TCR_Public/120422.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, April 22, 2012, Vol. 16, No. 111

                            Headlines

ABN AMRO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B-3 Tranche to 'B1 (sf)'
ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 7 Tranches to 'C'
ALESCO PREFERRED: S&P Puts 'CCC-' Rating on A-2 Secs. on Watch Pos
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. VI-M-1 Tranche to Caa3
APIDOS II: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes; Off Watch

ARES ENHANCED II: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes From 'BB+'
ARES VR: Moody's Raises Rating on US$56.2MM Cl. D Notes to 'Ba1'
ARES X: S&P Affirms 'B+' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
ARGENT SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 31 Tranches to 'C'
ATRIUM II: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Ba2'

BANC OF AMERICA 2003-11: Moody's Gives Caa1 Rating to 3-IO Tranche
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K Certs. to 'D'
BANK OF NEW YORK 2005-3: S&P Lowers Rating on Certificates to 'B-'
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches to 'C'
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K Cert. to 'D'

CALLIDUS DEBT IV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CAPITALSOURCE 2006-A: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on J Notes
CAPITAL TRUST 2005-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Debt Classes to 'D'
CARBON CAPITAL II: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class E Securities
CBA COMM'L. 2004-1: Moody's Affirms Rating on M-3 Certs. at 'C'

CBA COMM'L. 2005-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes
CCRE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on G Certificates
CEDARWOODS CRE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Debt Classes to 'CCC-'
CFCRE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on US$7.9MM Tranche
CHEVY CHASE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 RMBS Tranches to 'Caa3'

CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'C'
CIENA CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes to 'Caa1'
CITIGROUP COMM'L: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes to 'C'
COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Raises Rating on US$246MM Notes to Ba2
COLTS 2007-1: Moody's Raises Rating on $10MM Notes from 'Ba2'

CONN'S RECEIVABLES: Fitch to Rate $103MM Notes 'BBBsf'
CONNECTICUT VALLEY IV: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class C Notes
COUNTRYWIDE: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 RMBS Tranches to 'B1'
COUNTRYWIDE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 135 Tranches to 'C'
CRAFT 2007-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on US$16MM E Notes to 'B3'

CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 9 Certificate Classes to 'D'
CREDIT SUISSE 1999-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on L Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C1: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on K Certificate
CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-C5: S&P Lowers Class L Cert. Rating to 'CCC-'
CUSTODY RECEIPT: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-4 Notes to 'B-'

DAWN CLO I: S&P Withdraws 'CCC' Rating on Class A Notes
ECP 2012-3: S&P Rates US$24.75MM Class D Deferrable Notes 'BB'
EQUITABLE OF IOWA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Preferred Stock Rating
EQUIFIRST MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 RMBS Tranches to C
FINANCE AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 RMBS Tranches to 'C'

FIRST HORIZON: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 6 RMBS Tranches to 'Ba3'
FRASER SULLIVAN VII: S&P Rates $19MM Class D Notes 'BB-'
FRASER SULLIVAN VII: S&P Rates US$19MM Class D Notes 'BB'
FREMF MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Cl. X-2 Certs.
FREMONT HOME: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 28 RMBS Tranches to 'Csf'

GALAXY III: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $20.5MM Notes to 'Ba1'
GEM LIGOS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on US$12MM Notes to 'B2'
GLIMCHER REALTY: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Preffered Stock Rating
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 CMBS Classes
GRAMERCY 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 7 Debt Classes to 'D'

GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. M-LH Cert.
GULF STREAM 2003-1: Moody's Raises Rating on D Notes From 'Ba1'
HIGH GRADE 2005-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'D'
JEFFERIES TRUST 2010-R6: S&P Raises Class 2-A1 Rating From 'CCC'
JPMORGAN 2005-LDP3: S&P Lowers Class H Cerificate Rating to 'D'

JPMORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class H Secs.
JPMORGAN CIBC 2006: Moody's Lowers Rating on A-1 Cert. to 'Ca'
LASALLE 2006-MF3: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
LASALLE 2006-MF4: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Two CMBS Classes
LB-UBS 2004-C7: S&P Affirms Class K Certificate Rating to 'CCC-'

MARATHON CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes From 'BB+'
MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating for $9.3MM Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Tranches to 'C'
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Cert. Classes to 'C'
MILL CREEK: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $10.5MM Class E Notes

MORGAN STANLEY 1998-WF2: Fitch Cuts Rating on $5.3MM Notes to 'C'
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-IQ9: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Cl. J Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-8: S&P Cuts Rating on Class IA Notes to 'D'
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL IV: S&P Hikes Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'BB+'
NEWTON CDO: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes From 'BB+'

ORCHARD PARK: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'CC'
PACIFICA CDO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CC'
PETRA CRE 2007-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes to 'D'
RACERS 2004-13-E: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Certs.; Off Watch
RALI: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 5 RMBS Tranches to 'Caa1'

RESIDENTIAL ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Five Tranches to 'C'
STUDENT LOAN 2007-1: S&P Lowers 2 Certificate Ratings to 'B-'
TRIBECA PARK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB'
TRICADIA 2003-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class A-4L Notes
TRICADIA 2006-5: S&P Lowers Class C Note Rating to 'CC'; Off Watch

WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C20: S&P Lowers Rating on G Cert. to 'D(sf)'
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Fitch Cuts Rating on 7 Certificates to CC
WAVE SPC 2007-3: S&P Withdraws 'D' Rating on Class D Notes
ZAIS IX: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CC'; Off Watch

* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Ratings on Radian Asset-Backed Securities
* DBRS Confirms 'C(sf)' Ratings on Nine U.S. RMBS Transactions
* S&P Places Ratings on 168 Tranches From 42 CDOs on Watch Pos



                            *********

ABN AMRO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B-3 Tranche to 'B1 (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 14
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 6 tranches from 3 RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by ABN Amro
Mortgage Corporation.

Complete actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation, Multi-Class Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-6

Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IA-26, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IA-27, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IA-28, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IA-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IIA-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IIA-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IIA-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. IA-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. IIA-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation, Multi-Class Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-9

Cl. A-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation, Multi-Class Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-10

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Prime
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
set at 3% for Jumbo and which is typically higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans, the adjusted rate of
new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if current
delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future delinquencies
are expected to reflect this trend. To account for that, the rate
calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to
2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to
greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years
and ultimate expected losses are projected using the approach
described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF282868

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 7 Tranches to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 19
tranches, upgraded the ratings of three tranches, and confirmed
the ratings of six tranches from 11 RMBS transactions, backed by
Subprime loans, issued by ACE trusts.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2001-
AQ1 Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-
HE2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-
HE3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
HS1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
OP1

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
TC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
FM1

2004-FM1-M1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2004-FM1-M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE1

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE2

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE4

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF281393

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


ALESCO PREFERRED: S&P Puts 'CCC-' Rating on A-2 Secs. on Watch Pos
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 90
tranches from 66 U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transactions backed by pools of trust preferred securities
(TruPs) on CreditWatch with positive implications. "The aggregate
issuance amount of the affected tranches is $17.88 billion. These
CreditWatch placements follow the release of our updated criteria
and assumptions for rating U.S. TruPs CDOs that contain
significant concentrations of bank trust preferred securities,"
S&P said.

"Trust preferred CDOs (TruPs CDOs) are collateralized by hybrid
securities issued by banks, insurance and REITs. The trust
preferred securities collateralizing Standard & Poor's rated bank
TruPs CDOs are deeply subordinated, long-dated securities issued
predominantly by small community banks that have what we consider
to be speculative-grade credit profiles. These securities allow
the issuer to temporarily defer payments of interest and
principal," S&P said.

"We will review these transactions under our new criteria. For
purposes of analyzing the currently deferring securities held by
each of the TruPs CDO transactions, the updated criteria provides
a range of potential deferral cure (PDC) credit that can be
applied as part of the analysis of the CDOs, based on our near-
term performance expectations for currently deferring banks (see
table 4 and paragraph 38 of the criteria article). Based on our
analysis of the factors enumerated in the criteria, we are
applying a PDC credit of 15% for the currently deferring
securities held within our TruPs CDOs," S&P said. S&P's analysis
and review were based on these observations related to economic
and other factors impacting small banks that issue TruPs:

* Fewer banks have deferred payments in recent quarters;

* "Approximately 40 banks held by TruPs CDOs that we rate have
   cured their deferrals (out of approximately 520 that were
   deferring)," S&P said;

* The rate of U.S. bank failures has slowed in recent quarters;

* The number of troubled banks reported by the FDIC has been
   reduced; and

* The unemployment rate in the U.S. has started to improve.

"In our view, this combination of factors corresponds to the
'medium' deferral cure expectation, as indicated in table 4 of the
recent criteria article," S&P said.

                 Review Of The TruPs CDO Transactions

"We will resolve the CreditWatch placements on each of the
affected TruPs CDO transactions after we complete our credit and
cash flow analysis, followed by our committee review of such
analysis. In general, we expect to resolve the CreditWatch
placements within the next 90 days. We also expect to issue
multiple press releases as we complete our review of all the
affected transactions," S&P said.

Rating Actions

ALESCO Preferred Funding I Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
A-2                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding II Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)
A-2                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding III Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding IV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding IX Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
A-2A                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)
A-2B                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding V Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding VI Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding VII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1B                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding VIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1A                     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
A-1B                     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding X Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding XI Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1A                     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
A-1B                     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding XII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)
X                        BBB (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding XIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)
X                        BB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BB- (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding XIV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)
X                        A (sf)/Watch Pos     A (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding XV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

MM Community Funding IX Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

MMCapS Funding XVII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)
A-2                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

MMCaps Funding XVIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities IX Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      B- (sf)/Watch Pos   B- (sf)
A-2                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)
A-3                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Preferred Term Securities VII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)

Preferred Term Securities VIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Preferred Term Securities X Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XI Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
A-2                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)
A-3                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XIV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XIX Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XVI Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XVII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XVIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XX Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXI Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXIV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXVI Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXVII, Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXVIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Regional Diversified Funding 2004-1 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Soloso CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1LA                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

TPref Funding II Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

TPref Funding III Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
A-2                      BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

Trapeza CDO I LLC
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
A-2                      A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)

Trapeza CDO II LLC
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1B                      BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

Trapeza CDO III LLC
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A1A                      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    B+ (sf)
A1B                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Trapeza CDO IV LLC
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A1A                      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
A1B                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Trapeza CDO IX Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Trapeza CDO V Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A1A                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
A1B                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Trapeza CDO VI Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1A                     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
A-1B                     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Trapeza CDO VII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Trapeza CDO X Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Trapeza CDO XI Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Trapeza CDO XII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Trapeza CDO XIII Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Trapeza Edge CDO Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)
A-3                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Tropic CDO I Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-2L                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Tropic CDO II Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1L                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Tropic CDO III Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1L                     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Tropic CDO IV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1L                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding IV Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding I Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
A-2                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding II Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC (sf)
A-2                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding III Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)
A-2                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding V Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
A-1                      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. VI-M-1 Tranche to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches, and upgraded the ratings of four tranches from two RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by American Home.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-2

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IV-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
and Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools.

In addition, the rating action for Cl. II-A-1 in American Home
Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 reflects a correction to the
rating action announced on March 16, 2011, which did not
accurately reflect the enhancement available to the bond due to a
model input error. The upgrade reflects the additional enhancement
available for the bond.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating actions consist of upgrades as well as downgrades. The
upgrades are due to significant improvement in collateral
performance, and/ or rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to
high prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for
the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication listed
above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF280816

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


APIDOS II: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes; Off Watch
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-3, B, and C notes from Apidos CDO II, a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Apidos Capital Management
LLC, and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where S&P placed
them with positive implications on Feb. 10, 2012. "At the same
time, we affirmed the ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and D notes
and removed the rating on class D from CreditWatch with positive
implications," S&P said.

"The transaction is now in its amortization phase after its
reinvestment period ended in Jan. 17, 2012. The upgrades of the
class A-3, B, and C notes reflect the improvement we have observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio since our March 2010
rating actions. According to the Feb. 27, 2012, trustee report,
the transaction's asset portfolio held about $1.77 million in
defaulted assets, down from the $12.65 million noted in the
January 2010 trustee report. Additionally, the collateral pool
consisted of approximately $10.55 million in assets from obligors
rated in the 'CCC' category according to the February 2012 trustee
report, down from $21.33 million noted in January 2010," S&P said.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the senior notes.

The trustee reported these par value ratios in the February 2012
monthly report:

* The class A par value ratio was 121.98%, compared with a
   reported ratio of 119.54% in January 2010;

* The class B par value ratio was 113.39%, compared with a
   reported ratio of 111.14% in January 2010;

* The class C par value ratio test was 109.23%, compared with a
   reported ratio of 107.06% in January 2010; and

* The class D par value ratio test was 105.21%, compared with a
   reported ratio of 103.13% in January 2010.

"As a result, we raised our ratings on the class A-3, B, and C
notes. We affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and D notes
to reflect the sufficient credit support available to support
their current ratings. We removed the ratings on the class A-3, B,
C, and D notes from CreditWatch," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Apidos CDO II
                      Rating
Class            To                    From
A-3              AA (sf)               A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                A (sf)                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                BBB (sf)              BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                B+ (sf)               B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Apidos CDO II
Class            Rating
A-1              AA+ (sf)
A-2              AA+ (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:              Apidos CDO II
Collateral manager:  Apidos Capital Management LLC
Underwriter:         Credit Suisse Holdings (USA) Inc.
Trustee:             Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


ARES ENHANCED II: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes From 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2 notes from Ares Enhanced Loan
Investment Strategy (Ares Elis) II Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Ares Management LLC.
"Simultaneously, we removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
we placed them with positive implications on Feb. 10, 2012," S&P
said.

"The transaction is in its reinvestment period (scheduled to end
January 2013) and the credit support available to the notes has
improved, primarily due to the rising credit quality of the assets
and a lower level of defaults since we last lowered all of the
ratings in March 2010 following the application of our September
2009 corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria," S&P
said.

"According to the March 13, 2012, trustee report, the
transaction's asset portfolio held about $2.47 million in
defaulted assets, down from the $11.39 million noted in the Feb.
16, 2010, trustee report. Additionally, the collateral pool
consisted of approximately $13.23 million in assets from obligors
rated in the 'CCC' category according to the March 2012 trustee
report, down from $34.75 million noted in February 2010 trustee
report," S&P said.

"The reduction in defaults with the combination of other factors
has resulted in improvement of the overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios. For instance, the class A O/C ratio went up to 130.53%
based on the March trustee report from 128.21% as observed in
February 2010. Similar improvements were seen in the other O/C
ratios. In addition, the weighted average spread increased over
this time period to 3.20% from 2.86%," S&P said.

"Based on the credit improvements, we raised our ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2 and removed the ratings
from CreditWatch," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy II Ltd.
                      Rating
Class            To                    From
A-1              AA+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2              AA+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1              A+ (sf)               BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2              A+ (sf)               BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1              BBB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-2              BBB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:              Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy
                     II Ltd.
Collateral manager:  Ares Management LLC
Underwriter:         JPMorgan Securities Inc.
Trustee:             Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


ARES VR: Moody's Raises Rating on US$56.2MM Cl. D Notes to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Ares VR CLO, Ltd.:

US$22,100,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

US$23,400,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to A2
(sf);

US$56,200,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018
(current outstanding balance of $49,461,206.98), Upgraded to Ba1
(sf); previously on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of the amortization of the senior notes
resulting in an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in July 2011.
Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 38% or $145 million since the last rating action.
Based on the latest trustee report dated March 20, 2012, the Class
A/B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 137.5%, 126.2%, and, 107.4% respectively, versus June 2011
levels of 123.5%, 116.7% and 104.6%, respectively. Moody's also
notes that the credit quality of the portfolio has remained
relatively stable since the rating action in July 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $357 million,
defaulted par of $5.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.8% (implying a WARF of 2667), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 49.3%, and a diversity score of 46.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Ares VR CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans
and high yield bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2134)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3200)

Class A: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


ARES X: S&P Affirms 'B+' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C-1, and C-2 notes from Ares X CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Ares Management LLC.
"At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2,
A-3, D-1, and D-2 notes. Concurrently, we removed the ratings on
the class B, C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2 notes from CreditWatch with
positive implications, where we placed them Feb. 10, 2012," S&P
said.

"The upgrades reflect performance improvements we have observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio and the affirmations
reflect our belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels," S&P said.

"The transaction is currently in its amortization phase. Since May
20, 2011, the transaction has paid down the class A-1, A-2, and A-
3 notes by $141.65 million to approximately 25.63% of their
original balance. The aggregated class A current balance is $96.10
million, down from $237.76 million in March 2011. The paydowns
increased the subordination levels and increased the class A/B, C,
and D overcollateralization ratios," S&P said.

"In addition, the credit quality of the transaction's underlying
asset portfolio has improved since our June 28, 2011, rating
actions, and the improvements have reduced the amount of
underlying obligations rated in the 'CCC' range. Specifically, the
amount of 'CCC' rated obligations decreased by $1.87 million
between May 2011 and March 2012. Standard & Poor's will continue
to review whether, in its view, the ratings on the notes remain
consistent with the credit enhancement available to support
them and take rating actions as it deems necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Ares X CLO Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To           From
B                  AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1                AA- (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
C-2                AA- (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D-1                B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D-2                B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ares X CLO Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-1                AAA (sf)
A-2                AAA (sf)
A-3                AAA (sf)


ARGENT SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 31 Tranches to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 46
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 16 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 12 tranches from 16 RMBS transactions, backed by
Subprime loans, issued by Argent.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors. For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W9

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3B, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W10

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W3

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W8

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W4

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W5

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W7

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W8

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-PW1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W11

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W5

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W6

Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W7

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W9

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF279974

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


ATRIUM II: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Atrium II:

U.S. $12,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

U.S. $5,000,000 Class A-2b Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

U.S. $11,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf);

U.S. $6,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

U.S. $6,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf); previously on July 19, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of de-leveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A-1
Notes have been paid down by approximately 37% or $36.8 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated March 7, 2012, the Class A, Class B and Class C
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 147.2%, 129.5% and
114.5%, respectively, versus June 2011 levels of 131.8%, 120.5%
and 110.2%, respectively.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes. Based on the March 7, 2012 trustee
report, reference securities that mature after the maturity date
of the notes currently make up approximately 29% of the underlying
reference portfolio. These investments potentially expose the
notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of
the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $121.1 million,
defaulted par of $4.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.21% (implying a WARF of 2875), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.44%, and a diversity
score of 37. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Atrium II, issued in December 2003, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2300)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class B: +2

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3450)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) De-leveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether de-leveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. De-leveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


BANC OF AMERICA 2003-11: Moody's Gives Caa1 Rating to 3-IO Tranche
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 95
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 26 tranches from 13 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Banc of America.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, the rarting
agency captures this risk by running each individual pool through
a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured
Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model developed by
Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and
the structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for
the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication listed
above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete List of Actions:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-10

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 15-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. CB-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-11

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 15-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. CB-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. CB-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. CB-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. CB-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. CB-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. NC-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. NC-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. NC-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-4

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-5

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. CB-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. NC-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. NC-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. NC-WIO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-6

Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-CB-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 1-NC-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-NC-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-NC-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-NC-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-NC-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-NC-WIO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-8

Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-CB-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 2-NC-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-NC-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2-NC-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-NC-WIO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-WIO, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-9

Cl. 1-CB-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 2-NC-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-NC-WIO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 15-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. CB-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-6

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2004-1 Trust

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 8-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. NC-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-2

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-WIO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF280814

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K Certs. to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
K commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2005-5, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D
(sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The downgrade reflects principal losses that class K incurred, as
detailed in the April 10, 2012, trustee remittance report. The
aggregate principal losses totaled $15.3 million on two assets.

"The largest asset, One Renaissance Square, consisted of a
491,623-sq.-ft. 25-story office building in Phoenix. This asset
had an aggregate beginning scheduled principal balance of $103.6
million and was liquidated in April at a loss severity of 12.7%.
The other asset, Chestnut Hill Tower, had an aggregate beginning
scheduled principal balance of $15.4 million and was liquidated in
April at a loss severity of 14.3%.  Consequently, class K incurred
a 2.7% loss to its beginning principal balance of $12.3 million.
According to the April 10, 2012, trustee remittance report, the
class L, M, N, and O certificates also experienced principal
losses that reduced their outstanding beginning principal balances
to zero. We previously lowered our ratings on these classes to 'D
(sf)'," S&P said.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


BANK OF NEW YORK 2005-3: S&P Lowers Rating on Certificates to 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Bank of
New York's transferable custody receipt related to NCF Grantor
Trust 2005-3's series 2005-GT3 certificates due 2033 to 'B- (sf)'
from 'BBB (sf)' and removed it from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

"The rating on the custody receipt is dependent on the higher of
the ratings on (i) the underlying security, NCF Grantor Trust
2005-3's class A-5-1 certificates due Oct. 25, 2033 ('B- (sf)');
and (ii) the insurance provider, Ambac Assurance Corp. (NR)," S&P
said.

"The rating actions follow the April 5, 2012, lowering of our 'BBB
(sf)' rating on the underlying security to 'B- (sf)' and its
subsequent removal from CreditWatch with negative implications. We
may take subsequent rating actions on the custody receipts due to
changes in our rating on the underlying security," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 142
tranches and confirmed the ratings of eight tranches from 26 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Bear Stearns.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
and Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating action constitute of a number of downgrades. The
downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for
the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication listed
above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2003-3

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2003-5

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CL. IV-A, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2003-6

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-1

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-12

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-2

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-5

Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-7

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-9

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2002-1

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-10

Cl. I-1-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-2-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-2-A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-2-A-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-2-A-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-3-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-4-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-5-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-12

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-4

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-5

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-6

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-7

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-8

Cl. I-1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-AC4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-AC5

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities I Trust 2004-AC2

Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. I-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities I Trust 2004-AC3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2002-AC1

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-AC4

Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-AC6

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF281652

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K Cert. to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)'on the class K commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2007-PWR18, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

"The downgrade reflects principal losses that class K incurred, as
detailed in the April 13, 2012, trustee remittance report. We
attribute the aggregate principal losses, which totaled $3.1
million, to one asset: the BGK Portfolio. The asset had an
aggregate beginning scheduled principal balance of $6.1 million
and was liquidated in April at a loss severity of 49.7%.
Consequently, class K incurred a 2.2% loss of its $25.0 million
beginning principal balance. According to the April 2012 trustee
remittance report, the class L also experienced principal losses
that reduced the class' outstanding balance to zero. We previously
lowered our rating on class L to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


CALLIDUS DEBT IV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, and C notes from Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund IV Ltd.,
a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management. "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on the class A-1A, A-1B, and D notes.
Concurrently, we removed the ratings on the class A-2, B, C, and D
notes from CreditWatch, where we had placed them with positive
implications on Dec. 20, 2011," S&P said.

"The upgrades mainly reflect and improvement in the performance of
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since December 2009,
when we downgraded the class A-1A, A-1B, and C notes following the
application of our September 2009 corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria," S&P said.

"As of the March 2012 trustee report, the transaction had $0.38
million of defaulted assets. This was down from $6.83 million
noted in the November 2009 trustee report, which we referenced for
our December 2009 rating actions. Furthermore, assets from
obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were reported at $21.52
million in March 2012, compared with $63.47 million in November
2009," S&P said.

"The upgrades also reflect an improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the notes since
the December 2009 rating actions," S&P said. The trustee reported
these O/C ratios in the March 2012 monthly report:

* The class A O/C ratio was 124.1%, compared with a reported
   ratio of 119.2% in November 2009;

* The class B O/C ratio was 116.4%, compared with a reported
   ratio of 111.8% in November 2009;

* The class C O/C ratio was 109.9%, compared with a reported
   ratio of 105.6% in November 2009; and

* The class D O/C ratio was 106.2%, compared with a reported
   ratio of 102.00% in November 2009.Callidus Debt Partners CLO
   Fund IV Ltd. will be in its reinvestment period until April
   2012.  After that time, the transaction should start pay down
   its notes, starting with the class A-1A and A-1B notes.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class A-1A, A-1B, and D notes to
reflect the availability of credit support at the current rating
levels," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund IV Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-2           AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B             A+ (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Pos
C             BBB (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BB (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund IV Ltd.
Class                Rating
A-1A                 AA+ (sf)
A-1B                 AA+ (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund IV Ltd.
Co-issuer:          Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund IV Inc.
Collateral manager: GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management
Underwriter:        Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


CAPITALSOURCE 2006-A: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on J Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed all classes of Notes issued
by CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A (the "Issuer") due
to the key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-1R, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A is a currently static
(reinvestment period ended January 2012) CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of whole loans (90.2% of the pool),
commercial mortgage backed securities (3.5%), B-note debt (2.0%),
small business loans (2.0%), mezzanine debt (1.4%) and
collateralized debt obligations (0.9%). The current aggregate
collateral balance of the pool is $1.05 billion.

