TCR_Public/111211.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, December 11, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 343

                            Headlines

ABSPOKE 2005-VIA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class VFRN to 'CCC-'
ACAS CRE: Fitch Affirms Rating on 17 Note Classes
ACM 2004-2: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. J Notes at 'Ba1'
ACT 2005-RR: Fitch Cuts Rating on $92MM Class A-2 Notes to 'Dsf'
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: S&P Ups Series 2010-2 ABS Rating From 'BB'

ANTHRACITE 2005: Fitch Junks Rating on Five Note Classes
AVIATION CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Rating of Class B Notes to 'Ba3'
BABSON CLO: S&P Keeps 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
BACM 2004-3: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. G Notes Rating at 'B1'
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Junks Rating on Five Certificate Classes

BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Cuts Rating on Class J Certs. to 'B+'
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Rating Eight Note Classes to Junk
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
CAPITAL TRUST: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes to 'D'
CFCRE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 (sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes

CGCMT 2005-EMG: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. J Notes at 'Ba1'
CITIGROUP COMM: Fitch Junks Rating on Four Certificate Classes
COMM 2004-LNB4: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. B Notes to 'Ba1'
COMM MORTGAGE: Fitch Junks Rating to Two Note Classes
COMPASS RE: S&P Gives 'B+' Rating on $250-Mil. Sr. Secured Notes

CONNECTICUT VALLEY: Moody's Confirms Rating of $15MM Notes at B1
CPS AUTO: Moody's Assigns (P) Ba2 (sf) to Class C Notes
CPS AUTO: S&P Gives 'B+' Rating on Class D Asset-Backed Notes
CSFB 2003-C4: Moodys Affirms Rating of Cl. G Notes at 'Ba3'
CSFB 2004-C5: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. E Notes at 'Ba2'

DENALI CAPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-1L Notes From 'BB+'
EMBARCADERO AIRCRAFT: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. A-1 Notes to Ca
FAXTOR ABS: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Two Note Classes
FIRST UNION: S&P Cuts Rating on Class L Certificates to 'CCC-'
FLATIRON CLO: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Deferrable Notes

FOLEY SQUARE: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class E Notes
INDOSUEZ CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Note Classes
JP MORGAN: Fitch Junks Rating on Five Certificate Classes
JP MORGAN: Moody's Raises Rating to Aaa; Previously 'Ba2'
LB-UBS COMM: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Ten Note Classes

LBFRC 2007-LLF C5: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. C Notes at 'Ba2'
LBUBS 2004-C1: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. H Notes to 'B1'
MERRILL LYNCH: DBRS Downgrades Class M Rating to 'D'
MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Cert. Classes
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Cuts 3 Classes of Cert. Ratings to 'D'

MESA WEST: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. B Notes at 'Ba3'
MILL CREEK: Moody's 'Ba3' Rating to US$10.5MM Class E Notes
MSCI 2004: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Four Note Classes
N-STA REAL: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on 11 Note Classes
NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Affirms Cl. I-MM Notes Rating at 'B1'

PUTNAM STRUCTURED: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'B+'
RACE POINT: Fitch Raises Rating on Three Note Classes to Low-B
RACE POINT: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Deferrable Notes
SCSC 2006-5: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. F Notes at 'Ba1'
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. A-1 Notes to 'Ba2'

TRICADIA CDO 2006-5: Moody's Raises Rating of US$55MM Notes to B3
TROY DOWNTOWN: Fitch Junks Rating on Two Bond Classes
UBS-CITIGROUP: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class F Certificates
WAMU COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
WBCMT 2006-C26: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. C Notes at 'Ba1'

ZAIS INVESTMENT: Moody's Raises Rating of US$81-Mil. Notes to Ba1

* Fitch Lowers Rating on 51 Bonds in 28 CMBS Transactions to 'D'
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 164 Classes from 69 US RMBS Transactions
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 201 Classes from US RMBS Transactions



                            *********

ABSPOKE 2005-VIA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class VFRN to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on
26 tranches from 25 U.S. corporate-backed synthetic
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions and
removed them from CreditWatch with positive implications.
"At the same time, we lowered our ratings on one tranche
from one synthetic CDO transaction backed by residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), five tranches from five
synthetic CDO transactions backed by commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS), and one tranche from one corporate-
backed synthetic CDO. In addition, we affirmed our ratings
on 20 tranches from 15 synthetic CDO transactions," S&P said.

"The upgraded classes are from synthetic CDOs that experienced
a combination of upward rating migration in their underlying
reference portfolios and seasoning of the underlying reference
names. These classes also experienced an increase in the synthetic
rated overcollateralization (SROC) ratios above 100% at higher
rating levels (as of the November review) and at our projection
of the SROC ratios in 90 days assuming no credit migration. The
downgraded classes are from synthetic CDOs that had experienced
negative rating migration in their underlying reference portfolios
or reductions in credit enhancement available to the notes. The
affirmations reflect our opinion of the sufficient credit support
available at the current rating levels," S&P said.

Rating Actions

ABSpoke 2005-VIA Ltd.
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
VFRN               CCC- (sf)           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR1 mil tranche A Hunter Valley CDO II fixed-rate notes due 30
June 2014 series 2007-9
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Tranche A          BB+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR10 mil tranche A Hunter Valley CDO II floating rate notes due
June 30, 2014 series 2007-2
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Tranche A          BB+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR7.5 mil tranche B Hunter Valley CDO II floating rate notes due
June 30, 2017 series 2007-5
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Tranche B          BB- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Cloverie PLC
EUR100 mil Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes Series 2007-44
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B (sf)              CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Cloverie PLC
EUR50 mil Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes Series 2007-43
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B (sf)              CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10 mil HSBC Bank USA NA - The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp.
Ltd. 227212/227229/227230
                                 Rating
Class               To                From
Tranche             BBsrp (sf)        BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.891 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506494096
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.891 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506551445
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.892 bil Swap Risk rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506551406
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.892 bil Swap Risk rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506551414
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.892 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506551423
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506551442
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.894 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506551435
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.895 bil Sawp Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506551383
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No. SDB506550851
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref. No. SDB506551403
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+srp (sf)          Bsrp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
$187.5 mil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
PYR_8631051_82386545_Vizzavona
                            Rating
Class              To                  From
Swap               Asrp (sf)           A-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

CypressTree Synthetic CDO Ltd.
Series 2006-1
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               A+ (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Pos

Galena CDO II (Ireland) PLC
Series A-1U10-B
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1U10-B            B+ (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 6
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A1A-$LMS            BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Halcyon 2005-2 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   BB (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Landgrove Synthetic CDO SPC
Series 2007-2
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Marvel Finance 2007-3 LLC
Series 2007-3
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
IA                  B- (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2005-9
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2007-35
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   A- (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2008-5
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Class I             A+ (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2006-2
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
III                 B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

North Street Referenced Linked Notes 2005-9 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
D                   AA- (sf)            A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E                   BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

ORSO Portfolio Tranche Index Certificates
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
CL                  A+ (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Pos

Salisbury International Investments Ltd.
Series 2005-08
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Salisbury International Investments Ltd.
Series 2005-5
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Salisbury International Investments Ltd.
Series 2005-6
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Seawall SPC$50 mil Seawall SPC
Series 2006-2 (CMBS Synthetic Reremic)
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC+ (sf)           B- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

AMP CMBS 2006-1
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Securd Nts         BBB (sf)            BBB (sf)

AMP CMBS 2006-2
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Securd Nts         AA- (sf)            AA- (sf)

Claris Ltd.
$15 mil Sonoma Valley 2007-3 CDO of CMBS Variable Notes due 2049
Series 106/2007
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Tranche            BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)

Claris Ltd.
$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Notes
due 2049 Series 94/2007
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Tranche 1          BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)

Claris Ltd.
$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Notes
due 2049 Series 92/2007
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Tranche 1          A+ (sf)             A+ (sf)

Claris Ltd.
$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Notes
due 2049 Series 93/2007
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Tranche 1          BBB (sf)            BBB (sf)

Claris Ltd.
$23 mil Sonoma Valley 2007-4 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Notes
due 2051 Series 115/2007
                            Rating
Class              To                  From
Tranche            B (sf)              B (sf)

Claris Ltd.
$31.5 mil Sonoma Valley 2007-3 CDO of CMBS Variable Notes due 2049
Series 105/2007
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             BBB+ (sf)           BBB+ (sf)

Credit Default Swap
$1 bil Credit Default Swap - CRA600016
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Swap                AAAsrp (sf)         AAAsrp (sf)

Credit Default Swap$1 bil Credit Default Swap - CRA600036
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Swap                AAAsrp (sf)         AAAsrp (sf)

Credit Default Swap
$1 bil Swap Risk Rating Portfolio -Deutsche Bank AG, New York
Branch - AG Financial Products, Inc. CDS Reference # N734765N
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
Swap                AAAsrp (sf)         AAAsrp (sf)

Galena CDO II (Ireland) PLC
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1E10              CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)
A-1J10              CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)
A-1U10              CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)
A-1UA10             CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)

STEERS High-Grade CMBS Resecuritization Trust
Series 2006-1 2 3
                                 Rating
Class               To                  From
2006-1              BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)
2006-2              BB- (sf)            BB- (sf)
2006-3              BB- (sf)            BB- (sf)


ACAS CRE: Fitch Affirms Rating on 17 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes issued by ACAS CRE CDO 2007-
1 Ltd./LLC (ACAS CRE CDO) as a result of continued negative credit
migration.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2011, approximately
24.2% of the collateral has been downgraded.  Currently, 100% of
the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade,
of which all is rated in the 'CCC' category and below.  As of the
November 16, 2011 trustee report, 96.4% of the portfolio is
experiencing interest shortfalls.

Over the past year interest proceeds have continued to be
insufficient to pay the full swap counterparty payment. As a
result, classes A through D notes have not been receiving their
timely interest distributions. Therefore, classes A through D have
been affirmed at 'Dsf'.  For classes E through N notes, Fitch
analyzed each class' sensitivity to the default of the distressed
assets ('CCC' and below).  Given the high probability of default
of the underlying assets and the expected limited recovery
prospects upon default, classes E through N have been affirmed at
'Csf', indicating that default is inevitable.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
Given the portfolio's distressed nature, Fitch believes that the
probability of default for all classes of notes can be evaluated
without factoring potential further losses from the non-defaulted
portion of the portfolio.  Therefore, this transaction was not
modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF
PCM).

ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 is a commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO) that is backed by commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) B-pieces and closed on July 24, 2007.
The portfolio is composed of 105 assets from 20 obligors from the
2005 through 2007 vintages.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

  -- $181,411,874 class A at 'Dsf';
  -- $86,330,000 class B at 'Dsf';
  -- $41,000,000 class C-FL at 'Dsf';
  -- $11,850,000 class C-FX at 'Dsf';
  -- $25,250,000 class D at 'Dsf';
  -- $25,175,783 class E-FL at 'Csf';
  -- $27,908,927 class E-FX at 'Csf';
  -- $34,399,638 class F-FL at 'Csf';
  -- $38,414,711 class F-FX at 'Csf';
  -- $24,747,845 class G-FL at 'Csf';
  -- $33,193,998 class G-FX at 'Csf';
  -- $72,241,675 class H at 'Csf';
  -- $45,972,991 class J at 'Csf';
  -- $47,300,290 class K at 'Csf';
  -- $70,472,536 class L at 'Csf';
  -- $39,889,901 class M at 'Csf';
  -- $6,804,162 class N at 'Csf'.


ACM 2004-2: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. J Notes at 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) downgraded the ratings of
three classes and affirmed 14 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-2:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on January 28, 2011
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on January 28, 2011
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. L, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. N, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf) and Confirmed

Cl. O, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on January 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on October 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.5% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 4%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is 9% of
the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and
the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans,
the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could
decline below the current levels. If future performance materially
declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and the
priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the
current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are in
recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter , amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. Please see the Credit Policy
page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 16 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.1 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated January 28, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 50% to
$572.6 million from $1.13 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 51 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 48% of the pool. Eleven loans,
representing 19% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. Government securities.

Nine loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $1.2 million (46% loss severity). Currently
two loans, representing 4% of the pool, are in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Lakeside III Loan
($13.4 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 102,000
square foot (SF) office building located in Dulles, Virginia. The
loan was transferred to special servicing in March 2011 due to
imminent default. The property is currently 97% occupied, however
a major tenant (65% NRA) is exercising its early termination
clause and vacating in November 2012. The tenant will pay
$1.5 million for the early termination fee and the property will
become 33% occupied. The borrower submitted a loan modification
proposal in October 2011. The other specially serviced loan is
secured by a retail center in Keene, NH. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $7.8 million loss for both the specially serviced loans
(32% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 2% of the pool and has estimated an
$1.7 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 30% probability
default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for
100% of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 87% compared to 83% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 14% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.48X and 1.22X, respectively, compared to
1.57X and 1.28X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Prince Kuhio Plaza Loan
($35.2 million -- 6.2%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 504,000 square foot regional mall located in Hilo,
Hawaii. The mall is owned by an affiliate of General Growth
Properties, Inc. (GGP). The mall was 80% leased as of June 2011
compared to 87% at last review. Anchor tenants include Sears,
Macy's and Safeway. The property's performance has declined
since last review, but the decline has been largely offset by
amortization. The loan amortized 2% since last review. Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.41X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.38X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 25.6% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Eden Prairie Mall Loan
($75.4 million -- 13.2%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.1 million square foot regional mall located in
suburban Minneapolis, Minnesota. The mall is owned by an affiliate
of GGP. The mall was 98% leased as of June 2011 compared to 99% at
last review. The mall's performance has declined significantly due
to a 37% increase in real estate taxes as well as a 55% increase
in repairs and maintenance. Anchor tenants include Sears, Target,
Von Maur and Kohl's. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and
0.99X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.32X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Broward Financial Loan ($42 million
-- 7.4%), which is secured by a 325,500 square foot Class A office
tower located in downtown Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The property
was 79% leased as of June 2011 compared to 76% at last review. The
loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to the June 2011 lease
expiration and vacancy of the property's largest tenant, Franklin
Templeton, which leased 42% of the property. The borrower has
leased up about 65% or 90,000 square feet of Templeton's vacant
space, and thus increasing occupancy to 64%. The loan matures in
February 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.81X,
respectively compared to 128% and 0.84X as at last review.

The third largest loan is the MHC Portfolio-Waterford Estates Loan
($29 million -- 5.1%), which is secured by a 731-pad manufactured
housing community located approximately ten miles south of
Wilmington in Bear, Delaware. The property was 96% leased as of
September 2010, essentially the same at last review. Performance
has been stable and the loan has benefited from amortization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.05X, respectively,
compared to 93% and 1.02X at last review.


ACT 2005-RR: Fitch Cuts Rating on $92MM Class A-2 Notes to 'Dsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed two classes issued
by ACT 2005-RR Depositor Corp. (ACT 2005-RR) as a result of
continued negative credit migration and increased principal
losses.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2011, approximately
60% of the collateral has been downgraded.  Currently, 98.5% of
the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 89.5% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and below.  As of the
Nov. 22, 2011 trustee report, 71.1% of the portfolio is
experiencing interest shortfalls.  Since the last rating action,
the deal has experienced $133.1 million in losses.

For the class A-1FL notes, Fitch analyzed each class' sensitivity
to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below).  Given
the high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class A-1FL
notes have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.  The class A-2 notes have experienced $25.5 million of
principal losses while the class A-3 notes have experienced a
complete principal loss.  Therefore, the class A-2 notes have been
downgraded and the class A-3 notes affirmed at 'Dsf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
Given the portfolio's distressed nature, Fitch believes that the
probability of default for all classes of notes can be evaluated
without factoring potential further losses from the non-defaulted
portion of the portfolio.  Therefore, this transaction was not
modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF
PCM).

ACT 2005-RR is backed by 75 bonds from 31 commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) transactions and is considered a CMBS B-
piece resecuritization (also referred to as first loss commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)/ReREMIC) as
it includes the most junior bonds of CMBS transactions.
Approximately 32.6% of the portfolio consists of first loss 'NR'
bonds, all of which have experienced principal losses and/or
interest shortfalls to date.  The transaction closed on Nov. 9,
2005.

Fitch has taken these rating actions on ACT 2005-RR:

  -- $205,948,939 class A-1FL affirmed at 'Csf';
  -- $92,500,799 class A-2 downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
  -- $0 class A-3 affirmed at 'Dsf'.





AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: S&P Ups Series 2010-2 ABS Rating From 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services initiated various rating
actions following its review of 19 series of asset-backed
securities (ABS) issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables
Trust, AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust, and Bay
View Owner Trust that were issued between 2005 and 2010:

    "We raised our long-term ratings on 28 classes from 16 series
    and affirmed our long-term ratings on 16 classes from 10
    series," S&P said.

    "We removed eight long-term ratings from CreditWatch with
    negative implications where they were placed on Oct. 3, 2011,
    and placed seven other long-term ratings on CreditWatch with
    positive implications," S&P related.

    "We raised Standard & Poor's underlying ratings (SPURs) on 14
    classes from nine series from the same issuers," S&P said.

    "We removed four of the 14 raised SPURs from CreditWatch,
    where they were placed on Oct. 3, 2011," S&P said.

"A SPUR reflects our opinion of the stand-alone creditworthiness
of a security -- that is, its capacity to pay debt service on a
debt issue in accordance with its terms -- without considering an
otherwise applicable bond insurance policy. The long-term rating
for each of the nine series we reviewed is currently equal to the
SPUR, which is higher than the rating on the monoline," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect each transaction's collateral
performance to date, our views regarding future collateral
performance, the structure of each transaction, and the credit
enhancement levels. In addition, our analysis incorporates
secondary credit factors such as credit stability, payment
priorities under various scenarios, and sector- and issuer-
specific analysis," S&P said.

"The raised and affirmed long-term ratings and SPURs reflect our
view that the total credit support as a percent of the amortizing
pool balance, compared with our revised expected remaining losses,
is adequate for each of the raised or affirmed ratings," S&P said.

"AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2006-R-M, 2007-A-X,
2007-B-F, 2007-C-M, 2007-D-F, 2008-A-F, 2010-A, and 2010-B, as
well as AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-2-M,
benefit from a financial guaranty of timely interest and ultimate
principal provided by various monoline insurers. In accordance
with our criteria, the issue credit rating on a fully credit-
enhanced bond issue is the higher of the rating on the credit
enhancer or SPUR on the class (see 'Methodology: The Interaction
of Bond Insurance and Credit Ratings,' published Aug. 24, 2009),"
S&P said.

"Series 2007-B-F, 2007-D-F, and 2008-A-F are insured by Assured
Guaranty Municipal Corp (AA-/Stable/--), and 2010-A and 2010-B are
insured by Assured Guaranty Corp. (AA-/Stable/--) (collectively
'Assured'). We placed our ratings on each of these five series on
CreditWatch with negative implications on Oct. 3, 2011, as a
direct result of our Sept. 27, 2011, placement of our rating of
Assured on CreditWatch  (see 'Assured Guaranty Ltd. Operating
Companies Placed On CreditWatch Negative,' published Sept. 27,
2011). However, given our revised loss expectations for the five
series, as well as each transaction's growth in credit enhancement
as a percentage of the amortizing pool balance, we raised the
SPURs for each of these series to 'AAA (sf)'. As a result, we
have delinked the long-term ratings from that of Assured, raised
the long-term ratings to 'AAA (sf)' to match the SPURs, and
removed the ratings from CreditWatch. AmeriCredit Automobile
Receivables Trust 2006-R-M, 2007-C-M, as well as AmeriCredit
Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-2-M, are insured by MBIA
Insurance Corp. (B/Negative/--), and AmeriCredit Automobile
Receivables Trust 2007-A-X is insured by Syncora Guarantee
Inc.(not rated). The SPURs on these series have been higher than
the ratings on the insurer for some time, and each long-term
rating is equal to each SPUR and is delinked from the rating of
the respective monoline," S&P said.

"We also placed the long term ratings on class B, C, and D from
series 2010-3 and 2010-4, as well as the class E from series 2010-
4, on CreditWatch with positive implications. The CreditWatch
placements reflect the fact that collateral performance appears to
be trending better than our initial expectations," S&P said.

"The series issued between 2006 and 2008 have each performed worse
than our initial expectations, and we have periodically revised
our loss expectations for each series. Since our last loss
revision in 2010, performance has improved and, as a result, we
are lowering our expectations slightly to reflect the improved
performance trends and our expectations regarding future
performance (see table 1). The series issued in 2009 and early
2010 (series 2010-1, 2010-A, 2010-B, and 2010-2) have performed,
and are expected to continue to perform, better than initially
expected; thus, we have revised our loss expectations. The better-
than-expected performance can be attributed to stronger collateral
characteristics, including healthy recovery rates since deal
inception. Similarly, series issued later in 2010 (series 2010-3
and 2010-4) appear to be performing better than our initial
expectations. However, we are maintaining our initial loss
expectation pending further performance," S&P said.

Table 1
Collateral Performance (%)
As of November 2011 distribution

                             Initial    Former      Revised
              Pool   Current lifetime   lifetime    lifetime
Series    Mo. Factor CNL    CNL exp.    CNL exp.    CNL exp.
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
2006-R-M  66  4.46  16.16  12.00-13.00 17.75-18.75 16.20-16.60
2007-A-X  58  8.77  17.34  12.00-13.00 18.25-19.25 17.75-18.25
2007-B-F  55  10.80 16.79  12.00-13.00 18.00-19.00 17.25-18.00
2007-C-M  52  13.98 16.97  12.00-13.00 18.50-19.50 17.50-18.50
2007-D-F  50  15.77 18.39  12.00-13.00 20.00-21.00 19.00-20.00
2008-A-F  42  21.59 16.40  13.00-14.00 19.50-20.50 18.00-19.00
2008-1    37  26.29 14.39  13.00-14.00 19.50-20.50 16.75-17.75
2008-2    36  28.02 12.58  13.00-14.00 17.50-18.50 15.25-16.25
2009-1    28  35.08  8.22  13.50-14.00 N/A         11.00-12.00
2010-1    21  49.62  3.45  13.25-13.75 N/A         7.25- 8.25
2010-A    19  56.08  3.56  13.00-13.50 N/A         8.00- 9.00
2010-2    18  55.42  2.54  12.50-13.00 N/A         7.00- 8.00
2010-B    15  66.56  2.13  12.50-13.00 N/A         7.25- 8.25
2010-3    14  72.41  1.45  12.50-13.00 N/A         N/A
2010-4    12  67.08  1.55  11.75-12.25 N/A         N/A
AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust
2007-1    53   9.62  7.26  3.50- 4.00  8.00- 8.50  7.50-8.00
2007-2M   49  15.39 10.80  4.50-5.00  12.00-12.50  11.0-12.0
2009-1    24  37.14  4.83  7.75-8.25   N/A         7.00-8.00
Bay View Owner Trust
2005-3    71   2.45  3.93  3.00-3.50   4.00-4.50   3.93-4.00

CNL -- cumulative net loss. N/A -- Not applicable. For 2006-R-M
pool factor and CNL are calculated as a percent of the initial
pool balance plus all subsequent receivables purchases.

Each transaction has credit enhancement in the form of a spread
account, overcollateralization, and excess spread. In addition,
the series without the benefit of bond insurance were also
structured with subordination for the more senior classes. The
credit support levels have grown for all outstanding classes as a
percent of the declining collateral balances (see table 2).

Table 2
Hard Credit Support
As of the November 2011 distribution

                                                Current
                              Total hard        total hard
                   Pool       credit support    credit support(ii)
Series      Class  Factor(%)  at issuance(i)    (% of current)
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
2006-R-M    A-3     4.46       9.50             68.31
2007-A-X    A-4     8.77       9.00             45.59
2007-B-F    A-4    10.80       9.00             29.53
2007-C-M    A-4-A  13.98       9.00             43.19
2007-C-M    A-4-B  13.98       9.00             43.19
2007-D-F    A-4-A  15.77       9.00             41.00
2007-D-F    A-4-B  15.77       9.00             41.00
2008-A-F    A-4    21.59      20.50             30.00
2008-1      A-3    26.29      43.60            102.71
2008-1      B      26.29      35.60             95.38
2008-2      A-3    28.02      43.60             97.67
2008-2      B      28.02      35.75             95.12
2009-1      A-3    35.08      44.25             84.04
2009-1      B      35.08      37.50             64.80
2009-1      C      35.08      28.10             38.00
2010-1      A-3    49.62      43.50             80.69
2010-1      B      49.62      32.50             58.52
2010-1      C      49.62      21.00             35.34
2010-1      D      49.62      15.00             23.25
2010-A      A-2    56.08      18.00             26.07
2010-A      A-3    56.08      18.00             26.07
2010-2      A-2    55.42      38.50             69.84
2010-2      A-3    55.42      38.50             69.84
2010-2      B      55.42      30.25             54.95
2010-2      C      55.42      20.00             36.45
2010-2      D      55.42      10.50             19.31
2010-2      E      55.42       8.25             15.25
2010-B      A-2    66.56      17.00             25.01
2010-B      A-3    66.56      17.00             25.01
2010-3      A-2    72.41      37.60             56.63
2010-3      A-3    72.41      37.60             56.63
2010-3      B      72.41      29.85             45.92
2010-3      C      72.41      19.80             32.04
2010-3      D      72.41      10.50             19.20
2010-4      A-2    67.08      35.20             55.67
2010-4      A-3    67.08      35.20             55.67
2010-4      B      67.08      27.95             44.87
2010-4      C      67.08      18.95             31.45
2010-4      D      67.08      10.10             18.25
2010-4      E      67.08       7.75             14.75
AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust
2007-1      B       9.62      10.75            108.11
2007-1      C       9.62       7.50             74.32
2007-1      D       9.62       4.00             37.93
2007-1      E       9.62       1.50             13.85
2007-2-M    A-4-A  15.39       3.50             35.99
2007-2-M    A-4-B  15.39       3.50             35.99
2009-1      A-3    37.14      32.50             54.81
2009-1      A-4    37.14      32.50             54.81
2009-1      B      37.14      27.75             42.02
2009-1      C      37.14      23.75             31.25
Bay View Owner Trust
2005-3      D       2.45       3.25             62.74

(i)Consists of a reserve account and overcollateralization, as
well as subordination for the higher rated tranches, and excludes
excess spread that can also provide additional enhancement.
(ii)Total hard credit support at issuance and Current total hard
credit support are as a percent of the initial pool balance,
except for 2006-R-M which is as a % of the initial pool balance
plus all subsequent receivables purchases.

