TCR_Public/120513.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, May 13, 2012, Vol. 16, No. 132

                            Headlines

AAMES MORTGAGE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class M-1 Tranche to 'C'
ABFC ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 25 RMBS Tranches to C
AEGIS ASSET: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 RMBS Tranches to 'C'
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on 31 RMBS Tranches to C
AMORTIZING RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'C'

AMRESCO RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Confirms Caa3 Rating on M-2F Tranche
APIDOS CDO V: S&P Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB'; Off Watch
ARCAP 2003-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class F Certificates to 'C'
ARCAP 2003-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Note Classes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Certs. to 'Caa2'

BATTALION CLO 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. X-1B Certs. to 'Ba3'
CIFC FUNDING 2006-I: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'BB'
CIFC FUNDING 2006-II: S&P Hikes Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'BB'
COLUMBUS PARK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB'

DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on II-MR-1 Tranche to Caa3
DRYDEN XII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Tranches to 'Caa2'
FIRST HORIZON: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 RMBS Tranches to 'Caa2'
FIRST NAT'L. 2009-3: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class D Notes
FIRST UNION: Fitch Puts Ratings on 3 Certs. on Watch Negative

HOMEBANC MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. I-M-2 Tranche to C
HOME EQUITY: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M-3 Tranche to 'Caa3'
JER CRE 2005-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Eight Note Classes
JPMCC 2005-CIBC13: Fitch Lowers Rating on 7 Certificate Classes
JPMCM 1999-C8: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 2 Cert. Classes

KNIGHTSBRIDGE CLO 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Lowers Rating on 4 Sub. Loan Classes
MARATHON CLO IV: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating to US$16.4MM Class D Notes
MERITAGE MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M-4 Tranche to 'C'
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Upgrades Rating on D Certificates to 'Ba1'

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. M-2 Tranche to 'C'
MONTANA HIGHER: Fitch Withdraws 'Bsf' Rating on Class 2006C Bonds
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Fitch Cuts Rating on Three Cert. Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2004-IQ7: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class N
MWAM 2001-1: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Three Note Classes

NEW CENTURY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches to 'C'
NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Cl. AIO Tranche Rating to 'Caa1'
PACIFICA CDO IV: S&P Affirms Rating on Class B-2L Notes at 'BB-'
PEOPLE'S CHOICE 2004-2: Moody's Lifts Rating on M2 Tranche to B1
PERITUS I: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ba1'

PETRA 2007-1: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Eight Note Classes
SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-3: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba1'
SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-3: S&P Gives 'BB+' Rating on US$43MM E Notes
SASCO 2007-BHC1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'C'
SAXON ASSET: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 7 RMBS Tranches to 'C'

STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Tranches to Caa3
SYMPHONY CLO IX: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on US$27.75MM Cl. E Notes
UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Puts Low-B Ratings on Two Note Classes
UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Class F Securities
VINACASA CLO: S&P Hikes Rating on Cl. C Notes to 'BB+'; Off Watch

WHITNEY CLO I: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class B-1LB Notes

* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $965 Million Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Reviews Six SF CDOs for Possible Downgrade
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 253 Classes From 74 US Residential RMBS
* S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on 55 Classes From 7 CMBS & CDO Deals
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 10 Classes From 5 U.S. CMBS Deals to 'D'

* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 62 Classes From 40 CMBS & CDO Deals


                            *********

AAMES MORTGAGE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class M-1 Tranche to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches from one RMBS transaction backed by Subprime loans issued
by Aames Mortgage Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2002-1

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF283838

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


ABFC ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 25 RMBS Tranches to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 54
tranches and confirmed the ratings of five tranches from 13 RMBS
transactions backed by Subprime loans issued by ABFC.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFC 2002-NC1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABFC 2002-OPT1 Trust

Cl. AIO-INV, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC 2003-OPT1 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-AHL1

Cl. AI, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-WMC1

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-AHL1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-HE1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 4, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT3

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-
WF2

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-
WF1

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF283847

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


AEGIS ASSET: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 RMBS Tranches to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches, upgraded the ratings of one tranche, and confirmed the
ratings of nine tranches from four RMBS transactions backed by
Subprime loans issued by Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-2

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-2

Cl. M1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-3

Cl. A1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A2-B, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-4

Cl. A1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A2-B, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF283842

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on 31 RMBS Tranches to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 47
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 21 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 9 tranche from 19 RMBS transactions, backed by Subprime
loans, issued by Ameriquest.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction. The above
mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages 2004 and
prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., 2003-AR3

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2002-3

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2002-AR1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-10

Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-12

Cl. AF, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-13

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-5

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-7

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-8

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-9

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-FR1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R10

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R11

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R12

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R3

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R5

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R6

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R8

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284485

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


AMORTIZING RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 10
tranches and confirmed the ratings of three tranches from five
RMBS transactions backed by Subprime loans issued by Amortizing
Residential Collateral Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all
vintages 2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the
respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2002-BC8

Cl. A1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-SIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2004-1

Cl. A5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M4, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-BC6

Cl. A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-BC1

Cl. A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC4

Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF283833

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


AMRESCO RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Confirms Caa3 Rating on M-2F Tranche
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of one
tranche and confirmed the ratings of seven tranches from two RMBS
transactions backed by Subprime loans issued by AMRESCO
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance and
detailed analysis of timing and amount of credit enhancement
released due to step-down. This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variations across the different pools and
the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages. Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are
made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2)
the level of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of
pool performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the
pool decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace. The above methodology only
applies to pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of
greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool
factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines
to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural features allow for
a monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: AMRESCO Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-3

A-8, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-9, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-1F, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: AMRESCO Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-1

A-5, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-6, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-1A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-1F, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-2F, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284171

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


APIDOS CDO V: S&P Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB'; Off Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1-S, A-1-J, A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes from Apidos CDO V, a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Apidos Capital Management LLC. "Simultaneously, we removed all of
the ratings from CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive
implications on Feb. 10, 2012," S&P said.

"The performance of the transaction has improved since we lowered
our ratings on some of the classes in February 2010, primarily due
to an improvement in the credit quality of the assets and a lower
level of defaults. The transaction is in its reinvestment period
that is scheduled to end in April 2014," S&P said.

"As of the April 2012 trustee report, the transaction's asset
portfolio had approximately $1.858 million in defaulted assets,
down from $7.505 million in the January 2010 trustee report, which
we used for the analysis in the February 2010 rating actions. The
'CCC' rated assets in the collateral pool also went down to
$11.791 million in April 2012 from approximately $26.018 million
in January 2010," S&P said.

In addition, the transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
have increased since January 2010. The trustee reported the
following O/C ratios in the April 2012 monthly report:

  * The class A-2 O/C ratio was 122.94%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 120.54% in January 2010;

  * The class B O/C ratio was 115.27% compared with a reported
    ratio of 113.03% in January 2010;

  * The class C O/C ratio was 109.43%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 107.29% in January 2010; and

  * The class D O/C ratio was 105.85%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 103.79% in January 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its opinion,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Apidos CDO V
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-1-S              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1-J              AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1                AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                  BBB (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                  BB (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Apidos CDO V
Coissuer:           Apidos CDO V Corp.
Collateral manager: Apidos Capital Management LLC.
Underwriter:        JPMorgan Securities Inc.
Indenture trustee:  The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


ARCAP 2003-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class F Certificates to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
classes and affirmed the rating of one class of Certificates
issued by ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust. The downgrades are
due to realized losses to the underlying collateral as well as an
increase in interest shortfalls. The affirmation is due to the key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic)
transactions.

Cl. A, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust is a static pooled re-remic
transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (100% of the pool balance) with the collateral
issued between 1999 and 2003. As of the April 20, 2012 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $403.2 million from $414.4 million at issuance, with
the paydown directed to the Class A Certificates. The paydown was
due to amortization of the collateral and Defaulted Securities
Interest Proceeds being classified as Principal Proceeds. The
current collateral par amount is $285.1 million, representing an
approximately $129.3 million decrease, of which $124.1 million is
the result of cumulative realized losses to the collateral pool
since securitization.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 7,250 compared to 7,355 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Aaa-Aa3 (2.4% compared to 2.0% at last review), A1-A3
(0.0% compared to 0.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (11.6% compared to
9.4% at last review), B1-B3 (16.5% compared to 13.0% at last
review), and Caa1-C (69.5% compared to 75.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.4 compared to 2.9
at last review. The increased WAL is due to the current profile of
the collateral pool and assumptions about underlying loan
extensions.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
3.1% compared to 4.2% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
3.1% to 0.0% or up to 8.1% would result in average rating movement
on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward and 0 to 2
notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


ARCAP 2003-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine classes and affirmed one class
issued by ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization, Inc. (ARCap 2003-1).  The
rating actions are the result of negative credit migration and
additional principal losses on the underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in May 2011, approximately 50.6%
of the collateral has been downgraded. Currently, 90.1% of the
portfolio has a Fitch-derived rating below investment grade, while
64.9% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and below.  This compares
to 90% and 54.4%, respectively, at the last rating action.  Over
this period, the class A notes have received $5.9 million in
paydowns, while the transaction has realized losses of
approximately $94.7 million.

Fitch analyzed this transaction under the framework described in
its Oct. 6, 2011 report, 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured
Finance CDOs', using the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios.  This is
discussed in more detail in Fitch's Sept. 15, 2011 report, 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed and
experiencing interest shortfalls, as well as those with near-term
maturities.  The breakeven rates in Fitch's cash flow model for
the class A through D notes are generally consistent with the
ratings assigned below.

Fitch analyzed class E through K's sensitivity to the default of
the distressed assets ('CCC' and below).  This resulted in Fitch
downgrading the class E notes to 'CCCsf' (indicating that default
is possible) given the high probability of default of the
underlying assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon
default.  Similarly, Fitch downgraded the class F notes to 'CCsf'
(indicating a probable default).  The downgrades on the class G
through J notes along with the affirmation of the class K notes
indicate that default is inevitable.

The Stable Outlook on the class A notes reflects Fitch's view that
the notes will continue to delever.  The Negative Outlook on the
class B and C notes reflects the potential for further losses on
the underlying collateral. Fitch does not assign Outlooks to
classes rated 'CCC' and below.

ARCAP 2003-1 is backed by 48 bonds from 12 commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) transactions and is considered a CMBS B-
piece resecuritization (also referred to as first loss commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation [CRE CDO]/ReREMIC) as
it includes the most junior bonds of CMBS transactions.  The
transaction closed Aug. 27, 2003.

Fitch has taken the following actions as indicated:

  -- $43,567,502 class A notes downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf';
     Outlook to Stable from Negative;

  -- $36,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $20,500,000 class C notes downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $15,400,000 class D notes downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf';

  -- $36,100,000 class E notes downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';

  -- $13,000,000 class F notes downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf';

  -- $45,000,000 class G notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

  -- $9,000,000 class H notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

  -- $28,000,000 class J notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

  -- $24,000,000 class K notes affirmed at 'Csf'.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Certs. to 'Caa2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed 14 classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage,
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-3 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans and concerns about
refinance risk associated with the pool's third largest loan.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
12.8% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8.9%. Realized losses have increased from
2.2% of the original balance to 2.6% since the prior review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 23 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated June 2, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the April 12, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to $1.62
billion from $2.16 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 80 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 57% of
the pool. One loan, representing less than a percent of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

Seventeen loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $56.4 million (31% average loss severity).
Currently eight loans, representing 12% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the FRI
Portfolio Loan ($70 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured
by two office properties totaling 727,400 square feet (SF) located
in Nashville, Tennessee and West Palm Beach, Florida. The
Tennessee property represents 81% of the portfolio by size.
Overall the portfolio is 67% leased. The loan was transferred to
special servicing when the loan failed to pay off at maturity in
May 2010. The Tennessee property is REO, and the Florida property
is in foreclosure. The borrower is negotiating a discounted pay
off of the Florida property.

