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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, November 13, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 315

                            Headlines

ALCL FRANCHISE: Losses Cue Fitch to Downgrade Certain Ratings
AMAC CDO: Moody's Affirms Cl. A-1 Notes Rating at Ba3 (sf)
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: Moodys' Gives Ba2 Rating to Class E Notes
AMRESCO COMMERCIAL: Fitch Withdraws 'CPS3' Rating on CMBS
ANTHRACITE CDO: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on 11 Note Classes

ARBOR REALTY: Moody's Affirms Cl. C Notes Rating at 'Ba3'
BALLYROCK CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class Q Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Cuts Class G Certs. Rating to 'CCC-'
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Cuts Rating on Class H Certs. to 'D'

BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms Primary Servicer Rating at 'CPS1
BSCMS 2007-PWR16: Moody's Affirm Rating of Cl. B Notes at 'B1'
C-BASS CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Note Classes
CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Ups Rating on Class E Notes From 'B+' to 'BB+'
CAPITAL GUARDIAN: S&P Keeps 'D' Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes

CEDARWOODS CRE CDO: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. A-1 Notes to Ba1
CHESAPEAKE FUDING: Moody's Raises Rating of Two Classes of Notes
CIT RV TRUST: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'Caa1'
COLTS 2005-2: Moody's Raises Cl. D Notes Rating to Baa3 From Ba3
COLTS 2007-1: Moody's Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'Ba2'

CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Lowers Rating of $25-Mil. Notes to 'B3'
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
CRF-18 LLC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes From 'B' to 'CCC'
CT CDO: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on 15 Note Classes
DETROIT DOWNTOWN: Fitch Lowers Rating on Tax Bonds to 'BB+'

EDUCATIONAL LOANS: Moody's Cuts Ratings Six Note Classes to 'C'
EMPORIA PREFERRED: Moody's Raises Rating of Class D Notes to Ba1
EMPORIA PREFERRED: Moody's Upgrades Rating of Class D Notes to Ba1
FALCON FRANCHISE: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Class E Notes
FLEET LEASE: Moody's Raises Rating of 1 Class of Fixed Rate Notes

FUNB 2002-C1: Moody's Affirms Class H Notes Rating at 'Ba1'
GALLERY AT HARBORPLACE: Moody's Cuts Rating on B-3 Notes to 'Ca'
GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Certificates to 'CCC-'
GECMC 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms Class J Notes Rating at 'Ba2'
GULF STREAM-COMPASS: S&P Removes 'CCC-' Class E Rating From Watch

HARTFORD MEZZANINE: Fitch Holds Rating on Three Note Classes
JP MORGAN: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class MH Certificates
JPMCC 2003-CIBC6: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. H Notes at Ba1(sf)
JPMCC 2006-CIBC16: Moody's Affirms Cl. A-J Notes Rating at 'B1'
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Certificates to 'D'

LB-UBS 2005-C2: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating of Cl. E Notes
LEAF RECEIVABLES: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E-2 Notes
LEHMAN BROTHERS: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Ratings on 2 Classes
LITIGATION SETTLEMENT: Moody's Reviews Ba1 Rating; Might Upgrade
MERRILL LYNCH: DBRS Confirms Class F Rating at 'BB'

MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
MLCFC 2006-3: Moody's Affirms Cl. B Notes Rating at 'Ba2'
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'CCC-'
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Lowers Ratings on 4 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
MSC 2003-TOP11: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. H Notes at 'Ba2'

MSC 2006-HQ8: Moody's Affirms Cl. D Notes Rating at 'Ba1'
MSC 2007-XLF9: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating of Cl. F Notes
NAVISTAR FINANCIAL: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Notes
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: Moody's Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'Ba1'
PANGAEA CLO 2007-1: Moody's Raises Rating of Class C Notes to Ba1

PORTER SQUARE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC-'
PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Lowers Rating of $42.5-Mil. Notes to 'B3'
REALT 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Class F Notes Rating at 'Ba1'
REALT 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. F Notes at 'Ba1'
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE: DBRS Confirms Class B-1 Rating at 'C'

RFC CDO: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on 11 Note Classes
SCHOONER TRUST: DBRS Confirms Class F Rating at 'BB'
SIERRA TIMESHARE: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class C Notes
SPRINT CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Rating of $38-Mil. Notes to 'B3'
T2 INCOME: Moody's Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'Ba1'

TIAA REAL: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Two Note Classes
TRUP CDO: Moody's Raises Rating of Class A-2 Notes to 'Ba2'
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certificates to 'D'
WBCMT 2005-C22: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. A-J Notes to 'Ba1'

* S&P Affirms Ratings on 1,140 Classes from 259 US RMBS Deals
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 5 Sprint-Related Transactions to 'B+'



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ALCL FRANCHISE: Losses Cue Fitch to Downgrade Certain Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on these ACLC
Franchise Loan Receivables Trusts and ACLC Business Loan
Receivables Trusts:

ACLC Franchise Loan Receivables Trust 1998-A:

  -- Class A-3 upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf' and assigned a Stable
     Outlook.

ACLC Business Loan Receivables Trust 1998-2:

  -- Class B downgraded to 'Dsf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR2' and
     withdrawn;
  -- Class C affirmed at 'Dsf/RR6' and withdrawn.

ACLC Business Loan Receivables Trust 1999-1:

  -- Class A-3 downgraded to 'Csf/RR2' from 'CCsf/RR2', and
     withdrawn;
  -- Class B affirmed 'Dsf/RR5' and withdrawn;
  -- Class C affirmed at 'Dsf/RR6 and withdrawn.

ACLC Business Loan Receivables Trust 1999-2:

  -- Class D revised to 'CCCsf/RR3' from 'CCCsf/RR5'.

ACLC Business Loan Receivables Trust 2000-1:

  -- Class A-3A affirmed at 'BBB', Stable Outlook;
  -- Class A-3F affirmed at 'BBB', Stable Outlook;
  -- Class B affirmed at 'D/RR2';
  -- Class C affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class D affirmed at 'D/RR6'.

Additionally, these classes were removed from Rating Watch
Negative:

Series 1998-A - Class A-3
Series 1998-2 - Class B
Series 1999-1 - Class A-3
Series 1999-2 - Class D
Series 2000-1 - Class A-3A and A-3F

The upgrade of the class A-3 note in the 1998-A transaction
reflects the significant credit support available to the note over
the short expected remaining life.  In its analysis, Fitch found
the notes to pass stress scenarios consistent with the upgraded
rating category of 'BBBsf'.  Additionally, the level of upgrade
reflects the application of the 'BBsf' rating cap for pools with
fewer than ten obligors.

The downgrade of the class B note in 1998-2 is due to principal
losses on the note as a significant portion of the collateral pool
has defaulted.  The subsequent ratings withdrawal of the notes is
due to Fitch's view that the ratings are no longer relevant to the
agency's coverage, considering that the notes have defaulted.

The downgrade of the class A-3 note in the 1999-1 transaction is a
result of diminishing credit support due to principal write-downs
on subordinate classes.  As a result, the class A-3 note is unable
to sustain incremental defaults under Fitch's analysis.  Fitch
believes default on the note is imminent, resulting in a negative
rating action.  The subsequent ratings withdrawal of the notes is
due to Fitch's view that the ratings are no longer relevant to the
agency's coverage, considering that each class has either already
defaulted or Fitch's expectation is that default is imminent.

The affirmations on the remaining notes reflect the notes' ability
to pass stress-case scenarios consistent with the current rating
levels.  Additionally, recovery prospects for the distressed notes
have changed, leading to a revision of the Recovery Ratings.  For
additional detail, please refer to Fitch's 'Criteria for
Structured Finance Recovery Ratings', dated July 12, 2011.

The Stable Rating Outlook designation for all applicable notes
reflects Fitch's view that ratings are not expected to change
within the next 12-18 months, based on current performance.




AMAC CDO: Moody's Affirms Cl. A-1 Notes Rating at Ba3 (sf)
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of eight classes of Notes issued
by AMAC CDO Funding I due to key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating actions are:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

AMAC CDO Funding I is a revolving cash CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio of whole loans or senior participations in whole
loans (93.7% of the pool balance), B-Notes (3.2%), and mezzanine
loans (3.1%). As of the October 24, 2011 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, $368.1 million from $400 million at issuance, with the
paydown directed to the Class A-1 Notes, as a result of failing
the Class C par value tests.

There is one asset with a par balance of $4.7 million (1.5% of the
current pool balance) that is considered an Impaired Interest as
of the October 24, 2011 Trustee report. This is asset is a
mezzanine loan. Per the governing transaction document, Impaired
Interests are defined as assets that are in default. While there
have been no realized losses to date, Moody's does expect
significant losses to occur once they are realized.

On September 21, 2011, Moody's downgraded the long term deposit
ratings of Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA"), the Counterparty, to A2
from Aa3, while BANA's short-term rating was affirmed at Prime-1.
This resulted in a "Ratings Collateralization Event" under the
Swap Agreement. In response to the Ratings Collateralization
Event, the counterparty is working on remediating actions.
However, notwithstanding the Collateralization Event, BANA
satisfies Moody's current de-linking criteria (please see
"Framework for De-Linking Hedge Counterparty Risks from Global
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions" published in October
2010).

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 7,130 compared to 7,574 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(0.9% compared to 0.8% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.7% compared
to 3.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (6.0% compared to 3.6% at last
review), B1-B3 (14.6% compared to 17.6% at last review), and Caa1-
C (77.8% compared to 75.1% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.4 years compared
to 5.0 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
54.3% compared to 52.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 25.1% compared to 20.3% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
53% to 43% or up to 63% would result in average rating movement on
the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notches downward and 0 to 4 notches
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and performance
in the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
continuing to show signs of recovery through the first half of
2011, while recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are
tied to pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office
markets are showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing
activity. The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: Moodys' Gives Ba2 Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-5
(AMCAR 2011-5). This is the fifth senior/subordinated transaction
of the year for AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.
(AmeriCredit).

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-5

Class A-1 Notes, rated Prime-1 (sf);

Class A-2 Notes, rated Aaa (sf);

Class A-3 Notes, rated Aaa (sf);

Class B Notes, rated Aa1 (sf);

Class C Notes, rated A1 (sf);

Class D Notes, rated Baa2 (sf);

Class E Notes, rated Ba2 (sf);

RATINGS RATIONALS

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, the experience and expertise of AmeriCredit
Financial Services, Inc. (AmeriCredit) as servicer, and the backup
servicing arrangement with Aa3-rated Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities," published in
May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the AMCAR 2011-
5 pool is 11.0% and total credit enhancement required to achieve
Aaa rating (i.e. Aaa proxy) is 40.0%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of AmeriCredit's portfolio vintage
performance as well as performance of past securitizations, and
current expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the strong back-up servicing
arrangement present in this transaction in addition to the size
and strength of AmeriCredit's servicing platform.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 20%, 25% or 35.0%,
the initial model output for the Class A notes might change from
Aaa to Aa1, Aa2, and Baa1, respectively; Class B notes might
change from Aa1 to Baa1, Ba1, and below B3, respectively; Class C
notes might change from A1 to Ba2, B3, and below B3, respectively;
Class D notes might change from Baa2 to below B3 in all three
scenarios; and Class E notes might change from Ba2 to below B3 in
all three scenarios.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.


AMRESCO COMMERCIAL: Fitch Withdraws 'CPS3' Rating on CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings withdraws AMRESCO Commercial Finance, LLC's
(AMRESCO) commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) primary
servicer rating of 'CPS3' and its special servicer rating of
'CSS3'.

The rating withdrawal is based on insufficient information to
maintain the ratings.  The last information received from AMRESCO
covered the period ended June 30, 2011 and the servicer has not
responded to repeated requests for updated quarterly statistics
which has traditionally been the only touch point with this
servicer during the interim between ratings updates.  This
servicer does not service any Fitch rated CMBS transactions.

AMRESCO is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NCS I, LLC ('NCS') which
was formed for the sole purpose of acquiring AMRESCO from its
former parent company, AMRESCO, Inc. NCS is predominately owned by
an affiliate of Fortress Investment Group LLC ("Fortress"), a
global real estate private equity and asset management company,
and by an affiliate of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

The servicer rating is based on the methodology described in
Fitch's reports 'U.S. Commercial Mortgage Servicer Rating
Criteria,' dated Feb. 18, 2011, and 'Global Rating Criteria for
Structured Finance Servicers' dated Aug. 16, 2010, available on
Fitch's web site.


ANTHRACITE CDO: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on 11 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes issued by Anthracite CDO III
Ltd./Corp. (Anthracite CDO III).  The affirmations to the senior
classes are a result of increased credit enhancement to the notes
from principal paydowns.

Since the last review in November 2010, approximately 29.1% of the
collateral has been downgraded while 12.8% has been upgraded.
Currently, 58.1% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 32.6%% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and
below.  The class A notes have received $39 million in paydowns
since the last review, including approximately $13.9 million from
assets with a Fitch derived rating of 'CCC' and below.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.

Although the cash flow model passing rates for the class A notes
are higher than the class' current rating, this is offset by the
concentration risk on the underlying portfolio.  These notes have
been receiving principal paydowns through principal amortization,
excess spread due to failure of coverage tests, and interest on
defaulted collateral that have been reclassified as principal
proceeds.  The breakeven rates in Fitch's cash flow model for the
class B and C notes are generally consistent with the ratings
assigned below.

For the class D through H notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below).  Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class D and E notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf', indicating
default is probable.  Similarly, the class F through H notes have
been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is inevitable.
The class D through H notes are currently receiving interest paid
in kind (PIK) whereby the principal amount of the notes is written
up by the amount of interest due.

The Positive Outlook on the class A notes is primarily driven by
the significant cushion in the modeling results as well as the
continued pay downs to the structure, both of which serve to
mitigate potential further deterioration in the portfolio.
Similarly, the Stable Outlook on the class B notes reflects the
cushion in the passing rating while taking into account the
concentration risk and risk of further interest shortfalls.

Anthracite CDO III is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on March 30, 2004.  Currently, the portfolio is composed
of 72 securities from 37 issuers of which 75.7% are commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS), 16.8% CMBS rake bonds or credit
tenant leases (CTL) classified as commercial real estate loans
(CREL), and 7.5% real estate investment trusts (REITs).

Fitch has taken these actions as indicated below:

  -- $123,450,816 class A notes affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook to
     Positive from Negative;
  -- $27,000,000 class B-FL notes affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative;
  -- $14,384,000 class B-FX notes affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative;
  -- $24,727,000 class C-FL notes affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  -- $2,500,000 class C-FX notes affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  -- $14,042,645 class D-FL notes affirmed at 'CCsf';
  -- $10,255,682 class D-FX notes affirmed at 'CCsf';
  -- $10,739,096 class E-FL notes affirmed at 'CCsf';
  -- $27,378,168 class E-FX notes affirmed at 'CCsf';
  -- $23,764,542 class F notes affirmed at 'Csf';
  -- $7,809,257 class G notes affirmed at 'Csf';
  -- $13,766,185 class H notes affirmed at 'Csf'.


ARBOR REALTY: Moody's Affirms Cl. C Notes Rating at 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of nine classes of Notes issued
by Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities 2005-1, Ltd. The affirmations
are due to the key transaction parameters performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

Moody's rating actions are:

Cl. A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2009 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2009
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2009 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities 2005-1, Ltd. is a static
(reinvestment period ended in April 2011) cash CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of a-notes and whole loans (47.6% of the
pool balance), b-notes (27.6%), mezzanine loans (19.0%), rake
bonds (3.7%) and CRE CDO (2.1%). As of the October 21, 2011 Note
Vauation report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $463.7 million from
$475.0 million at issuance. The paydown was directed to the Class
C, Class D, Class E, Class F, Class G, and Class H Notes during
the reinvestment period as a result of a "junior-turbo" feature
that directed excess interest proceeds to paydown these notes.
Since the end of the reinvestment period, the paydown has been
directed in a senior sequential priority. Additionally, the
outstanding note balance of the preferred shares increased to
$131.3 million from $118.8 million at issuance as the result of a
sponsor equity contribution feature as specified in the governing
transaction documents.

There is one asset with a par balance of $4.0 million (0.9% of the
current pool balance) that is considered Defaulted Securities as
of the October 21, 2011 Note Valuation report. While there have
been no realized losses to the bond balance to date, Moody's does
expect low to moderate losses to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The probability of default WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled
a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,940 compared to 5,320 at last review.
The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-
Aa3 (0.5% compared to 0.6% at last review), A1-A3 (7.1% compared
to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 0.9% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (3.1% compared to 4.7% at last review), B1-B3
(11.4% compared to 30% at last review), and Caa1-C (77.6% compared
to 63.8% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.5 years compared
to 4.2 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
27.5% compared to 29.1% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9% compared to 16.8% at last review.
The higher MAC is due to the high concentration of high default
probability collateral within a few collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
27.5% to 17.5% or up to 37.5% would result in average modeled
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 6 notches downward
and 0 to 6 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and performance
in the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
continuing to show signs of recovery through the first half of
2011, while recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are
tied to pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office
markets are showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing
activity. The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


BALLYROCK CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class B, C, D, and E notes from Ballyrock CLO 2006-1 Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Ballyrock Investment Advisors LLC, and removed these ratings from
CreditWatch with positive implications. "At the same time, we
affirmed our rating on the class A notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect improved performance we have observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio since our March 2010
rating actions. As of the Oct. 20, 2011, trustee report, the
transaction held $1.9 million in defaulted assets. This was
down from $14.1 million in defaulted assets noted in the
February 2010 trustee report, which we referenced for our
March 2010 rating actions. Also, as of October 2011, the
transaction held $19.4 million in assets from underlying
obligors with ratings in the 'CCC' range, compared with
$65.2 million in 'CCC' rated assets held in February 2010,"
S&P related. As of the October 2011 trustee report, each of
the transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) ratios has
improved since February 2010:

    The class A/B O/C ratio is 126.7% versus 122.3%;

    The class C O/C ratio is 119.8% versus 115.7%;

    The class D O/C ratio is 110.7% versus 106.9%; and

    The class E O/C ratio is 107.2% versus 103.5%.

"The improvement in the O/C ratios helped to mitigate obligor
concentration risk in the portfolio, as the class E notes were
able to withstand the specified combination of underlying asset
defaults at the 'B (sf)' rating category in our largest obligor
default test," S&P said.

The affirmation of the class A notes reflects the availability of
credit support at the current rating level.

"We will continue to review our ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in our view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary," S&P said.

Rating And CreditWatch Actions

Ballyrock CLO 2006-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                   To           From
B                       AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                       A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                       BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E                       B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed

Ballyrock CLO 2006-1 Ltd.

Class                   Rating
A                       AA+ (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class Q Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the super senior classes and downgraded
seven below investment grade classes of Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc. (BACM) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2007-3, due to greater certainty of expected losses on the
specially serviced assets.

Fitch modeled losses of 17% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 16.2%, including losses already
incurred.  The pool has experienced $8.6 million (0.24% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated 29 loans (32.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 12 specially serviced assets (6.5%).  Fitch expects
classes L through S to be fully depleted from losses associated
with the specially serviced assets.

As of the October 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 6.3% to $3.3 billion from
$3.52 billion at issuance.  No loans have defeased since issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Second & Seneca
loan (5.2% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately
500,000 square foot (sf) office property in downtown Seattle, WA.
As of October 2011, the balance of the loan was $170 million,
which consisted of a $153.3 million A-note and $16.7 million B-
note resulting from a modification.  The loan was previously in
special servicing, having transferred in June 2009 for imminent
default due to the loss of a major tenant.  In June 2010, a
modification closed in which the borrower paid down the debt by $5
million and the note was split into two tranches.  The loan
returned to the master servicer in September 2010.  However,
occupancy remains low and servicer-reported net operating income
(NOI) in 2010 was insufficient to cover the modified debt service.
Despite this, the loan has remained current as of the October 2011
distribution date.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Pacifica
Tower loan (5%), which is secured by a 314,074 sf office tower
that is part of the Plaza at La Jolla office development, a six-
building property that features 825,000 sf of office space spread
over 17 acres located in the Golden Triangle/University Town
Center submarket of San Diego, CA.  The balance of the 10.5-year,
interest-only loan was $166.3 million as of October 2011. The
property is highly leveraged and has significant upcoming rollover
with in-place rents well above market.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Pacific
Shores Building 9 & 10 loan (5.6%), which is secured by two
buildings in a 10-building office development in Redwood City, CA
(Silicon Valley).  The collateral consists of a 283,015 sf class A
office building and a 164,732 sf flex industrial building.
Property cash flow is expected to dramatically decline in 2013
after an in-place lease expires and a new lease goes into effect
at a rate less than half that of the current rate.

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns or revises the
Recovery Rating (RR) as indicated:

-- $241.7 million class A-J to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf';
-- $35.2 million class B to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf';
-- $26.4 million class L to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $4.4 million class M to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR1'.

Fitch downgrades these classes:

-- $43.9 million class K to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $17.6 million class N to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';
-- $4.4 million class O to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

-- $224.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $100.7 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $133 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $78.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $1,017 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $50 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $645.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $116.6 million class A-M at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $100 million class A-MF at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $135 million class A-MFL at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $48.3 million class C at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $26.4 million class D at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $26.4 million class E at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $35.2 million class F at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $30.8 million class G at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $48.3 million class H at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $35.2 million class J at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $8.8 million class P at 'CCsf/RR6';
-- $13.2 million class Q at 'Csf/RR6'.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the $48.6 million class S.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Cuts Class G Certs. Rating to 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3. "In addition, we
affirmed our ratings on nine other classes from the same
transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust. Using
servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.20x and loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 146.7%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.65x
and an LTV ratio of 214.7%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 99.1% and 53.5%. The DSC and LTV
calculations we exclude the transaction's 12 specially serviced
assets ($213.8 million, 6.5%). We separately estimated losses for
these assets, which we included in our 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

"The downgrades further reflect our analysis of interest
shortfalls that have affected the trust and consequently, reduced
liquidity support available from interest shortfalls related to
the specially serviced assets. As of the Oct. 11, 2011, remittance
report, the trust had experienced monthly interest shortfalls
totaling $1.0 million. The monthly interest shortfalls affected
class H and all classes subordinate to it. Classes H through Q are
currently rated 'D (sf)' by Standard & Poor's," S&P related.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels and liquidity that is
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class XW interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria," S&P said.