As of the March 26, 2012 trustee report, three whole loans
totaling approximately $7.1 million (0.7% of the pool) were listed
as defaulted.

The Issuer had its Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) status
revoked on June 18, 2009, therefore federal and state income taxes
became payable pursuant to the transaction's Indenture. However,
NorthStar Realty Finance Corp. ("Northstar") stated that in July
2010 it purchased classes J, K and equity notes becoming the
collateral manager delegate as well as special servicer delegate;
Northstar subsequently was approved as the replacement special
servicer for the transaction. Since Northstar is a qualified REIT,
it has elected to no longer escrow for the payment of such taxes
during the last three quarters. However, the resulting increase in
cash flows is offset by Moody's concerns on the future performance
of certain non-traditional asset classes within the collateral
pool such as timeshare resorts.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated assets. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default
probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-
dollar WARF of 5,509 compared to 4,922 at last review (excluding
defaulted securities). The distribution of current ratings and
credit estimates is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (4.8% compared to 5.8% at
last review), A1-A3 (2.1% compared to 1.7% at last review), Baa1-
Baa3 (0.9% compared to 0.4% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (3.9%
compared to 2.0% at last review), B1-B3 (21.9% compared to 2.8% at
last review), and Caa1-C (66.4% compared to 87.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the assets in the
pool for time. Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.7 years which reflects
the static nature of the current pool and assumptions about
extensions.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
(excluding defaulted securities) of 45.7% compared to 44.1% at
last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 14.3%, compared to 16.3% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R)v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R)v3.2.1, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
45.7% to 35.7% or up to 55.7% would result in average rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 4 notches downward and 0 to
6 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


CAPITAL TRUST 2005-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Debt Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services downgraded its ratings on three
classes from Capital Trust Re CDO 2005-1 Ltd., a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction, and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The downgrades reflect our analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the credit characteristics of the
underlying collateral using our criteria for rating global CDOs of
pooled structured finance assets. Our analysis also considered the
amount of defaulted assets in the underlying asset pool ($43.1
million, 28.4%) and their expected recoveries. In addition, the
analysis also considered the event of default (EOD) the
transaction experienced and the liquidity available to pay
interest due on the class A. We downgraded class B to 'D (sf)'
after receiving the March 27, 2012, notice from the trustee
indicating that the transaction experienced an event of default
due to interest shortfalls on the nondeferrable class. We lowered
our rating on class C to 'D (sf)' because we determined that the
class is unlikely to be repaid in full," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's recently revised its criteria for rating global
CDOs of pooled structured finance assets. The updated criteria
include revisions to our assumptions on correlations, recovery
rates, and default patterns and timings of the collateral. The
criteria also include supplemental stress tests (largest obligor
default test and largest industry default test) in our analysis,"
S&P said.

"According to the March 15, 2012, trustee report, the
transaction's collateral totaled $152.1 million, while the
transaction's liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled
$229.8 million. This is down from $337.8 million at issuance," S&P
said. The transaction's current asset pool includes:

* Eleven subordinate-interest loans ($111.4 million, 73.2%);

* Six commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) tranches from
   six distinct transactions issued between 1998 and 2007 ($27.0
   million, 17.8%); and

* Three CRE CDO tranches from one distinct transaction issued in
   2006 ($13.7 million, 9.0%)

The trustee report noted 14 defaulted assets ($200 million, 50%),
including five defaulted loan assets ($21.1 million, 13.9%).
Standard & Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery rates for
these defaulted loan assets ranging from 0% to 71%, and the
weighted average recovery rate was 12.4%. We based the recovery
rates on information provided by the collateral manager, special
servicer, and third-party data providers," S&P said. The defaulted
assets are:

* The Embassy Suites LBV subordinate loan ($7.5 million,
   4.9%);

* The Resorts International Portfolio subordinated loan ($5.3
   million, 3.5%);

* The Liberty Properties subordinate loan ($4.3 million, 2.9%);

* The Crescent Resources subordinated loan ($2.9 million, 1.9%);
   and

* The Pointe Apartments subordinated loan ($1.1 million, 0.7%).

"In our review of the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral, our analyses of the publicly rated collateral were
based on Standard & Poor's issued ratings. We based our analyses
of the unrated collateral on information provided by the
collateral manager, CT Investment Management Co. LLC, and
trustee, U.S. Bank N.A., as well as market and valuation data from
third-party providers," S&P said.

According to the trustee report, the deal is failing both par
value coverage tests and both interest coverage tests.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in our view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Capital Trust Re CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A         CCC- (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
B         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
C         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


CARBON CAPITAL II: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class E Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on five
classes from Carbon Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd. (Carbon
Capital 2005-1), a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) transaction, and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. "Subsequently, we withdrew
our rating on class A following the full repayment of the class'
principal balance," S&P said.

"The affirmations reflect our analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the credit characteristics of the
underlying collateral using our criteria for rating global CDOs of
pooled structured finance assets criteria. We also considered the
amount of defaulted loan assets ($88.1 million, 64%) and their
expected recoveries in our analysis," S&P said.

"Our criteria for rating global CDOs of pooled structured finance
assets include revisions to our assumptions on correlations,
recovery rates, and default patterns and timings of the
collateral. The criteria also include supplemental stress tests
(largest obligor default test and largest industry default test),"
S&P said.

"According to the March 15, 2012, trustee report, the
transaction's collateral totaled $137.6 million, while the
transaction's liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled
$325.2 million. This is down from $455 million at issuance," S&P
said. The transaction's current asset pool includes:

* Six subordinate-interest loans ($61.0 million, 44.3%);

* Two whole loans ($58.6 million, 42.6% of the collateral pool);
   and

* One commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) tranche issued
   in 2007 ($18.0 million, 13.1%).

"The trustee report noted five defaulted loan assets ($88.1
million, 64%). Standard & Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery
rates for these defaulted loan assets ranging from 0% to 90%, with
a weighted average recovery rate of 51.7%. We based the recovery
rates on information provided by the collateral manager, special
servicer, and third-party data providers," S&P said. The defaulted
assets are:

* The Hilton Pittsburgh whole loan ($44.1 million, 32.1%);

* The San Francisco Multifamily Portfolio subordinated loan
   ($15.0 million, 10.9%);

* The Highwoods Office Park whole loan ($14.5 million, 10.5%);

* The Lembi Mezzanine 3 subordinated loan ($8.4 million, 6.1%);
   and

* The Lembi Open Pool 8 subordinated loan ($6.0 million, 4.4%).

"In our review of the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral, our analyses on the publicly rated collateral are
based on Standard & Poor's issued ratings. Our analyses on the
unrated collateral are based on information provided by the
collateral manager, BlackRock Financial Management Inc., and
trustee, U.S. Bank N.A., as well as market and valuation data from
third-party providers," S&P said.

"According to the trustee report, the deal is failing all three of
its par value coverage tests. The deal is passing the class A/B
and class C/D/E interest coverage tests and failing its class
F/G/H interest coverage test," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Carbon Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
B         BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
C         B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D         CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
E         CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

RATING AFFIRMED, REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH, AND WITHDRAWN

Carbon Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class     To      Interim        From
A         NR      A- (sf)        A- (sf)/Watch Neg

NR-Not rated.


CBA COMM'L. 2004-1: Moody's Affirms Rating on M-3 Certs. at 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes of
CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2004-1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations at are due to overall stable performance and
increased credit subordination due to amortization and loan
payoffs. Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf)
remain within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
13.4% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected was 15.1%. Moody's provides a current list of base
losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Small Loan Transactions"
published in December 2004 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver. 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 76 compared to 86 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a Press Release dated May 11, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 26, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 67% to $34.1
million from $102.0 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 103 mortgage loans, with the top ten loans
representing 7% of the pool. The pool is characterized by both
geographic and property type concentrations. Approximately 68% of
the pool is secured by multi-family properties and properties
securing 61% of the loans are located in California, Texas and
Arizona

There are currently two loans, representing 1% of the pool on the
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-fMoody's loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $6.1 million loss (64%
loss severity on average). Currently, there are 15 loans,
representing 13% of the pool in special servicing. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $2.1 million loss (65% expected loss on
average) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 17 poorly
performing loans, representing 21% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $1.8 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year and partial year 2010
operating results for 51% of the pool. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 94%
compared to 103% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.31X, respectively, compared to
1.19X and 1.13X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


CBA COMM'L. 2005-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of fMoody's classes
of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2005-1 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings are affirmed based on realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's loan to value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the Herfindahl Index (Herf) remain within acceptable ranges.
Based on Moody's current base expected loss the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
13.5% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected was 12.7%. Moody's provides a current list of base
losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Small Loan Transactions"
published in December 2004 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities".

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver. 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 109, compared to 123 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a Press Release dated May 11, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 26, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 68% to $68.6
million from $214.9 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 201 mortgage loans with all loans less than
1% of the pool. The top ten loans represent 3% of the pool. The
pool is characterized by both geographic and property type
concentrations. Approximately 68% of the pool is secured by multi-
family properties; a combined 65.8% of the pool is located in
California, Texas, New York and Ohio.

There are nine loans comprising 2% of the pool that are currently
on the watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ninety-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $24.6 million loss (68%
loss severity on average). Currently, there are 25 loans,
representing 13% of the pool in special servicing. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $5.7 million loss (65% expected loss on
average) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 27 poorly
performing loans, representing 13% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $2.2 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 45%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 102% compared to 106% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 10%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.34X, respectively, compared to
1.16X and 1.09X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


CCRE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on G Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of twelve classes
of CCRE Commercial Mortgage Securities, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2011-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. This is Moody's
first review since securitization

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.0% of the current balance. The pool has not experienced any
losses. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, the same as at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's Pre Sale Report was
issued April 13, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 16, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 0.7% to $630
million from $635 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 38 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 58% of
the pool.

One loan, representing 3% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Currently two loans, representing 3% of the pool, are in special
servicing. Moody's is not anticipating a loss for these loans at
this time.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 45%
of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV is 93.2% compared to
93.4% at securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 8.5% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 1.06X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the GSA -- NGP Portfolio I Loan ($66.5 million --
10.6% of the pool), which is secured by three single-tenant office
buildings that are 100% leased through the General Services
Administration (GSA) of the US Government and total 299,378 square
feet (SF). All three properties were built-to-suit for the
particular government agency in occupancy. The principals of the
sponsor, NGP V Fund, have the largest multi-state, GSA-leased,
real estate portfolio in the US. The loan has a five year term
with a three year interest-only period. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 92% and 1.03X, respectively, the same as at
securitization.

The second largest conduit loan is the GSA -- NGP Portfolio II
Loan ($63.4 million -- 10.1% of the pool), which is secured by 11
single-tenant office buildings that are 100% leased through the
General Services Administration (GSA) of the US Government and
total 331,832 SF. The properties were built between 2007 and 2009
and are located across seven states. All were built-to-suit for
the particular government agency in occupancy. The principals of
the sponsor, NGP V Fund, have the largest multi-state, GSA-leased,
real estate portfolio in the US. The loan has a five year term
with a three year interest-only period. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 94% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.02X at
securitization.

The third largest conduit loan is the Hudson Valley Mall Loan
($51.9 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 765,465
SF regional mall located in Kingston, NY - approximately 100 miles
north of New York City. It is the only regional mall within a 25
mile radius. Occupancy as of December 2011 was 95% compared to 94%
as of March 2011. Lease renewals however, have been at lower rates
than previously paid. This along with an increase in expenses has
resulted in declining performance. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 94% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.18X at
securitization.


CEDARWOODS CRE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Debt Classes to 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services downgraded its ratings on eight
classes from Cedarwoods CRE CDO Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction, and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The downgrades reflect our analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the credit characteristics of the
underlying collateral using our global CDOs of pooled structured
finance assets criteria. We also considered the transaction's
exposure to underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS), CRE CDOs, and resecuritized real estate mortgage
investment conduit (re-REMIC) collateral that have experienced
negative rating actions. The downgraded collateral securities are
from 36 transactions and total $195.3 million (47.4% of the total
asset balance)," S&P said.

"The global CDOs of pooled structured finance assets criteria
include revisions to our assumptions on correlations, recovery
rates, and the collateral's default patterns and timings. The
criteria also include supplemental stress tests (largest obligor
default test and largest industry default test) in our analysis,"
S&P said. According to the March 20, 2012, trustee report, the
transaction's collateral totaled $412.7 million while the
transaction's liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled
$376.8 million. This is down from $400 million at issuance," S&P
said. The transaction's current asset pool includes these:

* 110 CMBS tranches from 69 distinct transactions issued between
   1997 and 2008 ($292.9 million, 71.1%);

* 26 re-REMIC and CRE CDO tranches from 14 distinct transactions
   issued between 2002 and 2006 ($93.5 million, 22.7%); and

* Four real estate investment trust (REIT) securities ($25.7
   million, 6.2%).

S&P's analysis of Cedarwoods reflected exposure to these
certificates that Standard & Poor's has lowered:

* LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd. (classes B, C-FX, H, and J; $25.0 million,
   6.1%);

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C7 (classes AJ, B, and C;
   $14.7 million, 3.6%);

* Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2006-C2 (classes AJ and E; $13.0
   million, 3.2%);

* Anthracite CDO III Ltd. (classes B-FL, C-FL, D-FX, and E; $9.9
   million, 2.4%); and

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6 (classes AJ and C;
   $9.9 million, 2.4%).

According to the trustee report, the deal is failing all four par
value coverage tests and all four interest coverage tests.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in our view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Cedarwoods CRE CDO Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A-1       BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2       B+ (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3       B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B         CCC+ (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
C         CCC+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D         CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
E         CCC- (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Neg
F         CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg


CFCRE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on US$7.9MM Tranche
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of CFCRE Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2011-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Fitch's affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool and limited reporting since issuance.
The pool has experienced no realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated four loans as Fitch Loans of Concern, including two
loans in special servicing.

The two loans (3.1% of the pool) that are in special servicing
transferred in February 2012 due to a technical default related to
a transfer of ownership.  Both loans have a common sponsor.  After
the transfer, the servicer became aware that the loan sponsor and
guarantor was being investigated for an alleged $220 million Ponzi
scheme.  As of year-to-date September 2011, the properties were
performing in-line with issuance underwriting.  As of the March
2012 remittance the loans were current.

The other two loans (5.8%) which are designated Fitch Loans of
Concern have debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) significantly
below issuance underwriting.  In one case this is due to higher
than underwritten expenses and in the other case due to a decline
in occupancy.

As of the March 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 0.7% to $629.8 million
from $634.5 million at issuance.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

  -- $27.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $304.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $153.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.7 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.3 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $27 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.9 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.9 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class NR or interest only class X-B
certificates.


CHEVY CHASE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 RMBS Tranches to 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 31
tranches from 7 RMBS transactions, backed by Option ARM loans,
issued by Chevy Chase.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. In Moody's current approach, Moody's
captures this risk by running each individual pool through a
variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for
the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication listed
above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors. For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2003-4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade*

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade*

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade*

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade*

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade*

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade*

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-A

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-B

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-1I, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF282630

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 45 tranches, confirmed 50
Tranches, and withdrawn the ratings on six tranches from 24 RMBS
transactions issued by CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust. The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages. The
actions impact approximately $965.4 million of RMBS issued from
2002 to 2004.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Prime
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating action constitutes of a number of downgrades. The
downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, the rating
agency captures this risk by running each individual pool through
a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured
Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model developed by
Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and
the structural nuances of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
set at 3% for Jumbo and which is typically higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans, the adjusted rate of
new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if current
delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future delinquencies
are expected to reflect this trend. To account for that, the rate
calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to
2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to
greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years
and ultimate expected losses are projected using the approach
described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor). As such, Moody's has
withdrawn the rating of CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB2
pursuant to published rating methodologies that allow for the
withdrawal of the rating if the size of the underlying collateral
pool at the time of the withdrawal has fallen below a specified
level.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors. For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-1

Cl. 1-A-5, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-21

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-24

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-11, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-27

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-37

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-39

Cl. A-16, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-41

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-42

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-48

Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-X-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-49

Cl. A-8-B, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-56

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-7A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-7B, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-7C, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-X, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-58

Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-60

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-7

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB2

Cl. 1-A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. 1-X, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-11

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3-A-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-22

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J1

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 3-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J3

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J4

Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-2, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 3-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J5

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J6

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 3-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2002-J5

Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF281291

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


CIENA CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded five certificates and
upgraded two certificates issued in five securitizations of small
business loans sponsored by Ciena Capital, LLC, formerly known as
Business Loan Express. Small balance commercial real estate
primarily secures the loans.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2003-A

Class A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Class B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2007-A

Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-1

Class M, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. M, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2012 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade actions on the 2003-A, 2007-A, and 2005-1
securitizations were due to a decrease in available credit
enhancement caused by prolonged levels of continued charge-offs in
the underlying collateral pools. In addition, delinquency levels
have remained relatively high for these pools. Over the past two
years, delinquencies 60 days or more past due, including REO, for
these deals have persisted between approximately 20% to 40% of the
outstanding pool balance.

The upgrade actions on the 2003-1 and 2003-2 securitizations were
due to an increase in credit enhancement and decrease in
delinquencies 60 days or more past due, including REO. Over the
past year, the delinquencies 60 days or more past due, including
REO, decreased in the 2003-1 and 2003-2 securitizations to
approximately 10.5-13.5% from 14.0-15.5% of the pool balance as of
the March 2012 distribution date.

The methodology used in the rating actions for deals with more
than 60 loans remaining included an analysis of the loan
collateral to arrive at a projected lifetime losses. For the 2003-
1, 2003-2, 2005-1 and 2007-A securitizations, Moody's determined
the expected lifetime loss using representative delinquency roll
rates and an estimate of market recoveries. Because of the hard
charge-off policy by which a loan must be charged off after being
a certain number of days past due, Moody's also estimated and
incorporated future recoveries on charged-off loans whose
collateral has not yet been sold. These future recoveries were
determined by a loan level analysis using an estimate of market
value. Moody's current ranges of lifetime expected net losses for
the 2003-1, 2003-2, 2005-1 and 2007-A securitizations are 10.00%-
10.25%, 7.40%-7.75%, 12.50%-13.00%, and 28.00%-29.50% of the
original pool balances, respectively.

For the 2003-A securitization, which has 14 loans remaining, a
loan level analysis was performed to determine a range of lifetime
expected net losses. Moody's assessed the likelihood of each loan
to default base on the current delinquency status, estimate of
market value, loan concentrations, business types, property
locations, past payment histories, and borrower's
creditworthiness. Moody's range of lifetime net losses, taking
into account future recoveries on already charged-off loans, is
5.00%-5.50% of the original pool balance.

The range of projected lifetime net losses were then evaluated
against the available credit enhancement provided by reserve
accounts, subordination, and excess spread. Sufficiency of
coverage was considered in light of the credit quality of the
collateral pools, industry, geographical and loan concentrations,
historical variability of losses experienced by the issuer, and
servicer quality.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession. If the remaining
expected net loss used in determining the ratings increased by
10%, the senior classes may be downgraded.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating these transactions can also be found on
Moody's website.


CITIGROUP COMM'L: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
and affirmed 17 classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust
2005-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-C3 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. CP-1, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. CP-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. CP-3, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected loss from the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf) remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.4% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 6.9%. Moody's provides a current list of
base losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com
at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 39 compared to 42 at the Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 28, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 16, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to $1.10
billion from $1.43 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 103 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 39%
of the pool. The pool includes one loan with an investment grade
credit estimate, representing 9% of the pool. Five loans,
representing 3% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-five loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$30.6 million loss (50% loss severity on average). Currently ten
loans, representing 18% of the pool, are in special servicing. The
largest specially serviced loan is the Novo Nordisk Headquarters
Loan ($49.1 million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
mortgage on two three-story Class A suburban office buildings
totaling 225,651 square feet (SF) located in Princeton, New
Jersey. The loan transferred to special servicing in January 2010
for imminent maturity default. The loan matured on March 3, 2010.
The property is 77% occupied by Novo Nordisk (Novo)with a lease
expiration December 2012. Novo is planning to vacate at lease
expiration and relocate to a newly constructed property. The
remaining nine specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$33.0 million appraisal reduction for five specially serviced
loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $77.0 million
(39% expected loss on average) for all the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated a
$7.4 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 30% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full or partial year
2011 operating results for 96% and 85% of the pool, respectively,
excluding specially serviced loans and defeasance. Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 91% compared to 97% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.49X and 1.25X, respectively, compared to
1.28X and 1.05X at last full review. Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Carolina Place Loan ($97.9
million -- 9.0%), which is the pooled component of a $111.3
million first mortgage loan secured by the borrower's interest in
a 1.1 million SF regional mall located in suburban Charlotte,
North Carolina. The mall is anchored by Belk, Dillard's, Macy's,
J.C. Penney and Sears. The overall property was 99% leased as of
September 2011, the same as at last review. Performance has been
stable. The trust also includes the $13.5 million non-pooled loan
component which secures the non-pooled Classes CP-1, CP-2 and CP-
3. Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR for the pooled loan
component are A3 and 1.67X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.65X
at last review.

The top three performing loans represent 10% of the pool balance.
The largest performing loan is the Abilene Mall Loan ($34.9
million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 680,000 SF single-story regional mall located in
Abilene, Texas. The mall is anchored by Dillard's, J. C. Penney
and Sears. J.C. Penney is only anchor included in the collateral.
The overall property was 93% leased as of October 2011 compared to
91% at last review. Performance has been stable. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 104%
and 0.97X at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Penn Mar Shopping Center
Loan ($34.7 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
382,000 SF retail center located in Forestville (Prince George's
County), Maryland. The center was 91% leased as of June 2011
compared to 92% at last review. Performance has been stable.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.15X, respectively,
compared to 85% and 1.11X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the 250 West Pratt Loan
($34.1 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 24-
story 355,000 SF office property located in downtown Baltimore,
Maryland. Property performance has remained weak but stable. The
property was 86% leased as of September 2011 compared to 77% at
last review. The loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to low
DSCR and occupancy. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 116% and
0.87X, respectively, compared to 122% and 0.82X at last review.


COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Raises Rating on US$246MM Notes to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Coast Investment Grade 2002-1, Limited.

U.S.$246,900,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due November 17, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $80,720,882.87), Upgraded to Ba2
(sf); previously on September 23, 2011 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily the result of the improved credit quality of the
underlying portfolio and the deleveraging of the Class A Notes.

Moody's notes that since the last rating action in September 2011,
the trustee reported weighted average rating factor has improved
from 2141 to 1773. This improvement was driven by recent upgrades
to the underlying collateral as a result of Moody's recent CLO
ratings sweep.

Additionally, since the last rating action in September 2011, the
deal has benefited from the recovery of principal received from
collateral prepayments and sale proceeds from defaulted assets.
Since September 2011, the deal has used these proceeds to pay down
the Class A Notes by 25% or $26.4 million. According to the
trustee report dated February 2012, the Class A, Class B and Class
C/D overcollateralization ratios are 120.42%, 94.32% and 68.56%,
respectively, versus August 2011 levels of 89.87%, 75.78% and
59.00%, respectively.

Coast Investment Grade 2002-1, Limited, issued in May 2002, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
CLO and CBO tranches originated between 2000 and 2007.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Caa rated assets notched up by 2 rating notches

Class A: +4

Class B: +2

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Moody's Caa rated assets notched down by 2 rating notches

Class A: -3

Class B: -2

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. Additionally, there is a large
concentration of tranches from CLO and CBO transactions which have
not yet begun to repay principal.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether delevering from CLO and CBO tranches will continue and
at what pace.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels.


COLTS 2007-1: Moody's Raises Rating on $10MM Notes from 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by CoLTS 2007-1 Ltd.:

U.S.$40,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2021 Notes,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on November 6, 2011 Upgraded to
A1 (sf);

U.S.$21,215,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
Due 2021, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on November 6, 2011
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

U.S.$10,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2021 (current rated balance
of $6,748,831), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on November 6,
2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the end of the deal's reinvestment period
in March 2012. In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions
applicable during the amortization period, and therefore limited
ability to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from a lower WARF and
higher spread compared to the levels assumed at the last rating
action in November 2011.

The rating actions also reflect the increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in November
2011. Based on the latest trustee report dated March 5, 2012, the
Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 157.1%, 128.8%, 117.6%, and 107.7%
respectively, versus October 2011 levels of 156.0%, 127.9%, 116.7%
and 107.0% respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $278.4 million,
defaulted par of $27.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.16% (implying a WARF of 3088), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.91%, and a diversity
score of 46. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

CoLTS 2007-1, Ltd. issued in February 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of broadly
syndicated and middle-market senior secured loans.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011 and
"Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes"
published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2470)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Combination Notes: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3705)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Combination Notes: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
begin and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates. Moody's also conducted stress tests to assess
the collateral pool's concentration risk in obligors bearing a
credit estimate that constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.