The remaining seven specially serviced properties are secured by a
mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $94.8
million loss for the specially serviced loans (47% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for nine poorly
performing loans representing 12% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $59.6 million loss (30% expected loss based on a 64%
probability default) from these troubled loans. The largest of the
troubled loans is the Marley Station Loan, which is discussed
below.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 80%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 99% compared to 104% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 9.7% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.58X and 1.13X, respectively, compared to
1.47X and 1.03X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 30% of the pool. The
largest loan is the Woolworth Building Loan ($200 million -- 12.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a 812,000 SF Class B office
building located in the downtown city hall submarket of New York
City. The property is also encumbered by a $50 million junior
loan. The property was 89% leased as of December 2011, slightly
down from 93% at last review. Performance has declined due to an
overall drop in base rents from the increase in vacancy. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 0.93X, respectively, compared to
97% and 0.98X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Ridgedale Center Loan ($167.7
million -- 10.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 340,800 SF
regional mall located in Minnetonka, Minnesota. The loan is owned
by an affiliate of General Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP) and is
anchored by Sears, JCPenney and Macy's. In-line shops were 93%
leased as of December 2011, which was an improvement from 85% at
last review. Performance has remained relatively stable since last
review, however due to some near term lease roll over in the next
few years, Moody's stressed the cash flow to reflect potential
vacancies at the property. In addition, this loan is subject to a
1% liquidation fee at maturity or liquidation as part of the GGP
restructuring. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 119% and 0.77X,
respectively, compared to 119% and 0.80Xat last review.

The third largest loan is the Marley Station Loan ($114.4 million
-- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a two-story regional
mall located in Glen Burnie, Maryland. The center is anchored by
Sears, JCPenney and Macy's. Boscov's was the fourth anchor,
however the retailer vacated the premises after the company's
bankruptcy and the space is currently dark. The dark space is
controlled by a third party which plans to convert the space into
office space and lease it to data and operations companies. The
in-line space was 56% leased as of December 2011 compared to 59%
at last review and 67% at the second prior review. In-line sales
were $292 per square foot, which is down 5% since last review and
underperforming the competitive set. Performance has declined over
the prior two reviews due to lower revenues declines in inline
occupancy. The loan sponsor is Simon Property Group. The loan
matures on July 2012. Due to the poor performance in a declining
market and uncertainty of refinancing, Moody's has classified this
as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 219% and 0.49X,
respectively, compared to 147% and 0.66X at last review.


BATTALION CLO 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of notes from Battalion CLO 2007-1 Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction backed by corporate loans.
Brigade Capital Management LLC manages the transaction. "At the
same time, we removed the ratings from CreditWatch with positive
implications, where we placed them on Feb. 10, 2012. We affirmed
our ratings on two other classes from the transaction and removed
them from CreditWatch with positive implications," S&P said.

"This transaction is currently in its reinvestment phase, which
will continue until July 2014. The rating actions reflect the
improved credit quality of the transaction's asset portfolio since
our March 2010 rating actions. According to the April 2012 trustee
report, the amount of defaulted assets decreased to $9.74 million
from $12.16 million reported in the February 2010 report, which we
used for our March 2010 action. Due to this and other factors,
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios increased for the class A/B, C,
D, and E notes," S&P said.

The affirmations reflect credit quality commensurate with the
classes' current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Battalion CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                Rating
Class        To         From
A            AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B            AA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C            A (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Pos
D            BBB (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
E            BB (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. X-1B Certs. to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Securities Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-BBA7 as follows:

Cl. H, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2011 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. X-1B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades were based on the improved performance of the loan
collateral and loan deleveraging from scheduled amortization.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.3. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. Also
incorporated in the model is the CMBS IO calculator v 1.0 which
uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating
based on the published methodology: original and current bond
ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond balances
grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within
the transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as
defined in the published methodology. The calculator then returns
a calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated July 28, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the April 16, 2012 Payment Date, the transaction's
certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $30.9 million from
$700.0 million at securitization due to the payoff of four loans
originally in the pool and scheduled amortization and a partial
collateral release associated with the CPI Hilton Portfolio Loan,
the only remaining loan in the pool.

The pool has not experienced losses to date. As of the April 2012
distribution date, Class K has experienced interest shortfalls
totaling $835. Interest shortfalls can be caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust
expenses.

The CPI Hilton Portfolio Loan is secured by four limited service
hotels located in four states (California, Colorado, Florida and
Georgia) with a total of 760 rooms. Three of the hotels are
branded Hilton Garden Inn and one is branded Homewood Suites. At
securitization the loan was secured by five hotels with a total of
944 rooms. The Hilton Garden Inn Chicago was released from the
loan collateral in June 2011. The CPI Hilton Portfolio Loan was
modified in October 2010. Significant terms of the modification
include three extension options to extend the Initial Maturity
Date of the Loan to December 31, 2012; December 31, 2013; and
March 12, 2014. Special servicing fees and workout fees were paid
by the borrower and these costs were not incurred by the trust.
RevPAR for the portfolio in calendar year 2011 was $73, an 11%
increase over calendar year 2010 RevPAR of $66. The RevPAR index
in 2011 ranged from 89 for the Hilton Garden Inn in Englewood,
Colorado to 111 for the Hilton Garden Inn in Atlanta Georgia. The
weighted average RevPAR index for the portfolio was 103, not
materially different than in 2010. Moody's loan to value (LTV)
ratio is 90%, compared to 93% at last review. Moody's credit
estimate is B3, compared to Caa1 at last review.


CIFC FUNDING 2006-I: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L notes from CIFC Funding 2006-I Ltd. and
removed them from CreditWatch with positive implications. "At the
same time, we affirmed our ratings on the class A-1L, A-1LR, and
P-1 notes and removed the ratings on the class A-1L and A-1LR from
CreditWatch with positive implications. CIFC Funding 2006-I Ltd.
is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Commercial Industrial Finance Corp.," S&P said.

"The transaction will remain in its reinvestment phase until
October 2012. The upgrades reflect the improved credit quality of
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since our February
2010 rating actions. The improved credit quality has benefited the
rated notes. The transaction has used proceeds designated for
reinvestments to build additional collateral in the portfolio. We
also note that the amount of defaulted assets and 'CCC' rated
obligations held in the portfolio has decreased over the same
period," S&P said.

As a result, the senior class A, A, B-1L, and B-2L
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have increased.

The affirmations reflect the sufficient credit support available
to the notes at the current rating levels.

The class P-1 note is backed by a U.S. Treasury strip certificate
due Aug. 20, 2020.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

CIFC Funding 2006-I Ltd.
                       Rating
Class               To           From
A-1L                AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1LR               AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L                AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L                A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1L                BBB (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2L                BB (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

CIFC Funding 2006-I Ltd.

Class               Rating
P-1                 AA+ (sf)


CIFC FUNDING 2006-II: S&P Hikes Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1LAr, A-1LAt, A-1LB, A-1L, A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L notes from
CIFC Funding 2006-II Ltd. and removed them from CreditWatch with
positive implications. CIFC Funding 2006-II Ltd. is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Commercial Industrial Finance Corp.

"The transaction will remain in its reinvestment phase until March
2013. The upgrades reflect the improved credit quality of the
transaction's underlying asset portfolio since our March 2010
rating actions. The improved credit quality has benefited the
rated notes. The transaction has used proceeds designated for
reinvestments to build additional collateral in the portfolio. We
also note a significant decrease in the amount of defaults and
'CCC' rated obligations held in the portfolio over the same
period. As a result, the senior class A, class A, class B-1L, and
Class B-2L overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have increased," S&P
said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

CIFC Funding 2006-II Ltd.
                    Rating       Rating
Class               To           From
A-1LAr              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1LAt              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1LB               AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1L                AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L                AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L                A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1L                BBB (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2L                BB (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


COLUMBUS PARK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from Columbus Park CDO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by GSO
Capital Partners L.P. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings
on the class A-1 and A-2 notes and removed our ratings on all of
the notes from CreditWatch with positive implications," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect improved credit performance we have observed
in the underlying asset pool since December 2009. We affirmed our
ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes to reflect our belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels," S&P said.

This transaction will be in its reinvestment period until April
2013.

"The credit quality of the transaction's underlying asset
portfolio has improved since our Feb. 4, 2010, rating actions, as
evidenced by a decrease in obligations rated in the 'CCC' range.
The amount of 'CCC' rated obligations decreased by $7.85 million
between December 2009 and April 2012 and the amount of defaulted
obligations decreased by $8.68 million during the same period,"
S&P said.

"When calculating the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios, the
trustee haircuts defaulted, deferring interest, and discount
obligations from the O/C numerator. There was no haircut in the
O/C calculations in the April 2012 report (compared with a $29.98
million haircut in December 2009). As a result, overall O/C ratios
have improved. For instance, the class A O/C was 134.11% in April
2012, up from 131.43% in December 2009," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's also notes that the weighted average spread
increased from 3.84% to 4.53% over this time period.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Columbus Park CDO Ltd.
                Rating       Rating
Class           To           From
A-1             AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2             AA (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B               A+(sf)       A (sf)/Watch Pos
C               A- (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D               BBB- (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on II-MR-1 Tranche to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 25
tranches, upgraded the ratings of four tranches and confirmed the
ratings of four tranches from four RMBS transactions, backed by
Alt-A loans, issued by Deutsche Bank.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
and Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating action constitute of a number of upgrades as well as
downgrades. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance, and/ or rapid build-up in credit
enhancement due to high prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for
the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication listed
above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust
Series 2003-3

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-PO-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2003-2XS

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Loan
Trust, Series 2004-1

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. III-A-6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2004-4

Cl. I-A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. II-AR-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-AR-2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-MR-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-AR-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-AR-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-AR-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-AR-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VII-AR-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VII-AR-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VII-AR-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284036

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


DRYDEN XII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Tranches to 'Caa2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced the following rating actions
on tranches of Dryden XII, a collateralized debt obligation
transaction (the " Collateralized Synthetic Obligation" or "CSO").
The CSO tranches reference the same portfolio of senior unsecured
corporate bonds. The CSO notes are due in 2013.

Issuer: Dryden XII

U.S.$5,000,000 Tranche A2-$LS Notes Due June 2013-1, Upgraded to
Ba1(sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3(sf)

U.S.$ 38,500,000 Tranche A3-$LS Notes Due June 2013-1 (current
balance of $ 31,000,000) , Upgraded to Ba3(sf); previously on Jul
29, 2011 Upgraded to B1(sf)

U.S.$1,000,000 Tranche A3B-$LS Notes Due June 2013-1, Upgraded to
Ba3(sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to B1(sf)

U.S.$ 55,000,000 Tranche A4-$L Notes Due June 2013-1 (current
balance of $ 40,000,000), Upgraded to B1(sf); previously on Jul
29, 2011 Upgraded to B3(sf)

U.S.$ 10,000,000 Tranche A4-$F Notes Due June 2013-1, Upgraded to
B1(sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to B3(sf)

U.S.$3,000,000 Tranche A5-$LS Notes Due June 2013-1, Upgraded to
B3(sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to Caa1(sf)

U.S.$3,000,000 Tranche A7-$LC Notes Due June 2013-1 (current
balance of $ 500,000), Upgraded to Caa2(sf); previously on Jul 29,
2011 Upgraded to Caa3(sf)

U.S.$6,000,000 Tranche A7B-$FS Notes Due June 2013-1, Upgraded to
Caa2(sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to Caa3(sf)

U.S.$10,000,000 Tranche A7B-$LS Notes Due June 2013-1, Upgraded to
Caa2(sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to Caa3(sf)

Issuer: Dryden XII Additional Issuance I

U.S. $25,000,000 Class A1A-$LS (current balance of $ 21,000,000),
Upgraded to Baa3(sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1(sf)

Issuer: Dryden XII Additional Issuance II

U.S. $15,000,000 Class A3C-$LS, Upgraded to Ba3(sf); previously on
Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to B1(sf)

Issuer: Dryden XII Additional Issuance III

U.S. $10,000,000 Class A6-$L, Upgraded to Caa1(sf); previously on
Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to Caa3(sf)

Issuer: Dryden XII Additional Issuance IV

U.S. $80,000,000 Class A4B-$L (current balance of $ 10,000,000),
Upgraded to B1(sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Upgraded to B3(sf)

EUR $6,000,000 Class A4-EL, Upgraded to B1(sf); previously on Jul
29, 2011 Upgraded to B3(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's rating action is the result of the shortened time to
maturity of the CSO and the level of credit enhancement remaining
in the transaction. In addition to these positive factors is the
stable credit quality of the reference portfolio.There have been
no additional additional credit events since the previous rating
action.