"We incorporated cash flow analysis in the review of the series,
which included current and historical performance to estimate
future performance. The various cash flow scenarios included
forward-looking assumptions on recoveries, timing of losses, and
voluntary absolute prepayment speeds that we believe are
appropriate given the transaction's current performance. The
results demonstrated, in our view, that all of the classes have
adequate credit enhancement at their raised and affirmed rating
levels even without giving credit to the swap," S&P said.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of each transaction
to ensure that the credit enhancement remains sufficient, in our
view, to cover our revised cumulative net loss expectations under
our stress scenarios for each of the rated classes. For series
2010-3 and 2010-4, we will continue to gather information we deem
necessary in order to resolve the CreditWatch placements
in the next few months," S&P said.

Long-Term And Spur Rating Raised; Removed From CreditWatch

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust

Series    Class                To         From
2007-B-F  A-4   Long Term Rtg  AAA(sf)    AA+(sf)/Watch Neg
                SPUR           AAA(sf)    BBB(sf)/Watch Pos

Series    Class                 To       From
2007-D-F  A-4-A  Long Term Rtg  AAA(sf)  AA+(sf)/Watch Neg
                 SPUR           AAA(sf)  BBB+(sf)/Watch Pos

Series    Class                 To       From
2007-D-F  A-4-B  Long Term Rtg  AAA(sf)  AA+(sf)/Watch Neg
                 SPUR           AAA(sf)  BBB+(sf)/Watch Pos

Series    Class                 To       From
2008-A-F  A-4    Long Term Rtg  AAA(sf)  AA+(sf)/Watch Neg
                 SPUR           AAA(sf)  A+(sf)/Watch Pos

Series    Class                 To       From
2010-A    A-2    Long Term Rtg  AAA(sf)  AA+(sf)/Watch Neg
          A-2    SPUR           AAA(sf)  A (sf)
          A-3    Long Term Rtg  AAA(sf)  AA+(sf)/Watch Neg
          A-3    SPUR           AAA(sf)  A (sf)

Series    Class                 To        From
2010-B    A-2    Long Term Rtg   AAA(sf)  AA+(sf)/Watch Neg
          A-2    SPUR            AAA(sf)  A (sf)
          A-3    Long Term Rtg   AAA(sf)  AA+(sf)/Watch Neg
          A-3    SPUR            AAA(sf)  A (sf)

Long-Term Rating Raised; Spur Raised

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
                      Long-term Rating    SPUR
Series        Class   To       From      To       From
2006-R-M      A-3     AAA(sf)  A(sf)     AAA(sf)  A(sf)
2007-A-X      A-4     AAA(sf)  BBB(sf)   AAA(sf)  BBB(sf)
2007-C-M      A-4-A   AAA(sf)  BBB(sf)   AAA(sf)  BBB(sf)
2007-C-M      A-4-B   AAA(sf)  BBB(sf)   AAA(sf)  BBB(sf)

The series benefit from insurance policies provided by various
monoline insurers. The letter at the end of each series indicates
which insurer provides bond insurance. A= Assured Guaranty Corp.;
F= Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp,; M= MBIA Insurance Corp., and
X= Syncora Guarantee Inc.

Long-Term Ratings Raised

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
                       Rating
Series    Class     To        From
2008-1    B         AA+(sf)   AA(sf)
2008-2    B         AA+(sf)   AA(sf)
2009-1    B         AA+(sf)   AA(sf)
2009-1    C         AA(sf)    A(sf)
2010-1    B         AA+(sf)   AA(sf)
2010-1    C         AA(sf)    A(sf)
2010-1    D         AA-(sf)   BBB(sf)
2010-2    B         AA+(sf)   AA(sf)
2010-2    C         AA(sf)    A(sf)
2010-2    D         AA-(sf)   BBB(sf)
2010-2    E         A+(sf)    BB (sf)

Long-Term Ratings Affirmed

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
Series   Class      Rating
2008-1   A-3        AAA(sf)
2008-2   A-3        AAA(sf)
2009-1   A-3        AAA(sf)
2010-1   A-3        AAA(sf)
2010-2   A-2        AAA(sf)
2010-2   A-3        AAA(sf)
2010-3   A-2        AAA(sf)
2010-3   A-3        AAA(sf)
2010-4   A-2        AAA(sf)
2010-4   A-3        AAA(sf)

Long-Term Ratings Placed On CreditWatch

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
                            Rating
Series    Class     To                 From
2010-3    B         AA(sf)/Watch Pos    AA(sf)
2010-3    C         A(sf)/Watch Pos     A(sf)
2010-3    D         BBB(sf)/Watch Pos   BBB(sf)
2010-4    B         AA(sf)/Watch Pos    AA(sf)
2010-4    C         A+(sf)/Watch Pos    A+(sf)
2010-4    D         BBB(sf)/Watch Pos   BBB(sf)
2010-4    E         BB(sf)/Watch Pos    BB(sf)

Long-Term Rating Raised; Spur Raised

AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust
                      Long-term rating      SPUR
Series        Class   To       From      To       From
2007-2-M      A-4-A   AAA(sf)  BBB+(sf)  AAA(sf)  BBB+(sf)
2007-2-M      A-4-B   AAA(sf)  BBB+(sf)  AAA(sf)  BBB+(sf)

Long-Term Ratings Raised

AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust
                       Rating
Series    Class     To        From
2007-1    D         AA+(sf)   A-(sf)
2007-1    E         A(sf)     BB(sf)
2009-1    C         AA(sf)    A(sf)

Long-Term Ratings Affirmed

AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust
Series    Class     Rating
2007-1    B         AAA(sf)
2007-1    C         AAA(sf)
2009-1    A-3       AAA(sf)
2009-1    A-4       AAA(sf)
2009-1    B         AA+(sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Bay View 2005-3 Owner Trust
Series     Class     Rating
2005-3     D         AAA(sf)


ANTHRACITE 2005: Fitch Junks Rating on Five Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six and affirmed three classes issued
by Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd./Corp (Anthracite 2005-HY2) as a result
of continued negative credit migration on the underlying
collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in December 2010,
approximately 36.4% of the underlying collateral has been
downgraded.  Currently, 85% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade and 65.7% has a rating in the 'CCC'
category and below, compared to 87.5% and 57.7%, respectively, at
the last rating action.  As of the Nov. 28, 2011 trustee report,
49.7% of the underlying collateral is experiencing interest
shortfalls, compared to 43.5% at the last rating action.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.  Based on this analysis, the class A and B notes'
breakeven rates are generally consistent with the ratings assigned
below.

For the class C through G notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below).  Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class C notes have been downgraded to 'CCsf', indicating that
default is probable.  Similarly, the class D notes have been
downgraded and the class E through G notes affirmed at 'Csf',
indicating that default is inevitable.

The Stable Outlook on the class A notes reflects the cushion
in modeling results which will serve to mitigate further
deterioration in the portfolio.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks
to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

Anthracite 2005-HY2 is backed by 63 tranches from 23 obligors.
The transaction closed in July 2005 and is considered a commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) B-piece resecuritization (also
referred to as a first loss commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation [CRE CDO]) as it primarily includes junior bonds
of CMBS transactions.  The portfolio is composed of 74% CMBS, 15%
commercial real estate loans (CREL), and 11% real estate
investment trust (REIT) assets.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $101,052,411 class A to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable
     from Negative;
  -- $52,593,000 class B to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
  -- $25,360,000 class C-FL to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $7,000,000 class C-FX to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $25,275,000 class D-FL to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $13,500,000 class D-FX to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $9,376,000 class E at 'Csf';
  -- $58,000,000 class F at 'Csf';
  -- $58,804,113 class G at 'Csf'.


AVIATION CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Rating of Class B Notes to 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has taken rating actions on certain aircraft lease backed
ABS notes from three transactions from three different sponsors.
The rating actions cover notes issued by Aviation Capital Group
Trust II (ACG II), sponsored by Aviation Capital Group; ACS 2006-1
Pass Through Trust (ACS 2006-1), sponsored by Aircastle Limited;
and Aircraft Lease Securitization Limited, Series 2007-1 (ALS
2007-1), sponsored by AerCap.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions result from a varying combination of model
error correction and transaction-specific performance.

With respect to model error correction, Moody's corrected the cash
flow model used in the quantitative analysis of the transactions.
Specifically, certain errors were corrected in the portions of the
model that simulate lessee defaults and aircraft down time between
leases, and that allocate cash flow in the priority of payments.
The varying impact of correction for these errors relative to the
impact of performance is noted below for each transaction. It
should be noted that model generated output is one among several
important factors considered by Moody's in rating these
transactions.

In addition to model output, Moody's also considered, among other
factors, the loan-to-value (LTV) of each class of rated notes, the
number, type and age of the aircraft in the portfolio, the current
lessee diversity and lease terms, and the outlook for lease
revenue given these factors. The Principal Methodology section
contains additional information on the assumptions made regarding
aircraft portfolio value and the calculation of LTV.

ACG II: The downgrade of the ACG II notes was primarily due to
model error correction. The new ratings now accurately reflect the
impact of several issues, particularly LTV and aircraft age. The
calculated LTV (based on adjusted average appraised values) of the
class G-1 and G-2 senior notes and the class B-1 junior notes were
approximately 75% and 98%, respectively, as of October 2011. The
LTV for the senior classes is relatively low for their rating.
However the paydown of the senior notes is negatively impacted
by the large size of the junior class and related waterfall
priorities, as measured by corrected model output. Specifically,
junior interest and minimum principal is paid behind senior
interest and minimum principal but ahead of senior scheduled
principal. Conversely, the LTV for the junior class is relatively
high for the rating, reflecting the benefits, as indicated by
corrected model output, of a large class size, and the relatively
favorable waterfall priority for junior minimum principal. Moody's
notes that senior notes are paying ahead of minimum target
payments but behind their respective scheduled principal target
balances, while the junior class is only paying to minimum
schedule.

The weighted average age of the aircraft underlying the
transaction is approximately thirteen years and the lease
revenue generated by the pool is declining. With approximately
half of the original notes' balance still outstanding, Moody's
expects the paydown of the notes to take longer than Moody's
previous expectations. The longer paydown terms along with the
aging of the underlying pool increases the uncertainty surrounding
the future lease income.

ACS 2006-1: The downgrade of the ACS 2006-1 notes was primarily
due to weakened performance, specifically the steeper than
expected decline in aircraft value in the context of an aged pool.
The calculated LTV is approximately 66%, as of October 2011, and
the notes have recently begun to pay principal full turbo -- both
credit strengths. However, per the structure, until recently, the
scheduled principal paydown on the notes was very limited, leaving
them increasingly exposed to declining aircraft value and lease
revenue over time. Corrected model results indicate that the
recent inception of the full turbo payment mode is insufficient to
offset these weaknesses. Corrected model output indicates complete
principal paydown will take approximately ten years in the
expected case and fourteen years in certain of Moody's stress
scenarios. As the required time to fully pay the bonds increases,
the uncertainty of future lease income and the remaining useful
life of the aircraft become larger concerns. Currently, the
weighted average age of the aircraft is approximately thirteen
years. This implies the asset portfolio has twelve years of useful
life remaining. With the note paydown expected to take ten years,
the very modest two year gap between the remaining lives of the
asset and bond is viewed as a credit weakness.

ALS 2007-1: The ALS 2007-1 notes were upgraded because of the
notes' accelerated paydown. Paydown of the notes has benefited
from the full turbo of principal payments since closing, the
positive effects of which have been compounded by the use of
interest rate caps. The calculated LTV is approximately 62%, as of
October 2011. The transaction benefits from a conservative full
turbo structure whereby all cash flow available after payment of
expenses, interest and policy premium to the Policy Provider is
available to pay Class G-1 principal. Furthermore, unlike interest
rate swaps, interest rate caps give the benefit of falling
interest rates to the party receiving protection from floating
interest rates. Thus the transaction has benefitted from the long
duration of low floating interest rates. These two positive
factors have resulted in the ALS 2007-1 notes deleveraging faster
than expected. Moody's expects principal to be fully paid in
approximately six years; nine years in certain stressed scenarios.
The current weighted average age of the aircraft portfolio is
approximately eleven years, indicating approximately fourteen
years of remaining useful life of the assets. The positive eight
year gap between the expected asset useful life and the expected
time to retire the bonds is viewed as a credit strength.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in
March 1999.

Aircraft values are an important consideration in the methodology.
In particular, aircraft values are a factor in the revenue
equation in aircraft leasing. Additionally, aircraft values are
used to calculate LTV ratios, which are a convenient measure of
transaction leverage. Valuations are always provided at deal
inception, often from multiple firms. However, thereafter,
aircraft are not valued on a frequent basis, and the requirements
to provide valuations to Moody's vary by deal. Moody's necessarily
uses the base value, or estimates thereof, as opposed to the
market value in its analysis. Base value is the estimate of
underlying value of the aircraft that adjusts for expected
temporary market value fluctuations.

When aircraft valuations are available as of the approximate date
of the analysis, Moody's uses those values. For modeling purposes,
for deals with multiple valuations, Moody's uses the lower of mean
or median of the appraising firms' valuations. If such valuations
precede the analysis date by several months, Moody's adjusts such
valuations by a factor derived by comparing the market values of
similar aircraft available from other sources as of the
approximate period of the valuations and the market values as of
the analysis date.

For deals without reasonably current valuations, other methods to
estimate current aircraft values may be used. In one method,
Moody's may rely on adjusting portfolio appraisals from the
initial rating. By comparing market values from time of closing
and current market values, a factor is calculated and applied to
the initial portfolio base value. In a second method, a small
upward adjustment is applied to the current market values since
market values do not take into account additional factors unique
to the aircraft such as the engine type and interior
configuration.

For all transactions, Moody's performs sensitivity to the base
value and incorporates the results into the ratings.

For presentation purposes, LTV shown is calculated using the note
remaining balances and the aggregate aircraft values as determined
as described above. Moody's excludes the impact of the reserve and
liquidity facilities to provide a comparable metric across the
sector. The deals vary on the form and uses of credit enhancement.
In some deals, liquidity is a cash deposit, and in others it is a
credit line; some deals only allow the liquidity to be used for
interest and expenses, and others allow interest, expenses, and
certain principal payments. For further information on the credit
enhancement for ACG II, ACS 2006-1, and ALS 2007-1, please see the
Pre-Sale reports available on moodys.com.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Aviation Capital Group Trust II

Class G-1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously, on
December 17, 2010, downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

Class G-2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously, on
December 17, 2010, downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

Class B Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously, on December 17,
2010, downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

Issuer: ACS 2006-1 Pass Through Trust

Class G-1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously, on
December 14, 2010, A2 (sf), placed on review for possible
downgrade

Issuer: Aircraft Lease Securitization Limited, Series 2007-1

Class G-3 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously, on December 10,
2010, Baa1 (sf), placed on review for possible upgrade


BABSON CLO: S&P Keeps 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2A, A-2B, A-2Bv, C-1, and C-2 notes from Babson CLO Ltd.
2004-I, a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by Babson Capital Management LLC. "At the same time, we
removed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2A, A-2B, and A-2Bv notes
from CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications
on Oct. 6, 2011. We affirmed our ratings on the class B and D
notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect a pro rata paydown to the class A
notes and improved performance we have observed in the deal's
underlying asset portfolio since we last raised our ratings on all
of the classes on Feb. 10, 2011. As of the Oct. 5, 2011, trustee
report, the transaction's asset portfolio had $6.00 million in
defaulted obligations and approximately $27.38 million in assets
from obligors rated in the 'CCC' range. This was down from
$7.27 million in defaulted obligations and up from approximately
$26.73 million in assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' range
noted in the Jan. 5, 2011, trustee report, which we used for our
February 2011 rating actions. Over that same time period, the
class A note balance decreased by $121.12 million due to pro rata
paydowns, leaving them at approximately 46.50% of their original
balance," S&P said.

"We also observed an increase in the overcollateralization (O/C)
available to support the rated notes," S&P said. The trustee
reported these O/C ratios in the Oct. 5, 2011, monthly report:

    The class A/B O/C ratio was 142.11%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 127.31% in January 2011; and

    The class D (mezzanine) O/C ratio was 109.76%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 108.37% in January 2011.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class B and D notes to reflect our
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current ratings," S&P related.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

Rating And CreditWatch Actions

Babson CLO Ltd. 2004-I
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-1                AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2A               AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2B               AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2Bv              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1                A+ (sf)      A (sf)
C-2                A+ (sf)      A (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Babson CLO Ltd. 2004-I

Class              Rating
B                  AA+ (sf)
D                  BB+ (sf)


BACM 2004-3: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. G Notes Rating at 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the ratings of twelve
non-pooled classes, downgraded the ratings of four pooled classes,
and affirmed the ratings of ten classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-3:

Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2007 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2007 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Confirmed at
A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Confirmed at
A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. SS-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. SS-B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004
Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. SS-C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004
Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. SS-D, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004
Assigned Ba3 (sf)

UH-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

UH-B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

UH-C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

UH-D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

UH-E, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

UH-F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

UH-G, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

UH-H, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

UH-J, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to overall improved loan financial
performance and increased credit support due to amortization for
the non-pooled rake bonds associated with the U-Haul Portfolio and
17 State Street Loans.

The downgrades are due to higher than expected realized losses
from two loans that were liquidated from the trust. At last
review, realized losses represented 0.2% of the then current
pooled balance. Since the prior review, realized losses have
increased to 3.4% of the current pooled balance.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.6% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.7%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
7.1% of the current balance. Though the cumulative base expected
loss decreased by 3.1% since the prior review, realized losses
have increased by 3.2% during the same timeframe. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are in
recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter , amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com
for a copy of this methodology.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20 compared to 19 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated April 28, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 40% to
$692.9 million from $1.16 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 68 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 51% of the pool. Eight loans,
representing 8% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S.
Government securities. The pool contains two loans with investment
grade credit estimates, representing 24% of the pool.

Seventeen loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $38.9 million (69% loss severity on average).
Currently two loans, representing less than 2% of the pool, are in
special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.2 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (65% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $5.4 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 30%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 95%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 84% compared to 88% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.2%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.25X, respectively, compared to
1.48X and 1.20X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with an investment grade credit estimate is the
U-Haul Portfolio Loan ($93.7 million --13.5% of the pool), which
is secured by 78 properties operated as U-Haul storage or rental
centers. The portfolio is also encumbered by a $62.5 million B-
note which is the collateral for non-pooled Classes UH-A, UH-B,
UH-C, UH-D, UH-E, UH-F, UH-G, UH-H and UH-J. The properties total
4.0 million square feet (SF) and are located in 24 states with
concentrations in Texas (21%), Florida (16%) and Arizona (10.4%).
Property performance continues to be stable. Moody's current
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 3.37X, respectively,
compared to Aaa and 2.84X at last full review.

The second loan with an investment grade credit estimate is the 17
State Street Loan ($69.2 million -- 10.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 44-story, Class A, 532,000 SF office building located
within the South Ferry/Financial District sub-market of New York
City. The property is encumbered by a $33.0 million B-note which
is the collateral for non-pooled Classes SS-A, SS-B, SS-C, SS-D
and a non-rated class. The loan was transferred into special
servicing in July 2010 due to the servicer's determination of
imminent default. The borrower had insufficient funds to pay for
capital improvements. The special servicer granted approval for
the borrower to receive a capital infusion from a new source in
the form of preferred equity to fund these improvements.
Subsequently, the loan was sent back to the master servicer on
April 1, 2011. As of September 2011, the property was 88% leased
compared to 80% at last full review. Though property performance
continues to perform very well, Moody's analysis reflects a
downward adjustment to current NOI due to upcoming lease
maturities and above market rents. Moody's current credit estimate
and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.72X, respectively, compared to Baa2
and 1.48X at last full review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the SUN Communities -- Scio Farm Loan
($38.1 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 913-pad
manufactured housing community located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. As
of June 2011, the portfolio was 95% leased compared to 94% at last
full review. The loan is stable and benefitting from amortization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.04X, respectively,
compared to 92% and 1.00X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the SUN Communities Portfolio 9 Loan
($34.7 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by four
manufactured housing communities totaling 1,235 pads located in
Michigan (3) and Florida (1). As of June 2011, the portfolio was
94% leased, the same as last full review. The loan is stable and
benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
84% and 1.15X, respectively, compared to 90% and 1.08X at last
full review.

The third largest loan is the SUN Communities Portfolio 8 Loan
($25.9 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by three
manufactured housing communities totaling 1,174 pads located in
Indiana (2) and Florida (1). As of June 2011, the portfolio was
73% leased, the same as last full review. The loan is stable and
benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
102% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 105% and 0.97X at last
full review.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Junks Rating on Five Certificate Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades seven classes of commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc. (BACM), series 2007-1, due to increased expected
losses on the specially serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool, which includes assumed losses on loans in special
servicing and on performing loans with declines in performance
indicative of a higher probability of default.  Fitch modeled
losses of 11.1% of the remaining pool(10.8% cumulative transaction
losses, which includes losses realized to date) based on expected
losses on the specially serviced loans and loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity.  The Negative Outlooks reflect
the uncertainty regarding the workouts of recent transfers of
large loans to special servicing and the final disposition of
other specially serviced assets.

As of the November 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased 7.1% to $2.92 billion from
$3.15 billion at issuance.  As of November 2011, there are
cumulative interest shortfalls in the amount of $8.6 million,
affecting classes J through Q.

The largest contributor to expected loss is the largest specially
serviced loan (7.5% of the pool), secured by the Solana office
complex located in Westlake, TX.  The pari passu loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2009 for imminent
default and has since been modified.  One of the largest tenants
at the property vacated their space prior to their lease
expiration in 2011.  A reported appraisal from April 2011
indicates a value significantly below the loan amount.

The second largest specially serviced loan is Pacific Shores
(5.7%), which transferred to special servicing in November 2011
for imminent maturity default.  The loan, secured by eight
buildings of a ten-building office complex located in Redwood
City, CA, is 89% occupied as of June 2011; however, the majority
of tenants have lease expirations between 2011 and 2014.  The
borrower notified the servicer they would not be able to make the
balloon payment at the January 2012 scheduled maturity. Fitch did
not model a loss on this asset.

The third largest specially serviced asset is 575 Lexington Avenue
(4.4%), which is an approximately 640,000 square foot (sf) office
building located in Midtown Manhattan.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in April 2010 for imminent default.  The loan
has been modified and the sponsors have paid down the pari passu
note balance to $128.5 million.  In addition, the loan has been
extended three years with the new maturity date scheduled for May
2014.  The servicer reported occupancy as of September 2011 was
86%.  Fitch did not model a loss on the asset.

The largest contributor to expected loss of the loans not in
special servicing is the StratREAL Industrial Portfolio I (6.5%).
The collateral consists of a portfolio of industrial properties
with the majority of properties located in the Memphis, TN and
Columbus, OH areas.  The servicer reported occupancy for the
portfolio was 76% as of third-quarter 2011, compared with a
combined 94.5% at issuance.

In total, there are 23 loans (23.5% of the pool) in special
servicing, including six assets (1.6%) that are real estate owned
(REO). At Fitch's last review, there were 19 loans (17.6%) in
special servicing with four REO (0.9%).

Fitch downgrades, revises Outlooks, and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (RE):

  -- $259.5 million class A-J to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $27.5 million class B to 'B-sf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $35.4 million class C to 'CCCsf', RE 100% from 'Bsf';

  -- $27.5 million class D to 'CCCsf', RE 100% from 'B-sf';

  -- $35.4 million class G to 'CCsf', RE 100% from 'CCCsf', RE
     100%;

  -- $35.4 million class H to 'CCsf', RE 100% from 'CCCsf', RE
     100%;

  -- $11.8 million class L to 'Csf', RE 100% from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch also affirms these classes, revises Outlooks and revises
REs:

  -- $147.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $444 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $68.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $698.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $632.3 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $214.5 million class A-MFX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;
  -- $100 million class A-MFL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $39.3 million class E at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $39.3 million class F at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $39.3 million class J at 'CCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $7.9 million class K at 'CCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $7.9 million class M at 'Csf', RE 100%;
  -- $3.9 million class N at 'Csf', RE 100%;
  -- $7.9 million class O at 'Csf', RE 80%;
  -- $11.8 million class P at 'Csf', RE 0%.