CONN'S RECEIVABLES: Fitch to Rate $103MM Notes 'BBBsf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Conn's Receivables Funding I, LP,
asset backed fixed rate notes series 2012-A as follows:

$103,679,000 class A notes 'BBBsf (EXP)'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch's stress analysis is discussed in the presale titled 'Conn's
Receivables Funding I, LP, Series 2012-A', dated April 18, 2012.


CONNECTICUT VALLEY IV: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on five
notes from Connecticut Valley CLO Funding IV Ltd., a U.S.
corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of CDO transaction
that is managed by Babson Capital Management LLC, and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.

"We placed the ratings on CreditWatch negative on March 19, 2012,
in connection with the recent criteria concerning pools of
structured finance assets. Though the transaction has seen a
decrease in defaulted obligations and payment-in-kind (PIK)
obligations since our rating action in May 2010, the transaction
continues to fail all par value ratios. Since our last rating
action, this has resulted in a $38.90 million paydown on the class
A-1 notes and a combined $3.85 million deferral of interest to the
class B and C notes. As of the February 2012 monthly report, the
transaction is failing its weighted average spread test (2.43%,
which is below the minimum requirement of 2.45%)," S&P said.

"In addition, as of February 2012, the transaction is failing the
threshold specified for assets with a Standard & Poor's rating of
'BB+' or lower (63.94%, which is above the maximum requirement of
25.00%). When calculating the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios,
the trustee haircuts from the O/C numerator a portion of the 'BB',
'B', and 'CCC' rated collateral that exceeds the threshold
specified in the transaction documents. This threshold has
continued to be in breach since before our May 2010 rating action,
leading to a current haircut of $56.78 million when calculating
the O/C ratios," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, and C
notes to reflect our belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current ratings," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in our view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Connecticut Valley CLO Funding IV Ltd.

Class         Rating
              To                  From
A-1           BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2           BB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3           B+ (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B             B- (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Neg
C             CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


COUNTRYWIDE: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 3 RMBS Tranches to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche from one RMBS
transaction, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by Countrywide.

Complete actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWMBS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB2

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Prime
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
set at 3% for Jumbo and which is typically higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans, the adjusted rate of
new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if current
delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future delinquencies
are expected to reflect this trend. To account for that, the rate
calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to
2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to
greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years
and ultimate expected losses are projected using the approach
described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF282874

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


COUNTRYWIDE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 135 Tranches to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 184
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 24 tranches from 26 RMBS
transactions, backed by Subprime loans, issued by Countrywide.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors. For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-10

Cl. AF-5A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-5B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3 placed on
review for possible downgrade on Dec 19, 2011)

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BV, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-12

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BV, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-13

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BV, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-14

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-15

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BV, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-AB2

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-4

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-5

Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. MF-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. MV-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. BV, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-6

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-1

Cl. 3-A, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-3

Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-4

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-3

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-4

Cl. A, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-5

Cl. 3-A, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 4-A-3, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 4-A-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-6

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-7

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BV, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-9

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-BC3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC4

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC6

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-BC5

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Confirmed
at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-ECC1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-ECC2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF281962

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


CRAFT 2007-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on US$16MM E Notes to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by CRAFT 2007-1, Ltd.:

U.S. $20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Credit Linked Notes due 2017,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on October 8, 2009 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf);

U.S. $16,000,000 Class E Deferrable Credit Linked Notes due 2017,
Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on October 8, 2009 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of improvement in the credit quality of the
portfolio and increased par coverage. Based on the January 2012
portfolio as reported by the manager, the weighted average rating
factor is currently 1916 compared to 2231 in September 2009.

CRAFT 2007-1 Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations", published in June 2011.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on the Monte Carlo
simulation framework within CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss . Once
the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated, each
collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via an Excel cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers. In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality. Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities. The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee. Although the impact of these decisions is
mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of
these decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty
in Moody's assumptions. Given the tranched nature of CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility. All else
being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more junior
or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe. Should macroeconomics conditions evolve,
the CSO ratings will change to reflect the new economic
developments.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 9 Certificate Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from five
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions due
to current and potential interest shortfalls.

"We lowered our ratings on nine of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future. The nine classes that we
downgraded to 'D (sf)' have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding between two and 10 months," S&P said. The recurring
interest shortfalls for the certificates are primarily due to one
or more of these reasons:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts in
   effect for specially serviced assets;

* The lack of servicer advancing for assets where the servicer
   has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

* Special servicing fees; and

* Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
   modifications.

"Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals. We also
considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in our view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls," S&P said.

"The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each respective transaction's terms. Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is
60-days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not
available within a specified timeframe. We primarily considered
ASER amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when
deciding which classes from the affected transactions to downgrade
to 'D (sf)'. This is because ARAs based on a principal balance
haircut are highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the
special servicer obtains the MAI appraisals," S&P said.

"Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt
shortfalls due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery
of previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or a servicer's
failure to advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations
have been determined. Trust expenses may include, but are not
limited to, property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses," S&P said.

"We detail the 17 downgraded classes from the five U.S. CMBS
transactions," S&P said.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2001-
CP4

"We lowered our ratings on the class E, F, and G certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s
series 2001-CP4," S&P said.

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class G certificate to
reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for six
months, primarily due to ASER amounts related to seven ($73.7
million; 73.4%) of the 12 assets ($88.7 million; 88.3%) that are
currently with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. (LNR), and
special servicing fees. We lowered our rating on class F because
this class may experience interest shortfalls relating to the
specially serviced assets in the future. We lowered our rating on
the class E certificate due to the reduction in liquidity support
available to this class resulting from continued interest
shortfalls. As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report,
ARAs totaling $35.9 million were in effect for eight of the 12
specially serviced assets, and the total reported ASER amount
was $126,257. The reported monthly interest shortfalls total
$151,347 and have affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including class G," S&P said.

Credit Suisse First Boston Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-CP5

"We lowered our ratings on the class G, H, J, K, L, and M
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp.'s series 2002-CP5. We lowered our ratings on the
class L and M certificates to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for between three to nine months,
primarily due to ASER amounts related to four ($26.3 million;
3.5%) of the 14 assets ($97.1 million; 12.9%) that are currently
with the special servicer, LNR, interest not advanced on one asset
that the master servicer has declared nonrecoverable, and special
servicing fees. We lowered our ratings on class J and K due the
potential for these classes to experience interest shortfalls in
the future relating to the specially serviced assets. We lowered
our ratings on classes G and H due to the reduction in liquidity
support available to these classes resulting from the continued
interest shortfalls. As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $9.4 million were in effect for four of the
15 specially serviced assets, and the total reported ASER amount
was $33,853. According to the special servicer one, of the
specially serviced assets paid off subsequent to the March trustee
remittance report. The reported monthly interest shortfalls
totaled $74,949 and have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class L," S&P said.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2003-
C3

"We lowered our ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, and N
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp.'s series 2003-C3. We lowered our ratings on the
class K, L, M, and N certificates to 'D (sf)' to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for between two
to nine months, primarily due to ASER amounts related to seven
($47.2 million; 4.5%) of the eight ($49.2 million; 4.5%) assets
that are currently with the special servicer, C-III Asset
Management LLC (C-III), interest paid to servicer on outstanding
advances, and special servicing fees. We lowered our ratings on
classes H and J due to the reduction in liquidity support
available to these classes and the potential for these classes to
experience interest shortfalls in the future relating to the
specially serviced assets. As of the March 16, 2012, trustee
remittance report, ARAs totaling $23.2 million were in effect for
seven of the eight specially serviced assets. The total reported
monthly ASER amount was $89,333. The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $109,080 and have affected all of the classes
subordinate to and including class K," S&P said.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2004-
C1

"We lowered our rating on the class J certificate from Credit
Suisse First Boston Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2004-C1. We lowered our ratings on the class J certificate to 'D
(sf)' from 'CCC- (sf) to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for 10 months, primarily due to ASER amounts related
to six ($32.2 million; 2.9%) of the nine assets ($46.5 million;
4.1%) that are currently with the special servicer, CWCapital
Asset Management LLC (CWCapital), and special servicing fees. As
of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$22.3 million were in effect for seven of the nine specially
serviced assets, and the total reported ASER amount was $92,573.
The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $148,397 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class J,"
S&P said.

       Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1

"We lowered our rating on the class E certificate from Credit
Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Securities Corp.'s series 2008-
C1. We lowered our rating on the class E certificate to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for 10 months, primarily due to ASER amounts related
to three ($22.6 million; 2.6%) of the six assets ($46.2 million;
5.4%) that are currently with the special servicer, C-III,
interest not advanced on one asset that the master servicer has
declared nonrecoverable, interest shortfall due to interest rate
reduction, and special servicing fees. As of the March 16, 2012,
trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $20.7 million were in
effect for four of the six specially serviced assets, and the
total reported ASER amount was $45,723. The reported monthly
interest shortfalls totaled $314,581 and have affected all of the
classes subordinate to and including class E," S&P said.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CP4
                                           Reported
          Rating           Credit      interest shortfalls
Class To        From       enhcmt(%)  Current  Accumulated
E     A (sf)    AA (sf)    49.93            0            0
F     CCC- (sf) BBB (sf)   35.78            0            0
G     D (sf)    CCC- (sf)  25.48       (8,900)     331,656

Credit Suisse First Boston Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP5
                                          Reported
         Rating             Credit      interest shortfalls
Class To        From        enhcmt(%)  Current  Accumulated
G     BBB (sf) A- (sf)       9.07            0            0
H     BB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)      7.1            0            0
J     CCC (sf) B+ (sf)       4.15            0            0
K     CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)    3.37            0            0
L     D (sf)   CCC  (sf)     2.19        2,844       23,623
M     D (sf)   CCC- (sf)      1.2       32,414      174,123

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C3

                                           Reported
         Rating          Credit        interest shortfalls
Class To        From     enhcmt(%)    Current  Accumulated
H     B- (sf)   BBB (sf)    5.70            0            0
J     CCC+(sf)  BB (sf)     3.90            0            0
K     D (sf)    B+ (sf)     2.70        6,063       17,514
L     D (sf)    B (sf)      2.11       22,805       69,753
M     D (sf)    CCC- (sf)   1.11       38,008      267,509
N     D (sf)    CCC- (sf)   0.91        7,602       68,415

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-C1
                                            Reported
         Rating          Credit         interest shortfalls
Class To        From     enhcmt(%)     Current  Accumulated
J     D (sf)    CCC- (sf)  2.88        13,619        81,669

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                           Reported
         Rating           Credit        interest shortfalls
Class To        From      enhcmt(%)   Current  Accumulated
E     D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     7.9        2,696      282,089


CREDIT SUISSE 1999-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on L Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two CMBS classes
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C1 as
follows:

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 4, 2006 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmation of Class L is due to realized and anticipated
losses from specially serviced loans. The rating of the IO Class,
Class A-X, is consistent with the expected credit performance of
the pool and thus is affirmed. The key parameters, including
Moody's LTV ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remain within acceptable
ranges.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
approximately 52% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's cumulative base expected loss was approximately 48%.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's uses
its credit-tenant lease ("CTL") financing methodological approach
("CTL" approach). Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a
transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds. This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease. The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan. The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust. The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.
Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal integrity
of the transaction.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.2 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 22, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 16, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $85 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 50% of the pool. The pool contains no defeased loans or
loans with investment-grade credit estimates. The pool contains a
credit tenant least (CTL) component which represents 33% of the
pool.

Five loans, representing 49% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirty-three loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $38 million (17% average loan loss
severity). Currently, one loan, representing 50% of the pool, is
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Tallahassee Mall Loan ($43 million -- 50% of the pool), which is
secured by a 1 million square foot regional mall in Tallahassee,
Florida. The center is anchored by Belk, the department store
chain headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. The second
anchor space has been vacant since Dillard's closed its store at
the mall in 2007. The property is subject to a ground lease which,
with the borrower's extension option, expires in 2063. The
property was listed for sale after the loan entered default in
2009. The sale was interrupted after the ground lessor refused to
issue an Estoppel Certificate. A foreclosure sale was completed in
2011, and the property is currently REO. The lender is currently
in litigation with the ground lessor and will be going to trial.
The servicer has recognized an appraisal reduction equal to the
outstanding loan balance of approximately $43 million. Moody's
estimates a 100% loss for this loan.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 75% of the performing pool. Moody's weighted
average LTV is 100%, compared to 80% at last full review. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 33% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
0.99X and 2.10X, respectively, compared to 1.25X and 2.00X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 16% of the pool.
The largest loan is the IBM Corporate Center Loan ($8 million --
9% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 130,000 square foot, 2-
story, Class B office property now known as the "Montville East
Corporate Center", located in Parsippany, New Jersey. The loan
passed its ARD date in 2009, and the borrower continues to pay the
original interest rate, with unpaid interest deferred until loan
maturity in 2029. The property is currently listed for sale with
broker NAI James E. Hanson for $9.5 million. According to the
servicer, the largest tenant, Dish Network (Moody's Long Term
Corporate Family Rating Ba2, Stable Outlook), recently extended
its lease for one year until December 31, 2012. Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.90X, respectively, compared
to 94% and 1.15X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Park Glen West Business Center Loan
($5 million -- 5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 130,000
square foot flex property in Saint Louis Park, Minnesota, a
western suburb of Minneapolis. As of February 2012, the property
was 87% leased compared to 81% in February 2011. The largest
tenant is Federal Express Corporation (Moody's Senior Unsecured
Rating Baa1, Stable Outlook). However, leases covering over 50% of
the property's NRA are scheduled to expire in 2012, including the
FedEx lease. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and
1.12X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.33X at last review.

The third-largest loan is the 1674 Broadway Loan ($1 million -- 1%
of the pool). The loan is secured by a 50,000 square foot office
property in Midtown Manhattan. Moody's current LTV and stressed
DSCR are 9% and 12.14X respectively, compared to 10% and 10.43X at
last review.

The CTL component includes two loans secured by properties leased
under bondable leases. The CTL exposure consists of two cross-
collateralized loans secured by a bondable lease to Accor, S.A.,
the French hotel company. The collateral consists of 11 "Motel 6"
hotels totaling 1,224 rooms and located across five states. Due to
business reasons, Moody's on July 2, 2010 withdrew its Prime-3
commercial paper rating of Accor, S.A. For the purpose of rating
this component of the subject transaction, utilized an internal
credit estimate.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C1: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on K Certificate
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

"The affirmations follow our analysis of the credit
characteristics of the collateral remaining in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.
The affirmations reflect subordination and liquidity levels that
provide adequate support through various stress scenarios and are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class A-X and A-Y interest-only (IO)
certificates based on our current criteria," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.36x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 111.0% for the loans in the pool. We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 0.95x and a LTV ratio of 139.1%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
70.2% and 36.4%. The DSC and LTV calculations exclude 14 ($88.8
million, 3.6%) of the 29 ($252.3 million, 10.3%) assets currently
with the special servicer and one defeased loan ($2.8 million,
0.1%). We separately estimated losses for the excluded specially
serviced assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, the
transaction had an aggregate trust balance of $2.44 billion (383
loans and one real estate owned {REO} asset), compared with $3.01
billion (417 loans) at issuance. The master servicers, KeyBank
Real Estate Capital (KeyBank) and Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC
(Berkadia), provided financial information for 95.3% of the pool
(by balance), which was partial- or full-year 2011 information
(65.5%) and partial- or full-year 2010 (29.8%). We calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.27x for the loans in the pool based on
the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.36x
and 111.0%, respectively, which exclude 14 ($88.8 million, 3.6%)
of the 29 ($252.3 million, 10.3%) assets currently with the
special servicer and one defeased loan ($2.8 million, 0.1%). The
weighted average DSC for the reporting specially serviced assets
was 0.88x. The trust has experienced principal losses to date
totaling $23.7 million from 20 assets. Ninety-four loans ($531.1
million, 21.8%) are on the combined master servicers' watchlist,
including two of the top 10 loans. Twenty-six loans ($93.5
million, 3.8%) have a reported DSC between 1.00x and 1.10x and 86
loans ($552.1 million, 22.6%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.00x," S&P said.

                      SUMMARY OF TOP 10 LOANS

"The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$720.8 million (29.6%). Using servicer-reported information, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.37x for the top 10 loans.
Our adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.35x
and 102.7%. One of the top 10 loans ($40.0 million, 1.6%) is with
the special servicer. In addition, two of the top 10 loans ($113.7
million, 4.7%) are on the combined master servicers' watchlist,"
S&P said.

"The 8201 Greensboro Drive loan ($74.7 million, 3.1%), the third-
largest loan in the pool, is on the combined master servicers'
watchlist due to a low reported DSC, which was 0.60x for year-end
2011. The loan is secured by a 360,854-sq.-ft. office property in
McLean, Va., built in 1984. According to the combined master
servicers' watchlist report, the low reported DSC was primarily
due to a 9% decline in occupancy following the departure of former
tenant Adobe Systems Inc. after its lease expired in May 2011.
Occupancy at the collateral property was 83.2%, according to the
September 2011 rent roll," S&P said.

"The Westgate West loan, the eighth-largest loan in the pool, has
a trust balance of $39.0 million (1.6%) and a whole-loan balance
of $41.8 million. The loan is on the combined master servicers'
watchlist due to a low reported DSC, which was 0.94x for year-end
2011. The loan is secured by a 235,766-sq.-ft. anchored retail
center in San Jose, Calif. Occupancy was 88.8%, according to the
September 2011 rent roll," S&P said.

                     CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, 28 assets
($250.7 million, 10.3%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, Situs Asset Management LLC (Situs). The master servicer
indicated that one additional loan, the 116-118 North York Road
loan ($1.6 million) was transferred to the special servicer
subsequent to the March 2012 trustee remittance report. The
reported payment status of these loans as of the March 2012
trustee remittance report is: one ($8.2 million, 0.3%) is REO,
three ($9.1 million, 0.4%) are in the process of foreclosure, nine
($102.9 million, 4.2%) are 90-plus-days delinquent, three ($24.4
million, 1.0%) are 60-days delinquent, one ($3.4 million, 0.1%) is
30-days delinquent, six ($56.1 million, 2.3%) are late but less
than 30 days delinquent, two ($22.0 million, 0.9%) are in their
grace periods, and four ($26.2 million, 1.1%) are current.
Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $32.6 million were in
effect against 14 of the specially serviced assets. Details of the
two largest assets with the special servicer, one of which is a
top 10 loan, are as set forth," S&P said.

"The Lane Portfolio loan ($40.0 million 1.6%), is the largest
asset with the special servicer and the seventh-largest loan in
the pool. The loan has a reported trust exposure of $43.7 million.
The loan is secured by three hotel properties comprising 591 rooms
located in Annapolis, Md., Grand Rapids Airport, Mich., and
Durham, N.C., built between 1968 and 1997. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on April 30, 2010, due to
imminent monetary default. The loan has a reported payment status
of 90-plus-days delinquent. Situs stated that it is currently
engaged in modification discussions with the borrower. The
reported DSC for the trailing-12-months ended Sept. 30, 2011, was
0.99x," S&P said.

"The Corporate Gateway Center loan ($20.6 million, 0.8%), the
second-largest asset with the special servicer, is secured by a
127,185-sq.-ft. office building built in 1988 in Diamond Bar,
Calif., east of Los Angeles, built in 1988. The loan, which has a
reported late but less-than-30 days delinquent payment status, was
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 10, 2012, due to
imminent monetary default. Situs is currently evaluating the
workout strategy, including a modification, for this loan. The
reported DSC for year-end 2011 was 0.90x," S&P said.

"The remaining 27 assets with the special servicer individually
represent less than 0.75% of the total pool balance. ARAs of $32.6
million are in effect for 14 of these assets. We estimated losses
for 14 of these assets and arrived at a weighted average loss
severity of 42.1%. According to Situs, 12 of the remaining assets
have either been modified, are in discussions for a potential
modification, or were recently transferred to the special
servicer, while one asset was returned to the master servicer,"
S&P said.

"We stressed the collateral in the pool according to our criteria
and the resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent with
our affirmed ratings," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-3        AAA (sf)                  35.96
A-AB       AAA (sf)                  35.96
A-4        AAA (sf)                  35.96
A-1A       AAA (sf)                  35.96
A-M        AA- (sf)                  23.65
A-J        A- (sf)                   13.96
B          BBB+ (sf)                 13.19
C          BBB (sf)                  11.65
D          BBB- (sf)                 10.26
E          BB+ (sf)                   9.34
F          BB (sf)                    7.96
G          BB- (sf)                   6.72
H          B+ (sf)                    5.34
J          B+ (sf)                    4.11
K          CCC- (sf)                  2.57
A-X        AAA (sf)                    N/A
A-Y        AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-C5: S&P Lowers Class L Cert. Rating to 'CCC-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2004-C5, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction. "Concurrently, we lowered our ratings on four classes
and affirmed our ratings on five classes from the same
transaction," S&P said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the credit
characteristics of the collateral remaining in the pool, the deal
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust. The upgrades
reflect increased credit enhancement due to the deleveraging of
the pool balance and liquidity levels that provide adequate
support through various stress scenarios," S&P said.

"The downgrades primarily reflect credit support erosion that we
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of eight ($41.8
million, 3.1%) of the 10 assets ($47.4 million, 3.5%) that are
with the special servicer and two ($18.4 million, 1.4%) loans that
we deem to be credit-impaired. We also considered the monthly
interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class A-X interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.29x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 97.7%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.04x
and an LTV ratio of 123.0%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 64.7% and 29.1%. The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude eight ($41.8 million, 3.1%) of the 10 assets
($47.4 million, 3.5%) that are with the special servicer, two
loans ($18.4 million, 1.4%) that we deem to be credit-impaired,
and eight loans ($43.7 million, 3.2%) that have fully defeased. We
separately estimated losses for the excluded specially serviced
assets and credit impaired loans, and included them in our 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, the trust
had experienced interest shortfalls totaling $97,277. These
shortfalls were primarily related to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction (ASER) net amounts ($48,769) and special
servicing and workout fees ($40,592). The interest shortfalls
affected all classes subordinate to and including class L. Class L
has experienced cumulative interest shortfalls for one month," S&P
said.

                    CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, 10 assets
($47.4 million, 3.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners LLC (LNR). The reported payment status for the 10
specially serviced assets is: two are real estate owned (REO;
$15.2 million, 1.1%), four are 90-plus-days delinquent ($12.6
million, 0.9%), one is less than 30 days delinquent ($1.2 million,
0.1%), one is current ($4.4 million, 0.3%), and two are matured
balloon loans ($14.1 million, 1.0%). Appraisal reduction amounts
(ARAs) totaling $11.8 million are in effect against seven of the
10 specially serviced assets. Details of the two largest specially
serviced assets are as set forth," S&P said.

"The Hyperion Apartments loan ($8.6 million, 0.6%) is the largest
specially serviced loan. The loan is secured by a 243-unit
multifamily property located in San Antonio, Texas, built in 1985.
The asset was transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 23,
2011, due to maturity default. LNR indicated that it has
temporarily postponed foreclosing on the property as the borrower
continues to seek refinancing for the loan. We expect a minimal
loss upon the resolution of this asset," S&P said.

"The Commons on Edgebrook Apartments asset ($8.3 million, 0.6%) is
the second-largest specially serviced asset and has a total trust
exposure of $9.6 million. The asset comprises a 444-unit
multifamily property located in Houston, Texas, built in 1968. The
asset was transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 30, 2008,
due to imminent monetary default and became REO on Nov. 1, 2011.
According to LNR, the property is being marketed for sale via
auction. An ARA of $4.6 million is in effect against this asset.
We expect a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of the
loan," S&P said.

"The eight remaining assets with the special servicer have
individual balances that represent less than 0.6% of the total
trust balance. ARAs totaling $7.2 million are in effect against
six of these assets. We estimated losses for six of the eight
remaining assets and arrived at a weighted-average loss severity
of 34.0%. The two remaining loans are expected to be returned to
the master servicer," S&P said.

"In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined two
loans ($18.4 million, 1.4%) to be credit-impaired," S&P said.

"The Medical Center Apartments loan ($13.3 million, 1.0%), secured
by a 276-unit multifamily property in San Antonio, Texas, has a
reported payment status of less than 30 days delinquent as per the
March 16, 2012, trustee report. The loan is on the watchlist due
to a low DSC. KeyBank Real Estate (KeyBank), the master servicer,
has sent a default notice to the borrower and the reported DSC for
the loan was 1.12x as of year-end 2011," S&P said.

"The Oakwood Apartments loan ($5.1 million, 0.4%), secured by a
216-unit multifamily property in Fort Worth, Texas, has a reported
payment status of 30 days delinquent. The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC. KeyBank has contacted the
borrower and is awaiting response. The DSC was 0.84x as of year-
end 2011," S&P said.