Since the last rating review in July 2011, the ten-year weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of the portfolio dropped from 899 to
875, excluding settled credit events. The credit quality of the
portfolio has improved slightly with 5.6% of the portfolio rated
Caa1 or below, compared to 7.2% from the last review. There are 14
reference entities with a negative outlook compared to 11 that are
positive, and 8 entities on watch for downgrade compared to none
on watch for upgrade.

There have been no additional credit events since the previous
rating action. The portfolio is exposed Residential Capital, LLC,
which has not had a credit event, but nonetheless is rated C.

The tranches have a remaining life of 1.4 years.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.8.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are given in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the base case, where
higher notches correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-
versa:

* Moody's reviews a scenario consisting of reducing the maturity
of the CSO by six months, keeping all other things equal. Compared
to the base case, the results of this run is one to two notches
higher.

* Market Implied Ratings ("MIRS") are modeled in place of the
corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default probability of
the reference entities in the portfolio. The gap between an MIR
and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating is an indicator of the
extent of the divergence in credit view between Moody's and the
market. The result of this run is half a notch to two and a half
notches lower than in the base case. Tranches with the lowest
ratings are not affected materially while tranches with ratings in
the B or Ba ranges show the largest gap against the base case
results (2.5 to 3 notches lower).

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers. In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model. For a description
of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the CDOROM user's
guide on Moody's website.

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality. Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities. The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee. Although the impact of these decisions is
mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of
these decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty
in Moody's assumptions. Given the tranched nature of CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility. All else
being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more junior
or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe. Should macroeconomics conditions evolve,
the CSO ratings will change to reflect the new economic
developments.


FIRST HORIZON: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 RMBS Tranches to 'Caa2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 11
tranches, upgraded the ratings of two tranches and confirmed the
ratings of two tranches from five RMBS transactions, backed by
Alt-A loans, issued by First Horizon.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating action constitute of a number of upgrades as well as
downgrades. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance, and/or rapid build-up in credit
enhancement due to high prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for
the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication listed
above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-
AA1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-
AA2

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-
AA3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-
AA5

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-
FA1

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-PO, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284033

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


FIRST NAT'L. 2009-3: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings and Outlooks assigned to
First National Master Note Trust as follows:

Series 2009-3:

  -- Class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The affirmation is based on continued positive trust performance.
As of the April 2012 reporting period, the 12-month average gross
yield was 25.26% compared to the 12-month average of 20.81% at the
same point last year.

Monthly payment rate (MPR), a measure of how quickly consumers are
paying off their debt, has remained consistent over the past year.
Currently the12-month average is 16.26%, up from 15.24% at this
point last year.

Gross charge-offs have declined over 36% since the April 2011
reporting period.  The 12-month average has come down to 6.29% and
an even lower three month average of 5.44%. In April 2011, the
three month average was 8.39%.

Fitch runs cash flow breakeven analysis by applying stress
scenarios to 3-, 6-, and 12-month performance averages to evaluate
the breakeven loss multiples at different rating levels. The
performance variables that Fitch stresses are the gross yield,
monthly payment rate, gross charge-off, and purchase rates.
Fitch's analysis included a comparison of observed performance
trends over the past few months to Fitch's base case expectations
for each outstanding rating category.  As part of its ongoing
surveillance efforts, Fitch will continue to monitor the
performance of these trusts. For further information, please
review the U.S. Credit Card ABS Issuance updates published on a
monthly basis.

The affirmations are based on the performance of the trusts in
line with expectations.  Stable outlook indicates that Fitch
expects the ratings will remain stable for the next two years.


FIRST UNION: Fitch Puts Ratings on 3 Certs. on Watch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed three classes of First Union National
Bank Commercial (FUNBC) Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2000-C1 on Rating Watch Negative.
The classes have been placed on Rating Watch Negative based on
interest shortfalls affecting classes H, J, and K, in addition to
an increase in preliminary estimates of expected losses from loans
in special servicing following updated valuations.

Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch status upon a complete
review of the transaction within the next several months, and
include an analysis of updated valuations, performance data and
ultimate recovery prospects of any interest shortfalls.  Fitch
expects classes H, J, and K could be downgraded given the increase
in expected losses coupled with the high concentration of the
pool, as well as the potential for an increase in interest
shortfalls.

Fitch has placed the following classes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $7.8 million class H 'Asf';
  -- $3.9 million class J 'A-sf';
  -- $7.8 million class K 'B-sf'.

Fitch also revises the Rating Outlook as indicated:

  -- $29.1 million class G 'A+sf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Positive.


HOMEBANC MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. I-M-2 Tranche to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches backed by Alt-A loans, issued by HomeBanc.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. In Moody's  current
approach, Moody's captures this risk by running each individual
pool through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural nuances of the transaction

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2004-1

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284486

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


HOME EQUITY: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M-3 Tranche to 'Caa3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from two RMBS
transactions backed by Subprime loans issued by Indymac.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD
2004-A

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
Series SPMD 2002-B

Cl. AF, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF283834

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


JER CRE 2005-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Eight Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed all classes of Notes issued
by JER CRE CDO 2005-1, Limited due to the key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

JER CRE CDO 2005-1, Limited is a static CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(95.2%) and CRE CDOs (4.8%). As of the April 17, 2012 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $298.2 million from $416.0 million at issuance, with
the paydown directed to the Class A Notes, as a result of failing
the Class A/B overcollateralization test and the re-classification
of interest on defaulted securities as principal.

There are fifty three assets with par balance of $279.5 million
(93.9% of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Securities as of the April 17, 2012 Trustee report. Fifty of these
assets (94.8% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS and three assets
are CRE CDOs (5.2%). There have been realized losses of $115.4
million to date, and Moody's does expect significantly more losses
to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,512 compared to 9,462 at last
review. The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is as follows: Baa1-Baa3 (2.8% compared to 2.5% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (0.0%, same as at last review), B1-B3 (0.0% compared to
0.9% at last review), and Caa1-C (97.2% compared to 96.6% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.5
years compared to 5.7 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
1.0% compared to 1.2% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 0% compared to 12% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption up from
1.0% to 11.0% would not result in any rating movement on the rated
tranches.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


JPMCC 2005-CIBC13: Fitch Lowers Rating on 7 Certificate Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven and affirmed 16 classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2005-
CIBC13 (JPMCC 2005-CIBC13) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, due to further performance deterioration, which
includes an increase in expected losses on the specially serviced
loans as well as other loans in the pool.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 15.8% for the remaining pool
(expected losses of the original pool are at 16.8% and includes
losses realized to date).  Fitch has designated 63 loans (40.1%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 22 specially serviced
loans (23.2%).

As of the April 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased by 13% to $2.4 billion from $2.7
billion at issuance.  Realized losses incurred to date total $81.9
million.  No loans are currently defeased.  Cumulative interest
shortfalls in the amount of $28.9 million are currently affecting
classes D and below.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a portfolio of
16 real estate owned (REO) office properties (7.6%) located in the
Southeast.  Prior to marketing the properties for sale, the
special servicer has been working to increase the portfolio's
overall occupancy.

The next largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a
defaulted loan (4.5%) secured by a 322-room luxury hotel property
located in the South Beach area of Miami, FL.  While recent
performance at the property has improved with the March 2012
trailing 12 RevPAR up 20% from the prior year, the loan remains
highly leveraged.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2009 due to imminent default.  The special servicer is
currently pursuing foreclosure.

The third largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a loan
(7.3%) secured by a 700,000 square foot (sf) office property
located in downtown Los Angeles.  While property performance has
improved over the last year, the YE 2011 Servicer reported NOI is
still approximately 30% below the YE 2009 Servicer reported NOI.
The loan matures in October 2012.

Fitch downgrades the following classes, as indicated:

  -- $272.1 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $187 million class A-J to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf; RE55%;
  -- $54.4 million class B to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE0%;
  -- $23.8 million class C to 'CCsf' from'CCCsf/; RE 0%;
  -- $44.2 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $34 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0% ;
  -- $37.4 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch also affirms the following classes, as indicated:

  -- $244.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $109.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $160.3 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $50.6 million class A-2FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $206.4 million class A-3A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25 million class A-3A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $751.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $83.7 million class A-SB at ''AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.
  -- $30.6 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $34 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $10.2 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $6.5 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.


JPMCM 1999-C8: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of J.P. Morgan Commercial
Mortgage Finance Corp. series 1999-C8 commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates:

  -- $12.2 million class G notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.3 million class H notes at 'Dsf'; RE85%;
  -- Class J notes at 'Dsf'; RE0%.

As of the April 2012 remittance report, the transaction balance
has been reduced by 96.9% to $22.4 million from $731.5 million at
issuance.  Fourteen loans remain in the transaction, of which two
loans (5.1%) are defeased and one (4.2%) is in special servicing.
Fitch modeled additional losses of 7.1% of the remaining pool for
a total, including losses to date, of 7.8% of the original
balance.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2011 or 2010 fiscal year-end net operating income,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 9% and 10.5% to
determine value.  All the loans also underwent a refinance test by
applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule to
the stressed cash flow.  All but one of the loans were modeled to
pay off at maturity, and could refinance to a debt-service
coverage ratio (DSCR) above 1.25 times (x).  While the credit
profile of the class G notes has improved, an upgrade is not
recommended given the increasing concentration and long dated
maturities of the underlying collateral.

The largest contributor to loss (13.2% of pool balance) is a 120
unit healthcare property located in Lantana, FL.  The loan is
current as of April 2012 and has a servicer reported year end 2010
DSCR of 0.34x. According to the servicer, the subject is well
maintained and in good condition.  Fitch modeled the loan to
default during the term.

Fitch does not rate the class NR notes and previously withdrew the
ratings on the K notes.  Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F have
paid in full.


KNIGHTSBRIDGE CLO 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A1, A2, B, C, D, and E notes from Knightsbridge CLO 2007-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by Ivy Hill Asset Management L.P. "At the same time, we removed
the ratings on the class A2, B, C, D, and E notes from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications on
Feb. 10, 2012," S&P said.

The transaction is currently in its reinvestment period, which
ends in January 2014.

"There have been some performance improvements in the transaction
since our March 5, 2010, downgrade of the A2 notes, most notably
the decrease in the 'CCC' rated assets," S&P said.

"Based on the March 30, 2012, trustee report, which we referenced
for the actions, the transaction contained $36.97 million of 'CCC'
rated assets, compared with $64.98 million noted in the Dec. 31,
2009, trustee report, which we used for our last actions. There
are less severe haircuts applied in the calculation of the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for the excess 'CCC' rated
assets in the March 2012 report, compared with the December 2009
report. As a result, the B, C, D, and E O/C ratios have improved,
on average, about 2.89%," S&P said.

"However, this was offset with the increase in defaults held in
the deal's underlying portfolio. The transaction reported $25.23
million in defaulted assets in the March 2012 trustee report,
significantly higher than the $13.64 million noted in the Dec. 31,
2009, report, which we used for our March 2010 rating actions,"
S&P said.

"Based on our analysis, the transaction has sufficient credit
support available to the notes at the current rating levels. We
affirmed the ratings on all the notes at this point and removed
the ratings on classes A2, B, C, D, and E from CreditWatch with
positive implications," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AFFIRMATIONS AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Knightsbridge CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                         Rating
Class            To                    From
A1               AAA (sf)              AAA (sf)
A2               AA+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                AA (sf)               AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C                A (sf)                A (sf)/Watch Pos
D                BBB (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E                BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Pos

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:              Knightsbridge CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
Collateral manager:  Ivy Hill Asset Management L.P.
Trustee:             Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Lowers Rating on 4 Sub. Loan Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four subordinate classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2005-C7, and affirmed all
investment grade classes.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool since last review. Fitch modeled losses of 4.68% of the
outstanding pool.  The expected losses of the original pool are at
6.41%, which includes 2.92% in losses realized to date.  Fitch has
designated 33 loans (31.13%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
include seven specially serviced loans (5.96%).  Six of the Fitch
Loans of Concern (21.12%) are within the transaction's top 15
loans by unpaid principal balance.  Fitch expects that class K may
eventually be fully depleted and class J partially depleted from
losses associated with loans currently in special servicing.