                     Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 11, 2011, remittance report, 12 assets
($213.8 million, 6.5%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR). The reported payment
status of these assets as of the Oct. 11, 2011, remittance
report is: one is real estate owned (REO) ($7.3 million,
0.2%), four are in foreclosure ($114.1 million, 3.5%), and
seven are 90-plus-days delinquent ($92.4 million, 2.8%).
Eleven ($208.7 million, 6.3%) of the 12 specially serviced
assets have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect
totaling $102.7 million. One of the top 10 loans ($86.0 million,
2.6%) is specially serviced.

The Metropolis Shopping Center loan ($86.0 million, 2.6%) is the
10th-largest loan in the pool and the largest asset with the
special servicer. The loan is secured by a 507,770-sq.-ft. retail
property in Plainfield, Ind. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Nov. 22, 2010, for imminent default. The asset
is classified as being in foreclosure. A $54.8 million ARA was
reported for the loan. "We expect a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan," S&P said.

The remaining 11 assets with the special servicer ($127.8 million;
3.9%) individually represent less than 0.9% of the total pool
balance. Ten of the 11 assets have ARAs in effect, with an
aggregate amount of $47.9 million. "We estimated losses for all 11
assets, resulting in a weighted-average loss severity of 54.6%,"
S&P related.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 11, 2011, remittance report, the transaction
had an aggregate trust balance of $3.30 billion (146 loans and
one REO asset), compared with $3.52 billion (151 loans) at
issuance. Bank of America N.A., the master servicer, provided
financial information for 98.9% of the pool (by balance), the
majority of which reflected full-year 2010 financial data. "We
calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.19x for the loans in the
pool based on the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV
ratio were 1.20x and 146.7%. Our adjusted figures exclude the
transaction's 12 ($213.8 million, 6.5%) specially serviced assets,
which had a weighted-average reported DSC of 0.74x. Thirty-two
loans ($973.4 million, 29.5%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, including four of the top 10 loans. Thirty-seven
loans ($1.18 billion, 35.9%) had a reported DSC of less than
1.10x, 28 of which ($1.07 billion, 32.5%) had a reported DSC
of less than 1.00x," S&P related.

                   Summary of Top 10 Loans

"The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$1.71 billion (51.8%). Using servicer-reported information, we
calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.11x for nine of the top 10
loans. The 10th-largest loan is with the special servicer. Our
adjusted DSC and LTV figures for nine of the top 10 loans were
1.08x and 168.9%. Four ($711.3 million, 21.7%) of the top 10 loans
are on the master servicer's watchlist," S&P related.

The Renaissance Mayflower Hotel loan ($200.0 million, 6.1%) is
the second-largest loan in the pool, and the largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by a 657-room
lodging property in Washington, DC. The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist for low reported DSC. As of June 2011,
reported DSC and occupancy were 0.78x and 67.7%.

The Rockwood Ross Multifamily loan is the fifth-largest loan in
the pool, and the second-largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist. The loan has a trust balance of $175.0 million (5.3%)
and a whole loan balance of $275.0 million. The loan is secured by
seven multifamily properties totaling 2,508 units in Maryland and
Virginia. The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist for
low reported DSC. Reported DSC and consolidated occupancy were
0.99x and 93.5% as of December 2010 and June 2011.

The Second & Seneca loan ($170.0 million, 5.2%) is the sixth-
largest loan in the pool, and third-largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by a 497,271-sq.-ft.
office in Seattle, Wash. The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist for low reported occupancy at the collateral property.
Reported DSC and occupancy were 0.71x as of December 2010 and
68.3% as of March 2011.

The Pacifica Tower loan is the seventh-largest loan in the pool
and the fourth-largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.
The loan has a trust balance of $166.3 million (5.1%) and a whole-
loan balance of $183.5 million. The loan is secured by a 314,118-
sq.-ft. office in San Diego, Calif. The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist for low reported DSC. As of March
2011, reported DSC and occupancy were 0.92x and 94.1%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the pool collateral according to its
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent
with our rating actions.

Ratings Lowered

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
               Rating
Class       To        From      Credit enhancement (%)
A-4         BBB (sf)  A- (sf)                    31.74
A-5         BBB (sf)  A- (sf)                    31.74
A-1A        BBB (sf)  A- (sf)                    31.74
A-M         BB (sf)   BB+ (sf)                   21.08
A-MF        BB (sf)   BB+ (sf)                   21.08
A-MFL       BB (sf)   BB+ (sf)                   21.08
E           B- (sf)   B (sf)                      9.61
F           B- (sf)   B (sf)                      8.54
G           CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)                   7.61

Ratings Affirmed

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class       Rating       Credit enhancement (%)
A-2         AAA (sf)                      31.74
A-2FL       AAA (sf)                      31.74
A-3         AAA (sf)                      31.74
A-AB        AAA (sf)                      31.74
A-J         B+ (sf)                       13.74
B           B (sf)                        12.67
C           B (sf)                        11.21
D           B (sf)                        10.41
XW          AAA (sf)                        N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Cuts Rating on Class H Certs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on class H
from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-3. "In
addition, we affirmed our ratings on 21 other classes from the
same transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust. The downgrade to 'D (sf)' on the
class H certificates reflects credit support erosion that we
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of the four
specially serviced assets ($21.8 million, 2.8%) and the monthly
interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust; we believe the
resulting accumulated interest shortfalls will remain outstanding
for the foreseeable future," S&P said.

The affirmed ratings on the pooled principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels and liquidity that is
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the X interest-only (IO) certificates based on our
current criteria," S&P related.

"The class 'UH' raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flow
from the subordinate, nonpooled junior portion of the U-Haul
Portfolio loan and the class 'SS' raked certificates derive 100%
of their cash flow from the subordinate, nonpooled junior portion
of the 17 State Street loan. The analysis of the ratings on the
raked certificates was consistent with the rating approach
outlined in the Approach and Surveillance Sections of the J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-FL1 Presale
Report, published Nov. 8, 2011," S&P said.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
the remaining assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.58x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 73.3%
for the loans in the pool. We further stressed the loans' cash
flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of
1.28x and an LTV ratio of 91.0%. The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 22.7% and 24.7%. These
figures exclude eight defeased loans ($52.6 million, 6.8%). We
separately estimated losses for three of the four specially
serviced and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss severity figures," S&P related.

As of the Oct. 11, 2011 trustee remittance report, the trust has
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $44,943. The
total interest shortfall amount primarily reflects ASERs in the
amount of $27,850 and special servicing and workout fees of
$4,566. "The interest shortfalls affected all classes subordinate
to and including class H. Class H experienced cumulative interest
shortfalls for five consecutive months, and we expect these
interest shortfalls to continue in the near term. Consequently,
we lowered the rating of the class H certificates to 'D (sf)',"
S&P said.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 11, 2011 trustee remittance report, four loans
($21.8 million; 2.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Midland Loan Services Inc. (Midland). The reported payment status
of these loans as of the Oct. 11, 2011, trustee remittance report
is: two are 90-plus-days delinquent ($13.1 million; 1.7%); one
is a matured balloon ($3.5 million, 0.5%); and one is current
($5.3 million; 0.7%). Two loans ($13.1 million, 1.7%) have
appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect totaling
$6.2 million. Details of the two largest specially serviced
loans are:

The Lexington Park Apartments loan ($8.0 million, 1.0%), is the
largest asset with the special servicer and is secured by a 362-
unit multifamily property built in 1964, renovated in 2003 in
Minneapolis, Mn. The loan was transferred to the special servicer
due to imminent monetary default on July 22, 2010. An ARA of
$4.7 million is in effect against this asset. The borrower and
Midland are currently negotiating a loan modification. In the
event an agreement is not reached, Midland expects to pursue
foreclosure or a receivership sale. The DSC for the loan was 0.40x
for the six months ended June 30, 2011, and occupancy was 41.1% as
of September 2011. "We expect a significant loss upon the
resolution of this loan," S&P said.

The Pines Corporate Center loan ($5.3 million, 0.7%) is secured
by a 100,240-sq-ft. office building in Las Vegas. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 6, 2010, due to
imminent default. The loan was under receivership and was sold via
an assumption and loan modification on June 10, 2011; the loan
will be transferred back to the master servicer later this month.
Midland indicated that a workout fee will not be paid by the
borrower.

The remaining two assets with the special servicer ($8.5 million;
1.1%) have individual balances of less than $5.1 million and
individually represent less than 1% of the total pool balance. A
$1.5 million ARA is in effect for one of the two remaining assets.
"We estimated losses for these two assets at a weighted-average
loss severity of 20.6%," S&P said.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 11, 2011 trustee remittance report, the transaction
had an aggregate trust balance of $777.8 million (70 loans),
compared with $1.2 billion (94 loans) at issuance. Bank of America
N.A. (Bank of America), the master servicer, provided financial
information for 99.3% of the pool (by balance), which was
primarily full-year 2010 information. "We calculated a weighted-
average DSC of 1.71x for the loans in the pool based on the
reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.58x and 73.3%,
which exclude three of the four ($16.5 million; 2.1%) of the
transaction's specially serviced assets, as well as eight defeased
loans ($52.5 million, 6.8%). The trust has experienced four
principal losses to date totaling $38.6 million. Seventeen
loans ($104.8 million, 13.5%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, including one of the top 10 loans. One loan
($15.9 million, 2.1%) has a reported DSC between 1.00x and
1.10x, and nine loans ($67.1 million, 8.6%) have reported DSCs
of less than 1.00x," S&P said.

                      Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$351.9 million (54.9%). "Using servicer-reported information, we
calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.88x for the top 10 loans.
Our adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.65x
and 65.2%. The two largest loans in the pool, the U-Haul Portfolio
and the 17 State Street loan, have nonpooled classes of
certificates that derive 100% of their cash flows from the
subordinate portion of these loans. One of the top 10
loans ($15.9 million, 2.1%) is on the master servicer's
watchlist," S&P said.

The U-Haul Portfolio loan is the largest loan in the pool
with a whole-loan balance of $156.5 million, which consists
of a $93.9 million senior pooled balance, and a $62.6 million
subordinate, nonpooled balance. The loan is secured by a 78-
property, 44,931-unit self-storage portfolio located throughout
the country. As of the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009, the
portfolio had a DSC of 2.32x and was 100% occupied. "Based on our
current valuation using an adjusted net cash flow, our adjusted
whole loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 63.4%. Our adjusted valuation
for this loan has declined by 1% since issuance," S&P related.

The 17 State Street loan is the second-largest loan in the
pool with a whole-loan balance of $104.3 million, which
consists of a $69.3 million senior pooled balance, and a
$12.5 million subordinate, nonpooled balance. In addition,
there is a $21.0 million B note, which is held outside the
trust. The loan is secured by a 531,521-sq.-ft.office building
in downtown Manhattan. As of Dec. 31, 2010, the A note DSC for
the property was 2.36x and the whole-loan DSC for the property
was 1.80x. Occupancy was 85.4% as of March 31, 2011. "Based on
our current valuation using an adjusted net cash flow, our
adjusted whole LTV ratio is 66.9%. Our adjusted valuation for
this loan has declined by 9.1% since issuance," S&P said.

The University Office Plaza I and II loan ($15.9 million, 2.1%),
the largest loan on Bank of America's watchlist and the 10th-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by two office properties
aggregating 192,180 sq. ft. in Hamilton, N.J. The loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a decrease in occupancy. The
New Jersey Department of Health occupied two suites totaling
54,589 sq ft or 70.9% of the net rentable area of the property.
According to the master servicer, the State of New Jersey vacated
the entire premises in accordance with a cost-saving directive
issued by former Governor Corzine for the State government in
January 2010. As of Dec. 31, 2010, the reported DSC was 1.07x;
the reported occupancy as of April 30, 2011, was 69.7%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
criteria and the resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with its lowered and affirmed ratings.

Rating Lowered

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-3
            Rating
Class    To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
H         D (sf)   CCC-  (sf)         0.88

Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-3

Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-5       AAA (sf)                  17.93
A-1A      AAA (sf)                  17.93
B         AA+ (sf)                  13.82
C         AA (sf)                   12.18
D         BBB+(sf)                   8.68
E         BB+(sf)                    7.04
F         B-(sf)                     4.78
G         CCC-(sf)                   3.14
X         AAA (sf)                    N/A

Ratings Affirmed (Nonpooled Certificates)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-3

Class     Rating
UH-A      AAA (sf)
UH-B      AAA (sf)
UH-C      AAA (sf)
UH-D      AAA (sf)
UH-E      AAA (sf)
UH-F      AA+ (sf)
UH-G      AA- (sf)
UH-H      A  (sf)
UH-J      BBB+ (sf)
SS-B      BBB+ (sf)
SS-C      BBB  (sf)
SS-D      BBB- (sf)

N/A -- Not applicable.


BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms Primary Servicer Rating at 'CPS1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms Bank of America Merrill Lynch's (BofAML)
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) primary servicer
rating at 'CPS1', master servicer rating at 'CMS2+' and special
servicer rating at 'CSS2'.

BofAML's primary servicer rating is based on the bank's
experienced management and staff, its strong use of technology and
the continued refinement of its comprehensive quality assurance
program.  The master servicer rating reflects the bank's proven
ability to oversee third-party servicers and to accurately report
and remit to CMBS trustees.  The special servicer rating is based
on the bank's demonstrated ability to workout, manage and
liquidate nonperforming loans and real estate owned (REO)
properties in CMBS transactions.  Each of the ratings reflects the
financial condition of Bank of America Corporation and its
commitment to commercial mortgage servicing.

As of Sept. 30, 2011, BofAML's total commercial mortgage servicing
portfolio consisted of 10,050 loans with a principal balance of
$120 billion of which 4,490 loans totaling $80.4 billion were
CMBS.  As of the same date, the bank was named master servicer on
53 CMBS transactions, overseeing 11 primary servicers who serviced
1,142 loans totaling $10.237 billion.  Also as of Sept. 30, 2011,
BofAML was named special servicer on 14 large loan and single
asset CMBS transactions totaling $17.9 billion and was actively
special servicing 11 CMBS loans totaling $2.1 billion.


BSCMS 2007-PWR16: Moody's Affirm Rating of Cl. B Notes at 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 23
classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-PWR16:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.0% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 9.0%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
19.5% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
sluggish macroeconomic environment and performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
continuing to show signs of recovery through the first half of
2011, while recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are
tied to pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office
markets are showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing
activity. The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 32 compared to 25 at Moody's prior review. Herf
increased since the prior review due to the deleveraging of the
Beacon D.C. & Seattle Pool Loan.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 8% to $3.05 billion
from $3.31 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 250 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 40% of the pool.

Seventy-seven loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $23.5 million (63% loss severity). Currently
twenty-one loans, representing 18% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Beacon D.C.
& Seattle Pool Loan ($338.2 million -- 11.1% of the total pool)
which represents a pari-passu interest in a $1.9 billion
(originally $2.7 billion) first mortgage loan spread across five
other CMBS deals. After the releases of six individual properties
with applicable loan pay-downs, the loan currently is secured by
13 mortgaged (originally 17 mortgaged properties at
securitization) office properties, as well as an excess cash flow
pledge on one property (originally three cash flow pledged
properties at securitization), located in Seattle/Bellevue
Washington, northern Virginia, and Washington, D.C currently
totaling 7.3 million square feet (SF). Overall, the portfolio is
84% leased but regionally, the Seattle/Bellevue properties are 78%
leased while the Washington D.C. properties are 92% leased. This
loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to
imminent default. As a result, the loan was modified in December
2010 and is current. The loan modification includes a five-year
extension, a coupon reduction (if a minimum $900MM loan principal
pay-down is made by the target date of 5/7/12) along with an
unpaid interest accrual feature and a yield maintenance period
waiver to facilitate property sales. The borrower, Beacon Capital
Partners, is actively marketing other properties for sale and the
special servicer expects the loan to be transferred back to the
master servicer in the second quarter of 2012.

The remaining 20 specially serviced properties are secured by a
mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $149 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (28% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 39 poorly
performing loans representing 18% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $82.9 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 30%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 96%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 109% compared to 110% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 12% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.3%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.30X and 0.97X, respectively, compared to
1.32X and 0.96X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 18% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 32 Sixth Avenue Loan
($320.0 million -- 10.5%), which represents a 89% pari passu
interest in a $360.0 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by an office and telecommunications building totaling
1.1 million SF located in Lower Manhattan's Tribeca District.
The largest tenants are Qwest Communications Corporation (15%
of the Net Rentable Area (NRA); lease expiration August 2020)
and AMFM Operating, Inc. (11% of the NRA; lease expiration
September 2022). The property was 97% leased as of June 2011
compared to 99% at last review. The loan has six months remaining
on a 60-month interest-only period that will then amortize on a
360-month schedule maturing in April 2017. Performance slightly
declined since the last review due to occupancy loss and and
increase in real estate taxes. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
108% and 0.87X, respectively, compared to 103% and 0.92X at last
full review.

The second largest loan is The Mall at Prince Georges Loan
($150.0 million -- 4.9%), which is secured by a 920,801 SF
regional mall located in Hyattsville, Maryland. The mall is
anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney, and Target. As of March 2011,
the property was 96% leased, the same as at last review.
Property performance continues to decline due to a drop in
expense recoveries and percentage rents along with increases
in real estate taxes and repairs and maintenance expenses. The
loan is interest-only throughout its entire 10-year term maturing
in June 2017. Moody's has assumed a high default probability for
this loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 149% and 0.62X,
respectively, compared to 134% and 0.69X at last full review.

The third largest loan is the Kalahari Waterpark Resort Loan
($87.4 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 380-
room indoor water park resort hotel located in Wisconsin Dells,
Wisconsin. Property performance since the last review remains
stable but performance since securitization has declined as the
resort has been impacted by the downturn in the tourism industry.
The loan is amortizing on a 300-month schedule and matures in May
2017. The loan has paid down 2% since last review and 8% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.43X,
respectively, compared to 85% and 1.43X at last full review.


C-BASS CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes and revised the Outlook on
one class of notes issued by C-BASS CBO VI, Ltd. (C-BASS VI) as
follows:

  -- $3,391,350 class A notes affirmed at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $6,144,790 class B notes affirmed at 'Asf', Outlook revised
     to Stable from Negative;
  -- $5,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'BBBsf', Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $21,874,396 class D notes affirmed at 'CCsf';
  -- $3,000,000 class E notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.
Fitch also considered additional qualitative factors into its
analysis to conclude the rating actions for the rated notes.

Since Fitch's last rating action in November 2010, the credit
quality of the underlying collateral has declined further, with
approximately 38.9% of the portfolio downgraded a weighted average
of 5.2 notches and 1.1% upgraded a weighted average of 2.6
notches.  Currently, 74.8% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade and 52% has a rating in the 'CCC'
rating category or lower, compared to 61% and 44.5%, respectively,
at last review.  An Event of Default notice was received on April
13, 2011 because the net outstanding portfolio collateral balance
was less than the aggregate outstanding amount of the class A, B,
C and D notes.  To date, no notice of acceleration or liquidation
has occurred.

The affirmation of the notes is primarily driven by the
amortization of the capital structure since the last review. The
class A notes have received $8.2 million, or 70.7% of the prior
review balance, in pay downs.  With only 1.4% of its original
balance outstanding, the class A notes are likely to redeem within
the next four payment periods.  Pay downs to the notes are
primarily from principal amortization.  Additionally, since the
expiration of the interest rate swap in May 2011, the notes have
begun to benefit from excess spread.

Although the cash flow model passing rates for the class A and B
notes are higher than the class' current ratings, this is offset
by the significant deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since the last review.

Fitch maintains its Stable Outlook on the class A notes and
revises its Outlook to Stable from Negative for the class B notes.
The Stable Outlooks on these two classes is primarily driven by
the significant cushion in the modeling results available to
mitigate potential further deterioration in the portfolio as well
as the continued pay downs to the structure.

Breakeven levels for the class D and E notes were below SF PCM's
'CCC' default level, the lowest level of defaults projected by SF
PCM.  The class D notes began to receive their full interest
distribution upon expiration of the swap in May 2011; however, the
notes still have roughly $259,730 of deferred interest still
outstanding.  Excess spread will likely not be sufficient enough
to pay back class D deferred interest and default in the full
principal prepayment of the notes is still probable.  The class E
notes are currently not receiving any interest distributions and
are not expected to receive interest distributions in the future.
Default remains inevitable for the class E notes.

C-BASS VI is cash structured finance (SF) collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) that closed on April 15, 2003 and is monitored by
NIC Management LLC.  As of the Sept. 30, 2011 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of 86.9% residential mortgage backed
securities (RMBS), 10.9% Structured Finance CDOs (SF CDOs) and
2.3% commercial asset backed securities (ABS), from the 2004 and
earlier vintage transactions.




CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Ups Rating on Class E Notes From 'B+' to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class B, C, D, and E notes from Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund
III Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management. "At the same
time, we removed our ratings on the class D and E notes from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications on
Sept. 2, 2011. We also affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2,
A-3, and A-4 notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect a $98.6 million paydown to the class
A notes and the improved performance we have observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since we last upgraded the
notes on Jan. 12, 2011. As of the Oct. 6, 2011, trustee report,
the transaction had only $2.17 million in defaulted assets.
Additionally, the class A notes paid down to $77.7 million from
$176.3 million during the same period. Today's affirmations
reflect the credit support available to the notes at the current
rating levels," S&P related.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the Oct. 6, 2011, monthly
report:

    The B O/C ratio was 167.72%, compared with a reported ratio of
    127.6% in November 2010;

    The C O/C ratio was 127.20%, compared with a reported ratio of
    116.71% in November 2010;

    The D O/C ratio was 111.82%, compared with a reported ratio of
    109.49% in November 2010; and

    The E O/C ratio was 103.38%, compared with a reported ratio of
    106.2% in November 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund III Ltd.
                     Rating
Class             To          From
B                 AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C                 AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D                 A- (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
E                 BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund III Ltd.
Class        Rating
A-1          AAA (sf)
A-2          AAA (sf)
A-3          AAA (sf)
A-4          AAA (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:               Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund III Ltd.
Coissuer:             Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund III Inc.
Collateral manager:   GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management
Trustee:              The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:     Cash flow CLO


CAPITAL GUARDIAN: S&P Keeps 'D' Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-1A, A-1B, and A-1C notes from Capital Guardian ABS CDO I
Ltd., a mezzanine structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) backed in part by residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) and managed by Capital Guardian Trust Co. "In
addition, we removed our ratings on these classes from CreditWatch
with negative implications," S&P related.

"The downgrades reflect credit deterioration in the transaction's
underlying asset portfolio since we lowered the ratings on each of
the notes on Jan. 25, 2010," S&P said.

"According to the Sept. 27, 2011 trustee report, the transaction
had $22.40 million in underlying assets rated 'CCC+' or lower.
This was an increase from the $14.25 million reported in the Dec.
24, 2009, trustee report, which we used for our January 2010
rating actions," S&P related.

As of September 2011, the transaction had paid the class A-1A, A-
1B, and A-1C note balance down to a total balance of $20.45
million from $37.33 million as of December 2009. Despite the
reduced note balance, the coverage test ratios dropped during the
same time period. The trustee reported the following
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios in the Sept. 27, 2011, monthly
report:

    The class A/B O/C ratio test was 69.62%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 73.14% in December 2009; and

    The class C O/C ratio test was 59.24%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 63.84% in December 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

Capital Guardian ABS CDO I Ltd.
             Rating
Class    To           From
A-1A     BBB (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B     BBB (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1C     BBB (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Neg

Other Ratings Outstanding

Capital Guardian ABS CDO I Ltd.

Class                 Rating
B                     D (sf)
C                     D (sf)
Preferred shares      D (sf)


CEDARWOODS CRE CDO: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. A-1 Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings of six classes and affirmed the
ratings of two classes of Notes issued by Cedarwoods CRE CDO, Ltd.
due to deterioration in the underlying collateral as evidenced by
an increase in Moody's weighted average rating factor (WARF),
decrease in Moody's weighted average recovery rate (WARR) and
deteriorization of Principal Coverage Tests since Moody's last
rating action. The affirmations are due to key transaction
parameters performing within levels commensurate with the existing
ratings levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation and re-remic (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

Moody's rating actions are:

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Cedarwoods CRE CDO, Ltd. is a static (the reinvestment period
ended in July 2011) CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (71.0% of the pool
balance), CRE CDOs (23.1%), real estate investment trust (REIT)
debt (5.9%) and one rake bond which is less than 0.1% of the pool.
As of the October 19, 2011 Trustee report, the aggregate Note
balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, has
decreased to $380.3 million from $400 million at issuance, with
the paydown directed to the Class A-1 Notes, as a result of
amortization of the collateral and the failing of the mezzanine
and junior Principal Coverage Tests.

There are three assets with a par balance of $9.1 million (2.1% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
as of the October 19, 2011 Trustee report. There are also nine
assets with a par balance $38.3 million (8.7% of the current pool
balance) that are considered Deferred Interest PIK securities.
Moody's expects significant losses to occur from the Defaulted
Securities and Deferred Interest PIK securities once they are
realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 3,848 compared to 3,541 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(1.4% compared to 3.5% at last review), A1-A3 (8.5% compared to
10.8% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (15.4% compared to 25.3% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (11.6% compared to 15.3% at last review), B1-B3
(21.2% compared to 12.1% at last review), and Caa1-C (41.8%
compared to 33.0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.6 years compared
to 8.0 years as at last review. Moody's prior WAL considered the
remaining revolving period.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
13.9% compared to 17.1% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.9% compared to 10.4% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
13.9% to 3.9% or up to 23.9% would result in average rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward and 0 to
1 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and performance
in the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
continuing to show signs of recovery through the first half of
2011, while recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are
tied to pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office
markets are showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing
activity. The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


CHESAPEAKE FUDING: Moody's Raises Rating of Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the subordinated
classes of Chesapeake Funding LLC Series 2009-4 floating rate
asset backed notes (Series 2009-4 or the notes). The notes were
issued by Chesapeake Funding LLC (the Issuer), a bankruptcy-remote
special purpose entity wholly owned by PHH Corporation (PHH, Ba2,
stable), a fleet lease and management company. The servicer is PHH
Vehicle Management Services LLC, also a subsidiary of PHH.

Issuer: Chesapeake Funding LLC, Series 2009-4

Class B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Class C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATING RATIONALE

The Issuer is structured as a master trust. Series 2009-4 has been
in amortization since March 2010 although the master trust is
still revolving. Series 2009-4 was issued with three classes which
are paid sequentially, supported by over-collateralization and a
reserve account. The over-collateralization has stepped down to a
floor and is now locked out. In addition, the reserve account is
non-declining. With approximately 20 months of amortization, the
transaction has had significant buildup in credit enhancement.
Specifically, total credit enhancement to Class B and Class C is
about 22% and 13% of the allocated aggregate pool balance for this
series, respectively, up from 9.22% and 6.15%, respectively, at
closing.

The collateral performance of the master trust has been good and
within Moody's expectations with three month average delinquencies
at 0.75% and 12-month average charge off ratio of 0.06%.

During the review period, Moody's has fine-tuned its analysis of
how the increased credit enhancement benefits these classes, with
attention to modeling, structural features, potential loss
severity in light of seniority and current obligor pool
concentrations.

The notes are ultimately backed by a special unit of beneficial
interest in a pool of largely open-end leases and the related
vehicles. The leases were originated by a subsidiary of PHH, which
provides fleet leasing and fleet management services primarily to
corporate clients throughout the United States.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

As the majority of the underlying collateral consists of a
pool of open-end leases (i.e. leases where the lessees are
responsible for any residual value losses), the potential
credit loss of this transaction is primarily driven by the
default likelihood of the lessees, the recovery rate when
a lessee defaults, and the diversity of the pool of lessees. An
approach similar to that used in CDO transactions is used. The CDO
approach hinges on the idea of using a 'hypothetical pool' to map
the credit and loss characteristics of an actual pool and then
employing a mathematical technique called binomial expansion to
determine the expected loss of the bond to be rated. Using the
binomial expansion technique, the probability of default of each
possible scenario is calculated based on a mathematical formula,
and the cashflow profile for each scenario is determined based on
an assumed recovery rate. Then each cashflow scenario is fed into
a liability model to determine the actual loss on the bond under
each scenario, and the probability weighted loss or expected loss
of the bond is determined. The expected loss of the bond is then
compared with Moody's Idealized Cumulative Expected Loss Rates
Table to determine a rating for the bond.

The hypothetical pool is characterized by a diversity score. The
diversity score measures the diversity of the actual pool by
mathematically converting the obligor concentrations of the actual
pool into the number of equally-sized uncorrelated obligors which
would represent the same credit risk as the actual pool. This
process is summarized as follows. Each lessee is assigned its
applicable industry category. Lessees in the same industry are
assumed to be correlated with each other, while lessees in
different industries are assumed to be independent. The number
of lessees in the same industry is reduced to reflect the
correlation among them. For example, when calculating the
diversity score, six equal-sized lessees in the same industry are
counted as three independent obligors, while six equal-sized
lessees in six different industries are counted as six independent
obligors. The size of the lessees is also accounted for by
reducing the number of lessees with below average lessee size. In
general, the higher the diversity score, the lower the collateral
loss volatility will be and consequently, the lower the expected
loss of a security, other factors being the same.

Each possible default scenario is determined by both the diversity
score and the average probability of default of the pool. The
weighted average probability of default of the pool is determined
by the probability of default of each lessee or obligor, which is
estimated using the actual lessees' credit ratings, if rated. For
non-rated lessees, the average rating is assumed to be lower than
that of the rated lessees. For example, if the average rating for
the rated lessees is Baa3, Moody's assumes a rating of Ba3 or
lower as the average rating for the non-rated lessees. The
estimated weighted average rating for the entire hypothetical
pool is then used to estimate the probability of each default
scenario.

The actual net loss on the bonds under each default scenario is
determined taking into consideration of recoveries in case of
default. When a lessee defaults, recoveries are obtained as the
related leased vehicles are reprocessed and sold to repay the
defaulted lease obligation. Moody's conducts detailed recovery
analyses based on the types of vehicles leased and various default
scenarios for lessees. Based on those recovery analyses, Moody's
determines the ratings after considering the breakeven recovery
rates for the different classes of notes at their associated
credit enhancement levels.


CIT RV TRUST: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'Caa1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded two tranches from two
transactions backed by recreational vehicle (RV) and marine
installment sales contracts serviced by Vericrest Financial, Inc.
(Vericrest). Vericrest Financial, Inc., formerly known as CIT
Group/Sales Financing, Inc., was acquired by Lone Star Funds in
2009.

RATINGS

Issuer: CIT RV Trust 1998-A

Class B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CIT Marine Trust 1999-A

Certificates, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

For CIT RV 1998-A transaction, the action is the result of updated
expected recovery of principal on the affected security. Moody's
expects that Class B from CIT RV Trust 1998-A is likely to lose
approximately 10% of the outstanding balance. Losses on the
underlying pool have depleted the reserve account and the
transaction is currently under-collateralized by $6,060,865, which
is equal to almost the entire amount of the certificates, which
provide protection to Class B.

For CIT Marine Trust 1999-A transaction, the action was prompted
by higher pool lifetime cumulative net losses.

Unlike other vehicle-backed ABS, the impact of the weakened
economy on a RV and marine transaction has been more severe and
long lasting due to the non-essential nature of the underlying
collateral, and the longer financing terms, which on average range
between 170 and 185 months. As a result, the transaction has
experienced more than one economic downturn during its life.

Below are key performance metrics and credit assumptions for each
affected transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected
lifetime CNL expectation which is expressed as a percentage of the
original pool balance; and Moody's lifetime remaining CNL
expectation which is expressed as a percentage of the current pool
balance. Performance metrics include pool factor; total credit
enhancement (expressed as a percentage of the outstanding
collateral pool balance) which typically consists of
subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve fund; and per
annum excess spread.

Issuer: CIT RV Trust 1998-A

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 8.75%, prior expectation (February
2011) was 8.75%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 9.2%

Pool factor -- Approximately 1.3%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class B --
Approximately 1%

Issuer: CIT Marine Trust 1999-A

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 6.80%, prior expectation (February
2011) was 6.70%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 16.31%

Pool factor -- Approximately 1.4%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class B --
Approximately 12%

Ratings on the affected securities may be downgraded if the
lifetime CNLs are higher by 10%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions.

The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on
an assessment of a range of factors including, but not
exclusively, the performance metrics. Primary sources of
assumption uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment,
in which unemployment continues to rise, and weakness in the RV
and marine market. Overall, Moody's expects overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to
trend growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent
unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in these notes was " Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan Backed Securities (2011)" rating
methodology published in May 2011.


COLTS 2005-2: Moody's Raises Cl. D Notes Rating to Baa3 From Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Colts 2005-2 Ltd.:

US$16,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due
2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$34,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due
2018, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due
2018, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of delevering of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in September 2009. Moody's notes that the Class
A Notes have been paid down by approximately 90% or $228.4 million
since the rating action in September 2009. As a result of the
delevering, the Class D overcollateralization ratio has increased
to 127.65% based on the latest trustee report dated September 2,
2011, compared to the June 2009 level of 112.65%.

The actions also reflect the application of Moody's revised CLO
assumptions described in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. The
primary changes to the modeling assumptions include (1) a removal
of the temporary 30% default probability macro stress implemented
in February 2009 as well as (2) increased BET liability stress
factors and increased recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $113.7 million,
defaulted par of $42 million, a weighted average default
probability of 28.21% (implying a WARF of 5635), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.34%, and a diversity
score of 18. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Colts 2005-2 Ltd., issued in January 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans of middle market loan issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011. In addition, due to the low
diversity of the collateral pool, CDOROM 2.8 was used to simulate
a default distribution that was then applied as an input in the
cash flow model.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability stresses. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool).

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates. Moody's also conducted stress tests to assess
the collateral pool's concentration risk in obligors bearing a
credit estimate that constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.


COLTS 2007-1: Moody's Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by CoLTS 2007-1:

US$22,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2021 Notes, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf), Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$40,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2021 Notes,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf), Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$21,215,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf),
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$22,250,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf),
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2021 (current rated balance of
$7,255,656), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1
(sf), Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $275 million,
defaulted par of $31.2 million, a weighted average default
probability of 24.43% (implying a WARF of 3587), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.13%, and a diversity
score of 40. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

CoLTS 2007-1 Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans from middle market issuers.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011 and
"Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes"
published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is the extent of delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds
when the deal ends its reinvestment period in March 2012.
Delevering may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the
loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3. Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity
score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered
spread and diversity levels higher than the covenant levels due to
the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.

4. Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates. Moody's also conducted stress tests to assess
the collateral pool's concentration risk in obligors bearing a
credit estimate that constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.


CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Lowers Rating of $25-Mil. Notes to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded and left on review for
possible downgrade the following certificates issued by Corporate
Backed Trust Certificates, Sprint Capital Note-Backed Series 2003-
17:

US$25,000,000 Class A-1 Certificates due 11/15/2028, Downgraded to
B3 and Remains On Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on
October 18, 2011 Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of $25,455,000 6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint
Capital Corporation which was downgraded to B3 and remains on
review for possible downgrade by Moody's on November 4, 2011.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
"Concurrently, we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on three other
classes from the same transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction,
the deal structure, and the liquidity available to the trust
primarily using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria. The
downgrades reflect credit support erosion that we anticipate will
occur upon the eventual resolution of 25 ($365.4 million, 14.7%)
of the 27 assets ($431.4 million, 17.4%) that are currently with
the special servicer, as well as two loans that we determined to
be credit-impaired ($9.7 million, 0.4%). We also considered the
monthly interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust and the
potential for additional interest shortfalls associated with
revised appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) on the specially
serviced assets. We lowered our rating on the class E, F, and G
certificates to 'D (sf)' because we believe the accumulated
interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future," S&P said.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class A-X interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria," S&P said.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of the remaining assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.23x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
135.5%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.73x and
an LTV ratio of 187.6%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 91.6% and 49.9%, respectively. The
DSC and LTV calculations exclude 25 ($365.4 million, 14.7%) of
the 27 ($431.4 million, 17.4%) specially serviced assets and two
($9.7 million, 0.4%) loans that we determined to be credit-
impaired. We separately estimated losses for these assets and
included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures," S&P related.

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the trust
had experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $526,213.
The repayment of accumulated interest shortfalls to class D of
$178,486 and ASER recoveries of $404,457 offset the total interest
shortfalls during this period. The total interest shortfall amount
primarily reflects an aggregate ASER amount of $548,342, interest
rate reductions due to loan modifications of $207,050, and special
servicing and workout fees of $171,437. "The interest shortfalls
affected all classes subordinate to and including class E. The
class E, F, and G certificates experienced cumulative interest
shortfalls for seven or more consecutive months, and we expect
these interest shortfalls to continue in the near term.
Consequently, we lowered our ratings on the class E, F, and G
certificates to 'D (sf)'," S&P stated.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, 25 assets
($424.7 million, 17.1%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc. (LNR). The reported payment status
of the specially serviced assets as of the most recent trustee
remittance report is: five are real estate owned (REO;
$137.0 million, 5.5%), nine are in foreclosure ($77.4 million,
3.1%), five are 90-plus-days delinquent ($70.6 million, 2.8%),
one is 60-plus-days delinquent ($1.5 million, 0.1%), and five
are in their grace periods ($138.3 million, 5.6%). Two loans
were transferred to LNR after the Oct. 17, 2011, trustee
remittance report ($6.7 million, 0.3%). Appraisal reduction
amounts (ARAs) totalling $117.1 million are in effect for 17
of the specially serviced assets. Details of the two largest
specially serviced assets, both of which are top 10 assets, are:

The Koger Center Office Park loans ($77.0 million, 3.1%) is the
fifth-largest asset in the pool and the largest asset with the
special servicer. The loans are secured by 15 class A and class
B office buildings with a total of 676,490 net rentable sq. ft.
located in St. Petersburg, Fla. The office park is located in
the Gateway/Mid-Pinellas submarket and is eight miles north of
downtown St. Petersburg and 16 miles southwest of downtown Tampa.
The properties were built between 1971 and 2000. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on June 1, 2009, due to
imminent default. LNR indicated that the original loan was
modified on Dec. 23, 2010. The modification terms include, but
are not limited to, the lender reducing the principal balance
to $80.0 million from $83.0 million and bifurcating the trust's
$80.0 million note into a $40.0 million senior A note and a
$40.0 million subordinate note, establishing a general reserve,
and deferring debt service payments on the B note. Subsequent to
the loan modification, the A note was paid down by $3.0 million to
its current principal balance of $37.0 million. Both the A note
and the B note are with the special servicer. The loan payment is
in its grace period. As of year-end 2010, the reported DSC and
occupancy were 0.72x and 66.0%. Standard & Poor's expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The 520 Broadway loan ($51.0 million, 2.1%) is the eighth-largest
asset in the pool and the second-largest specially serviced asset.
The loan is secured by a six-story, 111,583-sq.-ft. mid-rise
office building in Santa Monica, Calif. The asset was transferred
to the special servicer on Jan. 1, 2010, due to imminent default
and became REO on Feb. 22, 2011. LNR indicated that the asset
is currently being stabilized. As of year-end 2009, the reported
DSC and occupancy were 1.02x and 87.0%. There is an $18.4 million
ARA in effect against the asset. Standard & Poor's expects a
moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The 24 remaining assets with the special servicer have individual
balances that represent less than 1.7% of the pooled trust
balance. ARAs totaling $98.7 million are in effect against 16 of
these assets. "We estimated losses for 22 of these assets,
arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 50.7%. According
to the special servicer, one of the remaining assets is in its
grace period and the other is in the process of being returned to
the master servicer," S&P said.

Two loans were transferred subsequent to the Oct. 17, 2011,
trustee remittance report. The Centerpoint Business Park
($4.6 million, 0.2%) was transferred to the special servicer
due to payment default. The loan payment status was reported
as 60-plus-days delinquent. The Centerpoint Business Park loan
is secured by a 27,660-sq.-ft. suburban office building in
Lancaster, Calif. As of year-end 2010, the reported DSC and
occupancy were 0.32x and 100%, respectively. The Pine Grove
Marketplace ($2.1 million, 0.1%) was transferred to the special
servicer due to payment default. The loan payment status was
reported as 60-plus-days delinquent. The Pine Grove Marketplace
is secured by a 11,191-sq.-ft. retail center in Cottage Grove,
Minn. As of year-end 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were
1.06x and 90.0%.

"In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined
two loans to be credit impaired. The Executive Hills loan
($6.0 million, 0.2%) is secured by three office buildings in
Overland Park, Kan., and totaling 77,807 sq. ft. As of year-end
2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were 0.08x and 56.0%. The
Lincoln Plaza Pad ($3.7 million, 0.2%) is secured by a 10,108-sq.-
ft. retail pad site located in Phoenix. The master servicer
indicated that the sole tenant filed bankruptcy in January 2009
and vacated the premises, and that the space has been dark since
then. Given both properties' historical poor performance and low
reported DSC, we viewed these two loans to be at an increased risk
of default and loss," S&P said.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 remittance report, the collateral pool
had an aggregate trust balance of $2.48 billion, down from
$2.69 billion at issuance. The pool comprises 213 loans and five
REO assets, down from 238 loans at issuance. The master servicers,
KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets Inc. and Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., provided financial information for 89.4% of the loans in
the pool, the majority of which reflected full-year 2010 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.20x for the loans
in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted
DSC and LTV were 1.23x and 135.5%. Our adjusted figures exclude
25 ($365.4 million, 14.7%) of the 27 ($431.4 million, 17.4%)
specially serviced assets and two ($9.7 million, 0.4%) that we
determined to be credit-impaired. Recent financial reporting
information was available for 15 of the excluded specially
serviced and credit-impaired assets, which reflected a weighted
average DSC of 0.80x. We separately estimated losses for these
assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss severity figures. The transaction has experienced
$100.6 million in principal losses from 20 assets. Seventy loans
($829.7 million, 33.4%) in the pool are on the master servicers'
combined watchlist, including three of the top 10 assets. Sixty-
four loans ($780.4 million, 31.5%) have a reported DSC of less
than 1.10x, 51 of which ($262.6 million, 10.6%) have a reported
DSC of less than 1.00x," S&P said.

                    Summary of Top 10 Assets

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$817.0 million (32.9%). "Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.05x for nine of the
top 10 assets with reported information. Two of the top 10
assets ($128.0 million, 5.2%) are with the special servicer
and three other loans ($360.3 million, 14.5%) are on the master
servicers' combined watchlist, which we discuss below. Our
adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 assets are 1.04x and 172.4%.
Our adjusted figures exclude the aforementioned specially serviced
top 10 assets," S&P related. Details on the three largest top 10
assets on the master servicers' combined watchlist are set forth.