"Due to the delinquent status and decreased performance, we view
these two loans as a risk of loss to the trust," S&P said.

                      TRANSACTION SUMMARY

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $1.36 billion,
down from $1.87 billion at issuance. The pool comprises 180 loans
and two REO assets, down from 228 loans at issuance. KeyBank
provided financial information for 98.5% of the loans in the pool
(by balance), most of which reflected full-year 2010 (17.6%) and
partial or full-year 2011 data (80.5%)," S&P said.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.33x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV were 1.29x and 97.7%. Our adjusted figures exclude eight
($41.8 million, 3.1%) of the 10 assets ($47.4 million, 3.5%) that
are with the special servicer, two ($18.4 million, 1.4%) loans
that we deemed credit-impaired, and eight ($43.7 million, 3.2%)
loans that have been fully defeased. Twenty assets have caused
$24.8 million in principal losses to the transaction. Fifty-seven
loans ($354.9 million, 26.1%) in the pool are on the master
servicer's watchlist, five of which are top 10 loans. Forty-three
loans ($235.3 million, 17.3%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.10x, 31 of which ($119.6 million, 8.8%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.00x," S&P said.

                    SUMMARY OF TOP 10 LOANS

"The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$566.7 million (41.6%). Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.28x for the top 10 loans.
Our adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.14x and 102.3% for the top 10
loans. Five of the top 10 loans ($124.7 million, 9.2%) are on the
master servicer's watchlist," S&P said.

"The Beco Park Forbes Center - BRIT I, II, and III loan ($46.3
million, 3.4%), the third-largest loan in the pool, is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC. The
collateral consists of three cross-collateralized office
properties totaling 602,247 sq. ft. located in Lanham, Md.,
outside of Washington, D.C. According to KeyBank, the borrower is
actively marketing the property for lease and has identified
prospective tenants. The reported DSC as of year-end 2011 was
1.02x, and the occupancy was 78.2% as of the Sept 30, 2011, rent
roll," S&P said.

"The 1300 Parkwood Office Building loan ($25.5 million, 1.9%), the
fifth-largest loan in the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a reporting issue that has been resolved. The
loan is secured by a 210,733-sq.-ft. office property in Atlanta,
Ga. The reported DSC for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2011, was
1.55x, and the occupancy was 89.3% as of the Dec. 31, 2011, rent
roll," S&P said.

"The Valwood Building and Industrial Portfolio loan ($22.3
million, 1.6%), the eighth-largest loan in the pool, is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to deferred maintenance issues at
three of the four properties and pending lease expirations. The
collateral consists of four cross-collateralized industrial
properties totaling 353,111 sq. -ft. located in Carrolton, Texas,
a Dallas suburb. The reported DSC for the nine months ended Sept.
30, 2011, was 1.41x, and the occupancy was 95.4% as of the Sept.
30, 2011, rent roll," S&P said.

"The City Centre Place loan ($19.1 million, 1.4%), the ninth-
largest loan in the pool, is on the master servicer's watchlist
due to significant near-term lease rollover. The loan is secured
by a 103,199-sq.-ft. office property in Las Vegas. KeyBank is
actively monitoring the leasing activity at the property. The
reported year-end 2011 DSC 1.37x, and the occupancy was 89.8% as
of the Dec. 31, 2011 rent roll," S&P said.

"The 71-77 Summer Street and 184 High Street loan ($17.9 million,
1.3%), the 10th-largest loan in the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC. The loan is secured by two
office properties totaling 109,754 sq. ft. located in the Boston
central business district. The reported year-end 2011 DSC was
1.05x, and the occupancy was 89.6% as of the Dec. 31, 2011, rent
roll," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the pool collateral according to its
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent
with our lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C5

         Rating     Rating
Class    To         From         Credit enhancement (%)
A-4      AAA (sf)   AA (sf)                       25.56
A-1-A    AAA (sf)   AA (sf)                       25.56
A-J      A+ (sf)    A- (sf)                       18.20
B        A- (sf)    BBB (sf)                      13.92
C        BBB+ (sf)  BBB-(sf)                      12.72
D        BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)                      10.33
E        BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)                        8.45

RATINGS LOWERED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C5

          Rating     Rating
Class     To         From         Credit enhancement (%)
H         B  (sf)    B+ (sf)                        3.48
J         B- (sf)    B  (sf)                        3.14
K         CCC(sf)    B  (sf)                        2.29
L         CCC-(sf)   B- (sf)                        1.60

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C5

Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-3       AAA (sf)                   25.56
A-AB      AAA (sf)                   25.56
F         BB-(sf)                     6.74
G         B+ (sf)                     5.37
A-X       AAA (sf)                     N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


CUSTODY RECEIPT: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-4 Notes to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Custody
Receipt Related To $169,520,000 Of National Collegiate Student
Loan Trust 2006-2's class A-4 floating-rate student loan asset-
backed notes due Sept. 25, 2031, to 'B- (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and
removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The rating on the custody receipts is dependent on the higher of
the ratings on (i) the underlying security, National Collegiate
Student Loan Trust 2006-2's class A-4 floating-rate student loan
asset-backed notes due Sept. 25, 2031 ('B- (sf)'); and (ii) the
insurance provider, Ambac Assurance Corp. (NR)," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow the April 5, 2012, lowering of our 'BBB
(sf)' rating on the underlying security to 'B- (sf)' and its
subsequent removal from CreditWatch with negative implications. We
may take subsequent rating actions on the custody receipts due to
changes in our rating on the underlying security," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


DAWN CLO I: S&P Withdraws 'CCC' Rating on Class A Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on eight
classes of notes from seven collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions.

"The withdrawals follow the complete paydown of the notes on their
most recent payment dates," S&P said.

"CoLTS 2005-2 Ltd. is a U.S. CDO transaction collateralized by
corporate loans (CLO). The transaction paid the class A notes down
in full on the March 20, 2012, payment date, from an outstanding
balance of $10.01 million," S&P said.

"Dawn CDO I Ltd. is a U.S. CDO transaction collateralized in part
by residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other asset-
backed securities (ABS). The transaction paid the class A notes
down in full on the March 26, 2012, payment date, from an
outstanding balance of $1.34 million," S&P said.

Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003 is a U.S. CLO transaction that
paid the class A notes down in full on the March 22, 2012, payment
date, from an outstanding balance of $21.37 million.

Foxe Basin CLO 2003 Ltd. is a U.S. CLO transaction that paid the
class A-3 notes down in full on the March 15, 2012, payment date,
from an outstanding balance of $3.28 million.

JWS CBO 2000-1 Ltd. is cash flow corporate bond obligation (CBO).
The transaction paid the class C-1 and C-2 notes down in full on
the March 28, 2012, payment date, from outstanding balances of
$1.16 million and $1.27 million.

Saturn Ventures 2005-1 Ltd. is a U.S. CDO transaction
collateralized in part by RMBS and ABS securities. The transaction
completed the liquidation of $106.73 million in underlying
collateral resulting in proceeds of $37.06 million. This combined
with other available proceeds and paid the class A-1 notes down in
full on the Feb. 29, 2012, payment date, from an outstanding
balance of $39.32 million.

Signature 6 Ltd. is a U.S. CBO transaction, which paid the class A
notes down in full on the March 27, 2012, payment date, from an
outstanding balance of $5.59 million.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

   http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111558.pdf

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

CoLTS 2005-2 Ltd.
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

Dawn CDO I Ltd.
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  CCC (sf)

Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Foxe Basin CLO 2003, Ltd.
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)


JWS CBO 2000-1 Ltd.
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
C-1                 NR                  BBB- (sf)
C-2                 NR                  BBB- (sf)

Saturn Ventures 2005-1, Ltd.
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  CCC- (sf)/Watch NEG

Signature 6, Ltd.
                          Rating
Class               To             From
A                   NR             AAA (sf)

NR-Not rated.


ECP 2012-3: S&P Rates US$24.75MM Class D Deferrable Notes 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to ECP CLO 2012-3 Ltd./ECP CLO 2012-3 LLC's $411.75
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 13,
2012. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

* The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
   through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
   subordinated notes.

* The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
   withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
   (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
   can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
   CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using the
   assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
   collateralized debt obligation criteria.

* The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
   bankruptcy remote.

* The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily comprises
   broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

* The collateral manager's experienced management team.

* "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
   principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
   assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
   commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
   various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
   0.34%-13.84%," S&P said.

* The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
   tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
   interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
   rated notes outstanding.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
ECP CLO 2012-3 Ltd./ECP CLO 2012-3 LLC

Class                 Rating    Amount (mil. $)
A-1                   AAA (sf)           300.00
A-2                   AA (sf)             18.00
B (deferrable)        A (sf)              48.00
C (deferrable)        BBB (sf)            21.00
D (deferrable)        BB (sf)             24.75
Subordinated notes    NR                  50.69

NR - Not rated.


EQUITABLE OF IOWA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Preferred Stock Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the A3 insurance financial
strength (IFS) ratings of the ING US life insurance companies with
a stable outlook. Other unguaranteed affiliated ratings were also
affirmed with a stable outlook (see complete rating list, below).
Separately, Moody's assigned a Baa3 guaranteed issuer rating to
ING American Insurance Holdings, Inc. (ING AIH), guaranteed by
Lion Connecticut Holdings, Inc., (LCH; issuer rating at Baa3,
stable outlook). LCH is a wholly-owned intermediate holding
company of ING AIH that directly owns most of the ING US life
insurance companies. Both ING AIH and LCH and their affiliates are
all wholly, indirectly-owned subsidiaries of ING Groep, N.V.
(senior debt at A1, review for possible downgrade). Ratings
guaranteed by ING Groep NV and Verzekeringen NV were not affected
by these rating actions and are not discussed in this Press
Release.

Rating Rationale

Commenting on the affirmation of A3 IFS rating of the insurance
entities of ING US, Moody's said it was based on the group's
important position in the U.S. retirement services and life
insurance markets, particularly in the specialized 403(b) and 457
pension sectors, where the company has leading market shares, and
improving net cash flows in 2011. The rating is also based on the
company's stand-alone credit profile, including its anticipated
ultimate stand-alone capital structure, discussed below.

"ING AIH has made significant progress toward its ultimate
separation from ING NV, as evidenced by the upcoming closing of an
independent bank facility," said Moody's Vice President Laura
Bazer. "As a result, we are now analyzing the group's financial
flexibility based on Moody's expectations of the company's
ultimate, independent capital structure and financial flexibility
(i.e., with no support from ING NV affiliates), which we
anticipate will be slightly weaker than that at the consolidated
ING NV level." The rating agency said that it expects ING AIH to
continue its capital initiatives in 2012, resulting in adjusted
financial leverage in the range of 20%-30%, earnings coverage of
2-4x, and cash coverage of 1.5-3x.

According to Moody's, the company's strengths are mitigated by the
group's significant exposure to the U.S. equity market, from its
large book of legacy variable annuities (VAs) and fee-based
pension businesses, as well as weak earnings and modest ordinary
dividend capacity (although the group's 2011 NAIC Risk Based
Capital Ratio was strong at 488%). Separation risks and
uncertainties about the group's ultimate IPO and other capital
raising initiatives also remain.

Commenting on ING AIH's guaranteed issuer rating, Moody's said it
is based on an unconditional and irrevocable general guarantee by
LCH of ING AIH's senior unsecured obligations, which allows for
the substitution of LCH's credit profile (Baa3 issuer rating) for
that of ING AIH. The guarantee has no express termination date,
however, the guarantee can be terminated, amended or assigned with
regard to a particular debt series with the consent of 100% of the
holders of that debt series. Because of the structural
subordination of ING AIH's obligations to those of LCH, ING AIH's
stand-alone credit profile is a notch lower (Ba1).

Moody's said the following factors could lead to an upgrade of ING
AIH group's ratings: the successful completion of ING US' IPO/exit
from ING NV ownership without deterioration to business,
profitability, or other financial metrics; reduction in earnings
volatility, resulting in ROC's consistently at 6% or better; RBC
ratio consistently at or above 375%, while maintaining good
capital adequacy at offshore captives; and stand-alone cash
coverage of over 3x, and earnings coverage of at least 5x, each on
a consistent basis.

The rating agency added that the following factors could result in
a downgrade of the group's ratings: the erosion of ING US'
business franchise, distribution, and employee base, as a result
of the potentially long lead time until the launch of the ING US
IPO or an unsuccessful IPO; ROC's consistently below 4%;
consolidated RBC ratio falling below 300% (excluding the captive,
which, separately, must be adequately capitalized); adjusted
financial leverage of greater than 30%; cash coverage of less than
1.5x; earnings coverage of below 2x.

The following ratings were affirmed with a stable outlook:

ING Life Insurance & Annuity Company: insurance financial strength
rating at A3;

ING USA Annuity and Life Insurance Company: insurance financial
strength at A3; short-term insurance financial strength at P-2;

Security Life of Denver Insurance Company: insurance financial
strength at A3; short-term insurance financial strength at P-2;

Reliastar Life Insurance Company: insurance financial strength at
A3;

Reliastar Life Insurance Company of New York: insurance financial
strength at A3;

ING Security Life Institutional Funding: funding agreement-backed
senior secured debt at A3; funding agreement-backed senior secured
program rating at (P)A3;

ING USA Global Funding Trust 3: funding agreement-backed senior
secured debt at A3;

Lion Connecticut Holdings, Inc.: long-term issuer rating at Baa3.

The following rating was assigned with a stable outlook:

ING America Insurance Holdings, Inc.: guaranteed issuer rating at
Baa3;

The following rating was affirmed with a positive outlook:

Equitable of Iowa Capital Trust II: preferred stock at Ba1(hyb).

ING AIH companies are wholly, indirectly-owned subsidiaries of the
ING Verzekeringen N.V., and members of the ING Groep, N.V. The two
largest subsidiaries, ING USA Annuity and Life Insurance Company,
and ING Life Insurance & Annuity Company reported year-end 2011
statutory assets of $72 billion and $69 billion, respectively at
year-end 2011, and statutory surplus of approximately $2 billion
and $2 billion, respectively.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Global
Rating Methodology for Life Insurers published in May 2010.


EQUIFIRST MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 RMBS Tranches to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 17
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 1 tranche, and confirmed the
ratings of 8 tranches from five RMBS transactions, backed by
Subprime loans, issued by Equifirst.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction. The above
mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages 2004 and
prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-6, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF282741

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


FINANCE AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 RMBS Tranches to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 24
tranches, upgraded the ratings of two tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of one tranche from seven RMBS transactions, backed by
Subprime loans, issued by various issuers.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Finance America Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Finance America Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Finance America Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. Series 1998-HE1

A6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-7, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

S, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mortgage Services, Series 1998-HE2

A6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

B1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Confirmed at
Ca (sf)

S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services Inc 1997-HE4

A6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services, Series 1999-HE2

S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

M, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 1999 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

B1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Confirmed at
Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF282797

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


FIRST HORIZON: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 6 RMBS Tranches to 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 28 tranches, and
confirmed the ratings on 13 tranches from 11 RMBS transactions
issued by First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust. The
collateral backing these deals consists primarily of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages. The
actions impact approximately $249.8 million of RMBS issued from
2003 to 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-10

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-5

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-13, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-14, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-16, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-19, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-7

Cl. I-A-12, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. I-A-13, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-AR4

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-1

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-5

Cl. I-A-4, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-7

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR1

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR5

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR6

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-FL1

Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2009
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2009
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Prime
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The rating action constitutes of a number of downgrades. The
downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
set at 3% for Jumbo and which is typically higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans, the adjusted rate of
new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if current
delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future delinquencies
are expected to reflect this trend. To account for that, the rate
calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to
2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to
greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years
and ultimate expected losses are projected using the approach
described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF281960

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


FRASER SULLIVAN VII: S&P Rates $19MM Class D Notes 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Fraser
Sullivan CLO VII Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Corp.'s $406.0
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by a revolving
pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured
loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

* The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
   subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
   subordinated notes.

* The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
   withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
   (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
   can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
   CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using the
   assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
   collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

* The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
   bankruptcy remote.

* The diversified collateral portfolio, which comprises primarily
   broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
   loans.

* The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

* "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
   principal payments on the rated notes, which we assessed using
   our cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
   assigned ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
   including LIBOR ranging from 0.3439%-11.3629%," S&P said.

* "The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
   tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
   interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
   rated notes outstanding," S&P said.

* "The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of which
   will lead to the reclassification of excess interest proceeds
   that are available prior to paying uncapped administrative
   expenses and fees; portfolio manager incentive fees; and
   subordinated note payments into principal proceeds for the
   purchase of additional collateral assets during the
   reinvestment period," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Corp.

Class                 Rating           Amount
                                     (mil. $)
A-1                   AAA (sf)          273.5
A-2                   AA (sf)            53.5
B (deferrable)        A (sf)             39.0
C (deferrable)        BBB (sf)           21.0
D (deferrable)        BB (sf)            19.0
Subordinated notes    NR                52.65

NR-Not rated.


FRASER SULLIVAN VII: S&P Rates US$19MM Class D Notes 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Ltd. /Fraser Sullivan CLO VII
Corp.'s up to $406.0 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by a revolving
pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 18,
2012. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

* The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
   through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
   subordinated notes.

* The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
   withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
   (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
   can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
   CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using the
   assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
   collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

* The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
   bankruptcy remote.

* The diversified collateral portfolio, which comprises primarily
   broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

* The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

* "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
   principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
   assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
   commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
   various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
   0.3439%-11.3629%," S&P said.

* The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
   tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
   interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
   rated notes outstanding.

* The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of which
   will lead to the reclassification of excess interest proceeds
   that are available prior to paying uncapped administrative
   expenses and fees; portfolio manager incentive fees; and
   preference share payments into principal proceeds for the
   purchase of additional collateral assets during the
   reinvestment period.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

   http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111558.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Corp.

Class                 Rating           Amount
                                     (mil. $)
A-1                   AAA (sf)          273.5
A-2                   AA (sf)            53.5
B (deferrable)        A (sf)             39.0
C (deferrable)        BBB (sf)           21.0
D (deferrable)        BB (sf)            19.0
Subordinated notes    NR               50.425

NR-Not rated.


FREMF MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Cl. X-2 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes of
FREMF Mortgage Trust, Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-K12 as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmation of Class B is due to overall stable performance
and key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
rating of the Interest Only Class, Class X-2 is affirmed because
it is consistent with the expected loss for the entire pool. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.7% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 26, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.20 billion
from $1.21 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 69 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 41% of
the pool.

Moody's was provided with full and partial year 2011 operating
results for 91% of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV is 103%
compared to 104% at securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects
a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most recently available
net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 8.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.37X and 0.91X,
respectively, compared to 1.36X and 0.90X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 33 compared to 34 at securitization.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 200 Water Street Loan ($107.8 million -- 9.0%
of the pool), which is secured by a 576-unit multifamily high-rise
located in the Financial District of Manhattan, New York City. The
property was 96% occupied as of September 2011 compared to 99% as
of March 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 0.95X,
respectively, compared to 86% and 0.95X at securitization.

The second largest loan is the Mid-America Portfolio Loan ($86.9
million - 7.2% of the pool), which is secured by fMoody's cross-
collateralized and -defaulted multifamily loans located in
Tennessee (2), Florida and South Carolina. The portfolio contains
1,312 units in the aggregate, represented by one-, two- and three-
bedroom floor plans. The portfolio was 96% occupied as of June
2011 compared to 94% as of January 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 107% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 109% and 0.88X
at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Summer House Apartments Loan ($70.8
million - 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 615-unit
garden-style multifamily property located in Alameda, California.
The property was 95% occupied as of September 2011 compared to 96%
as of February 2011. The loan has a 24-month interest only period
and, thereafter, amortizes on a 30-year schedule. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.82X, respectively, the same at
securitization.


FREMONT HOME: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 28 RMBS Tranches to 'Csf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 51
tranches, and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from 12 RMBS
transactions, backed by Subprime loans, issued by Fremont.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors. For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 1999-3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2002-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2003-1

Ser. 2003-1 Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ser. 2003-1 Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2003-A

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2003-B

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-A

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-B

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-C

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-D

Cl. M1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF282553

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


GALAXY III: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $20.5MM Notes to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Galaxy III CLO, Ltd.:

U.S.$21,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due August 17, 2016,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 14, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf);

U.S.$18,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due August
17, 2016, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on September 14, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

U.S.$20,500,000 Combination Securities Due August 17, 2016
(current rated balance of $12,679,128), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on September 14, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in September 2011. Moody's notes that the Class
A Notes have been paid down by approximately $95.6 million or 65%
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated March 10, 2012, the Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 145.56%, 125.71% and
105.32%, respectively, versus August 2011 levels of 125.19%,
115.31% and 103.68%, respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the March 2012 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2614
compared to 2478 in August 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $164 million,
defaulted par of $5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 13.09% (implying a WARF of 2767), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.06%, and a diversity
score of 48. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Galaxy III CLO, Ltd, issued in August 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011,
and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-
Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2381)

Class A-1: +0

Class A-1: +0

Class B: +0

Class C: +0

Class D: +2

Class E-1: +1

Class E-2: +1

Class E-3: +1

Combination Securities: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3572)

Class A-1: -0

Class A-1: -0

Class B: -0

Class C: -0

Class D: -2

Class E-1: -1

Class E-2: -1

Class E-3: -1

Combination Securities: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


GEM LIGOS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on US$12MM Notes to 'B2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the ratings of the
following notes issued by GEM LIGOs III:

U.S.$84,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
on September 17, 2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

U.S.$29,000,000 Class B Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
on September 17, 2010 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

U.S.$24,000,000 Class C Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously
on September 17, 2010 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

U.S.$12,000,000 Class D Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously
on September 17, 2010 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the upgrade action taken on the Class A-2
Notes is primarily a result of the delevering of the senior notes
and an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the rating action in September 2010. The downgrade actions
taken on the Class B Notes, Class C Notes, and Class D Notes are
driven by the significant credit deterioration in the portfolio,
particularly among those investments with low speculative grade
ratings.

Based on the latest trustee report dated March 16, 2012, the Class
A, Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 121.08%, 114.21%, 109.09% and 106.69%, respectively,
versus August 2010 levels of 119.96%, 113.35%, 108.40% and
106.09%, respectively. All overcollateralization ratios are in
compliance by a material margin: more than 10% above the OC
trigger level for the Class A test, and 2.40% above the OC trigger
level for the Class D test.

Notwithstanding these positive considerations, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the March 2012 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 1134
compared to 940 in August 2010. Furthermore, the portfolio
concentration in exposures with ratings in or assumed to be in the
Caa range increased to 10.8% currently from 0% in August 2010, a
credit negative for the most junior part of the capital structure.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, and in "Moody's Revised Its
Methodology For EM CDOs in April 2007", key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor and weighted average recovery rate may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $516.7 million, defaulted par of
$14.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 10.6%
(implying a WARF of 1,449), and a weighted average mean recovery
rate upon default of 27.8%. The default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are simulated in a CDOROM model to generate a
loss distribution then incorporated in a cash flow model analysis.
The default probability of each exposure is derived from the
senior unsecured rating and expected weighted average life. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the variable recovery rate assumptions under CDOROM
v2.8 and a mean of 40% and a standard deviation of 30% for
sovereign exposures. Historical and market performance trends, and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

GEM LIGOs III, issued in March 2006, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior unsecured
loans and bonds from emerging market corporate and sovereign
issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Revises
Its Methodology For Emerging Market CDOs" published in April 2007.

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOROM v2.8 to simulate a
loss distribution then applied to a cash flow model, similar to
the approach used for static cashflow structured finance CDOs, as
described in Section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 of the "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" rating methodology published in November 2010.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various scenarios relevant for the credit analysis
of the transaction. Below is a summary of the impact of different
model parameters changes on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Stressed Global Correlation (inter-industry for corporate and
inter-country for sovereign) but removing the 130% default
probability stress factor.

Class B: +1

Class C: +1

Class D: +2

Large Individual Exposure Concentration (3% or more of the
portfolio) notched down by 2 notches and removing the 130% default
probability stress factor. The aggregate of such large exposures
represent 45% of the portfolio.

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the debt market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially when they experience jump to default. Due to
the deal's low diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's
supplemented its analysis with a stress scenario notching down by
two rating levels any exposure above 3% of the portfolio notional.

5) The deal has a pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap
that is currently out of the money. If fixed rate assets prepay or
default, there would be a more substantial mismatch between the
swap notional and the amount of fixed assets. In such cases,
payments to hedge counterparties may consume a large portion or
all of the interest proceeds, leaving the transaction, even with
respect to the senior notes, with poor interest coverage. Payment
timing mismatches between assets and liabilities may cause
additional concerns. If the deal does not receive sufficient
projected principal proceeds on the payment date to supplement the
interest proceeds shortfall, a heightened risk of interest payment
default could occur. Similarly, if principal proceeds are used to
pay interest, there may ultimately be a risk of payment default on
the principal of the notes.