As of the April 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 25.6% (including 2.92% of
realized losses) to $1.74 billion from $2.34 billion at issuance.
Most recently in April 2012, the Reckson Portfolio I loan (5.25%
of original pool balance) had paid in full while in special
servicing.  No loans are currently defeased.  Interest shortfalls
are affecting classes H through T.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the Sarasota
Main Plaza loan (2.03% of pool balance).  The loan is secured by a
253,504 square foot (sf) mixed use (office/retail) building
located in the downtown sector of Sarasota, FL.  The property has
experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines in addition
to leases renegotiated at lower rents in order to retain existing
tenants.  The loan had transferred to the special servicer in
December 2008 for imminent default.  In April 2012 the servicer
reported a modification of the loan has been approved, which
includes an A-note & B-note split of the subject loan.  The
servicer is in process of finalizing the terms, and completing the
necessary closing documentation.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is secured
by a 73,235 sf retail center in Los Angeles, CA (1.15%) anchored
by Marshalls (34.27% net rentable area [NRA]).  Debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) for year end (YE) December 2011 improved to
1.20 times (x), compared to 1.18x and 0.87x at YE 2010 and YE
2009, respectively, however remains significantly below YE 2008 at
1.68x.  Occupancy has remained unchanged at 100%.  The decline in
property performance is primarily attributed to a 47% increase in
real estate taxes at YE 2009. The loan remains current as of the
April 2012 remittance date.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is secured
by a 64,242 sf mixed-use property (retail, office, and
multifamily) in Palm Beach Gardens, FL.  The loan had transferred
to the special servicer in March 2010 for payment default.  A note
sale has been approved by the servicer, and the borrower is
working to secure financing.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

  -- $23.5 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 100%;
  -- $26.4 million class G to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 45%;
  -- $17.5 million class H to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $17.5 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

In addition, Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the
Rating Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $43.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $48 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $79.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $847.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $88.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $233.9 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $195.9 million class A-J at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.2 million class B at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Positive;
  -- $35.2 million class C at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $29.3 million class D at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23.5 million class E at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 has repaid in full.  Classes K through S will remain at
'Dsf', RE 0% due to realized losses.  Fitch does not rate class T,
which has also been reduced to zero due to realized losses.

Fitch also affirms the Outlooks of the following classes:

  -- $1 million class CM-1 at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5 million class CM-2 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $956 thousand class CM-3 at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3 million class CM-4 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The CM rake classes represent the B-note for the Cherryvale Mall.
The $73.6 million A-note is included in the pooled portion of the
trust.  Fitch does not rate the SP-1 through SP-7 rake classes,
which are specific to the Station Place I $63 million B-note.  A
$16.8 million A-note for Station Place I is included in the pooled
portion of the trust.

Fitch had previously withdrawn the ratings on the interest-only
classes X-CP and X-CL.


MARATHON CLO IV: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating to US$16.4MM Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Marathon CLO IV Ltd./Marathon CLO IV LLC's $321.1
million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 7,
2012.

Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

  * The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes;

  * The transaction's cash flow structure, as assessed by Standard
    & Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined in the
    corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model;

  * The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote;

  * The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of speculative-grade senior-secured term loans;

  * The collateral manager's experienced management team;

  * S&P's expectation of the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, assessed
    using S&P's cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
    with the assigned preliminary ratings under various interest
    rate scenarios, including LIBORs ranging from 0.36%-12.84%;
    and

  * The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111592.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
Marathon CLO IV Ltd./Marathon CLO IV LLC

Class       Rating          Amount
                          (mil. $)
A-1           AAA (sf)      222.10
A-2           AA (sf)        36.40
B-1(i)        A (sf)         15.80
B-2(i)        A (sf)         12.00
C(i)          BBB (sf)       18.40
D(i)          BB (sf)        16.40
Subordinated  NR             34.90

(i)Deferrable.
NR-Not rated.


MERITAGE MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M-4 Tranche to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from three RMBS
transactions backed by Subprime loans issued by Meritage Mortgage
Loan Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF283841

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Upgrades Rating on D Certificates to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of two classes and
affirmed five classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C1-CTL as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 5, 1999 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PO, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 5, 1999
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement levels and
overall stable pool performance.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) and the Herfindahl (Herf)
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
12.4% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 13.2%. Moody's provides a current list of
base losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com
at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
("CTL") financing rating methodology ("CTL approach"). Under
Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates
is primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds. This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan. The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust. The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined; the
dark value must be sufficient, assuming a bankruptcy of the tenant
and rejection of the lease, to support the expected loss
consistent with the certificates' rating. The certificates' rating
may change as the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate
family rating) of the tenant changes. Moody's also considers the
overall structure and legal integrity of the transaction. In
addition, the rating of the CTL may in some cases exceed the
rating of the underlying tenant if the value of the underlying
asset on a dark basis provides a loan to value ("LTV") ratio and
potential debt service coverage ratio ("DSCR") that supports a
higher rating.

For deals that consist of a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-5 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the ratings.

The other model used in this review is a IO calculator ver_1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type as defined in the
published methodology. The calculator then returns a calculated IO
rating based on both a target and mid-point. For example, a target
rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The
midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the
simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf)
rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating factor is 700,
the CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf)
IO indication for consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated June 3, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 16, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 54% to $287.4
million from $630.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 86 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 51% of the pool. Seventy-six of the loans are CTL
loans secured by properties leased to 12 corporate credits. Ten
loans, representing 27% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $37.9 million (57% loss severity on
average). Due to realized losses, classes G,H, J and K have been
eliminated entirely and class F has experienced a 27% principal
loss. At Moody's prior review the pool had experienced an
aggregate $29.1 million realized loss.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist or in
special servicing.

The pool's largest exposures are Rite Aid Corporation ($79.2
million - 27% of the pool balance; Moody's senior unsecured rating
Caa3 - stable outlook), Georgia Power Company ($49.6 million -
17%; Moody's senior unsecured rating A3 - stable outlook) and
Kroger Co. ($25.7 million -- 9%; Moody's senior unsecured rating
Baa2 -- stable outlook). Approximately 79% of the pool, excluding
defeased loans, are publicly rated by Moody's.

The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this
pool is 3,200 compared to 3,308 at last review. WARF is a measure
of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-
dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within the
pool.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. M-2 Tranche to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 8
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 1 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 1 tranche from 4 RMBS transactions, backed by Subprime
loans, issued by Merrill Lynch.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction. The above
mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages 2004 and
prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2003-OPT1

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. S, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2003-HE1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC4

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284460

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


MONTANA HIGHER: Fitch Withdraws 'Bsf' Rating on Class 2006C Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the ratings on the following outstanding
bonds for Montana Higher Education Student Assistance Corporation
- 1993 General Indenture (MHESAC 1993) upon the issuance of the
2012A Bonds, and revises the Rating Watch Negative to Outlook
Negative.

Montana Higher Education Student Assistance Corporation - 1993:

  -- Class 2005B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class 2006A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class 2006C at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative and withdrawn.

Given the lack of investor interest, the rating on the 2006C bond
is no longer considered by Fitch to be relevant to Fitch's
coverage and Fitch will no longer provide a rating or analytical
coverage on it.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Fitch Cuts Rating on Three Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades three classes of Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Capital I Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2001-Top3.

The downgrades reflect an increase in expected losses from loans
in special servicing.  Despite increased credit enhancement of the
classes, affirmations reflect the concentrated nature of the pool
including exposure to single-tenant properties and locations in
tertiary markets.  Affirmation on class D reflects the potential
for interest shortfalls to occur on the class.

Fitch modeled losses of 19.6% (5.3% cumulative transaction losses
which includes losses realized to date).  Fitch expects that
classes J and H may be fully depleted and class G significantly
impacted from losses associated with the specially serviced
assets.

As of the April 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 85.4% to $150.1 million
from $1.03 billion at issuance.  Three loans (2.8%) in the
transaction are defeased.  As of April 2012, there are cumulative
interest shortfalls in the amount of $5.4 million currently
affecting classes F through N.

Fitch has identified eight loans (28%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes six specially serviced loans (26.6%).

The largest contributor to losses (8.7% of pool balance) is a
365,430 square foot (sf) industrial building located in Sterling
Heights, MI.  The vacant property was real estate owned (REO)
since April 2011 and was marketed for sale.  The asset was
disposed on April 30, 2012 with significant losses.

The next largest contributor to losses (4.5%) is a vacant single
tenant 221,374 sf industrial building located in Duluth, GA.  The
property became REO as of March 1, 2011.  The asset is being
marketed for sale and is expected to incur significant losses
based on recent valuations.

The third largest contributor to losses (4%) is a 183,717 sf
office/industrial property located in Auburn Hills, MI.  The
property is REO and the special servicer is marketing the property
for sale.

In total, there are currently six loans (26.6%) in special
servicing consisting of one loan (7.3%) that is non-performing
matured and four assets (19.3%) that are REO.

At Fitch's last review there were 11 loans (20.6%) in special
servicing consisting of two loans (3.5%) that were current, one
loan (0.4%) that was performing matured, one loan (2.1%) that was
non-performing matured, one loan (1%) that was 60 days delinquent,
three loans (5.9%) in foreclosure and three assets (7.7%) that
were REO.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and revises Recovery
Estimates as indicated:

  -- $11.6 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 5% from 85%;
  -- $10.3 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $5.6 million class J to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch also affirms the following classes as indicated:

  -- $20.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $30.8 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $28.3 million class C at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.9 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.6 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch does not rate class N. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3 and X-2 have
paid in full.  Class K, L and M remain at 'Dsf, RE0%' due to
realized losses.


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-IQ7: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class N
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 16
classes from Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-IQ7, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

"Our affirmations reflect our analysis of the remaining collateral
in the pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust. The affirmed ratings also reflect
subordination levels and liquidity support that are consistent
with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings
on the class X-1 and X-Y interest-only (IO) certificates based on
our current criteria," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.56x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 81.3%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.28x
and an LTV ratio of 104.0%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 20.3% and 28.1%. The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude one ($1.9 million, 0.3%) of the two loans
($13.9 million, 2.1%) that are with the special servicer, 10
($174.0 million, 25.7%) defeased loans, and 56 ($115.3 million,
17.0%) loans secured by cooperative housing (co-op) properties. We
separately estimated a loss for the excluded specially serviced
loan and included it in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and
loss severity figures. The co-op loans did not default under our
'AAA' scenario due to extremely low leverage," S&P said.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the April 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, two loans
($13.9 million, 2.1%) in the pool were with the special servicers,
Midland Loan Services Inc. (Midland) and NCB, FSB (NCB). The
reported payment status for the two specially serviced loans was:
one is a nonperforming matured balloon loan ($12.0 million, 1.8%)
and one is 90-plus-days delinquent ($1.9 million, 0.3%). An
appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $1.0 million is in effect
against one of the two specially serviced loans. Details of the
two specially serviced loans are as set forth," S&P said.

"The University Centre West III loan ($12.0 million, 1.8%) is the
largest specially serviced loan and the ninth-largest loan in the
pool. The total reported exposure was $12.4 million. The
collateral is an 83,753-sq.-ft. office and retail building in
Coral Springs, Fla. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Jan. 28, 2009, due to imminent maturity default, and
the trustee reported it as a nonperforming matured balloon loan.
Midland proposed a four-year loan extension from the original
maturity date (which was Jan. 10, 2009) with a 10% paydown of the
loan by the borrower, which the borrower accepted. Midland expects
the modification to close in the near term. The reported DSC and
occupancy as of year-to-date Oct. 31, 2011, was 1.18x and 77.0%.
An ARA of $1.0 million is in effect against this loan," S&P said.

"Tudor Oaks Owners Corp. ($1.9 million, 0.3%) is the smallest
specially serviced loan. The total reported exposure was $2.4
million. The collateral is a 105-unit, residential co-op building
in Middle Island, N.Y. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Aug. 6, 2007, and the borrower filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy on May 18, 2011. NCB is working with the bankruptcy
courts and has been successful in installing new management at the
co-op. In addition, the court recently appointed a trustee, who is
moving to foreclose on the sponsor-owned units on behalf of the
co-op. Recent financial information was not available for the
asset. We expect a minimal loss upon the eventual resolution of
the loan," S&P said.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the April 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $677.8 million,
down from $863.0 million at issuance. The pool comprises 117
loans, down from 128 loans at issuance. The master servicers,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and NCB, provided financial information for
97.4% of the nondefeased loans in the pool (by balance), most of
which reflected full-year 2010, interim-2011, or full-year 2011
data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.63x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV were 1.56x and 81.3%. Our adjusted figures exclude one
($1.9 million, 0.3%) of the two loans ($13.9 million, 2.1%) that
are with the special servicer, 10 ($174.0 million, 25.7%) defeased
loans, and 56 ($115.3 million, 17.0%) loans secured by co-op
properties. To date, the transaction has experienced $1.2 million
in principal losses from one asset. Fifteen loans ($96.4 million,
14.2%) in the pool are on the master servicers' combined
watchlist, one of which is a top 10 real estate loan. Twenty-six
loans ($66.4 million, 9.8%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.10x, 17 of which ($39.8 million, 5.9%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.00x," S&P said.