The Main Plaza loan ($160.7 million, 6.5%) is the largest asset in
the pool and on the watchlist. The loan is secured by two 12-story
class A office buildings in Irvine, Calif. The buildings were
built in 1988 and comprise 547,333 sq. ft. of office space and
35,538 sq. ft. of retail space. The loan appears on the master
servicers' combined watchlist because of a low reported DSC. The
loan payment status was reported as current as of the Oct. 17,
2011 trustee remittance report. For the six months ended June 30,
2011, the reported DSC and occupancy were 0.56x and 73.0%.

The Mandarin Oriental loan ($135.0 million, 5.4%) is the
second-largest asset in the pool and on the watchlist. The
loan is secured by a 248-room full-service hotel in the Time
Warner mixed-use complex at Columbus Circle in New York City.
The property, which opened in January 2004, contains 9,710
sq. ft. of meeting space, an award-winning restaurant (Asiate),
a modern bar (MOBar), a lobby lounge, a nationally recognized
17,000-sq.-ft. spa and fitness center, and an indoor swimming
pool, among other amenities. The loan is on the master servicers'
combined watchlist because of a low reported DSC. The loan payment
status was reported as current as of the Oct. 17, 2011, trustee
remittance report. For year-end 2010, the reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.01x and 72.0%.

The Marina Shores Apartments loan ($64.6 million, 2.6%) is
the sixth-largest asset in the pool and the third-largest
asset on the watchlist. The loan is secured by a 392-unit
garden-style multifamily complex in Virginia Beach, Va. The
property was built in 1991, renovated in 2006, and comprises
of 13 three-story buildings. The loan is on the master servicers'
combined watchlist because of a low reported DSC. The loan payment
status was reported as current as of the Oct. 17, 2011, trustee
remittance report. For the six months ended June 30, 2011, the
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.07x and 97.0%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the pool collateral according to its
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent
with our lowered and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Rating
Class     To             From        Credit enhancement (%)
A-AB      BBB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                    28.39
A-4       BBB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                    28.39
A-1-A1    BBB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                    28.39
A-1-A2    BBB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                    28.39
A-M       BB- (sf)       BB+ (sf)                     17.58
A-J       CCC+ (sf)      B+ (sf)                       9.47
B         CCC (sf)       B+ (sf)                       8.79
C         CCC- (sf)      B+ (sf)                       7.17
D         CCC- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)                     6.09
E         D (sf)         CCC (sf)                      5.27
F         D (sf)         CCC- (sf)                     4.33
G         D (sf)         CCC- (sf)                     3.11

Ratings Affirmed

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
A-2       AAA (sf)                   28.39
A-3       AAA (sf)                   28.39
A-X       AAA (sf)                     N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


CRF-18 LLC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes From 'B' to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on CRF-18
LLC's class D and E notes to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)'and to 'CCC-
(sf)' from 'B (sf)'. "We raised our rating on CRF-17 LLC's class C
notes to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)'. At the same time, we affirmed
our 'AAA (sf)', 'A (sf)', and 'BBB (sf)' ratings on CRF-18's class
A-3, B, and C notes," S&P related.

CRF-17 and CRF-18 are both asset-backed securitizations backed
primarily by a pool of small business development loans not
insured or guaranteed by any governmental agency. These loans are
generally secured by owner-occupied, multipurpose commercial real
estate. Approximately 60-65% of these loans are second lien loans.
The credit support for each rated note class is provided by a
combination of subordination, an interest reserve account in the
amount of three-months interest on the offered notes (reduced as
the offered note principal is paid), and excess spread.

The downgrades on CRF 18's class D and E notes reflect the rising
delinquencies and increasing cumulative net losses in the
underlying small business loan portfolio. Between April 2010 and
September 2011, total delinquencies (as a percentage of the then-
current pool balance) increased to 18.31 % from 12.16%; 90-plus-
day delinquencies (as a percentage of the then-current pool
balance) increased to 12.16% from 7.38%; and cumulative net losses
(as a percentage of the original pool balance) increased to 1.71%
from 1.29%. "As a result of the loan pool's deteriorating
performance, the class D and E notes were not able to withstand
the stresses commensurate with their prior rating levels.
Consequently, we lowered our ratings on the two classes
to levels commensurate with the stresses they could withstand,"
S&P related.

"The upgrade on CRF-17's class C notes reflects that the notes
were able to withstand our stress tests at a higher rating level
due to the combined benefit of relatively stable loan performance
and the natural amortization of the loan pool," S&P said.

"The affirmations on CRF-18's class A-3, B, and C notes reflect
that the notes were still able to withstand our stress tests at
their current rating levels," S&P said.

As of Sept. 1, 2011, CRF-17's loan pool had a pool factor of
32.31%, and its class C notes had a pool factor of approximately
15.0%. CRF-18's loan pool had a pool factor of 41.65%, and its
class A-3, B, C, D, E, and F notes had pool factors of 35.31%,
99.90%, 99.90%, 99.90%, 99.90%, and 100%.

As of Oct. 24, 2011, no cumulative loss rate events were triggered
for CRF-17's class C notes or CRF-18's class B through E notes
because the cumulative loss rates for each transaction did not
exceed the related classes' thresholds, as set in the transaction
documents for the related payment periods. As a result, according
to the transaction documents, no interest was deferred for these
classes. However, CRF-18's cumulative loss rate is closer to the
classes' thresholds while CRF-17's cumulative loss rate is much
lower than the classes' thresholds.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review any outstanding ratings
from these transactions and take additional rating actions as
appropriate.

Ratings Lowered

CRF-18 LLC
                       Rating
Class         To                  From
D             B+ (sf)             BB (sf)
E             CCC (sf)            B (sf)

Rating Raised
CRF-17 LLC
                       Rating
Class         To                  From
C             BBB+ (sf)           BB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed
CRF-18 LLC

Class         Rating
A-3           AAA (sf)
B             A (sf)
C             BBB (sf)


CT CDO: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on 15 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes issued by CT CDO IV Ltd.
(CT CDO IV).  The rating actions are a result of paydowns to the
senior notes offsetting the negative credit migration of the
portfolio.

Since the last review in December 2010, approximately 25.6% of the
collateral has been downgraded.  Currently, 70.3% of the portfolio
has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 46.4% has a
rating in the 'CCC' category and below, compared to 61.7% and
34.3%, respectively, at the last review.  Additionally, the class
A-1 notes have received $55.6 million in paydowns since the last
review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near term
maturities.  Based on this analysis, the class A-1 notes'
breakeven rates in Fitch's cash flow model are generally
consistent with the ratings assigned below.

For the class C through M notes, Fitch analyzed the class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below).  Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the classes E through M notes have been affirmed at 'Csf',
indicating that default is inevitable. The class E through M
notes are currently deferring their entire interest payments.

The transaction entered an Event of Default on Nov. 29, 2010, due
to non-payment of the full and timely accrued interest on the
class A-2 and B notes.  The class A-2 and B notes are non-
deferrable classes.  Currently, the class A-1 notes are receiving
interest through the use of principal proceeds while the class A-2
and B notes continue to be in default on their entire interest
payments.  Noteholders had not given direction to accelerate the
notes or liquidate the portfolio at the time of this review.

CT CDO IV is backed by 39 tranches from 30 obligors, the majority
of which is commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS, 59.3%).
The remainder of the pool consists of commercial real estate (CRE)
loans (24.5%), and structured finance CDOs (16.2%).  The
transaction is considered a CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also
referred to as first loss CRE CDO) as it primarily includes junior
bonds of CMBS transactions. The transaction closed in March 2006.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $158,492,868 class A-1 notes at 'CCCsf';
  -- $17,691,336 class A-2 notes at 'Dsf';
  -- $17,711,304 class B notes at 'Dsf';
  -- $12,408,966 class C notes at 'Csf';
  -- $5,684,108 class D-FL notes at 'Csf';
  -- $3,631,090 class D-FX notes at 'Csf';
  -- $4,905,782 class E notes at 'Csf';
  -- $2,234,871 class F-FL notes at 'Csf';
  -- $3,680,088 class F-FX notes at 'Csf';
  -- $7,402,648 class G notes at 'Csf';
  -- $3,866,950 class H notes at 'Csf';
  -- $2,440,512 class J notes at 'Csf';
  -- $5,369,286 class K notes at 'Csf';
  -- $4,899,424 class L notes at 'Csf';
  -- $3,429,115 class M notes at 'Csf'.


DETROIT DOWNTOWN: Fitch Lowers Rating on Tax Bonds to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken action on bonds issued by the Detroit
Downtown Development Authority, MI (DDA or district):

  -- Tax increment refunding bonds (Development Area No. 1
     projects), series 1998A affirmed at 'BBB-';

  -- Tax increment bonds (Development Area No. 1 projects), series
     1998B (taxable) affirmed at 'BBB-';

  -- Tax increment bonds (Development Area No. 1 projects), series
     1998C (junior lien) downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.

The Rating Outlook on all bonds remains Negative.

Bonds are secured by a pledge of all tax increment revenues
captured by Development Area No. 1.

WEAKENING COVERAGE CAUSES DOWNGRADE: Although the bulk of the
district's debt has a senior lien on tax increment revenue, Fitch
believes the difference in coverage between the senior and
subordinate liens now merits a rating distinction.  Fitch expects
very narrow coverage for subordinate lien bonds but at least
somewhat better protection for senior lien bondholders.

DECLINING PLEDGED REVENUE TREND: Pledged tax increment revenue has
dropped in each of the last three fiscal years, reducing all-in
debt service coverage to an estimated 1.20 times (x) in fiscal
2012 from 1.48x in fiscal 2009, with senior lien coverage dropping
to 1.33x from 1.64x.  Fitch projects that coverage will decrease
to close to the range of 1.05x-1.15x all in and 1.15x-1.25x for
the senior lien.

UNCERTAINTY OF APPEAL SETTLEMENT: An appeal related to the
district's largest taxpayer -- General Motors Co. (GM) -- has
recently been settled. The settlement involves both a reduction of
the property's value and a refund of taxes previously paid.  The
timing of the refund by the DDA and the impact of the reduction on
future pledged tax increment revenue is unclear.

HIGH TAXPAYER CONCENTRATION: The largest taxpayer represents 22%
of taxable value (TV) prior to the appeal settlement, and the top
10, representing 51%, are largely related to the automobile
industry.

IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL HUB: The district encompasses the core of
downtown Detroit, including many key commercial assets.

IMPROVED AUTO MANUFACTURING PROSPECTS: The health of the U.S.
automobile industry is improving, as evidenced by Fitch's recent
upgrades of the Issuer Default Ratings of both GM and Ford Motor
Co. (Ford).

NEGATIVE AFFECT OF APPEAL: A reduction in tax increment revenue
beyond the moderate level Fitch estimates would result in a lower
rating.

OVERALL TAX BASE EROSION: After incorporating the impact of the GM
appeal settlement, Fitch expects flat to slowly declining TV going
forward.  More than a modest annual decline would be cause for
concern.

ACCELERATED ECONIMIC WEAKENING: Fitch expects the economy to
remain very weak despite some improvement of the outlook for auto
manufacturing.  If economic indicators that affect the district's
tax base decline notably from already poor levels, a rating
downgrade may result.

The DDA was formed in 1976 to promote economic development in
downtown Detroit. Development Area No. 1 is comprised of 615
acres, roughly coterminous with the downtown business district and
represents about 7% of the city's TV. In addition to the GM-owned
Renaissance Center, the district includes one of the city's three
casinos, stadiums for the Detroit Lions and Detroit Tigers, and
development along the city's waterfront. The captured value
(incremental TV above the base) is moderate at 250% of total TV.

Estimated Impact of GM Appeal Settlement on Pledged Revenue:

The recent settlement of an appeal by GM, whose headquarters at
the Renaissance Center is the largest contributor to TV, will
resolve some uncertainty about the direction of the tax base and
pledged revenue.  The settlement reduces GM's tax payments over
the past three years and the TV from which future tax payments are
derived.  The 2011 tax year payments, the last to be adjusted,
declined 23% from the pre-appeal level.  Prior year adjustments
were more moderate.  The timing of the resulting refund by the
district and the impact on future tax increment are uncertain.

Fitch estimates that the settlement will reduce fiscal 2013
pledged revenue by at least $1.6 million, assuming the entire
refund is repaid in that year and that the ongoing reduction in TV
is at least 5%.  The latter figure assumes that the reduction in
TV is proportionate to the property's contribution to the tax
base, which is 22%.  However, this figure is likely understated
because the downward adjustment would apply only to the portion of
the TV above the base value.  Fitch is unable to determine the
portion of the property's TV that is part of the captured value.

Tax Base Concentration Within a Weak Economic Environment:

The rating also reflects the project area's high tax base
concentration, with the 10 largest taxpayers making up 51% of
captured value. In addition to GM at 22%, several taxpayers are
office buildings that rely for occupancy to some extent on the
auto industry.  Prospects for the industry have improved. Fitch
has recently upgraded both GM (to 'BB', Outlook Positive from
'BB-', Outlook Stable) and Ford (to 'BB+', Outlook Positive from
'BB-', Outlook Stable through two rating actions over the last
year).

Despite this improvement, the city's economic indicators continue
to be exceptionally weak, including an unemployment rate of 22.5%
in August 2011, down from 23% in August 2010.  Both the labor
force and employment declined, although the number of jobs in the
metropolitan area increased slightly.  City income and poverty
figures are quite weak.  The 2010 census showed a surprisingly
large drop in population to 713,777, a 25% decline from the 2000
census.

Declining Debt Service Coverage:

As Fitch had expected, coverage from pledged revenue has been
declining.  Coverage of maximum annual debt service is expected to
drop to 1.20x for combined senior and subordinate debt in fiscal
2012 from 1.48x in fiscal 2009.  Fiscal 2012 coverage of senior
lien bonds alone is expected to be slightly stronger at 1.33x.

Given the decline and the uncertain impact of the GM appeal
settlement, Fitch is concerned about the future direction of
pledged revenue. Fitch's estimate of fiscal 2013 coverage is just
1.04x (assuming full repayment of GM's refund) and 1.14x in fiscal
2014 assuming no other captured value or tax increment revenue
changes.  The bonds' standard debt service reserve accounts are
cash-funded, providing some protection on a shorter-term basis.
Subordinate bonds mature in fiscal 2018, leaving somewhat improved
coverage thereafter until senior lien bonds mature in fiscal 2028.


EDUCATIONAL LOANS: Moody's Cuts Ratings Six Note Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 25 notes from five
student loan-backed transactions issued by Education Loans
Incorporated (EdLinc). The underlying collateral of the 1998-1 and
2005-1 transactions consists of government guaranteed (FFELP)
loans. The collateral underlying the 1999, 2004-1 and 2004 C&D
transactions includes both FFELP and private student loans.
Student Loan Finance Corporation (SLFC) is the administrator and
servicer of the transactions. The rating actions conclude the
review of the notes.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades reflect Moody's concerns related to the issuer's
failure to address transaction governance risk going forward. As
discussed in Moody's press release dated December 6, 2010, when
the notes were put on review for possible downgrade, during 2009
and 2010, the issuer directed the 2004-1 trustee to use trust
funds to redeem subordinate notes without meeting the required
senior parity (the ratio of total assets to senior liabilities)
and total parity (the ratio of total assets to total liabilities)
thresholds stipulated by the Indenture of Trust. In addition, the
issuer requested the trustee to use fund from the 1998-1 and 1999
trusts to pay for legal costs associated with a lawsuit for which
EdLinc. and SLFC were named as defendants. The lawsuit involved
loans in the 1998-1 and 1999 trusts that benefited from 9.5%
guaranteed rate of return. EdLinc also failed to timely deliver
the required financial reports under the terms of the indentures.

Since Moody's began its review of the notes in December, EdLinc
and SLFC have not put in place a mechanism to prevent the
reoccurrence of similar governance issues. As a result, Moody's
ratings of all transactions issued by EdLinc and serviced and
administered by SLFC are capped at Ba3(sf).

In addition to the governance concerns, the ratings of the
subordinated notes in the 1999, 2004-1 and 2004 C&D transactions
were downgraded due to the performance deterioration of the
underlying private student loan pools.

The rating of the subordinated notes in the 1998-1 transaction was
also affected by the downgrade of the senior auction rate
securities (ARS) below Baa3. The downgrade of the senior ARS
results in increase in coupon payment on these notes and the
funding costs of the entire trust, which negatively affect the
amount of excess spread available for the subordinated notes.

Primary sources of uncertainty are the transaction governance
issues as well as credit performance of the private student loan
collateral.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

In monitoring securitizations backed by student loans Moody's
evaluates operational and transaction governance risks introduced
by non-performance of various transaction parties, in addition to
assessing liquidity and credit risks. The adherence of the
transaction parties to legal agreements governing securitization
transactions is the essential element of assuring that noteholders
receive the timely payments of interest and ultimate repayment of
their principal investments. Moody's monitors compliance with
covenants and other legal provisions of the transaction documents.

In addition, Moody's assesses both liquidity and credit risks of
the student loan transactions. The factors affecting liquidity and
credit performance of a transaction include defaults, guarantor
reject rates, voluntary prepayments, basis risk, borrower benefit
utilization, and the number of borrowers in non-repayment status,
such as deferment and forbearance. As a part of Moody's analysis,
Moody's examines historical FFELP static pool performance data. To
the extent that performance data is available from a specific
issuer, that information is used to arrive at Moody's cash flow
assumptions for that particular issuer. If an issuer's data are
either limited or unavailable, Moody's assumptions are based on
FFELP performance data received from other participants.

In addition, historical interest rates and spreads are analyzed to
evaluate the basis risk between the interest rate to which the
notes are indexed and the interest rate to which the FFELP loans
are indexed. This historical data is used to derive at expected,
or most likely, outcome for each variable. These expected
defaults, prepayments, interest rates, and other assumptions are
then stressed in accordance with the rating categories requested
by the issuer. Factors that influence the stress levels include
the availability of relevant issuer-specific performance data, the
seasoning of the loans, collateral concentrations (school types,
loan programs), the financial strength and stability of the
servicer, and the general economic environment.

These stressed assumptions are then incorporated into a cash flow
model that takes into account the FFELP loan characteristics as
well as structural (e.g., starting parity, cash flow waterfall,
bond tranching, etc.) and pricing features of the transaction. The
cash flow model outputs are analyzed to determine whether the
transaction as structured by the issuer has sufficient credit
protection to pay off the notes by their legal final maturity
dates. In certain circumstances where cash flow runs are not
available, Moody's relies on model results from similar
transactions. Moody's also analyzes the liquidity risk of the
transaction given that borrowers can be in non-repayment status
while in school, grace, deferment or forbearance status, and the
transaction can experience delays in default reimbursement and
other payments. Basis risk is the primary credit risk in FFELP
student loan ABS. Moody's Aaa stressed basis risk assumption
between LIBOR and the CP Rate is 25 basis points with certain
periods in which the spread increases to 150 basis points.
This is based on an analysis of historical spreads between the two
indices. For additional information, please see "Methodology
Update on Basis Risk in FFELP Student Loan-Backed Securitization,"
on moodys.com.

For the 1999, 2004-1 and 2004 C&D transactions, which include some
private student loans, Moody's also uses another methodology:
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Private Student Loan-Backed
Securities", published on January 6th, 2010. Other methodologies
and factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
this issue can also be found on Moody's website.

RATINGS

Issuer: Education Loan Incorporated (FFELP Loans - 2005 Indenture)

2005-1A3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2005-1B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Education Loans Incorporated (2004 Indenture)

2004-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2004-A3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2004-A4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2004-B1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Education Loans Incorporated (2004 C and D Indenture)

2004-C1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2004-C2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2004-C5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2004-D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Education Loans Incorporated, Series 1999-1

1999-1 Class 1A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

1999-1 Class 1C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2001-1 Class 1A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2001-1 Class 1B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2001-1 Class 1C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2002-1 Class 1A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2002-1 Class 1B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

2002-1 Class 1C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Senior Ser. 2003-1B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 6,
2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Senior Ser. 2003-1C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 6,
2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Sub. Ser. 2003-1D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Education Loans Incorporated, Student Loan Asset-Backed
Callable Notes Series 1998-1

Class .D, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Class H, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Class F-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Class K, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


EMPORIA PREFERRED: Moody's Raises Rating of Class D Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Emporia Preferred Funding I, Ltd.:

US$36,615,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Senior Floating Rate Notes
Due 2018, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Senior Fixed Rate Notes Due
2018, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$24,360,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$24,360,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$8,000,000 Class E-1 Fifth Priority Subordinated Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,195,000 Class E-2 Fifth Priority Subordinated Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios since the rating action
in July 2009. The trustee currently reports the Class A/B, Class
C, Class D and Class E Principal Coverage Ratios at 126.85%,
117.78%, 109.92% and 106.09%, respectively, versus levels of
122.8%, 114.15%, 106.65% and 102.98% in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $407 million,
defaulted par of $6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 24% (implying a WARF of 3458), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48%, and a diversity score of 60.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Emporia Preferred Funding I, Ltd., issued in October 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans from middle market issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level
of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties
of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.


EMPORIA PREFERRED: Moody's Upgrades Rating of Class D Notes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Emporia Preferred Funding II, Ltd.:

US$30,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Notes Due 2018,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$22,000,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due 2018, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$22,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated Deferrable
Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$14,500,000 Class E Fifth Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. The
primary changes to the modeling assumptions include (1) a removal
of the temporary 30% default probability macro stress implemented
in February 2009 as well as (2) increased BET liability stress
factors and increased recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $333 million,
defaulted par of $12.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 23.3% (implying a WARF of 3378), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.7%, and a diversity score of 52.
Moody's generally analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by
assuming the worse of reported and covenanted values for all
collateral quality tests. However, in this case given the limited
time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis
reflects the benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that certain
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to certain covenant requirements, as
seen in the actual collateral quality measurements. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Emporia Preferred Funding II, Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

2. Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for the weighted average rating
factor and diversity score. However, as a part of the base case,
Moody's considered diversity level higher than the covenant and
WARF level better than the covenant level due to the large
difference between the reported and covenant levels.

3. Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.


FALCON FRANCHISE: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these actions on three Falcon Franchise
Loan Transactions:

Falcon Franchise Loan Trust Certificates, Series 2000-1

  -- Class A-2 notes downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf' and
     assigned a Stable Outlook;

  -- Class B notes affirmed at 'Asf' and assigned a Negative
     Outlook;

  -- Class C notes affirmed at 'BBBsf' and assigned a Negative
     Outlook;

  -- Class D notes affirmed at 'BBsf' and assigned a Negative
     Outlook;

  -- Class E notes affirmed at 'CCCsf/RR2'.

In addition, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.

Falcon Auto Dealership LLC, Series 2001-1

  -- Class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AA+sf' and assigned a Stable
     Outlook;

  -- Class B notes affirmed at 'Asf' and assigned a Negative
     Outlook;

  -- Class C notes downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf' and assigned a
     Negative Outlook;

  -- Class D notes revised to 'CCCsf/RR3' from 'CCCsf/RR5';

  -- Class E and F notes affirmed at 'Dsf/RR6'.

In addition, the class A-2, B, C, and D notes are removed from
Rating Watch Negative.

Falcon Auto Dealership LLC, Series 2003-1

  -- Class A-1 and A-2 notes downgraded to 'CCsf/RR3' from 'BBsf';
  -- Class B notes downgraded to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6';
  -- Class C and D notes revised to 'Csf/RR5' from 'Csf/RR6';
  -- Class E and F notes affirmed at 'C/RR6'.

In addition, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.

All rating actions reflect the application of 'Surveillance
Criteria for Franchise Loan ABS' dated May 20, 2011.

The downgrade to the class A notes in Falcon 2000-1 is a result of
the application of rating caps as detailed in the Franchise
Surveillance Criteria.  While the rating cap methodology suggests
an 'Asf' rating based on the low borrower count, mitigating
factors exist which have limited the downgrade to one category.
These include the steady performance to date, increasing and
substantial credit enhancement (CE), and senior position in the
waterfall.  The affirmations to the class B, C, D, and E notes
reflect each class' ability to pass stress case scenarios
consistent with the current ratings.  The assignment of a Negative
Outlook for the class B, C, and D notes reflects the potential for
interest shortfalls to accrue were any borrowers to default.  Were
this to occur, downgrades to the affected classes would be likely.

The affirmations to the class A-2 and B notes in Falcon 2001-1
reflect each class' ability to pass stress case scenarios
consistent with the current ratings.  While the rating cap
methodology suggests a 'BBsf' rating for both classes based on the
low borrower count, mitigating factors exist which have resulted
in affirmations.  These include the steady performance to date,
increasing and substantial CE levels, and senior position in the
waterfall.  Furthermore, the collateral of the largest borrower in
the pool, which represents approximately 34%, was replaced with a
letter of credit from a highly rated financial institution,
greatly limiting the potential for default.  The downgrade to the
class C notes reflects their propensity to experience interest
shortfalls, which have fluctuated over the past two years.
Recovery prospects for the class D notes have improved slightly
since the last review, leading to the RR revision. The class E and
F notes are expected to receive little to no future payments,
consistent with their current 'Dsf/RR6' rating.  The assignment of
a Negative Outlook for the class B and C notes reflects the
potential for interest shortfalls to accrue were any borrowers to
default.  Were this to occur, downgrades to the affected classes
would be likely.

The downgrades to class A-1, A-2, and B notes in 2003-1
reflect the opinion that default is probable for the class A
notes and inevitable for the class B notes. Since the last
review, actual recoveries on defaulted loans were lower than
expected and recovery prospects on currently defaulted loans
have declined.  The class B notes and all those subordinate are
undercollateralized and expected losses on the current defaults
are likely to result in principal losses for the class A notes
based on Fitch's recovery assumptions.  While default is
inevitable for all other subordinate classes, the class C and D
notes are expected to continue to receive minimal interest
payments, consistent with a 'Csf/RR5'.  The class E and F notes
are expected to receive no further payments, consistent with a
'Csf/RR6'.

Fitch will continue to monitor these transactions and may take
additional rating action in the event of changes in performance
and credit enhancement measures.


FLEET LEASE: Moody's Raises Rating of 1 Class of Fixed Rate Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the subordinated
class of Fleet Lease Receivables Trust Series 2010-1 fixed rate
asset backed notes previously on review for possible upgrade.
The notes were issued by Fleet Lease Receivables Trust (the
Trust), a special purpose trust established under the laws of the
Province of Ontario, Canada. The servicer of the Trust is Vehicle
Management Services Inc. (PHH Canada), a Canadian subsidiary of
PHH Corporation (PHH, Ba2, stable), a mortgage and fleet lease and
management company.

Issuer: Fleet Leasing Receivables Trust Series 2010-1

Cl. B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 29, 2011 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

This transaction has been amortizing after closing. The principal
of the Class A and Class B notes are paid sequentially, supported
by over-collateralization and a reserve account. The
overcollateralization has reached its floor and the reserve
account is non-declining reserve account. With approximately 20
months of amoritzation, the transaction is performing well, with
significant buildup in credit enhancement. Specifically, total
credit enhancement to Class B is about 13% of the current pool
balance, up from 7.00% at closing.

The collateral performance of the pool has been good and within
Moody's expectations with three-month average delinquencies at
0.61% and three-month average charge off ratio of -0.18%.

During the review period, Moody's has fine-tuned its analysis of
how the increased credit enhancement benefits this class, with
attention to modeling, structural features, potential loss
severity in light of seniority and current obligor pool
concentrations.

The notes are ultimately backed by a special unit of beneficial
interest in a pool of 100% open-end leases and the related
vehicles. The leases were originated by PHH Canada, a Canadian
corporation and a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of PHH, which
provides fleet leasing and fleet management services primarily to
corporate clients throughout the United States and Canada.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

As the majority of the underlying collateral consists of a pool of
open-end leases (i.e. leases where the lessees are responsible for
any residual value losses), the potential credit loss of this
transaction is primarily driven by the default likelihood of
the lessees, the recovery rate when a lessee defaults, and the
diversity of the pool of lessees. An approach similar to that
used in CDO transactions is used. The CDO approach hinges on
the idea of using a 'hypothetical pool' to map the credit and
loss characteristics of an actual pool and then employing a
mathematical technique called binomial expansion to determine
the expected loss of the bond to be rated. Using the binomial
expansion technique, the probability of default of each possible
scenario is calculated based on a mathematical formula, and the
cashflow profile for each scenario is determined based on an
assumed recovery rate. Then each cashflow scenario is fed into a
liability model to determine the actual loss on the bond under
each scenario, and the probability weighted loss or expected loss
of the bond is determined. The expected loss of the bond is then
compared with Moody's Idealized Cumulative Expected Loss Rates
Table to determine a rating for the bond.

The hypothetical pool is characterized by a diversity score. The
diversity score measures the diversity of the actual pool by
mathematically converting the obligor concentrations of the actual
pool into the number of equally-sized uncorrelated obligors which
would represent the same credit risk as the actual pool. This
process is summarized as follows. Each lessee is assigned its
applicable industry category. Lessees in the same industry are
assumed to be correlated with each other, while lessees in
different industries are assumed to be independent. The number of
lessees in the same industry is reduced to reflect the correlation
among them. For example, when calculating the diversity score, six
equal-sized lessees in the same industry are counted as three
independent obligors, while six equal-sized lessees in six
different industries are counted as six independent obligors. The
size of the lessees is also accounted for by reducing the number
of lessees with below average lessee size. In general, the higher
the diversity score, the lower the collateral loss volatility will
be and consequently, the lower the expected loss of a security,
other factors being the same.

Each possible default scenario is determined by both the diversity
score and the average probability of default of the pool. The
weighted average probability of default of the pool is determined
by the probability of default of each lessee or obligor, which is
estimated using the actual lessees' credit ratings, if rated. For
non-rated lessees, the average rating is assumed to be lower than
that of the rated lessees. For example, if the average rating for
the rated lessees is Baa3, Moody's assumes a rating of Ba3 or
lower as the average rating for the non-rated lessees. The
estimated weighted average rating for the entire hypothetical
pool is then used to estimate the probability of each default
scenario.

The actual net loss on the bonds under each default scenario is
determined taking into consideration of recoveries in case of
default. When a lessee defaults, recoveries are obtained as the
related leased vehicles are reprocessed and sold to repay the
defaulted lease obligation. Moody's conducts detailed recovery
analyses based on the types of vehicles leased and various default
scenarios for lessees. Based on those recovery analyses, Moody's
determines the ratings after considering the breakeven recovery
rates for the different classes of notes at their associated
credit enhancement levels.


FUNB 2002-C1: Moody's Affirms Class H Notes Rating at 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded two and affirmed 12
classes of First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-C1:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2002
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2005 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2007 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2008 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2002 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2002 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. IO-I, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2002
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to an increase in subordination from payoffs
and amortization and an increase in the share of defeasance. The
pool has paid down 54% since securitization and 38% since last
review. Twenty loans, representing 42% of the pool, have been
fully defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities
compared to 38% at last review.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.1% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 1.6%. Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 5.5% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18 compared to 28 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17,2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 54% to
$334.85 million from $728.32 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 55 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 36% of the pool. Twenty loans, representing
42% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with
U.S. Government securities, compared to 38% at last review. The
entire pool matures by March 2012. All but four of these loans,
representing 4% of the non-defeased pool, have a Moody's stressed
debt service greater than 1.0X.

Thirty loans, representing 43% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $19.8 million loss (53% loss severity on
average). Currently two loans, representing 6% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The master servicer has not recognized any
appraisal reductions for the specially serviced loans. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate loss of $320 thousand (25% expected loss on
average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.0 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 100% and 83% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding the specially serviced Corner House
Shoppes loan and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is
75% compared to 78% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding the specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.48X, respectively,
compared to 1.40X and 1.38X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 17% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Promenade Loan ($24.6 million -- 7.3% of the pool),
which is secured by a 352,000 square foot (SF) power center
located in Garden Grove, California. Anchor tenants include Regal
Cinemas, 24 Hour fitness, Ross Dress for Less and Marshall's. The
property was 91% leased as of July 2011 compared to 80% at last
review. The property's financial performance has improved since
last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 53% and 2.04X,
respectively, compared to 60% and 1.81X at last review.

The second largest loan is the U-Hall Portfolio Loan
($21.0 million -- 6.3% of the pool), which is secured by 14 self
storage properties located in 11 states. The portfolio totals
7,128 units with individual properties ranging from 244 to 745
units. The portfolio was 84% leased as of June 2011 compared to
80% at last review. The loan is currently on the master servicer's
watchlist due to its upcoming maturity in January 2012. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 50% and 2.12X, respectively, compared to
51% and 2.06X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Ann Arbor Properties Loan
($10.9 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 167-
unit multifamily property located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. As of
December 2010, the property was 100% leased, the same as at last
full review. Property performance has been stable. The loan is
currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to its upcoming
maturity in November 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73%
and 1.40X, respectively, compared to 73% and 1.41X at last review.


GALLERY AT HARBORPLACE: Moody's Cuts Rating on B-3 Notes to 'Ca'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the ratings of three
classes of Gallery at Harborplace Mortgage Trust Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C5C:

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to better property cash flow performance and
decreased expected loss resulting from the interest shortfalls and
fees associated with the GGP bankruptcy loan modifications.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses. This action concludes Moody's review of this
transaction.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and performance
in the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
continuing to show signs of recovery through the first half of
2011, while recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are
tied to pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office
markets are showing signs of recovery through lending and
leasing activity. The availability of debt capital continues to
improve with terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish
recovery as the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations, however the
downside risks to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.2. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

The transaction consists of a $10.5 million B-Note which is
subordinate to an A-Note that was securitized in LB-UBS 2000-C5.
The A-Note has amortized approximately 15% to $50.8 million from
$60.0 million at securitization. The loan matures in June 2014.

The loan is secured by a 403,261 square foot office and retail
mixed-use complex and 1,140-space parking garage located within
the Inner Harbor development in Baltimore, Maryland. The property
was developed in 1987 by The Rouse Company which was acquired by
General Growth Properties (GGP) in 2004. The office component
(264,729 square feet) was 54% leased as of June 2011 compared to
55% at last review. The retail component (139,036 square feet) was
88% leased as of June 2011, the same as at last review. The net
cash flow has improved since last review. Moody's current loan to
value (LTV) ratio and stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
are 84% and 1.22X.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B-2 and B-3
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $502,948,
compared to $488,671 at last review. These shortfalls are due to a
reallocation of the B-Note debt service payments to the A- Note
holder during the GGP bankruptcy. Additional interest shortfalls
will result from workout fees based on 1% of the monthly debt
service payments and outstanding loan balance at maturity of both
the A-Note and B-Note. Only the B-Note will be assessed for the
workout fees.


GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Certificates to 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GE
Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series 2007-C1 Trust, a commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "In addition we
affirmed our ratings on eight other classes from the same
transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. conduit/fusion criteria, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.
The downgrades reflect credit support erosion we anticipate
will occur upon the eventual resolution of 21 ($681.8 million,
19.2%) of the transaction's 27 ($1.01 billion, 28.6%) specially
serviced assets, and one loan ($19.7 million, 0.56%) that was
transferred to special servicing subsequent to the 2011 trustee
remittance report's record date. In addition, we considered the
monthly interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust and the
potential for additional interest shortfalls associated with loan
modifications and/or revised appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs)
on the specially serviced assets. Our analysis also considered 41
($1.28 billion, 36.3%) loans in the pool that have a reported DSC
of less than 1.10x, 31 of which ($980.0 million, 27.6%) have a
reported DSC below 1.00x," S&P stated.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class XC and XP interest-only (IO)
certificates based on our current criteria," S&P related.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.17x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 133.4%.
We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.73x and an LTV ratio of
182.1%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 94.4% and 47.1%, respectively. All of the DSC and
LTV calculations we exclude 22 ($701.6 million, 19.8%) of the
transaction's 28 ($1.03 billion, 29.2%) specially serviced assets.
We separately estimated losses for the excluded specially serviced
assets and included them in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and
loss severity figures," S&P stated.

As of the Oct. 11, 2011, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $1.0 million.
The interest shortfalls were primarily related to ASER amounts
totaling $462,307 associated with 15 of the specially serviced
assets, as well as special servicing fees ($294,877), interest not
advanced ($147,000), interest on advances ($99,600), shortfalls
due to rate modifications ($16,467), and workout fees ($4,394).
The $462,307 ASER amount was net of $360,921 of recovered ASERs
from three loans that are currently with the special servicer and
the special servicer expects this recovered ASER amount to be
nonrecurring. The current interest shortfalls affected all
classes subordinate to and including class E. "While the class D
certificates has had accumulated interest shortfalls that have
been outstanding for three months, we expect these accumulated
interest shortfalls to be paid back in the next trustee remittance
report period based on the current interest shortfalls and the
ASER repayments. However, if the payback of this class does not
occur as expected and the accumulated interest shortfalls remain
outstanding, we may consider downgrading this class to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)'. We downgraded class B to 'CCC+ (sf)' and class C
to 'CCC- (sf)' due to reduced liquidity support available to these
classes and their susceptibility to interest shortfalls in the
future relating to the specially serviced assets," S&P said.

                     Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 11, 2011, remittance report, 27 ($1.01 billion,
28.6%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners LLC (LNR). There were two ($34.3 million, 1.0%) B-
notes created due to modifications to the whole loans that are
with the special servicer. The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: four($25.1 million, 0.7%) are real estate
owned (REO), five ($255.1 million, 7.2%) are in foreclosure,
eight ($282.5 million, 8.0%) are 90-plus-days delinquent,
one ($11.3 million, 0.3%) is 60-plus-days delinquent, two
($265.6 million, 7.5%) are 30 days delinquent, two ($88.8 million,
2.5%) are less than 30 days delinquent, four ($31.1 million,
0.8%) are in their grace period, and one ($54.3 million, 1.6%)
is current. "Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling
$277.7 million were in effect for 17 specially serviced assets.
Also, on Oct. 6, 2011, LNR notified us that the Deerfield Luxury
Townhomes loan ($19.7 million, 0.6%) transferred to special
servicing. The payment status of this loan is 60-plus-days
delinquent," S&P related. The four largest specially serviced
assets, all of which are top 10 assets, are:

The 666 Fifth Avenue loan is the largest asset with the special
servicer and the largest asset in the pool with a trust balance of
$249.0 million (7.0%) and whole-loan balance of $1.2 billion. The
loan is secured by a 39-story, 1.5 million-sq.-ft., class-A office
building in Midtown Manhattan on Fifth Avenue between West 52nd
and West 53rd street. The 10-year whole loan is a IO and is due to
mature on February 5, 2017. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on March 3, 2010 because the borrower requested a
restructuring of the loan due to declining financial performance
of the asset. "The special servicer has notified us that it is
currently discussing a loan modification with the borrower. The
most recent reported DSC and occupancy were 0.49x and 78.0%,
respectively, as of Dec. 31, 2010. The loan's reported payment
status is 30 days delinquent," S&P related.

The Manhattan Office Portfolio loan ($192.1 million, 5.4%), the
fifth-largest asset in the pool, is secured by a 36-building
multifamily apartment complex portfolio totaling 1,083 units in
New York City. The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Feb. 27, 2009, due to imminent monetary default. The reported
payment status of the loan is 90-plus-days delinquent. The special
servicer indicated that it is considering a note sale. The
reported DSC was 0.22x for year-end 2009 and reported occupancy
was 85.0% as of year-end 2010. There is an ARA of $111.2 million
for this loan. "We expect a significant loss upon the resolution
of this asset," S&P said.

The Four Seasons Resort Maui loan, the sixth-largest asset in the
pool, has a whole-loan balance of $425.0 million that is split
into two pari passu pieces: $175.0 million makes up 4.9% of the
pool trust balance. The remaining $250.0 million is in the CD
2007-CD4 transaction. The loan is secured by a 380-room full-
service luxury resort hotel in Wailea (in Maui County), Hawaii.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on April 6, 2010,
due to monetary default. Although the loan has a reported
foreclosure payment status as of the October 2011 remittance
report date, the special servicer for this loan, CWCapital Asset
Management LLC, stated that the loan has since been modified
and the payment status is current. The modification terms include,
but are not limited to, bifurcating the trust's $175.0 million
note into a $144.1 million senior A note and a $30.9 million
subordinate B note, establishing debt service, operating loss and
capital reserves, and extending the loan's maturity to Jan. 1,
2019, from Jan. 1, 2014. The remaining $250.0 million note that is
in the CD 2007-CD4 trust is split into a $205.9 million senior A
note and a $44.1 million subordinate B note. The reported DSC was
1.09x for the trailing 12-months ending Aug. 31, 2011. An ARA of
$79.8 million is in effect against the loan. "We expect a moderate
loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P said.

The Galleria Officentre loan ($86.8 million, 2.4%), the 10th-
largest asset in the pool, is secured by a suburban office complex
consisting of four class-A buildings totaling 1.0 million sq. ft
in Southfield, Mich. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on August 16, 2011 due to imminent monetary default. The
loan's reported payment status is less than 30 days delinquent.
The most recent reported DSC and occupancy were 0.79x and 72% as
of Dec. 31, 2010. The special servicer indicated that it is
exploring various workout strategies. "If the loan is not modified
then we expect a significant loss upon the resolution of this
asset," S&P said.

The 24 remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 1.6% of the total pool balance.
ARA's totaling $86.7 million are in effect against 15 of these
assets. "We estimated losses for 19 of these 24 assets, arriving
at a weighted average loss severity of 48.1%," S&P related.

According to the master servicer, three loans totaling $48.6
(1.2%) were previously with the special servicer and have since
been returned to the master servicer. The Four Seasons Resort Maui
loan ($175.0 million, 4.9%) is also scheduled to return to the
master servicer. Pursuant to the transaction documents, the
special servicer is entitled to a workout fee that is 1% of all
future principal and interest payments should the loans perform
and remain with the master servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 11, 2011, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had a trust balance of $3.54 billion, down from $3.95 billion
at issuance. The pool currently includes 175 loans and four REO
assets. The master servicers, KeyBank Real Estate Capital Markets
Inc. and Bank of America N.A., provided information for 94.2% of
the loans in the pool: 81.0% was partial- or full-year 2010 data
while 13.2% was 2009 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.14x for the pool based
on the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.17x
and 133.4%, which exclude 22 ($701.6 million, 19.8%) of the
transaction's 28 ($1.03 billion, 29.2%) specially serviced assets.
We separately estimated losses for these assets. The servicer
provided recent financial information for 14 of the 22 specially
serviced assets for which we estimated losses. The weighted
average DSC for these loans is 0.49. To date, the trust has
experienced $78.7 million in principal losses relating to 17
assets. Thirty-four ($448.0 million, 12.6%) loans, including the
seventh-largest loan in the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist," S&P said.