GLIMCHER REALTY: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Preffered Stock Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service revised the rating outlook for Glimcher
Realty Trust to positive from stable. According to the rating
agency, the revised outlook reflects the company's improving
credit metrics resulting from the company's reduction in leverage,
strengthening earnings and better refinancing rates.

Ratings Rationale

The following ratings were affirmed with a positive outlook:

Glimcher Realty Trust -- Preferred stock at B2; senior unsecured
shelf at (P)Ba3; subordinate shelf at (P)B1; senior subordinate
shelf at (P)B1; junior subordinate shelf at (P)B1; preferred shelf
at (P)B2.

Moody's notes Glimcher continues to make progress in lowering its
leverage, with effective leverage (debt + preferred equity % gross
assets) at 61.5% as of YE11 compared to 70.5% at YE10 and 72% at
YE09. Issuing equity has improved the company's high leverage.
Glimcher raised $250 million in 2011 and applied the proceeds to
paying down debt. Secured debt levels remain high at 49.5%
although down from 57.9% at YE10. Net debt/EBITDA has improved
significantly to 8.1x at YE11 from 9.3x at YE10 as leverage has
declined and earnings have improved.

Fixed charge coverage (interest expense, capitalized interest and
preferred dividends) is considered weak at 1.5x at YE11, but has
recovered somewhat from 1.4x at YE10 though it is still below 1.6x
at YE09 and 1.7x at YE08. Fixed charge coverage had declined as a
result of the weak retail environment and the company's high
capital costs. This situation is now reversing. In October 2011,
the company modified its credit facility to extend the term to
December 2015 including extensions and lowered its borrowing costs
by improving pricing based on its lower leverage.

Glimcher is poised to grow earnings in 2012 with the stabilization
of its Scottsdale development and growth from its core portfolio.
Longer term, earnings will grow and credit metrics are expected to
continue to improve from portfolio repositioning and redevelopment
initiatives. Same store net operating income grew 3% in 4Q11
compared to 4Q10. Occupancy remains strong at 94.8% at YE11. The
Scottsdale development was 80% occupied at YE11 and is expected to
provide a lift to earnings in 2012 as it becomes more fully
occupied and co-tenancy clauses trigger rent payments.

Moody's stated that a rating upgrade would be contingent upon
Glimcher maintaining leverage metrics below 8.5x net debt / EBITDA
and effective leverage below 65% of gross assets; as well as
achieving fixed charge coverage of 1.7x or better. Conversely, a
rating downgrade would result from fixed charge coverage falling
below 1.4x, effective leverage reaching 80% of gross assets or net
debt / EBITDA reaching 10x.

Moody's most recent rating activity with respect to Glimcher was
on September 22, 2010 when the rating agency revised the outlook
to stable from negative and affirmed the ratings. The change in
outlook reflected the company's improved liquidity positions as
well as better prospects for the company's growth and credit
profile.

Glimcher Realty Trust (NYSE: GRT) is a real estate investment
trust based in Columbus, Ohio which owns, manages, acquires and
develops malls, which include enclosed regional malls and open-air
lifestyle centers as well as community centers. As of December 31,
2011, Glimcher owned interests in and managed 27 properties
located in 13 states consisting of 24 malls and 3 community
centers. Glimcher(R) is a registered trademark of Glimcher Realty
Trust.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Rating
Methodology for REITs and Other Commercial Property Firms
published in July 2010.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 CMBS Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed 16 classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-C1 as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2007 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2007 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2007 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2007 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. N-1, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. N-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to overall improved pool financial
performance and increased credit support due to loan payoffs and
amortization.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.8% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 4.3%. Realized losses have increased from
0.9% of the original balance to 1.3% since the prior review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24 compared to 26 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 24, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 10, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29% to $743.7
million from $1.05 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 86 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 38% of the pool. Nineteen loans, representing 32% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains two loans with investment grade
credit estimates, representing 13% of the pool.

Eighteen loans, representing 16.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $13.4 million (41% loss severity). Currently
three loans, representing 5% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Towne Center
Plaza Loan ($32 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by
a 298,691 square foot (SF) anchored retail property located in
South Gate, California, a suburb of Los Angeles. The major tenants
are Regal Cinemas (36% GLA, exp. 8/2021) and La Curacao (36% GLA,
exp. 3/2036). The loan was transferred to special servicing in
March 2011 due to a material default. The borrower had not re-paid
the master servicer's July 2009 approximate $2,383,469 advance
prior to a Tax Sale for supplemental property taxes. The borrower
continues to work on a plan to re-pay the advance, and the Special
Servicer is evaluating its options. The property was approximately
92% leased as of September 2011, essentially the same as last
review. The loan is performing and Moody's is not expecting a loss
on this loan.

The remaining two specially serviced properties are secured by an
office property in Nevada and a multifamily property in Wisconsin.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $1.6 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (75% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $12.4 million loss (44% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 96%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 84% compared to 85% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11.3% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.31X, respectively, compared to
1.43X and 1.32X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Oakbrook Center
Loan ($49.7 million -- 6.7% of the pool), which represents a 25%
pari passu interest in a $199.1 million mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by the borrower's interest in a mixed-use property located
in Oak Brook, Illinois that consists of an open-air regional mall,
three office buildings and a ground lease underlying a hotel and
theater. Oakbrook Center totals approximately 2.4 million SF, with
only 1.6 million of square feet serving as collateral for the
loan. The mall is anchored by Lord & Taylor, Macy's, Neiman
Marcus, Nordstrom and Sears. Performance has improved since last
review due to an overall drop in expenses. Moody's current credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 1.88X, respectively,
compared to Aa3 and 1.77X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Chandler Fashion
Center Loan ($47.2 million -- 6.3%), which represents a 51% pari
passu interest in a $92.5 million mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.3 million SF regional
mall located in Chandler, Arizona. The center is anchored by
Dillard's, Macy's, Nordstrom and Sears. None of the anchors are
owned by the borrower. The property has historically experienced a
very high occupancy. It was 97% leased as of December 2011,
essentially the same as last review. Performance has been stable
and the loan has amortized 16% since securitization. Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.74X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.48X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 11.4% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Renaissance at Columbia Gateway Loan
($34.3 million -- 4.6%), which is secured by a 625,000 SF mixed
use property consisting of office and warehouse/distribution space
located in Columbia, Maryland. The loan is on the watchlist due to
decreased DSCR and occupancy. A major tenant, which previously
leased 39% of the net rentable area (NRA), vacated in December
2009. As of the December 2011 rent roll, the property was 61%
leased compared to 47% at last review. Moody's analysis is based
on a stabilized value for the property, and is in line with last
review. The loan sponsor is a publicly traded REIT. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to
111% and 0.95X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Norwest Woods Loan ($28.7 million -
3.9%), which is secured by a 322-unit apartment complex located in
Norwood, Massachusetts. The property was 94% leased as of March
2011, up slightly from 92% at last review and 86% in December
2009. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due low DSCR.
The loan matures in January 2013. Moody's is concerned about near
term refinancing risk due to the property's overall poor
performance, however due to an increase in performance since 2009
Moody's has not classified this loan as a troubled loan. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and 0.88X, respectively, compared
to 125% and 0.76X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Village Park Apartments Loan ($21.6
million -- 2.9%), which is secured by a 544-unit apartment complex
located in Troy, Michigan. The loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist due low DSCR and occupancy. As of December 2011, the
property was 89% leased compared to 74% at last review. Overall
increase in NOI since last review is attributed to an increase in
occupancy, however overall property performance since
securitization has significantly deteriorated due to weak Detroit
economic conditions. The loan matures in February 2013. Moody's is
concerned about near term refinancing risk due to the property's
poor performance, and has classified this loan as a troubled loan.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 205% and 0.50X, respectively,
compared to 203% and 0.51X at last review.


GRAMERCY 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 7 Debt Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 27
classes from three Gramercy Real Estate CDO transactions (Gramercy
2005-1, 2006-1, and 2007-1), all of which are commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions, and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications. "At
the same time, we affirmed our ratings on 11 classes from the
three transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications. We also lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' our
ratings on seven classes from Gramercy 2007-1," S&P said.

"The downgrades and affirmations reflect our analysis of the
transactions' liability structures and the credit characteristics
of the underlying collateral using our Global CDOs of Pooled
Structured Finance Assets criteria. We also considered the amount
of defaulted assets in each of the transactions and their expected
recoveries in our analysis. We downgraded classes F, G-FL, G-FX,
H-FL, H-FX, J, and K from Gramercy 2007-1 to 'D (sf)' due to our
determination that the classes are unlikely to be repaid in full,"
S&P said.

"The Global CDOs of Pooled Structured Finance assets criteria
include revisions to our assumptions on correlations, recovery
rates, and default patterns and timings of the collateral. The
criteria also include supplemental stress tests (largest obligor
default test and largest industry default test) in our analysis,"
S&P said.

               GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE CDO 2005-1

According to the March 30, 2012, trustee report, Gramercy 2005-1
collateral totaled $839.0 million, while the transaction's
liabilities totaled $839.0 million. This is down from $993.9
million at issuance. The transaction's current asset pool includes
these:

* 18 whole loans ($456.8 million, 54.4% of the collateral pool);

* 21 CMBS tranches from 17 distinct transactions issued between
   2004 and 2007 ($252.1 million, 30.0%); and

* Three subordinate-interest loans ($130.2 million, 15.5%).

"The trustee report noted six defaulted assets ($137.4 million,
16.4%), including four defaulted loan assets ($131.8 million,
15.7%). Standard & Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery rates
for the defaulted loan assets ranging from 0% to 61%, with a
weighted average recovery rate of 23.3%. We based the recovery
rates on information provided by the collateral manager, special
servicer, and third-party data providers," S&P said. The defaulted
loan assets are as set forth:

* Stuyvesant Town Mezzanine Loan ($50.1 million, 6.0%);

* Roddy Ranch Whole Loan ($33.9 million, 4.0%);

* Las Vegas Hilton Whole Loan ($27.3 million, 3.3%); and

* Williams Gateway Whole Loan ($20.5 million, 2.4%).

"In our review of the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral, our analyses on the publicly rated collateral are
based on Standard & Poor's issued ratings. Our analyses on the
unrated collateral reflect information provided by the collateral
manager, GKK Manager LLC, and trustee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., as
well as market and valuation data from third-party providers," S&P
said.

"According to the trustee report, the deal is passing all three
par value coverage tests and interest coverage tests," S&P said.

                GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE CDO 2006-1

According to the March 30, 2012, trustee report, Gramercy 2006-1
collateral, including cash, totaled $930.8 million, while the
transaction's liabilities totaled $891.2 million. This is down
from $990.5 million at issuance. The transaction's current asset
pool includes these:

* 24 whole loans and senior participations ($574.2 million,
    62.5%);

* Eight subordinate-interest loans and preferred equity ($178.3
   million, 19.4% of the collateral pool);

* 16 CMBS tranches from 14 distinct transactions issued between
   2005 and 2007 ($145.8 million, 15.9%); and

* Three CRE CDO tranches from two distinct transactions ($20.0
   million, 2.2%).

"The trustee report noted seven defaulted assets ($119.3 million,
13.0%), including three defaulted loan assets ($86.8 million,
9.5%). Standard & Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery rates
for the defaulted loan assets ranging from 8.5% to 61%, with a
weighted average recovery rate of 41.9%. We based the recovery
rates on information provided by the collateral manager, special
servicer, and third-party data providers," S&P said. The defaulted
loan assets are as set forth:

* Las Vegas Hilton whole loan ($41.7 million, 4.5%);

* Fiesta De Vida whole loan ($31.7 million, 3.4%); and

* Coral Cove whole loan ($13.4 million, 1.5%).

"In our review of the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral, our analyses on the publicly rated collateral are
based on Standard & Poor's issued ratings. Our analyses on the
unrated collateral reflects information provided by the collateral
manager, GKK Manager LLC, and trustee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., as
well as market and valuation data from third-party providers," S&P
said.

"According to the trustee report, the deal is passing all three
par value coverage and interest coverage tests," S&P said.

                 GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE CDO 2007-1

According to the March 30, 2012, trustee report, Gramercy 2007-1
collateral totaled $1.055 billion, while the transaction's
liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled $1.081
billion. This is down from $1.10 billion at issuance. The
transaction's current asset pool includes these:

* 49 CMBS tranches from 46 distinct transactions issued between
   2005 and 2010 ($824.6 million, 78.2%);

* Four subordinate-interest loans ($145.7 million, 13.8% of the
   collateral pool); and

* Three whole loans ($84.4 million, 8.0%).

"The trustee report noted five defaulted assets ($82.4 million,
7.8%), including one defaulted loan asset ($53.5 million, 5.1%).
Standard & Poor's estimated an asset-specific recovery rate for
this defaulted loan asset of 0%. We based the recovery rate on
information provided by the collateral manager, special servicer,
and third-party data providers," S&P said. The defaulted loan
asset is as set forth:

* Stuyvesant Town Mezzanine Loan ($53.5 million, 5.1%).

S&P's analysis of Gramercy 2007-1 also reflected exposure to these
CMBS certificates that Standard & Poor's has lowered:

* GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10 (class A-J; $36.6
   million, 3.5%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2007-CIBC19
   (class A-J; $35.0 million, 3.3%); and

* Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ14 (class A-J; $35.5
   million, 3.3%).

According to the trustee report, the deal is failing all three par
value coverage tests.

"In our review of the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral, our analyses on the publicly rated collateral are
based on Standard & Poor's issued ratings. Our analyses on the
unrated collateral reflects information provided by the collateral
manager, GKK Manager LLC, and trustee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., as
well as market and valuation data from third-party providers," S&P
said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we determine necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
          Rating               Rating
Class     To                   From
A1        BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A2        BB+ (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B         BB- (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C         B- (sf)              BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
D         CCC+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
E         CCC+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
F         CCC+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Neg
G         CCC+ (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
H         CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
J         CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
          Rating               Rating
Class     To                   From
A1        BB+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A2        B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B         CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
C         CCC- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D         CCC- (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Neg
E         CCC- (sf)            B- (sf)/Watch Neg
F         CCC- (sf)            CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
G         CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A1        B (sf)               BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A2        CCC- (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Neg
F         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
GFL       D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
GFX       D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
HFL       D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
HFX       D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
J         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
K         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
K         CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
H         CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
J         CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
K         CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A3        CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
BFL       CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
BFX       CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
CFL       CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
CFX       CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
D         CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
E         CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. M-LH Cert.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three rake or
non-pooled classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FL3.

Cl. H-LH, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. K-LH, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-LH, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges. The single loan
in the transaction is collateralized by a luxury hotel in New York
City.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.2. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated June 9, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 7, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $43 million
from $708 million at securitization as the result of the payoff of
13 loans originally in the pool. The Certificates are now
collateralized by a single mortgage loan.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization nor
are there outstanding interest shortfalls.

The remaining loan in the pool, the Lowell Hotel ($28.7 million
pooled portion and $14.3 million rake or non-pooled portion), is
secured by a first mortgage lien on a 70-room luxury boutique
hotel located on the Upper East Side in New York City. The hotel
has experienced stress to the net cash flow similar to other New
York City luxury hotels. The property posted a RevPAR of $602.92
for the trailing twelve month period ending February 2012 which is
a 12.5% increase over the previous year. RevPAR reached a high in
2008 of $716.62.

The loan was modified in November of 2010 which included a $2
million principal pay-down and a loan extension. The final
maturity date with extensions is September 2013. A November 2010
appraisal valued the property at $101 million. Moody's weighted
average pooled loan to value ("LTV") ratio is 67%, the same as
last review. Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio ("DSCR")
is 1.25X. Moody's current credit estimate for the pooled balance
is Ba2, the same as last review.


GULF STREAM 2003-1: Moody's Raises Rating on D Notes From 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Gulf Stream Compass CLO 2003-1, Ltd.:

U.S.$10,950,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
Subordinated Notes Due August 27 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on July 11, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

U.S.$11,850,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Subordinated Notes
Due August 27 2015, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 11,
2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in July 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately $58 million or 68%
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated March 15, 2012, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 184.75%, 145.29%,
118.01% and 104.73%, respectively, versus June 2011 levels of
137.44%, 123.66%, 111.56% and 104.65%, respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the March 2012 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2914
compared to 2519 in June 2011. In addition, the exposure to assets
with Moody's Rating below B3 is reported to have increased to
11.87% from 6.42% in June 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $75.2 million,
defaulted par of $1.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.98% (implying a WARF of 3109), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.61%, and a diversity
score of 32. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-1, Ltd., issued in August 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2487)

Class A: +0

Class B: +0

Class C: +0

Class D: +3

Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3730)

Class A: -0

Class B: -0

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


HIGH GRADE 2005-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
on the class A-1 notes from High Grade Structured Credit CDO 2005-
1 Ltd., a cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transaction backed by high-grade residential mortgage-backed
securities.

"We have received notice from the trustee stating that after the
liquidation of the portfolio assets, the available proceeds were
insufficient to pay the noteholders in full on the April 2, 2012,
final distribution date. As a result, we downgraded the class A-1
notes," S&P said.

"The transaction triggered an event of default (EOD) on March 25,
2009, after which the controlling noteholders voted to accelerate
the maturity of the notes and liquidate the collateral assets,"
S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING LOWERED

High Grade Structured Credit CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
                           Rating
Class               To                 From
A-1                 D (sf)             CC (sf)

OTHER RATINGS OUTSTANDING

High Grade Structured Credit CDO 2005-1 Ltd.

Class               Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
X                   D (sf)


JEFFERIES TRUST 2010-R6: S&P Raises Class 2-A1 Rating From 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
2-A1 from Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2010-R6 by raising it
to 'A (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'. Jefferies Resecuritization Trust
2010-R6 is a U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transaction.

"On May 17, 2011, we incorrectly lowered our rating on class 2-A1.
We based our original action on an incorrect interpretation of
certain provisions of the transaction documents. Upon further
review, we determined that, although certain provisions of the
documents purport to pay interest pro rata to the rated and
subordinated classes in the group 2 structure, the interest is
defined in such a way to effectively pay interest sequentially.
The rating correction reflects our current view that, given the
sequential nature of the interest payments, the projected credit
enhancement available for this class is expected to be more than
sufficient to withstand the stressed losses while receiving timely
payment of interest and principal at the revised rating level,"
S&P said.

"In performing our ratings analysis on the re-REMIC transaction,
we reviewed the interest and principal amounts due on the
underlying security, which are then passed through to the
applicable re-REMIC classes. We applied our loss projections,
incorporating our loss assumptions, to the underlying collateral
to identify the principal and interest amounts that could be
passed through from the underlying securities under our rating
scenario stresses," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

   http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111558.pdf

RATING CORRECTED

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2010-R6
Series 2010-R6
                                  Rating
Class    CUSIP        Current    05/17/11     Pre-05/17/11
2-A1     47233TAH9    A (sf)     CCC (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Neg


JPMORGAN 2005-LDP3: S&P Lowers Class H Cerificate Rating to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating to 'AAA (sf)'
from 'A+ (sf)' on class A-SB from JPMorgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-LDP3, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "Concurrently, we
lowered our ratings on three other classes and affirmed our
ratings on 11 other classes from the same transaction," S&P said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the credit
characteristics of the collateral remaining in the pool, the deal
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust. The upgrade
reflects increased credit enhancement and liquidity levels that
provide adequate support through various stress scenarios. The
downgrades primarily reflect credit support erosion that we
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of 10 ($48.8
million, 3.5%) of the 12 assets ($53.7 million, 3.9%) that are
with the special servicer. We also considered the monthly interest
shortfalls that are affecting the trust. We lowered our rating on
the class H certificates to 'D (sf)' because we expect the
interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class X-1 and X-2 interest-only (IO)
certificates based on our current criteria," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.53x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 115.0%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.92x
and an LTV ratio of 150.6%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 85.8% and 32.7%. The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude 10 ($48.8 million, 3.5%) of the 12 assets
($53.7 million, 3.9%) that are with the special servicer, and two
($13.6 million, 1.0%) defeased loans. We separately estimated
losses for the excluded specially serviced assets and included
them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity
figures," S&P said.

"As of the March 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced interest shortfalls totaling $134,260. These
shortfalls were primarily related to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts ($68,974), interest not
advanced on assets the master servicer has deemed nonrecoverable
($49,682), and special servicing and workout fees ($14,793). The
interest shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and
including class H. Class H experienced cumulative interest
shortfalls for 11 months, and we expect these interest shortfalls
to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future. Consequently, we
downgraded this class to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

                  CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the March 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, 11 assets
($53.3 million, 3.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital). Our discussions with
the master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia),
indicated that an additional loan ($479,521, 0.03%) was also
specially serviced. Berkadia is working with the trustee to
correct the reporting error. The reported payment status for the
12 specially serviced assets was: six are real estate-owned (REO)
($36.4 million, 2.6%), four are in foreclosure ($12.4 million,
0.9%), one is 90-plus days delinquent ($479,521, 0.03%), and one
is in its grace period ($4.5 million, 0.3%). Appraisal reduction
amounts (ARAs) totaling $16.6 million are in effect against eight
of the 12 specially serviced assets. Details of the two largest
specially serviced assets are as set forth," S&P said.

"The Alexander Dawson Building ($11.2 million, 0.8%) is the
largest specially serviced asset. The total reported exposure was
$12.7 million. The collateral is a 131,707-sq.-ft. office building
in Las Vegas. The asset was transferred to the special servicer on
Aug. 21, 2009, due to imminent payment default. Recent financial
information was not available for the asset. The trust completed
the foreclosure on Aug. 11, 2010, and the REO asset was sold on
March 14, 2012. An ARA of $8.7 million is in effect against this
asset. We expect a significant loss upon the resolution of the
asset," S&P said.

"Farmer Jack - Livonia, MI $11.1 million, 0.8%) is the second-
largest specially serviced asset. The total reported exposure was
$11.1 million. The collateral is a vacant 109,800-sq.-ft. retail
center in Livonia, Mich. The asset was transferred to the special
servicer on Oct. 29, 2010, due to imminent default, and is
currently REO. Recent financial information was not available for
the asset. We expect a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of the asset," S&P said.

"The 10 remaining assets with the special servicer have individual
balances that represent less than 0.4% of the total trust balance.
ARAs totaling $7.9 million are in effect against seven of these
assets. We estimated losses for eight of the 10 remaining assets,
arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 35.7%," S&P said.

"In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined the
Laurelton Medical Center loan ($2.9 million, 0.2%) to be credit-
impaired. This loan is secured by a 14,000-sq.-ft. office building
in Jamaica, N.Y. The reported payment status is current. The
borrower has not provided a financial statement since 2009. The
master servicer indicated that the borrower submitted a hardship
letter in December 2011 and is requesting a modification.
Consequently, we view this loan to be at an increased risk of
default and loss," S&P said.

                      TRANSACTION SUMMARY

"As of the March 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $1.39 billion,
down from $2.02 billion at issuance. The pool comprises 192 loans
and six REO assets, down from 232 loans at issuance. Berkadia
provided financial information for 95.4% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool (by balance), most of which reflected full-year 2010,
interim-2011, or full-year 2011 data," S&P said.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.58x for the assets in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV were 1.53x and 115.0%. Our adjusted figures exclude 10
($48.8 million, 3.5%) of the 12 assets ($53.7 million, 3.9%) that
are with the special servicer and two ($13.6 million, 1.0%)
defeased loans. To date, the transaction has experienced $58.2
million in principal losses from 16 assets. Fifty-six loans
($326.9 million, 23.6%) in the pool are on the master servicer's
watchlist, two of which are top 10 loans and are discussed below.
Forty-eight loans ($249.6 million, 18.0%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.10x, 37 of which ($151.5 million, 10.9%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.00x," S&P said.

                     SUMMARY OF TOP 10 LOANS

"The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$495.2 million (35.7%). Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.83x for the top 10 loans.
Our adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.70x and 97.9% for the top 10
loans. Two of the top 10 loans ($95.4 million, 6.9%) are on the
master servicer's watchlist," S&P said.

"The Sikes Senter loan ($58.1 million, 4.2%), the third-largest
loan in the pool, is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a
low reported DSC and an upcoming loan maturity. According to the
master servicer's comments, the low DSC is a result of reduced
revenue driven by decreased rental rates and percentage rent.
According to the master servicer, the borrower is working on
refinancing the loan. The loan is secured by a 668,086-sq.-ft.
anchored retail center in Wichita Falls, Texas. The reported DSC
as of year-end 2010, was 1.07x, with an occupancy of 95.1% as of
June 30, 2011," S&P said.