                  SUMMARY OF TOP 10 REAL ESTATE LOANS

"The top 10 real estate loans have an aggregate outstanding trust
balance of $204.7 million (30.2%). Using servicer-reported
numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.71x for the top
10 loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.56x and 74.1% for the
top 10 loans. One of the top 10 loans ($19.1 million, 2.8%) is on
the master servicer's watchlist," S&P said.

"The Long Beach Plaza loan ($19.1 million, 2.8%), the third-
largest real estate loan in the pool, is on the master servicers'
combined watchlist because the 93,842-sq.-ft. collateral property
is 100% leased by Waldbaums. A&P, which filed for bankruptcy in
December 2010, operates Waldbaums. According to the master
servicer, A&P is in the process of exiting bankruptcy. The
collateral property is located in Long Beach, N.Y. The reported
DSC as of year-end 2011, was 1.39x," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's stressed the pool collateral according to its
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent
with S&P's rating actions.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-IQ7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-IQ7

Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-3       AAA (sf)                   15.10
A-4       AAA (sf)                   15.10
B         AA+ (sf)                   10.81
C         A (sf)                      7.46
D         A- (sf)                     6.47
E         BBB+ (sf)                   5.08
F         BBB (sf)                    4.28
G         BBB- (sf)                   3.64
H         BB+ (sf)                    2.85
J         BB (sf)                     2.21
K         BB- (sf)                    1.89
L         B+ (sf)                     1.58
M         CCC+ (sf)                   1.26
N         CCC (sf)                    0.94
X-1       AAA (sf)                     N/A
X-Y       AAA (sf)                     N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


MWAM 2001-1: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Three Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of notes issued by MWAM
CBO 2001-1, Ltd. (MWAM 2001-1) as follows:

  -- $29,938,145 class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21,875,000 class B notes at 'CCCsf';
  -- $17,641,519 class C-1 notes at 'Csf';
  -- $13,249,668 class C-2 notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs' for
the class A and class B notes.  Fitch also considered additional
qualitative factors into its analysis, as described below.

Since Fitch's last review in May 2011, the credit quality of the
collateral has deteriorated with approximately 20.9% of the
portfolio being downgraded a weighted average 6.3 notches, and
10.5% of the portfolio upgraded a weighted average 1.8 notches.
Approximately 53.5% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade, and 29.3% has a rating in the 'CCC'
category or below, compared to 42.3% and 17.8% at the last review.

The affirmation of the class A notes is due to amortization of the
notes increasing credit enhancement to offset the deterioration in
the underlying portfolio.  The class A notes have received
approximately $8.6 million, or 22.3% of its previous outstanding
balance through principal collections and excess spread due to the
failing class C overcollateralization (OC) ratio.  Fitch expects
the class A notes to benefit further from excess spread going
forward because the class B OC ratio also began failing in
February 2012, which will divert interest collections that would
otherwise go to class C accrued interest.  Due to the type of
assets in the underlying portfolio, Fitch expects interest
collections and excess spread to remain robust as class A
continues to amortize.

Fitch maintains a Stable Outlook on the class A notes reflecting
its view that the performance of the underlying portfolio and the
transaction will remain relatively stable over the next one to two
years.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks to classes rated
'CCCsf' or below.

The class B notes have continued to benefit from the amortization
of the class A notes as shown in the increased credit enhancement
of the notes compared to the last review. However, the notes are
junior to the A notes in the capital structure, and will therefore
not receive principal amortization until after the class A notes
are fully redeemed.  There is a potential for concentration risk
and further defaults from lowly rated assets as the portfolio
continues to amortize.  As a result, Fitch has affirmed the
current rating of the class B notes.

Fitch's cash flow model displays breakeven levels for the class C-
1 and C-2 notes (together, class C) that indicate ratings below SF
PCM's 'CCC' default level.  The class C notes received full
interest payments on the last distribution date, but the class
credit enhancement level is very thin.  Expected losses calculated
from defaulted and distressed assets (rated 'CCsf' or lower) in
the portfolio are greater than the credit enhancement of the
notes, and full payment of principal at maturity is unlikely.

MWAM 2001-1 is a SF CDO that closed on Jan. 24, 2001 and is
managed by Metropolitan West Asset Management.  The portfolio is
comprised of corporate bonds (44.7%), residential mortgage-backed
securities (31.7%), commercial asset-backed securities (10.9%),
commercial mortgage-backed securities (6.8%), real estate
investment trusts (3.2%), and SF CDOs (2.6%), from 1992 through
2004 vintage transactions.


NEW CENTURY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 11
tranches, upgraded the rating of one tranche, and confirmed the
ratings of seven tranches from six RMBS transactions backed by
Subprime loans issued by New Century Home Equity Loan Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-3

CL. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CL. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-4

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-B

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF283843

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Cl. AIO Tranche Rating to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches, upgraded the ratings of eight tranches, and confirmed
the ratings of five tranches from four RMBS transactions, backed
by Subprime loans, issued by NovaStar Mortgage Funding trusts.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2003-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AIO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2003-2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2004-3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2004-4

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284615

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


PACIFICA CDO IV: S&P Affirms Rating on Class B-2L Notes at 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2L and A-3L notes from Pacifica CDO IV Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Alcentra Ltd. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the
class A-1L, B-1L, B-2L, PN1 Com se, PN2 Com se, and PN3 Com se
notes. We also removed our ratings on classes A-2L, A-3L, B-1L,
and B-2L from CreditWatch with positive implications," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect principal paydowns and improved credit
performance we have observed in the underlying asset pool since
February 2011," S&P said.

This transaction is currently in its amortization phase. Since
Feb. 4, 2011, class A-1L notes have paid down by $115.11 million
to 42.42% of their original balance.

"After the reinvestment period, the transaction has an interest
diversion mechanism in the payment waterfall which redeems the
class B-2L notes when the class B-2L overcollateralization (O/C)
ratio is less than 103.5%. Since the class B-2L O/C ratio
(108.57%) has not dropped below the threshold, the class B-2L
notes maintain 100% of their original balance," S&P said.

"The credit quality of the transaction's underlying asset
portfolio has improved since our last rating action on March 28,
2011. This has benefited the rated notes, evidenced by a decrease
in 'CCC' rated obligations held in the transaction. The 'CCC'
rated obligations have decreased by $17.59 million between
February 2011 and April 2012," S&P said.

"Despite the credit improvements, the underlying portfolio is more
concentrated in terms of obligors. As a result, class B-1L rating
is driven by the application of the largest obligor default test,
a supplemental stress test we introduced as part of our September
2009 corporate criteria update. In addition, based on April 2012
trustee report, 9.96% of the collateral in the portfolio are
scheduled to mature after the transaction's scheduled February
2017 maturity date," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class A-1L, B-1L, and B-2L notes
to reflect our belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels. We also affirmed our
'AA+ (sf)' ratings on the class PN1 Com se, PN2 Com se, and PN3
Com se notes, which have rated balances backed by U.S. Treasury
principal strips," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Pacifica CDO IV Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-2L               AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L               AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1L               BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2L               BB- (sf)     BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Pacifica CDO IV Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-1L               AAA (sf)
PN1 Com se         AA+ (sf)
PN2 Com se         AA+ (sf)
PN3 Com se         AA+ (sf)


PEOPLE'S CHOICE 2004-2: Moody's Lifts Rating on M2 Tranche to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four
tranches from two RMBS transactions backed by Subprime loans
issued by People's Choice in 2004.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2004-1

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2004-2

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF283844

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


PERITUS I: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Peritus I CDO Ltd.:

U.S.$64,000,000 Class C Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due May 24,
2015 (current balance of $ 29,003,627), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on August 2, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of delevering of the notes and an increase in
the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since the rating
action in August 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A, Class X,
and Class B Notes have been paidin full and Class C Notes have
been paid down by approximately 44% or $23 million since the last
rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated April 15,
2012, the Class C overcollateralization ratio is reported at
161.9% versus July 2011 level of 127.9%.

Notwithstanding benefits of the delevering, Moody's notes that the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated since
the last rating action. Based on the April 2012 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 3780 compared to
3404 in July 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $48.5 million, no
defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of 20.47%
(implying a WARF of 3678), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 27.47%, and a diversity score of 8. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CBO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Peritus I CDO Ltd., issued on May 26, 2005, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
unsecured bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011. In addition, due to the low
diversity of the collateral pool, Moody's supplemented its
analysis with a simulated default distribution using Moody's
CDOROMTM software and individual scenario analysis.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2942)

Class C: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4414)

Class C: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the bond/loan market and/or collateral sales
by the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.

2) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors that are rated Caa1 or lower/non investment grade,
especially when they experience jump to default. Due to the deal's
low diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented
its typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated
default distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM software and/or
individual scenario analysis.

3) The deal has a pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap
that is currently out of the money. If fixed rate assets prepay or
default, there would be a more substantial mismatch between the
swap notional and the amount of fixed assets.


PETRA 2007-1: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Eight Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed the
remaining eight classes of Petra CRE CDO 2007-1 (Petra 2007-1)
reflecting concern over the CDO's ability to continue to make
timely interest payments to classes A-2 and B as well as Fitch's
base case loss expectation of 60.1%.  Fitch's performance
expectation incorporates prospective views regarding commercial
real estate market values and cash flow declines.

Since November 2010, the CDO has been failing interest coverage
and overcollateralization tests resulting in the diversion of
interest payments from classes C and below and the full paydown of
class A-1 and minimal paydown of $56,938 to class A-2.  Further,
since the July 2011 payment date, interest proceeds have been
insufficient to pay the interest due on the timely classes; the
interest due on these classes has been paid from principal
proceeds.  Fitch is concerned about the CDO's ability to continue
to make timely interest payments to these classes given the
diminished amount of interest proceeds and significant swap
counterparty payments.  The downgrade to 'CCC' reflects the
possibility going forward that interest and/or principal proceeds
will not be available to pay the timely interest classes,
especially if there are further defaults or delinquencies on the
underlying collateral.

The lack of available interest proceeds stems from the CDO's high
default rate (53.9%); additional assets that are either
capitalizing interest or suffering interest shortfalls; and the
fact that the transaction is over-hedged with swaps that are 'out-
of the-money' and senior in priority to the CDO's interest
payments.  While the performing assets in the pool currently
contribute a significant amount of interest, substantial
expenses/advances are being made by the servicer from these funds
prior to the Waterfall.  Per the asset manager, these
expenses/advances include litigation advances (primarily related
to the significant amount of legal activity on defaulted loans);
property protection advances (taxes and insurance payments); and
other miscellaneous advances/fees, including special servicer
fees. The April 2012 Waterfall report from the Trustee reported
only $2,389 in available interest proceeds at the top of the
Waterfall to pay senior collateral manager fees, hedge costs, and
interest payments.  While principal proceeds from scheduled
amortization and disposed assets were used to pay the balance of
the prior months' timely interest payments, there is no assurance
that principal proceeds will be available in subsequent periods;
further ongoing monthly expenses/advances cannot be accurately
predicted.  For these reasons, the class A-2 is downgraded to
'CCCsf' and the class B is affirmed at 'CCCsf' indicating that
default is a real possibility.  Nevertheless, ultimate recoveries
to the classes could be substantial.

The downgrade of class H is the result of increased expected
losses on defaulted assets, which total 53.9% of the pool compared
to 49% at last review; further, assets of concern currently total
27.7%.

As of the April 2012 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations,
the CDO was substantially invested as follows: whole loans/A-notes
(45%); B-notes (8%), mezzanine debt (13%), preferred equity (4%);
CMBS (12%), CRE CDO securities (9%), REIT debt (8%), and a real
estate bank loan (2%). Since last review, nine assets were removed
from the CDO; total losses were approximately $35 million.  The
CDO also added two rated securities, which were purchased at a
discount and resulted in built par of $6 million.