                       Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$1.71 billion (48.3%). "Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.42x for the six of the top
10 loans. The remaining four loans ($702.9 million, 19.7%) are
with the special servicer. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the
top 10 loans were 0.99x and 160.5%. The Pacific Shores loan
($165.9 million, 4.7%), the seventh-largest asset in the pool,
appeared on the master servicers' combined watchlist due to its
impending Jan. 1, 2012, maturity. The loan is secured by eight
office properties totaling 1.2 million net rentable sq. ft. in
Redwood City, Calif. According to the master servicer, it is in
discussions with the borrower regarding a potential transfer of
the loan to the special servicer. The borrower has indicated that
it is having difficulty securing refinancing at the maturity date
because of the high percentage of tenants having their leases
rolling in the next four years. The reported DSC and occupancy for
the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2010, were 1.95x and 87.0%," S&P
stated.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
current criteria, and the analysis is consistent with the lowered
and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation Series 2007-C1 Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
             Rating
Class  To              From           Credit enhancement (%)
A-M    BB (sf)         BB+ sf)                        20.11
A-MFL  BB (sf)         BB+ sf)                        20.11
A-J    B- (sf)         B+ (sf)                        11.59
A-JFL  B- (sf)         B+ (sf)                        11.59
B      CCC+ (sf)       B (sf)                         10.48
C      CCC- (sf)       B (sf)                          9.22

Ratings Affirmed

GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation Series 2007-C1 Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating                Credit enhancement (%)
A-2      AAA (sf)                              31.27
A-3      AAA (sf)                              31.27
A-AB     AAA (sf)                              31.27
A-4      BBB+ (sf)                             31.27
A-1A     BBB+ (sf)                             31.27
D        CCC- (sf)                              8.10
XC       AAA (sf)                                N/A
XP       AAA (sf)                                N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


GECMC 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms Class J Notes Rating at 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the ratings of four
classes and affirmed 13 classes of GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-C1:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on December 10, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on December 10, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on December 10, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 6, 2007 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on September 25, 2008
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on November 18, 2010
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on November 18, 2010
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on December 10, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on December 10, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on December 10, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on November 18, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on November 18, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on November 18, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on November 18, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on November 18, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on November 18, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on December 10, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to an increase in subordination due to loan
payoffs and amortization and overall stable pool performance.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss
of 2.1%. At last review, Moody's cumulative base expected loss
was 2.7%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is 7.3% of the current
balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and performance in the commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward trend will not
be evident until the volume of transactions increases, distressed
properties are cleared from the pipeline and job creation
rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to
show signs of recovery through the first half of 2011, while
recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are tied to
pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office markets are
showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing activity.
The availability of debt capital continues to improve with
terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a
greater impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40.
The pool has a Herf of 37 compared to 40 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated November 18, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to
$734.5 million from $1.27 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 100 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 36% of the pool. Sixteen loans, representing
16% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities. At last review, defeasance represented 15%
of the pool. The pool contains one loan with an investment-grade
credit estimate, representing 8% of the pool.

Nineteen loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19.4 million (39% loss severity).
Currently there is one loan in special servicing. The Hanford Mall
loan ($26.3 million -- 3.6% of the pool) is secured by a 323,000
square foot retail property located in Hanford, California. The
loan was transferred into special servicing in September 2010 due
to imminent maturity default. As part of the loan modification,
the maturity date was extended from December 2010 to June 2011. As
of September 2011, the property was 93% leased compared to 95% at
Moody's last review. The full year 2010 net operating income DSCR
was 1.33X; as of September 2011 the DSCR was 1.32X. Moody's does
not anticipate a loss on from this loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, representing 2.9% of the pool, and has estimated
a $4.27 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 99% and 82% of the pool, excluding defeased
loans. Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is
83% compared to 81% at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects
a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently available
net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.48X and 1.32X, respectively, compared to 1.51X and 1.31X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the AFR Portfolio Loan
($42.1 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which represent a 22% pari
passu interest in a first mortgage loan secured by 114 properties
located in various states. The properties consist of office
buildings, operation centers and retail bank branches. As of
December 2010, the portfolio was 91% leased compared to 86% at
last review. Six properties have been released from the pool and
32 properties, representing 25% of the loan balance, have defeased
since securitization. Due to property releases, defeasance and
loan amortization, the loan balance has decreased by approximately
44% since securitization. The portfolio is also encumbered by a
$56.2 million B Note, which is held outside the trust. Moody's
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A1 and 1.91X, respectively,
compared to A1 and 1.82X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Arapahoe Crossings Shopping
Center Loan ($43.6 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 466,000 square foot retail power center built in phases
between 1997 and 2001. The property consists of 14 contiguous and
free standing buildings located in Aurora (Denver), Colorado. The
largest tenants are Kohl's (19% of the net rentable area (NRA);
lease expiration January 2040), AMC Theatres (16% of the NRA;
lease expiration January 2018) and Kroger's Supermarket (15% of
the NRA; lease expiration in January 2019). As of August 2011, the
property was 92% leased compared to 94% at last review. The
borrower has reported that Ross Dress for Less (6.5% of the NRA)
and Old Navy (5.4% of the NRA) will vacate their premises when
their leases expire in January 2012 and October 2011,
respectively. By January 2012, a total of 15% the NRA will have
vacated, reducing the property's occupancy to 76% if no additional
leasing has occured during the interim. The loan matures in
November 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 0.99X,
respectively, compared to 82% and 1.19X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Elmwood Shopping Center Loan
($32.7 million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 458,000
square foot power center built in 1972 and renovated in 1997. The
property is located in Harahan, approximately 10 miles west of New
Orleans, Louisiana. The largest tenants are Elmwood Fitness (18%
of the NRA; lease expiration in December 2012), Marshalls (8% of
the NRA; lease expiration in October 2012;) and OfficeMax (7% of
the NRA; lease expiration in December 2012). As of June 2011, the
property was 95% leased compared to 96% at last review. Leases for
approximately 35% of the NRA expire within the next two years.
Actual 2010 net operating income (NOI) decreased by 8% due to a
42% drop in expenses recoveries. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
79% and 1.31X, respectively, compared to 72% and 1.43X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Devonshire Reseda Shopping Center
Loan ($27.6 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by an
183,000 square foot shopping center located in Northridge,
California. As of September 2011, the property was 100% leased
compared to 98% at last review. The property is anchored by LA
Fitness, which leases 25% of the NRA through to February 2022, and
Albertson's Supermarket, which leases 19% of the NRA through March
2014. Property performance has remained since last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.1.4X, respectively, compared
to 68% and 1.21X at last review.


GULF STREAM-COMPASS: S&P Removes 'CCC-' Class E Rating From Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-1 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by GSAM
Apollo Holdings LLC. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on
the class A and E notes. We removed our ratings on the class B,
C, D, and E notes from CreditWatch, where we placed them with
positive implications on Sept. 2, 2011," S&P related.

"The upgrades reflect the improved performance we have observed in
the deal's underlying asset portfolio, as well as a $56.6 million
paydown to the class A notes since we last upgraded them on
Oct. 29, 2010. As of the Sept. 15, 2011, trustee report, the
transaction had only $1.34 million in defaulted assets, compared
with the $8.07 million noted in the Sept. 15, 2010 trustee report,
which we referenced for our October 2010 rating actions," S&P
said.

Additionally, the class A notes have paid down to $62.5 million
from $119.1 million during the same period. The affirmations
reflect the credit support available to the notes at the current
rating levels.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the Sept. 15,
2011 monthly report:

    The B O/C ratio was 145.72%, compared with a reported ratio of
    122.07% in September 2010;

    The C O/C ratio was 127.20%, compared with a reported ratio of
    112.70% in September 2010;

    The D O/C ratio was 111.82%, compared with a reported ratio of
    104.07% in September 2010; and

    The E O/C ratio was 103.38%, compared with a reported ratio of
    98.16% in September 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.
Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
Class             To          From
B                 AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                 AA- (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                 BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos
E                 CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-1 Ltd.
Class        Rating
A            AAA (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:               Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-1 Ltd.
Coissuer:             Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-1 Inc.
Collateral manager:   GSAM Apollo Holdings LLC
Trustee:              U.S. Bank N.A.
Transaction type:     Cash flow CLO


HARTFORD MEZZANINE: Fitch Holds Rating on Three Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Hartford Mezzanine
Investors I CRE CDO 2007-1 (HMI I 2007-1), reflecting Fitch's
base case loss expectation of 26.9% compared to 31% at last
review.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective
views regarding commercial real estate market values and cash flow
declines.

Since last review, class A-1 has received pay down of
$53.5 million due to intermittent overcollateralization (OC) test
failures.  While both Fitch's loss expectations for the pool and
the credit enhancement to the classes have generally improved
since last review, upgrades were not taken at this time due the
nearly one-third in uninvested principal proceeds currently in the
transaction and uncertainty regarding reinvestment collateral.
Currently, the CDO holds approximately $107 million in cash.
These funds are expected to be redeployed into new assets prior to
the end of the reinvestment period in August 2012.

As of the October 2011 trustee report and per Fitch
categorizations, the collateral pool consists of 39% whole loans
and A-notes, 3% B-notes, 27% mezzanine debt, 3% CMBS, and 29%
uninvested principal proceeds.  The combined percentage of
defaulted assets and Fitch loans of concern totals 34% compared to
23% at last review.

Since last review, eight loans were disposed of with realized
losses totaling approximately $14.5 million.  The CDO is currently
undercollateralized by an estimated $38 million.

HMI I 2007-1 is co-managed by Hartford Investment Management
Company (HIMCO) and KeyBank Real Estate Equity Capital Inc.  As of
the October 2011 trustee report, the F/G/H OC test was failing,
cutting off interest payments to class J and below.  The failure
is expected to be cured as of the November 2011 report due to a
principal paydown.  All other OC and interest coverage ratios are
in compliance.

Under Fitch's surveillance methodology, approximately 61.3% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 8.9% from the most recent available cash
flows (generally year-end 2010 or trailing 12 months [TTM] first
quarter 2011).  Fitch estimates that overall recoveries will be
better than average at 56.2%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is
related to a junior mezzanine loan (8.5%) secured by interests in
a 2.8 million square-foot (sf) office portfolio.  The loan, which
is significantly overleveraged, matures next month.  Extension
discussions are ongoing.  Fitch modeled a maturity default with a
substantial loss in its base case scenario.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is related to a whole loan (9.3%) secured by a 220,000 sf office
property located in Costa Mesa, CA.  While the property is now
100% leased, recent leasing has been below prior rent levels.
Further, a large tenant continues to market its space for sublease
while another tenant has indicated it will be terminating a
portion of its lease.  Fitch modeled a term default with a
significant loss in its base case scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is related to a whole loan (4.2%) secured by a three-property
multifamily portfolio located in Central California.  The
portfolio's performance remains challenged by economic conditions
in the market.  Fitch modeled a term default with a significant
loss in the base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) tests to project future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based on
stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
Factoring in the substantial amount of cash currently held in the
CDO, the credit enhancement of classes A-1 through G was compared
to the modeled expected losses, and determined to be consistent
with the rating assigned below.  Cash flow modeling was not
performed as part of the analysis given the uncertainty of future
collateral composition due to the significant amount of cash in
the deal.  Rating Outlooks for classes A-1 through C were revised
to Positive and Stable reflecting the classes' senior positions in
the capital stack and cushion in the modeling.

The 'CCC' ratings for classes H through K are based on a
deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets and Fitch Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each class' credit enhancement.  These
classes were assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) in order to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Outlooks and RR
ratings:

  -- $59,836,850 class A-1 at 'A'; Outlook to Positive from
     Stable;
  -- $50,000,000 class A-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook to Positive from
     Stable;
  -- $52,500,000 class A-3 at 'BBB'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $35,000,000 class B at 'BB'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;
  -- $10,000,000 class C at 'BB'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;
  -- $10,000,000 class D at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $15,000,000 class E at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $25,000,000 class F at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $20,000,000 class G at 'B'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $21,250,000 class H to 'CCC/RR4' from 'CCC/RR6';
  -- $23,750,000 class J at 'CCC/RR6';
  -- $38,750,000 class K at 'CC/RR6'.




JP MORGAN: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class MH Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2011-FL1's $784.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by five floating-rate mortgage loans
secured by 26 properties.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 8,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

"The preliminary ratings reflect our view of the credit support
provided by the subordinate classes of certificates, the liquidity
provided by the trustee, the underlying loans' economics, the
collateral's historical and projected performance, and the
transaction's structure. Standard & Poor's determined that the
pool has a debt service coverage ratio of 1.57x based on Standard
& Poor's net cash flow and assuming a weighted average debt
service constant of 9.8%, as well as a beginning and ending loan-
to-value ratio of 63.7% based on Standard & Poor's value," S&P
related.

             Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at

     http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111253.pdf

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-FL1

Class           Rating          Amount ($)
A               AAA (sf)       540,055,000
X-WAC           NR                     (i)
X-MHP           NR                     (i)
X-BCR           NR                     (i)
X-OFP           NR                     (i)
X-SPA           NR                     (i)
X-SPB           NR                     (i)
X-INA           NR                     (i)
X-INB           NR                     (i)
X-EXT           NR                     (i)
B               AA (sf)         67,725,000
C               A (sf)          61,015,000
D               BBB- (sf)       70,205,000
MH              BB (sf)     45,000,000(ii)

(i)Notional balance. (ii)The class MH certificates are nonpooled
and principal and interest payments thereon will be exclusively
funded by the subordinate portion of the Manhattan Hotel Portfolio
loan.


JPMCC 2003-CIBC6: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. H Notes at Ba1(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the rating of three
classes and affirmed 18 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-CIBC6:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. AC-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. AC-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. AC-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. BM-1, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. BM-2, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. BM-3, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2007 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to overall improved pool financial
performance and increased credit support due to loan payoffs and
amortization.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges for the pool. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.0% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.0%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
4.8% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and performance in the commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward trend will not
be evident until the volume of transactions increases, distressed
properties are cleared from the pipeline and job creation
rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery through the first half of 2011, while recovery
in the non-core office and retail sectors are tied to pace of
recovery of the broader economy. Core office markets are showing
signs of recovery through lending and leasing activity. The
availability of debt capital continues to improve with terms
returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 65 compared to 62 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated January 13, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 17% to $877 million
from $1,063 million at securitization. Significant payoffs are
expected within the next 24 months with loans representing 88% of
the pool facing near-term loan maturity. The Certificates are
collateralized by 119 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 29% of the pool. The pool contains one loan with an
investment grade credit estimate that represents 9% of the pool.
Twenty-four loans, representing 29% of the pool, have defeased and
are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Thirty-three loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a realized loss of $4.7 million (25%
loss severity). However, it should be noted that one loan
accounted for $4.5 million of this loss (61% loss severity) while
the remaining three loans all had loss severities of less than 2%.
Due to realized losses Class NR has experienced a 26% principal
loss. Currently four loans, representing 4.0% of the pool, are in
special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $3.6 million
loss (41% expected loss on average) for these specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $4.9 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 30%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 94% and 87%, respectively, of the performing
pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV for the conduit component is 78% compared to
82% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.50X and 1.40X, respectively, compared to
1.38X and 1.38X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Battlefield Mall Loan
($75.9 million -- 8.9%), which represents the senior component of
a $89.3 million mortgage loan secured by a 1.0 million square foot
(SF) regional mall located in Springfield, MO. The property is
also encumbered by a $13.4 million subordinate note which is the
security for the non-pooled classes BM1, BM2, and BM3. The mall is
anchored by J.C. Penney, two Dillard's stores, Sears and Macy's.
As of June 30, 2011 the mail was 97% leased compared to 96% at
last review. Performance has improved since last review due to
rising base rents. Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are
Aa1 and 1.95X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and 1.77X at last
review. In conjunction, Moody's has upgraded the non-pooled
classes associated with the subordinate note as outlined above.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 8.7% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the International Paper Office Loan
($30.7 million -- 3.6%), which is secured by a 214,060 SF Class A
office building located in Memphis, TN. The property is 100%
leased to International Paper through April 2017 which utilizes it
as the company's headquarters. The loan has amortized 2% since
last review. Performance has been stable. Moody's analysis is
based on a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
92% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.21X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Shelbyville Road Plaza Loan
($22.1 million -- 2.6%), which is secured by a 234,527 SF
community shopping center located in Louisville, KY. As of June
30, 2011 the property is 69% leased compared to 65% at last
review. Performance declined due to Linens-n-Things, Circuit City,
and Border's vacating the property since December 2008. However,
leases have been signed with Nike Factory Store and Trader Joe's.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.41X, respectively,
compared to 97% and 1.03X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Tices Corner Retail Marketplace Loan
($21.7 million -- 2.5%), which is secured by a 119,114 SF retail
center located in Woodcliff Lake, NJ. As of December 31, 2010 the
property is 100% leased, the same as last review. Tenants include
The Gap, Anthropologie, Pier 1 Imports, Apple, and J. Crew among
others. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 59% and 1.66X,
respectively, compared to 60% and 1.62X at last review.


JPMCC 2006-CIBC16: Moody's Affirms Cl. A-J Notes Rating at 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 22
classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Securities Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-CIBC16:

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.5% of the current lower pool balance compared to 10.2% at last
review. Moody's stressed scenario loss is 19.9% of the current
balance compared to 27.8% at last review. Since last review,
actual realized losses were lower for several liquidated specially
serviced loans in which Moody's had estimated higher overall
losses to be incurred. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and
the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans,
the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could
decline below the current levels. If future performance materially
declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and the
priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the
current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and performance in the commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward trend will not
be evident until the volume of transactions increases, distressed
properties are cleared from the pipeline and job creation
rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery through the first half of 2011, while recovery
in the non-core office and retail sectors are tied to the pace of
recovery of the broader economy. Core office markets are showing
signs of recovery through lending and leasing activity. The
availability of debt capital continues to improve with terms
returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 23 compared to 25 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

This rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 2, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 8% to
$1.978 billion from $2.147 billion at securitization and 4%
since Moody's prior review. The Certificates are collateralized
by 113 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1% to 13% of
the pool, with the top ten loans representing 54% of the pool. No
loans have defeased and there are no loans with credit estimates.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing transaction monitoring, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $36.9 million (28% loss severity
overall). Twelve loans, representing 14% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest loan in special
servicing is the REPM Portfolio Loan ($86.4 million -- 4.4% of
the pool), which is secured by 10 separate industrial buildings
totaling 1.6 million square feet (SF) and located in eight states.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2011 due to
imminent payment default. The second largest loan in special
servicing is the City View Portfolio I Loan ($69.0 million -- 3.5%
of the pool), which is secured by eight multifamily properties
totaling 2,712-units in Houston, Texas. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in February 2010 and is now real estate owned
(REO). Moody's has estimated an aggregate $108.3 million loss (38%
expected loss on average) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 28 poorly
performing loans representing 18% of the pool and has estimated a
$53.0 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Excluding specially serviced and defeased loans, Moody's was
provided with partial year 2011 operating results for 46% of the
pool and full year 2010 operating results for 93% of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 105% compared to 104% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.5%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.28X and 0.98X, respectively, compared to
1.32X and 0.99X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 29% of the
pool balance. The largest conduit loan is the RREEF Silicon
Valley Office Portfolio ($250 million -- 12.6% of the pool),
which is secured by a 36-property office portfolio located
across California. This loan represents a pari-passu interest
in a $700 million first mortgage loan. The loan is interest only
throughout the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117%
and 0.79X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.82X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the One and Two Prudential Plaza Loan
($205.0 million -- 10.4% of the pool), which is secured by two
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted Class A high-rise office
buildings located in the East Loop office submarket of Chicago,
Illinois. The buildings total 2.2 million SF and are Gold LEED
Certified. This loan represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a
$410 million first mortgage loan The property was 86% leased
as of March 2011 compared to 90% at last review. The decline in
occupancy led to a $10 million decline in revenue achievement.
The loan is interest only throughout the term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.79X, respectively, compared to 92%
and 1.06X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Prime Retail Outlets
Portfolio Loan ($110.2 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is
secured by three outlet centers totaling 780,000 SF. The
properties are located in Lee, Massachusetts; Gaffney, South
Carolina and Calhoun, Georgia. The properties were 89% leased as
of December 2010 compared to 95% at last review. Despite lower
occupancy, financial performance improved since last review due to
higher rental revenue achievement. The loan has also amortized 4%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and
1.25X, respectively, compared to 96% and 1.08X at last review.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Certificates to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-C3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction. "At the same time, we removed our ratings on three
of these classes from CreditWatch with negative implications. In
addition, we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on two other classes
from the same transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions primarily reflect our analysis of the
transaction using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust. Our analysis also considered
the transaction's near-term maturities. By balance, 51.6% of the
loans mature by the end of 2012, after excluding the 16 defeased
loans and five specially serviced assets. Our analysis also
reflects our application of the 'U.S. Government Support In
Structured Finance And Public Finance Ratings,' published
Sept. 19, 2011, on RatingsDirect on Global Credit Portal,
at www.globalcreditportal.com," S&P said

"We placed our ratings on the class B, C, and D certificates
on CreditWatch with negative implications on July 15, 2011, after
we placed our U.S. sovereign long-term rating on CreditWatch
negative. The trust has defeased loan collateral exposure of 39.3%
of the pool balance (as of the Oct. 12, 2011, trustee remittance
report)," S&P related.

"The downgrades reflect credit support erosion that we
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of the five
($35.2 million, 6.8%) assets with the special servicer, Torchlight
Loan Services LLC (Torchlight). We also considered the monthly
interest shortfalls affecting the trust and the reduced liquidity
support resulting from the interest shortfalls. We lowered our
rating on class F to 'D (sf)' because we expect interest
shortfalls to continue and believe the accumulated interest
shortfalls on this class will remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future," S&P said.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class X-1 interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria," S&P related.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated
an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.43x and a loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio of 72.5%. We further stressed the loans' cash
flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 1.23x and an LTV ratio of 90.8%. The implied defaults and
loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 20.1% and 40.3%. The
DSC and LTV calculations noted above exclude 16 defeased loans
($203.2 million, 39.3%) and the five ($35.2 million, 6.8%)
specially serviced assets. We separately estimated losses for
these assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures," S&P related.

