which included our revaluation of the collateral
securing the remaining four floating-rate loans in the pool, one
of which is currently with the special servicer. Our analysis also
considered the deleveraging of the transaction following loan
paydowns, deal structure, liquidity available to the trust, as
well as refinancing risk. In addition, we also considered the
workout fee that the transaction is incurring for the Continental
Grand II loan," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect increased credit enhancement levels due to
the deleveraging of the pool, as well as improved reported
performance of the largest loan in the pool, the Walt Disney World
Swan & Dolphin loan ($319.6 million, 75.8% of the pooled trust
balance)," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class X-2 and X-FLP interest-only (IO)
certificates based on our current criteria," S&P said.

"As of the May 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, the trust
consists of four floating-rate IO loans indexed to one-month LIBOR
with a pooled trust balance of $421.8 million and a trust balance
of $454.2 million. The reported one-month LIBOR was 0.25% per the
May 2012 trustee remittance report," S&P said.

"According to the May 2012 trustee remittance report, classes H,
J, K, and L incurred interest shortfalls due primarily to an
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amount of
$51,651 for the specially serviced National Conference Center
loan. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo),
reported that the ASER amount was incorrect, which Wells Fargo
expects to adjust in the next period remittance report," S&P said.

"We based our analysis, in part, on a review of the borrowers'
operating statements for year-end 2011 and 2010, the borrowers'
available 2012 budgets, the borrowers' May 2012 rent rolls (for
the office properties), and available Smith Travel Research (STR)
reports (for the hotel properties). Details on the four remaining
loans are as set forth," S&P said.

"The Walt Disney World Swan & Dolphin loan, the largest loan in
the trust, is secured by two upscale full-service convention and
resort hotels totaling 2,267 rooms in Lake Buena Vista, Fla. (near
Orlando). The loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $330.0
million that is split into a $319.6 million (75.8% of the pooled
trust balance) senior pooled component and a $10.4 million
subordinate nonpooled component that supports the class WSD raked
certificate (not rated). The reported year-end 2011 combined
occupancy and average daily rate (ADR) for the lodging properties
were 81.1% and $158.14, yielding a revenue per available room
(RevPAR) of $128.27. This was up 8.4% from year-end 2010 and 6.1%
from year-end 2009. Wells Fargo reported an in-trust debt service
coverage (DSC) of 9.67x for year-end 2011. Our adjusted valuation
using a 10.50% capitalization rate, yielded a stressed in-trust
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 92.0%. The loan matures on Sept. 1,
2012, and has one 12-month extension option remaining," S&P said.

"The National Conference Center loan, the second-largest loan in
the pool, is secured by a 1.2-million-sq.-ft. conference facility
in Lansdowne, Va. (917 guestrooms and 265,000 sq. ft. of meeting
space). The loan has a trust balance of $41.4 million (9.8%) and a
whole-loan balance of $63.4 million. In addition, equity interests
in the borrower of the whole loan secure a $35.0 million mezzanine
loan. The loan was previously transferred to the special servicer
on July 22, 2010, and subsequently modified on Sept. 15, 2011. The
modification terms included, among other items, a maturity
extension to Aug. 9, 2012, with two 12-month extension options.
The loan was returned back to the master servicer as a corrected
mortgage loan subsequent to the modification on Sept. 15, 2011.
The loan was transferred back to the special servicer, TriMont
Real Estate Advisors (TriMont), on Feb. 8, 2012, due to imminent
default. TriMont stated that it is currently exploring various
workout strategies with the borrower. The borrower reported that
cash flow was insufficient to cover operating expenses for year-
end 2011. The borrower reported occupancy of 26.3% and RevPAR of
$20.75, down 24.1% from year-end 2010. We considered the 2012
budgets in our adjusted valuation and used a capitalization rate
of 11.75%, which yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio that
significantly exceeded 100%," S&P said.

"The Continental Grand II loan, the second-smallest loan in the
pool, is secured by a 238,388-sq.-ft., class A office building in
El Segundo, Calif. The loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of
$36.0 million (8.5%). In addition, the equity interests in the
borrower of the whole loan secure mezzanine debt totaling $22.0
million. The loan, which has a reported current payment status,
was transferred to TriMont on June 8, 2010, due to imminent
default. According to TriMont, the loan was modified on Sept. 10,
2010, and returned to the master servicer on Nov. 16, 2010. The
modification terms included, but were not limited to, maturity
date extension to Aug. 6, 2011, three one-year extension options,
and funding for certain reserves. According to Wells Fargo, the
borrower is not paying the special servicing and workout fees on
the loan. Pursuant to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee that is 0.50% of all future
principal and interest payments if the loan performs and remains
with the master servicer. Our analysis considered current and
potential additional interest shortfalls due to the workout fee on
the loan paid by the trust. The borrower reported that cash flow
was not sufficient to cover operating expenses for year-end 2011
and 2010. Occupancy was 67.0% according to the May 4, 2012, rent
roll, up from a reported 56.0% occupancy at year-end 2011 and
38.0% in 2010. We considered market data in our adjusted valuation
and used a 9.50% capitalization rate, which yielded a stressed in-
trust LTV ratio of 145.1%," S&P said.

"The 30 Montgomery Street loan, the smallest loan in the pool, is
secured by a 292,172-sq.-ft., class B+ office building in Jersey
City, N.J. The loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $24.8
million (5.9%). The loan, which has a reported current payment
status, was transferred to TriMont on March 31, 2011, due to
maturity default. According to TriMont, the loan was modified on
May 20, 2011, and returned to the master servicer on Sept. 30,
2011. The modification terms included, among other items, maturity
extension to Sept. 9, 2013, and funding for certain reserves. It
is our understanding from the master servicer that the borrower
paid the special servicing and workout fees on the loan. Wells
Fargo reported an in-trust DSC of 6.44x for year-end 2011.
Occupancy was 72.4%, according to the May 25, 2012, rent roll. Our
adjusted valuation, using a 9.00% capitalization rate, yielded a
stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 122.9%," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description ,of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Lehman Bros. Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-LLF C5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Rating
Class     To          From        Credit enhancement (%)
B         AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)                 70.51
C         A- (sf)     BBB-(sf)                 57.79
D         BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)                 49.70
E         BB- (sf)    B+ (sf)                  38.93

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Lehman Bros. Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-LLF C5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating                     Credit enhancement (%)
A-2       AAA (sf)                                    84.39
F         B-  (sf)                                    32.68
G         CCC+ (sf)                                   22.01
H         CCC (sf)                                    12.31
J         CCC (sf)                                    11.45
K         CCC- (sf)                                    3.66
X-FLP     AAA (sf)                                      N/A
X-2       AAA (sf)                                      N/A

N/A - Not applicable.


LONG GROVE: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 14
classes of notes from eight collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions.

"The rating withdrawals follow the complete paydown of the notes
on their most recent payment dates," S&P said.

"ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1 is a U.S. cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO). The transaction paid the
class A notes down in full on the May 28, 2012, payment date, from
an outstanding balance of $4.80 million," S&P said.

"ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-1 is a U.S. CLO transaction that
paid the class A notes down in full on the May 16, 2012, payment
date, from an outstanding balance of $27.39 million," S&P said.

"C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd. is a U.S. CDO backed by mezzanine structured
finance assets. The transaction paid the class A-1 notes down in
full on the May 2, 2012, payment date, from an outstanding balance
of $0.57 million," S&P said.

Landmark III CDO Ltd. is a U.S. CLO transaction that paid the
class A-1LA notes down in full on the April 16, 2012, payment
date, from an outstanding balance of $5.36 million.

LightPoint CLO 2004-1 Ltd. is a U.S. CLO transaction that paid the
class B notes down in full on the May 15, 2012, payment date, from
an outstanding balance of $8.10 million.

Long Grove CLO Ltd. is a U.S. cash flow CLO. The transaction paid
the class A, B, C, and D notes down in full following an April 30,
2012, notice of optional redemption. The notes were paid down on
the May 25, 2012, payment date, from outstanding balances of
$40.40 million, $29.00 million, $17.80 million, and $9.29 million.

Signature 7 L.P. is a CLO. The transaction paid the class A, B,
and C notes down in full following a May 7, 2012, notice of
optional redemption. The notes were paid down on the May 23, 2012,
redemption date, from outstanding balances of $11.52 million,
$15.09 million, and $11.43 million.

Veer Cash Flow CLO Ltd. is a U.S. cash flow CLO that paid the
class senior and mezzanine deferrable notes down in full on the
March 15, 2012, and March 23, 2012, payment dates, from
outstanding balances of $14.18 million and $15.00 million.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description ,of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  A+ (sf)

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AA (sf)

Landmark III CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LA               NR                  AAA (sf)

LightPoint CLO 2004-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AA- (sf)

Long Grove CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
C                   NR                  BBB- (sf)
D                   NR                  B+ (sf)

Signature 7 L.P.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Veer Cash Flow CLO Ltd.
                           Rating
Class               To                  From
Sr Rt notes         NR                  AAA (sf)
Mez dfd nt          NR                  AA (sf)

NR-Not rated.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Takes Action on $205MM in 2001-2004 RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
tranches, upgraded the ratings of three tranches, and confirmed
the ratings of 12 tranches from three RMBS transactions, backed by
prime jumbo loans, issued by Merrill Lynch.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Prime
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating action constitute a few upgrades as well as downgrades.
The upgrades are due to improvement in collateral performance,
and/ or rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to high
prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In its current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
set at 3% for Jumbo and which is typically higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
76. For example, for a pool with 75 loans, the adjusted rate of
new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if current
delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future delinquencies
are expected to reflect this trend. To account for that, the rate
calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to
2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to
greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years
and ultimate expected losses are projected using the approach
described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. Moody's expects growth in the US
to remain below trend for the rest of 2012, and then pick up again
in 2013. The unemployment rate fell from 9.1% in April 2011 to
8.2% in March 2012. Moody's forecasts a further drop to 7.8% for
2013. House prices are expected to drop another 1% from their
4Q2011 levels before gradually rising towards the end of 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures; any change due to servicing transfers or
other policy/regulatory change can impact the performance of the
transaction.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Bank USA Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
2001-A

Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-B

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-F

Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-B, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287657

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Expected Losses Cues Fitch to Cut Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust (MLMT) 2005-CIP1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The downgrades reflect an increase in expected losses across the
pool since Fitch's last review of the transaction.  Fitch modeled
losses of 10.23% of the remaining pool.  Total expected losses
based on the original pool size are 9.93%, which also reflects
2.03% in losses already incurred to date.  Fitch has designated 39
loans (43.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include 14
specially serviced loans (17.6%).  Five of the Fitch Loans of
Concern (24.48%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans by
unpaid principal balance.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 22.78% (including 2.03% of
realized losses) to $1.59 billion from $2.06 billion at issuance.
There are three defeased loans (7.13%).  Interest shortfalls are
affecting classes E through Q.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is attributed to
the Highwoods Portfolio B-note (3.78% of the pool).  The loan is
secured by 31 cross-collateralized office properties in Charlotte,
NC (18 properties) and Tampa, FL (13 properties).  The original
$160 million loan on this property, which matured in August 2010,
had transferred to special servicing in March 2010 for imminent
maturity default.  The loan was modified in March 2011 while in
special servicing.  Terms of the modification included an
extension to the original loan term and bifurcation of the loan
into a senior ($100 million) and junior ($60 million) component.
Although losses are not expected imminently, any recovery to the
subject B-note is contingent upon full recovery to the A-note
proceeds at the loan's maturity in May 2014.  Unless collateral
performance improves, recovery to the B-note component is
unlikely.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the
Equity Lifestyle Portfolio (2.37%) loan.  The loan is
collateralized by three manufactured housing recreational vehicle
parks with two located in upstate New York and one located in New
Hampshire.  The properties have struggled since issuance.  The
servicer has reported that the subject properties experience
seasonal peaks and are out of season until April or May of each
year.  The combined servicer-reported year end (YE) 2011 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and YE December 2010 DSCR was 0.71x
and 0.62x,respectively.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is secured
by a B-note for University Village (0.64%).  The loan is
collateralized by a 161,090 square foot retail center located in
Riverside, CA, near the University of California at Riverside
campus.  The original $32 million loan on this property had
transferred to special servicing in January 2009 upon the
borrower's request for a loan modification due to property
performance deterioration from occupancy declines.  The loan was
modified in June 2011 while in special servicing.  Terms of the
modification included bifurcation of the loan into a senior ($21
million) and junior ($10.1 million) component.  Although losses
are not expected imminently, any recovery to the subject B-note is
contingent upon full recovery to the A-note proceeds at the loan's
maturity in July 2015.  Unless collateral performance improves,
recovery to the B-note component is unlikely.

The largest loan in the pool possesses high risk characteristics
due to the loan size (10.5%) relative to the pool balance and due
to its secondary location (Fort Wayne, IN).  Should property
performance significantly decline and the loan was expected to
experience a high loss severity, there can be reasonable
probability that credit support on the investment grade classes
would be eroded very quickly, negatively impacting the ratings.
The Negative Outlook on class B reflects the increased
concentration risk.

Fitch downgrades the following classes, revises the Rating
Outlooks on classes B and C, and assigns Recovery Estimates (REs)
as indicated:

  -- $138.8 million class A-J to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $43.7 million class B to 'BBB-sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;
  -- $18 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;
  -- $38.6 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 40%;
  -- $25.7 million class E to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 0%;
  -- $33.4 million class F to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $10.3 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $5.1 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $7.7 million class L to to 'Csf; from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes, maintains Rating Outlooks and
assigns REs as indicated:

  -- $224.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $157.9 million class A-3A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $50 million class A-3B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $70.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $510.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $205.7 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.6 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $25.7 million class H at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Class A-1 has repaid in full.  Classes M, N and P remain at 'Dsf';
RE 0% due to realized losses.  Fitch does not rate class Q, which
has been reduced to zero due to realized losses.

Fitch had previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
classes X-C and X-P.


MORGAN STANLEY 1998-HF2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on $4MM Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1998-HF2.

The upgrade reflects increased credit enhancement as a result of
paydown and defeasance.  As of the May 2012 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has reduced by 93.2% (including
1.6% in realized losses) to $71.8 million from $1.1 billion at
issuance.  Six loans in the pool (25.2%) are currently defeased.
There are currently two loans (15.04%) in special servicing.
Interest shortfalls are affecting classes L through N.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses were originally
two non cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted loans in Glen
Ellyn, IL, one secured by seven parcels of land with six office
buildings and one vacant lot within a corporate campus.  The other
was secured by two adjacent parcels of land with office buildings.
The loans were transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due
to monetary default and converted to real-estate-owned (REO) in
August 2011.  A sales contract is currently under negotiation.

Fitch upgrades the following class:

  -- $10.6 million class H to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $9.6 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.2 million class J at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.6 million class K at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $15.9 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 75%;
  -- $4 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2 and B through F have paid in full.  Fitch does
not rate class N.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on class
X.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-IQ: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the ratings on two classes of Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2001-IQ.

The upgrades are due to the pool's stable performance, scheduled
principal pay down, and low future expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  As of the May 2012 distribution date, the pool's
certificate balance has been reduced 97.35% (including 0.52% in
realized losses) to $18.9 million from $713 million at issuance.

There are nine of the original 91 loans remaining in the
transaction.  There are no specially serviced loans as of the May
2012 remittance report.  Fitch expects minimal losses to the
remaining pool balance.  Any incurred losses are expected to be
absorbed by the non-rated class O.

Fitch has identified four Loans of Concern (55.4% of the pool
balance).  The largest loan of concern (24.7%) is secured by a
54,597 square foot suburban office complex in Charlotte, NC.
Updated financial information for the property have not been
received by the servicer since year end (YE) December 2005, which
at that time reported the debt service coverage ratio at 1.62
times (x), compared to 1.70x at issuance.  REIS reported the first
quarter 2012 class B office vacancy in the Charlotte / Randolph
submarket at 14.4%, with average market rents at $17.39 per square
food (psf).  The most recent available rent roll reported
occupancy at 93% as of May 2011, with in place rents at $23.27psf.
The servicer reported that the property received a rating of
'good' at its most recent June 2011 inspection.  The loan remains
current as of the May 2012 remittance date.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2011 fiscal YE net operating income.  Fitch also
applied an adjusted market cap rate between 9% and 10% to
determine value.

Each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  All nine of the remaining loans are
considered to pay off at maturity, and could refinance to a DSCR
above 1.25x.  The current weighted average DSCR for the remaining
loans is 1.57x.  Seven (55.4%) of the remaining nine loans are
fully amortizing.

Fitch upgrades the following classes:

  -- $4.7 million class J to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.6 million class K to 'BBBsf' from 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirms the following classes:

  -- $1.8 million class L at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.4 million class M at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.8 million class N at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Class O is not rated by Fitch, which has been reduced to $1.66
million from $1.71 million at issuance due to realized losses.
Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, F, G and H have paid in full.

The interest only class X-2 has paid in full.  Fitch had
previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X-1.


MORGAN STANLEY 2004: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 10 RMBS Class to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches, upgraded the ratings of three tranches, and confirmed
the ratings of five tranches from three RMBS transactions backed
by Subprime loans issued by Morgan Stanley.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast. The unemployment rate fell
from 9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE8

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE9

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC4

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287692

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: Fitch Keeps D Rating on 9 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust, series 2007-TOP25 (MSCI 2007-TOP25).  In addition, Fitch
maintains five classes on Rating Watch Negative.

Classes A-M through D remain on Rating Watch Negative based upon
an increase in Fitch expected losses across the pool, primarily
from the loans in special servicing.

Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch status within the next
several months following a complete review of the transaction,
which will incorporate year-end 2011 operating history and updates
on valuations and workout strategies of the specially serviced
loans.  Fitch expects class A-M could be downgraded several
categories given limited subordination of the remaining classes
relative to the increased expected losses on the pool.

Fitch maintains the following classes on Rating Watch:

  -- $155.5 million class A-M 'AAAsf';
  -- $110.8 million class A-J 'BBB-sf';
  -- $27.2 million class B 'BBsf';
  -- $11.7 million class C 'Bsf';
  -- $25.3 million class D 'B-sf'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms the following classes:

  -- $65.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $58 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $784.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $135.5 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.7 million class E at 'Csf; RE 0%;
  -- $13.1 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%'
  -- $0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%'
  -- $0 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%'
  -- $0 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%'
  -- $0 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%'
  -- $0 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%'
  -- $0 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%'
  -- $0 million class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%'.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate class P.  The
rating on class X had been previously withdrawn.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-IQ: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the ratings on two classes of Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2001-IQ.

The upgrades are due to the pool's stable performance, scheduled
principal pay down, and low future expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  As of the May 2012 distribution date, the pool's
certificate balance has been reduced 97.35% (including 0.52% in
realized losses) to $18.9 million from $713 million at issuance.

There are nine of the original 91 loans remaining in the
transaction.  There are no specially serviced loans as of the May
2012 remittance report.  Fitch expects minimal losses to the
remaining pool balance.  Any incurred losses are expected to be
absorbed by the non-rated class O.

Fitch has identified four Loans of Concern (55.4% of the pool
balance).  The largest loan of concern (24.7%) is secured by a
54,597 square foot suburban office complex in Charlotte, NC.
Updated financial information for the property have not been
received by the servicer since year end (YE) December 2005, which
at that time reported the debt service coverage ratio at 1.62
times (x), compared to 1.70x at issuance.  REIS reported the first
quarter 2012 class B office vacancy in the Charlotte / Randolph
submarket at 14.4%, with average market rents at $17.39 per square
food (psf).  The most recent available rent roll reported
occupancy at 93% as of May 2011, with in place rents at $23.27psf.
The servicer reported that the property received a rating of
'good' at its most recent June 2011 inspection.  The loan remains
current as of the May 2012 remittance date.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2011 fiscal YE net operating income.  Fitch also
applied an adjusted market cap rate between 9% and 10% to
determine value.