Under Fitch's surveillance methodology, approximately 84.1% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 15% from the most recent available cash flows
(generally year-end 2011).  Fitch estimates that average
recoveries will be 28.5%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is the
modeled losses on the rated collateral (30.6% of the pool).  The
rated collateral has a weighted average rating of 'B-/CCC+'
compared with 'CCC+/CCC' at last review.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is related to a real estate owned (REO) multifamily property (8.1%
of the pool) located in Tempe, AZ.  Fitch modeled a significant
loss on the loan in its base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) tests to project future default
levels for the underlying CREL collateral in the portfolio and
uses the Portfolio Credit Model for the rated collateral.
Recoveries for the CREL collateral are based on stressed cash
flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various default
timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the
report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.

The 'CC' and below ratings for classes C through K are based on a
deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets and Fitch Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each class' credit enhancement.

Petra 2007-1 is managed by Petra Capital Management LLC.  The
CDO's six-year reinvestment period ends in June 2013.

Fitch has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch Negative the
following class:

  -- $133.7 million class A-2 to 'CCCsf/RE 100%' from 'BBsf';

Fitch has downgraded the following class:

  -- $27.9 million class H to 'Csf/RE 0%' from 'CCsf/RE 5%'.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Recovery Estimates (RE) to the
following classes, as indicated:

  -- $76.8 million class B at 'CCCsf/RE 100%';
  -- $58.2 million class C at 'CCsf/RE 0%';
  -- $25.8 million class D at 'CCsf/RE 0%';
  -- $22.4 million class E at 'CCsf/RE 0%';
  -- $34.2 million class F at 'CCsf/RE 0%';
  -- $20.9 million class G at 'CCsf/RE 0%';
  -- $47.8 million class J at 'Csf/RE 0%';
  -- $39 million class K at 'Csf/RE 0%'.

Class A-1 has paid in full.


SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-3: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-
3 (SDART 2012-3). This is the third public subprime transaction of
the year for Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SCUSA).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-3

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)P-1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of SCUSA as
servicer.

The principal methodology used in rating the transaction is
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities,"
published in May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the SDART 2012-
3 pool is 15.5% and the Aaa level is 47.5%. The loss expectation
was based on an analysis of SCUSA's portfolio vintage performance
as well as performance of past securitizations, and current
expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by a Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the presence of a highly rated
parent, Banco Santander (Aa3 RUR for possible downgrade/P-1), in
addition to the size and strength of SCUSA's servicing platform.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 19.75%, 27% or
29.5%, the initial model output for the Class A notes might change
from Aaa to Aa1, A1, and Baa1, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 16.25%, 20% or
24%, the initial model output for the Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to Aa2, A2, and Baa2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 15.75%, 17.5% or
21%, the initial model output for the Class C notes might change
from Aa3 to A2, Baa1, and Ba1, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 15.75%, 17.5% or
21%, the initial model output for the Class D notes might change
from Baa1 to Baa2, Ba2, and B2 respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 15.75%, 17% or
19%, the initial model output for the Class E notes might change
from Ba1 to Ba2, B2, and
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-3: S&P Gives 'BB+' Rating on US$43MM E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-3's
$1,292.38 million automobile receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 7,
2012. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

  * "The availability of 50.32%, 44.47%, 36.39%, 30.08%, and
    26.64% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes
    based on stress cash flow scenarios (including excess spread),
    which provide coverage of more than 3.5x, 3.0x, 2.3x, 1.75x,
    and 1.6x our 13.50%-14.50% expected cumulative net loss," S&P
    said.

  * The timely interest and principal payments made under stress
    cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the assigned
    preliminary ratings.

  * "Our expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
    scenario, all else being equal, our ratings on the class A, B,
    and C notes will remain within one rating category of the
    assigned preliminary ratings during the first year, and our
    ratings on the class D and E notes will remain within two
    rating categories of the assigned preliminary ratings, which
    is within the outer bounds of our credit stability criteria,"
    S&P said.

  * The originator/servicer's history in the subprime/specialty
    auto finance business.

  * S&P's analysis of six years of static pool data on Santander
    Consumer USA Inc.'s lending programs.

  * The transaction's payment/credit enhancement and legal
    structures.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

      http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111590.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-3

Class    Rating       Type            Interest          Amount
                                      rate(i)      (mil. $)(i)
A-1      A-1+ (sf)    Senior          Fixed             233.00
A-2      AAA (sf)     Senior          Fixed             358.98
A-3      AAA (sf)     Senior          Fixed             227.23
B        AA (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed             134.18
C        A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed             169.50
D        BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed             127.11
E        BB+ (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed              42.38

(i)The interest rates and actual sizes of these tranches will be
determined on the pricing date.


SASCO 2007-BHC1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded one class of Notes issued
by SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust. The downgrade is due to the
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio as evidenced
by an increase in the weighted average rating factor (WARF) and an
increase in cumulative realized losses since last review.  The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-BHC1 is a static cash CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of 100% commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS). As of the April 20, 2012 trustee report,
the aggregate Note balance of the transaction, excluding deferred
interest, has decreased to $474.3 million from $501.3 million at
issuance due to realized losses to Class H Notes through Class T
Notes. The current collateral par amount is $474.3 million, which
resulted from $27.0 million (5.4%) in realized losses to the
collateral pool since securitization. There were no realized
losses at last review.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's rated
collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default
probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-
dollar WARF of 9,075 compared to 8,983 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Ba1-Ba3 (1.8% compared to 1.7% at last review), B1-B3
(1.6% compared to 2.5% at last review), and Caa1-C (96.6% compared
to 95.8% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.5 years compared
to 5.3 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Due to the speculative-grade
collateral, Moody's modeled a fixed 0.3% WARR, the same as at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. However, in
light of the performance indicators noted above, Moody's believes
that it is unlikely that the ratings are sensitive to further
changes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


SAXON ASSET: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 7 RMBS Tranches to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 35
tranches, and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranche from 8 RMBS
transactions, backed by Subprime loans, issued by Saxon.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction. The above
mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages 2004 and
prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-3

AV-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

X-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2002-1

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2002-2

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2002-3

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2003-3

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-1

Cl. A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-2

Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-3

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-1C, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284329

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Tranches to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
from three RMBS transactions, backed by Subprime loans, issued by
Structured Asset Investment Loan (SAIL) trusts.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's  considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC3

Cl. M5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC5

Cl. M2-A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M2-B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284610

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


SYMPHONY CLO IX: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on US$27.75MM Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Symphony CLO IX L.P./Symphony CLO IX LLC's $559.75 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

  * The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
    subordination of cash flows that are payable to the limited
    partnership (LP) certificates.

  * The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

  * The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

  * The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

  * The collateral manager's experienced management team.

  * "The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
    rated notes, which we assessed using our cash flow analysis
    and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
    various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.34%-12.26%," S&P said.

  * The transaction's overcollateralization coverage tests, a
    failure of which will lead to the diversion of interest and
    principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the rated notes
    outstanding.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Symphony CLO IX L.P./Symphony CLO IX LLC

Class              Rating            Amount
                                   (mil. $)
X                  AAA(sf)             5.50
A                  AAA (sf)          377.25
B                  AA (sf)            75.00
C (deferrable)     A (sf)             43.50
D (deferrable)     BBB (sf)           30.75
E (deferrable)     BB (sf)            27.75
LP certificates    NR                 64.00

NR-Not rated.


UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Puts Low-B Ratings on Two Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to UBS Commercial
Trust 2012-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

  -- $72,819,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $105,671,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $657,155,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $96,008,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1,044,783,000*a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $113,130,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $66,547,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $49,910,000a class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $74,865,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26,618,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23,292,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only
A Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A

Fitch does not rate the $286,151,174 interest-only class X-B or
the $44,919,174 class G.

A detailed description of Fitch's rating analysis including key
rating drivers, stresses, rating sensitivity, analysis, model,
criteria application and data adequacy is available in Fitch's New
Issue Report.


UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Class F Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to twelve classes
of CMBS securities, issued by UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 2012-C1.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 73 fixed rate loans secured
by 100 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.32X is broadly in-line with the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 0.99X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 101.9% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. The largest loan in
the pool represents 9.0% of the pool balance and is effectively
secured by land underneath Dream Hotel Downtown in New York City.
If Moody's considers the value of the improvements on top of the
collateral, Moody's LTV ratio falls to 100.1%. By either measure,
Moody's LTV ratio for the pool is the highest level Moody's has
calculated for conduit pools rated since 2009. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 108.5% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 25.4. which is in-line with other multi-
borrower pools rated by Moody's since 2009. The score is in-line
with previously rated conduit and fusion transactions but higher
than previously rated large loan transactions.

With respect to property level diversity, the pool's property
level Herfindahl score is 26.6. Nine loans (13.0% of the pool
balance) are secured by multiple properties. Loans secured by
multiple properties benefit from lower cash flow volatility given
that excess cash flow from one property can be used to augment
another's cash flow to meet debt service requirements. These loans
also benefit from the pooling of equity from each underlying
property.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The weighted
average grade for the pool is 2.01, which is better than the
indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions since 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.60
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5.0%, 14.0%, or 22.3%, the model-indicated rating for the
currently rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa3, A2,
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather
they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-
indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into
consideration in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that
would be assigned in each case could vary from the information
presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


VINACASA CLO: S&P Hikes Rating on Cl. C Notes to 'BB+'; Off Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A2, B, and C notes from Vinacasa CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Babson Capital Management
LLC. "At the same time, we affirmed the rating on the class A1
notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the class A1 notes and
improvements in the credit quality of the assets in the
transaction's underlying asset portfolio since July 2011. The
affirmation reflects sufficient credit support available to the
notes at the current rating level," S&P said.

"The transaction's reinvestment period ended in October 2008 and
is now in its amortization phase. Since July 2011, the class A1
notes have paid down significantly by more than $169 million. The
class A1 notes currently have an outstanding balance of $1.36
million, about 0.29% of the original balance," S&P said.

"Most notable among the improvements in the transaction is the
decrease in the amount of defaulted and 'CCC' rated assets. There
are no defaulted assets and less than $0.6 million in 'CCC' rated
obligations according to the April 5, 2012, trustee report, which
we referenced for 's rating actions. This compares with $3.27
million in defaulted and $27.76 million in 'CCC' rated assets
noted in the May 16, 2011, trustee report, which we used for our
last action," S&P said.

"Due to the paydowns and the above-mentioned improvements, the
class A2, B, and C overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have
increased by 52.36%, 22.05%, and 10.11%," S&P said.

"The A2 and B notes can now support higher than their original
ratings. We upgraded the A2 notes one notch to 'AAA (sf)', while
we raised the rating on the B notes three notches to 'AA+ (sf)'.
We note that according to the April 5, 2012, trustee report, the
class C notes had a small unpaid interest portion of about
$3,163.83. Notwithstanding, we raised the rating on the class C
notes by one notch to 'BB+ (sf)' on account of the improvements in
the transaction," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Vinacasa CLO Ltd.
                          Rating
Class            To                    From
A2               AAA (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                AA+ (sf)              A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                BB+ (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

Vinacasa CLO Ltd.
Class           Rating
A1              AAA (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:              Vinacasa CLO Ltd.
Coissuer:            Vinacasa CLO Inc.
Collateral manager:  Babson Capital Management LLC
Trustee:             State Street Bank & Trust Co.
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


WHITNEY CLO I: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class B-1LB Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2L, A-2F, A-3L, and B-1LA notes from Whitney CLO I Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Apidos
Capital Management LLC. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings
on the class A-1L, A-1LA, A-1LB, B-1LB, P1, and P2 notes.
Concurrently, we removed our ratings on the class A-2L, A-2F, A-
3L, B-1LA, and B-1LB notes from CreditWatch, where we placed them
with positive implications on Feb. 10, 2012," S&P said.

"We raised our ratings on the class A-2L, A-2F, A-3L, and B-1LA
notes due to an increase in the credit support to them. The
affirmations of our ratings on the class A-1L, A-1LA, A-1LB, B-1LB
notes reflect the availability of credit support at the current
rating levels. The P1 and P2 notes are backed by U.S. Treasury
strips," S&P said.

"The transaction is in its amortization phase and continues to pay
down the A-1LA and A-1L notes in the manner as specified in the
transaction documents. Class A-1LA receives principal payments
ahead of class A-1LB, and therefore has a lower balance, which
could be paid off ahead of the class A-1L and A-1LB notes," S&P
said.