Class A-1 is paid in full. Fitch does not rate the $26.1 million
class Q.  Fitch previously withdraw the rating on the interest-
only class XW.





BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Cuts Rating on Class J Certs. to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2002-2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications. "At the
same time, we affirmed our ratings on 13 other classes from the
same transaction and removed six of these classes from CreditWatch
with negative implications," S&P said.

"Our rating actions primarily reflect our analysis of the
transaction using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust. Our analysis also considered
the transaction's near-term maturities. By pool balance, 54.3%
of the loans mature by the end of 2012, after excluding the 27
defeased loans and five specially serviced loans. Our analysis
also reflects our application of the 'U.S. Government Support In
Structured Finance And Public Finance Ratings,' published Sept.
19, 2011, on RatingsDirect on Global Credit Portal,
at www.globalcreditportal.com," S&P said.

"We placed our ratings on the class B, C, D, E, F, and G
certificates on CreditWatch with negative implications on July 15,
2011, after we placed our U.S. sovereign long-term rating on
CreditWatch negative. The trust has defeased loan collateral
exposure of 37.0% of the pool balance (as of the Nov. 14, 2011,
trustee remittance report). Additionally, we placed our ratings on
classes H and J on CreditWatch with negative implications on Nov.
21, 2011, after the transaction experienced credit support erosion
resulting from principal losses totaling $41.9 million following
the liquidation of three assets," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect credit support erosion that we
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of the five
($32.8 million, 5.3%) loans with the special servicer, C-III Asset
Management LLC (C-III). We also considered the near term loan
maturities and the potential for the transaction to experience
future interest shortfalls and reduced liquidity support because
we believe a portion of these loans may be transferred to the
special servicer should the borrower's not be able to refinance or
payoff these loans at maturity," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class XC interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria," S&P said.

"The class CM-A, CM-B, CM-C, CM-D, and CM-E raked certificates
derive 100% of their cash flow from the subordinate nonpooled
junior portion of the Crabtree Valley Mall loan, which is the
largest loan in the pool. The analysis of the ratings of the raked
certificates was consistent with the rating approach outlined in
the Approach and Surveillance Sections of the JP Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-FL1 Presale Report,
published Nov. 8, 2011," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated
an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.43x and a loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio of 72.4%. We further stressed the loans' cash
flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 1.23x and an LTV ratio of 89.5%. The implied defaults and
loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 18.1% and 26.4%. The
DSC and LTV calculations noted above exclude 27 defeased loans
($231.5 million, 37.0%) and five ($32.8 million, 5.3%) specially
serviced loans. We separately estimated losses for the specially
serviced loans and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

                    Credit Considerations

"As of the Nov. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, five
($32.8 million, 5.3%) loans in the pool were with the special
servicer, C-III. The reported payment status of the specially
serviced loans as of the November 2011 trustee remittance report
is: three are matured balloon ($16.7 million, 2.7%), one is in
grace ($13.0 million, 2.1%), and one is current ($3.1 million,
0.5%). Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $3.5 million
are in effect for two of the specially serviced loans," S&P said.
Details of the three largest specially serviced loans, one of
which is a top 10 loan, are:

"The Fairhaven Commons loan ($13.0 million, 2.1%) is the seventh-
largest asset in the pool and the largest specially serviced
asset. The loan is secured by a 212,325-sq.-ft. shopping center in
Fairhaven, Mass. The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on June 16, 2011, due to maturity default. The loan originally
matured on Aug. 1, 2011. C-III indicated that a loan modification
has been approved, and the loan will be returned to the master
servicer. The maturity date for the loan was extended to Feb. 1,
2012. The reported DSC as of year-end 2010 was 1.33x, and the
reported occupancy as of April 2011 was 96.4%. An ARA of
$3.3 million is reported for this loan. We expect a minimal
loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P said.

"The One Gateway Plaza loan ($8.2 million, 1.3%) is the second-
largest specially serviced asset. The loan is secured by an
112,990-sq.-ft. office building in Colorado Springs, Colo. The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on June 16, 2011, due
to imminent default. The reported payment status of the loan is it
is a matured balloon loan. The loan matured on Aug. 1, 2011. The
special servicer indicated that it is currently in negotiation
with the borrower to extend the loan. The reported DSC as of year-
end 2010 was 0.99x, and the occupancy of the property was not
reported. We expect a minimal loss upon the eventual resolution of
this loan," S&P said.

"The Jewel/Osco Store - Waukesha, WI loan ($7.6 million, 1.2%)
is the third-largest specially serviced asset. The loan is
secured by a 61,910-sq.-ft. shopping center in Waukesha, Wis.
The loan was transferred to special servicing on March 25,
2011, due to imminent default. The loan matured on July 1, 2011.
C-III indicated that it is currently in negotiations with the
borrower to modify or extend the loan. The reported DSC as of
year-end 2010 was 1.33x. We expect a minimal loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan," S&P said.

"The remaining two specially serviced assets have balances that
individually represent less than 0.5% of the total pool balance.
An ARA totaling $230,063 is in effect against one of these two
loans. We estimated losses for these two loans, arriving at a
weighted-average loss severity of 10.0%," S&P said.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Nov. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, the pool trust
balance was $624.9 million, which is 36.2% of the pool balance at
issuance. The pool includes 71 loans down from 152 loans at
issuance. The master servicer, Bank of America N.A., provided
financial information for 100% of the loans in the pool excluding
the 27 defeased loans, the majority of which was full-year 2010
data (97.9%), with the remainder reflecting partial-year 2011
data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.53x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio were 1.43x and 72.4%. Our adjusted DSC and LTV
figures excluded 27 defeased loans ($231.5 million, 37.0%) and the
five ($32.8 million, 5.3%) specially serviced loans. We separately
estimated losses for the specially serviced loans and included
them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity
figures. To date, the transaction has experienced $90.3 million
in principal losses in connection with 14 assets. Twenty-four
loans ($130.4 million, 20.9%) in the pool are on the master
servicer's watchlist. Fourteen loans ($87.8 million, 14.1%) have
a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, 10 of which ($71.4 million,
11.4%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x," S&P said.

           Summary of Top 10 Loans Secured By Real Estate

"The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $269.6 million (43.1%). Using servicer-
reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.61x for the top 10 loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio
for the top 10 loans were 1.45x and 72.4%. One of the top 10
loans ($13.0 million, 2.1%) is with the special servicer. The
largest loan in the pool, the Crabtree Valley Mall loan, has
nonpooled classes of certificates that derives 100% of its cash
flows from the subordinate portion of this loan. Five of the top
10 loans are on the master servicer's watchlist and are also
detailed," S&P said.

"The Crabtree Valley Mall is the largest loan secured by real
estate in the pool with a whole-loan balance of $152.1 million,
which consists of a $133.1 million senior pooled balance (21.3%)
and a $19.0 million subordinate nonpooled balance. The loan is
secured by a 998,486-sq.-ft. shopping mall in Raleigh, N.C. As
of year-end 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.92x
and 97.8%. Our adjusted valuation using a capitalization rate of
8.0%, yielded a LTV ratio of 57.1% on the whole-loan balance. The
loan is scheduled to mature on April 1, 2012. Consequently, we
affirmed our ratings on the class 'CM' raked certificates," S&P
said.

"The second-largest loan in the pool consists of two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans, the Santa Fe Pointe
Apartments loan and the Reflections of Tampa Apartments loan
($24.6 million, 3.9%). The Santa Fe Pointe Apartments loan,
secured by a multifamily apartment complex totaling 168 units in
Gainesville, Fla, is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a
low reported DSC, which was 0.13x for year-end 2010. The other
loan is secured by a multifamily apartment complex totaling 168
units in Tampa, Fla. The combined reported DSC for the two loans
was 0.63x as of year-end 2010. The reported combined occupancy as
of the June 30, 2011, rent roll was 91.5%. The two loans mature on
May 1, 2012," S&P said.

The Gravois Bluffs II loan ($20.6 million, 3.3%) is the third-
largest loan in the pool and the largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by a 263,926-sq.-ft.
shopping center in Fenton, Ms. The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC. The reported DSC
as of year-end 2010 was 0.74x. The reported occupancy as of the
June 30, 2011, rent roll was 74.0%. The loan matures on March 1,
2013.

The Quarry Square Shopping Center loan ($13.1 million, 2.1%), the
sixth-largest loan in the pool, is the third-largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by a 196,629-sq.-
ft. shopping center in Milford, Massachusetts. The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to its Feb. 1, 2012, pending
loan maturity. The reported DSC as of year-end 2010 was 1.43x. The
reported occupancy as of the June 30, 2011, rent roll was 92.6%.

The Tarragona Plaza loan ($10.2 million, 1.6%), the ninth-largest
loan in the pool, is the fourth-largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by a 76,085-sq.-ft.
shopping center in San Perdo, Calif. The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to its Dec. 1, 2011, loan
maturity. The reported DSC as of year-end 2010 was 1.44x. The
reported occupancy as of the June 30, 2011, rent roll was 86.0%.

The CLK-Hickory Lake Apartments loan ($8.4 million, 1.3%), the
10th-largest loan in the pool, is the fifth-largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by a 322-unit
multifamily property in Nashville, Tenn. The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to its Oct. 1, 2011, loan
maturity. The reported DSC as of year-end 2010 was 1.03x. The
reported occupancy as of the June 30, 2011, rent roll was 92.0%.

The remaining three top 10 loans have near-term maturities: the
Somerset Apartments loan ($18.2 million, 2.9%) matures on July 1,
2012, the Celebration Place #220 loan ($17.7 million, 2.8%)
matures on July 1, 2012, and the Sterling University Pines loan
($10.7 million, 1.7%) matures on June 1, 2013.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
current criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with our lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative (Pooled
Certificates)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-2
           Rating
Class   To         From              Credit enhancement (%)
H       BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg                 9.00
J       B+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg                 5.55

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative (Pooled
Certificates)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-2
               Rating
Class    To           From              Credit enhancement (%)
B        AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg                 26.59
C        AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg                 23.83
D        AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg                 21.76
E        AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg                 19.00
F        AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg                 15.55
G        AA (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Neg                  12.10

Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-2

Class    Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
A-3      AAA (sf)                              36.94
XC       AAA (sf)                                N/A

Ratings Affirmed (Nonpooled Certificates)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-2

Class   Rating
CM-A    AAA (sf)
CM-B    AA+ (sf)
CM-C    AA (sf)
CM-D    AA- (sf)
CM-E    A+ (sf)

N/A -- Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Rating Eight Note Classes to Junk
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the super senior and mezzanine class of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2006-
PWR14 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates and downgraded
10 classes.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses as a
result of updated property valuations on current specially
serviced loans.  Fitch modeled losses of 8.92% of the outstanding
pool, of which 2.31% are from specially serviced loans.  The
expected losses of the original pool are at 3.49%, which includes
losses of 1.45% to date.  Current cumulative interest shortfalls
totaling $4,555,836 are affecting classes G through P.

As of the November 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 10% to $2.1 billion from $2.4 billion.
Fitch has identified 78 (36.1%) Fitch Loans of Concern (LOC), of
which 12 (5.8%) are specially serviced. In addition, there are no
defeased loans within the pool.

The largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is the Philips at
Sunrise Shopping Center loan (2.98%).  The loan is collateralized
by a 414,082-square foot (sf) retail center located in Massapequa,
NY.  The property was 99.9% occupied at issuance, but dropped to
85.6% in 2009 following bankruptcies of Circuit City and Linens'N
Things.  The loan was previously in special servicing between
March 2009 and August 2010.  The loan was subsequently returned to
the master servicer as a modified loan and the borrower was able
to re-lease one of the vacant spaces to Michael's.  On Nov. 23,
2011, the loan transferred to special servicing again for imminent
default due to insufficient cash flow to serve debt payments.  As
of June 2011, the servicer reports a net operating income (NOI)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.0 times (x).

The second largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is the
Piedmont Mall (1.5%).  The loan is secured by a 474,734-sf
anchored retail center located in Danville, VA.  The loan was
transferred to special servicer in April 2009 as a result of the
sponsor, GGP, filing for bankruptcy protection.  GGP conveyed
title to the trust via a deed-in-lieu in September 2011.  The
special servicer has engaged a new property manager and leasing
agent, who is reportedly working through transitional accounting,
operations, and leasing issues.  Based on the property's rent
roll, as of March 31, 2011, the collateralized portion of the mall
was 56.9% occupied.

The third largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is the
Drury Inn Portfolio loan (1.56%) collateralized by three hotels
with a total of 453 rooms.  Two hotels are located in San Antonio,
TX and one in Albuquerque, NM. The hotels have Drury Inn and Best
Western Flags.  As of mid-year 2011, the portfolio reported
occupancy was 58.4%, which is down from 81.1% at issuance.  The
last reported DSCR by the servicer was 0.89x as of March 2011.

Fitch downgrades these classes, revises Outlooks and assigns
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

  -- $222.1 million class A-J to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $46.2 million class B to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;
  -- $24.6 million class C to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $37 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 100%
  -- $21.5 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $24.6 million class F to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $24.6 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 30%;
  -- $9.2 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%
  -- $6.1 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%
  -- $9.2 million class L to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes and assigns Recovery Estimates as
indicated:

  -- $77.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $68.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $125 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $950.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $258.5 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $246.8 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $24.6 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 100%;
  -- $3 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $4.3 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate class P.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
BlueMountain CLO 2011-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2011-1 LLC's
$322.0 million floating-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of Oct. 11, 2011.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral. On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach
the target level of portfolio collateral. Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached. The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents. Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date. The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction. This window
of time is typically referred to as a 'ramp-up period.' Because
some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets from the
new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may give
collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P said.

"For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, our ratings on the
closing date and prior to our effective date review are generally
based on the application of our criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to us by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect our assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines. This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased," S&P said.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio. Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee. (For more information on our criteria and our
analytical tools, see 'Update To Global Methodologies And
Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,'
published Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P said

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation. In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P said.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P said.

Ratings Affirmed
BlueMountain CLO 2011-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2011-1 LLC

Class                    Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A                        AAA (sf)              228.0
B (deferrable            AA (sf)                34.0
C (deferrable)           A (sf)                 28.0
D (deferrable)           BBB (sf)               17.0
E (deferrable)           BB (sf)                15.0
Subordinated notes       NR                     39.0

NR -- Not rated.


CAPITAL TRUST: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from Capital Trust Re CDO 2004-1 Ltd. (Capital Trust 2004-
1), a U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
(CRE CDO) transaction. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings
on four other classes from the same transaction," S&P said.

"The rating actions primarily reflect our analysis of the deal
following the deterioration in the transaction's collateralization
ratio. According to the Nov. 17, 2011, trustee report, the
transaction's collateral totaled $188.5 million, while the
transaction's liability totaled $254.9 million, which includes
capitalized interest," S&P said.

"The rating actions also reflect reported defaulted assets
in the amount of $105.7 million (56.1%) in the transaction's
collateral pool. The volume of defaulted assets has caused
further deterioration in the collateralization of the transaction.
We lowered our ratings on classes F, G, and H to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' because we determined that the classes are unlikely
to be repaid in full," S&P said.

"According to the Nov. 17, 2011, trustee report, the transaction's
current assets included 11 subordinate interest loans totaling
$163.0 million (86.5%) and three commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) tranches totaling $25.4 million (13.5%). Per
the trustee report, four of the 11 subordinate interest loans
are performing and have maturity dates ranging from 2012 to 2013,"
S&P said.

"The trustee report noted seven defaulted loans ($80.3 million,
42.6%) in the transaction. Standard & Poor's estimated specific
recovery rates for the defaulted loans to arrive at a weighted
average of 29.2%. We based the recovery rates on information from
the collateral manager, special servicer, and third-party data
providers," S&P said. The defaulted loan assets are:

    The Menlo Oaks loan ($24.5 million, 13%);

    The Broadreach Office portfolio loan ($21.1 million, 11.2%);

    The Resorts International portfolio loan ($10.5 million,
    5.6%);

    The Embassy Suites LBV loan ($7.5 million, 4.0%);

    The Arapaho Business Park loan ($6.5 million, 3.4%);

    The Liberty Properties loan ($5.9 million, 3.1%); and

    The Pointe Apartments loan ($4.4 million, 2.3%).

According to the November trustee report, the deal is failing its
class C/D/E overcollateralization test, is passing its class A/B
overcollateralization test, and is passing its interest coverage
tests.

"Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
assets in accordance with its current criteria. Our analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered

Capital Trust Re CDO 2004-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
B         CCC+ (sf)            B- (sf)
F         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)
G         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)
H         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Capital Trust Re CDO 2004-1 Ltd.

Class     Rating
A-2       BB- (sf)
C         CCC- (sf)
D         CCC- (sf)
E         CCC- (sf)


CFCRE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 (sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
thirteen classes of CMBS securities, issued by CFCRE Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2011-C2.

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by 51 fixed rate loans secured
by 72 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.46X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.12X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 92.8% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 97.6% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is
20.3. The transaction's loan level diversity is lower than the
band of Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 22.6. The
transaction's property diversity profile is lower than the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.14, which is better
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com
for a copy of this methodology.

On November 22, 2011, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in
which the rating agency has requested market feedback on potential
changes to its rating methodology for interest-only securities. If
the revised methodology is implemented as proposed, the ratings on
CFCRE 2011-C2 Classes X-A and X-B may be negatively affected.
Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled "Proposal
Changing the Global Rating Methodology for Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities," for further details regarding the
implications of the proposed methodology changes on Moody's
ratings.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, or 23%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa2, A1, respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


CGCMT 2005-EMG: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. J Notes at 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the ratings of four
classes, affirmed nine classes and downgraded one class of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-EMG:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

In addition, Moody's has corrected the rating for Class M to B1
(sf) from WR. The rating for this tranche was previously withdrawn
on September 22, 2006 due to an internal administrative error. The
rating for this class is being downgraded to Caa2 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to increased credit support due to loan
payoffs and amortization. The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.
The downgrade is due to realized losses from loans in special
servicing.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.2% of the current balance. At Moody's last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 1.6%. Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 2.5% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are in
recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter, amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com
for a copy of this methodology.

Moody's noted that on November 22, 2011, it released a Request for
Comment, in which the rating agency has requested market feedback
on potential changes to its rating methodology for Interest-Only
Securities. If the revised methodology is implemented as proposed
the rating on Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-EMG
Class X may be negatively affected. Please refer to Moody's
request for Comment, titled "Proposal Changing the Global Rating
Methodology for Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," for
further details regarding the implications of the proposed
methodology change on Moody's rating.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 27, compared to 42 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 16, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 22, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 77% to
$168.1 million from $722.1 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 87 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 50% of the pool. The pool includes four loans with
investment grade credit estimates, representing 28% of the pool.

Twenty-one loans, representing 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of
approximately $40,000 (1% loss severity). There is currently one
loan, representing less than 1% in special servicing. Moody's does
not anticipate a loss for this loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 financial for 99% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit component is
38% compared to 40% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs for the conduit component are
4.26X and 5.02X, respectively, compared to 3.73X and 4.47X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with an investment grade credit estimate is the
50 East 42nd Street Loan ($15.0 million -- 8.9% of the pool),
which is secured by a 144,378 square foot mixed use property
located in midtown Manhattan at the intersection of 42nd street
and Madison Avenue. The largest tenants are Rhinoceros Visual
Effects & Design (10% of the net rental area (NRA); lease
expiration 12/2014), East 42nd Street Fitness (7% of the NRA;
lease expiration 1/2025) and Shillington Graphic Design (3.5% of
the NRA; lease expiration 7/2017). The property was 91% leased as
of April 2011, the same as at last review. Moody's credit estimate
and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 2.28X, respectively, compared to Aa3
and 1.95X at last review.

The second loan with an investment grade credit estimate is the
1001 Central Park Avenue Loan ($14.0 million; -- 8.3% of the
pool), which is secured by a 238,700 square foot retail center
located in Scarsdale, New York. The largest tenants are Wakefern
Food Corporation (29% of the NRA; lease expiration 1/2031),
Simply Amazing of Westchester (10.3% of the NRA; lease expiration
10/2014) and Planet Fitness (4% of the NRA; lease expiration
10/2014). The property was 87% leased as of April 2011, the same
as at last review. Performance is in-line with last review.
Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.86X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The third loan with an investment grade credit estimate is the 6
West 32nd Street Loan ($11.2 million -- 6.7% of the pool), which
is secured by a 171-room hotel located in midtown Manhattan. The
hotel is flagged as a Red Roof Inn. Performance has been stable
and the loan is benefiting from amortization. Moody's credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 2.03X, respectively,
compared to Baa1 and 1.98X at last review.

The fourth loan with an investment grade credit estimate is the
295 Park Avenue South Loan ($7.6 million -- 4.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a 179 unit-multifamily property located in the
Flatiron neighborhood in Manhattan. The property was 99% leased as
of March 2011, the same as at last review. Property performance
has slightly declined since last year, but the loan is benefiting
from amortization. Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are
Aaa and 6.22X, respectively, compared to Aaa and 6.35X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 12% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the 18-28 West 33rd Street
Loan ($8.0 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured by an
183,750 square foot office building located in the garment
district in Manhattan. The largest tenants are Longstreet Holdings
(10% of the NRA; lease expiration 7/2012), Sasha Handbags (7% of
the NRA; lease expiration 1/2016) and News National Network (7% of
the NRA; lease expiration 12/2016). The property was 98% leased as
of January 2011, essentially the same as at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 46% and 2.32X, respectively, compared to
56% and 1.88X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 425 Madison Avenue Loan
($6.9 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 79,335
square foot office building located at the intersection of 49th
street and Madison Avenue in Manhattan. The building was 87%
leased as of December 2010 compared to 100% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 37% and 2.89X, compared to 31%
and 3.42X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 22 West 34th Street Loan
($5.8 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by an 88,747
square foot mixed use property located at the intersection of 34th
street and 6th Avenue in Manhattan. The property was 99% leased as
of December 2010, essentially the same as at last review. Property
performance has improved since last review and the loan benefits
from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 24% and
4.52X, respectively, compared to 28% and 3.83X at last review.


CITIGROUP COMM: Fitch Junks Rating on Four Certificate Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades seven classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust, series 2006-C5, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, due to further deterioration of performance. The
downgrades are driven by the transfer of several large loans to
the special servicer as well as greater than expected realized
losses on several dispositions since Fitch's last rating action.

Fitch modeled losses of 5.8% of the current balance which includes
expected losses on the specially serviced loans and loans assumed
to not refinance at maturity.  Cumulative losses, which include
realized losses and current modeled losses, were 8.5% of the
original balance compared to 7% at the last rating action.

As of the November 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 10% to $2.02
billion from $2.24 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are
affecting classes H through P.

The largest contributor to losses is the One and Two Securities
Center Loan (3.6%). The loan is secured by a 521,957-square foot
(sf) office property located in Atlanta, GA.  The loan transferred
to the special servicer in December 2010 for imminent default when
several tenants vacated upon lease expiration.  The loan is more
than 90 days delinquent and the special servicer is pursuing
foreclosure.  A recent valuation indicates significant losses.

The next largest contributor to losses is the Dominion Plaza loan
(1.7%) which is secured by a 318,695-sf office building in Dallas,
TX, approximately 16 miles north of the Dallas CBD. Property
performance has been trending downwards over the past few years as
occupancy has declined and rental rates have been eroded.  Year
end (YE) 2010 net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) was 1.09 times (x) compared to 1.30x and 1.50x at YE
2009 and YE 2008, respectively.

The third largest contributor to losses is the East Brook Mall
loan (1.2%) which is secured by a 241,000-sf regional mall located
in Mansfield, CT.  The mall is anchored by Kohl's, JC Penney and
TJ Maxx.  The loan began amortizing in September 2011 and had a YE
2010 DSCR of 1.03x on an amortizing basis. The property was 97%
occupied as of June 2011; however, significant concessions have
been offered to attract and retain tenants.

Fitch downgrades these classes and revises the Outlooks and
Recovery Estimates (RE) as indicated:

  -- $172.6 million class A-J to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $42.5 million class B to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;
  -- $21.2 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;
  -- $26.5 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 100%
  -- $29.2 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 100%
  -- $26.5 million class F to 'Csf'from 'CCCsf'; to RE 50% from RE
     100%;
  -- $21.2 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; to RE 0% from RE
     100%.

Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $193.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $93.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $92.8 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $774.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $201.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf' Outlook Stable;
  -- $212.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirms these non-pooled rake classes:

  -- $40 million class AMP-1 at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $48 million class AMP-2 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $27 million class AMP-3 at 'BBB-sf; Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 has paid in full. Classes H through O have realized
losses and remain at 'Dsf' RE 0%.  Fitch does not rate class P.