Each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  All nine of the remaining loans are
considered to pay off at maturity, and could refinance to a DSCR
above 1.25x.  The current weighted average DSCR for the remaining
loans is 1.57x.  Seven (55.4%) of the remaining nine loans are
fully amortizing.

Fitch upgrades the following classes:

  -- $4.7 million class J to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.6 million class K to 'BBBsf' from 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirms the following classes:

  -- $1.8 million class L at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.4 million class M at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.8 million class N at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Class O is not rated by Fitch, which has been reduced to $1.66
million from $1.71 million at issuance due to realized losses.
Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, F, G and H have paid in full.

The interest only class X-2 has paid in full.  Fitch had
previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X-1.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on $15.2MM Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all 11 classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2011-C2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  As of the May 2012 remittance, the
pool had not experienced a realized loss.  Fitch has not
designated any loans as Fitch Loans of Concern, and there have not
been any defaulted or specially serviced loans.

As of the May 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 0.9% to $1.20 billion for
$1.21 billion at issuance.

The largest loan of the pool (12.62%) is secured by Deerbrook
Mall, a 1,203,612 square foot (sf) regional mall, of which 554,461
sf is collateral for the loan, located in Humble, TX.  The mall
features four non-collateral anchors, including Dillard's, Macy's,
Sears, and JC Penney.  The subject serves a large trade area that
encompasses a population of more than 500,000 with an average
household income of $68K.  The closest competitor is another
regional mall that is owned by the same sponsor more than 21 miles
to the southwest.  The occupancy as of March 2012 was 99% versus
98% at issuance and the year-end 2011 reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.51 times (x).  The sponsor of the loan
is General Growth Properties.

The second largest loan (11.91%) is secured by a 1,125,747 sf
regional mall, Ingram Park Mall, located in San Antonio, TX.  The
non-collateral anchors of the mall are Dillard's, Dillard's Home
Center, Sears, JC Penney, and Macy's.  The mall benefits from its
proximity to the Lackland Airforce Base and Westover Hills master-
planned community.  The mall's occupancy as of year-end 2011 was
91% with a DSCR of 1.49x. The sponsor of the loan is Simon
Property Group.

The third largest loan (11.06%) is secured by 383,983 sf office
building located in Midtown Manhattan in New York, NY.  Built in
1962, the property is a 23-story office building containing
370,304 sf of office space and 13,679 sf of ground floor retail
space.  Major tenants at the location include Scripps HGTV, Misys
International, and Snell & Weisheimer.  The subject is less than
one block from a metro subway station and benefits from its easy
access to major New York City transit centers.  The property has
experienced steady performance since issuance and as of year-end
2011 occupancy of 90% with a DSCR of 1.69x.  The sponsors are NNA
Property Holding Group and Murray Hill Properties Real Estate.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

  -- $55.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $363.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $89 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $439.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45.5 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $50.1 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $31.9 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $50.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.2 million class F at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.1 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.2 million class H at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $959 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch does not rate class J and X-B.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL II: Moody's Ups Rating on B-1L Notes From 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO III Ltd.:

U.S. $13,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes due 2016, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on September 15, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

U.S. $6,000,000 Class A-3F 5.744% Notes due 2016, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on September 15, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

U.S. $15,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2016, Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 15, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging and an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios. Moody's notes that the
Class A-1L Notes have been fully paid down, and the Class A-2L
Notes have been paid down by approximately 50% or $25.6 million
since the rating action in September 2011. As a result of the
deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated May 7, 2012, the Senior Class A, Class A and Class B-1L
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 169.8%, 131.3%, and
108.7%, respectively, versus August 2011 levels of 140.9%, 120.6%,
and 107.4% respectively. The May 2012 trustee reported
overcollateralization ratios do not take into account deleveraging
of the Class A-2L Notes on the May 15, 2012 distribution date.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the May 2012 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 3039
compared to 2649 in August 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $89 million,
defaulted par of $5.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.3% (implying a WARF of 3290), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 50.3%, and a diversity score of 26.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Mountain Capital CLO III Ltd., issued in May 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology
published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2632)

Class A-1LB: 0
Class A-2L: 0
Class A-3L: 0
Class A-3F: 0
Class B-1L: 3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3948)

Class A-1LB: 0
Class A-2L: 0
Class A-3L: -1
Class A-3F: -1
Class B-1L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


MT WILSON: Moody's Ugprades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Mt. Wilson CLO, Ltd.:

U.S. $227,600,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
2018 (current outstanding balance of $221,558,514), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 2, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

U.S. $8,900,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
2018, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 2, 2011
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

U.S. $22,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
due 2018, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September 2, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

U.S. $16,900,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September 2, 2011
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); and

U.S. $6,900,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
due 2018, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on September 2, 2011
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in July 2012. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive
"cushion" relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, and
higher coupon and spread levels compared to the levels assumed at
the last rating action in September 2011. Moody's also notes that
the transaction's reported overcollateralization ratio are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $291.5 million,
defaulted par of $0, a weighted average default probability of
19.69% (implying a WARF of 2774), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.35%, and a diversity score of 50. The default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Mt. Wilson CLO, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2219)

Class A: 0
Class B: +1
Class C: +2
Class D: +1
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3329)

Class A: 0
Class B: -1
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's generally analyzes the impact of assuming the
worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon,
and diversity score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's
considered spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant
levels and WARF lower than the covenant levels due to the short
period of time until the end of the reinvestment period.

2) Deleveraging: Another source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds will
occur and at what pace. Deleveraging may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.


NACM CLO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by NACM CLO I:

U.S. $15,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011, Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

U.S. $16,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2019, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011,
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

U.S. $11,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011, Upgraded to Baa3
(sf)

U.S. $9,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011, Upgraded to Ba3
(sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in July 2012. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive
"cushion" relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from higher spread and
coupon levels compared to the levels assumed in the last rating
action in September 2011. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported overcollateralization ratio are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $289.4 million,
defaulted par of $5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.88% (implying a WARF of 2455), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.91%, and a diversity
score of 55. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

NACM CLO I, issued in June of 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1964)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class B: +2
Class C: +3
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2946)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: -2
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will occur and at what pace. Deleveraging may accelerate
due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity
score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered
spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant levels due to
the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.


NEW CENTURY: Moody's Confirms 'Ca' Rating on Cl. M-5 RMBS Tranche
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche
and confirmed the ratings of three tranches from one RMBS
transaction backed by Subprime loans issued by New Century Home
Equity Loan Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast. The unemployment rate fell
from 9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-5

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-I-5, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287687

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Lifts Cl. M-2 Tranche Rating to 'Caa1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five
tranches from two RMBS transactions, backed by Subprime loans,
issued by NovaStar trusts.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board still expects below-trend growth for the US
economy for 2012, with the unemployment rate remaining high, above
7.5% through 2013 and home prices dropping another 1% from their
4Q 2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2003-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2003-4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287674

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


PARK PLACE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M-4 RMBS Tranche to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
and upgraded the rating of one tranche issued by Park Place 2004-
WCW2. The collateral backing this RMBS transaction primarily
consists of first-lien, subprime mortgages.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board still expects below-trend growth for the US
economy for 2012, with the unemployment rate remaining high, aboe
7.5% through 2013 and home prices dropping another 1% from their
4Q 2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WCW2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287673

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


PARTS PRIVATE: Deteriorating Performance Cues Fitch to Cut Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has resolved the Rating Watch Negative by
downgrading all the notes for PARTS Private Student Loan Trust
Series 2007-CT1.  Fitch assigns a Negative Outlook to the senior
and subordinate note.  Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria' and 'U.S. Private Student Loan ABS Criteria' to
review the transaction.

The downgrades on all the notes are due to deteriorating
performance, reflected in increasing level of defaults and
anticipated decrease in the loss coverage multiples.  The level of
defaults has increased to 15.66% from 11.87% last year, and total
parity has continued to decrease from the previous year (February
2011) to the current (February 2012), from 99.85% to 88.33%.

Loss coverage multiples were determined by comparing the projected
net loss amount to available credit enhancement.  Fitch used
market vintage loss data to form a loss timing curve
representative of the collateral pool.  After giving seasoning
credit for those loans in repayment, Fitch applied the current
cumulative gross loss level to the loss timing curve to derive the
expected gross losses over the remaining life.  No credit is given
to recovery, as data provided indicated minimal recovery after
loans defaulted.  The Recovery Estimate for the class C notes is
RE0%.  The Negative Outlooks are assigned to the senior and
subordinate notes consistent with Fitch's negative view of the
private student loan sector in general.  The class C notes were
downgraded further to 'Csf', as Fitch believes default is
inevitable as they are severely under-collateralized.

Credit enhancement consists of excess spread and
overcollateralization.  Furthermore, senior notes benefit from
additional credit enhancement provided by the subordinate note.
Fitch assumed excess spread to be the lesser of the current
annualized excess spread; the average historical excess spread;
and the most recent 12-month average excess spread. That same rate
was applied over the remaining life.

The collateral securing the notes are private loans originated
according to either TERI or LEARN underwriting guidelines.  PHEAA
services the loan portfolio.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

PARTS Private Student Loan Trust Series 2007-CT1

  -- Class A downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook Negative;
  -- Class B downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook Negative;
  -- Class C downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.


PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B Certificates to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following certificates issued by PPLUS Trust Series RRD-1:

$60,000,000 PPLUS 6.30% Class A Trust Certificates; Downgraded
to Ba2; Previously on May 19, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1

$60,000,000 Notional Principal PPLUS 0.325% Class B Trust
Certificates; Downgraded to Ba2; Previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1

Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on
the rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction. The rating actions are a result of the change of
the rating of the Underlying Securities which are the 6.625%
Senior Debentures due April 15, 2029 issued by R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Company which were downgraded by Moody's to Ba2 on June 13,
2012.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis or stress
scenarios because the ratings are a pass-through of the rating of
the underlying security.

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the ratings on the
note.