As of the Oct. 12, 2011 trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $299,310
primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
(ASER) amounts of $16,427, special servicing fees of $25,025,
other interest loss of $104,977, and interest not advanced of
$151,947. The interest shortfalls affected all classes subordinate
to and including class D. "According to the master servicer, the
$104,977 other interest loss reflected the recovery of servicer's
advances for two of the specially serviced assets. This recovery
of advances is now complete, and we do not expect it to continue.
While classes D, E, and F have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding between two and seven months, we expect the
accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding for
class F in the near term. Consequently, we lowered our rating
on this class to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 12, 2011, trustee remittance report, five
($35.2 million, 6.8%) assets in the pool were with the
special servicer, Torchlight. The reported payment status
of the specially serviced assets as of the October 2011
trustee remittance report is: one is real estate owned (REO)
($17.2 million, 3.3%), three ($7.2 million, 1.4%) are in
foreclosure, and one ($10.8 million, 2.1%) is 90-plus-days
delinquent. Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling
$3.4 million are in effect for three of the specially serviced
assets. The master servicer made a nonrecoverability determination
on the remaining two specially serviced assets. Details of the
three largest specially serviced assets, two of which are top 10
assets, are:

The 78 Corporate Center asset ($17.2 million, 3.3%) is the fourth-
largest asset in the pool and the largest specially serviced
asset. The asset has a total reported exposure of $20.3 million.
The asset comprises two office buildings totaling 185,850 sq. ft.
in Lebanon, N.J. The asset was transferred to the special servicer
on Jan. 10, 2009, due to payment default and became REO on Aug. 7,
2009. Torchlight indicated that it recently approved a new
lease at the property. No recent financial information is
available for this REO property. Based on the recent available
appraisal, the master servicer has made a nonrecoverability
determination on this asset. "We expect a significant loss upon
the eventual resolution of this asset," S&P related.

The Sibley Building loan ($10.8 million, 2.1%) is the eighth-
largest asset in the pool and the second-largest specially
serviced asset. The total reported exposure for this loan is
$11.6 million. The loan is secured by a 250,095-sq.-ft. office
building in Syracuse, N.Y. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Oct. 29, 2010, due to imminent payment default. The
reported payment status of the loan is 90-plus-days delinquent.
The special servicer indicated that it is currently evaluating its
rights and remedies per the loan documents. The reported DSC as of
year-end 2009 was 1.26x; however, the property is currently 19.0%
occupied. Based on the recent available appraisal, the master
servicer has declared this asset nonrecoverable. "We expect a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P
said.

The Stonebrook Apartments loan ($4.1 million, 0.8%) is the third-
largest specially serviced asset. The total reported exposure for
this loan is $4.4 million. The loan is secured by a 174-unit
multifamily property in Atlanta. The loan was transferred to
special servicing on Feb. 9, 2011, due to imminent default. The
special servicer indicated that it has filed for foreclosure. The
reported DSC as of year-end 2009 was 0.72x. An ARA of $2.2 million
is in effect against the loan. "Based on the most recent available
appraisal, we expect a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan," S&P said.

The remaining two specially serviced assets have balances that
individually represent less than 0.5% of the total pool balance.
ARAs totaling $1.2 million are in effect against these two assets.
"We estimated losses for these two assets, arriving at a weighted-
average loss severity of 47.1%," S&P related.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 12, 2011, trustee remittance report, the total pool
balance was $516.7 million, which is 69.3% of the pool balance at
issuance. The pool includes 73 loans and one REO asset, down from
87 loans at issuance. The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), provided financial information for 93.6%
of the assets in the pool, the majority of which was full-year
2010 data (82.1%), with the remainder reflecting full-year
2009 or partial-year 2011 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.46x for the assets
in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted
DSC and LTV ratio were 1.43x and 72.5%. Our adjusted DSC and LTV
figures excluded 16 defeased loans ($203.2 million, 39.3%) and
the five ($35.2 million, 6.8%) specially serviced assets. We
separately estimated losses for the specially serviced assets
and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and
loss severity figures. To date, the transaction has experienced
$42.8 million in principal losses in connection with five assets.
Ten loans ($52.1 million, 10.1%) in the pool are on the master
servicer's watchlist. Ten loans ($30.6 million, 5.9%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, seven of which ($21.6 million,
4.2%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x," S&P said.

        Summary of Top 10 Assets Secured By Real Estate

The top 10 assets secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $144.5 million (28.0%). "Using
servicer-reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.50x for eight of the top 10 assets. The remaining
two top 10 assets ($28.0 million, 5.4%) are with the special
servicer. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for eight of the
top 10 assets were 1.34x and 78.2%, respectively. In addition,
the fifth-largest asset is on the master servicer's watchlist.
The Getronics Campus loan ($12.2 million, 2.3%) is the largest
loan on the master servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by a
278,802-sq.-ft. office building in Liberty Lake, Wash. The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported
occupancy. The reported DSC as of year-end 2010 was 1.83x. The
reported occupancy as of the June 30, 2011, rent roll was 68.0%,"
S&P stated.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
current criteria. "The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with our lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C3
                Rating
Class      To         From              Credit enhancement (%)
B          AA+ (sf)   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg                18.77
C          AA- (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg                 16.96
D          BB+ (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg                 12.27

Ratings Lowered

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C3

                Rating
Class      To         From              Credit enhancement (%)
E        B+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)                         10.47
F        D (sf)       B- (sf)                            6.14

Ratings Affirmed

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C3

Class    Rating                      Credit enhancement (%)
A-2      AAA (sf)                                     24.17
X-1      AAA (sf)                                       N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


LB-UBS 2005-C2: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating of Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) placed the ratings of eight
classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C2 on review for possible
downgrade:

Cl. A-J, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on December 17, 2010 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. G, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to an
increase in interest shortfalls, higher expected losses from The
Woodbury Office Portfolio Loans ($219.4 million; 18.2% of the
pool) and the Park 80 West Loan ($100.0 million; 8.3% of the pool)
and decreased diversity of loan size in the pool.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2010.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 38% to
$1.21 billion from $1.94 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 86 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 66% of the pool. Three loans, representing 19% of
the pool, have investment grade credit estimates. Four loans,
representing 5.9% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-nine loans, representing 41% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $35.9 million (17% loss severity). Currently 16
loans, representing 26% of the pool, are in special servicing.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans, interest shortfalls and the
performance of the overall pool.


LEAF RECEIVABLES: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
LLC - Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2011-2:

  -- Series 2011-2, Class A-1A Notes rated R-1 (high) (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2, Class A-1B Notes rated R-1 (high) (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2, Class A-2 Notes rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2, Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2, Class C Notes rated A (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2, Class D Notes rated BBB (high) (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2, Class E-1 Notes rated BBB (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2, Class E-2 Notes rated BB (sf)


LEHMAN BROTHERS: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Ratings on 2 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 20
classes from 18 commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

"We withdrew our ratings on 17 classes from 15 CMBS transactions
following the repayment of each class's principal balance, as
noted in each transaction's trustee remittance report. We withdrew
our ratings on three interest-only (IO) classes from three CMBS
transactions following the reductions of the classes' notional
balances as noted in each transaction's October trustee remittance
reports," S&P said.

Ratings Withdrawn Following Repayment Or Reduction Of Principal
Balance

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-PB1

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
F                        NR                  AAA (sf)

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-4

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
XP                       NR                  AAA (sf)

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF2

                                Rating
Class                    To                  From
D                        NR                  AA (sf)

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-TOP8
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

CDC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-FX1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C5

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-3

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

                                Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

JPMorgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C8

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
F                        NR                  BB (sf)

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-3                      NR                  AAA (sf)

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C7
Commercial mortgage pass through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
X-CP                     NR                  AAA (sf)

Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF
C5 Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
DMC-1                    NR                  CCC- (sf)
DMC-2                    NR                  CCC- (sf)

Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-Canada
14

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
XP-1                     NR                  AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-TOP17
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-4                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-NM                     NR                  AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A4                       NR                  AAA (sf)
B                        NR                  AAA (sf)

TIAA Seasoned Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C3

                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)


LITIGATION SETTLEMENT: Moody's Reviews Ba1 Rating; Might Upgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed under review for a possible
upgrade Subordinated Deferrable Interest Certificates issued by
Litigation Settlement Monetized Fee Trust I (LSMFT I). The trust
was formed to securitize payments to 11 law firms resulting from
the settlement of tobacco-related litigation between the State of
Florida and the largest domestic tobacco manufacturers: Altria
Group, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, and Lorillard Tobacco Company. The
securitization trust issued senior certificates backed by the
participating law firms' portion of the quarterly payments from
the tobacco manufacturers. Five of the 11 law firms also
securitized the residual payments due to them with the issuance
of the subordinated certificates.

Issuer: Litigation Settlement Monetized Fee Trust, Series 2001-1-B

Subordinated Deferrable Interest Certificates, Ba1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Apr 7, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATING RATIONALE

The review action was prompted by a full repayment of the senior
certificates and the consequent reallocation of available funds
(net of fees and expenses) toward the subordinated certificates.
Transaction documents state that the subordinated certificates are
entitled only to the cash flow remaining after the payment of
interest and scheduled principal on the senior certificates. Any
shortfalls in interest payments due on the subordinated
certificates can be covered by funds in the Subordinated Note
Liquidated Fee Reserve Account ( SNLFRC). However, ongoing
litigation has prevented draws from this account, and the
resulting shortfalls in the interest payments on the subordinated
certificates caused us to downgrade them to Ba1 (sf) on April 7,
2010.

Since the senior certificates were fully repaid in October 2011,
all available funds will be directed toward interest and principal
payments on the subordinated certificates. On the October 2011
payment date all unpaid and accrued interest on the subordinated
certificates ($2.8 million) has been fully repaid and principal
amortization of the certificates has commenced.

METHODOLOGY

Moody's analyzes cash flows of the securitization and evaluates
their sufficiency to repay the principal and any accrued interest
by legal maturity. Moody's uses Monte Carlo simulation, with the
tobacco manufacturers' probabilities of default as the main
simulated variable. Moody's derives expected revenues and
distributions and feed them through the transaction's priority of
payments to assess the potential performance of the certificates
under expected and stressed scenarios.

The main parameter that was used to project transaction's cash
flows was the probability of default of the tobacco manufacturers.
For each manufacturer the probability is a function of their
respective ratings. Altria Group, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, and
Lorillard are currently rated by Moody's Baa1, Baa3, and Baa2,
respectively.

Moody's considers the resulting expected reduction in yield,
default frequency and expected loss on the certificates in making
a rating decision. In addition, Moody's considers qualitative
factors, such as transaction's leverage, expected repayment, legal
risk and a probability of payment dilution as a result of the
addition of another law firm to the settlement.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found in the Rating
Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.


MERRILL LYNCH: DBRS Confirms Class F Rating at 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed these ratings of all 18 classes of Merrill
Lynch Financial Assets Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-Canada 15:

Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
Class B at AA (high) (sf)
Class C at A (high) (sf)
Class D-1 at BBB (high) (sf)
Class D-2 at BBB (high) (sf)
Class E-1 at BBB (sf)
Class E-2 at BBB (sf)
Class F at BB (high) (sf)
Class G at BB (sf)
Class H at BB (low) (sf)
Class J at B (high) (sf)
Class K at B (sf)
Class L at B (low) (sf)
Class XC-1 at AAA (sf)
Class XC-2 at AAA (sf)
Class XP-1 at AAA (sf)
Class XP-2 at AAA (sf)

DBRS does not rate the $3.8 million first loss piece, Class M.
The trends for all rated classes of the transaction are Stable.

The rating confirmations are supported by transaction-level
performance that is in line with the metrics at the time of the
last DBRS review.  The transaction has a healthy weighted-average
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.75 times (x) and a
weighted-average debt yield of 21.7%.  Furthermore, two loans,
representing approximately 10% of the current pool balance, are
fully defeased.  Since the last review, credit enhancement to the
bonds has increased, primarily as a result of loan amortization.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated one loan (12.7% of the current pool
balance) as investment grade.  DBRS has confirmed that the
performance of this loan remains consistent with investment-grade
loan characteristics.

This transaction also has exposure to single-tenant risk, with a
group of nine loans secured by properties that are fully leased to
a RONA inc. (Rona) home and garden retail store.  The loans are
not cross-collateralized and represent 23.5% of the current pool
balance.  The properties are located in various cities throughout
Ontario and Qu‚bec, and the Rona leases are not set to expire
until November 2019.  DBRS currently rates Rona at BBB with
Negative trend.

There are four loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing a
combined 3.8% of the pool.  The largest of the watchlisted loans
is Prospectus ID#20, Royal Windsor (2.6% of the current pool
balance).  This loan is secured by a 200,000 square foot (sf) flex
office and industrial property situated within an industrial
corridor in Mississauga, Ontario.  The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist because of the low occupancy rate, which was 60% as of
the June 2011 rent roll, compared with 68% at YE2010 and 75% at
YE2009. As a result, the DSCR was 0.52x at YE2010, down from 1.06x
at YE2009.  Furthermore, there is near-term rollover risk, with a
tenant representing 15% of the net rentable area (NRA) on a lease
that is scheduled to expire in February 2012.  DBRS will continue
to monitor leasing activity at the property.

DBRS continues to monitor this transaction on a monthly basis in
the Global CMBS Monthly Surveillance report, which can provide
more detailed information on the individual loans in the pool.


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2008-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "In addition, we affirmed
our ratings on 10 other classes from the same transaction.
Furthermore, we withdrew our rating on the class A-1 certificates.
The rating withdrawal follows the full repayment of the class'
principal balance, as noted in the trustee remittance report," S&P
stated.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust. Our
downgrades reflect credit support erosion that we anticipate
will occur upon the resolution of six ($32.3 million, 3.5%)
of the eight ($193.1 million, 21.0%) assets with the special
servicer. The downgrades also considered reduced liquidity
support available to these classes and the potential for these
classes to experience interest shortfalls in the future relating
to the specially serviced assets. We lowered our ratings on the
class K and L certificates to 'D (sf)' because we expect interest
shortfalls to continue and believe the accumulated interest
shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future,"
S&P said.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class X interest only (IO) certificates based
on our current criteria," S&P said.

"We withdrew our rating on the class A-1 certificates following
the full repayment of its principal balance, as noted in the
Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report," S&P related.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of the remaining assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.36x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 110.7%.
We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.84x and an LTV ratio of
158.2%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 94.5% and 38.6%. Our adjusted DSC and LTV figures
excluded six ($32.3 million, 3.5%) of the eight ($193.1 million,
21.0%) assets that are currently with the special servicer, for
which we separately estimated losses and included in our 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

As of the Oct. 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $79,413 primarily
related to special servicing fees of $61,338 and appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts of $89,956, which
was offset by ASER recoveries totaling $78,882. "The interest
shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and including class
K. Classes K and L experienced cumulative interest shortfalls
for six months, and we expect these interest shortfalls to
continue in the near term. Consequently, we downgraded these
classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P related.

                     Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, eight
assets ($193.1 million, 21.0%) in the pool were with the
special servicers, LNR Partners LLC (LNR) for the Farallon
Portfolio loan, and Midland Loan Services Inc. (Midland) for
all other assets. The reported payment status of the specially
serviced assets as of the most recent trustee remittance report
is: one is real estate owned (REO; $1.6 million, 0.2%), five are
90-plus-days delinquent ($36.3 million, 3.9%), one is 60-plus-days
delinquent ($5.5 million, 0.6%), one is less than 30 days
delinquent ($296.7 million, 8.6%), one is in its grace period
($72.4 million, 2.1%), and one is current ($149.7 million, 16.3%).
Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $17.2 million are in
effect for seven of the specially serviced assets. Details of the
two largest specially serviced assets, one of which is a top 10
asset, are:

The Farallon Portfolio loan is the largest asset in the pool and
the largest asset with the special servicer, LNR. The loan is
secured by 253 manufactured housing communities totaling 53,499
pads in various states. The whole-loan balance is $1.49 billion
and consists of 45 A and B notes, $149.7 million of which makes up
16.3% of the pool trust balance. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on June 25, 2010, due to imminent default. The
reported payment status of the loan is current. LNR indicated that
the loan was modified April 15, 2011. The modification terms
include, among other items, extending the maturity to Aug. 1,
2015, on the floating-rate, five- and seven-year notes, trapping
excess cash flows, and adding Helix MHC Investment LLC, a sponsor
controlled entity, as an additional carve-out guarantor. The
reported DSC and occupancy for the portfolio were 1.99x for the
12 months ended Sept. 30, 2010, and 81.0% as of March 2011,
respectively. Pursuant to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee that is 1% of all future
principal and interest payments if the loan performs and remains
with the master servicer. According to LNR, the borrower is not
paying the special servicing and workout fees on this loan. The
loan is expected to be returned to the master servicer in the near
future.

The Heritage Financial Center loan ($11.1 million, 1.2%) is the
second-largest asset with the special servicer, Midland. The loan
has a total reported exposure of $11.8 million and is secured by a
61,163-sq. ft. office building in Agoura Hills, Calif. The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 16, 2010, due to
imminent default. The reported payment status is 90-plus days
delinquent.  Midland is current in discussions with the borrower
regarding the borrower's modification proposal. An ARA of
$3.6 million is in effect against the loan. As of the trailing-12
months ending October 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were
0.98x and 86.0%.

The six remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 1.0% of the pooled trust
balance. ARAs totaling $13.6 million are in effect against these
six assets. "We estimated losses for these six specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 43.9%,"
S&P said.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $92.9 million, or 97.1% of the balance at
issuance. The pool includes 89 loans and one REO asset, down from
92 loans at issuance. The master servicers, Midland Loan Services
Inc. (Midland), Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Servicing, and
Bank of America N.A. (BofA), provided financial information for
98.5% of the loans in the pool, 64.8% of which was full-year
2010 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for the assets
in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted
DSC and LTV ratio were 1.36x and 110.7%. Our adjusted DSC and
LTV figures excluded six ($32.3 million, 3.5%) of the eight
($193.1 million, 21.0%) assets that are currently with the special
servicer, for which we separately estimated losses and included in
our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures. To
date, the transaction has experienced $8.0 million in losses
related to two assets. Twenty-six loans ($286.1 million, 31.1%) in
the pool are on the master servicers' watchlist. Twenty-three
loans ($159.9 million, 17.4%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.10x, 18 of which ($123.4 million, 13.4%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.00x," S&P said.

                     Summary of Top 10 Assets

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$484.7 billion (52.6%). "Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.50x for the top 10 assets.
The largest asset in the pool is with the special servicer. Four
of the top 10 assets ($157.5 million, 17.1%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top
10 assets were 1.41x and 116.2%," S&P stated.

The Arundel Mills loan, the second-largest asset in the pool, has
a $63.3 million (6.9%) trust balance. The loan, which is secured
by a 1,289,907-sq.-ft. regional mall in Hanover, Md., is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC. As of the
trailing-12-months ended June 30, 2011, the reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.15x and 97.4%. According to the master servicer,
BofA, the loan does not meet the watchlist criteria and will be
removed as of the November 2011 trustee remittance report.

The Apple Hotel Portfolio loan, the third-largest asset in the
pool, has a $63.1 million (6.9%) trust balance. The loan, which is
secured by 27 lodging properties in 14 states, is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a below 1.40x DSC. As of the trailing-
12-months ended June 30, 2011, the reported DSC and occupancy were
1.34x and 70%.

The Landmark Towers loan, the eighth-largest asset in the pool,
has a $16.0 million (1.7%) trust balance. The loan, which is
secured by a 212,595-sq.-ft. office condominium interest of the
Landmark Towers and Park Towers building in St. Paul, Minn., is on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC of 0.71x
as of year-end 2010. The reported occupancy was 87% for the same
period.

The Savoy Plaza loan, the 10th-largest asset in the pool, has a
$15.1 million (1.6%) trust balance. The loan, which is secured by
a 143,037-sq.-ft. anchored retail center in Savoy, Ill., is on the
master servicer's watchlist to due a low reported DSC of 0.85x as
of year-end 2010. The reported occupancy was 80.0% according to
the March 31, 2009, the most recent rent roll provided by the
master servicer, Midland.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its current criteria. "The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with our lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P related.

Ratings Lowered

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                Rating
Class      To           From     Credit enhancement (%)
AJ         BB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)                  13.68
AJ-A       BB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)                  13.68
AJ-AF      BB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)                  13.68
B          BB (sf)      BBB- (sf)                 12.52
C          BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)                  11.23
D          B+ (sf)      BB (sf)                   10.33
E          B+ (sf)      BB- (sf)                   9.43
F          B (sf)       B+ (sf)                    8.40
G          B- (sf)      B+ (sf)                    7.37
H          CCC+ (sf)    B+ (sf)                    6.21
J          CCC (sf)     B+ (sf)                    4.92
K          D (sf)       CCC (sf)                   3.77
L          D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                  2.86

Ratings Affirmed

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating       Credit enhancement (%)
A-2        AAA (sf)                      30.04
A-3        AAA (sf)                      30.04
A-SB       AAA (sf)                      30.04
A-4        AA- (sf)                      30.04
A-1A       AA- (sf)                      30.04
A-1AF      AA- (sf)                      30.04
AM         A- (sf)                       19.73
AM-A       A- (sf)                       19.73
AM-AF      A- (sf)                       19.73
X          AAA (sf)                        N/A

Rating Withdrawn

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class   To      From
A-1     NR      AAA (sf)

N/A -- Not applicable. NR-Not rated.


MLCFC 2006-3: Moody's Affirms Cl. B Notes Rating at 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 18
classes of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-3, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-3:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. AM, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. AJ, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
7.1% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8.0%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
30.5% of the current balance. At last review, realized losses
represented 1.3% of the then current pooled balance. Since the
prior review, realized losses have increased to 2.6% of the
current pooled balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs
and the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced
loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and performance in the commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward trend will not
be evident until the volume of transactions increases, distressed
properties are cleared from the pipeline and job creation
rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to
show signs of recovery through the first half of 2011, while
recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are tied to
pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office markets are
showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing activity.
The availability of debt capital continues to improve with
terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 37 compared to 36 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 2, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 8% to $2.23 billion
from $2.42 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 197 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 38% of the pool.