COMM 2004-LNB4: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. B Notes to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) downgraded the ratings of four
classes and affirmed 13 classes of COMM 2004-LNB4 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-LNB4:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011 Confirmed at
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are primarily due to current and potential
future interest shortfalls. As of the most recent remittance
date, the pool has experienced cumulative interest shortfalls
totaling $6.7 million and affecting Classes P through C. Moody's
anticipates that the pool will continue to experience interest
shortfalls caused by specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs), extraordinary trust expenses and non-advancing by the
master servicer based on a determination of non-recoverability.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

On August 4, 2011 Moody's downgraded seven classes and remained
three classes on review for possible downgrade due to concerns
about interest shortfalls. This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
8.9% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8.9%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
14.6% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline
and job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
in recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter , amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. Moody's noted that on November 22, 2011, it released
a Request for Comment, in which the rating agency has requested
market feedback on potential changes to its rating methodology for
Interest-Only Securities. If the revised methodology is
implemented as proposed the rating on COMM 2004-LNB4 transaction
Class X-C may be negatively affected. Please refer to Moody's
request for Comment, titled "Proposal Changing the Global Rating
Methodology for Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," for
further details regarding the implications of the proposed
methodology change on Moody's rating.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a
greater impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29, compared to 32 at the Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated August 4, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 36% to
$786.0 million from $1.22 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 92 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 45% of the pool. Four loans, representing 5% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities. One loan, representing 7% of the pool, has an
investment grade credit estimate.

Twenty loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $30.9 million loss
(54% loss severity on average). There are currently eight loans,
representing 17% of the pool, in special servicing. The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $49.1 million appraisal
reduction for six of the specially serviced loans. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate loss of $50.0 million (48% expected loss
on average) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven
poorly performing loans representing 7% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $8.7 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 88% and 11% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 87%, the same as the Moody's prior review. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.26X, respectively, compared to
1.35X and 1.25X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the 731 Lexington Avenue
Loan ($60.0 million -- 7.7% of the pool), which is a 23.6%
participation interest in a $255.0 million loan. The property is
also encumbered by a $86 million junior loan which is held outside
the trust. The loan is secured by a 694,634 square foot (SF)
office building located in New York City. The property is 100%
leased to Bloomberg, LP until 2028. Performance has been stable.
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A3 and
2.01X, respectively, the same as last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Crossings at Corona-Phase I & II
Loan ($75.0 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
503,037 SF retail power center located in Corona, California. The
property was 98% leased as of March 2011. Property performance has
been stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 0.9X,
respectively, compared to 103% and 0.9X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Woodyard Crossing Shopping Center
Loan ($37.2 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
483,724 SF retail power center located in Washington, DC. The
property was 99% leased as of April 2011. The largest tenants are
Wal-Mart and Lowe's. Performance has been stable. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.31X, respectively, compared to 76% and
1.29X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 280 Trumbull Street Loan
($31.5 million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 664,479
SF office property located in Hartford, Connecticut. The property
was 70% leased as of May 2011. The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist due to high vacancy and decreased income. Although
performance has declined over the past two years, the property is
generating sufficient cash flow to cover the debt service. Year-
end 2010 DSCR was 1.61X. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and
1.16X, respectively, compared to 89% and 1.16X at last review.


COMM MORTGAGE: Fitch Junks Rating to Two Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed two classes
from COMM Mortgage Trust 2005-FL10.  The downgrades are due to
increased certainty on Fitch expected losses with respect to
classes K and L.

The pool paid down by 84% from October to November 2011 following
the $516 million full payoff of the Palisades Center loan.  Only
two loans remain in the pool, both of which are specially
serviced, with an updated base case loss expectation of 56% (or
2.5% of the original pooled balance).

The larger of the two remaining loans is the specially-serviced 10
MetroTech Center (52.3% of the pool), which is secured by a seven-
story, 358,672-square foot (sf) office building in downtown
Brooklyn, NY.  The loan transferred to special servicing in March
2010 for final maturity default.  The property remains 97%
occupied by two tenants: the Internal Revenue Service (88% of the
space through February 2012) and Human Resources Administration
(9% through March 2013).  The IRS is expected to vacate at its
upcoming lease expiration or soon thereafter.  The special
servicer, LNR Partners, Inc., is pursuing foreclosure while
concurrently entertaining any borrower proposals.

The other remaining loan is the specially-serviced Berkshire Mall
(47.7%), which is secured by 589,146 sf of a 715,146-sf regional
mall located in Lanesboro, MA, about 30 miles east of Albany, NY.
The collateral consists of 192,793 sf of in-line space and 396,353
sf of anchor/major tenant space. The non-collateral anchor space
(Target) totals approximately 126,000 sf.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2010 for imminent final maturity
default.  A full cash sweep was implemented for future leasing
costs and approximately $1.7 million remains in a collateral
reserve.  The property suffers from a tertiary location and weak
in-line / junior anchor occupancy.  The loan was extended through
March 2012 and the special servicer, CT Investment Management,
continues to closely monitor the asset.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $19.8 million class K to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $6.5 million class L to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed this class:

  -- $6.6 million class J at 'CCCsf', RE 10%.

The $11.2 million class M remains at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

These classes originally rated by Fitch have paid in full: A-1, A-
J1, A-J2, X-1, MOAX-1, MOAX-2, MOAX-3, B, C, D, E, F, MOA-1, MOA-
2, N-PC, O-PC, P-PC, Q-PC, N-DEL and O-DEL.  In addition, Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only classes X-2-
DB, X-2-NOM, X-2-SG, X-3-DB, X-3-NOM and X-3-SG.

Fitch does not rate classes A-J3, G, H and MOA-3.


COMPASS RE: S&P Gives 'B+' Rating on $250-Mil. Sr. Secured Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB- (sf)', 'BB-
(sf)', and 'B+ (sf)' issue credit ratings to the Series 2011-1
Class 1, 2, and 3 notes issued by Compass Re Ltd.

The notes are exposed to losses from U.S. hurricanes and
earthquakes in the covered area. Compass Re is a Bermuda exempted
company licensed as a special-purpose insurer under the Bermuda
Insurance Act 1978, as amended, and incorporated under the laws of
Bermuda. The company is owned by a purpose trust. National Union
Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. (A/Stable/A-1) is the cedent
in this transaction.

"Our views of the transaction's credit risk reflect the
counterparty credit ratings on all of the parties involved that
can affect the timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment
of principal on the notes," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Gary Martucci. "Our ratings on the notes take into account the
rating on National Union, which will make quarterly premium
payments to Compass Re; the implied rating on the catastrophe risk
for the Class 1 notes ('BB-'), Class 2 notes ('BB-'), and Class 3
notes ('B+'); and the rating on the assets in the collateral and
the reinsurance trust accounts (currently treasury money market
funds rated 'AAAm'). The rating for each class of notes reflects
the lowest of these three ratings, which is currently the rating
on the catastrophe risk."

Ratings List
New Ratings

Compass Re Ltd. - Series 2011-1
$75 mil Class 1 senior secured notes due 2015       BB- (sf)
$250 mil Class 2 senior secured notes due 2015      BB- (sf)
$250 mil Class 3 senior secured notes due 2015      B+ (sf)


CONNECTICUT VALLEY: Moody's Confirms Rating of $15MM Notes at B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 1 class of
notes, and confirmed the ratings of 4 classes of notes issued by
Connecticut Valley Structured Credit CDO II, Ltd. The classes of
notes affected by the rating actions are:

US$25,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes (current balance of
$155,319,658), Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 26, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$6,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Confirmed
at B1 (sf); previously on August 26, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf) and
Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Confirmed at
B1 (sf); previously on August 26, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf) and
Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$18,250,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf); previously on August 26, 2011 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$13,250,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Confirmed at
Caa3 (sf); previously on August 26, 2011 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf) and
Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the portfolio.

Since the last rating action in August 2011, the weighted average
rating factor has improved to 1844 from 2346 as of the August 2011
report. Also as of the latest trustee report dated October 31,
2011, the Class A/B and Class C Par

Coverage ratios have improved and are reported at 106.92% and
91.59% compared to August 2011 levels of 103.88% and 88.98,
respectively.

The rating actions on the notes also reflect CLO tranche upgrades
that have taken place within the last six months. Since Moody's
June 22nd announcement that nearly all CLO tranches currently
rated Aa1 and below were placed on review for possible upgrade,
82.08% of the collateral had been upgraded, 18.5% of which took
place following the previous rating action on the Notes in August.
According to Moody's, none of the collateral remains on review.

Moody's also notes that an event of default occurred under Section
5.1(vi) of the indenture on August 13, 2009 as a result of the
Class A Par Value Ratio being less than 102%. The Controlling
Party subsequently directed the Trustee to declare the principal
and accrued and unpaid interest on the Notes to be immediately due
and payable. As a result of the acceleration of the Notes, all
proceeds from the underlying assets are being used to pay interest
and principal on the Class A-2 Notes until such notes are paid in
full.

Connecticut Valley Structured Credit CDO II, Ltd. is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
CLOs which originated between 2003 and 2006.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the

CDOEdge cash-flow model . The cash flow model takes into account
the following: collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants,
the priority of payments (waterfall) for interest and principal
proceeds received from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions,
the timing of defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign
exchange risk (if present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each
tranche is the weighted average of losses to each tranche across
all the scenarios, where the weight is the likelihood of the
scenario occurring. Moody's defines the loss as the shortfall in
the present value of cash flows to the tranche relative to the
present value of the promised cash flows. The present values are
calculated using the promised tranche coupon rate as the discount
rate. For floating rate tranches, the discount rate is based on
the promised spread over Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's rating action the factors in a number of sensitivity
analyses and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are shown
in terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Entire collateral pool downgraded by 1 notch:

Class A-2: -2

Class B-1: -3

Class B-2: -3

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1

Entire collateral pool upgraded by 1 notch:

Class A-2: +2

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +2

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1


CPS AUTO: Moody's Assigns (P) Ba2 (sf) to Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2011-C. This is
the third senior/subordinated transaction of the year for Consumer
Portfolio Services, Inc. (CPS).

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2011-C

Class A Notes, rated (P) A2 (sf);

Class B Notes, rated (P) Baa2 (sf);

Class C Notes, rated (P) Ba2 (sf);

Class D Notes, rated (P) B2 (sf);

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, the experience and expertise of CPS as
servicer, and the backup servicing arrangement with Aa3-rated
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities," published in
May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the underlying
pool is 12.0%. The loss expectation was based on an analysis of
CPS' portfolio vintage performance as well as performance of past
securitizations, and current expectations for future economic
conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is
Medium/High versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the
Medium/High assessment for Governance due to the unrated
sponsor/servicer.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes
owing to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 20%, or 25%, the
initial model output for the Class A notes might change from A2 to
Baa2, and B1, respectively; Class B notes might change from Baa2
to B3, and below B3, respectively; Class C notes might change from
Ba2 to below B3 in all three scenarios, respectively; Class D
notes might change from B2 to below B3 in all three scenarios.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not
aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of
each scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


CPS AUTO: S&P Gives 'B+' Rating on Class D Asset-Backed Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2011-C's $119.4 million
asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securitization of subprime
auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 5,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

    "The availability of approximately 35.3%, 26.9%, 21.4%, and
    19.5% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes
    based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including excess
    spread). These credit support levels provide coverage of more
    than 2.1x, 1.7x, 1.33x, and 1.11x our 13.75%-14.50% expected
    cumulative net loss range for the class A, B, C, and D notes,"
    S&P said.

    "The expectation that, under a moderate stress scenario of
    1.70x our expected net loss level, the ratings on the class A,
    B, and C notes will not decline by more than two rating
    categories during the first year, all else being equal. This
    is consistent with our credit stability criteria, which
    outlines the outer bound of credit deterioration equal to a
    two-category downgrade within the first year for 'A', 'BBB',
    and 'BB' rated securities (see 'Methodology: Credit Stability
    Criteria,' published May 3, 2010)," S&P said.

    The credit enhancement underlying each of the preliminary
    rated notes, which is in the form of subordination,
    overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread
    for the class A, B, C, and D notes.

    "The timely interest and principal payments made to the
    preliminary rated notes under our stressed cash flow modeling
    scenarios, which we believe are appropriate for the assigned
    preliminary ratings," S&P said.

    The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
    loans securitized in this transaction.

    The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,
    which include performance triggers.

    The transaction's legal structure.

             Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

      http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111319.pdf

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2011-C

Class             Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A                 A (sf)                 98.4
B                 BBB (sf)                9.6
C                 BB (sf)                 6.0
D                 B+ (sf)                 5.4


CSFB 2003-C4: Moodys Affirms Rating of Cl. G Notes at 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of
fifteen classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
C4:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 10, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.9% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 5.0%. Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 7.9% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are in
recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter, amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com
for a copy of this methodology.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a
greater impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 32 compared to 33 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 10, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to
$933.77 million from $1.34 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 141 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 37% of the pool. Twenty-one loans, representing 18%
of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities. Two loans, representing 12% of the pool,
have investment grade credit estimates.

Thirty-three loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $22.1 million loss (36%
loss severity on average). Currently six loans, representing 6% of
the pool, are in special servicing. The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $9.9 million appraisal reduction for the
specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss
of $20.4 million (38% expected loss on average) for all of the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 11 poorly
performing loans representing 11% of the pool and has estimated a
$15.4 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 100% and 97% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 79% compared to 82% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 12% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.64X and 1.48X, respectively, compared to
1.76X and 1.54X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Circle Centre Mall
Loan ($68.3 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by an
800,000 square foot (SF) regional mall located in Indianapolis,
Indiana. The loan is sponsored by Simon Property Group. The mall
is anchored by Carson Pirie Scott. Although the property was 96%
leased as of September 2011 compared to 85% at last review,
Nordstrom has vacated its 206,000 SF store but is still making
rental payments. Nordstrom's lease expires in February 2026.
Property performance has declined since last review. Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.60X,
respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.97X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the 540 Madison Avenue
Loan ($43.6 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
281,000 SF office building located in the Plaza District office
submarket of New York City. The property was 97% leased as of
September 2011 compared to 92% at last review. Property
performance has improved since last review. Moody's current credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 3.02X, respectively,
compared to Aa1 and 2.63X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 10.8% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is Wanamaker Building Loan
($57.5 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
974,000 SF office property located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
The property is also encumbered by a $15 million B-note. The
largest tenant is The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia,
occupying 19% of NRA with a lease expiration in June 2027. The
property was 97% leased as of June 2011, compared to 99% at last
review. Property performance remains stable. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.63X, respectively, compared to 62%
and 1.65X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Town & Country Apartments Loan
($22.0 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 618
unit multifamily property located near the University of Illinois
Champaign campus in Urbana, Illinois. The property was 99% leased
as of September 2011 compared to 89% at last review. Property
performance has been stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95%
and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 104% and 0.94X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Blackbaud Plaza Loan ($21.1 million
-- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 280,000 SF office
property located in Charleston, South Carolina. The property is
100% leased to Blackbaud, Inc. through September 2023. The lease
originally expired in July 2010. Property performance has been
stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to 75% and 1.52X at last review.


CSFB 2004-C5: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. E Notes at 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 20
classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C5:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on December 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.5% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 6.7%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
17.7% of the current balance. Moody's base expected loss is a
function of the total anticipated losses for the loans remaining
in the pool. The decrease in base expected loss is due an increase
in realized losses to the pool since Moody's last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are in
recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter , amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published on April 19, 2005
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published on July 7, 2000. Please see the Credit
Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 20 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.2 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to $1.38
billion from $1.87 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 182 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 22% of the pool, with the top loans representing 42% of
the pool. The pool does not contain any loans with investment
grade credit estimates. Eight loans, representing 3% of the pool,
are fully defeased by US Government securities.

Fifty-nine loans, representing 50% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $24.8 million (30% loss severity). Currently six
loans, representing 2% of the pool, are in special servicing. Five
of the six specially serviced loans are secured by multifamily
properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $12.5 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (42% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $14.3 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Excluding special serviced, defeased and troubled loans, Moody's
was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 100% of the
pool's loans. Excluding the aforementioned loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 94%, a decrease from 97% at the prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to
the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.8%.

Excluding special serviced, defeased and troubled loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.26X and 1.07X, respectively,
compared to 1.29X and 1.03X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Time Warner Retail Loan ($303.7 million -- 22.1% of
the pool), which is secured by a 343,000 square foot (SF) retail
center located at Columbus Circle between West 58th and West 60th
Street in New York City. The largest tenants are Whole Foods (17%
of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration January 2024) and
Equinox (12% of the NRA; lease expiration February 2019). Century
21, a discount retailer, has leased the 26,000 SF of space vacated
by Borders as part of its mid-2011 bankruptcy liquidation. The
property was 99% leased as of October 2011, the same as at the
prior review. The property's financial performance improved in
2010 over the prior year as increases in revenue, specifically
revenue from expense recoveries, outpaced a slight increase in
expenses. The loan is currently on the master servicer's watchlist
because the DSCR is currently below 1.20X. Since the loan began to
amortize in January 2008, the loan has moved on and off the
watchlist due to the DSCR fluctuating around 1.20X. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 108% and 0.80X, respectively, compared to
101% and 0.85X at last review.

The second largest loan is the AT&T Consumer Services Headquarters
Loan ($52.6 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
387,000 SF office building located in Morris Township, New Jersey.
The property is 100% leased to AT&T Consumer Services (Moody's
senior unsecured rating - A2, negative outlook) through September
2014. AT&T has been in the building since it was built in 1979 and
has renewed its lease multiple times but no options remain to
extend the lease beyond the currently scheduled 2014 expiration.
The loan was interest only until its anticipated repayment date
(ARD) of October 2009 at which point the interest rate increased
from 5.35% to 7.35%, the loan began to amortize and all excess
cash flow began to be used to reduce the outstanding principal
balance. Since the ARD date, the loan has amortized 9%. The loan
is on the servicer's watchlist for missing its ARD but is
performing. The final maturity date is in October 2034. Moody's
analysis incorporated the tenancy risk associated with the single
tenant exposure, the near-term lease expiration and lack of
extension options. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 122% and
0.80X, respectively, compared to 125% and 0.78X at last review.

The third largest conduit exposure is the BECO Portfolio Loan
($46.6 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which consists of three
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by 14
adjacent office buildings located 10 miles northeast of
Washington, D.C. in Lanham, Maryland. As of June 2011, the
portfolio was 76% leased, a decline from 85% at year-end 2009 and
89% at securitization. Two of the three loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist for low DSCR. The loan matures in September
2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.87X,
respectively, compared to 79% and 1.24X at last review.


DENALI CAPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-1L Notes From 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1L, A-1LR, and B-1L notes from Denali Capital CLO VI Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Denali Capital LLC. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on
the class A-2L, A-3L, and B-2L notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect improved performance we have observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio since we lowered our
ratings on all of the classes on Nov. 17, 2009, following the
application of our September 2009 corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria. As of the Nov. 7, 2011, trustee report,
the transaction's asset portfolio had $9.62 million in defaulted
obligations and approximately $28.14 million in assets from
obligors rated in the 'CCC' range. This was a decrease from
$17.43 million in defaulted obligations and from approximately
$55.71 million in assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' range
noted in the Oct. 7, 2009, trustee report, which we used for our
November 2009 rating actions," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class A-2L, A-3L, and B-2L notes
to reflect our belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current ratings," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

Denali Capital CLO VI Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-1L               AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
A-1LR              AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
B-1L               BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Denali Capital CLO VI Ltd.

Class              Rating
A-2L               A+ (sf)
A-3L               BBB+ (sf)
B-2L               B+ (sf)


EMBARCADERO AIRCRAFT: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. A-1 Notes to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded one class of pooled
aircraft lease-backed notes (the Notes) issued by Embarcadero
Aircraft Securitization Trust (EAST), Series 2000-1. GATX Capital
Corp is the sponsor, and Macquarie Aircraft Leasing Limited is the
servicer.

The complete rating action:

Issuer: Embarcadero Aircraft Securitization Trust (EAST 2000),
Series 2000-1

Class A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Notes were downgraded because EAST has sold a number of
aircraft from the portfolio, leaving $103 million of Class A-1
Notes (in addition to $272 million in C-rated subordinate notes)
secured by a portfolio of only eight aircraft with an average
appraised base value of approximately $49 million (as of July,
2011, as disclosed by EAST). These eight aircraft are older and in
low demand, and two of the aircraft in the pool are off-lease.

The current LTV ratio of the Class A-1 is approximately 210%,
using the appraised base value, indicating that the noteholders
will likely suffer substantial losses relative to the outstanding
balance of the Notes.

We also considered the portfolio rental income and the reserve
account. The amount generated by rental income is insignificant
comparing to the outstanding balance of the Class A notes,
having dropped to below $1 million per month as aircraft are
sold from the portfolio or come off lease. In addition, there
is a $15 million collateral account for Class A. The rental income
and the reserve account are relatively small compared to the
current outstanding balance of $103 million Class A-1 notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in
March 1999." Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com
for a copy of this methodology.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account third
party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
a negative impact on the rating.


FAXTOR ABS: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Two Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all Faxtor ABS 2005-1 B.V.'s (Faxtor
ABS 2005-1) notes and revised the Outlook to Stable from Negative
for three classes of notes.  The transaction is a cash flow
securitisation of primarily mezzanine structured finance assets.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A1 floating-rate notes due 2070 (XS0235143970):
     affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  -- Class A2E floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235144358):
     affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  -- Class A2F fixed-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235144945): affirmed
     at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  -- Class A3 fixed-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235146056): affirmed
     at 'Bsf'; Negative Outlook

  -- Class A4 floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235146569):
     affirmed at 'CCsf'

  -- Class B floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235147617): affirmed
     at 'CCsf'

The affirmation reflects the stability of the transaction's
performance since the last review in January 2011.  The 'CCCsf'
and below bucket has fallen slightly to 13.7% of the portfolio
from 14.7% in January.  The two largest industry sectors are RMBS
at 49% of the portfolio and CDOs at 27%.  Fitch believes that
a material risk for the transaction is that the underlying
structured finance assets' maturity may extend beyond their
reported weighted average expected life.  This is taken into
account in the agency's portfolio analysis.

All over-collateralisation (OC) tests are failing but there
has been a gradual improvement in the OC tests since the end
of the reinvestment period in February 2011.  According to the
transaction documents, the collateral manager may continue to sell
defaulted or credit-risk assets after the reinvestment period, but
may no longer reinvest any proceeds.

Class A1 has been paying down from interest and principal
diversion due to the OC tests breach since March 2008, and there
was a discounted buyback of EUR29.8m class A1 notes in March 2011.

The affirmation of classes A1, A2E and A2F and revision of their
Outlooks to Stable from Negative reflects the increase in the
level of credit enhancement due to the transaction's deleveraging
since the last review and the end of the reinvestment period.  The
affirmation of class A3 reflects its level of credit enhancement
relative to the portfolio's credit quality, and the Negative
Outlook reflects its vulnerability to the extension risk of the
portfolio assets.  The affirmation of classes A4 and B, which are
deferring interest, reflects their levels of credit enhancement
relative to the portfolio's exposure to assets rated 'CCCsf' and
below.


FIRST UNION: S&P Cuts Rating on Class L Certificates to 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2002-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications. "We also lowered our ratings on three other classes
from the same transaction. In addition, we affirmed our ratings on
seven other classes from the same transaction and removed four of
them from CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said.

"Our rating actions primarily reflect our analysis of the
transaction using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of the
remaining assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust. Our analysis also considered the
transaction's near-term maturities. By pool balance, 41.0% of
the loans are scheduled to mature by year-end 2012. This excludes
the 14 defeased loans, two specially serviced loans, one loan that
was transferred to the special servicer subsequent to the November
2011 trustee remittance report, and one loan that we determined to
be credit-impaired. Our analysis also reflects our application of
the 'U.S. Government Support In Structured Finance And Public
Finance Ratings,' published on Sept. 19, 2011," S&P said.

"We placed our ratings on the class B, C, D, E, F, and G
certificates on CreditWatch with negative implications on July 15,
2011, after we placed our U.S. sovereign long-term rating on
Credit Watch negative. As of the Nov. 14, 2011, trustee remittance
report, 45.3% of the trust balance consists of defeased
collateral," S&P said.

The upgrades on classes D and E reflect increased credit
enhancement levels due to the deleveraging of the pool balance.