RAMP SERIES 2002-RS2: Moody's Cuts Rating on M-I-2 Tranche to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches from RAMP Series 2002-RS2 Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

Moody's rating actions are based on the current level of credit
enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-level loss
expectations. Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, crosscollateralization, excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls. In addition, the rating actions reflect correction of
an error wherein incorrect delinquent pipeline data was utilized
in determining the rating actions taken on March 30, 2012 for
group I of RAMP Series 2002-RS2 Trust. As of January 2011, the
group I foreclosure loan balance as a percentage of the group I
collateral balance was 17.81%; however, loss projection was
calculated based on a 1.97% foreclosure loan balance. The rating
actions takes into account the correct delinquent pipeline data
and proper loss projection base.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board still expects below-trend growth for the US
economy for 2012, with the unemployment rate remaining high, above
7.5% through 2013, and home prices dropping another 1% from their
4Q 2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS2 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287733

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


SNAAC AUTO 2012-1: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class D Fixed Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to SNAAC
Auto Receivables Trust 2012-1's $150 million auto receivables-
backed notes series 2012-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-  The availability of approximately 38.1%, 30.1%, 23.2%, and
    19.8% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes
    based on stress cash flow scenarios (including excess spread),
    which provide coverage of slightly more than 3.10x, 2.40x,
    1.75x, and 1.50x our 11%-12% expected cumulative net loss.

-  The timely interest and principal payments made under stress
    cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the assigned
    ratings.

-  S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
    scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A and
    B notes would remain within one rating category of its 'AA
    (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively, within the first
    year and its ratings on the class C and D notes would remain
    within two rating categories of our 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)'
    ratings within the first year. These potential rating
    movements are consistent with our credit stability criteria,
    which outlines the outer bound of credit deterioration equal
    to a one-category downgrade within the first year for 'AA'
    rated securities and a two-category downgrade within the first
    year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under moderate
    stress conditions.

-  The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
    overcollateralization, reserve account, and excess spread.

-  A cumulative net loss performance trigger that is designed to
    increase credit enhancement if losses are higher than
    expected.

-  The favorable track record of the management team, which has
    many years of experience individually in the industry and
    together at the company.

-  The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool, with
    11 months seasoning and 47 months of remaining terms.

-  The transaction's payment and legal structures.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED
SNAAC Auto Receivables Trust 2012-1

Class   Rating      Type          Interest           Amount
                                  rate             (mil. $)
A       AA (sf)     Senior        Fixed              112.00
B       A (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed               16.00
C       BBB (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed               14.00
D       BB (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed                8.00


SOUNDVIEW HOME: Moody's Cuts Rating on II-A-4 Tranche to 'Caa2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
and upgraded the rating of one tranche from Soundview Home Loan
Trust 2006-OPT4, backed by subprime mortgage loans.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

In addition, these actions reflect correction of an error in the
Structured Finance Workstation cash flow model used by Moody's in
rating this transaction previously, specifically in how the model
handled cash distribution from prepayments between senior and
subordinate certificates. When rating these deals, the error in
the model led to some senior certificates not being credited with
the appropriate amount of principal prepayments. It should be
noted that model-generated output is but one factor considered by
Moody's in rating these transactions.

Moody's previous ratings on the deal assumed that after the
depletion of the mezzanine certificates, principal distributions
to the group II senior certificates would be made sequentially.
However, corresponding deal documents indicate that the senior
principal waterfall will be changed to pay pro-rata among senior
bonds after the mezzanine certificates are depleted. As such,
Moody's has revised the waterfall projection after mezzanine
depletion to be in alignment with the corresponding deal document,
and have adjusted Moody's analysis accordingly. The rating of
Class I-A-1 issued by Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT4 has been
downgraded to Caa1 (sf) from B2 (sf) and the rating of Class II-A-
4 issued by Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT4 has been upgraded
to Caa2 (sf) from C (sf).

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, subprime residential mortgage loans. The actions are a
result of the recent performance review of subprime pools and
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2008.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprised of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high, above 7.5%, and home prices
dropping another 1% from their 4Q 2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT4

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287732

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/cust/getdocumentByNotesDocId.asp?criteria=PBS_SF198689


SOUTH STREET 2000-1: Fitch Withdraws 'D' Rating on 5 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings of five
classes of notes issued by South Street CBO 2000-1 Ltd./Corp. as
follows:

  -- $12,136,423 class A-4L notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
  -- $4,854,569 class A-4A notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
  -- $6,068,211 class A-4C notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
  -- $15,000,000 class B-1 notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
  -- $4,198,658 class B-2 notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'.

The transaction's final maturity date was May 30, 2012. At that
time, total available proceeds of approximately $51,000 were used
to pay senior fees and expenses.  No class of notes received any
payments at the final maturity date.  The remaining classes of
notes referenced above have each defaulted since they have not
received their full principal balances by the final maturity date.
Fitch has withdrawn the ratings due to the defaults of these
tranches.

According to the trustee reports, one defaulted bond and 12 equity
positions remained in the portfolio after the final maturity date.
Future recoveries on these assets are possible, though likely
minimal.  Fitch will not maintain any further surveillance on the
transaction.

South Street CBO 2000-1 was a cash flow collateralized bond
obligation (CBO) that closed on May 3, 2000.


VENTURE X: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to
two classes of notes issued by Venture X CLO, Limited:

Ratings

U.S. $263,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S. $13,750,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2022 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Class A Notes and the Class E Notes are
based on the expected losses of these notes. The ratings reflect
the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans,
the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Venture X is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 95% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans or eligible
investments, and up to 5% of the portfolio may consist of second-
lien loans, unsecured loans and bonds. The portfolio is
approximately 87% ramped up as of the closing date.

MJX Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will manage the CLO. It
will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period,
including discretionary trading. Thereafter, 50% of unscheduled
principal payments and sale proceeds of credit risk assets may be
used to purchase additional collateral obligations, subject to
certain conditions.

In addition to the Class A Notes and Class E Notes rated by
Moody's, the Issuer will issue five additional tranches, including
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011. Moody's used the
following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: $410,000,000

Diversity Score: 50

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2450
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7 years.

The Class A-1 Notes' and Class E Notes' performance is subject to
uncertainty. The notes' performance is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis which was an
important component in determining the provisional ratings
assigned to the Class A Notes and the Class E Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the impact of an
increase in default probability (expressed in terms of WARF level)
on the Class A Notes and the Class E Notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF Ratings Impact in Rating Notches

WARF + 15% (to 2818 from 2450) Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class E Notes: -1

WARF +30% (to 3185 from 2450) Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class E Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled, "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in
the Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009, available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

Further details regarding Moody's analysis of this transaction may
be found in the pre-sale report, available on Moodys.com.

The principal methodology used in assigning the rating to the
notes issued by the Issuer was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in June 2011.


VENTURE X: S&P Gives 'BB-' Rating on Class F Deferrable Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Venture
X CLO Ltd./Venture X CLO Corp.'s $383.5 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-  The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
    subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
    subordinated notes.

-  The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which can
    withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's CDO
    Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using the
    assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

-  The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

-  The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-secured term
    loans.

-  The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

-  S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the rated notes, which it assessed using
    its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
    assigned ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
    including LIBOR ranging from 0.35%-13.84%.

-  The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

-  The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
    failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
    interest proceeds that are available prior to paying
    subordinated portfolio manager fees, uncapped administrative
    expenses and fees, portfolio manager incentive fees, and
    payments to the subordinated notes.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Venture X CLO Ltd./Venture X CLO Corp.

Class               Rating                Amount
                                        (mil. $)
A                   AAA (sf)              263.50
B                   AA (sf)                55.75
C (deferrable)      A (sf)                 27.00
D (deferrable)      BBB (sf)               18.50
E (deferrable)      BB (sf)                13.75
F (deferrable)      BB- (sf)                5.00
Subordinated notes  NR                     41.50

NR-Not rated.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on 9 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-WHALE 7 based on performance being
in line with expectations.  The revisions in Rating Outlooks and
Recovery Estimates represent a decrease in expected losses on the
associated loans since Fitch's last rating action.

Under Fitch's methodology, all of the pooled and non pooled loans
were modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined
as the 'B' stress, as all the loans in the pool are currently in
special servicing.  Expected losses to the pooled portion are
2.1%.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline is
5.8% from generally year-end 2011 servicer-reported financial
data, or to the recent appraised values.  To determine sustainable
Fitch cash flow and stressed value, Fitch analyzed servicer
reported operating statements and rent rolls, updated property
valuations, STR reports and recent lease and sales comparisons.
Given that the loan positions within the pooled portion of the
CMBS are the lower leveraged A-notes (average base case LTV of
76.8%), Fitch estimates that average recoveries on the pooled
loans will be approximately 97.9% in the base case, whereas, the
more highly leveraged non-pooled component notes have a lower
modeled recovery.

The transaction is collateralized by eight loans, four of which
are secured by hotels (91.6%), three by office (6.6%), and one by
retail (1.7%).  All of the original final maturity dates including
all extension options have passed; all of the remaining loans have
been further extended through modifications and / or forbearance.

Fitch's analysis resulted in loss expectations for four A-notes,
and each of the B-note non-pooled components in the 'B' stress
scenario.  However, losses to certain B-note components have
improved since Fitch's last rating action.  The Recovery Estimates
on certain B-notes associated with the Kyo Ya Hotel Portfolio and
4000 MacArthur Boulevard have been revised.  The three largest
pooled contributors to losses (by unpaid principal balance) in the
'B' stress scenario are: Westin Aruba (5.3%), Broadreach Pool
(3.9%) and Colonial Mall - Myrtle Beach (1.7%).

The Westin Aruba is a 478 room, real estate owned (REO) hotel
property located in Palm Beach, Aruba.  The property has
beachfront access, retail and meeting space, as well as a
nightclub and a 12,000 square foot (sf) casino.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in November 2008 when the
borrower failed to make operating advances to the hotel operator
as specified in the loan agreement.  The property has been REO
since May 2009, when the special servicer foreclosed on the
mezzanine lender, Petra Realty Advisors, who foreclosed on the
original sponsor, Belfonti Capital Partners.  Starwood initiated
an 'all inclusive' option in 2009 which has resulted in increased
income.  The casino operator ceased paying rent in April 2010, was
evicted in October 2010 and the former casino operator's bank
repossessed the casino equipment which resulted in a six week shut
down.  The casino reopened in December 2010 with new equipment and
a new name, the Palm Beach Casino. Aruba Casino Management
currently operates the casino.