"The LXP-Nissan loan ($37.3 million, 2.7%), the eighth-largest
loan in the pool, is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a
decrease in reported DSC. Occupancy at the property declined 16%
in the third quarter of 2010 when Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp.,
the sole tenant, downsized 43,396 sq. ft. to 225,049 sq. ft and
reduced its rental rate $4.60 per sq. ft. to $13.50 per sq. ft.
The loan is secured by a 268,445-sq.-ft. office building in
Irving, Texas. The reported DSC was 1.03x as of year-to-date June
30, 2011, with an occupancy of 83.8% as of June 30, 2011," S&P
said.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the pool collateral according to its
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent
with our rating actions," S&P said.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP3
             Rating
Class     To         From         Credit enhancement (%)
A-SB      AAA (sf)   A+ (sf)                       24.96

RATINGS LOWERED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP3
             Rating
Class     To         From         Credit enhancement (%)
F         CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)                         4.01
G         CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)                        2.55
H         D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)                      0.73

RATINGS AFFIRMED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP3

Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-3       AAA (sf)                   24.96
A-4A      AAA (sf)                   34.34
A-4B      A+ (sf)                    24.96
A-1A      A+ (sf)                    24.96
A-J       BBB (sf)                   14.03
B         BBB- (sf)                  11.30
C         BB+ (sf)                   10.02
D         BB- (sf)                    7.29
E         B+ (sf)                     6.01
X-1       AAA (sf)                     N/A
X-2       AAA (sf)                     N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


JPMORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class H Secs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
fourteen classes of CMBS securities, issued by JPMCC Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C6.

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P) Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P) Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P) Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Assigned (P) Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Assigned (P) Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P) Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P) A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P) A3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P) Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P) Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Assigned (P) Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Assigned (P) B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Assigned (P) Aaa (sf)*

Cl. X-B, Assigned (P) Ba3 (sf)*

*Class X-A and Class X-B are interest-only classes.

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 49 fixed rate loans secured
by 118 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.57X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.07X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 97.8% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 101.8% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is
22.8. The transaction's loan level diversity is similar to
Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower transactions issued
since 2009. With respect to property level diversity, the pool's
property level Herfindahl Index is 25.6. The transaction's
property diversity profile is higher than the indices calculated
in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.27, which is similar
to the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 10%, or 15%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa2, A1, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


JPMORGAN CIBC 2006: Moody's Lowers Rating on A-1 Cert. to 'Ca'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the rating of one class and affirmed the
ratings of three classes of Certificates issued by JP Morgan-CIBC
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities Trust 2006-RR1. The
downgrades are due to realized losses to the underlying collateral
as well as an increase in interest shortfalls. The affirmations
are due to the key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic)
transactions.

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

JP Morgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities Trust 2006-
RR1 is a static pooled re-remic transaction backed by a portfolio
of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the pool
balance) issued between 2002 and 2006. As of the March 21, 2012
Trustee Report date, the aggregate Certificate balance of the
transaction has decreased to $468.7 million from $523.9 million at
issuance due to partial losses attributable to Class C and total
writedown attributable to Classes D through L. The ratings on
Classes D through L will be withdrawn.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 6,821 compared to 6,802 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Aaa-Aa3 (2.6% compared to 1.4% at last review), A1-A3
(7.5% compared to 6.8% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (10.7% compared
to 10.8% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (1.1% compared to 2.5% at last
review), B1-B3 (5.8% compared to 6.1% at last review), and Caa1-C
(72.4% compared to 72.5% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.1 compared to 4.8
at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
5.6% compared to 5.2% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R)v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R)v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
5.6% to 0.6% or up to 10.6% does not result in any ratings
movement.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


LASALLE 2006-MF3: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes of
LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2006-MF3 as
follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to actual and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans as well as anticipated
interest shortfalls. Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf) remain within acceptable ranges for the affirmed
ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
12.1% of the current balance compared to 15.6% at last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Small Loan Transactions"
published in December 2004, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 159.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a Press Release dated May 4, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 20, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 53% to $234.5
million from $493.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 239 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 2% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 14%
of the pool. The pool is characterized by both geographic and
property type concentrations. Approximately 98% of the pool is
secured by multi-family properties and approximately 43% of the
pool is located in Texas, Ohio and Oklahoma.

Seventy-nine loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

One hundred-five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $75.9 million loss (65%
loss severity on average). Currently, there are 37 loans,
representing 17% of the pool in special servicing. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $13.8 million loss (65% expected loss on
average) for 19 of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 29 poorly
performing loans, representing 11% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $3.7 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial 2011
operating results for 89% and 26%, respectively, of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 99% compared to 97% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.24X and 1.11X, respectively, compared to
1.31X and 1.16X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance

The pool has also experienced significant interest shortfalls.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B, D, E, G
through N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.04 million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.


LASALLE 2006-MF4: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Two CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes of
LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2006-MF4 as
follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to actual and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans as well as anticipated
interest shortfalls. Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf) remain within acceptable ranges for the affirmed
ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.0% of the current balance compared to 10.3% at last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Small Loan Transactions"
published in December 2004, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 167.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a Press Release dated May 4, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 20, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 41% to $265.1
million from $450.9 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 238 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 2% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
13.3% of the pool. The pool is characterized by both geographic
and property type concentrations. Approximately 98% of the pool is
secured by multi-family properties and approximately 39% of the
pool is located in Texas, Oregon and Washington.

Seventy-eight loans, representing 30% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Sixty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $62.9 million loss (67%
loss severity on average). Currently, there are 21 loans,
representing 10% of the pool in special servicing. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $13.7 million loss (65% expected loss on
average) for 16 of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 24 poorly
performing loans, representing 8% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $3.7 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial 2011
operating results for 69% and 38%, respectively, of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 97%, the same as at Moody's prior review. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.28X and 1.13X, respectively, compared to
1.22X and 1.11X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance

The pool has also experienced significant interest shortfalls.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B through N
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2.7
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.


LB-UBS 2004-C7: S&P Affirms Class K Certificate Rating to 'CCC-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C7, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

"The rating affirmations for the principal and interest
certificates follow our analysis of the transaction primarily
using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria, which included a
review of the credit characteristics of the remaining collateral
in the pool, and subordination and liquidity support levels that
we consider to be consistent with our outstanding ratings on these
classes. Our ratings analysis also considered the slight decline
in credit support that we anticipate will occur upon the eventual
resolution of one ($2.8 million, 0.3%) of the two ($5.9 million,
0.7%) assets that are currently with the special servicer," S&P
said.

"We affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class X-CL and X-OL
interest-only (IO) certificates based on our current criteria,"
S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.52x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 87.7%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.12x
and an LTV ratio of 113.0%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 48.0% and 29.0%. The DSC and LTV
calculations noted above exclude one ($2.8 million, 0.3%) of the
two ($5.9 million, 0.7%) assets that are currently with the
special servicer and two ($151.3 million, 18.3%) defeased loans.
We separately estimated the loss for the excluded specially
serviced asset and included it in our 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

'As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $827.5 million,
down from $1.42 billion at issuance. The pool comprises 66 loans
and one real estate owned (REO) asset, down from 90 loans at
issuance. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the master servicer, provided
financial information for 99.7% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool (by balance), which primarily reflected full-year 2010,
interim- or full-year 2011 data," S&P said.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.44x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV were 1.52x and 87.7%. Our adjusted figures reflect our
examination of more recent reporting information for several of
the larger loans. Our adjusted figures also exclude one ($2.8
million, 0.3%) of the two ($5.9 million, 0.7%) assets that are
currently with the special servicer and two ($151.3 million,
18.3%) defeased loans. To date, the transaction has experienced
$8.9 million in principal losses on six assets. Nineteen loans
($353.9 million, 42.8%) in the pool are on the master servicer's
watchlist, including four of the top 10 real estate loans, which
we discuss below. Eleven assets ($218.9 million, 26.5%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, eight of which ($189.5 million,
22.9%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x," S&P said.

             SUMMARY OF TOP 10 REAL ESTATE LOANS

"The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding pooled balance of $447.5 million (54.1%). Using
servicer-reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.39x for the top 10 loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV for the top
10 loans were 1.50x and 92.6% respectively. Our adjusted figures
reflect our examination of more recent reporting information for
several of the larger loans. Four ($283.2 million, 34.2%) of the
top 10 loans are on the master servicer's watchlist," S&P said.

"The 600 Third Avenue loan ($168.0 million, 20.3%) is the largest
real estate loan in the pool. The loan is secured by a 529,773-
sq.-ft., 42-story, class A office building in New York City. The
building is located two blocks away from the United Nations and
Grand Central Station on Third Avenue between East 39th and East
40th Streets. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due
to a low reported DSC, which was 0.99x for the year ended Dec. 31,
2011. The decline in income was due to the December 2010 departure
of a tenant that occupied 27.0% of the building's total gross
leasable space (GLA) and contributed approximately $6.1 million in
annual rents. According to the March 5, 2012, rent roll, this
space was leased up in 2011; however, 'free rent' and concessions
for the new tenant(s) held down income. The free rent and
concessions have now burned off, which should result in an
improvement in DSC. Occupancy was 88.2% according to the March 5,
2012, rent roll," S&P said.

"The World Apparel Center loan, the third-largest real estate loan
in the pool, has a whole-loan balance of $204.7 million that is
split into four pari passu pieces, $68.2 million of which makes up
8.2% of the pooled trust balance. The loan is secured by a 1.15-
million-sq.-ft. office building in the Garment District of Midtown
Manhattan that was built in 1970 and renovated in 1999. The loan
is on the master servicer's watchlist due to near-term tenant
lease expirations for which the master servicer is waiting for a
response from the borrower. The reported DSC and occupancy for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2011, were 1.48x and 88.4%," S&P said.

"The North Dekalb Mall loan ($26.6 million, 3.2%), the fourth-
largest real estate loan in the pool, is secured by 431,953 sq.
ft. of a 628,705-sq.-ft. regional mall in Decatur, Ga. The loan
was previously transferred to the special servicer in August 2010
due to imminent default. According to the master servicer, the
loan was modified and returned to the master servicer as a
corrected loan effective Nov. 2, 2011. The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist because it reported a low DSC of 0.69x for
the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2011. Among other things, the
modification terms increased the interest-only periods by 96
months and changed the interest rate over time. Effective Jan. 15,
2012, the interest rate is currently 2.00% and will increase over
time to end at 6.25%. The reported occupancy for the year-ended
Dec. 31, 2011, was 92.2%," S&P said.

"The Guam Multifamily loan ($20.4 million, 2.5%) is the fifth-
largest real estate loan in the pool. The loan is secured by 13
multifamily properties with 507 units in Guam built between 1970
and 2000. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a
low reported DSC, which was 1.17x for the year-ended Dec. 31,
2011. The reported occupancy was 81.0% for the same reporting
period," S&P said.

                        CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, three assets
($8.9 million, 1.1%) in the pool were reported as being with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital).
Wells Fargo indicated during discussions with Standard & Poor's
that the Sun Terra Apartments loan ($3.0 million, 0.4%) was
returned to master servicing in June 2011. Details of the
two specially serviced assets are as set forth," S&P said.

"The Corona Self Storage loan ($3.1 million, 0.4%) is secured by a
503-unit self storage facility in Corona, Calif. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on March 24, 2011, due to
imminent monetary default, and the reported payment status is in
foreclosure. CWCapital indicated that the borrower provided funds
to reinstate the loan in October 2011. CWCapital stated that it is
currently documenting the reinstatement and anticipates that the
loan will be returned to master servicer shortly. The reported DSC
was 0.79x for year-end 2010. An appraisal reduction amount (ARA)
of $47,905 was reported for this loan," S&P said.

"The A-American Self Storage REO asset ($2.8 million, 0.3%) is a
600-unit self-storage facility in Cerritos, Calif. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 16, 2010, due to
monetary default, and the property became REO on July 22, 2011.
CWCapital informed us that it is currently marketing the property
for sale. The reported occupancy is currently 75.0%," S&P said.

"An ARA of $517,024 is in effect against the asset. We expect a
moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset," S&P
said.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the pool collateral according to its
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent
with the affirmed ratings," S&P said.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-5       AAA (sf)                   17.52
A-6       AAA (sf)                   17.52
A-1A      AAA (sf)                   17.52
B         AA+ (sf)                   16.24
C         AA (sf)                    14.53
D         AA- (sf)                   12.60
E         A+ (sf)                    11.11
F         A (sf)                      9.39
G         A- (sf)                     7.90
H         BBB+ (sf)                   6.40
J         BB (sf)                     5.33
K         CCC- (sf)                   3.19
X-CL      AAA (sf)                     N/A
X-OL      AAA (sf)                     N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


MARATHON CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes From 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C and E notes from Marathon CLO I Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Marathon Asset Management
LLC. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the class A-1,
A-2, B, and D notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect performance improvements we have observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since our last rating
action on March 29 2011," S&P said.

"This transaction is currently in its amortization phase. Since
Feb. 17, 2011, classes A-1 and A-2 notes have paid down by $13.31
million in total to 9.46% of their original balance," S&P said.

"The transaction has an interest diversion mechanism lower in the
payment waterfall, which allocates 50% of the available interest
proceeds to redeem the class E notes and then the D notes. The
class E notes have benefited from the interest diversion and paid
down by $1.37 million to 0.22% of the original balance since March
2011, our last rating action," S&P said.

"The credit quality of the transaction's underlying asset
portfolio has improved since our last rating action on March 29,
2011. This has benefited the rated notes, and is evidenced by a
significant decrease in obligations rated in the 'CCC' range. The
CCC rated obligations have decreased by $10 million between
February 2011 and March 2012," S&P said.

"The application of the largest obligor default test, a
supplemental stress test we introduced as part of our September
2009 corporate criteria update, have constrained the class D and E
ratings at 'BBB+ (sf)'," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, and D notes to
reflect our belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Marathon CLO I Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
C                  AAA (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                  BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E                  BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Marathon CLO I Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-1                AAA (sf)
A-2                AAA (sf)
B                  AAA (sf)


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating for $9.3MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of four classes of Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1997-C2.

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement to the
remaining Fitch rated classes. Performance of the pool has been
stable since Fitch's last review. As of the April 2012
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance was
$46.2 million, down from $686 million at issuance. There are no
defeased loans. There are currently nine loans remaining in the
pool, none of which are in special servicing. There are cumulative
interest shortfalls in the amount of $665,462 currently affecting
classes H through K.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

--$30 million class F at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
--$6.9 million class G at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
--$9.3 million class H at 'Dsf';
--Class J at 'Dsf'.

Classes A-1, A-2 and B through D have paid in full. Fitch does not
rate classes E and K. The rating on class IO has previously been
withdrawn.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Tranches to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 57
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 17 tranches from 14 RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by Merrill.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Prime
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities is
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For example, for
shifting interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose
the seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the
majority of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their
principal payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement
available to the senior bonds. In Mooyd's current approach, the
rating agency captures this risk by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural nuances of the transaction

The action taken on the interest-only bond Class X-B issued by
Merrill 2003-G reflects the correction of an error wherein the
bond was incorrectly linked to both the Class B-1 and B-2 bonds
during the previous rating action. The Class X-B bond is in fact
linked to only the Class B-2 bond. Accordingly, the rating has
been corrected to Ca from Caa2.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
set at 3% for Jumbo and which is typically higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans, the adjusted rate of
new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if current
delinquency levels in a small pool are low, future delinquencies
are expected to reflect this trend. To account for that, the rate
calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to
2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to
greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years
and ultimate expected losses are projected using the approach
described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high, between 8% and 9%, and home
prices dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-C

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-X-3, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-D

Cl. X-B, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-E

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-F

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

CL. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-G

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-1

Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-D

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

Cl. X-B, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-E

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-HB1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLMI Series 2004-A2

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-A

Cl. 1A, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. X-1A, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X-2A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. X-2A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-B

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-A1

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-A6

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF281626

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243269


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Cert. Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed seven classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-KEY2 as
follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to increases in realized losses along with
anticipated losses from troubled and special serviced loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.8% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 6.0%. Realized losses have increased from
2.0% of the original balance to 3.4% since the prior review.
Moody's provides a current list of base losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver 1.0,
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29 compared to 33 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated May 12, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Mar 12, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $744 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 94 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 39% of the pool. Seven loans, representing 12% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains one loan with an investment grade credit
estimate, representing 11% of the pool.

Twenty-six loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $38.3 million (40% loss severity on average).
Currently three loans, representing 7% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the 150 & 200
Meadowlands Parkway Loan ($21.5 million -- 2.9% of the pool),
which is secured by a 211,962 square foot (SF) Class B office
building located in Secaucus, New Jersey. The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2012 due to imminent default due to
cash flow issues from upcoming expiring leases that were not
expected to renew. The two major tenants with expiring leases,
Medical Economics and Delta Galil, lease 44% of the net rentable
area (NRA). The property will be 42% leased after these two
tenants vacate the property. At this time, the special servicer is
gathering loan and property specific information in order to
develop a resolution strategy.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Castaic Village
Shopping Center Loan ($18.2 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is
secured by a 122,974 SF grocery anchored shopping center located
in Castaic, California. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in November 2010 due to imminent payment default due to
insufficient cash flow issues. Modification discussions with the
borrower were unsuccessful and a deed-in-lieu was subsequently
completed on March 29, 2012. As of January 2012, the property was
87% leased compared to 90% at the prior review.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the 1100 Wall St.
Loan ($14.6 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
59,436 SF unanchored retail center located in Los Angeles,
California. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
December 2010 due to payment default. The note will be included in
a note auction scheduled for April 2012 and a foreclosure sale
which has also been set for May 2012. The property was 81% leased
as of March 2012 compared to 87% at the prior review.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $24.9 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (46% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for ten poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $9.8 million loss (18% expected loss based on a 35%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010/2011 operating results
for 98% of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 82% compared to 87% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.24X, respectively, compared to
1.37X and 1.21X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Crossroads Center Loan
($79.1 million -- 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
775,319 SF regional mall located in St Cloud, Minnesota. The
property is also encumbered by a $28.8 million mezzanine loan. The
mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Sears, Macy's, and Target (not
part of the collateral). As of September 2011, total collateral
and in-line occupancy was 99% and 90%, respectively, compared to
97% and 81% at the prior review. Moody's underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.25X, respectively, compared to Baa3
and 1.28X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 14% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the U-Haul Portfolio Loan ($43 million -- 5.8% of
the pool), which is secured by two cross collateralized and cross
defaulted loans secured by 34 U-Haul self storage and moving
centers located across 18 states. The portfolio contains a
combined 1.53 million SF of storage space in 15,052 units. As of
December 2011, the portfolio was 75% leased compared to 74% at the
prior review. The loan is stable and benefitting from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.52X,
respectively, which is in line with the prior review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 1900 Ocean Apartments Loan
($42.7 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 266
unit high-rise multifamily property located in Long Beach,
California. The property was built in 1966 and renovated in 2004.
As of December 2011, the property was 93% leased compared to 97%
at the prior review. The loan is stable and benefitting from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 100% and 0.84X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the West Chester Commons Loan
($19.3 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by an off-
campus student housing property located in West Chester,
Pennsylvania. The property was built in 2004 and serves as off
campus housing for students enrolled at Westchester University. As
of December 2011, the property was 99% leased compared to 100% at
the prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 1.06X at last review.


MILL CREEK: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $10.5MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Mill
Creek CLO Ltd./Mill Creek CLO LLC's $241.8 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Feb. 22,
2012.

"Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral. On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral. Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached. The 'effective date' for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents. Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an 'effective
date rating affirmation')," S&P said.

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date. The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction. This window
of time is typically referred to as a 'ramp-up period.' Because
some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets from the
new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may give
collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P said.

"For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, our ratings on the
closing date and prior to our effective date review are generally
based on the application of our criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to us by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect our assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines. This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased," S&P said.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio. Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation. In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P said.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

   http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111558.pdf

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Mill Creek CLO Ltd./Mill Creek CLO LLC

Class                Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)              178.0
B                    AA (sf)                15.0
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                 26.0
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)               12.3
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                10.5
Subordinated notes   NR                     32.8

NR-Not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY 1998-WF2: Fitch Cuts Rating on $5.3MM Notes to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed the remaining
seven classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-WF2.

The downgrade reflects a slight increase in Fitch expected losses.
The affirmations reflect the mostly stable performance since the
last review. As of the April 2012 distribution date, the pool's
certificate balance has been reduced by 90% (including 0.70% in
realized losses) to $106 million from $1.1 billion at issuance.
One loan (8.5%) has been defeased. There is currently one
specially serviced loan (1.7%) in the pool. Interest shortfalls
are affecting classes M and N.

The specially serviced loan (1.7%) is secured by a 47,550 square
foot (sf) retail center located in Indianapolis, IN. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2010 due to a payment
default and became real estate owned (REO) in December 2011. The
special servicer is focusing on leasing and repairs prior to
listing the property for sale.

Fitch downgrades the following class as indicated:

-- $5.3 million class M to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 95%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $12.4 million class E at 'AAAsf''; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.2 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.9 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.6 million class H at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8 million class J at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8 million class K at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.9 million class L at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Classes A-1, A-2 and B through D have paid in full. Fitch does not
rate class N. The rating on class X has previously been withdrawn.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-IQ9: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Cl. J Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-IQ9, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

"The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates follow our analysis of the transaction primarily
using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria, which included a
review of credit characteristics of the remaining collateral in
the pool and subordination and liquidity support levels that we
consider to be consistent with our outstanding ratings on these
classes. Our ratings analysis also considered the potential
decline in credit support that we anticipate will occur upon the
eventual resolution of six ($14.4 million, 1.2%) of the nine
($25.0 million, 2.1%) loans that are with the special servicer. We
also considered the monthly interest shortfalls that are affecting
the trust. As of the March 15, 2012, trustee remittance report,
the trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling
$46,449, which affected classes M through O," S&P said.

"We affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class X-1 and X-Y
interest-only (IO) certificates based on our current criteria,"
S&P said.

"Our analysis of the transaction included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining loans in the pool and the
transaction structure. Using servicer-provided financial
information, we calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC)
of 1.37x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 82.9%. We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 0.95x and an LTV ratio of 104.6%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
52.4% and 28.0%. The DSC and LTV calculations noted above exclude
six ($14.4 million, 1.2%) of the transaction's nine ($25.0
million, 2.1%) specially serviced loans, two ($13.9 million, 1.1%)
defeased loans, and 66 ($154.2 million, 12.7%) cooperative
apartment loans. We separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced loans and included them in our 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss severity figures. We excluded the
cooperative apartment loans because they did not default under our
'AAA' scenario due to extremely low leverage," S&P said.

                  CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the March 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, nine ($25.0
million, 2.1%) loans in the pool were with the special servicers,
C-III Asset Management (C-III) and NCB FSB (NCB). The reported
payment statuses of the specially serviced loans are: three are in
foreclosure ($6.3 million, 0.5%); two are matured balloon loans
($5.4 million, 0.5%); one is late, but less than 30 days
delinquent ($2.9 million, 0.2%); one is in its grace period ($0.9
million, 0.1%); and two are current ($9.5 million, 0.8%).
Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $1.5 million are in
effect for three of the specially serviced loans. Details of the
two largest specially serviced loans are as set forth," S&P said.

"The Eastwyck Village Town Houses loan ($6.8 million, 0.6%) is the
largest specially serviced loan in the pool. The loan is secured
by a 441-unit cooperative apartment located in Decatur Ga.. The
loan's payment status was reported as current. According to NCB,
the loan was transferred to special servicing on Feb. 17, 2012,
when the borrower incurred financial difficulties due to
increasing vacancy at the property. Per the most recent operating
statement, occupancy was 95% for year-end 2010," S&P said.

"The 3965 Durango loan ($3.3 million, 0.3%) is the second-largest
specially serviced loan in the pool. The loan is secured by a
25,116-sq.-ft. office property located in Las Vegas. According to
C-III, the loan, which was reported as a matured balloon loan, was
transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 21, 2011, due to
imminent payment default. As of September 2010, the reported DSC
was 1.53x. We expect a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan," S&P said.

"The remaining seven specially serviced loans have individual
balances that represent less than 0.3% of the total pool balance.
ARAs totaling $1.5 million are in effect for three of the seven
remaining specially serviced loans. We estimated losses for five
of the seven remaining specially serviced loans, arriving at a
weighted-average loss severity of 29.8%. One of the remaining
two loans is a recent transfer, while a modification is being
finalized for the other loan," S&P said.