"The downgrades reflect credit support erosion that we anticipate
will occur upon the eventual resolution of the transaction's three
($26.4 million, 11.6%) loans that are with the special servicer
and one loan ($4.8 million, 2.1%) that we determined to be credit-
impaired. We also considered the near-term loan maturities, the
potential for the transaction to experience future interest
shortfalls, and reduced liquidity support because we believe a
portion of these loans may be transferred to the special servicer
if the borrowers are not able to refinance or pay off these loans
at maturity," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class IO-I interest-only (IO) certificate
based on our current criteria," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.29x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 76.1%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.12x
and a LTV ratio of 95.1%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 31.2% and 13.4%. The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude the transaction's three ($26.4 million,
11.6%) loans that are with the special servicer, one loan
($4.8 million, 2.1%) that we determined to be credit-impaired,
and 14 loans ($102.9 million, 45.3%) that have defeased. We
separately estimated losses for the specially serviced and credit-
impaired loans and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

"As of the Nov. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $4,807, primarily
related to special servicing and workout fees. The interest
shortfalls have affected all classes subordinate to and including
class M. We downgraded class J to 'BB+ (sf)', class K to 'B-
(sf)', and class L to 'CCC- (sf)' due to reduced liquidity support
available to these classes and their susceptibility to future
interest shortfalls. We considered the high volume of loans
maturing by year-end 2012 and the possible effect on interest
shortfalls to the trust if these loans transfer to the special
servicer. We previously lowered our rating on the class M
certificate to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

                       Credit Considerations

"As of the Nov. 14, 2011 trustee remittance report, two
($19.6 million, 8.6%) loans in the pool were with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital). According
to the master servicer, subsequent to the November 2011 trustee
remittance report, the Addison Com Center loan ($6.8 million,
3.0%) was transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 9, 2011. All
three loans, which are reported to be matured balloon loans, were
transferred to CWCapital primarily because the borrowers were
unable to payoff the loans at their maturity dates. No appraisal
reduction amounts (ARAs) were reported for the specially serviced
loans," S&P said. Details of the two largest specially serviced
loans, both of which are top 10 loans, are:

"The Madison Place loan ($18.3 million 8.1%), the largest loan
secured by real estate in the pool, is secured by an anchored
retail center totaling 225,983 sq. ft. in Madison Heights, Mich.,
outside of Detroit. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on June 22, 2011, due to imminent maturity. The loan
matured on July 1, 2011. The most recent reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.43x and 83.0%, respectively, as of Dec. 31, 2010.
The special servicer indicated that it is exploring a loan
modification as a workout strategy. We expect a minimal loss, if
any, upon the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P said.

"The Addison Com Center loan ($6.8 million, 3.0%), the sixth-
largest loan secured by real estate in the pool, is secured by a
industrial property totaling 96,409 sq. ft. in Addison, Texas,
outside of Dallas. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Nov. 9, 2011, due to maturity default. The loan
matured on Nov. 1, 2011. The most recent reported DSC and
occupancy were 0.97x and 63.0% as of Dec. 31, 2010. We expect a
moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P
said.

"The remaining loan with the special servicer has a balance that
individually represents less than 0.6% of the total pool balance.
In addition to the specially serviced loans, we determined the
Whiteville Shopping Center loan ($4.8 million, 2.1%) to be credit-
impaired due to declining cash flow generated by the asset. Also,
the anticipated repayment date is January 2012. According to the
master servicer, however, the borrower indicated that it is
having difficulty obtaining refinancing. The loan, the ninth-
largest loan secured by real estate, is secured by a retail center
totaling 62,935 sq. ft. in Whiteville, N.C. The loan has a
reported current debt service payment status. The reported DSC and
occupancy were 0.97x and 98.0%, respectively, as of year-end 2010.
According to the master servicer, the borrower has indicated that
the submarket where the collateral property is situated has high
unemployment and is suffering from present economic conditions.
The borrower also stated that the property is being negatively
impacted from a super Wal-Mart that opened in close proximity four
years ago. Therefore, it has been difficult to obtain financing to
pay off the loan. As a result, we viewed this loan to be at an
increased risk of default and loss," S&P said.

                           Transaction Summary

As of the Nov. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, the pool
balance was $227.3 million, down from $728.3 million at issuance.
The pool comprises 42 loans down from 106 loans at issuance. The
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), provided
financial information for 100% of the loans in the pool excluding
the 14 defeased loans: 92.9% was full-year 2010 data, 5.6% was
partial year 2011 data, while 1.5% was full-year 2009 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.30x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio were 1.29x and 76.1%. Our adjusted DSC and LTV
figures exclude the transaction's three ($26.4 million, 11.6%)
specially serviced loans, one loan ($4.8 million, 2.1%) that we
determined to be credit-impaired, and 14 loans ($102.9 million,
45.3%) that have defeased. We separately estimated losses for
the specially serviced and credit-impaired loans and included them
in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures.
To date, the transaction has experienced $19.7 million in
principal losses from 10 assets. Twenty-six loans ($104.7 million,
46.1%) in the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist. Eight
loans ($27.3 million, 12.0%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.10x, four of which ($15.6 million, 6.9%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.00x," S&P said.

           Summary of Top 10 Loans Secured By Real Estate

"The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $78.2 million (34.4%). Using servicer-
reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.34x
for the top 10 loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top
10 loans were 1.33x and 75.6%. Two of the top 10 loans are with
the special servicer and we determined one to be credit-impaired,
which we discussed above. The remaining seven top 10 loans
appear on the master servicer's watchlist because of scheduled
maturities by year- end 2012," S&P said. Details of the largest
loan on the master servicer's watchlist are set forth:

The Shorewood Crossing loan ($9.6 million, 4.2%), the second-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by retail center totaling
87,705 net rentable sq. ft. in Shorewood, Ill. The loan matures on
Feb. 1, 2012. According to the master servicer, the borrower plans
to pay off the loan at maturity. The reported DSC and occupancy
were 1.28x and 98.0%as of year-end 2010.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
current criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with our raised, lowered, and affirmed ratings," S&P
said.

Ratings Raised And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

                Rating
Class      To           From       Credit enhancement (%)
D          AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg          34.59
E          AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Neg           30.98

Ratings Lowered

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

                Rating
Class      To           From       Credit enhancement (%)
J          BB+  (sf)    BBB- (sf)                   8.15
K          B- (sf)      BB (sf)                     5.74
L          CCC- (sf)    B (sf)                      3.34

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

             Rating
Class    To         From                Credit enhancement (%)
B        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg          53.01
C        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg          38.59
F        AA- (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Neg          25.37
G        A- (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Neg           20.97

Ratings Affirmed

First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

Class    Rating                      Credit enhancement (%)
A-2      AAA (sf)                                     64.63
H        BBB+ (sf)                                    14.56
IO-I     AAA (sf)                                       N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


FLATIRON CLO: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Deferrable Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Flatiron CLO 2011-1 Ltd./Flatiron CLO 2011-1 Inc.'s
$322.25 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 2,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria (see "Update To
    Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
    And Synthetic CDOs," published Sept. 17, 2009).

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which comprises
    primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured
    term loans.

    The asset manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.3439%-13.8300%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

    http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111314.pdf

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
Flatiron CLO 2011-1 Ltd./Flatiron CLO 2011-1 Inc.

Class                   Rating                  Amount
                                              (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)                220.00
B                       AA (sf)                  53.00
C-1 (deferrable)        A (sf)                    8.25
C-2 (deferrable)        A (sf)                   11.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                 16.00
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                  14.00
Subordinated notes      NR                       31.85

NR -- Not rated.


FOLEY SQUARE: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 17
classes of notes from four U.S. collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transactions.

The rating withdrawals follow the complete paydown of the notes on
their most recent payment dates.

Centurion CDO VI Ltd. is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO).
The transaction paid the class A, B-1, B-2, C, D-1, D-2, and D-3
notes down in full following a notice of optional redemption. The
Oct. 21, 2011, notice indicated that a supermajority of the
preference shares had directed a full redemption of the notes. The
transaction paid the class A, B-1, B-2, C, D-1, D-2, and D-3 notes
down in full on the Nov. 7, 2011, payment date.

Endeavor Funding Ltd. is a CLO. The transaction paid the class A-
1, A-2, B, and C notes down in full following a notice of optional
redemption. The Oct. 28, 2011, notice indicated that most income
notes had directed a full redemption of the notes. The transaction
paid the class A-1, A-2, B, and C notes down in full on the
Nov. 15, 2011, payment date.

Foley Square 2007-1 is a collateralized bond obligation. The
transaction paid the class A, B, C, D, and E notes down in full
following a notice of optional redemption. The March 1, 2011,
notice indicated that the class F notes had directed a full
redemption of the notes. The transaction paid the class A, B,
C, D, and E notes down in full on the March 23, 2011 payment date.

Trapeza CDO II LLC. is a CDO backed by trust preferred securities.
The transaction paid the class A1A notes down in full on the
Oct. 5, 2011 payment date.

Ratings Withdrawn

Centurion CDO VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1                 NR                  AA- (sf)
B-2                 NR                  AA- (sf)
C                   NR                  A- (sf)
D-1                 NR                  BBB- (sf)
D-2                 NR                  BBB- (sf)
D-3                 NR                  BBB- (sf)

Endeavor Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
A-2                 NR                  A+ (sf)
B                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
C                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)

Foley Square CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  BB+ (sf)
B                   NR                  BB- (sf)
C                   NR                  B+ (sf)
D                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)
E                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

Trapeza CDO II LLC
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1A                 NR                  A+ (sf)

NR -- Not rated.


INDOSUEZ CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these three classes of notes issued by
Indosuez Capital Funding VI, Ltd./Corp. (Indosuez VI):

  -- $10,152,270 class C notes affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate RE 50%;
  -- $17,966,684 class D-1 notes affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
     Estimate RE 0%;
  -- $5,999,436 class D-2 notes affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
     Estimate RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the class C notes at 'CCsf', indicating that
a default is probable, due to the net undercollateralization
of these notes and the possibility for further collateral
deterioration.  The performing portfolio currently consists
of obligations from just five obligors totaling $10 million
of par, $8 million of which is scheduled to mature after the
transaction's maturity date in September 2012.  The long-dated
assets will need to be liquidated prior to the transaction's
maturity, introducing a dimension of market value risk to the
transaction.  The two defaulted loans in the portfolio are not
expected to have any recovery value.  The portfolio also contains
three equity positions, to which Fitch did not ascribe any
recovery value in its analysis.

The class D-1 and D-2 notes are unlikely to receive any future
payments and will default upon the transaction's maturity.

In calculating the recovery estimate for the class C notes, Fitch
assumed that the lone bond scheduled to mature prior to the
transaction's maturity will pay off as scheduled.  The four long-
dated assets (three senior unsecured bonds, one preferred stock
position) were assumed to be liquidated at values equal to their
base case ('B' stress) recovery rates, per Fitch's 'Global Rating
Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.

Fitch notes that these assumed recovery values are significantly
lower than the current market prices of the long-dated assets, and
that it might be possible for the class C notes to be paid in full
if the long-dated assets, in addition to the equity positions, are
ultimately liquidated at prices similar to their current marks.

Indosuez VI is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that closed
on Sept. 14, 2000 and is managed by LCM Asset Management LLC,
having succeeded the original manager Indosuez Capital in July
2004.




JP MORGAN: Fitch Junks Rating on Five Certificate Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2006-LDP7 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, due to the greater certainty
of expected losses on the specially serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 8.01% of the remaining pool.
Fitch has designated 60 loans (20%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 26 specially serviced loans (10.4%).  Fitch expects
classes J thru Q may be fully depleted from losses associated with
the specially serviced assets and class H will also be impacted
slightly.

As of the November 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased by approximately 11% to
$3.5 billion from $3.9 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls
totaling $11.4 million are affecting classes J through NR.

The largest contributor to loss (6.8%) is secured by a portfolio
of four regional malls and one anchored retail center totaling
2.4 million square feet (sf) (1.7 million sf of collateral)
located in OH, CT, MO, CA, and CO.  The decline in performance is
mostly attributed to the Midway Mall property located in Elyria,
OH, which continues to struggle and is currently 62% occupied.
The mall has experienced declining income as a result of low
occupancy, lower market rents, tenant issues, and current economic
conditions.  As of trailing 12 months (TTM) June 2011, the debt-
service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the portfolio declined to 1.10
times (x) from 1.20x TTM June 2010.  The portfolio was 86.7%
occupied as of August 2011.

The second largest contributor to loss (1.4%) is currently in
special servicing and is a 393,533 sf office property located in
Atlanta, GA.  The property consists of three buildings built in
1980 and renovated in 1997.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in June 2010 due to imminent default as a result of the
loss of two large tenants vacating at lease expiration in May and
June of 2010.  The property became real estate owned (REO) in June
2011. CB Richard Ellis is the property manager and leasing agent
and marketing efforts are currently underway for lease-up of the
properties. Occupancy remains at 40% as of September 2011.

The third largest contributor to loss (1.5%) is currently
specially serviced and is secured by a 552,927 sf office property
located in Shoreview, MN, approximately 12 miles north of the
Minneapolis CBD.  The collateral consists of five buildings built
in 1973 and renovated in 2005.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in October 2009 due to imminent default
resulting from the largest tenant, (41%) net rentable area (NRA),
vacating at lease expiration.  A receiver was appointed to the
property in August 2011 and the foreclosure sale was held in
September 2011. The property was 63.2% occupied as of August 2011.

Fitch downgrades, revises Outlooks, and assigns Recovery Estimates
(RE):

  -- $78.8 million class B to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $44.3 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $14.8 million class D to 'B-sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $39.4 million class E to 'CCCsf', RE 100% from 'Bsf';

  -- $39.4 million class F to 'CCCsf', RE 100% from 'Bsf';

  -- $49.2 million class G to 'CCsf', RE 100% from 'CCC', RE
     100%';

  -- $39.4 million class H to 'Csf', RE 95% from 'CCCsf, RE 100%;

  -- $44.3 million class J to 'Csf', RE 0% from 'CCsf', RE 80%.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises the Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $22.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75 million class A-3A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $94.1 million class A-3B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1,616.1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $140.8 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $330.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $393.9 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $310.3 million class A-J at 'Asf' Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $14.8 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $14.8 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $19.7 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%.

Class A-1 has paid in full. Fitch does not rate classes N, P, Q,
and NR.





JP MORGAN: Moody's Raises Rating to Aaa; Previously 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded the certificates from a prime auto loan
securitization sponsored by JPMorgan Chase Bank in 2008.

RATINGS

Issuer: JPMorgan Auto Receivables Trust 2008-A

Certificates, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2008
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade was prompted by a downward revision of collateral loss
expectation and further accretion of credit enhancement due to the
overcollateralization floor.

Despite the concurrent pay structure which allows the subordinate
securities to receive principal payments as long as the available
subordination is greater than specified levels, the transaction
is paying sequentially since the subordination behind the
Certificates cannot decline to less than 1% of the original
balance, the OC floor. The transaction is very seasoned and
has a pool factor of approximately 7%.

Another unique feature in these transactions is that the
servicing fee, as long as JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is the
servicer, is subordinated to principal and interest payments in
the transaction's cash flow waterfall. Typically servicing fee in
other auto ABS transactions is paid before principal and interest
and reserve account payments, if any. The excess spread within the
transaction is therefore enhanced by the subordination of the
servicing fee. Yet, if JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is replaced as
primary servicer, the servicing fee will move to the top of the
payment priority list. A transfer of servicing is normally caused
by a servicer default. Moody's views the risk of default during
the expected term of the transaction by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
which has a senior unsecured debt rating of Aa1, to be low.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the November 2011
distribution date) and credit assumptions for each affected
transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime
CNL expectation which is expressed as a percentage of the original
pool balance; and Moody's lifetime remaining CNL expectation and
Aaa (sf) levels which are expressed as a percentage of the c
urrent pool balance. The Aaa (sf) level is the level of credit
enhancement that would be consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating for
the given asset pool. Performance metrics include pool factor
which is the ratio of the current collateral balance and the
original collateral balance at closing; total credit enhancement
(expressed as a percentage of the outstanding collateral pool
balance) which typically consists of subordination,
overcollateralization, and a reserve fund; and per annum excess
spread.

Issuer: JPMorgan Auto Receivables Trust 2008-A

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 2.90%, prior expectation (May 2011)
was 3.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 0.98%

Aaa level -- Approximately 5%

Pool factor - Approximately 7%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread) - Certificates
-- 14.10%

Excess spread - Approximately 3.6% per annum

Ratings on the certificates may be downgraded if the lifetime CNL
expectation is increased by 10%

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent
on an assessment of a range of factors including, but not
exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment continues to
remain at elevated levels, and strength in the used vehicle
market. Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as much
stronger now than it was at the end of 2008 when the uncertainty
relating to the economy as well as the future of the U.S. auto
manufacturers was significantly greater. Overall, Moody's expects
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in these notes was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan Backed Securities (2011)" rating
methodology published in May 2011. Other methodologies and factors
that may have been considered in the process of rating these notes
can also be found on Moody's website.


LB-UBS COMM: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Ten Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the super senior and mezzanine 'AAA'
classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates and downgraded three classes.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool based on updated valuations property valuations and
workout strategies on the existing specially serviced loans,
particularly for the Innkeepers Hotel Portfolio.  Fitch modeled
losses of 10.75% of the remaining pool; expected losses of the
original pool are at 10.99%, including losses realized to date.
Fitch designated 41 loans (44.92% of the pool balance) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, including fifteen specially serviced loans
(18.58%).  Seven of the Fitch Loans of Concern (31.70%) are within
the transaction's top 15 loans by unpaid principal balance.  Fitch
expects classes K through T may be fully depleted from losses
associated with the specially serviced assets.

As of the November 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by approximately 1.96% (including
0.45% of realized losses) to $2.92 billion from $2.98 billion at
issuance.  No loans are currently defeased.  Interest shortfalls
are affecting classes J through T.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is the Innkeepers
Hotel Portfolio loan (14.13%), which is secured by 44 limited
service hotels and 1 full service hotel totaling 5,683 rooms,
located across 16 states.  The properties are affiliated with
Marriott, Hilton Hotels, and Global Hyatt.  The subject portfolio
is also secured by an identical pari pasu note which was
securitized in the LBUBS 2007-C2 transaction.

The loan transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to
monetary default as a result of declining occupancy and cash flows
stemming from the economic downturn.  The original borrowing
entities, the Innkeepers USA Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT),
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief in July 2010.  In October
2011, Innkeepers USA REIT had closed on the sale of 64 hotels
(including the subject collateral) to Cerberus Capital Management
LP (Cerberus).  As a result of the portfolio sale the subject
loans (including the pari pasu LBUBS 2007-C2 note) will be
modified, and assumed by Cerberus. The loan modification is
expected to include a principal write down.

The second-largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the
McCandless Towers loan (3.99%).  The property, which is also
referred to as the Santa Clara Towers, is collateralized by two
11-story, Silicone Valley office buildings totaling 426,326 square
feet (SF) located in Santa Clara, CA.  The property has
experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines, as well as
softening market conditions.  The year-to-date (YTD) June 2011
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) reported at 0.80 times (x),
compared to issuance at 1.00x.  The June 2011 rent roll reported
occupancy at 87%, a slight improvement from 84% in 2010, however,
below issuance at 96%.  Tower II (214,080sf) is 100% leased
through March 2013 to McAfee Associates Inc., which had vacated a
majority of the building since issuance but continues to pay rent
and sublease its space.

The properties current borrower is Shorenstein Properties, who had
foreclosed on the equity interests of the prior borrower (Tishman
Speyer) in March 2010.  As of November 2011, the loan is current
and there are more than $2.2 million in upfront and ongoing
leasing cost reserves.

The third largest contributor to losses is the Greensboro Park
loan (3.73%), which is collateralized by two office buildings
totaling 485,047sf located in the Tyson's corner area of McLean,
VA.  The property has experienced cash flow issues due to
occupancy declines.  The July 2011 rent roll reported occupancy at
76%, compared with 87% at issuance.  The YTD June 2011 NOI DSCR
reported at 1.01x, compared to 1.18x at issuance.

The subject loan was previously transferred into special servicing
in April 2010 based on imminent default.  The lender for a
mezzanine loan encumbered by the property at issuance had
foreclosed on the original sponsor, Broadway Real Estate Partners,
equity interest in August 2010.  The loan was assumed by a new
Borrower, Greensboro Park Property Owner LLC (an affiliate of
Beacon Capital Partners LLC), in October 2010 and subsequently
modified and returned to the master servicer in March 2011.
Modification of the loan included a three year extension of the
maturity date to June 2015.  As of November 2011, the loan is
current and there is approximately $2.0 million in upfront and on-
going reserves.

Fitch downgrades the following classes, and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) and revises Ratings Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $156.4 million class A-J to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable from Negative;
  -- $29.8 million class E to 'B-sf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $29.8 million class F to 'CCCsf', RE 100%' from 'B-sf.

Fitch also affirms the following classes, and assign's Recovery
Estimates (REs) and revises Ratings Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $436.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $38.4 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $169.0 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $67.0 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $910.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $418.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $227.9 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $70.0 million class A-MFL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $33.5 million class B at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $37.2 million class C at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $33.5 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $33.5 million class G at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $37.2 million class H at 'CCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $41 million class J at 'Csf', RE 90%;
  -- $29.8 million class K at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $44.7 million class L at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $14.9 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $11.2 million class N at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $3.7 million class P at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $7.4 million class Q at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $7.4 million class S at 'Csf', RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the $44.7 million class T.  The unrated class
T has been reduced to $31.3 million due to realized losses.  Class
A-1 has repaid in full.


LBFRC 2007-LLF C5: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. C Notes at 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the ratings of five,
affirmed the ratings for 22, and downgraded the ratings of four
classes of Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-LLF C5. Moody's rating action is:

Cl. A-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9,
2011 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9,
2011 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on December 17,
2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. E Certificate, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on December 17,
2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. F Certificate, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on December 17,
2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. G Certificate, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H Certificate, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J Certificate, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on December 17,
2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. CQR-1 Certificate, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. CQR-2 Certificate, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. HAR-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. HAR-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. HSS Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. INO Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. JHC Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. OCS Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. ONA Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. OWS-1 Certificate, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. OWS-2 Certificate, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. PHO Certificate, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. SBG Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. SFO-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. SFO-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. SFO-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. SFO-4 Certificate, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. SFO-5 Certificate, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on
December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. UCP Certificate, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on March 19,
2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades of the senior classes are due to loan payoffs. A
total of six loans paid off since last review. The affirmations
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
remaining within acceptable ranges. The downgrade of certain
rakes, or non-pooled classes, are due to decline in performance of
certain assets and the uncertainty related to upcoming maturity in
2012.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline
and job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
in recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector
has been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing
challenges. Across all property sectors, the availability of
debt capital continues to improve with monetary policy expected
to remain supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's
central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter , amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published on July 2000. Moody's noted that on November 22, 2011,
it released a Request for Comment, in which the rating agency
has requested market feedback on potential changes to its
rating methodology for Interest-Only Securities. If the revised
methodology is implemented as proposed the rating on Lehman
Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF C5
Class X-2 may be negatively affected. Please refer to Moody's
request for Comment, titled "Proposal Changing the Global Rating
Methodology for Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," for
further details regarding the implications of the proposed
methodology change on Moody's rating.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.2. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased to $1.73 billion from
$2.09 billion at last review. The Certificates are collateralized
by 26 floating rate whole loans and senior interests in whole
loans. The loans range in size from 1% to 17% of the pooled
balance, with the top three loans representing 37% of the pooled
balance. Due to the high number of loans and high diversity, Trust
Herfindahl Index is 13.5, exceptionally high for a floating rate
large loan pool. Almost all of the loans have additional debt in
the form of a non-pooled or rake bond within the trust, B note or
mezzanine debt outside of the trust. The majority of the loans
mature in 2012, and high leverage continues to be a concern for
refinancing.

Cumulated bond loss totals $46 and interest shortfalls total
$116,565 as of the current distribution date. The interest
shortfalls affect pooled Class J, as well as rake classes INO,
NOP-1, NOP-2, NOP-3, and VIS. In addition, interest advances total
$186,541.

Moody's weighted average pooled LTV ratio is 85% compared to 89%
at last review, and Moody's weighted average pooled stressed DSCR
is 1.19X slightly higher than at last review (1.17X).

The largest loan in the pool is secured by fee and leasehold
interests in Calwest Industrial Portfolio Loan ($275 million, or
14% of the pooled balance). There is additional debt in the form
of pari passu and mezzanine debt outside the trust. The pro rata
portion that is included in the trust as well as the referenced
mezzanine debt accounts for 25% of the total outstanding debt. The
95 property portfolio (23.3 million square feet) is located across
six states and 12 MSAs. The sponsor is Walton Street Capital, LLC.
As of July 2011 rent roll, the portfolio was 86% leased. In 2010,
total Net Cash Flow (NCF) for the portfolio was $96.3 million.
During the trailing twelve month period ending June 2011, the
overall portfolio's NCF was $95.4 million. The loan's final
maturity date including extensions is June 8, 2012. Moody's
weighted average LTV for the pooled portion is 107%. Moody's
current credit estimate for the pooled portion is Caa3, compared
to Caa1 at last review.

The second largest loan, the John Hancock Chicago Loan
($175 million, or 9% of pooled balance plus a $7.5 million rake
bond), is secured by fee interest in over 1 million square foot
mixed-use building located in downtown Chicago, IL. The sponsor
is Whitehall Street Global Real Estate LTD Partnership 2007 and
Goulub & Company. As of June 2011 rent roll, the property was 68%
leased, and the property's NCF for the trailing twelve month
period ending June 2011 was $23.0 million. NCF for the calendar
year 2010 was $22.0 million. The loan's final maturity date
including extensions is February 9, 2012. There is additional
debt in the form of mezzanine outside the trust. Moody's weighted
average LTV for the pooled portion is 71%, and including the rake
bonds is 75%. Moody's current credit estimate for the pooled
portion is Ba1, compared to Ba3 at last review.