The Broadreach Pool was originally collateralized approximately
1.04 million sf in nine office properties in various submarkets of
Los Angeles and San Diego, CA.  One property, Whittier Financial
Center in Whittier, CA, was released in February 2007, reducing
the principal balance of the pooled note to $71.6 million from $85
million at issuance.  The portfolio now has 900,233 sf.  The
remaining properties are as follows: Morehouse Tech Center in San
Diego, CA; Activity Business Center in San Diego, CA; Freeway
Business Center/1501 Hughes Way in Long Beach, CA; 3901 Via Oro
Avenue in Long Beach, CA; South Bay Center in Torrance, CA; 91
Freeway Center in Artesia, CA; Norwalk Corporate Center in
Norwalk, CA; and Glendale Corporate Center in Glendale, CA.  The
overall occupancy at issuance was below market at 83% and as of
the April 2012 rent roll, it has declined to 64.5%. An additional
29% of the space expires by the end of 2014.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in August, 2011 before its maturity date the
same month.  The loan is categorized as Non Performing Matured and
is currently being marketed for sale.

The Colonial Mall - Myrtle Beach is collateralized by a 524,767 sf
regional mall located in Myrtle Beach, SC.  Anchors include J.C.
Penney, two Belk stores, Bass Pro Shops, and the newly constructed
Carmike Cinemas; in-line tenants are a typical mix of national
retailers, with some local tenants.  The anchors, with the
exception of the cinema and the improvements to the Belk #2 store,
are part of the collateral.  The Belk #2 store pays ground rent.
In 2004, a new super-regional mall opened 15 miles from the
subject, resulting in declines in occupancy and sales.  Issuance
expectations assumed some level of performance stabilization;
however, improved performance expectations have not been realized
and occupancy has declined. At issuance, the total mall was 90.6%
occupied, which was lower than historical rates in excess of 95%.
Per the December 2009 rent roll, the total mall and in-line
occupancy had declined to 84.2% and 66.5%, respectively.  As of
the December 2011 rent roll, total mall and in-line occupancy were
80.3% and 42.9%, respectively.  J.C. Penney and both Belk store's
(60% of the total anchor space) leases expire in 2014.  As a
percent of the total in-line space, rollover is as follows: 12.4%
in 2012; 13.5% in 2013; 5.8% in 2014; and 6.7% in 2015.

Fitch affirms and maintains or revises Rating Outlooks and
Recovery Estimates (RE) as indicated:

  -- $632 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $573.5 million class A-2 at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to
     Positive from Stable;
  -- $98.6 million class B at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Positive
     from Stable;
  -- $95 million class C at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $76.8 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75.2 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $70.4 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $71.8 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.
  -- $64.9 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $21.9 million class J at 'CCCsf'; RE100%';
  -- $25.4 million class K at 'CCsf'; RE 0%';
  -- $28.3 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%';
  -- $68.9 million class KH-1 at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $54.1 million class KH-2 at 'CCCsf'; RE 85%;
  -- $18 million class BH-1 at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $28 million class BH-2 at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
  -- $56 million class BH-3 at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $46 million class BH-4 at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $3.3 million class WA at 'Csf'', RE 0%;
  -- $2 million class BP-1 at 'CCsf; RE 50%;
  -- $2.2 million class BP-2 at 'CCsf; RE 0%;
  -- $2.3 million class MB-1 at 'CCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $2.6 million class MB-2 at 'CCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $2.6 million class MB-3 at 'CCsf'; RE 10%;
  -- $2.5 million class MB-4 at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $1.1 million class CM at 'Csf'; RE 0%'.

Interest-only class X-1A and rake classes UV and WB have paid in
full and class X-1B was previously withdrawn.


WAVE SPC 2007-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 4 Classes to 'D(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes to 'D (sf)' from WAVE SPC's series 2007-1, a commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.
"At the same time, we affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)' rating on class A-1
from the same transaction. We also removed all ratings from
CreditWatch negative," S&P said.

"The rating actions on classes A-2 and B reflect our analysis of
the transaction following interest shortfalls to nondeferrable
classes, which caused an event of default (EOD). Classes A-2 and B
experienced interest shortfalls according to the May 22, 2012,
trustee remittance report, and we subsequently lowered our ratings
on these classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on classes C and D to 'D (sf)' because we
determined that the classes are unlikely to be repaid in full,"
S&P said.

"We affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)' rating on class A-1 based on our
analysis of the transaction's liability structure and the credit
characteristics of the underlying collateral using our criteria in
'Global CDOs Of Pooled Structured Finance Assets: Methodology And
Assumptions,' published Feb. 21, 2012. Our criteria include
revisions to our assumptions on correlations, recovery rates,
and default patterns and timings of the collateral. The criteria
also includes supplemental stress tests (largest obligor default
test and largest industry default test), which we considered in
our analysis," S&P said.

"The trustee, Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, delivered an EOD
notice on May 29, 2012, which noted that WAVE 2007-1 had
experienced an EOD under section 5.1 (a) of its indenture. The
notice indicates that there was a default in the payment of
interest accrued on the class A-2 and B notes. This default in
payment continued for a period of three business days, which
resulted in an EOD," S&P said.

"The liquidity interruption resulted from the failure of the
underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) for WAVE
2007-1 to produce sufficient interest proceeds to pay the full
interest amount due to the nondeferrable interest classes," S&P
said.

"According to the most recent trustee report, WAVE 2007-1 was
collateralized by 31 classes of CMBS ($952.0 million, 100%) from
31 distinct transactions issued between 2006 and 2007.  All the
securities are class A-J tranches from their respective CMBS
transactions," S&P said.

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

WAVE SPC
Series 2007-1
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
A-2      D (sf)               CCC- (sf) / Watch Neg
B        D (sf)               CCC- (sf) / Watch Neg
C        D (sf)               CCC- (sf) / Watch Neg
D        D (sf)               CCC- (sf) / Watch Neg

RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

WAVE SPC
Series 2007-1
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
A-1      CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


* Moody's Puts $378MM Resecuritized RMS on Review for Upgrade
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed ratings of nine tranches on
upgrade review from four RMBS resecuritization transactions issued
between 2005 and 2009.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of Moody's recent review actions on the
underlying vintage RMBS tranches backing these resecuritizations.
On May 30, 2012, Moody's placed the ratings of 1,188 bonds on
review for upgrade and the ratings of 384 bonds on review for
downgrade from over 29,000 RMBS bonds issued since 2005 that
Moody's rates.

The methodologies used in the resecuritization bond ratings are
"Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities" published in December 2008, "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Resecuritized Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities"
published in February 2011, and "2005-2008 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in July 2011. The methodology used in
rating interest-only securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of the underlying transactions and hence
the resecuritizations.

The review on the resecuritization bonds will be completed once
the review on the underlying bonds is resolved.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2005-WF1

Cl. I-A-2, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jun 1, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jun 1, 2011 Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jun 1, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-X, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on May 12, 2011 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Issuer: GSMSC Pass-Through Trust 2009-1R

Cl. 23A2, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Apr 7, 2009 Assigned B2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Structured Securities Corp. Series 2005-1

Cl. A-1, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on May 12, 2011 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IO, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Residential Mortgage Securities Funding 2008-3, Ltd.

Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 26, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF287401


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $49-Mil. Subprime RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches and confirmed the rating of two tranches from various
subprime issuers.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

In addition, Moody's has corrected the ratings of the Class A-1
tranche issued by Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2001-3, the Class A-1V tranche issued by Long
Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-2 and the Class AV-1 tranche issued
by C-BASS 2002-CB4 to Aaa (sf) from Aaa (sf) on review for
downgrade.

The ratings of the Class A-1V bonds issued by Long Beach Mortgage
Loan Trust 2001-2 and the Class AV-1 bonds issued by C-BASS 2002-
CB4 are based solely on guarantees by Freddie Mac (Aaa, negative
outlook), and the rating of the Class A-1 bonds issued by Long
Beach Mortgage Loan Trust Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-3
is based solely on guarantees by Fannie Mae (Aaa, negative
outlook). Due to an internal administrative error, the ratings of
these tranches were inadvertently put on review for downgrade on
January 31, 2012. Moody's is now correcting the ratings of these
tranches to align them with the ratings of Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae, respectively.

Complete rating history is as follows:

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-2, tranche Cl. A-1V --
Aaa (sf) rating assigned on July 31, 2001, rating placed on review
for downgrade on July 13, 2011 and confirmed at Aaa (sf) on August
2, 2011;

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2001-3, tranche Cl. A-1 -- Aaa (sf) rating assigned on
September 27, 2001, rating placed on review for downgrade on July
13, 2011 and confirmed at Aaa (sf) on August 2, 2011;

Issuer: C-BASS 2002-CB4, tranche Cl. AV-1 -- Aaa (sf) rating
assigned on September 18, 2002, rating placed on review for
downgrade on July 13, 2011 and confirmed at Aaa (sf) on August 2,
2011.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 76, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 76. For
example, for a pool with 75 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool are low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board still expects below-trend growth for the US
economy for 2012, with the unemployment rate remaining high, above
7.5% through 2013, and home prices dropping another 1% from their
4Q 2011 levels.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS 2002-CB4 Trust

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-2

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2001-3

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF288833

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


* Moody's Says US Comm'l Real Estate Prices Down 0.6% in April
--------------------------------------------------------------
US commercial real estate prices, as measured by Moody's/RCA
Commercial Property Price Indices (CPPI) national all-property
composite, were down 0.6% in April.

"A broad price recovery in commercial real estate prices has been
effectively stalled since Fall 2011," says Moody's Director of
Commercial Real Estate Research, Tad Philipp. "Even apartment
prices in both major and non-major markets have settled down after
leading in price recovery since the financial crisis."

The April monthly performance of the CPPI is discussed in the
report "Moody's/RCA CPPI: Commercial and Apartment Prices Stall."