                      TRANSACTION SUMMARY

"As of the March 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, the total
pool balance was $1.21 billion, which is 79.2% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool includes 218 loans, down from 241 loans at
issuance. Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Servicing (Wells Fargo)
is the master servicer for 151 loans ($1.06 billion, 87.2%)
secured by a variety of commercial real estate property types,
and NCB is the master servicer for 67 loans ($154.9 million,
12.8%) secured by cooperative apartment loans. Excluding the
cooperative apartment loans, the master servicers provided
financial information for 96.4% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, the majority of which was full-year 2010 data (47.0%) or
September 2011 data (29.7%). We calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.66x for the loans in the pool based on the servicer-reported
figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.37x and 82.9%. Our
adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude six ($14.4 million, 1.2%) of
the transaction's nine ($25.0 million, 2.1%) specially serviced
loans, two ($13.9 million, 1.1%) defeased loans, and 66 ($154.2
million, 12.7%) cooperative apartment loans. According to the
March 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, to date, the
transaction has experienced $11.8 million in principal losses in
connection with six loans. Forty-nine loans ($162.5 million,
13.4%) in the pool are on the master servicers' combined
watchlist. Twenty-seven loans ($107.9 million, 8.9%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, 18 of which ($78.4 million, 6.5%)
have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x," S&P said.

                   SUMMARY OF TOP 10 LOANS

"The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding balance of $606.1
million (49.9%). Using servicer-reported numbers, we calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.81x for nine of the top 10 loans. The
10th-largest loan is a cooperative apartment loan and does not
have financial data available. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for
these nine loans were 1.62x and 91.2%. None of the top 10 loans
appear on the master servicer's combined watchlist. The 125 Park
Avenue loan ($146.3 million, 12.1%) is the largest loan in the
pool and is secured by a 603,433-sq.-ft. office building in New
York. Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 1.94x for nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2011, and occupancy of 94% reported June 30, 2011," S&P
said.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
current criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with the affirmed ratings," S&P said.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-IQ9
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating                      Credit enhancement (%)
A-3      AAA (sf)                                     24.27
A-4      AAA (sf)                                     24.27
A-5      AAA (sf)                                     24.27
A-AB     AAA (sf)                                     24.27
A-1A     AAA (sf)                                     24.27
A-J      AA- (sf)                                     13.54
B        A (sf)                                       10.86
C        A- (sf)                                       9.91
D        BBB+ (sf)                                     7.70
E        BBB (sf)                                      6.44
F        BBB- (sf)                                     5.18
G        BB+ (sf)                                      4.23
H        CCC+ (sf)                                     2.81
J        CCC (sf)                                      2.34
X-1      AAA (sf)                                       N/A
X-Y      AAA (sf)                                       N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-8: S&P Cuts Rating on Class IA Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
IA notes issued by Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2007-8, a synthetic
corporate investment-grade collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to
'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

"The lowered rating follows a number of recent write-downs of
underlying reference entities, which have caused the class IA
notes to incur principal losses," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL IV: S&P Hikes Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1LA, A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L notes from Mountain Capital CLO
IV Ltd. "At the same time, we affirmed the rating on classes A-1L
and A-1LB. We also raised the ratings on the class A-1LA, A-1LB,
A-1L, A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L notes from Mountain Capital CLO V
Ltd. Both the transactions are collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transactions managed by Carlyle Investment Management LLC,"
S&P said.

"The upgrades mainly reflect improvements in the credit quality of
the assets in the transactions' underlying portfolios since our
review on Jan. 26, 2010. The affirmations reflect sufficient
credit support available to the notes at the current rating
levels," S&P said.

"Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. ended its reinvestment on March 15,
2012, and is expected to start amortizing on its next distribution
date of June 15, 2012. The improved performance of the underlying
loans in Mountain Capital CLO IV since our January 2010 rating
actions have benefited the CLO's rated notes. In particular, the
amount of defaulted assets and 'CCC' rated obligations has
decreased significantly. Based on the March 7, 2012, trustee
report, which we referenced for 's rating actions, the transaction
contained $4.95 million of defaulted assets, down from the $18.69
million noted in the Dec. 7, 2009, trustee report, which we used
for our last downgrade actions on Jan. 26, 2010," S&P said.

"Additionally, the transaction had a 'CCC' excess haircut applied
in the calculation of the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios at
the time of our January 2010 rating actions. Since the amount of
'CCC' rated assets is currently below the covenanted threshold,
there is no such haircut applied. The reduction in defaulted
securities and lower levels of 'CCC' rated assets held has
resulted in an increase in the class A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L O/C
ratios," S&P said.

Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. will be in its reinvestment phase
until Sept. 15, 2012, and all principal proceeds are currently
being used to reinvest in new collateral.

"The improvements in the credit quality of the underlying assets
of Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. since January 2010 have been
significant. There has been a decrease in the amount of defaulted
assets held as well as a $6 million increase in performing par in
the transaction. As a result, the A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L O/C
ratios have increased," S&P said.

"As per the March 7, 2012, trustee report, the transaction had
$4.95 million in defaulted assets, significantly less than the
$20.29 million noted in the Dec. 7, 2009, trustee report, which we
used for our Jan. 26, 2010 rating action," S&P said.

"The spreads available in both the transactions, generated by the
underlying floating-rate assets, are significantly higher than in
January 2010. Additionally, the B-2L notes in both transactions
were constrained by the top obligor test at the time of our
January 2010 rating actions. Therefore, the B-2L note ratings were
capped at 'CCC- (sf)' at the time. They are no longer constrained
by the supplemental tests, and we have raised them to 'BB+ (sf)',"
S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd.
                          Rating
Class            To                    From
A-1LA            AAA (sf)              AA+ (sf)
A-2L             AA (sf)               A+ (sf)
A-3L             A+ (sf)               BBB (sf)
B-1L             BBB+ (sf)             BB (sf)
B-2L             BB+ (sf)              CCC- (sf)

Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd.
                          Rating
Class            To                    From
A-1LA            AAA (sf)              AA+ (sf)
A-1LB            AA+ (sf)              AA- (sf)
A-1L             AA+ (sf)              AA- (sf)
A-2L             AA+ (sf)              A+ (sf)
A-3L             A+ (sf)               BBB (sf)
B-1L             BBB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)
B-2L             BB+ (sf)              CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd.
Class            Rating
A-1LB            AA+ (sf)
A-1L             AA+ (sf)


NEWTON CDO: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes From 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1 and A-2 notes from Newton CDO Ltd., a cash flow collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by corporate bonds and
loans. "At the same time, we affirmed our rating on the class B
notes," S&P said.

"The transaction is its amortization phase and continues to pay
down the class A-1 and A-2 notes (which are pari passu). The notes
received a combined paydown of $7.797 million on the March 27,
2012, payment date. This paydown reduced the classes' balances to
$23.48 million and $2.60 million, respectively, which is about
9.64% of their original balances," S&P said.

"We calculate that the class A overcollateralization (O/C) ratio -
after the paydowns - should be around 152%. This is based on the
par value of the performing assets and market value of the
defaults, as reported by the trustee in the March 2012 monthly
report," S&P said.

"The trustee reports that the principal coverage ratio (i.e. O/C)
prior to the paydown was 137.20% in March 2012, up from 128.45% in
August 2011, when we last upgraded the notes. Standard & Poor's
notes that when calculating the principal coverage ratio, the
trustee, as per terms of the transaction, haircuts the numerator
for securities that mature beyond the transaction's maturity date.
The trustee reduced the numerator by $832k (or 2.11% of the
performing assets) when calculating this ratio in March 2012," S&P
said.

"We raised our ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes due to the
increased credit support available to the notes. As with our
November 2011 rating action, the top obligor test was the dominant
factor in determining the rating action," S&P said.

"We affirmed our 'AA+ (sf)' rating on the class B notes, which are
backed by an Israeli sovereign bond with a guarantee from the
United States through the Agency for International Development,"
S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Newton CDO Ltd.
                      Rating
Class            To              From
A-1              BBB+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)
A-2              BBB+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

Newton CDO Ltd.
Class            Rating
B                AA+ (sf)


TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:              Newton CDO Ltd.
Coissuer:            Newton CDO Corp.
Collateral manager:  Babson Capital Management
Trustee:             The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:    Cash flow corporate bond CDO


ORCHARD PARK: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'CC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of notes from Orchard Park Ltd., a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) backed by asset-backed securities (ABS)
transactions.

"The downgrades reflect the large balance of defaulted assets in
the transaction's collateral pool, which has affected the credit
support available to the rated tranches. According to the February
2012 trustee report, the deal currently has $76.6 million (70.2%)
in defaulted assets, compared with $61.1 million (47.58%) as of
the June 2010 trustee report, which we used for our October 2010
rating actions. The large balance of defaulted assets has reduced
the transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) ratio. As of
February 2012, the class A O/C ratio was 28.94%, and the A-1
series 1 notes and series 2 notes are backed by 'CC' rated
assets," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Orchard Park Ltd.
                 Rating
Class        To          From
A-1 Ser 1    CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)
A-1 Ser 2    CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)


PACIFICA CDO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CC'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of notes from Pacifica CDO II Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed by corporate loans. Alcentra Ltd. manages
the transaction. "At the same time, we removed the ratings from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where we had placed them
on Feb. 10, 2012. We lowered our rating on one class and our
ratings on three other classes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect principal payments on the class A-1 notes,
the most senior class, since our last rating action," S&P said.

This transaction entered its amortization phase in July 2008. The
class A-1 notes have been paid down by $15.14 million since the
February 2011 rating action. The class A-1 balance is now $18.00
million which is 8.57% of its original balance.

"Additionally, the credit quality of the transaction's underlying
asset portfolio has improved since our last rating action in
February 2011, as evidenced by a significant decrease in the
amount of defaulted obligations held, which has benefited the
rated notes. Other contributing factors include an increase in the
weighted average spread and increases in the class A, B, C,
and D overcollateralization (O/C) ratios," S&P said.

"We note that the transaction has significant exposure to long-
dated assets (i.e., assets maturing after the stated maturity of
the CLO). According to the April 2012 trustee report, the balance
of long-dated assets represent 31.12% of the portfolio. Our
analysis accounted for the potential market value and/or
settlement related risk arising from the potential liquidation of
the remaining securities on the legal final maturity date of the
transaction," S&P said.

"The application of the largest obligor default test, a
supplemental stress test we introduced as part of our September
2009 corporate criteria update, has constrained the class B-1 and
B-2 ratings at 'BBB+ (sf)' and the class C-1 and C-2 ratings at
'CCC+ (sf)'," S&P said.

The downgrade of the class D notes was due to the inability to pay
back the deferred interest balance, as well as an increased
likelihood that the notes will not receive their full principal.

The affirmations reflect credit quality commensurate with their
current rating levels.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Pacifica CDO II Ltd.
                Rating
Class        To         From
A-2          AAA(sf)    AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
B-1          BBB+(sf)   BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos
B-2          BBB+(sf)   BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos
D            CC(sf)     CCC-(sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Pacifica CDO II Ltd.
Class          Rating
A-1            AAA(sf)
C-1            CCC+(sf)
C-2            CCC+(sf)


PETRA CRE 2007-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes and affirmed its rating on one class from Petra CRE CDO
2007-1 Ltd. (Petra 2007-1), a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction. "We lowered
the ratings on three classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect our analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the credit characteristics of the
underlying collateral using our global criteria for rating CDOs of
pooled structured finance assets. We also considered the amount of
defaulted and credit-impaired assets ($382.1 million, 53.4%) and
their expected recoveries in our analysis. We also considered the
transaction's exposure to underlying commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) and commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) collateral that have experienced negative
rating actions. The downgraded collateral is from seven
transactions and total $36.9 million (5.2% of the total asset
balance)," S&P said.

"We lowered the ratings on classes H, J, and K to 'D (sf)' because
we determined that the classes are unlikely to be repaid in full,"
S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's global CDOs of pooled structured finance assets
criteria include revisions to our assumptions on correlations,
recovery rates, and default patterns and timings of the
collateral. The criteria also include supplemental stress tests
(largest obligor default test and largest industry default test)
in our analysis," S&P said.

"According to the March 26, 2012, trustee report, the
transaction's collateral totaled $715.6 million, while the
transaction's liabilities, including capitalized interest, totaled
$662.5 million. Comparatively, the deal's liabilities were $869.6
million at issuance," S&P said. The transaction's current asset
pool includes these:

* 16 whole or senior participation loans ($321.9 million, 45%);

* 10 subordinate-interest loans ($210.7 million, 29.4%);

* 13 CMBS tranches from 12 distinct transactions issued between
   2005 and 2007 ($75.8 million, 10.6%);

* Seven CRE CDO tranches from six distinct transactions issued
   between 2004 and 2007 ($57.3 million, 8%); and

* One REIT security ($50 million, 7%).

"The trustee report noted 17 defaulted assets ($372.1 million,
52%), including 14 defaulted loan assets ($310.6 million, 43.4%).
Standard & Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery rates for
these defaulted loan assets ranging from 0% to 77%, with a
weighted average recovery rate of 32%. We based the recovery
rates on information provided by the collateral manager, special
servicer, and third-party data providers," S&P said. The defaulted
assets are:

* The Haven whole loan ($57.1 million, 8%);

* The Petra REIT debt ($50 million, 7%);

* The ResortQuest Waikiki Beach subordinate-interest loan ($34.9
   million, 4.9%);

* The Bank of America Plaza subordinate-interest loan ($34.6
   million, 4.8%);

* The Fort Tryon Construction whole loan ($30.5 million,
   4.3%);

* The 160-08 Jamaica Ave. whole loan ($22.7 million, 3.2%);

* The Amoco Building whole loan ($21.4 million, 3%);

* The Paladin whole loan ($18 million, 2.5%);

* The Resorts International senior participation loan ($17.1
   million, 2.4%);

* The 1122-28 Chestnut Street whole loan ($16.5 million,
   2.3%);

* The Broadreach Office portfolio subordinate-interest loan ($16
   million, 2.2%);

* The Mondrian-Scottsdale subordinate-interest loan ($14 million,
   2%);

* The 2060 Detwiler Road whole loan ($12.4 million, 1.7%);

* The Allerton Hotel subordinate-interest loan ($10 million,
   1.4%);

* The JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust series
   2007-CIBC19 class G ($10 million, 1.4%);

* The Shiloh Inn whole loan ($5.5 million, 0.8%); and

* The GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. series 2004-C3
   class D ($1.5 million, 0.2%).

"In addition, we have determined one asset, the HAM Holdings REOC
loan ($10 million, 1.4%) to be credit-impaired," S&P said.

S&P's analysis of Petra 2007-1 reflected exposure to these
certificates that Standard & Poor's has lowered:

* Cobalt CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3 class B ($10
   million, 1.4%);

* GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust series 2006-C1 class
   B ($10 million, 1.4%); and

* Concord Real Estate CDO series 2006-1 class A-1 ($5.4 million,
   0.8%).

"In our review of the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral, we based our analyses on the publicly rated collateral
on Standard & Poor's issued ratings. Our analyses on the unrated
collateral are based on information provided by the collateral
manager, Petra Capital Management LLC, and trustee, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A., as well as market and valuation data from third-party
providers," S&P said.

"According to the March trustee report, the deal is failing all
three of its interest coverage tests. The deal is passing its
class A/B overcollateralization ratio test and failing its class
C/D/E and F/G/H overcollateralization ratio tests," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we determine necessary," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Petra CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
          Rating               Rating
Class     To                   From
A-2       BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)/Watch Neg
B         B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C         CCC+ (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
D         CCC+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
E         CCC (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg
F         CCC- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
G         CCC- (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Neg
H         D (sf)               CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
J         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
K         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Petra CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
          Rating              Rating
Class     To                  From
A-1       A+ (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg


RACERS 2004-13-E: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Certs.; Off Watch
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch with negative implications its rating on the
repackaged securities from Restructured Asset Certificates with
Enhanced Returns (RACERS) Series 2004-13-E Trust, a repack
transaction arranged by ZAIS Group LLC.

"The affirmation reflects our belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating," S&P said.

"We placed the ratings on the trust certificates on CreditWatch
with negative implications on March 19, 2012, following our
updated criteria on pools of structured finance assets," S&P said.

"The repack transaction is collateralized by (i) a certificate
representing $50 million of the class B floating-rate notes from
SFA CABS II CDO, a mezzanine structured finance CDO transaction;
(ii) control of the voting rights for the class A floating-rate
note from SFA CABS II CDO; (iii) a $50 million zero-coupon
synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
arranged by Citigroup Global Markets Ltd.; and (iv) $2.76 million
of cash deposited in an interest accruing reserve account," S&P
said.

"The RACERS Series 2004-13-E Trust is structured such that all
payments made to the class B notes from SFA CABS II CDO are
deposited into the $2.76 million reserve account. This reserve
account is designed to cover the interest payment due to the
repackaged trust certificates. On the March 2012 payment date, the
SFA CABS II CDO transaction paid down in full the class A notes
and used all remaining proceeds to pay down the class B notes. The
interest and principal paid to the class B notes on the March 2012
payment date were greater than the interest due to the repackaged
trust certificates by approximately $66,000. As a result, the
reserve account increased by the excess. As of the February 2012
monthly report, the underlying portfolio for SFA CABS II CDO Ltd.
comprised only 10 performing assets, totaling $19.87 million in
par. The trustee report classified the remaining $30.58 million in
the underlying portfolio as defaulted," S&P said.

"The principal component backing the RACERS Series 2004-13-E Trust
is a $50 million zero-coupon synthetic CDO transaction. To date,
the synthetic CDO transaction has experienced a number of credit
events in the underlying $1 billion referenced portfolio of 125
investment-grade corporate names; however, the deal has not
breached the subordination threshold," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

   http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111558.pdf

RATING AFFIRMED

Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced Returns (RACERS)
Series 2004-13-E Trust

Class                     Rating
                     To               From
RACERS 2004-13-E     CCC+ (sf)        CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg


RALI: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 5 RMBS Tranches to 'Caa1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 86
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 5 tranches and confirmed the
ratings of 11 tranches from 17 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by RALI.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

In addition, Moody's has corrected the ratings on the Cl. A-V
tranches from RALI Series 2002-QS7 Trust and RALI Series 2003-QS11
Trust pursuant to the methodology described in "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published
in February 2012. The Cl. A-V tranches from these two transactions
are interest-only tranches linked to the collateral. Due to an
internal administrative error, these tranches were initially
misclassified and thus not included in the February 22, 2012
rating action on certain RMBS interest-only securities.

The rating action consists of a number of upgrades as well as
downgrades. The upgrades are due to significant improvement in
collateral performance, and/ or rapid build-up in credit
enhancement due to high prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For example, for
shifting interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose
the seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the
majority of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their
principal payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement
available to the senior bonds. In Moody's current approach,
Moody's captures this risk by running each individual pool through
a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured
Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by
Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and
the structural nuances of the transaction

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for
the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool are low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication listed
above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors. For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high, between 8% and 9%, and home
prices dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RALI Series 2001-QS13 Trust

A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-P, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2001-QS19 Trust

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2002-QS7 Trust

Cl. A-V, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2002-QS13 Trust

A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-7A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-P, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2002-QS18 Trust

A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QA1 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QS1 Trust

A-8, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 30,
2011 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3, Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade on December 19, 2011)

A-13, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-14, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-P, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QS10 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QS11 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Reinstated to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-13, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QS15 Trust

A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A-5, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-7, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-P, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QS18 Trust

A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QS3 Trust

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QS9 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS1 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS16 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-V, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-P, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-V, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS5 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS6 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF281812

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


RESIDENTIAL ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Five Tranches to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 21
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 11 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of eight tranches from 14 RMBS transactions, backed by
Subprime loans, issued by Residential Asset Mortgage Products
(RAMP) trusts.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Subprime pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

The rating actions reflect recent collateral performance, Moody's
updated loss timing curves and detailed analysis of timing and
amount of credit enhancement released due to step-down. Moody's
captures structural nuances by running each individual pool
through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variations across the
different pools and the structure of the transaction.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (11% for all vintages
2004 and prior). The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication listed above.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The above methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans
and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific
structural features allow for a monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors. For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's
Macroeconomic Board and Moody's Analytics (MA) still expect a
below-trend growth for the US economy for 2012, with the
unemployment rate remaining high between 8% to 9% and home prices
dropping another 2-3% from the levels seen in 1Q 2011.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2001-RS2, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-RS2

Cl. A-II, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-II-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS1 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS4 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-I-6, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS5 Trust

Cl. A-II, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS10 Trust

Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS4 Trust

Cl. A-II-A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-II-B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS6 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-II-A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS7 Trust

A-I-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A-I-6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-I-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-I-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

M-II-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-II-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-KR1 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-KR2 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS12 Trust

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-II-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS3 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-I-5, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS5 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS8 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF282549

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


STUDENT LOAN 2007-1: S&P Lowers 2 Certificate Ratings to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its 'BB' ratings on
Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1's class 5-A-l and
5-A-IO certificates to 'B-' and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

"The ratings on the class 5-A-l and 5-A-IO certificates are
dependent on the lower of (i) the rating on Deutsche Bank AG
('A+/Negative/A-1'); and (ii) the higher of the ratings on the
underlying securities, NCF Grantor Trust 2005-1's class A-5-1 and
A-5-2 certificates due March 26, 2035 ('B- (sf)'); and the rating
on Ambac Assurance Corp. (NR), which provides a financial
guarantee insurance policy on the underlying securities," S&P
said.

"The rating actions follow the April 5, 2012, lowering of our 'BB
(sf)' ratings on the underlying securities to 'B- (sf)' and their
subsequent removal from CreditWatch with negative implications. We
may take subsequent rating actions on the custody receipts due to
changes in our rating on Deutsche Bank AG or the underlying
security," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


TRIBECA PARK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, C, and D notes from Tribeca Park CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by GSO Capital
Partners L.P. "Simultaneously, we affirmed the rating on the class
A-1 notes. We also removed our ratings on all the classes in this
review from CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive
implications on Feb. 10, 2012," S&P said.

The upgrades reflect an improvement in credit support and the
class A-1 rating affirmation is based on sufficient credit support
at the current rating.

"The transaction is in its reinvestment period (scheduled to end
April 2013) and the credit support available to the notes has
improved, primarily due to an improvement in the credit quality of
the assets and a lower level of defaults since we last lowered
most of the ratings in February 2010 following the application of
our September 2009 corporate collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) criteria," S&P said.

"The trustee reported that the transaction's portfolio had $23.78
million of 'CCC' rated assets in its March 2012 monthly report,
down from $31.94 million in the January 2010 monthly report, which
we used for the February 2010 rating actions. When calculating the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios, the trustee haircuts from the
O/C numerator a portion of the 'CCC' rated collateral that exceed
the threshold specified in the transaction documents. Since the
current level of 'CCC' rated collateral is less than the
threshold, there was no haircut in the O/C calculations in the
March 2012 report," S&P said.

"In addition, the amount of defaulted obligations held in the
transaction's underlying portfolio also declined during this
period. According to the March 2012 trustee report, the
transaction held $3.48 million in defaulted assets, down from
$9.01 million in the January 2010 trustee report," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's also notes that the transaction is currently
passing its reinvestment O/C test. The transaction is structured
such that failure of this test--measured during the reinvestment
period in the interest proceeds section of the CLO's payment
waterfall--will divert excess interest proceeds--equal to lesser
of 50% of the available interest proceeds and the amount necessary
to cure the test--to purchase additional collateral obligations.
The transaction did not fail this test in the period since our
February 2010 rating actions. Based on the March 2012 trustee
report, the reinvestment O/C test result was 112.96%, compared
with a required minimum of 109.50%," S&P said.

"The transaction also has fewer deferrable obligations than it did
in February 2010. Additionally, the transaction's class A, B, C,
and D principal coverage O/C tests have improved over the same
period, and the weighted average spread has increased by 1.14%,"
S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Tribeca Park CLO Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To           From
A-1                AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                AA (sf)      AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  A+ (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
C                  BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D                  BBB- (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos


TRICADIA 2003-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class A-4L Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1LA, A-1LB, A-2L, A-3L, and A-4L notes from Tricadia CDO
2003-1 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transaction of mainly mezzanine tranches of corporate backed
CDOs; Tricadia CDO Management LLC manages the transaction. "At the
same time, we removed the ratings on the A-1LB, A-2L, A-3L, and A-
4L notes from CreditWatch, where we had placed them with negative
implications on March 19, 2012, following our update to the
criteria and assumptions we use to rate CDO transactions backed by
SF securities," S&P said.

"The affirmations reflect our updated CDO of SF securities
criteria and the availability of credit support at the current
rating levels, though we have seen a slight improvement in the
transaction's performance since we raised all of our ratings on
the notes in October 2011," S&P said.

"Since the time of the last action, the transaction has paid down
some senior notes. More specifically, the class A-1LA and A-2L
notes received approximately $12.93 million in principal
distributions, leaving them at 22.38% and 30.14% of their original
balances, respectfully. These paydowns have helped improve the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the notes since
the October 2011 rating actions," S&P said. The trustee reported
these O/C ratios in the March 2012 monthly report:

* The class senior class A O/C ratio was 141.7%, compared with a
   reported ratio of 136.2% in September 2011;

* The class A O/C ratio was 124.4%, compared with a reported
   ratio of 121.5% in September 2011; and

* The class B O/C ratio was 109.1%, compared with a reported
   ratio of 106.9% in September 2011.