The third largest loan in the pool is secured by fee interests
in San Francisco Office Portfolio Loan ($147 million, or 9% of
the pooled balance plus $42 million of rake bonds). There is
additional debt in the form of mezzanine debt outside the trust.
The loan is secure by five class A office buildings located in
the San Francisco CBD market. The sponsor is Morgan Stanley Real
Estate Value Fund V US, L.P. As of June 2011 rent roll, the
portfolio was 78% leased, and the portfolio's NCF for the first
six months of this year was $10.9 million. NCF for the calendar
year 2010 was $22.7 million. The loan's final maturity date
including extensions is May 9, 2012. Moody's weighted average
LTV for the pooled portion is 57% and including the rake bonds
is 74%. Moody's current credit estimate for the pooled portion
is A3, compared to A2 at last review.

There are currently six loans totaling approximately 25% of pooled
balance in special servicing. The 10 Universal City Plaza Loan
($124 million, or 8% of pooled balance) was transferred to special
servicer in October 2011 due to imminent default. As of June 2011
rent roll, the office building was 77% leased, and achieved Net
Operating Income of $10.5 million during the first six months of
2011. During calendar year 2010, the property achieved NOI of
$21.5 million. The special servicer is engaged in discussion with
the borrower.

The Normandy Office Portfolio Loan ($97 million, or 5% of pooled
balance plus $8.4 million rake bonds) transferred to special
servicing in October 2011 due to imminent maturity default
(pending maturity date in December 2011). The As of June 2011
rent roll, the portfolio was 75% leased, and achieved Net Cash
Flow of $3.5 million during the first six months of 2011. During
calendar year 2010, the property achieved NCF of $7.4 million.
Moody's does not rate three rake bonds associated with this loan
(NOP-1, NOP-2, NPO-3).

The PHOV Hotel Portfolio Loan (5% of pooled balance plus a
$8.4 million rake bond) has been in special servicing since
April 2011 due to imminent maturity default. The portfolio
includes Marriott Burbank, CA, Marriott Pleasanton, CA, and
Renaissance Denver, CO totaling 1,132 guestrooms. The loan
matured on September 9, 2011 and remains in default. The assets
are located in primary MSAs (Los Angeles, Denver and Pleasanton),
and should benefit from general market recovery. For the year-to-
date through October 2011 over the same period in 2010, Revenue
per Available Room (RevPAR) for Denver MSA, Los Angeles MSA and
San Francisco MSA were up 8.7%, 12.5% and 19.7%, respectively
according to Smith Travel Research.

Other specially serviced loans include the Interstate Office
Portfolio (3% of the pooled balance), the Liberty Square loan
(2%), and the Crescent Hotel Portfolio -- Ventana Inn and Spa Loan
(1%). The the Crescent Hotel Portfolio -- Ventana Inn and Spa Loan
has been modified and pending return to master servicer. The final
maturity date including extensions has been pushed out to December
2013.


LBUBS 2004-C1: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. H Notes to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) downgraded the ratings of two
classes and affirmed 14 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust Series 2004-C1:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2006 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2006 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2006 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2006 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2006 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-ST, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are primarily due to higher losses due to interest
shortfalls. As of the most recent remittance date, the pool has
experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2.4 million
and affecting Classes T through J. Moody's anticipates that the
pool will continue to experience interest shortfalls caused by
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs),
extraordinary trust expenses and non-advancing by the master
servicer based on a determination of non-recoverability.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

On August 4, 2011 Moody's placed two classes on review for
possible downgrade. This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.7% of the current balance, the same as at last review. Moody's
stressed scenario loss is 6.9% of the current balance. Depending
on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level
for investment grade classes could decline below the current
levels. If future performance materially declines, the expected
level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow
waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of these
classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and performance
in the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
continuing to show signs of recovery through the first half of
2011, while recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are
tied to pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office
markets are showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing
activity. The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. Please see the Credit Policy
page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a
greater impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10 compared to 10 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs
the large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses
the excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and
weights the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated August 4, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to
$995.7 million from $1.4 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 80 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 65% of the pool. The pool contains three loans with
investment grade credit estimates that represent 50% of the pool.
Seven loans, representing 6% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Fourteen loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.2 million (37% loss severity
overall). Four loans, representing 7% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Passaic Street Industrial Park Loan ($36.9 million -- 3.7% of the
pool), which is secured by 2.2 million square foot (SF) Class C
industrial warehouse space located in Woodridge, New Jersey. The
loan was transferred to special servicing in March 2010 due to
monetary default and is currently dual tracking foreclosure/loan
modification. The remaining three specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of office, industrial warehouse and retail
property types. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$38.5 million appraisal reduction for four of the specially
serviced loans. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$37.9 million appraisal reduction for three of the specially
serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $39.8 million
loss (59% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's was provided with full and partial year 2010 and partial
year 2011 operating results for 84% and 39% of the pool's non-
defeased loans, respectively. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 82%, compared to
83% at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.28X, respectively, essentially
the same at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the GIC Office
Portfolio Loan ($193.0 million -- 19.4%), which is a pari-passu
interest in a $675.3 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a portfolio of 12 office properties located in seven
states and totaling 6.4 million SF. The largest geographic
concentrations are Illinois (39%), Pennsylvania (17%) and
California (12%). The portfolio was 87% leased as of December 2010
compared to 90% as of December 2009. Property performance has
declined due to decreased rental income. The property is also
encumbered by a $120.6 million B Note. The loan had a 60-month
interest only period and is amortizing on a 360-month schedule
maturing in January 2014. Moody's current credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.44X, respectively, compared to Baa3
and 1.43X at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan with a credit estimate is the UBS Center -
- Stamford Loan ($187.8 million -- 18.9%), which is secured by the
leasehold interest in a 682,000 SF Class A office property located
in Stamford, Connecticut. The property is 100% leased to UBS AG
and serves as the U.S. headquarters of UBS Investment Bank. The
lease is triple net and expires in December 2017. The loan is
structured with a 23.75 year amortization schedule and matures in
October 2016. Moody's current credit estimate is A3, the same as
at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan with a credit estimate is the MGM Tower
Loan ($12.5 million -- 11.3%), which is secured by a 777,000 SF
Class A office building located in the Century City office
submarket of Los Angeles, California. As of March 2011, the
property was 84% leased compared to 98% as of June 2010. The
largest tenants are MGM (34% of the NRA; lease expiration May
2018) and International Lease Finance Corporation (19% of the NRA;
lease expiration August 2015). The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist because MGM recently filed for bankruptcy
protection. Three leases, totaling 104,000 SF (13% of the NRA)
have recently been signed, bringing the total space leased to
97%. The property is also encumbered by a $78.4 million B Note.
Property performance remains stable and the loan is benefitting
from amortization. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are Aa1 and 2.72X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and 2.70X at
Moody's last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 6% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Kurtell Medical Office
Portfolio Loan ($26.8 million -- 2.7%), which is secured by five
medical office buildings and one out-patient surgical center
located in Nashville, Tennessee (5) and Orlando, Florida. The
portfolio has a total of 212,000 SF. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 80% and 1.35X, respectively, essentially the same as at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is The Fountains Loan ($19.6 million --
2.0%), which is secured by a 130,200 SF grocery-anchored retail
center located in Overland Park, Kansas. As of December 2010, the
property was 94% leased compared to 89% as of December 2009.
Performance has declined since Moody's last review due to a
decline in effective gross income. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 101% and 0.96X, respectively, essentially the same as at
Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Green River Loan ($18.3 million --
1.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 333-unit mobile home park
located in Corona, California. The park was 90% leased as of March
2011 compared to 94% as of June 2010. Performance is stable and
the loan is benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.39X, respectively, essentially the
same as at Moody's last review.


MERRILL LYNCH: DBRS Downgrades Class M Rating to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS has downgraded these classes of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust 2005-CIP1:

  -- Class M to D (sf) from C (sf)
  -- Class N to D (sf) from C (sf)

The downgrades follow realized losses to the above mentioned
classes, which resulted from the liquidation of two loans in
addition to further liquidation expenses associated with a loan
that liquidated with the October 2011 remittance.

Courtyard Marriott Parsippany (Prospectus ID#29) was secured by a
151-room full-service hotel located in the Parsippany-Troy Hills
area of New Jersey.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in December 2010 for payment default, after having been on the
servicer's watchlist for a low DSCR.  The note was sold on
October 28, 2011, which resulted in a $9.0 million loss to the
trust, realized with the November 2011 remittance.

Coco Center (Prospectus ID#65) was secured by a mixed-use property
in Margate, Florida.  The loan had previously been on the
servicer's watchlist because the largest tenant's lease was
scheduled to expire on December 31, 2010.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing shortly after in February 2011
for imminent default, and the note was sold on October 14, 2011,
which resulted in a loss of $2.9 million with the November 2011
remittance.

Additional liquidation expenses related to a loan that was
liquidated in October 2011, Village Park at Brookhaven (Prospectus
ID#118), were passed through the trust with the November 2011
remittance.

The cumulative losses for this transaction, to date, have resulted
in the full principal losses to Classes Q, P and N and have
reduced the balance of Class M to $1.9 million.

Since the last DBRS annual surveillance review in January 2011,
five loans have been transferred to special servicing: Park Forest
(Prospectus ID#113), Sunrise Plaza (Prospectus ID#89), Hampton Inn
Newton (Prospectus ID#35), Hampton Inn Great Valley (Prospectus
ID#58) and Kirkwood Bend Office (Prospectus ID#30).  These loans
cumulatively comprise 2.74% of the pool balance, as of the
November 2011 remittance.  DBRS continues to monitor this
transaction on a monthly basis, with increased focus on these
pivotal loans and the other loans currently in special servicing.

DBRS expects to complete a full annual surveillance review of this
transaction in the coming months.


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and removes from Rating Watch Evolving
all classes of Merrill Lynch Floating Rate Trust Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-1 based on stable performance and
scheduled pay down since the last review.

The affirmations reflect the payoff of the Trizec Portfolio, which
formerly represented 30% of the collateral balance, as well as
unchanged performance from the remaining loans in the trust.  With
the payoff of Trizec, the Lord & Taylor portfolio now represents
approximately 85% of the outstanding collateral.

The Lord & Taylor Portfolio is secured by 37 of Lord & Taylor's
retail properties, including 36 of the retail stores and one
distribution warehouse.  The portfolio is structured with a
20-year triple net (NNN) master lease agreement between the
operating entity and properties.  Approximately 67% of the retail
portfolio's square footage is located in the New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut tri-state area.  All retail stores in New Jersey
are located in northern New Jersey within proximity to New York
City.  The collateral includes Lord & Taylor's flagship store on
5th Avenue in Manhattan.

Fitch applied a dark value analysis in its determination of
recoverable value based on the premise that market fundamentals
(namely asking rents and vacancies) are softer than the benchmarks
assumed at the time of origination, in addition to lower demand
for expansion space from retailers across the U.S.

The loan does not mature until June 2012, but given the size of
the debt, it is not uncommon for borrowers to begin refinance
discussions well in advance of the maturity, and Fitch expects the
picture may be clearer in the first quarter of 2012.

The next loan, Royal Holiday Portfolio (8.9%), is secured by
six full-service hotels in Mexico, located within five distinct
tourist markets, including Cancun, Cozumel, Ixtapa, Acapulco, and
San Jose del Cabo.  The loan has been in special servicing since
February 2010 after the borrower amended certain operating leases
without lender approval.  The servicer continues to negotiate with
all parties to the loan, and the involvement of both the U.S. and
Mexican legal systems complicates the workout.  According to the
servicer, litigation surrounding the workout may face a long
horizon as the borrower and principals continue to use their
influence in Mexico to delay foreclosure proceedings.
Nevertheless, fairly recent value estimates for the portfolio
indicate strong recovery prospects. Ultimate recovery however may
be affected by a long workout window if advances continue to
accrue.

The final two loans in the transaction, Crowne Plaza (4.5%) and
Greenville Office Portfolio (2%), also mature in June 2012, which
suggests that Royal Holiday Portfolio may be the last remaining
loan in the pool given the expectation of a lengthy workout.

Fitch affirms these classes, removes from Rating Watch Evolving,
assigns Rating Outlooks, and assigns Recovery Estimates as
indicated:

  -- $239.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $55.4 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $48.9 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.6 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75.3 million class E at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $46.7 million class F at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $44.3 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.6 million class H at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35.9 million class J at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $36.3 million class K at 'CCCsf'; RE 35%;
  -- $31.1 million class L at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $48.2 million class M at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Cuts 3 Classes of Cert. Ratings to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on
eight classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2006-C2, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "Concurrently,
we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on five other classes from
the same transaction," S&P said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria. Our
analysis also included a review of the deal structure and the
liquidity available to the trust. The downgrades reflect credit
support erosion that we anticipate will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the 14 ($171.5 million, 13.6%) assets that are
currently with the special servicer, as well as one loan that we
determined to be credit-impaired ($13.3 million, 1.1%). We also
considered the monthly interest shortfalls that are affecting
the trust. We lowered our ratings on the class E, F, and G
certificates to 'D (sf)' because we believe the accumulated
interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class X interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria," S&P said.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of the remaining assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.21x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 112.8%.
We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.82x and an LTV ratio of
161.2%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 88.8% and 43.5%, respectively. The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude the 14 ($171.5 million, 13.6%) specially
serviced assets and one ($13.3 million, 1.1%) loan that we
determined to be credit-impaired. We separately estimated losses
for these assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

"As of the Nov. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, the trust had
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $538,828, which
was offset by appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER)
recoveries of $19,645 this one-month period. The current interest
shortfalls primarily reflect ASER amounts of $480,873, interest
rate reductions due to loan modifications of $35,377, and special
servicing and workout fees of $39,409. The interest shortfalls
affected all classes subordinate to and including class D. The
class E, F, and G certificates experienced accumulated interest
shortfalls for one, 10, and 11 consecutive months, and we expect
these interest shortfalls to continue in the near term.
Consequently, we lowered our ratings on the class E, F,
and G certificates to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the Nov. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, 14 assets
($171.5 million, 13.6%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III). The reported
payment status of the specially serviced assets as of the most
recent trustee remittance report is: two are real estate owned
(REO; $77.5 million, 6.1%), six are in foreclosure ($44.7 million,
3.6%), and six are 90-plus-days delinquent ($49.3 million, 3.9%).
Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totalling $91.8 million are in
effect for all 14 specially serviced assets. Details of the two
largest specially serviced assets, one of which is a top 10 asset,
are:

The Mall at Whitney Field asset ($73.4 million, 5.8%) is
the third-largest asset in the pool with total exposure of
$77.4 million and is the largest asset with the special servicer.
The asset consists of a 664,974-sq.-ft. single-level enclosed
regional mall in Leominster, Mass., approximately 55 miles
northwest of Boston. The asset was transferred to the special
servicer on April 29, 2009, due to imminent default and became
REO on Oct. 27, 2010.

"As of year-end 2008, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.10x
and 93.7%. There is a $40.3 million ARA in effect against the
asset. We expect a significant loss upon the eventual resolution
of this asset," S&P said.

"The Bridger Office Building loan ($14.7 million, 1.2%) is the
second-largest specially serviced asset with total exposure of
$16.6 million. The loan is secured by a 68,714-sq.-ft. office
building in Las Vegas, Nev., built in 1984. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on May 25, 2010, due to
imminent default and is currently reported to be in foreclosure.
As of year-end 2009, the reported DSC was 0.92x. There is a
$9.5 million ARA in effect against the loan. We expect a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan,"
S&P related.

"The 12 remaining assets with the special servicer have
individual balances that represent less than 1.0% of the pooled
trust balance. ARAs totaling $42.0 million are in effect against
these assets. We estimated losses for the remaining assets,
arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 54.4%," S&P
said.

"In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined the
Macayo's Plaza loan ($13.3 million, 1.1%) to be credit-impaired.
The Macayo's Plaza loan is secured by a 64,193-sq.-ft. grocery
anchored retail center in Surprise, Ariz. As of year-end 2010,
the reported DSC and occupancy were 0.76x and 72.0%, respectively.
The loan is on the master servicers' combined watchlist because
multiple tenants and subtenants had lease expirations in 2011,
and the borrower does not expect these tenants to renew, per the
master servicer. Given the historical weak property performance
and low reported DSC, we view this loan to be at an increased risk
of default and loss," S&P said.

"Nine loans totalling $60.0 million (3.9%) that were previously
with the special servicer have been returned to the master
servicer. According to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future
principal and interest payments on the corrected loans, provided
that they continue to perform and remain with the master
servicer," S&P said.

                           Transaction Summary

As of the Nov. 14, 2011 remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $1.26 billion, down
from $1.54 billion at issuance. The pool comprises 118 loans
and two REO assets, down from 126 loans at issuance. The
master servicers, Prudential Asset Resources and Wells Fargo
Bank N.A., provided financial information for 91.5% of the
loans in the pool, the majority of which reflected full-year
2010 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.20x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted
DSC and LTV were 1.21x and 112.8%. Our adjusted figures exclude
the 14 ($171.5 million, 13.6%) specially serviced assets and
one ($13.3 million, 1.1%) loan that we determined to be credit-
impaired. Recent financial reporting information was available
for 10 of the excluded specially serviced and credit-impaired
assets, which reflected a weighted average DSC of 0.88x. We
separately estimated losses for these assets and included them in
our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures. The
transaction has experienced $18.7 million in principal losses from
three assets. Forty-seven loans ($492.9 million, 39.2%) in the
pool are on the master servicers' combined watchlist, including
five of the top 10 assets. Thirty-nine loans ($413.2 million,
32.9%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, 22 of which
($193.7 million, 15.4%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x,"
S&P said.

                       Summary of Top 10 Assets

"The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$510.7 million (40.6%). Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.21x for nine of the
top 10 assets with reported information. One of the top 10
assets ($73.4 million, 5.8%) is with the special servicer and
five other loans ($201.5 million, 16.0%) are on the master
servicers' combined watchlist, three of which we discuss
below. Our adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 assets are
1.13x and 126.1%, respectively. Our adjusted figures exclude
the aforementioned specially serviced asset. Details on the
three largest top 10 assets on the master servicers' combined
watchlist are set forth," S&P said.

The RLJ Portfolio loan, the second-largest asset in the pool, has
a $494.3 million whole loan balance that is split into eight pari
passu pieces, $93.4 million of which makes up 7.4% of the trust
balance. The loan is secured by 43 hotels totalling 5,429 rooms in
eight U.S. states. The loan payment status was reported as current
as of the Nov. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report. The loan is on
Wells Fargo's watchlist due to a low reported combined DSC, which
was 1.05x for the 12 months ended June 30, 2011. The reported
combined occupancy was 66.5% for the same period.

The Maui Coast Hotel loan ($38.6 million, 3.1%) is the sixth-
largest asset in the pool and the second-largest asset on the
master servicers' combined watchlist. The loan is secured by a
265-room full-service hotel Kihei, Hawaii. The property, which was
built in 1993 and renovated in 1999, is located in close proximity
to golf courses and beaches. The loan is on the master servicers'
combined watchlist because of a low reported DSC, which was 1.18x
as of year-end 2010. Reported occupancy was 81.6% for the same
period.

The City Centre Building loan ($30.0 million, 2.4%) is the
seventh-largest asset in the pool and the third-largest asset on
the watchlist. The loan is secured by a 220,368-sq.-ft., class A
office building, built in 1986 and located in the Salt Lake City
central business district. The loan is on the master servicers'
combined watchlist because of a low reported DSC. The loan payment
status was reported as in grace as of the Nov. 14, 2011 trustee
remittance report. For the six months ended June 30, 2011, the
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.08x and 71.9%.

"Standard & Poor's stressed the pool collateral according to its
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent
with our lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2006-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Rating
Class     To             From        Credit enhancement (%)
AM        BBB+ (sf)      A (sf)                       23.05
AJ        BB- (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                    14.30
B         B (sf)         BBB (sf)                     11.85
C         B- (sf)        BB- (sf                      10.62
D         CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)                      8.48
E         D (sf)         CCC- (sf)                     7.10
F         D (sf)         CCC- (sf)                     5.10
G         D (sf)         CCC- (sf)                     3.88

Ratings Affirmed

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2006-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-2       AAA (sf)                   35.31
A-3       AAA (sf)                   35.31
A-4       AAA (sf)                   35.31
A-1A      AAA (sf)                   35.31
X         AAA (sf)                     N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


MESA WEST: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. B Notes at 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of eleven classes of Notes issued
by Mesa West Capital CDO, Ltd. 2007-1. The affirmation is due to
key transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate
with the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2009
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Mesa West Capital CDO, Ltd. 2007-1 is a revolving cash CRE CDO
transaction (revolving period is to end Februrary 2012) backed by
a portfolio of A-notes and whole loans (98.3% of the pool balance)
and one B-note (1.7%). As of the November 25, 2011 Trustee report,
the aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, is $600.0 million, the same as at issuance.

There are no assets that are classified as Defaulted Securities as
of the November 25, 2011 Trustee report and the transaction has
not taken any losses to date. Also, this transaction is passing
all of the coverage tests.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 6,114 compared to 6,507 at last review.
The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Ba1-Ba3 (0.7% compared to 10.0% at last review), B1-B3
(1.0% compared to 4.7% at last review), and Caa1-C (98.3% compared
to 85.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.3 years compared
to 6.5 years at last review. The modeled WAL includes the
remaining reinvestment period.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
51.9% compared to 55.0% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 25.6% compared to 99.9% at last review.
The reduction in MAC is due to the improved collateral credit
distribution and number of names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
51.9% to 41.9% or up to 62.9% would result in the average modeled
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 5 notches downward
and 0 to 6 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of
the slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment
and the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline
and job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
in recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter, amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.
Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of
these methodologies.


MILL CREEK: Moody's 'Ba3' Rating to US$10.5MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following ratings to notes issued by Mill Creek CLO, Ltd.:

US$178,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$10,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022 (the "Class E Notes," and together with the Class A Notes,
the "Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Notes address the expected losses posed to
noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Mill Creek CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first-lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must be
invested in senior secured loans or eligible investments and up to
5% of the portfolio may consist of second-lien loans, bonds and
senior secured notes. At closing, the underlying collateral pool
is approximately 80% ramped up and is expected to be fully ramped
within three months thereafter.

40|86 Advisors, Inc. will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage
in trading activity during the transaction's three-year
reinvestment period, including discretionary trading. Thereafter,
sales of securities that are defaulted, credit improved, or credit
risk are allowed but purchases of additional collateral
obligations are not permitted.

In addition to the Class A Notes and the Class E Notes rated by
Moody's, the Issuer has issued four other tranches, including
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the rated notes in order of seniority.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these assumptions:

Par amount of $270,000,000

Diversity of 45

Weighted Average Rating Factor of 2300

Weighted Average Spread of 3.15%

Weighted Average Coupon of 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 44.0%

Weighted Average Life of 8.5 years.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

A summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's WARF + 15% (2645)

Class A Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Moody's WARF +30% (2990)

Class A Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 17, 2009.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in assigning the ratings to the
Notes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in June 2011.


MSCI 2004: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Four Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes issued by MSCI 2004-RR2 as a
result of stable performance on the underlying portfolio since the
last rating action.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2011, approximately
2.76% of the collateral has been downgraded.  Currently, 60.7% of
the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 13% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and below, compared to
56% and 13%, respectively, at the last rating action.

Additionally, the class A-2 notes have received $15 million in
paydowns for a total of $68.1 million in principal repayment since
issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.  Based on this analysis, the credit characteristics of
classes A-2 through J are generally consistent with the ratings
assigned below.

For the class K through M notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below).  Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class K through M notes have been affirmed at 'CCCsf',
indicating that default is possible.

The Negative Outlook on the class A-2 through H notes reflects the
concentration risk of the underlying portfolio.  Fitch does not
assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.
MSCI 2004-RR2 is a static Re-Remic backed by commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) B-pieces that closed June 29, 2004. The
transaction is collateralized by 14 CMBS assets from 12 obligors
from the 1997-2000 vintages.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $40,986,089 class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $30,164,000 class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $15,082,000 class C notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5,299,000 class D notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $12,229,000 class E notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3,261,000 class F notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6,930,000 class G notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3,668,000 class H notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2,446,000 class J notes at 'CCCsf';
  -- $2,446,000 class K notes at 'CCCsf';
  -- $2,446,000 class L notes at 'CCCsf';
  -- $1,630,000 class M notes at 'CCCsf'.


N-STA REAL: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on 11 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes issued by N-Star Real
Estate CDO IX Ltd. (N-Star IX).  While the underlying collateral
has experienced negative credit migration since the last rating
action, the affirmations are due to adequate credit enhancement
relative to modeled losses.

Since Fitch's last rating action in December 2010, approximately
42.8% of the collateral has been downgraded.  Currently, 85.8% of
the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 52.5% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and below, compared
to 85% and 47.1%, respectively, at the last rating action.
N-Star IX is currently in its reinvestment period.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed
the structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.  Based on this analysis, the class A notes' breakeven
rates are generally consistent with the ratings assigned below.

For the class B through K notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below).  Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class B through J notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf',
indicating that default is probable.  Similarly, the class K
notes have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.