Apartment prices were down 1.2% in April after increasing by 37.4%
from their January 2010 trough. Apartments in major markets
started their recovery 28 months ago, according to the CPPI, and
have since retraced 82.0% of their peak to trough decline, the
strongest performance among the 20 sub-sectors of the CPPI.

All of the commercial real estate sectors had flat-to-down prices
in April, except the industrial sector, where prices gained 1.1%
during the month. The industrial sector has posted the biggest
gain over the last quarter, at 3.9%, but still slightly lags the
recovery in the core commercial sectors overall.

Moody's also notes that although the central business district
office sector in non-major markets was the first to reach its
post-crisis pricing bottom, which it did 31 months ago, it has yet
to regain much pricing traction, retracing only 7.5% of its peak
to trough decline.

In the major markets, the suburban office sector has seen a
significant setback to its nascent recovery, says Moody's, falling
by 14.4% over the last 5 months.

Prices across sectors for non-distressed properties in the major
markets have recovered to 90.9% of peak levels, explains the "From
the Lab" section of this month's CPPI report. Distressed
transactions are showing price recovery in major markets, up 27.8%
from the trough 19 months ago, while distressed transaction prices
in non-major markets continue to languish, essentially flat since
the fourth quarter of 2009.

Composed of a suite of 20 indices, the Moody's/RCA Commercial
Property Price Indices is a series that measures price changes in
US commercial real estate through advanced repeat-sale regression
(RSR) analytics. The indices use transaction data from Real
Capital Analytics (RCA) and a methodology developed by David
Geltner, a professor at MIT, in conjunction with Moody's and RCA.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 9 Classes From 3 U.S. RMBS Re-REMIC Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from three residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transactions issued between 2006 and 2010. "We also raised our
rating on class N-3 from Greenwich Structured ARM Products CI
2006-1. In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 92 classes from
two transactions with lowered ratings and five other
transactions," S&P said.

Four transactions in this review pay interest on a pro rata basis
and five pay interest sequentially.

"We intend our ratings on the re-REMIC classes to address the
timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal. We
reviewed the interest and principal amounts due on the underlying
securities, which are then passed through to the applicable re-
REMIC classes. We applied our loss projections, incorporating our
loss assumptions, to the underlying collateral to identify the
principal and interest amounts that could be passed through from
the underlying securities under our rating scenario stresses. We
stressed our loss projections at various rating categories to
assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand the stressed
losses associated with their ratings while receiving timely
payment of interest and principal consistent with our criteria,"
S&P said.

"We based our downgrades on our assessment of projected interest
shortfalls and/or projected principal losses from the underlying
securities that would impair the re-REMIC classes at the
applicable rating stresses," S&P said.

"The upgrade of class N-3 from Greenwich Structured ARM Products
CI 2006-1 reflects our expectation of a fast pay down of this
class prior to losses occurring," S&P said.

"The affirmations reflect our assessment that the re-REMIC classes
will likely receive timely interest and the ultimate payment of
principal under the applicable stressed assumptions for the
current ratings," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

  http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111639.pdf

RATING ACTIONS

CSMC Series 2009-14R
Series 2009-14R
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
4-A-2      12639GCV8   CC (sf)              B (sf)
4-A-16     12639GDK1   CC (sf)              B (sf)
4-A-15     12639GDJ4   CC (sf)              B (sf)
4-A-10     12639GDD7   CC (sf)              B (sf)
4-A-19     12639GDN5   CC (sf)              B (sf)
4-A-17     12639GDL9   CC (sf)              B (sf)
4-A-18     12639GDM7   CC (sf)              B (sf)

Greenwich Structured ARM Products CI 2006-1
Series 2006-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
N-3        39700UAC8   BB (sf)              CCC (sf)

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R4
Series 2008-R4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      466309AC5   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-R5
Series 2008-R5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        46633BAA1   BBB- (sf)            BBB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

BCAP LLC 2009-RR14 Trust
Series 2009-RR14
Class      CUSIP       Rating
XI-A7      05532LCC1   AA (sf)
X-A11      05532LBU2   BBB (sf)
XII-A3     05532LCK3   AA (sf)
VIII-A3    05532LAU3   AA (sf)
VIII-A7    05532LAY5   AA (sf)
X-A9       05532LBS7   AA (sf)
XII-A1     05532LCH0   AAA (sf)
VIII-A5    05532LAW9   A (sf)
VIII-A8    05532LAZ2   A (sf)
IV-A1      05532LAJ8   AAA (sf)
XII-A5     05532LCM9   A (sf)
IX-A1      05532LBD0   AAA (sf)
XIII-A1    05532LCU1   AAA (sf)
VI-A1      05532LAN9   AAA (sf)
XIII-A5    05532LCY3   A (sf)
XIII-A3    05532LCW7   AA (sf)
VIII-A1    05532LAS8   AAA (sf)
X-A12      05532LBV0   BBB (sf)
XI-A1      05532LBW8   AAA (sf)
X-A10      05532LBT5   A (sf)
XIII-A8    05532LDB2   A (sf)
XII-A8     05532LCQ0   A (sf)
X-A3       05532LBL2   AA (sf)
XI-A5      05532LCA5   A (sf)
X-A5       05532LBN8   A (sf)
X-A1       05532LBJ7   AAA (sf)
XIII-A7    05532LDA4   AA (sf)
XII-A7     05532LCP2   AA (sf)
XI-A8      05532LCD9   A (sf)
X-A7       05532LBQ1   BBB (sf)
XI-A3      05532LBY4   AA (sf)

CSMC Series 2009-14R
Series 2009-14R
Class      CUSIP       Rating
4-A-6      12639GCZ9   AAA (sf)
2-A-23     12639GJW9   AAA (sf)
4-A-14     12639GDH8   AAA (sf)
4-A-9      12639GDC9   BBB (sf)
4-A-5      12639GCY2   AAA (sf)
2-A-22     12639GJV1   AAA (sf)
2-A-20     12639GJT6   BBB (sf)
2-A-5X     12639GBT4   AAA (sf)
2-A-8      12639GBC1   BBB (sf)
4-A-7      12639GDA3   AAA (sf)
2-A-25     12639GJY5   AAA (sf)
2-A-14     12639GBJ6   A (sf)
2-A-6      12639GBA5   AAA (sf)
2-A-6X     12639GBU1   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      12639GCU0   AAA (sf)
2-A-3X     12639GBR8   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12639GAV0   BBB (sf)
2-A-12     12639GBG2   AAA (sf)
2-A-13     12639GBH0   AAA (sf)
2-A-AX     12639GBX5   AAA (sf)
4-A-11     12639GDE5   AAA (sf)
4-A-12     12639GDF2   AAA (sf)
2-A-11     12639GBF4   AAA (sf)
4-A-13     12639GDG0   AAA (sf)
4-A-8      12639GDB1   AAA (sf)
2-A-24     12639GJX7   AAA (sf)
2-A-BX     12639GBY3   AAA (sf)
4-A-3      12639GCW6   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      12639GAY4   AAA (sf)
2-A-4X     12639GBS6   AAA (sf)
2-A-21     12639GJU3   A (sf)
2-A-7      12639GBB3   A (sf)
2-A-5      12639GAZ1   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      12639GAX6   AAA (sf)
4-A-4      12639GCX4   AAA (sf)
2-A-CX     12639GBZ0   AAA (sf)

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R4
Series 2008-R4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      466309AA9   CCC (sf)

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2010-R4
Series 2010-R4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
4-A2       47233NAP4   BBB (sf)
2-A2       47233NAH2   BBB (sf)
3-A2       47233NAL3   BBB (sf)
2-A1       47233NAG4   AAA (sf)
3-A1       47233NAK5   AAA (sf)
4-A1       47233NAN9   AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2010-R8
Series 2010-R8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-C1       61759XAD4   BBB (sf)
1-A        61759XAA0   AAA (sf)
1-B        61759XAB8   A (sf)

Picard Funding 4 Limited
Series      4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
J          71952YAK0   BB+ (sf)
C          71952YAC8   AA- (sf)
L          71952YAM6   BB- (sf)
D          71952YAD6   A+ (sf)
F          71952YAF1   A- (sf)
A          71952YAA2   AAA (sf)
B          71952YAB0   AA (sf)
M          71952YAN4   B- (sf)
H          71952YAH7   BBB (sf)
I          71952YAJ3   BBB- (sf)
G          71952YAG9   BBB+ (sf)
K          71952YAL8   BB (sf)
E          71952YAE4   A (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Loan 2010-RR4 Trust
Series 2010-RR4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      94987FAC0   A (sf)
2-A-1      94987FAG    A (sf)


* S&P Raises Ratings on 17 Tranches From 9 U.S. CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on 17
tranches from nine U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions backed by pools of trust preferred securities
(TruPs). The upgraded tranches have a total issuance amount of
$3.49 billion. "In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 10
tranches from six U.S. TruPs CDO transactions. We removed 12
ratings from CreditWatch with positive implications," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect the application of our updated
criteria for rating CDOs backed by TruPs. Some of the trust-
preferred CDO transactions have also benefited from improvements
in their underlying collateral portfolios, including cessation of
deferrals that had been occurring and changes in the credit
quality of the small banks that issued the TruPs collateralizing
the CDOs. Some of the rating actions also reflect significant
paydowns made to the transaction's senior notes," S&P said.

"Trust preferred CDOs are collateralized by hybrid (or TruPs)
securities issued by banks, insurance companies, and REITs (real
estate investment trusts). The assets collateralizing bank trust
preferred CDOs rated by Standard & Poor's are deeply subordinated,
long-dated securities issued predominantly by small community
banks with speculative-grade credit profiles. Further, many of
these banks have significant real estate exposures, and it is our
view that their performance in times of economic and/or credit
stress may be highly correlated," S&P said.

"The updated criteria incorporate several elements, including a
decreased emphasis on front-loaded defaults (which are generally
more stressful on the transaction's cash flows) for lower rating
categories; a potential deferral cure (PDC) credit in our cash
flow analysis for prospective deferring and currently deferring
bank TruPs; and an assumption that larger banks may redeem their
TruPs due to U.S. regulatory changes that phase out Tier 1 capital
credit for such securities," S&P said.