"At the same time, we would also like to highlight that the
transaction's underlying credit performance has not significantly
changed since the last action. As of the March 2012 trustee
report, the transaction had $8.75 million of defaulted assets and
$50.36 million in assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC'
category," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1LB         A- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2L          A- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3L          BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4L          B (sf)       B (sf)/Watch Neg

RATING AFFIRMED

Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
Class                Rating
A-1LA                A+ (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
Coissuer:           Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Corp.
Collateral manager: Tricadia CDO Management LLC
Underwriter:        Bear Stearns Cos. LLC
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO


TRICADIA 2006-5: S&P Lowers Class C Note Rating to 'CC'; Off Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
C notes from Tricadia CDO 2006-5 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transaction primarily backed by CDOs of corporate
assets and managed by Tricadia CDO Management LLC. "At the same
time, we affirmed our rating on the class B notes and removed our
ratings on both class from CreditWatch, where we placed them with
negative implications on March 19, 2012, in connection with our
February 2012 revised criteria for CDOs of pooled structured
finance assets," S&P said.

"We lowered the rating on the class C note to a level that is
commensurate with the credit available. The affirmation of the
rating on the class B notes reflects our opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with current rating level," S&P
said.

"On the transaction's March 19, 2012, payment date, Tricadia CDO
2006-5 failed its senior coverage test, resulting in an $896,780
deposit into the reserve account and reduced the unfunded super
senior note balance. This coverage test has been out of compliance
since July 30, 2010, and the resulting paydowns have reduced the
balance of the unfunded super senior notes by $32.60 million
to $145.66 million. This has also resulted in an aggregate
deferral of $4.46 million in interest payments to the class D, E,
and F notes," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Tricadia CDO 2006-5 Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To          From
B                  B (sf)      B (sf)/Watch Neg
C                  CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C20: S&P Lowers Rating on G Cert. to 'D(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2005-C20, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "In
addition, we lowered our ratings on two classes and affirmed our
ratings on eight other classes from the same transaction," S&P
said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the credit
characteristics of the collateral remaining in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.
The upgrades reflect credit enhancement and liquidity levels that
provide adequate support through various stress scenarios. The
upgrades considered deleveraging of the deal from loan paydowns
and 107 loans ($1.9 billion, 77.7%) with reported debt service
coverage (DSCs) above 1.25x," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect the monthly credit support erosion that we
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of eight ($65.7
million, 2.7%) of the 10 ($123.6 million, 5.0%) assets with the
special servicers, as well as reduced liquidity support due to
continued interest shortfalls to the trust," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class X-P and X-C interest-only (IO)
certificates based on our current criteria," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted DSC of 1.83x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 94.0%. We
further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to
yield a weighted average DSC of 1.05x and an LTV ratio of 126.1%.
The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario
were 59.3% and 34.8%. All of the DSC and LTV calculations we
exclude eight ($65.7 million, 2.7%) of the transaction's 10
($123.6 million, 5.0%) assets with the special servicers and
eight defeased loans ($150.0 million, 6.1%). Our defeased figure
includes the 200 Public Square loan ($108.9 million, 4.4%), which
according to the master servicer was defeased subsequent to the
March 16, 2012, trustee remittance reporting. We separately
estimated losses for the excluded specially serviced assets and
included them in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures," S&P said.

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $112,459. The
interest shortfalls were primarily related to appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts totaling $89,391
and special servicing fees of $25,789. The current interest
shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and including class
H. Class G had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for
seven months. We lowered the rating on class G to 'D (sf)' because
we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future. In addition, we lowered
our rating on class F to 'CCC+ (sf)' due to reduced liquidity
support and the class' susceptibility to future interest
shortfalls from the specially serviced assets," S&P said.

                    TRANSACTION SUMMARY

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had a trust balance of $2.47 billion, down from
$3.66 billion at issuance. The pool currently includes 155 loans
and three real estate owned (REO) assets. The master servicer,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), provided financial
information for 97.7% of the loans in the pool: 36.3% was full-
year 2010 data, 20.7% was partial-year 2011 data, and 40.7% was
full-year 2011 data," S&P said.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.75x for the pool based
on the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.83x
and 94.0%, which exclude eight ($65.7 million, 2.7%) of the
transaction's 10 ($123.6 million, 5.0%) assets with the special
servicers and eight defeased loans ($150.0 million, 6.1%). The
weighted average of the reporting specially serviced assets was
1.28x. We separately estimated losses for the excluded specially
serviced assets and included them in the 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures. To date, the trust has
experienced $140.4 million in principal losses relating to eight
assets. Twenty-three loans ($424.3 million, 17.2%), including two
of the top 10 loans in the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist. Twenty-two loans ($200.6 million, 8.1%) reported a DSC
below 1.10x, of which 16 ($134.4 million, 5.5%) loans reported
a DSC below 1.00x," S&P said.

          SUMMARY OF TOP 10 LOANS SECURED BY REAL ESTATE

"Excluding the 200 Public Square loan, which was defeased
subsequent to the March 2012 trustee remittance reporting, the top
10 loans currently secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $1.1 billion (43.1%). Using servicer-
reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of 2.05x
for these loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top 10
loans were 1.90x and 94.7%, respectively. While one of the top 10
loans ($54.0 million, 2.2%) is in special servicing, two of the
top loans ($231.4 million, 9.4%) in the pool are on the master
servicer's watchlist, and are discussed as set forth," S&P said.

"The NGP Rubicon GSA Pool loan, the largest loan in the pool
currently secured by real estate, has a whole-loan balance of
$380.1 million that is divided into two pari passu pieces, of
which $190.1 million makes up 7.7% of the trust balance. The loan
appeared on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported
DSC, which was 1.26x for year-end 2011. The loan is secured by 14
suburban office buildings and one distribution center totaling
2.99 million sq. ft. in 10 states and Washington, D.C. According
to the March 31, 2012, rent rolls, nine of the properties are each
100% leased to General Services Administration (GSA) entities. The
reported occupancy was 100.0% for year-ended 2011," S&P said.

"The Evansville Pavilion loan ($41.3 million, 1.7%), the 10th-
largest loan in the pool, appeared on the master servicer's
watchlist because of a low reported DSC, which was 0.74x for the
year-end 2010. Wells Fargo indicated that it mainly attributes the
low DSC to the filling for bankruptcy of two large junior anchors,
Linens 'n Things Inc. (28,169-sq.-ft.) and Borders Group Inc.
(23,000-sq.ft.). The loan is secured by a 272,406-sq.-ft. anchored
retail center in Evansville, Ind. The reported occupancy was 80.0%
as of Sept. 30, 2011," S&P said.

                   CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

"As of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance report, 10 ($123.6
million, 5.0%) assets in the pool were with the special servicers,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital) and C-III Asset
Management LLC (C-III). The payment status of the specially
serviced assets as of the March 16, 2012, trustee remittance
report is as follows: three ($14.1 million, 0.5%) are REO, one
($16.5 million, 0.7%) is in foreclosure, three ($30.2 million,
1.2%) are 90-plus-days delinquent, two ($58.9 million, 2.4%) are
60 days delinquent, and one ($3.9 million, 0.2%) is current.
Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $35.5 million were in
effect for six of the specially serviced assets. Details of the
largest specially serviced asset, which is a top 10 loan currently
secured by real estate, is as set forth," S&P said.

"The 101 Avenue of the Americas loan is the largest loan with the
special servicer and the ninth-largest loan currently secured by
real estate in the pool. The loan has a whole-loan balance of
$134.9 million that is split into two pari passu pieces, $54.0
million of which makes up 2.2% of the trust balance. The loan is
secured by 23-story, 411,097-sq.-ft. office property in New York
City. The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 7,
2011, due to the sole tenant vacating at its lease expiry and its
Dec. 11, 2011, maturity. According to the special servicer for
this loan, C-III, the loan was subsequently modified on Dec. 30,
2011. The modification terms included, among other items,
extending the loan's maturity date to Jan. 11, 2013, with an
option to extend until January 11, 2014 and converting the debt
service payments to interest only. C-III indicated that the office
building is currently undergoing renovation and is 100% vacant. An
ARA of $13.5 million is reported for this loan. According to C-
III, the borrower has indicated that it is in the process of
finalizing a lease with a potential tenant to occupy 149,000 sq.
ft. of the vacant space. C-III stated that it expects to return
the loan to the master servicer in the near future," S&P said.

"The nine remaining loans with the special servicers have
individual balances that represent less than 0.7% of the total
pool balance. ARAs totaling $22.0 million are in effect against
five of the nine assets. We estimated losses for eight of these
assets, arriving at a weighted average loss severity of 39.8%.
According to the special servicer for the Sam Houston Parkway
Office Building loan ($3.9 million, 0.2%), CWCapital, it expects
the loan, which has a reported DSC of 1.13x for the three months
ended March 31, 2011, to be returned to the master servicer on
June 2012. The loan has a reported current payment status," S&P
said.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to
its current criteria, and the analysis is consistent with the
raised, lowered, and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C20
                  Rating
Class        To              From       Credit enhancement (%)
A-MFL        AAA (sf)        A+ (sf)                     24.01
A-MFX        AAA (sf)        A+ (sf)                     24.01
A-J          A- (sf)         BBB- (sf)                   12.87
B            BBB- (sf)       BB (sf)                      9.72
C            BB+ (sf)        BB- (sf)                     8.60
D            BB- (sf)        B+ (sf)                      5.82

RATINGS LOWERED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C20
             Rating
Class  To              From           Credit enhancement (%)
F      CCC+ (sf)       B- (sf)                         2.48
G      D (sf)          CCC+ (sf)                       1.18

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C20

Class    Rating                Credit enhancement (%)
A-6A     AAA (sf)                              38.86
A-6B     AAA (sf)                              38.86
A-PB     AAA (sf)                              38.86
A-7      AAA (sf)                              38.86
A-1A     AAA (sf)                              38.86
E        B   (sf)                               4.15
X-P      AAA (sf)                                N/A
X-C      AAA (sf)                                N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Fitch Cuts Rating on 7 Certificates to CC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven distressed classes of Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2007-C30.

The downgrades reflect more certainty of losses for the specially
serviced loans, therefore the already distressed bonds are being
downgraded. Fitch modeled losses of 14.5% of the original pool
balance (includes losses realized to date) based on updated
cashflows and valuations of specially serviced loans.  This is a
slight improvement in expected losses from Fitch's last rating
action, thus the majority of the pool is being affirmed.  There
are currently 28 specially serviced loans (31.7%) in the pool.
Four of the specially serviced loans (27.4%) are within the
transaction's top 15 loans by unpaid principal balance.

As of the March 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 10.8% to $7.05 billion
from $7.90 billion at issuance.  There are no defeased loans.
Cumulative interest shortfalls in the amount of $57.9 million are
currently affecting classes D through S.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled loss was Peter Cooper
Village/Stuyvesant Town (PCV/ST) (21.3%), which comprises 56
multi-story buildings, situated on 80 acres, and includes a total
of 11,227 apartments.  The loan transferred to special servicing
in November 2009. Property performance continues to be below what
is needed to service the debt; however, the securitized loan
balance per unit ($267,213) is low relative to other NYC multi-
family properties.  The most recent servicer-reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) is 0.63 times (x) and occupancy is 95% as of
December 2010.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is Five Times
Square (7.6%). The interest-only loan is secured by the leasehold
interest in a 1.1 million square foot (sf) office property in New
York City.  The December 2011 year-to-date (YTD) OSAR reflects a
DSCR of 1.03x with occupancy at 100%.  The property is 96.7%
leased to Ernst & Young through 2022 with two 10-year extension
options. The loan is highly leveraged, with the A-note at $973 per
sf and total debt at $1,095 per sf.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is One Congress
Street (2.7%).  The interest-only loan is secured by a 1.2 million
sf building which features approximately 313,527 sf of office and
retail space and a parking garage with approximately 886,473 sf in
downtown Boston, MA near City Hall.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in November 2011 due to imminent monetary
default.  As of January 2012, the building's office and retail
occupancy is at 33% and the June 2011 YTD OSAR reflects a DSCR of
0.67x. The special servicer is currently in discussions with the
borrower regarding a loan restructure.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

  -- $69.2 million class D to 'CC' from 'CCC' '; RE 0%;
  -- $59.3 million class E to 'CC' from 'CCC'; RE 0%;
  -- $69.2 million class F to 'CC' from 'CCC'; RE 0%;
  -- $98.8 million class G to 'CC' from 'CCC'; RE 0%;
  -- $79 million class H to 'CC' from 'CCC'; RE 0%;
  -- $88.9 million class J to 'CC' from 'CCC'; RE 0%;
  -- $79 million class K to 'CC' from 'CCC'; RE 0%.

Additionally, Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

  -- $338.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $195.5 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $126.9 million class A-PB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.876 billion class A-5 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.199 billion class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $540.3 million class A-M at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $250 million class A-MFL at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $671.8 million class A-J at 'CCC'; RE 65%;
  -- $49.4 million class B at 'CCC'; RE 0%;
  -- $79 million class C at 'CCC''; RE 0%.

Fitch has previously withdrawn the ratings of the interest only
classes X-P, X-C and X-W.

Class A-1 and A-2 are paid in full.  Fitch does not rate classes L
through S.


WAVE SPC 2007-3: S&P Withdraws 'D' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes and affirmed its ratings on three classes from WAVE SPC's
series 2007-3, a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) transaction, and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. "We subsequently withdrew
our ratings on the notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect our analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the credit characteristics of the
underlying collateral using our global CDOs of pooled structured
finance assets criteria. We downgraded class D to 'D (sf)' due to
our determination that the class is unlikely to be repaid in full.
We subsequently withdrew our ratings on the classes of notes
following the redemption of the notes in exchange for the
underlying collateral. According to the March 19, 2012, trustee
report, the notes were redeemed in exchanged for the release of
the underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
collateral. Following the release of the collateral, the principal
balances of the notes were reduced to zero," S&P said.

"The global CDOs of pooled structured finance assets criteria
include revisions to our assumptions on correlations, recovery
rates, and default patterns and timings of the collateral. The
criteria also include supplemental stress tests (largest obligor
default test and largest industry default test) in our analysis,"
S&P said.

"Prior to the redemption of the notes, WAVE 2007-3 consists of 30
classes of CMBS ($330 Million, 100%) from 30 distinct transactions
issued in 2006 or 2007," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED, REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH AND WITHDRAWN

WAVE SPC
Collateralized debt obligations series 2007-3
                  Rating
Class     To            Interim        From
A-1       NR            CCC- (sf)      B (sf)/Watch Neg
D         NR            D (sf)         CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED, REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH AND WITHDRAWN

WAVE SPC
Collateralized debt obligations series 2007-3
                  Rating
Class     To            Interim        From
A-2       NR            CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
B         NR            CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
C         NR            CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


ZAIS IX: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CC'; Off Watch
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class B notes from Zais Investment Grade Ltd. IX, a collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by tranches from other
CDOs, and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.
"At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the A-1, A-2, and X
notes, and removed two of them from CreditWatch negative. Zais
Group LLC manages the transaction," S&P said.

"The rating action follows our performance review of the
transaction and reflects our updated criteria for CDOs backed by
structured finance assets. In our view, insufficient collateral
remains to pay the B notes in full. As of the March 2012 trustee
report, $280 million in collateral was backing $295 million in
class A and B liabilities," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on the A-1, A-2, and X notes to reflect
the availability of credit support at the current rating levels,"
S&P said.

"The remaining notes in the transaction, classes C and D, are
deferrable, and we lowered their ratings to 'D (sf)' in October
2011 to reflect the ongoing collateral deterioration of the
securities within the asset pool," S&P said.

"We will continue to review our ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in our view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Zais Investment Grade Ltd. IX
                              Rating
Class                   To           From
A-1                     BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2                     B (sf)       B (sf)/Watch Neg
B                       CC (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

RATING AFFIRMED

Zais Investment Grade Ltd. IX
Class                   Rating
X                       AAA (sf)

OTHER RATINGS OUTSTANDING

Zais Investment Grade Ltd. IX
Class                   Rating
C                       D (sf)
D                       D (sf)


* Moody's Confirms Ba1 Ratings on Radian Asset-Backed Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 2 classes
of US structured finance securities wrapped by Radian Asset
Assurance. The impacted securities are backed by residential
mortgages.

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-4

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-13CB

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2011 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

This action is solely driven by Moody's announcement on April 17,
2012 that it has confirmed the Ba1 insurance financial strength
rating of Radian Asset Assurance.

The methodologies used in rating CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
2004-4 were "Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities" published in December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2012. The
methodologies used in rating CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-13CB were "Moody's Approach to Rating US
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in December
2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

Moody's ratings on structured finance securities that are
guaranteed or "wrapped" by a financial guarantor are generally
maintained at a level equal to the higher of the following: a) the
rating of the guarantor (if rated at the investment grade level);
or b) the published or unpublished underlying rating. Moody's
approach to rating wrapped transactions is outlined in Moody's
special comment entitled "Assignment of Wrapped Ratings When
Financial Guarantor Falls Below Investment Grade" (May, 2008); and
Moody's November 10, 2008 announcement entitled "Moody's Modifies
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities Wrapped by
Financial Guarantors". The principal methodology used in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have a financial guaranty and is as
described earlier.

This action is driven solely by the rating action on Radian and is
not a result of change in key assumptions, expected losses, cash
flows and stress scenarios on the underlying assets.


* DBRS Confirms 'C(sf)' Ratings on Nine U.S. RMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has confirmed its outstanding ratings on nine U.S.
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) transactions based
on a review of the assignment and transfer of servicing rights
from JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association to Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, effective April 2, 2012, the subservicing by
JPMorgan of certain of the mortgage loans and the amendments
relating to the financing of advances by the servicer.

Issuer                      Debt Rated          Rating Action
------                      ----------          -------------
Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed      Confirmed AAA(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-1

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed      Confirmed BBB(low)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through      (sf)
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-2

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed         Confirmed B(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-3

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed         Confirmed C(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-4

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed         Confirmed C(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-5

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed         Confirmed C(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-6

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed         Confirmed C(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-7

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed         Confirmed C(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-8

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed         Confirmed C(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-9

Park Place Securities Inc.,  Asset-Backed         Confirmed C(sf)
Series 2005-WCH1             Pass-Through
                             Certificates,
                             Series 2005-
                             WCH1, Class M-10

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class 1-A-1

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class 2-A-3

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class 2-A-4

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class M-1

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class M-2

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class M-3

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class M-4

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class M-5

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class M-6

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class M-7

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class M-8

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class B-1

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class B-2

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class B-3

Credit Suisse First Boston   Home Equity Pass-    Confirmed C(sf)
Mortgage Securities Corp.    Through Certificates,
Home Equity Asset Trust      Series 2006-4,
2006-4                       Class B-4

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class A1

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class A3

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class A4

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class M1

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class M2

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class M3

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class M4

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class M5

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class M6

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class M7

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class M8

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class B1

Structured Asset Investment Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Loan Trust, Series 2006-    Certificates, Series
BNC3                        2006-BNC3, Class B2

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class A1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class A3

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class A4

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M2

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M3

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M4

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M5

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M6

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M7

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M8

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class M9

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class B1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2006-BC2              2006-BC2, Class B2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class A1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed B(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class A2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class A3

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class A4

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class A5

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M3

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M4

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M5

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M6

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M7

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M8

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class M9

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class B1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-1                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-1, Class B2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class A1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class A2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class A3

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class A4

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class A5

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M3

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M4

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M5

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M6

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M7

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M8

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class M9

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class B1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-2                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-2, Class B2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A2A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A2B

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A3

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A3A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A3B

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A4

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A4A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class A4B

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M1A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M1B

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M2A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M2B

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M3

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M3A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M3B

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M4

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M4A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M4B

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M5

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M5A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M5B

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M6

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M6A

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M7

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M8

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class M9

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class B1

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class B2

BNC Mortgage Loan Trust     Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
2007-4                      Certificates, Series
                            2007-4, Class B3

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class A1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class A2

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed B(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class A3

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class A4

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M2

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M3

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M4

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M5

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M6

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M7

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M8

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class M9

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class B1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC4              2007-BC4, Class B2

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class A1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed BBB
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series  (high) (sf)
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class A2

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class A3

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class A4

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class A5

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class A6

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M2

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M3

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M4

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M5

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M6

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M7

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M8

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class M9

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class B1

Structured Asset Securities Mortgage Pass-Through Confirmed C(sf)
Corporation Mortgage Loan   Certificates, Series
Trust 2007-BC1              2007-BC1, Class B2


* S&P Places Ratings on 168 Tranches From 42 CDOs on Watch Pos
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 168
tranches from 42 U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.

The affected tranches are from CDO transactions backed by
securities issued by corporate obligors. These tranches had an
original issuance amount of $7.39 billion.

"Most of the affected transactions are collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs), and the CreditWatch placements reflect the
continued improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
obligors, including reduction in defaults and an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying loans that collateralize
these CLOs," S&P said.

"At the end of the first quarter of 2012, the default rate on the
Standard & Poor's LSTA Leveraged Loan Index was 0.51% by principal
amount and 0.77% by issuer count. These are significantly lower
than the historical averages of 3.45% by amount and 3.28% by
number, and a fraction of the default rates seen in November 2009
when they peaked at 10.81% and 8.25%, respectively. Of the 15
publicly rated U.S. speculative-grade entities that defaulted
during the first quarter, 11 were held in U.S. CLOs in the
beginning of the quarter," S&P said.

"We will resolve 's CreditWatch placements after we complete a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review for each of
the affected transactions. We expect to resolve these CreditWatch
placements within 90 days. We will continue to monitor the CDO
transactions we rate and take rating actions, including
CreditWatch placements, as we deem appropriate," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

   http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111558.pdf

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

ACA CLO 2005-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1L                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2L                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
A-3L                 A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
B-1L                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
B-2L                 BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

ARES VIR CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1-A                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-1-C                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
C-1                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
D                    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB (sf)

Avenue CLO Fund Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2L                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-3L                 A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
B-1F                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
B-1L                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
B-2L                 CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Berkeley Street CDO (Cayman) Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)

Black Diamond International Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
2005-A MTN           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
Senior variable fund AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)

Bristol Bay Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B                    CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

Carlyle Veyron CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1-B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C(def)               A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
D(def)               BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

CIFC Funding 2006-IB Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2L                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-3L                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
B-1L                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
B-2L                 CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

CIFC Funding 2007-I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1L                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-1LB                AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-2L                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-3L                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
B-1L                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
B-2L                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

CIFC Funding 2007-III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1-J                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D                    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

CIT CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
C                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
D                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
E                    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

CoLTS 2005-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B                    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D                    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

CSAM Funding II
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A                    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)

CSAM Funding III
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                    A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Dryden VII-Leveraged Loan CDO 2004
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B-1L                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B-2L                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
C-1                  AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
C-2                  AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
D-1                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D-2                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D-3                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
E                    CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

FIRST 2004-I CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B                    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)

FM Leveraged Capital Fund I
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B                    AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
C                    A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
D                    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Gannet Peak CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1                  AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
A-1B                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
A-2                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
B-1                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
B-2                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
C                    B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)
D-1                  CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)
D-2                  CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Golub International Loan Ltd. I
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A                    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)

Grand Horn CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
C                    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
D                    BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
E                    BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Grayson CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1b                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-2                  A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
B                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
C                    CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)
D                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Hewett's Island CLO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B-1                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B-2                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Hewett's Island CLO V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B                    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
D                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
E                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Katonah 2007-I CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2L                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-3L                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
B-1L                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
B-2L                 BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Latitude CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
B-1                  BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
B-2                  BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
C                    CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)
D                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

LCM II L.P.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B                    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
C                    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
D                    BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
E1                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
E2                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

LCM IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B                    AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
C                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
D                    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Navigator CDO 2004 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-3A                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-3B                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B-1                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)

NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2005-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B                    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
C                    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
D                    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

Oak Hill Credit Partners II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
C-1                  A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
C-2                  A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
D-1                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D-2                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D-3                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

OWS CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
X-1                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
X-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)

Pacifica CDO VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
B                    A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
C-1                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
C-2                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Peritus I CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
C                    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Sandelman Finance 2006-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
B                    A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D                    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-1J                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-1S                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2                  AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
B                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D                    CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

TCW Select Loan Fund Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
Composite            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
D-1                  B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
D-2                  B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Venture III CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
Def B                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C                    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)

WG Horizons CLO I
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1                  AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D                    CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

WhiteHorse III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1L                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-2L                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-3L                 BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
B-1L                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

WhiteHorse IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C                    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D                    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Wind River CLO II - Tate Investors Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                To                  From
A-1                  AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
A-2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B-1                  BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
B-2                  BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
C                    CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)
D-1                  CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)
D-2                  CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)
Type 1 Cp            CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)




                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***