The Negative Outlook on the class A-1 notes reflects the potential
for further deterioration on the underlying collateral.  Fitch
does not assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

N-Star IX is a revolving collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
which closed Feb. 28, 2007.  The portfolio is composed of 78.1%
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), 13% of structured
finance CDOs (SF CDOs), 7.7% of commercial real estate loans
(CREL), and 1.2% real estate investment trust securities (REITs).

The transaction has a five-year reinvestment period, during which
the collateral manager has the ability to sell any asset, as long
as the aggregate amount of assets sold during a given year does
not exceed 10% of the collateral balance at the beginning of that
year.  Principal proceeds not reinvested will be used to pay down
the notes pro rata, provided the current portfolio balance remains
at least 50% of the original portfolio balance, no OC test is
failing as of that payment date and, if an OC test has previously
failed for two or more dates, the OC ratio is at least equal to or
greater than the ratio on the effective date. The reinvestment
period ends in June 2012.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $512,000,000 class A-1 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $96,000,000 class A-2 at 'CCCsf';
  -- $48,000,000 class A-3 at 'CCCsf';
  -- $37,280,000 class B at 'CCsf';
  -- $12,800,000 class C at 'CCsf';
  -- $23,200,000 class D at 'CCsf';
  -- $4,800,000 class E at 'CCsf';
  -- $3,600,000 class F at 'CCsf';
  -- $14,080,000 class G at 'CCsf';
  -- $7,200,000 class H at 'CCsf';
  -- $7,040,000 class J at 'CCsf';
  -- $6,000,000 class K at 'Csf'.


NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Affirms Cl. I-MM Notes Rating at 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of one class of Notes issued
by Newcastle CDO VI, Ltd., due to key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation and re-remic (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

Cl. I-MM Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on
Feb 8, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Newcastle CDO VI, Ltd., is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of conduit, large loan and rake classes of commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (55.9%), residential mortgage
backed securities primarily in the form of subprime classes (RMBS)
(21.4%), REIT debt (21.8%), term loans (0.7%), and small business
loans (0.2%). As of the November 17, 2011 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction has decreased to
$346.3 million from $500.0 million at issuance, with the principal
paydown directed to the Class I-MM Notes. The paydowns are a
result of regular amortization and the failure of the par value
tests. Per the governing transaction documents, interest payments
are re-directed as principal to pay the notes in a senior
sequential manner. Additionally, there is approximately
$8.0 million in accrued interest proceeds due to the Class
II, Class III, Class IV, and Class V notes.

There are nineteen assets with a par balance of $56.2 million
(22.6% of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Securities as of the November 17, 2011 Trustee report, compared to
twenty assets with a par balance of $96.3 million (26.0% of the
pool balance) at last review. Moody's expects significant losses
from those Defaulted Securities to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's rated
collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default
probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-
dollar WARF of 2,240, excluding defaulted securities, compared to
2,362 at last review. The distribution of current ratings and
credit estimates (excluding defaulted securities) is as follows:
Aaa- Aa3 (11.7% compared to 14.1% at last review), A1- A3 (18.1%
compared to 12.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (18.6% compared to
16.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (12.4% compared to 19.6% at last
review), B1-B3 (9.0% compared to 19.3% at last review), and Caa1-C
(30.1% compared to 18.7% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.6 years compared
to 3.7 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR,
excluding defaulted securities, of 24.5% compared to 22.0% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 7.1% compared to 12.7% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
24.5% to 14.5% or up to 34.5% would result in average rating
movement on the rated tranch of 1 notch downward and 1 notch
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline
and job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
in recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter, amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.
Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of
these methodologies.


PUTNAM STRUCTURED: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'B+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the
class A-2 notes from Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
and removed it from CreditWatch, where it was placed with
negative implications on Sept. 2, 2011. "Concurrently, we
affirmed our ratings on the class A-1LT-a, A-1LT-b, A-1LT-c,
A-1LT-d, A-1LT-e, A-1LT-i, and A-1LT-j notes and removed four
of them from CreditWatch with negative implications. At the
same time, we withdrew our ratings on the class A-1MM-f,
A-1MM-g, A-1MM-h, A-1MT-b, and A-1MT-c notes. Prior to being
withdrawn, our ratings on these classes were on CreditWatch
negative (see list). Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other asset-
backed securities," S&P said.

"The downgrade reflects the deterioration in the credit quality
available to support the notes since our May 2010 rating actions.
According to the Oct. 7, 2011 trustee report, the transaction held
$166.6 million in assets rated 'CCC', up from $84.2 million in
assets rated 'CCC' as of the March 3, 2010 trustee report, which
we used in our May 2010 analysis," S&P said.

The affirmations reflect the sufficient credit support available
at the current rating levels.

The withdrawals follow confirmation from the trustee that the
terms of these notes have been converted to long term.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
Class               To           From
A-1LT-d             A (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-e             A (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-i             A (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-j             A (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2                 B+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
Class                                 Rating
A-1LT-a                               A (sf)
A-1LT-b                               A (sf)
A-1LT-c                               A (sf)

Ratings Withdrawn

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class               To           From
A-1MM-f             NR (sf)      A/A-1 (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1MM-g             NR (sf)      A/A-1 (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1MM-h             NR (sf)      A/A-1 (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1MT-b             NR (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1MT-c             NR (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg

NR -- Not rated.


RACE POINT: Fitch Raises Rating on Three Note Classes to Low-B
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded these eight classes of notes and
affirmed one class of notes issued by Race Point II CLO, Ltd./Inc.
(Race Point II CLO) and assigned Rating Outlooks:

  -- $59,400,501 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $15,000,000 class A-2 notes upgraded to 'AAAsf from 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,000,000 class B-1 notes upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $38,000,000 class B-2 notes upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,000,000 class C-1 notes upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $5,000,000 class C-2 notes upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $3,500,000 class D-1 notes upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $3,000,000 class D-2 notes upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $4,000,000 class D-3 notes upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf';
     Outlook Stable.

The affirmation of class A-1, and the upgrades to the class
A-2, B-1, B-2 (class B), C-1, C-2 (Class C), D-1, D-2 and D-3
(class D) notes, are due to significant deleveraging of the
capital structure, which has resulted in improved credit
enhancement for all classes of notes, in addition to the
relatively stable performance of the underlying loan portfolio.
Fitch also maintains Stable Outlooks on the notes reflecting
its expectation of stable rating performance over the next one
to two years.

Since the last review, the class A-1 notes have received
approximately $151 million of principal payments, representing
37.6% of their initial balance.  The quality of the $202 million
performing portfolio has remained relatively stable with the
average rating staying at 'B/B-' and exposure to defaulted assets
slightly decreasing to $3.3 million from $5.5 million.  As of
the Nov. 1, 2011 trustee report, all overcollateralization and
interest coverage tests are passing there minimum thresholds with
sizeable amounts of cushion.  However, the weighted average life
of the portfolio exceeds the maximum threshold by 1.2 years and
approximately 63.1% of the performing portfolio is scheduled to
mature during or after 2014; with an additional 9.2% scheduled to
mature after the stated maturity of the transaction.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' using the
Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default and
recovery levels for the underlying portfolio.  These default and
recovery levels were then utilized in Fitch's cash flow model
under various default timing and interest rate stress scenarios,
as described in the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis
in CDOs'.  While Fitch's cash flow analysis indicates higher
passing rating levels for the class B, C and D notes, the upgrades
sufficiently capture the improvements in credit enhancement while
accounting for the profile of the remaining portfolio.

Race Point II CLO is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on April 16, 2003 and is managed by Sankaty Advisors, LLC.
The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2009.  The
portfolio primarily consists of senior secured loans (87%), with
the remaining portfolio comprised of second lien loans (2.2%) and
bonds (11%).  The stated maturity of the transaction is
May 15, 2015.


RACE POINT: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Deferrable Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Race
Point V CLO Ltd./Race Point V CLO Corp.'s $362 million floating-
rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
    subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
    subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, (see "Update To
    Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
    And Synthetic CDOs," published Sept. 17, 2009).

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

    The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the rated notes, which we assessed using
    our cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
    assigned ratings under various interest rate scenarios,
    including LIBOR ranging from 0.34%-13.84%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

    The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
    failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
    interest proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
    administrative expenses and fees, portfolio manager incentive
    fees, and subordinated note payments to principal proceeds for
    the purchase of additional collateral assets during the
    reinvestment period.

           Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

     http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111318.pdf

Ratings Assigned
Race Point V CLO Ltd./Race Point V CLO Corp.

Class                   Rating                  Amount
                                              (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)                251.00
B                       AA (sf)                  47.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                   28.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                 19.00
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                  17.00
Subordinated notes      NR                       43.00

NR -- Not rated.


SCSC 2006-5: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. F Notes at 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed these ratings of 14
classes of Schooner Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-5:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.9% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.2%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
5.7% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment
grade classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline
and job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors
are in recovery and improvements in the office sector continue,
with fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their
suburban counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied
to employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter , amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions"
published in September 2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000. Please see the Credit
Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a
greater impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 38 compared to 41 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated January 28, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 17% to $401.9
million from $486.6 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 79 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 33% of the pool. Five loans, representing 6% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by Canadian Government
securities.

Seven loans, representing 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

The pool has not realized any losses since securitization. There
are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans representing 3.2% of the pool and has estimated
an aggregate $1.5 million loss (12% expected loss based on a 30%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 89%
of the pool. Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 79% compared to 80% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.6% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.52X and 1.35X, respectively, compared to 1.50X and 1.31X at
last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Briton House Loan
($26.8 million -- 6.7%), which is secured by a 220 unit retirement
home located in Toronto, Ontario. The loan amortizes on a 25-year
schedule. The property is 100% leased as of April 2011 compared to
98% at last review. Performance has been stable. Moody's current
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.47X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.52X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is The Greenwood Beach
Retail Centre loan ($11.9 million -- 3%), which is secured by
three retail properties totaling 105,148 square feet and located
in Toronto, Ontario. Major tenants include Ontario Jockey Club,
Alliance Atlantis (movie theater), Beach Fitness Centre and Bank
of Montreal. Occupancy as of May 2011 was 95%, essentially the
same as last review, and 100% at securitization. The loan benefits
from amortization, and has paid down 3% since last review. Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.88X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.75X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 12.8% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Lindsay Square loan
($18.4 million -- 4.6%), which is secured by 193,933 square
foot anchored retail mall located in Lindsay, Ontario. The
property was 94% leased as of December 2010 compared to 96% at
last review and 90% at securitization. The decline in performance
is attributed to a decline in occupancy and lower base rents.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.05X, respectively,
compared to 83% and 1.18X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 380 & 400 Waterloo Avenue loan
($16.9 million -- 4.2%), which is secured by 262 unit multifamily
property located in Guelph, Ontario. The property was 98% leased
as of September 2010 compared to 100% at last review. Performance
is stable and the loan benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 89% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to 95% and
0.88X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Springdale Square loan
($15.8 million -- 3.8%), which is secured by a 105,453 square
foot anchored retail property located in Brampton, Ontario. The
property was 100% leased as of March 2010, similar to last review.
The loan has amortized 3% since last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 96% and
0.99X at last review.


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. A-1 Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches from two deals issued by Structured Asset Mortgage
Investments II Trust in 2005.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2005-AR1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2005-AR5

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate Alt-A residential mortgage loans. The
actions are a result of the recent performance review and reflect
Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005
to 2008.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four
prepayment curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a
tranche due to extended foreclosure timelines by servicers is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach is adjusted slightly when estimating
losses on pools left with a small number of loans to account for
the volatile nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small
pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in the
overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To
project losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first
estimates a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the
pool that varies from 10% to 21% on average. The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 10.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 10.10%. In addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend. To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 80%
respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
"2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" publication.

The methodology only applies to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's now
projects house price index to reach a bottom in early 2012, with a
3% remaining decline in 2012, and unemployment rate to start
declining, albeit slowly, as the year progresses.

Moody's noted that on November 22, 2011, it released a Request for
Comment, in which the rating agency has requested market feedback
on potential changes to its rating methodology for Interest-Only
Securities. If the revised methodology is implemented as proposed
the rating on Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2005-
AR1 Class X-1 will have a neutral impact. Please refer to Moody's
request for Comment, titled "Proposal Changing the Global Rating
Methodology for Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," for
further details regarding the implications of the proposed
methodology change on Moody's rating.


TRICADIA CDO 2006-5: Moody's Raises Rating of US$55MM Notes to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two classes
of notes issued by Tricadia CDO 2006-5, Ltd. The classes of notes
affected by the rating action are:

US$55,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2046,
Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded to
B3(sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$56,000,000 Class C Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2046,
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa2(sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement of the credit quality of the portfolio.

As of the latest trustee report dated October 31, 2011, the Senior
Class Par Coverage Ratio is reported at 89.42% versus June 2011
levels of 83.44%. Also based on this October report the WARF
reported is 1020 versus June 2011 reported WARF of 1908.

The rating actions on the notes reflect CLO tranche upgrades that
have taken place within the last six months. Since Moody's June
22nd announcement that nearly all CLO tranches currently rated Aa1
and below were placed on review for possible upgrade, 100% of the
performing collateral has been upgraded, 60% of which took place
following the previous rating action on the Notes in August.

Tricadia CDO 2006-5, Ltd is a collateralized debt obligation
backed by a portfolio of CLOs.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the

CDOEdge cash-flow model . The cash flow model takes into account
the following: collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants,
the priority of payments (waterfall) for interest and principal
proceeds received from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions,
the timing of defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign
exchange risk (if present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each
tranche is the weighted average of losses to each tranche across
all the scenarios, where the weight is the likelihood of the
scenario occurring. Moody's defines the loss as the shortfall in
the present value of cash flows to the tranche relative to the
present value of the promised cash flows. The present values are
calculated using the promised tranche coupon rate as the discount
rate. For floating rate tranches, the discount rate is based on
the promised spread over Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model
output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Performing Assets notched up by 2 rating notches:

Class B: +4

Class C: +4

Class D: 0

Class E: 0

Class F: 0

Moody's Performing Assets notched down by 2 rating notches:

Class B: -3

Class C: -2

Class D: 0

Class E: 0

Class F: 0


TROY DOWNTOWN: Fitch Junks Rating on Two Bond Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
In the course of routine surveillance, Fitch Ratings has taken
these actions on Troy Downtown Development Authority, Michigan's
tax increment bonds (TIBs):

  -- $11.9 million outstanding development and refunding bonds,
     series 2001 downgraded to 'C' from 'B'.

  -- $2.8 million outstanding community center facility junior
     lien bonds, series 2003 downgraded to 'C' from 'B';

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The authority's tax base continues to deteriorate as valuations
decreased by 12% in fiscal 2012.  This represents the second
consecutive year of double digit tax base declines and a loss
of over one quarter of redevelopment area assessed values over
the past three years.  The tax increment, burdened by relatively
high base year values, dropped much further; falling by over 70%
during this period.  As a result, tax increment revenues generated
within the redevelopment area are falling increasingly short of
covering annual debt service.  By the end of fiscal 2012, the
authority will have utilized all but $3.5 million of its
unrestricted general reserves to plug the revenue gaps.  At
this rate, the authority will have burned through its remaining
operating reserves by the beginning of fiscal 2014, requiring
a draw on the reserve fund to pay future debt service.  The
$3.2 million reserve fund provides less than an additional year
of coverage.

Exacerbating the authority's already dire predicament, the city
property assessor projects another sizable drop in redevelopment
area valuations in fiscal 2013, ranging from 12% to 14% and a
further decrease of 7% to 8% in fiscal 2014. The projected loss in
fiscal 2013 would reduce the redevelopment area's tax base to base
year levels, wiping out the tax base increment.  Realization of
these projected losses would accelerate the depletion of reserves
and hasten the need to draw upon the bond reserve funds by about a
year to fiscal 2013.  Only after fiscal 2014, does the assessor
expect some stabilization in taxable values.

The redevelopment area's largely commercial properties have been
hurt by the sharp downturn in office and commercial real estate.
A rapid recovery of the tax base is unlikely given the depths of
the real estate downturn, the overcapacity of the city's office
market and state constitutional limitations on year to year
assessment growth. Fitch believes that, absent forceful city
intervention, the bonds will default within the next two or three
years.

Troy is an affluent bedroom community in Oakland County located 14
miles north of downtown Detroit.  The redevelopment area
encompasses 772 acres and includes the retail and commercial core
of the city.  In addition to the presence of an upscale regional
mall, the area contains an extensive number of office and
commercial properties, including several corporate headquarters.
The tax base is concentrated, typical of tax increment bonds, with
the top ten taxpayers representing 45% of taxable values.  Only
three authority bond issues remain outstanding, including one
junior lien and two senior lien bond issues, and all are scheduled
to mature by November 2018.

The city's above average wealth is indicated by city per capita
income levels which are 163% and 152% above the state and national
averages, respectively.  Between 2001 and 2010, the city lost over
17% of employment, and August 2011 employment levels are down 1.0%
over the same month in 2010.  Unemployment rates soared past 11%
in 2009 and stayed high averaging about 10.6% in 2010.  Although
rates have come down since, they remain elevated but still below
the regional and state averages.


UBS-CITIGROUP: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class F Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C1 (the
Certificates) to be issued by UBS-Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Series 2011-C1.  The trends are Stable.

  -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
  -- Class B at AA (sf)
  -- Class C at "A" (sf)
  -- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
  -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
  -- Class F at BB (sf)
  -- Class G at B (sf)

The collateral consists of 32 fixed-rate loans secured by 38
multifamily, mobile home parks and commercial properties.  The
portfolio has a balance of $673,920,599.  The pool consists of
moderate leverage financing, with a DBRS weighted-average term
debt service coverage ratio and debt yield of 1.35 times and
10.0%, respectively.  Of the collateral, 87.5% is located in
suburban or urban locations and benefits from relatively diverse
economies. Underwriting was generally prudent, and the average
DBRS net cash flow variance was -5.6%.

The pool suffers from concentrations of both number of loans and
loan size among the top ten.  The 32-loan pool is approximately
half the size of the average conduit deal brought to market in
2011, and the top ten loans represent 63.2% of the pool by cutoff
date balance.  DBRS has accounted for these concentration concerns
by applying a pool-wide upward adjustment of probability of
default at each rating category of approximately 10%.  The deal is
further challenged by the concentration of hotel loans,
representing 15.4% of the pool balance, including three of the
largest 15 loans in the pool.  These riskier property types are
mitigated by applying hotel-specific cash flow volatiles, which
assume between a 31% and 40% cash flow decline for a BBB stress
and a 67% to 85% cash flow decline for a AAA stress.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure
and underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to
ongoing surveillance, upgrades or downgrades by DBRS after the
date of issuance.

Finalization of ratings is contingent upon receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.


WAMU COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class J and K commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates from WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-SL1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

"We downgraded classes J and K to 'D (sf)' following principal
losses to the J, K, and L classes, as detailed in the Nov. 23,
2011 remittance report. Class J lost 57.2% of its $2.5 million
original balance. Class K lost 100% of its beginning balance.
Class L, which Standard & Poor's lowered to 'D (sf)' on May 4,
2011, lost 100% of its beginning balance," S&P said.

According to the November 2011 remittance report, the liquidation
of 5027-5253 4th Road North loan and 225 South B Street loan
prompted principal losses totaling $3.6 million. These two loans
were with the special servicer, Key Bank Real Estate Capital, and
their weighted average loss severity was 85.7%.

The 5027-5253 4th Road North asset is a 54-unit multifamily
property in West Palm Beach, Fla. Based on the November 2011
remittance report, the loss severity was 93.1%.

The 225 South B Street asset is a 16-unit multifamily property in
Lake Worth, Fla. Based on the November 2011 remittance report, the
loss severity was 65.5%.

Ratings Lowered

WaMul Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-SL1
            Rating
Class    To         From        Credit enhancement
J        D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                   0%
K        D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                   0%


WBCMT 2006-C26: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. C Notes at 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed 22 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-C26:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-P, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
8.4% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 10.7%. Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 17.6% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are in
recovery and improvements in the office sector continue, with
fundamentals in Gateway cities outperforming their suburban
counterparts. However, office demand is closely tied to
employment, where fundamentals remain weak, so significant
improvement may be delayed. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with on-going rent deflation and leasing challenges.
Across all property sectors, the availability of debt capital
continues to improve with monetary policy expected to remain
supportive and interest rate hikes postponed. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall downward
revision of forecasts since last quarter, amidst ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging,
persistently high unemployment levels, and weak housing markets
that will continue to constrain growth.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. Please see the Credit Policy page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 39 compared to 33 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated January 13, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to
$1.46 billion from $1.73 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 106 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 38.8% of the pool. There are currently no loans that
have defeased.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $10.2 million loss (37%
loss severity on average). Currently 10 loans, representing 8% of
the pool, are in special servicing. The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $45.8 million appraisal reduction for the
specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss
of $48.3 million (43% expected loss on average) for all of the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loans representing 21% of the pool and has estimated a
$53.2 million loss (17% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 100% and 91% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 97% compared to 102% at last full
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.07X, respectively, compared to
1.39X and 1.03X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is a 50% pari passu interest in the
Prime Outlets Pool II Loan ($143 million -- 9.8% of the pool),
which is secured by three Prime Outlet retail properties totaling
1.5 million SF. The properties are located in Birch Run, Michigan,
Williamsburg, Virginia and Hagerstown, Maryland. The property is
also encumbered by a $17 million B-note. The portfolio benefits
from strong management from Simon Property Group. The properties
were 92% leased as of March 2011 compared to 93% at last full
review and property performance has improved since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.10X, respectively,
compared to 94% and 1.03X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the Chemed Center Leasehold Loan
($60 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold
interest in a 551,000 square foot office property located in
Cincinnati, Ohio's Central Business District (CBD). The collateral
property was 87% leased as of June 2011, compared to 89% at last
full review. Property performance has improved since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.43X, respectively,
compared to 87% and 1.24X at last full review. The loan secured by
the fee interest in the Chemed Center is also in the pool
($45 million -- 3.1% of the pool).

The third largest loan is the Lincoln Place Loan ($49.6 million --
3.4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 140,000 SF office
property located in Miami Beach, Florida. The property was built
in 2002 for the current tenant, LNR Property (Ba2, stable
outlook), and serves as LNR's headquarters. The property 100%
leased to LNR through June 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
remain the same as last review at 116% and 0.84X.


ZAIS INVESTMENT: Moody's Raises Rating of US$81-Mil. Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five classes
of notes issued by ZAIS Investment Grade Limited IX. The classes
of notes affected by the rating actions are:

US$81,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2052 (current balance: $54,718,749), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$90,079,566 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2052 (current balance: $88,691,752), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$39,920,434 Class A-1C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2052, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded
to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$54,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2052, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$58,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on August 3, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
results primarily from the improvement of the credit quality of
the portfolio.

As of the latest trustee report dated November 3, 2011, the Class
A and Class A/B overcollateralization ratios are reported at
119.27% and 89.49%, versus June 2011 levels of 117.8% and 74.45%,
respectively. Based on this November report the WARF is 1176
versus June 2011 WARF of 3378. Additionally the Class A-1A notes
have paid down approximately $3 million since the last rating
action.

The rating actions on the notes reflect CLO tranche upgrades that
have taken place within the last six months, as well as a two
notch adjustment for tranches which are currently on review for
possible upgrade. Since Moody's June 22nd announcement that nearly
all CLO tranches currently rated Aa1 and below were placed on
review for possible upgrade, 93% of the performing collateral had
been upgraded, 78% of which took place following the previous
rating action on the Notes in August.

ZAIS Investment Grade Limited IX. is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of CLOs.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference
pool. Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a
normal (or Gaussian) copula model that applies the asset
correlation framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are
generated by applying within the simulation the distributional
assumptions, including correlation between recovery values.
Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model. The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model
output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Performing Assets notched up by 2 rating notches:

Class A-1A: +3

Class A-1B: +3

Class A-1C: +3

Class A2: +4

Class B: +4

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Class Y: 0

Class X: 0

Moody's Performing Assets notched down by 2 rating notches:

Class A-1A: -2

Class A-1B: -2

Class A-1C: -2

Class A2: -3

Class B: -2

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Class Y: 0

Class X: 0


* Fitch Lowers Rating on 51 Bonds in 28 CMBS Transactions to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 51 bonds in 28 U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions to 'D', as the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down.  The bonds were all
previously rated 'CC' or 'C' which indicates that Fitch expected a
default.

The action is limited to just the bonds with write-downs.  The
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.  Fitch has downgraded the bonds to 'D' as
part of the ongoing surveillance process and will continue to
monitor these transactions for additional defaults.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 164 Classes from 69 US RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on 164
classes from 69 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions and removed five of them from CreditWatch
with negative implications. "Concurrently we raised our rating
on class B-1 from one of the transactions with lowered ratings,
Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust's series 2004-6. Additionally, we
affirmed our ratings on 487 classes from the transactions with
lowered ratings and removed six of them from CreditWatch negative.
We also withdrew our ratings on 21 classes from five of the
reviewed transactions. Seventeen of the withdrawals were on one
transaction, ABN AMRO Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates' series
2003-5 because the classes were paid in full. The remaining four
withdrawals were due to our interest only (IO) criteria," S&P
said.