"Given the current rating distribution of the TruPs CDOs,
incorporating the differentiated default patterns in our cash flow
scenarios will have the most impact on the current ratings of the
affected transactions," S&P said.

"Some tranches in our analysis had breakeven default rates (BDRs)
that failed to exceed the 'CCC-' scenario default rate (SDR)
generated by CDO Evaluator. We lowered our ratings on these
tranches to 'CC (sf)' if, in our view, the transaction collateral
even absent further deferrals was insufficient to cover the
currently outstanding tranche balance. Otherwise, we assigned a
'CCC-(sf)' rating," S&P said.

"We intend to review the remaining transactions with ratings on
CreditWatch in connection with our TruPs CDO criteria update and
resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected tranches within the
next three months," S&P said.

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

MM Community Funding IX, Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      B (sf)        CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)

MMCapS Funding XVII,Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      B+ (sf)       CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC+ (sf)     CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
B                        CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)

MMCaps Funding XVIII Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      B+ (sf)       CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XIX, Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      BB- (sf)      CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC (sf)      CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XV, Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      BB- (sf)      CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC (sf)      CCC- (sf)
A-3                      CCC (sf)      CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)     CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)
A-3                      CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXIII Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      BB (sf)       CCC+ (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      B (sf)        CCC- (sf)
A-FP                     B (sf)        CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXV, Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      BB+ (sf)      CCC (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC (sf)      CCC- (sf)

Regional Diversified Funding 2004-1 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      B+ (sf)       CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding IV Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding V Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf) /Watch Pos
A-2                      CCC-  (sf)    CCC- (sf)
A-3                      CC (sf)       CC (sf)


* S&P Takes Actions on 312 Classes from 22 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 312
classes from 21 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions and affirmed its ratings on 157 classes from 22
transactions. S&P also withdrew its ratings on three classes from
Alternative Loan Trust 2007-9T1 based on our current IO criteria.

"The downgrades to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' reflect our opinion
that the affected classes are highly vulnerable to nonpayment. We
lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' due to principal
write-downs. The affirmations reflect our current assessment of
the classes' vulnerability to nonpayment. During our review, we
identified certain classes that we previously downgraded due to an
error. We affirmed our ratings on these classes because our
current projections are consistent with the current ratings," S&P
said.

"We withdrew our ratings on three classes from Alternative Loan
Trust 2007-9T1 to reflect our current IO criteria," S&P said.

"Our 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' ratings reflect our assessment that
the credit enhancement for these classes will remain insufficient
to cover projected losses," S&P said.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Alternative Loan Trust 2006-45T1
Series 2006-45T1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      02149JAA4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-4      02149JAD8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-6      02149JAF3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-9      02149JAJ5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-10     02149JAK2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-12     02149JAM8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-13     02149JAN6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-15     02149JCA2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-16     02149JCB0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-3      02149JAS5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-5      02149JAU0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-10     02149JAZ9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-11     02149JBA3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-12     02149JBB1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-13     02149JBC9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-14     02149JBD7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-16     02149JCC8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
PO         02149JBH8   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2007-13
Series 2007-13
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        02150MAA3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-2        02150MAB1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-3        02150MAC9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-4        02150MAD7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
PO         02150MAP0   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2007-18CB
Series 2007-18CB
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-5      02151NAE2   D (sf)               CC (sf)
2-A-9      02151NAR3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-12     02151NAU6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
PO         02151NBM3   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2007-9T1
Series 2007-9T1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-2      02150JAB8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-22     02150JBW1   D (sf)               CC (sf)
1-A-26     02150JCA8   NR                   CCC (sf)
1-A-28     02150JCC4   D (sf)               CCC (sf)
1-A-32     02150JCG5   NR                   CCC (sf)
2-A-13     02150JCX8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-14     02150JCY6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-16     02150JDA7   NR                   CCC (sf)
2-A-18     02150JDC3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-21     02150JDF6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
PO         02150JBC5   D (sf)               CC (sf)


Bank of America Funding 2007-2 Trust
Series 2007-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      05951GAP7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-2      05951GAQ5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-3      05951GAR3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-5      05951GAT9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-7      05951GAV4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-9      05951GAX0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-11     05951GAZ5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-13     05951GBB7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-15     05951GBD3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-17     05951GBF8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-20     05951GBJ0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-22     05951GBL5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-23     05951GBM3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-24     05951GBN1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-26     05951GBQ4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-27     05951GBR2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-29     05951GBT8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-30     05951GBU5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-31     05951GBV3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-32     05951GBW1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-33     05951GBX9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-34     05951GBY7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-36     05951GCA8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-37     05951GCB6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-39     05951GCD2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
30-PO      05951GCK6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
T-A-3      05951GAD4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
T-A-5      05951GAF9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2007-21
Series 2007-21
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      17025WAA2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-2      17025WAB0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-1      17025WAF1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-2      17025WAG9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-3      17025WAH7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-PO       17025WAK0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2007-5
Series 2007-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        12544VAA7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-2        12544VAB5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-3        12544VAC3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-4        12544VAD1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-5        12544VAE9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-6        12544VAF6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-7        12544VAG4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-8        12544VAH2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-10       12544VAK5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-11       12544VAL3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-12       12544VAM1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-13       12544VAN9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-14       12544VAP4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-15       12544VAQ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-16       12544VAR0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-18       12544VAT6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-20       12544VAV1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-22       12544VAX7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-46       12544VBX6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-47       12544VBY4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-49       12544VCL1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
M-A        12544VCD9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-23       12544VAY5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-24       12544VAZ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-25       12544VBA6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-26       12544VBB4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-27       12544VBC2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-28       12544VBD0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-31       12544VBG3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-32       12544VBH1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-34       12544VBK4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-35       12544VBL2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-37       12544VBN8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-38       12544VBP3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-40       12544VBR9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-43       12544VBU2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-44       12544VBV0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-51       12544VCN7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-14
Series 2007-14
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        12544DAB5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-6        12544DAF6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-7        12544DAG4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-8        12544DAH2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-10       12544DAK5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-12       12544DAM1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-15       12544DAQ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-16       12544DAR0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-18       12544DAT6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-20       12544DAV1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-23       12544DAY5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-15
Series 2007-15
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-2      17025TAB7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-3      17025TAC5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-4      17025TAD3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-5      17025TAE1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-7      17025TAG6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-9      17025TAJ0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-11     17025TAL5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-12     17025TAM3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-13     17025TAN1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-15     17025TAQ4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-16     17025TAR2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-20     17025TAV3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-21     17025TAW1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-22     17025TAX9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-23     17025TAY7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-25     17025TBA8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-26     17025TBB6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-29     17025TBE0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-30     17025TBF7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-2      17025TBJ9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-4      17025TBL4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-5      17025TBM2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-7      17025TBZ3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-8      17025TCA7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-9      17025TCB5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
PO         17025TBQ3   D (sf)               CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-HY7
Series 2007-HY7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      12544HAA8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-1A     12544HAC4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-1B     12544HAV2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-1C     12544HBB5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-1A     12544HAE0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-1B     12544HAW0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-1C     12544HBC3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
4-A-1A     12544HAG5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
4-A-1B     12544HAX8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
4-A-1C     12544HBD1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-1        12544HAY6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-3        12544HBA7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2007-4
Series 2007-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      126379AA4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-5      126379AE6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-6      126379BJ4   D (sf)               CC (sf)
3-A-1      126379AL0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-8      126379AT3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

HSI Asset Loan Obligation Trust 2007-2
Series 2007-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-A-1     40432BAE9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-A-5     40432BAJ8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-A-7     40432BAL3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-A-9     40432BAN9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-A-10    40432BAP4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-A-11    40432BAQ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-A-12    40432BAR0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
III-A-1    40432BAU3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
III-A-2    40432BAV1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
III-A-3    40432BAW9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
III-A-4    40432BAX7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
III-A-6    40432BAZ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
III-A-7    40432BBA6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
III-A-8    40432BBB4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
III-A-9    40432BBC2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2007-S3
Series 2007-S3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      46631NAA7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-11     46631NAL3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-12     46631NAM1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-13     46631NAN9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-14     46631NAP4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-15     46631NAQ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-16     46631NAR0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-17     46631NAS8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-20     46631NAV1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-21     46631NAW9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-22     46631NAX7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-23     46631NAY5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-24     46631NAZ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-25     46631NBA6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-26     46631NBB4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-27     46631NBC2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-28     46631NBD0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-30     46631NBF5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-31     46631NBG3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-32     46631NBH1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-33     46631NBJ7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-34     46631NBK4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-35     46631NBL2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-36     46631NBM0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-37     46631NBN8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-38     46631NBP3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-42     46631NBT5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-43     46631NBU2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-44     46631NBV0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-45     46631NBW8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-46     46631NBX6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-47     46631NBY4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-48     46631NBZ1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-49     46631NCA5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-50     46631NCB3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-51     46631NCC1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-52     46631NCD9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-53     46631NCE7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-54     46631NCF4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-55     46631NCG2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-56     46631NCH0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-57     46631NCJ6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-58     46631NCK3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-60     46631NCM9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-64     46631NCR8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-67     46631NCU1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-68     46631NCV9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-72     46631NCZ0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-74     46631NDB2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-75     46631NDC0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-76     46631NDD8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-77     46631NDE6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-78     46631NDF3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-79     46631NDG1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-80     46631NDH9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-81     46631NDJ5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-83     46631NDL0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-85     46631NDN6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-87     46631NDQ9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-90     46631NDT3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-97     46631NEA3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-99     46631NEC9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-100      46631NED7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-101      46631NEE5   D (sf)               CC (sf)
A-114      46631NET2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2007-A3
Series 2007-A3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      46630UAA2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-1      46630UAC8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-2      46630UAD6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-3      46630UAE4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-3M     46630UAF1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-3L     46630UAH7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-2      46630UAM6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-9
Series 2007-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A1       52522XAA5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A4       52522XAG2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A5       52522XAH0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-8      55274QAH8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-9      55274QAJ4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-10     55274QAK1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-30     55274QBF1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-3
Series 2006-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-2      55274SAB7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-3      55274SAC5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-4      55274SAD3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-5      55274SAE1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-6      55274SAF8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-7      55274SAG6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-8      55274SAH4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-9      55274SAJ0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
1-A-11     55274SAL5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-1      55274SAM3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-4      55274SAQ4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-5      55274SAR2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-1      55274SAS0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-12
Series 2007-12
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-2      61755GAB9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-2      61755GAF0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-1      61755GAJ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-3      61755GAL7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-7      61755GAQ6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-8      61755GAR4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-9      61755GAS2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-11     61755GAU7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-12     61755GAV5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-13     61755GAW3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-14     61755GAX1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-16     61755GAZ6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-17     61755GBA0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-18     61755GBB8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-19     61755GBC6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-20     61755GBD4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-21     61755GBE2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-22     61755GBF9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-23     61755GBG7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-26     61755GBK8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-27     61755GBL6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-29     61755GBN2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-30     61755GBP7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-32     61755GBR3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-33     61755GBS1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-35     61755GBU6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-36     61755GBV4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-37     61755GBW2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-39     61755GBY8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-41     61755GCA9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-42     61755GCB7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-A-P      61755GCC5   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-13
Series 2007-13
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-P      61756HAJ9   D (sf)               CC (sf)
7-A-4      61756HBW9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
7-A-8      61756HCA6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
5-A-P      61756HBM1   D (sf)               CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2008-RF1
Series 2008-RF1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AF         86362DAA0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
AO         86362DAC6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-8 Trust
Series 2007-8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-3      94986AAC2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
I-A-13     94986AAN8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
I-A-14     94986AAP3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
I-A-16     94986AAR9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
I-A-22     94986AAX6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-PO       94986ABS6   D (sf)               CC (sf)