"After the most recent paydowns in March 2012, the class A-1LA and
class A-1L note balances had been paid down to 44.56% and 56.64%
of their original amounts down from 94.79% and 95.83% in February
2011, which we used for the analysis when we last upgraded some of
the notes in April 2011," S&P said.

As a result of the note lower balances, the transaction's
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have increased. The trustee
reported the O/C ratios in its March 22, 2011, monthly report:

  * The senior class A O/C (measured at the class A-2 level) ratio
    was 137.71%, compared with a reported ratio of 123.89% in the
    February 2011;

  * The class A O/C ratio was 123.36%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 115.52% in February 2011;

  * The class B-1LA O/C ratio was 112.36%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 108.63% in February 2011; and

  * The class B-1LB O/C ratio was 106.56%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 104.81% in February 2011.

"Standard & Poor's notes that as per the March 22, 2012 trustee
report, 2.98% of the underlying assets are expected to mature
after the transaction's maturity date. We took this into account
in our review," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in our view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Whitney CLO I Ltd.
              Rating
Class     To           From
A-2L      AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2F      AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L      AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1LA     BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1LB     B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Whitney CLO I Ltd.
Class                    Rating
A-1LA                    AAA (sf)
A-1L                     AAA (sf)
A-1LB                    AAA (sf)
P1                       AA+ (sf)
P2                       AA+ (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:             Whitney CLO I Ltd.
Coissuer:           Whitney CLO I (Delaware) Corp.
Collateral manager: Apidos Capital Management LLC
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $965 Million Subprime RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 20
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 5 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 19 tranche from 15 RMBS transactions, backed by
Subprime loans, issued by various issuers.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction. The above
mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages 2004 and
prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors. For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: BankBoston Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2

A-7, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3 placed on
review for possible downgrade on Dec 19, 2011)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NC2

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CIT Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-2

Cl. AF, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. MV-2, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. MF-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-B

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-C

Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2011
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Cl. BV-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. BV-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. BF-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. BF-2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CPT Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-EC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: EQCC Trust 2001-1F

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-4

A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3 placed on
review for possible downgrade on Dec 19, 2011)

Issuer: HomeGold Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1

A-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Aa3 placed
on review for possible downgrade on Mar 20, 2012)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-4

Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2004-WMC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2
Trust

Cl. AI-8, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AII-1B, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AIII-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WMC Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-1

M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WMC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-A

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF284461

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


* Moody's Reviews Six SF CDOs for Possible Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has updated its methodology in relation
to structured finance (SF) CDO transactions whose ratings take
into account credit assessments of non-Moody's rated assets that
are inferred from ratings assigned by other rating agencies.
Moody's has placed the affected ratings on review for possible
downgrade.

Ratings Rationale

In its analysis of SF CDOs to date, Moody's has in certain limited
circumstances inferred the credit assessment of certain underlying
collateral assets that have not been rated by Moody's from ratings
assigned by other agencies. However on a going forward basis
Moody's will produce Credit Estimates (CEs) for those assets it
does not rate based on its Rating Implementation Guidance,
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions". Where information is inadequate to produce a CE and
the unrated asset is material to Moody's credit analysis of the SF
CDO, Moody's may withdraw the rating of the SF CDO notes due to
lack of information, as per Moody's Rating Withdrawal Policy,
"Policy for Withdrawal of Credit Ratings".

Moody's has examined the universe of 563 U.S. SF CDOs outstanding
and determined that the ratings from the following list of 6
transactions will be placed under review for possible downgrade:

Issuer: DG Funding Trust

U.S.$500,000,000 Callable Noncumulative Trust Preferred Securities
Preferred Stock, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on July 27, 2001 Modified Rating Direction
to Aaa (sf)

Issuer: House of Europe Funding IV PLC

EUR 740,000,000 Class A1 House of Europe Funding IV PLC Floating
Rate Notes due 2090 Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on March 22, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2
(sf)

Issuer: House of Europe Funding V PLC

EUR 580,000,000 Class A1 House of Europe Funding V PLC Floating
Rate Notes due 2090 Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on March 22, 2010 Downgraded to B1
(sf)

EUR 200,000,000 Class A1 House of Europe Funding V PLC Delayed
Draw Note due 2090 Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on March 22, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: MKP CBO III Ltd

U.S.$50,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes, Due 2039 Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on April 20, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf)

Issuer: North Street Referenced Linked Notes, 2002-3A Limited

U.S.$100,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Notes, Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on October
16, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: NYLIM STRATFORD CDO 2001-1 LTD.

U.S.$40,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 Notes, A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on
July 1, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

The principal methodology used in these rating analysis was
"Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 253 Classes From 74 US Residential RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 253
classes from 74 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions from 1992-2007. "Concurrently, we raised our ratings
on nine classes from seven of the transactions in this review. In
addition, we affirmed our ratings on 885 classes from 100 of the
transactions reviewed. We also withdrew our ratings on 45 classes
from 16 of the reviewed transactions," S&P said.

The complete rating list is available for free at:

    http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_RMBS_RatingList_5_8_12.pdf

"The underlying collateral for the 119 RMBS transactions in this
review consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo
mortgage loans secured by first liens on one- to four-family
residential properties. Subordination provides credit support for
the affected transactions," S&P said.

"In accordance with our published criteria, these rating actions
reflect our view of the recent performance of the collateral
backing these transactions, our current projected losses, the
timing of the projected defaults and losses, and the projected
credit support to cover those losses. The actions also reflect our
view of structural features such as cross collateralization,
payment allocations, and super senior/subordinate senior
relationships," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect our belief that projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will likely be insufficient
to cover the projected losses we applied at the previous rating
stresses. The downgrades of class 1-A-1 from Structured Asset
Securities Corp. Series 2003-6A and classes 1-A1 and B1-I
from Structured Asset Securities Corp. Series 2002-11A also
incorporated our interest shortfall criteria," S&P said.

"Among other factors, the upgrades reflect our view of a decrease
in delinquencies within the structures associated with these
classes. This has reduced the remaining projected losses for these
structures, allowing these classes to withstand more stressful
scenarios. The upgrades to 'B- (sf)', 'B (sf)', 'BB- (sf)', and
'BB (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect our opinion that
these classes are no longer projected to default based on the
credit enhancement available to cover the projected losses. In
addition, each upgrade reflects our assessment that the projected
credit enhancement for each affected class will be more than
sufficient to cover projected losses at the revised rating levels;
however, we are limiting the extent of the upgrades to reflect our
view of ongoing market risk," S&P said.

"The affirmations reflect our belief that projected credit
enhancement available for these classes will likely be sufficient
to cover projected losses associated with these rating levels,"
S&P said.

"We withdrew our ratings on 42 classes from 14 transactions due to
the small number of mortgage loans remaining in the related
mortgage pools (some have as few as one loan) and the potential
for performance volatility. If any of the remaining loans default,
the resulting loss could have a greater effect on the pool's
performance than if the pool had more loans. Because this
performance volatility may have an adverse effect on our
outstanding ratings, we withdrew our ratings on the related
transactions. Each of these ratings prior to withdrawal reflect
the current credit quality of these classes as outlined in our
'Methodology And Assumptions For U.S. RMBS Issued Before 2005'
criteria article, published March 12, 2009. We also withdrew
ratings on two classes that have been paid in full, and we
withdrew our rating on class B1-I-X from Structured Asset
Securities Corp. Series 2002-11A based on our current interest-
only (IO) criteria," S&P said.

"In order to maintain a 'B (sf)' rating on a class, we assessed
whether, in our view, a class could absorb the remaining base-case
loss assumptions we used in our analysis. In order to maintain a
rating higher than 'B (sf)', we assessed whether a class could
withstand 127% of our remaining base-case loss assumption in order
to maintain a 'BB (sf)' rating, while we assessed whether a
different class could withstand 154% of our remaining base-case
loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB (sf)' rating. Each class that
has an affirmed 'AAA (sf)' rating can withstand approximately 235%
of our remaining base-case loss assumptions. Classes rated 'CCC
(sf)' and 'CC (sf)' reflect our assessment that the credit
enhancement for these classes will remain insufficient to cover
projected losses," S&P said.

The information shows average pool factor, cumulative loss, and
total and severe delinquency information by vintage for prime
jumbo collateral as of the March 2012 distribution period.

All Vintages
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      24.64        1.73              14.80              11.76

2005 Vintage
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      34.00        2.20              13.61              10.78

2006 Vintage
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      38.45        4.03              18.45              14.96

2007 Vintage
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      44.60        4.10              18.93              15.30

*Cumulative losses represent the percentage of the original pool
balance, and total and severe delinquencies represent the
percentage of the current pool balance.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on 55 Classes From 7 CMBS & CDO Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 55
classes from six U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
and one commercial real estate-collateralized debt obligation
(CRE-CDO) transactions.

"We withdrew our ratings on 55 classes from seven CMBS and CRE-CDO
transactions following the previous downgrades of all outstanding
ratings from each transaction to 'D (sf)'. We had previously
lowered most of the ratings to 'D (sf)' due to recurring or
accumulated interest shortfalls. We had previously lowered a
smaller number of ratings to 'D (sf)' following principal losses
to the classes," S&P said.

The recurring and accumulated interest shortfalls primarily
occurred due to one or more of these factors:

  * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) in effect
    for the specially serviced assets;

  * Trust expenses that may include, but are not limited to,
    property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
    payments, and legal expenses; and

  * Special servicing fees.

                       ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.

"We lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on the non-deferrable classes
A through D from ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd., a CRE-CDO transaction,
between March and May 2010 following interest shortfalls. We
downgraded classes E through K to 'D (sf)' in April 2012,
following our expectation that these classes are unlikely
to be repaid in full. We downgraded classes L, M, and N to 'D
(sf)' in February 2009, due to deferred interest on these classes,
which we expect to recur. We do not expect the classes to be
ultimately repaid," S&P said.

      Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. Series 2000-2

"We lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes J, K, L, and M from
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2000-2, a CMBS
transaction, on March 1, 2011, due to accumulated interest
shortfalls that we do not expect to be repaid in the near term. We
lowered the ratings on classes N and O to 'D (sf)' due to
recurring interest shortfalls on April 14, 2010. According to the
April 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, the class J certificate
is the only class outstanding and shows a cumulative loss of $5.2
million," S&P said.

              Banc of America Large Loan Trust 2007-BMB1

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on class RDI-1 from Banc of
America Large Loan Trust 2007-BMB1, a CMBS transaction, on Feb.
21, 2012, following principal losses of $13.8 million due to the
liquidation of the Reader's Digest loan," S&P said.

                 Hometown Commercial Trust 2006-1

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on class A from Hometown
Commercial Trust 2006-1, a CMBS transaction, due to a principal
loss on Dec. 16, 2011. We lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on
classes B, C, and D between February and July 2010, due to
recurring interest shortfalls. The downgrades to 'D (sf)' of
classes E through N reflect our expectations of recurring interest
shortfalls to these classes as a result of appraisal reduction
amounts (ARAs) as of March 3, 2009," S&P said.

    LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2005-MF1

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class A from LaSalle
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2005-MF1, a CMBS
transaction, due to principal losses totaling $803,124 to the
trust as reflected in the Feb. 21, 2012, trustee report. We
lowered ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes B, C, D, E, F, and G due to
recurring shortfalls on between June and December 2010. We lowered
our rating to 'D (sf)' on class H due to the principal loss of 45%
of its opening certificate balance as of the May 2010 remittance
report. The downgrades to 'D (sf)' of classes J, K, L, and M to
'D' on Jan. 26, 2009, reflects our expectation that these classes
will either be exposed to recurring interest shortfalls or have a
high propensity to experience interest shortfalls," S&P said.

      Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc. Series 1999-C1

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on class F from Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors Inc.'s series 1999-C1, a CMBS transaction, on
March 30, 2010, due to recurring interest shortfalls. We lowered
our rating to 'D (sf)' on class G on Jan. 26, 2009, due to
nonrecoverability determination made on an asset in the trust at
the time. We lowered our ratings on class H on Nov. 19, 2003, and
class J on March 20, 2002 due to accumulated shortfalls," S&P
said.