The complete rating list is available for free at:

   http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_PrimeJumboRMBS_List_120111.pdf

The 70 RMBS transactions in this review are backed by prime jumbo
mortgage loan collateral issued from 2002 through 2004.

"On May 11, 2011, we placed a number of U.S. RMBS ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications (see '7,389 Ratings From
2005-2007 U.S. Prime, Subprime, And Alt-A RMBS On Watch Neg Due To
Revised Loss Projections'). For revised transaction specific loss
projections associated with these transactions, see 'RMBS:
Transaction-Specific Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime,
Subprime, And Alternative-A U.S. RMBS Issued In 2005-2007,'
published June 27, 2011," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect our belief that projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover
the projected losses we applied at the applicable rating stresses.
For certain classes, the downgrade incorporated interest shortfall
criteria (refer to 'Methodology for Assessing The Impact Of
Interest Shortfalls On U.S. RMBS,' published Sept. 23, 2011),"
S&P related.

"The upgrade on class B-1 from Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust's
series 2004-6, reflects our assessment that projected credit
enhancement for this class is sufficient to cover our projected
losses at this rating," S&P said.

"Among other factors, the upgrades reflect our view of a decrease
in delinquencies within the structures associated with these
classes. This has caused a decrease to the remaining projected
losses for these classes, resulting in these classes withstanding
more stressful scenarios. The upgrades to 'B- (sf)', 'B (sf)', or
'BB (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' reflect our opinion that these classes
are no longer projected to default based on the credit enhancement
available to cover the projected losses. In addition, each of the
upgrades reflects our assessment that the projected credit
enhancement for each of the upgraded classes will be more than
sufficient to cover projected losses at the revised rating levels;
however, we are limiting the extent of the upgrades to reflect our
view of the ongoing market risk," S&P said.

"The rating actions take transaction specific loss projections
into account. In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, we
assessed whether, in our view, a class could absorb the remaining
base-case loss assumptions we used in our analysis. For prime
jumbo transactions, we assessed whether a class could withstand
127% of our remaining base-case loss assumption in order to
maintain a 'BB' rating, while we assessed whether a different
class could withstand 154% of our remaining base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class that has an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can withstand approximately 235% of our
remaining base-case loss assumptions," S&P said.

For additional structure-level information regarding delinquencies
and cumulative losses for these transactions through the September
2011 remittance period please see:

Losses and Delinquencies*

ABN AMRO Mortgage Corp.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-5        701    0.00    0.08           0.00           0.00

Banc of America Mortgage Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-F      1,064    7.55    0.03           5.16           2.84

Bank of America Mortgage Securities Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-C        727   20.46    0.07           9.07           6.12

Bear Stearns ARM Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-1      1,174    4.43    0.10           8.87           4.08
2003-9        880   13.16    0.48          14.00          12.06
2004-5        614   18.72    0.68           8.78           4.20

Charlie Mac Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-2        154   30.94    0.17           4.23           0.78

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-S2       450   24.53    0.06           3.01           2.48

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-49       842   26.20    0.16           8.65           6.28
2003-52       203   11.29    0.42          20.74          16.68
2003-58       611   13.25    0.16          11.95          10.36
2004-11       434   29.22    0.28          14.63          10.30
2004-15       299   18.47    1.72          26.68          24.64

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)

2003-10       420   14.22    0.03           1.93           0.93

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-4        409   28.06    0.10           5.75           2.69
2004-AR3      291   25.71    0.36           2.05           1.28

GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-J10      207   13.21    0.00           3.23           3.22

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-4F       989    3.25    0.02           8.54           6.11
2004-7        700   19.53    0.53          11.85           9.57

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-6        701   13.51    1.10          16.24          12.88
2004-7        683   12.36    2.01          21.63          16.19
2004-8      1,406   13.71    1.27          41.25          36.73

JPMorgan Mortgage Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-A2       371   15.31    0.19           9.03           8.42
2004-A4       386   22.69    0.23           9.83           7.80

MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-1        354    8.38    0.62          20.00          15.93

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-5        329   18.60    0.08           6.72           5.18

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-A5       549   11.81    0.15          10.21          10.08

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-A1       604   12.63    0.24          12.61           9.40
2004-A2       436   11.53    0.41          15.34           8.85
2004-G        485    9.38    0.29           5.61           3.18
MLCC2004-F  1,000    8.48    0.17           3.18           3.02

Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-5AR    1,010   19.05    0.59          13.93           9.68

Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-HYB1     253   12.68    0.45          11.85          10.88
2004-HYB4     391   21.30    0.48          18.23          15.97

Prime Mortgage Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-CL1    1,321    8.48    0.29          17.17          10.60
2004-CL2      206    8.59    0.05          21.06          10.19

Provident Funding Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-1        397   14.99    0.05           5.00           2.70

RFMSI Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-S14      203   14.79    0.00           3.31           1.97
2003-S16      255   17.13    0.03           1.71           0.90
2004-S7       105   20.59    0.00           3.48           2.97
2004-SA1      250   19.31    0.45          10.14           7.07

Sequoia Mortgage Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-8        977    9.45    0.15           8.74           5.95
2004-1        625    9.68    0.24          19.34          16.10
2004-8        820   12.03    0.39           7.28           5.44

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 10
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
10          1,050    9.51    0.07           2.45           2.41

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 11
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
11            720    6.79    0.22           7.80           3.65

Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-10     1,749   21.68    1.19          14.97           9.91
2004-12     2,250   22.70    1.41          11.27           8.34
2004-14     1,826   21.08    1.41          10.79           7.37
2004-3AC      863   22.66    0.69           6.63           5.16
2004-6      1,616   26.66    0.83           7.33           5.78

Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-AR7      987    7.59    0.71          22.36          17.97

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-15A      589    9.22    0.25           7.69           4.86
2003-24A      620   15.51    0.38           6.37           5.84
2003-31A      647   16.55    0.50           7.69           5.54

Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-4        866    6.16    0.05           5.99           1.10
2004-3      1,256   17.13    0.22           6.01           3.85

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-S12      407   18.40    0.00           3.05           2.27
2004-AR1      550   17.86    0.27           7.55           5.08


Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-RA3      344   15.58    0.15           7.14           4.26

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-AR1    1,000    1.49    0.18          31.55          27.11

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-15       400   19.87    0.00           0.94           0.30
2003-18       600   22.97    0.05           4.04           1.97
2003-19       225   19.20    0.17           4.01           3.04
2004-5        371   17.77    0.00           1.45           1.09
2004-7        371   20.73    0.05           2.28           1.61
2004-8        376   21.35    0.00           1.81           0.99
2004-C        308   15.50    0.02           6.80           5.21
2004-G        417   19.38    0.24           2.04           2.04
2004-Q        678   21.53    0.33           7.74           5.24

*Cumulative losses represent the percentage of the original pool
balance, and total and severe delinquencies represent the
percentage of the current pool balance.

The information shows average pool factor, cumulative loss, and
total and severe delinquency information by vintage for prime
jumbo collateral as of the September 2011 distribution period.

Pre-2003 Vintage
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      2.72        0.33              9.36               6.53

2003 Vintage
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      12.85        0.11              6.14              4.38

2004 Vintage
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      20.12        0.56              10.50             7.99

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 201 Classes from US RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 201
classes from 109 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions issued between 1997 and 2004 and removed
seven of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.
"Concurrently, we raised our ratings 137 classes from six of
the transactions with lowered ratings and on an additional 79
transactions. Additionally, we affirmed our ratings on 870 classes
from 210 of the reviewed transactions and removed nine of them
from CreditWatch negative. We also withdrew our ratings on seven
classes from six of the reviewed transactions because the classes
have been paid in full," S&P said.

The complete rating list is available for free at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_RMBS_12511.pdf

The 218 RMBS transactions in this review are backed by prime
jumbo, subprime, and Alt-A mortgage loan collateral issued from
1997 through 2004.

"The downgrades reflect our belief that projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will be insufficient to
cover the projected losses we applied at the applicable rating
stresses. For certain classes, the downgrade incorporated our
interest shortfall criteria (refer to "Methodology for Assessing
The Impact Of Interest Shortfalls On U.S. RMBS," published Sept.
23, 2011)," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect our view of recent performance trends, which
include, among other factors, decreasing delinquencies within the
structures. This has reduced the remaining projected losses for
these structures, allowing the upgraded classes to withstand more
stressful rating scenarios. In addition, each upgrade reflects our
assessment that the projected credit enhancement for each of the
affected classes will be more than sufficient to cover projected
losses at the raised rating levels; however, we are limiting the
extent of the upgrades to reflect our view of the ongoing market
risk," S&P said.

"The affirmations reflect our belief that projected credit
enhancement for these classes will be sufficient to cover our
projected losses at these rating levels," S&P said.

"To assess the creditworthiness of each class, we reviewed each
transaction's ability to withstand additional credit deterioration
and the effect that projected losses will have on each class," S&P
said.

"The tables provide additional structure-level information
regarding delinquencies and cumulative losses for the transactions
we reviewed for this release. The tables include data through the
October 2011 remittance period," S&P said.

Losses And Delinquencies

Aames Mortgage Investment Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-1      1,200    6.48    5.03          48.86          39.16

Aames Mortgage Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-3        175    5.88    8.91          43.61          35.36
2001-4        235    5.40    5.74          35.52          32.44
2003-1        509    8.13    4.12          33.82          19.64

ABFC Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-NC1      483    3.99    3.51          31.46          16.61
2003-WF1      292    5.49    1.57          14.60          11.52

Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-1         69    8.08    2.58          20.45          11.87
2002-1        139    1.94    1.79           8.85           5.89
2002-2        179   10.04    1.50          15.54          10.78
2003-3        210    3.39    1.21          33.37          27.31
2003-3        195   22.53    1.77          12.34           9.02
2004-3        246   31.80    1.77          14.90           9.75
2004-3        766   10.00    2.76          21.12          14.79
2004-4      1,047   14.58    3.53          19.10          11.85

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-HE2      673    3.08    2.49          25.02          20.71
2002-HE3      698    3.93    2.31          16.43          12.08
2004-HE3    1,106    7.11    4.68          30.67          25.14

Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-6      1,000   11.63    8.19          29.87          20.83

AFC Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1998-4        152    1.65   10.75          39.98          26.68
1998-4        152    2.47    7.76          36.53          25.21

AFC Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certs
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1998-1        253    1.20    7.53          60.49          52.61
1998-1        204    0.91    7.50          35.98          25.98
1998-3        241    2.15    8.73          43.06          34.86
1998-3        214    1.50   10.11          17.95           5.50

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-3        805    3.35    3.89          23.07          19.66
2002-D      1,340    4.16    1.69          21.87          16.72
2003-2        400    4.66    3.88          29.80          25.11
2003-7        600    7.48    3.13          17.47          13.53
2003-9        750   12.71    2.84          13.12           8.62
2004-R11    1,500   12.83    4.02          23.61          18.96
2004-R3     1,000   13.63    5.66          24.20          19.18
2004-R4     1,000    8.67    5.77          29.47          23.11

Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-BC2      663    2.90    2.42          29.11          24.95
2002-BC4      665    3.46    3.28          22.61          15.32

Argent Securities Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-W4       575    5.56    2.48          19.43          12.48
2004-PW1      350    7.29    7.49          33.81          27.99
2004-W10      800   10.64    4.84          28.71          22.04

Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-HE1      950    2.92    3.71          26.06          14.99
2003-HE2      736    4.10    2.27          17.38           9.32
2003-HE3      607    5.06    2.75          21.66          13.15
2004-HE10     243   13.30    4.50          33.60          25.47
2004-HE5      966   10.14    3.47          21.03          11.31
2004-HE9      558    6.76    5.02          39.96          25.27

BankBoston Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1998-1        350    2.73    4.80          32.55          17.81

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2000-2        292    9.69    9.09          31.09          21.27

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-BO1    1,345   23.22   12.73          21.16          12.66
2004-HE10     613    9.34    3.65          32.21          26.61
2004-HE11   1,637   11.35    5.13          44.58          35.81
2004-HE9      727   10.54    4.23          44.21          38.54

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-HE1      423    7.85    3.21          35.19          31.33

CDC Mortgage Capital Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-HE1      887    4.88    2.50          30.38          27.45
2004-HE2      661    4.82    3.13          42.39          37.56

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-D        600    8.11    6.44          24.44          13.93
2003-A        600   10.33    4.70          21.71          12.66
2004-A        950   11.70    3.94          19.82          10.96
2004-C        900   14.95    4.70          23.44          12.96
2004-D        360   32.71    2.07          11.88           6.05
2004-D        540    9.18    5.22          31.25          21.72

Chase Funding Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-3        210   10.52    1.84          12.55           8.24
2002-3        420    3.60    2.47          31.87          21.83
2003-1        510    3.05    2.44          28.37          20.68
2003-1        340   12.47    2.12          17.95          12.01
2003-2        530    4.04    2.43          30.97          18.48
2003-2        370   14.44    1.80          15.71           9.07

CitiFinancial Mortgage Securities Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-1        240    2.08    4.20          25.13          15.42
2003-1        535   10.70    5.27          18.78          10.16

Citigroup Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-HE1      231    5.84    1.54          28.60          18.78

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-HYB1     175   12.21    0.23           1.42           0.00
2004-UST1   1,030   22.31    0.00           2.37           1.04

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-HE3      460   18.67    5.76          18.69          12.81
2003-HE4      330   22.40   14.43          35.31          24.58

Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-C        200    5.00    4.99          12.69           7.55
2002-C        275    7.96    8.36          10.31           3.94

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-5        693    3.28    0.45          18.20          14.23
2002-AR33     783    1.03    0.02          20.08          20.08

CSFB ABS Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-HE16     283    3.18    5.27          22.73          17.78
2001-HE25     475    2.75    5.10          26.07          15.69
2001-HE30     393    4.45    5.22          30.10          18.49
2001-HE30     201    5.85    4.73          26.08          15.77
2002-HE16     515    2.29    2.99          20.48          11.00
2002-HE4      885    3.12    3.88          28.84          14.20
2002-HE4      115    7.39    6.42          21.13          14.25

CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-1        960    2.93    3.62          26.12          17.84
2002-3        615    3.10    3.50          25.92          17.17
2002-5        680    2.97    3.01          20.90          14.69
2003-1        625    3.95    3.28          24.94          15.71
2003-2        550    3.70    4.32          24.52          16.43
2003-3        600    4.17    3.19          22.37          14.24
2003-4      1,200    4.39    2.80          24.91          15.47

CWABS
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-3        490    3.32    2.06          27.23          20.34
2002-4        464    4.10    2.73          39.14          35.23
2002-5        183    8.93    1.03          23.55          14.52
2002-5        465    4.03    1.23          31.18          23.97
2002-6        392    5.67    1.02          42.49          34.97
2002-BC2      550    2.49    1.27          40.48          30.11
2003-4        277    5.33    1.03          38.05          28.74
2003-BC2      500    3.57    1.59          40.74          32.97
2004-5      4,300   12.10    2.55          37.23          32.04

CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-BC3      450    4.13    2.19          46.07          40.92

CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-AB2    1,225   13.12    4.87          63.83          61.30
2004-BC5      761   11.39    3.05          44.99          37.99

DLJ ABS Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2000-7        422    3.31    2.64          27.06          15.48

EQCC Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-1F     1,999    4.60    3.81          20.89          11.97
2001-1F     1,994    5.19    2.09          14.65           7.41
2001-1F     1,596    4.77    2.45          18.74           9.56
2001-1F     1,501    4.58    3.11          19.01          10.53

Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-1        294    8.57    7.40          15.80           9.45
2003-2        465   11.02    5.89          14.07           9.75
2004-3        469   13.03    7.28          18.50          13.71

Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-3        210    4.70    5.51          33.70          24.02
2002-4        303    6.64    4.07          28.61          22.45
2003-2        501    8.02    4.01          26.69          19.18
2003-3        647    8.95    3.98          26.52          18.22
2004-2        700   14.91    3.95          26.36          18.63
2004-3        646   20.24    4.14          25.10          18.20

Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-3      1,000    4.16    3.44          42.07          31.15

Finance America Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-1        325    5.44    2.74          30.31          20.36
2004-3        572    8.51    5.03          40.91          30.17

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-FF1      247    1.03    1.73          27.75          13.22
2002-FF4    1,098    2.62    0.96          28.50          24.24
2003-FF1      603    3.50    2.58          19.86           7.98
2003-FFH1     583    4.59    6.25          16.88          14.86
2004-FF1    1,338    4.87    1.81          23.95          19.19
2004-FF10   1,395   12.31    3.74          45.85          41.47
2004-FF2      879    4.18    2.43          27.22          24.01
2004-FF4      648   10.98    3.41          41.21          38.07
2004-FF8    1,242    9.29    4.01          44.46          40.14
2004-FFH1     794    4.38    5.94          22.12          13.74
2004-FFH3   1,500    8.22    8.52          29.31          24.46
2004-FFH4     732    9.93   10.12          25.87          18.49

FNBA Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-AR1      223   20.00    2.11          15.13           9.70

Fremont Home Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-1        217    2.41    2.91          44.07          36.75
2002-2        487    2.54    1.81          40.38          29.80
2003-1        344    2.89    1.94          38.78          27.86
2003-A        562    5.54    1.46          32.08          25.07
2004-4      1,350    8.61    4.75          45.63          35.29
2004-B        790    7.17    2.31          33.50          29.38
2004-D        793    8.84    4.05          47.13          36.55

GSAMP Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-AHL      307    8.30    2.69          22.05          18.77
2003-HE1      436    6.39    3.21          39.10          20.42
2003-NC1      220    5.00    1.51          26.74          20.72

Home Equity Asset Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-5        550    5.58    4.04          24.46          19.14
2003-8        525    5.28    2.63          23.62          18.03
2004-2        800    6.59    3.31          32.83          24.83
2004-4      1,100    7.64    4.27          29.04          22.03
2004-5        825    7.90    5.43          26.27          17.75
2004-7      1,200    9.06    4.80          28.33          18.64

Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-B      1,000   11.43    3.04          32.99          24.70
SPMD2000-A    120    3.49    5.42          37.95          23.38
SPMD2002-B    400    4.99    3.64          22.03          15.79
SPMD2004-A    450    8.88    4.05          38.34          25.11

Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-1        310   11.87    1.49          16.07          14.52
2004-5        414   17.61    2.61          15.01          12.45

IMC Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1997-5        975    1.68   10.06          31.15          24.49
1998-1      1,000    2.38    8.27          27.31          21.07

Impac CMB Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-10       670   14.44    3.49          13.88          11.64
2004-10       165   23.71    0.00           5.45           2.89
2004-10       251   12.31    2.43          18.26          13.91
2004-10     1,000   11.66    4.40          13.42          11.14
2004-7      2,200    8.74    1.84          10.53           7.80

Impac Secured Assets Corp.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-4      1,000   13.27    4.20          19.56          12.82

Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-1        725    3.52    7.37          44.76          37.30
2003-2        926    5.11    4.08          42.25          33.60
2004-6      1,104    9.47    4.60          49.10          41.06

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-NC1      398    5.43    2.46          21.16          10.54
2003-OPT1   1,464    5.19    1.65          26.31          21.32
2003-WMC1     744    2.89    2.04          30.71          21.60

Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-1        298    5.81    5.08          22.90          12.97
2004-1        692    2.78    5.38          24.08          16.58

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1999-H1       252    1.23     2.31          77.59         28.39
2002-AFC1     196    6.24    10.00          51.30         25.97

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-HE1      783    3.65    1.77          35.32          27.47
2004-WMC4   1,306    5.64    2.42          20.77          18.12

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-NC6      794    4.58    2.66          22.34          17.01
2004-HE4    1,441    9.35    2.90          34.80          29.57

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-AM1      359    1.71    4.59          40.51          28.47
2002-AM3      731    4.97    3.83          28.26          17.60
2002-HE2      623    3.00    3.95          29.14          20.94
2002-NC3      614    4.07    4.08          29.11          23.67
2002-NC4      709    3.96    3.84          38.54          28.76
2002-NC5      824    4.21    3.59          37.88          26.92
2003-NC1      984    3.88    3.31          26.31          21.35

MortgageIT Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-2        635   23.78    2.62           8.55           4.93

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-A        647    3.61    4.38          26.03          14.34
2003-5      1,100   20.47    1.02           8.69           6.43
2004-A        476   36.45    2.00          10.88           7.23
2004-A        728   32.11    1.51          12.02           7.98
2004-A        476    2.91    1.58          67.45          63.03

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation Alternative Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-AR4      434   11.04    3.46          21.87          18.11

NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-3        750    3.99    0.98          21.23          17.95
2004-1      1,750    6.23    3.17          23.77          18.23

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-4        329    2.70    2.12          14.55           9.83
2002-5        625    3.23    2.97          48.77          34.73
2002-6        800    4.30    1.66          28.39          18.06
2002-A      2,000    3.36    2.33          29.14          23.24
2003-1      1,600    5.19    1.68          26.48          19.51
2003-2      1,600    6.11    1.69          21.15          15.90
2003-3      1,300    6.92    2.09          23.90          17.53
2003-5        750    8.13    2.43          23.49          17.30

Park Place Securities
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-WCW1   1,565   13.60    7.70          47.43          41.16
2004-WCW2   3,000   12.85    6.37          44.55          40.42
2004-WHQ1   2,000    9.98    7.09          23.76          16.62

Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-5        602   25.47    5.00          27.03          19.00

RAAC Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-SP1      234   13.14    1.96          14.59           9.35

RALI Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-QA1      201    9.94    1.42          17.41           5.80

RASC Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-KS2      900    5.43    6.91          23.86          15.00
2001-KS2      625    2.40    5.27          24.31          13.03
2001-KS3    1,150    2.06    4.78          26.96          18.32
2001-KS3      850    6.18    6.92          22.85          13.57
2003-KS4      450    2.77    3.35          31.95          25.28
2003-KS4      650   13.30    3.95          17.63          10.91
2003-KS4      200    2.28    3.02          18.66          13.35
2003-KS7      725   16.80    3.39          18.76          13.01
2004-KS1      650    3.62    4.10          25.68          18.08
2004-KS1      300   18.89    2.91          18.24          13.29

Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-2        200    5.83    4.79          21.91          14.70
2002-3        250    8.34    4.93          26.48          17.85
2002-4        225    8.93    3.12          17.84          11.81
2003-1        263    8.74    2.95          24.19          14.16
2003-3        440   18.23    2.31          15.24           9.40
2003-4        475   16.69    2.46          18.97          13.78
2004-2        520   22.62    3.27          23.29          16.05
2004-4        480   27.86    3.93          24.25          17.70

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1998-AQ1      675    1.93    4.08          22.11          14.91

Salomon Home Equity Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2001-1         71    7.88    7.92          21.83          19.90
2002-CIT1     248    7.88    4.64          38.25          23.26

Saxon Asset Securities Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-1        900    4.68    3.91          25.72          19.94
2003-3      1,000    9.09    2.29          17.46          14.75
2004-2        743    8.64    2.57          19.92          17.39
2004-3        900   11.00    4.42          26.02          21.60

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-DO1      382    9.58    4.23          41.20          35.97

Soundview Home Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-1        264   15.07    9.51          26.42          18.02
2004-WMC1     584    8.57    4.87          28.97          24.46

Southern Pacific Secured Assets Corp.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1997-2         84    2.22   11.69          30.15          22.39

Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-BC2      284    5.34    3.45          26.86          22.74

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2003-BC3    1,112    2.87    2.18          22.25          15.89
2003-BC5    1,060    4.64    2.28          17.72          13.24
2004-11     2,300   10.26    4.30          36.98          29.15

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2002-25A      659    5.08    0.19          22.52          13.30
2002-HF1      774    4.86    5.24          29.02          18.39
2003-BC2      276    8.04    9.67          44.79          21.46

Terwin Mortgage Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-3HE      250    7.27    3.11          22.47          19.50

UCFC Acceptance Corp.
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1998-D        525    5.67    8.28          26.62          24.59
1998-D        225    4.61    7.24          37.22          30.77

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
2004-L        457   21.26    0.07           1.24           1.09
2004-U        761    4.68    0.09          10.28           7.04

WMC Mortgage Loan Trust
         Original    Pool    Cum.          Total         Severe
          balance  factor  losses  delinquencies  delinquencies
Series   (mil. $)     (%)     (%)            (%)            (%)
1998-1        302    1.12    9.01          40.41          27.66
1998-B        800    1.48    8.80          31.80          21.55

Notes: Original balance represents the original collateral
balance for the structure represented. Pool factor represents the
percentage of the original pool balance remaining. Cumulative
losses represent a percentage of the original pool balance, and
total and severe delinquencies are percentages of the current pool
balance.

The information shows average pool factor, cumulative loss, and
total and severe delinquency information for pre-2005 vintage
prime jumbo, subprime, and Alt-A mortgage collateral as of the
October 2011 distribution period.

Prime Jumbo
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      12.75       0.46              10.46               5.07

Alt-A
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      15.17       1.12              17.41               8.79

Subprime
    Average     Average            Average            Average
pool factor  cumulative              total             severe
        (%)  losses (%)  delinquencies (%)  delinquencies (%)
      6.84        4.17              28.82              15.78

Subordination, any applicable overcollateralization, bond
insurance, and excess spread provide credit support for the
transactions in this review.

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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