NR-Not rated.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Alternative Loan Trust 2006-45T1
Series 2006-45T1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*2-A-15    02149JBE5   CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2007-13
Series 2007-13
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*A-9       02150MAJ4   CC (sf)
*A-11      02150MAL9   CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2007-18CB
Series 2007-18CB
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*2-A-22    02151NBE1   CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2007-9T1
Series 2007-9T1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-A-2      02150JAU6   CC (sf)
2-A-3      02150JAV4   CC (sf)
2-A-7      02150JCR1   CC (sf)
2-A-8      02150JCS9   CC (sf)
2-A-9      02150JCT7   CC (sf)
2-A-11     02150JCV2   CC (sf)
2-A-12     02150JCW0   CC (sf)
2-A-15     02150JCZ3   CC (sf)
2-A-17     02150JDB5   CC (sf)
2-A-19     02150JDD1   CC (sf)
2-A-20     02150JDE9   CC (sf)

Bank of America Funding 2007-2 Trust
Series 2007-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-16     05951GBE1   CCC (sf)
1-A-18     05951GBG6   CCC (sf)
*1-A-40    05951GCE0   CC (sf)
*1-A-42    05951GCG5   CC (sf)
2-A-1      05951GCH3   CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2007-21
Series 2007-21
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*1-A-3     17025WAC8   CC (sf)
*1-PO      17025WAE4   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2007-5
Series 2007-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*A-9       12544VAJ8   CC (sf)
*A-17      12544VAS8   CC (sf)
*A-19      12544VAU3   CC (sf)
*A-21      12544VAW9   CC (sf)
*A-29      12544VBE8   CC (sf)
*A-30      12544VBF5   CC (sf)
*A-36      12544VBM0   CC (sf)
*A-41      12544VBS7   CC (sf)
*A-42      12544VBT5   CC (sf)
*A-48      12544VBZ1   CC (sf)
*A-50      12544VCM9   CC (sf)
*PO        12544VCB3   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-14
Series 2007-14
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        12544DAA7   CCC (sf)
A-3        12544DAC3   CC (sf)
A-4        12544DAD1   CCC (sf)
A-9        12544DAJ8   CC (sf)
A-11       12544DAL3   CC (sf)
A-14       12544DAP4   CC (sf)
*A-17      12544DAS8   CC (sf)
A-19       12544DAU3   CC (sf)
A-21       12544DAW9   CC (sf)
A-22       12544DAX7   CC (sf)
PO         12544DAZ2   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-15
Series 2007-15
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*1-A-19    17025TAU5   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-HY7
Series 2007-HY7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*A-2       12544HAZ3   CC (sf)
*A-4       12544HBF6   CC (sf)

CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2007-4
Series 2007-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*1-A-3     126379AC0   CC (sf)
1-A-11     126379BP0   CC (sf)

HSI Asset Loan Obligation Trust 2007-2
Series 2007-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-PO     40432BAD1   CC (sf)
I-A-1      40432BAA7   CCC (sf)
I-A-2      40432BAB5   CC (sf)
II-A-PO    40432BAT6   CC (sf)
*II-A-3    40432BAG4   CC (sf)
II-A-4     40432BAH2   CC (sf)
III-A-PO   40432BBE8   CC (sf)
III-A-5    40432BAY5   CC (sf)
A-PO       40432BBG3   CC (sf)

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2007-S3
Series 2007-S3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*1-A-71    46631NCY3   CC (sf)
*1-A-73    46631NDA4   CC (sf)
*1-A-96    46631NDZ9   CC (sf)
2-A-1      46631NEX3   CC (sf)
2-A-2      46631NEY1   CC (sf)
A-P        46631NFB0   CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2007-A3
Series 2007-A3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*3-A-2M    46630UAN4   CC (sf)

Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-9
Series 2007-9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A2       52522XAB3   CC (sf)
1-A3       52522XAC1   CC (sf)
2-A1       52522XAD9   CC (sf)
2-A2       52522XAE7   CC (sf)
2-A3       52522XAF4   CC (sf)
*2-A6      52522XAJ6   CC (sf)
2-A8       52522XAL1   CC (sf)
AP         52522XAM9   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      55274QAA3   CC (sf)
1-A-3      55274QAC9   CC (sf)
1-A-4      55274QAD7   CC (sf)
1-A-5      55274QAE5   CC (sf)
1-A-6      55274QAF2   CC (sf)
1-A-11     55274QAL9   CC (sf)
1-A-12     55274QAM7   CC (sf)
1-A-13     55274QAN5   CC (sf)
1-A-14     55274QAP0   CC (sf)
1-A-15     55274QAQ8   CC (sf)
1-A-16     55274QAR6   CC (sf)
1-A-22     55274QAX3   CC (sf)
1-A-23     55274QAY1   CC (sf)
1-A-24     55274QAZ8   CC (sf)
1-A-26     55274QBB0   CC (sf)
1-A-27     55274QBC8   CC (sf)
1-A-28     55274QBD6   CC (sf)
1-A-31     55274QBG9   CC (sf)
1-A-32     55274QBH7   CC (sf)
1-A-33     55274QBJ3   CC (sf)
1-A-34     55274QBK0   CC (sf)
1-A-35     55274QBL8   CC (sf)
2-A-2      55274QBN4   CC (sf)
PO         55274QBS3   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-3
Series 2006-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*1-A-10    55274SAK7   CC (sf)
15-PO      55274SAV3   CC (sf)
30-PO      55274SAW1   CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-12
Series 2007-12
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      61755GAA1   CC (sf)
1-A-3      61755GAC7   CC (sf)
1-A-P      61755GAD5   CC (sf)
2-A-1      61755GAE3   CC (sf)
2-A-3      61755GAG8   CC (sf)
3-A-6      61755GAP8   CC (sf)
*3-A-15    61755GAY9   CC (sf)
*3-A-25    61755GBJ1   CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-13
Series 2007-13
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      61756HAA8   CC (sf)
1-A-2      61756HAB6   CC (sf)
1-A-3      61756HAC4   CC (sf)
1-A-P      61756HAD2   CC (sf)
2-A-1      61756HAF7   CC (sf)
2-A-2      61756HAG5   CC (sf)
2-A-3      61756HAH3   CC (sf)
3-A-1      61756HAK6   CC (sf)
4-A-4      61756HAQ3   CC (sf)
4-A-6      61756HAS9   CC (sf)
4-A-8      61756HAU4   CC (sf)
6-A-1      61756HBN9   CC (sf)
6-A-3      61756HBQ2   CC (sf)
6-A-4      61756HBR0   CC (sf)
6-A-5      61756HBS8   CC (sf)
7-A-1      61756HBT6   CC (sf)
7-A-6      61756HBY5   CC (sf)
7-A-11     61756HCD0   CC (sf)
7-A-17     61756HCK4   CC (sf)
5-A-1      61756HBH2   CC (sf)
5-A-3      61756HBK5   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2008-RF1
Series 2008-RF1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
*A         86362DAK8   CC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-15 Trust
Series 2007-15
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        949797AA2   CCC (sf)
A-2        949797AB0   CC (sf)
A-5        949797AE4   CCC (sf)
A-6        949797AF1   CCC (sf)
A-7        949797AG9   CCC (sf)
A-PO       949797AH7   CC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-8 Trust
Series 2007-8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-2      94986AAB4   CC (sf)
I-A-4      94986AAD0   CC (sf)
I-A-5      94986AAE8   CC (sf)
I-A-6      94986AAF5   CC (sf)
I-A-7      94986AAG3   CC (sf)
I-A-9      94986AAJ7   CC (sf)
I-A-10     94986AAK4   CC (sf)
I-A-11     94986AAL2   CC (sf)
I-A-12     94986AAM0   CC (sf)
I-A-15     94986AAQ1   CC (sf)
I-A-17     94986AAS7   CC (sf)
I-A-18     94986AAT5   CC (sf)
I-A-19     94986AAU2   CC (sf)
I-A-20     94986AAV0   CC (sf)
I-A-21     94986AAW8   CC (sf)
I-A-23     94986AAY4   CC (sf)
II-A-2     94986ABB3   CCC (sf)
II-A-8     94986ABH0   CCC (sf)
II-A-9     94986ABJ6   CCC (sf)
II-A-11    94986ABL1   CCC (sf)





                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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