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Series 2005-XLF

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on class L from Morgan Stanley
Capital I Inc.'s series 2005-XLF, a CMBS transaction, on Feb. 21,
2012, due to principal losses from the liquidation of the sole
remaining loan in the trust, the Metrocenter Mall loan. We lowered
our rating to 'D (sf)' on class M on April 26, 2010, due to
recurring interest shortfalls," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
Commercial real estate-collateralized debt obligations
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        NR                  D (sf)
B                        NR                  D (sf)
C-FL                     NR                  D (sf)
C-FX                     NR                  D (sf)
D                        NR                  D (sf)
E-FL                     NR                  D (sf)
E-FX                     NR                  D (sf)
F-FL                     NR                  D (sf)
F-FX                     NR                  D (sf)
G-FL                     NR                  D (sf)
G-FX                     NR                  D (sf)
H                        NR                  D (sf)
J                        NR                  D (sf)
K                        NR                  D (sf)
L                        NR                  D (sf)
M                        NR                  D (sf)
N                        NR                  D (sf)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-2

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
J                        NR                  D (sf)
K                        NR                  D (sf)
L                        NR                  D (sf)
M                        NR                  D (sf)
N                        NR                  D (sf)
O                        NR                  D (sf)

Banc of America Large Loan Trust 2007-BMB1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
RDI-1                    NR                  D (sf)

Hometown Commercial Trust 2006-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through notes
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        NR                  D (sf)
B                        NR                  D (sf)
C                        NR                  D (sf)
D                        NR                  D (sf)
E                        NR                  D (sf)
F                        NR                  D (sf)
G                        NR                  D (sf)
H                        NR                  D (sf)
J                        NR                  D (sf)
K                        NR                  D (sf)
L                        NR                  D (sf)
M                        NR                  D (sf)
N                        NR                  D (sf)

LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-MF1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        NR                  D (sf)
B                        NR                  D (sf)
C                        NR                  D (sf)
D                        NR                  D (sf)
E                        NR                  D (sf)
F                        NR                  D (sf)
G                        NR                  D (sf)
H                        NR                  D (sf)
J                        NR                  D (sf)
K                        NR                  D (sf)
L                        NR                  D (sf)
M                        NR                  D (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
F                        NR                  D (sf)
G                        NR                  D (sf)
H                        NR                  D (sf)
J                        NR                  D (sf)


Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-XLF
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
L                        NR                  D (sf)
M                        NR                  D (sf)

NR-Not rated.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 10 Classes From 5 U.S. CMBS Deals to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from five
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions due
to current and potential interest shortfalls.

"We lowered our ratings on 10 of these classes to 'D (sf)' because
we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future. The 10 classes that we
downgraded to 'D (sf)' had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding between one and 12 months," S&P said. The recurring
interest shortfalls for the certificates are primarily due to one
or more of these factors:

  * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts in
    effect for specially serviced assets;

  * The lack of servicer advancing for assets where the servicer
    has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

  * Special servicing fees; and

  * Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
    modifications.

"Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals. We also
considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations, special
servicing fees, and interest rate reductions and deferrals
resulting from loan modifications that are likely, in our view, to
cause recurring interest shortfalls," S&P said.

"The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each respective transaction's terms. Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when it is 60
days past due and an appraisal, or other valuation, is not
available within a specified timeframe. We primarily considered
ASER amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when
deciding which classes from the affected transactions to downgrade
to 'D (sf)'. This is because ARAs based on a principal balance
haircut are highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the
special servicer obtains the MAI appraisals," S&P said.

"Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt
shortfalls due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery
of previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure
to advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have
been determined. Trust expenses may include, but are not limited
to, property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses," S&P said.

"We detail the 14 downgraded classes from the five U.S. CMBS
transactions," S&P said.

    Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR6

"We lowered our ratings on the class P certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR6. We lowered
our rating on class to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for five months. The accumulated interest
shortfalls resulted primarily from ASER amounts and special
servicing fees related to the two loans with the special servicer,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo). As of the April 11, 2012
trustee remittance report, Wells Fargo reported ARAs totaling $1.6
million in effect for two specially serviced assets. The total
reported monthly ASER amount and the monthly shortfall amount was
negative due to the recovery of ASER 's related to Hunter
Technology Park. Accumulated interest shortfalls have affected
classes M, N, and P. While we expect the accumulated interest
shortfalls for classes M and N to be repaid within the next few
months, our analysis indicates that the accumulated interest
shortfalls for class P will remain outstanding.  Subsequently, we
lowered this class to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

"The special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC, informed us
that the borrower for Hunter Technology Park loan, which has a
trust and whole-loan balance of $3.1 million, paid approximately
$379,000, which was generated from historical net operating cash
flow. A portion of this amount was applied to some of the past due
interest and principal payments resulting in a negative ASER for
the current remittance period," S&P said.

            Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust Series 1999-C1

"We lowered our ratings on the class E, F and G certificates from
Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust series 1999-C1. We lowered our
ratings on the class G certificates to 'D (sf)' due to accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for eight months. The accumulated
interest shortfalls resulted primarily from ASER amounts and
special servicing fees ($36,645). We downgraded the class E and F
certificates to 'A (sf)' and 'CCC+ (sf)' due to reduced liquidity
support available to the classes. Class F had experienced interest
shortfalls for one month. As of the April 17, 2012, trustee
remittance report, the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
(Wells Fargo), reported ARAs totaling $85.0 million in effect for
four specially serviced assets. The total reported monthly ASER
amount on these assets was $605,846. The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $664,043 million and have affected all of
the classes subordinate to and including class F," S&P said.

         COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1

"We lowered our ratings on the class A-J, B, C, and D certificates
from COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1. We lowered our
ratings on the class B, C, and D certificates to 'D (sf)' due to
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between 10 and 12
months. The accumulated interest shortfalls resulted primarily
from ASER amounts and special servicing fees ($110,307)," S&P
said.

"We downgraded class A-J to 'CCC- (sf)' due to reduced liquidity
support available to the class. Class A-J had experienced interest
shortfalls for three months. As of the April 2012 trustee
remittance report, the master servicer, Wells Fargo, reported ARAs
totaling $214.2 million in effect for 14 of the 26 ($507.4
million, 25.4% of the pool balance) specially serviced assets. The
total reported monthly ASER amount on these assets was $982,768.
The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $1.1 million and
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class A-J," S&P said.

                       COMM 2006-C7

"We lowered our ratings on the class B, C, D, E, and F
certificates from COMM 2006-C7. We lowered our ratings on the
classes C, D, E, and F to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding between one and 11 months. The shortfalls
were primarily due to ASER amounts related to 11 of the 16 assets
($385.2 million, 17.8%) that are currently with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC, workout fees of $7,138,
and special servicing fees of $91,152. We downgraded the class B
certificate to 'CCC+ (sf)' due to reduced liquidity support
available to this class. As of the April 2012, trustee remittance
report, Wells Fargo reported ARAs totaling $177.9 million in
effect for 11 assets and a total reported monthly ASER amount of
$1,037,057. Accumulated interest shortfalls have affected all of
the classes subordinate to and including class B," S&P said.

         GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series 2001-3

"We lowered our rating on the class I certificates from GE Capital
Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s series 2001-3 to 'D (sf)' to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for nine months. The
shortfalls were primarily due to ASER amounts related to seven
($44.5 million, 61.9%) of the nine assets ($51.4 million, 71.6%)
that are currently with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC,
and special servicing fees of $10,742. As of the April 2012,
trustee remittance report, Wells Fargo reported ARAs totaling
$17.9 million in effect for seven assets and a total reported
monthly ASER amount of $89,573. Accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class I," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                            Credit             Reported
          Rating       enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To         From         (%)      Current Accumulated
P      D(sf)      CCC(sf)      0.97     5,190      25,949

Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1
                            Credit             Reported
          Rating       enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To         From         (%)      Current Accumulated
E      A(sf)      AA(sf)       17.56          0           0
F      CCC+(sf)   A-(sf)       12.23     25,768      25,768
G      D(sf)      CCC+(sf)       6.3    309,245   1,532,418


COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                            Credit             Reported
          Rating       enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To         From         (%)      Current Accumulated
A-J    CCC-(sf)   B(sf)        12.30    (7,273)       3,189
B      D(sf)      CCC+(sf)      9.77   226,074    1,236,109
C      D(sf)      CCC-(sf)      8.34   128,090    1,280,900
D      D(sf)      CCC-(sf)      6.59   157,720    1,759,500

COMM 2006-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                            Credit             Reported
          Rating       enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To         From         (%)      Current Accumulated
B      CCC+(sf)   B(sf)         10.71    20,151      20,151
C      D(sf)      CCC(sf)        9.57   121,643     121,643
D      D(sf)      CCC-(sf)       7.87   182,475     182,475
E      D(sf)      CCC-(sf)       6.88   106,443     663,060
F      D(sf)      CCC-(sf)       5.46   152,059   1,505,152

GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-3
                            Credit             Reported
          Rating       enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To         From         (%)      Current Accumulated
I      D(sf)      CCC-(sf)      19.82    31,540     166,092


* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 62 Classes From 40 CMBS & CDO Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 62
classes from 39 commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions and one commercial real estate-collateralized
debt obligation (CRE-CDO) transaction.

"We withdrew our ratings on 56 principal and interest paying
classes from 38 CMBS and one CRE CDO transactions following the
repayment in full of each class' principal balance, as noted in
each transaction's respective April 2012 trustee remittance
report. We withdrew our ratings on two interest-only (IO) classes
from two CMBS transactions following the reduction of the classes'
notional balances, as noted in each transaction's trustee
remittance report," S&P said.

"In addition, we withdrew our ratings on four other IO classes
from four CMBS transactions following the repayment of all
principal and interest paying classes rated 'AA- (sf)' or higher,
according to our criteria for rating IO securities," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN FOLLOWING REPAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL BALANCE OR
REDUCTION OF NOTIONAL BALANCE

Asset Securitization Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-D5
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1E                     NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-PB1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
J                        NR                  AA+ (sf)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-4
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-5
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

CAM Commercial Mortgage Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CAM2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B                        NR                  AA+ (sf)

CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)


Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Column Canada Issuer Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CCL1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B                        NR                  AAA (sf)
C                        NR                  AA+ (sf)

COMM 2005-LP5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)
X-P                      NR                  AAA (sf)

COMM 2007-FL14
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
PH1                      NR                  CCC (sf)
PH2                      NR                  CCC- (sf)
PH3                      NR                  CCC- (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
E                        NR                  AAA (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKP1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
D                        NR                  AA+ (sf)
E                        NR                  AA (sf)


DLJ Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CF1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B-1                      NR                  AA- (sf)
B-2                      NR                  A (sf)

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
G                        NR                  A- (sf)

First Union-Lehman Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-C2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
D                        NR                  AAA (sf)

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
F                        NR                  AA (sf)
G                        NR                  A (sf)

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B                        NR                  AAA (sf)
C                        NR                  AAA (sf)

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-GG4
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)


JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CIBC1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
E                        NR                  A (sf)

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP5
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2FL                    NR                  AAA (sf)

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-FL1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)
B                        NR                  AAA (sf)
C                        NR                  AAA (sf)
D                        NR                  AAA (sf)
E                        NR                  AAA (sf)

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B                        NR                  AAA (sf)

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
J                        NR                  A- (sf)

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-4                      NR                  AAA (sf)
B                        NR                  AAA (sf)

Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-CANADA
22
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-MW1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-4                      NR                  AAA (sf)

ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2FL                    NR                  AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-XLF
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-PPM
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
C                        NR                  AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-IQ2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-4                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Petra CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
Commercial real estate-collateralized debt obligations
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1Notes                 NR                  A+ (sf)


PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-CM1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B-5                      NR                  BB+ (sf)

Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
XP-1                     NR                  AAA (sf)

Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-KEY2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-3                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B                        NR                  AAA (sf)
C                        NR                  AAA (sf)
D                        NR                  AAA (sf)
E                        NR                  AA+ (sf)

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C6
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-3                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C19
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-4                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Washington Mutual Asset Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        NR                  AAA (sf)

Washington Mutual Asset Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-J                      NR                  AAA (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN DUE TO REPAYMENT OF ALL PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST
PAYING CLASSES RATED 'AA- (sf)' OR HIGHER

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-PB1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
XC                       NR                  AAA (sf)

Column Canada Issuer Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CCL1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-X                      NR                  AAA (sf)

DLJ Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CF1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
S                        NR                  AAA (sf)

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
X-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)


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Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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