Sixty-seven loans, representing 42% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

The trust has taken losses on 15 loans to date resulting in $62.7
million in realized losses. $39.3 million in realized losses have
come from loan liquidations while the remainder have come from a
combination of non-recoverable advances and loan modifications
resulting in principal write-downs. Currently 19 loans,
representing 8% of the pool, are in special servicing. The
specially serviced properties are secured by a mix of property
types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $65.3 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (41% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 23 poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $26 million loss (17% expected loss based on a 53%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 93%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 111% compared to 112% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.4%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.17X and 0.96X, respectively, compared to
1.17X and 0.95X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 23% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is The Atrium Hotel Portfolio Loan ($247.0 million --
11.1% of the pool), which is secured by six full service hotels
totaling 1,473 guestrooms. The portfolio consists of five hotels
which operate under the Embassy Suites franchise and one
independent hotel. As of March 2011, the portfolio's occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR were 72%, $122, and $89 respectively. RevPAR of
each property's competitive sets were $62 on average. The loan's
interest only period recently ended and the loan is amortizing on
a 30-year schedule through maturity. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 152% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 145% and 0.93X at
last full review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Stonestown Mall Loan
($151.1 million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in an 860,500 square foot regional mall and
adjacent 56,000 square foot medical office building located in San
Francisco, California. The borrower is an affiliate of General
Growth Properties Inc. (GGP) and the loan had been included in
GGP's bankruptcy filing. The center is anchored by Macy's and
Nordstrom, which are not part of the collateral. The property was
72% leased as of March 2011 compared to 84% at last review. The
loss of Border's attributed to a majority of the occupancy loss
since the prior review. Additionally, performance has declined as
tenants continue to vacate the property. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 104% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 91% and 1.13X
at last full review.

The third largest conduit loan is Wilton Portfolio Pool I Loan
($121.8 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by 45
commercial properties located in and around Richmond, Virginia.
The portfolio totals 1.9 million square feet and consists of
retail (77% of the allocated loan balance), industrial/flex (18%)
and office (5%). Overall, the portfolio is stable and benefitting
from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and
1.05X, respectively, compared to 97% and 1.05X at last full
review.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-IQ6, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "In addition, we
affirmed our ratings on eight other classes from the same
transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction, the
deal structure, and the liquidity available to the trust primarily
using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria. The downgrades
reflect credit support erosion that we anticipate will occur upon
the resolution of four ($8.9 million, 1.1%) specially serviced
assets," S&P said.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class X-1, X-2, and X-Y interest-only
certificates based on our current criteria," S&P said.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
the remaining assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.60x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 77.7%.
We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.30x and an LTV ratio of
95.4%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 16.4% and 32.7%, respectively. The DSC and LTV
calculations noted exclude the four ($8.9 million, 1.1%) assets
with the special servicer. We separately estimated losses for
these assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

"Our analysis also considered the transaction's near-term
maturities. By balance, 4.6% of the loans mature by the end of
2012 and 29.8% mature by the end of 2013, excluding the 22
defeased loans and four specially serviced assets," S&P related.

                    Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, four assets
($8.9 million, 1.1%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III). The reported payment status
for each of these assets is 90-plus-days delinquent And there are
no appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect against them.
Details of these assets, none of which are top 10 assets, are:

All four specially serviced assets ($8.9 million, 1.1%) are
single-tenant retail properties occupied by Borders Group Inc.
(Borders). The single-tenant retail properties range in size from
24,600 sq. ft to 28,000 sq. ft. in Oklahoma City, Omaha, Columbia,
Md., and Germantown, Md. These loans were transferred to the
special servicer on Feb. 24, 2011, due to imminent default
after Borders filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Feb. 16, 2011.
"On June 21, 2011, Borders won Bankruptcy Court approval to
liquidate its entire business platform and close all of its
operating stores. We expect minimum to moderate losses upon the
eventual resolution of each of these assets," S&P said.

                         Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $805.3 million, which is 80.7% of the balance at
issuance. The pool consists of 163 loans, down from 175 loans at
issuance. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells
Fargo), provided financial information for 99.5% of the loans in
the pool, of which 90.1% was partial- or full-year 2010 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.67x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio were 1.60x and 77.7%. Our adjusted DSC and LTV
figures excluded the four ($8.9 million, 1.1%) specially serviced
assets in the trust. We separately estimated losses for these
specially serviced assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss severity figures. The transaction has
experienced $9.0 million in principal losses from 2 assets to
date. Thirteen loans ($26.1 million, 3.2%) in the pool are on the
master servicer's watchlist. Twenty-four loans ($53.4 million,
6.6%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x, and seven loans
($20.8 million, 2.6%) have a reported DSC between 1.00x and
1.10x," S&P said.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$381.1 million (47.3%). "Using servicer-reported numbers,
we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.76x for the top 10
loans. None of the top 10 loans appear on the master servicer's
watchlist. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top 10 assets
are 1.65x and 73.6%," S&P said. Details of the two largest loans
in the pool are:

The Mall at Tuttle Crossing loan ($110.9 million, 13.8%) is the
largest loan in the pool. The loan is secured by 380,953 sq. ft.
out of a 1.1 million-sq.-ft. super regional mall in Dublin, Ohio
which opened in 1997. The reported DSC as of Dec. 31, 2010, was
2.20x and occupancy was 90.0% according to the June 30, 2011, rent
roll.

The 840 N. Michigan loan ($54.7 million, 6.8%) is the second-
largest loan in the pool. The loan is secured by an 87,136-sq.-
ft., four-story class A retail building, constructed in 1991, on
North Michigan Avenue (The Magnificent Mile) in Chicago. The
reported DSC as of Dec. 31, 2010, was 1.25x and occupancy was
100% according to the June 30, 2011 rent roll.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its current criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-IQ6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-IQ6
                Rating
Class      To             From      Credit enhancement (%)
D          A- (sf)        A (sf)                      6.01
E          BBB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                   5.08
F          BBB- (sf)      BBB (sf)                    3.69
G          BB- (sf)       BBB- (sf)                   2.76
H          B+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)                    1.98
J          B- (sf)        BB (sf)                     1.36
K          CCC+ (sf)      BB- (sf                     1.05
L          CCC (sf)       B+ (sf)                     0.74
M          CCC- (sf)      B (sf)                      0.43
N          CCC- (sf)      B- (sf)                     0.12

Ratings Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-IQ6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-IQ6

Class      Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-3        AAA (sf)                             14.37
A-4        AAA (sf)                             14.37
A-1A       AAA (sf)                             14.17
B          AA+ (sf)                             11.12
C          A+ (sf)                               7.40
X-1        AAA (sf)                               N/A
X-2        AAA (sf)                               N/A
X-Y        AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Lowers Ratings on 4 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "Concurrently, we
affirmed our ratings on seven other classes from the same
transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria. Our
analysis also included a review of the deal structure and the
liquidity available to the trust. The downgrades reflect credit
support erosion that we anticipate will occur upon the resolution
of the 20 assets ($218.6 million, 8.7%) that are with the special
servicer and two loans ($16.1 million, 0.6%) that we determined
to be credit-impaired. We also considered the monthly interest
shortfalls affecting the trust. We lowered our ratings on the
class J, K, L, and M certificates to 'D (sf)' because we believe
the accumulated interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for
the foreseeable future," S&P said.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class X-1 and X-2 interest-only certificates
based on our current criteria," S&P related.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of the remaining assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.30x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 111.9%.
We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.84x and an LTV ratio of
156.0%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 91.5% and 39.0%. The DSC and LTV calculations noted
above exclude the 20 specially serviced assets ($218.6 million,
8.7%) and two loans ($16.1 million, 0.6%) that we determined to be
credit-impaired. We separately estimated losses for these assets
and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures," S&P said.

As of the Oct. 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $507,184
primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
(ASER) amounts of $433,360, special servicing fees of $42,837, and
reimbursement for interest on advances of $24,609. "The interest
shortfalls affected all classes subordinate to and including class
J. Classes J, K, L, and M have had cumulative interest shortfalls
outstanding between one and two months, and we expect these
interest shortfalls to continue in the near term. Consequently, we
downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, 20 assets
($218.6 million, 8.7%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III). The reported payment
status of the specially serviced assets as of the October 2011
trustee remittance report is: four are real estate owned (REO;
$56.2 million, 2.3%), one is in foreclosure ($4.3 million, 0.2%),
12 are 90-plus-days delinquent ($131.4 million, 5.2%), one is 30
days delinquent ($10.0 million, 0.4%), one is less than 30 days
delinquent ($8.6 million, 0.3%), and one is current ($8.1 million,
0.3%). ARAs totaling $81.7 million are in effect against 12 of the
specially serviced assets. Details of the three largest specially
serviced assets, two of which are top 10 assets, are:

The Marriott Columbia loan ($41.3 million, 1.6%), the ninth-
largest asset in the pool, is secured by a 300-room full-service
hotel in Columbia, S.C. The loan has a reported 90-plus-days
delinquent payment status and a reported total exposure of
$43.0 million. The loan was transferred to C-III on May 28, 2010,
due to imminent default. C-III indicated that a foreclosure
agreement has been signed and the property is being marketed for
sale. The reported DSC for the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2010, was
0.18x according to the special servicer. An ARA of $22.0 million
is in effect against the loan. "We expect a significant loss upon
the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P related.

The Ashtabula Mall loan ($39.8 million, 1.6%), the 10th-largest
asset in the pool, is secured by a 754,882-sq.-ft. regional mall
in Ashtabula, Ohio. The loan has a reported total exposure of
$42.7 million and was transferred to the special servicer on
Sept. 20, 2010, due to imminent monetary default. The reported
payment status of the loan is 90-plus-days delinquent. The
reported DSC for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009, was 0.69x
and occupancy at the mall was 42.7% as of June 30, 2011. C-III
indicated that it is pursuing foreclosure. An ARA of $14.6 million
is in effect against the loan. "We expect a significant loss upon
the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P said.

The Crowne Plaza-Addison asset ($36.6 million, 1.5%) consists
of a 429-room full-service hotel in Addison, Texas. The asset
has a reported total exposure of $40.5 million. The asset was
transferred to C-III on Feb. 5, 2010, due to imminent default and
became REO on March 1, 2011. C-III stated that the property is
currently listed for sale with disposition expected as early as
in December 2011. NOI was not reported for this asset. An ARA of
$21.8 million is in effect against the asset. "We expect a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset," S&P
said.

The 17 remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent 0.4% or less of the pooled trust balance.
ARAs totaling $23.3 million are in effect against nine of these
assets. "We estimated losses for the 17 assets, arriving at a
weighted-average loss severity of 42.9%," S&P related.

"Subsequent to the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report,
the master servicer informed us that the fourth-largest asset
in the pool, the Hilton Daytona Beach loan, was transferred
to the special servicer due to imminent default. This loan
($94.7 million, 3.8%) is secured by a 744-room full-service
Hilton hotel in Daytona Beach, Fla. The loan's reported payment
status is current. The reported DSC was 0.84x for the 12 months
ended June 30, 2011, and the reported occupancy at the property
was 63.9% as of March 2011," S&P said.

"In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined
two loans ($16.1 million, 0.6%) to be credit-impaired primarily
because both loans have a delinquent payment status. The Prospect
Square loan ($12.6 million, 0.5%) has a reported 30-days-
delinquent payment status and is secured by a 113,146-sq.-ft.
retail property in Cincinnati. The reported DSC was 0.96x for
year-end 2010. The master servicer indicated that the loan may
be transferred to the special servicer due to imminent default.
The other loan, the Gateway Center loan ($3.5 million, 0.1%),
has a reported 30-days-delinquent payment status and is secured
by a 28,240-sq.-ft. retail center in Newberry, S.C. The master
servicer reported a 1.11x DSC for year-end 2010 and the reported
occupancy at the collateral property is currently at 73.0%. The
master servicer stated that the loan was recently transferred to
the special servicer due to imminent default. As a result, we
viewed both loans to be at an increased risk of default and loss,"
S&P said.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $2.5 billion, which is 97.2% of the balance at
issuance. The pool consists of 217 loans and four REO assets,
down from 234 loans at issuance. The master servicers, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC, NCB FSB, and Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
provided financial information for 97.0% of the loans in the
pool: 85.2% was partial- or full-year 2010 data, 5.7% was partial-
year 2011 data, and the remainder was 2009 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.28x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio were 1.30x and 111.9%. Our adjusted DSC and LTV
figures excluded the 20 specially serviced assets ($218.6 million,
8.7%) and the two loans ($16.1 million, 0.6%) that we determined
to be credit-impaired. We separately estimated losses for these
assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and
loss severity figures. If we included the special serviced and
credit-impaired assets our adjusted DSC would have been 1.26x. The
transaction has experienced $18.1 million in principal losses from
13 assets to date. Seventy loans ($641.7 million, 25.4%) in the
pool are on the master servicers' combined watchlist. Forty-three
loans ($487.2 million, 19.3%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.00x, and 24 loans ($216.1 million, 8.6%) have a reported DSC
between 1.00x and 1.10x," S&P said.

                      Summary of Top 10 Assets

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$949.1 million (37.6%). "Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.39x for eight of the
top 10 assets. The remaining two assets ($81.1 million, 3.2%)
were with the special servicer as of the October 2011 trustee
remittance report. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for eight of
the top 10 assets were 1.34x and 110.0%.  The Milford Crossing
loan ($75.5 million, 3.0%) is the eighth-largest asset in the
pool and the second-largest loan on the master servicers'
combined watchlist. The loan, secured by a 379,685-sq.-ft.
anchored retail property in Milford, Conn., is on the master
servicers' combined watchlist due to a low reported DSC, which
was 0.99x as of year-end 2010. The reported occupancy was 89.7%
according to the June 2011 rent roll," S&P related.

Ratings Lowered

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
              Rating
Class     To           From       Credit enhancement (%)
A-M       BBB (sf)     BBB+ (sf)                  19.85
A-MFL     BBB (sf)     BBB+ (sf)                  19.85
A-MA      BBB (sf)     BBB+ (sf)                  19.85
A-J       BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)                   12.14
A-JFL     BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)                   12.14
A-JA      BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)                   12.14
B         B+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)                   11.37
C         B+ (sf)      BB (sf)                    10.34
D         B (sf)       BB (sf)                     9.70
E         B (sf)       BB- (sf)                    8.15
F         B- (sf)      BB- (sf)                    7.64
G         CCC+ (sf)    B+ (sf)                     6.22
H         CCC (sf)     B+ (sf)                     5.20
J         D (sf)       B (sf)                      4.17
K         D (sf)       CCC (sf)                    2.88
L         D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                   2.50
M         D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                   2.11

Ratings Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-1       AAA (sf)                             30.14
A-2       AAA (sf)                             30.14
A-3       AAA (sf)                             30.14
A-4       A+ (sf)                              30.14
A-1A      A+ (sf)                              30.14
X-1       AAA (sf)                               N/A
X-2       AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


MSC 2003-TOP11: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. H Notes at 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the ratings of two
classes and affirmed 12 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-TOP11:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005 Confirmed
at A3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005 Confirmed
at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005 Confirmed
at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2005 Confirmed
at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2003
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to overall improved pool financial
performance and increased credit support due to loan payoffs and
amortization.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.8% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.0%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
4.4% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and performance in the commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward trend will not
be evident until the volume of transactions increases, distressed
properties are cleared from the pipeline and job creation
rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery through the first half of 2011, while recovery
in the non-core office and retail sectors are tied to pace of
recovery of the broader economy. Core office markets are showing
signs of recovery through lending and leasing activity. The
availability of debt capital continues to improve with terms
returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 67 compared to 61 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated January 13, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 13, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 39% to $722 million
from $1.195 million at securitization. Significant payoffs are
expected within the next 24 months with loans representing 85% of
the pool coming up for maturity. The Certificates are
collateralized by 154 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 28% of the pool. The pool contains five loans with
investment grade credit estimates that represents 18% of the pool.
Twenty-one loans, representing 18% of the pool, have defeased and
are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-five loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a realized loss of $5.3 million (6%
loss severity). However, it should be noted that four of these
loans had loss severities of less than 2% with the remaining five
loans exhibiting an overall loss severity of 16%. Due to realized
losses, Class NR has experienced a 45% principal loss. Currently
four loans, representing 3.2% of the pool, are in special
servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $7.6 million loss (33%
expected loss on average) for these specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $5.3 million loss (17% expected loss based on a 35%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 97% and 41%, respectively, of the performing
pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV for the conduit component is 64%, the same as
the prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.93X and 1.87X, respectively, compared to
1.55X and 1.86X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Center Tower Loan
($59.8 million - 8.3%), which is secured by a 462,191 square foot
(SF) Class A office building located in Costa Mesa (Orange
County), California. The property was 82% leased as of July 2011,
similar to last review. The largest tenants are Latham & Watkins
(24% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration July 2015),
Sheppard Mullin Richter (14% of the NRA; lease expiration April
2019) and Lewis, Bisbois, Bisgaar (12% of the NRA; lease
expiration July 2014). Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR
are A3 and 1.70X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.62X at last
review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the 516 West 34th Street
Loan ($22.2 million -- 3.1%), which is secured by a 264,443 SF
office building located in the Midtown Manhattan submarket of New
York City. The property is owned by and 100% occupied by Coach
Inc. Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A1 and 1.91X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 1.84X at last review.

The third loan with a credit estimate is the Rexmere Village MHC
Loan ($19.4 million -- 2.7%), which is secured by a 774-unit
manufactured housing community located in Davie, Florida. The
property was 97% leased as of June 2011 compared to 96% at last
review. The loan is interest-only for its entire 10-year term.
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and
1.85X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.84X at last review.

The fourth loan with a credit estimate is the ITT Gilfillan
Building Loan ($15.8 million -- 2.2%), which is secured by two
single-story industrial buildings totaling 278,077 SF, located in
Van Nuys, California. The buildings are 100% leased to ITT
Industries Inc. through January 2013. The loan matures in April
2013. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa3
and 2.35X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 2.22X at last review.

The fifth loan with a credit estimate is the 9401 Wilshire
Boulevard Loan ($13.7 million -- 1.9%), which is secured by a
127,662 SF office building located in Beverly Hills, California.
The property was 91% leased as of July 2011 compared to 89% at
last review. The largest tenant is Ervin, Cohen & Jessup (29% of
the NRA, lease expiration August 2017). Moody's current credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are A2 and 2.01X, respectively,
compared to A2 and 1.81X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 6% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Monterey Pines Apartments Loan
($16.6 million -- 2.3%), which is secured by a 286-unit garden
style apartment complex in San Jose, California. The property was
93% occupied as of December 2010 compared to 97% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.37X, respectively,
compared to 74% and 1.38X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Crown Point Corporate Center Loan
($14.9 million -- 2.1%), which is secured by a 129,030 SF office
building located in Gaithersburg, Maryland. The property was 61%
leased as of December 2010 compared to 71% at last review.
Property performance has declined as a result of the decline in
occupancy. The loan matures in December 2012. Moody's considers
this loan to have a high default probability due to its low
occupancy, soft market conditions and near-term maturity and has
identified it as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 163% and 0.66X, respectively compared to 154% and 0.67X as at
last review.

The third largest loan is the Bisso Corporate Center Loan
($13.5 million -- 1.9%), which is secured by a 141,532 SF office
building located in Concord, California. The property was 75%
leased as of December 2010. Bank of the West originally occupied
25% of the premises but vacated at its lease expiration in
December 2010. The current vacancy was reflected in Moody's
previous review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.47X,
respectively, compared to 76% and 1.39X at last review.


MSC 2006-HQ8: Moody's Affirms Cl. D Notes Rating at 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 22
classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HQ8:

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss
of 8.0% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 7.5%. Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 29.6% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and performance
in the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
continuing to show signs of recovery through the first half of
2011, while recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are
tied to pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office
markets are showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing
activity. The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 60 compared to 65 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 2, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 15% to
$2.32 billion from $2.73 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 246 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 29% of the pool. Four loans, representing
0.4% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with
U.S. Government securities.

Eighty-nine loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $23.2 million loss (52% loss severity on
average). Currently 30 loans, representing 13% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The master servicer has recognized appraisal
reductions totaling $97.2 million for the specially serviced
loans. Moody's has estimated a $125.3 million loss (40% expected
loss) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $14.1 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 97% and 87%, respectively, of the performing
pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV for the pool is 105% compared to 109% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 9% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs for the pool are 1.28X and 1.01X, respectively,
compared 1.28X and 0.98X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing represent 16% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Portfolio Loan ($172.8 million --
7.4%), which is secured by four Ritz-Carlton hotel properties
located in New York City (2) and Washington, D.C. (2). The
portfolio originally included a Boston property which paid-off in
January 2007 resulting in a pay down of 125% of its allocated loan
amount. The loan represents an 87% participation interest in a
$198.4 million loan. The hotel portfolio was impacted by the
downturn in the tourism industry, but performance has been
improving. The loan amortizes on a 226-month schedule for its
first seven years and then converts to a 331-month schedule
thereafter, and has amortized 4% since last full review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.10X, respectively, compared to
97% and 1.06X at last review.

The second largest loan is the COPT Office Portfolio Loan
($108.5 million -- 4.7%), which is secured by ten crossed
suburban office properties, totaling 597,482 square feet,
located in Columbia and Annapolis Junction, Maryland. Performance
has declined since last review due to both reduced base rent and
increased expenses. The loan is interest-only for its entire ten-
year term and matures in January 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 119% and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 118% and 0.85X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the Flournoy Portfolio Loan
($94.2 million -- 4.1%), which is secured by four multifamily
properties with a total of 1,397 units located in Texas (2),
Tennessee, and Kansas. Three of the loans are on the servicer's
watchlist due to low DSCR; however, performance of those
properties has improved since last review. The loan had a 36-
month interest-only period and is amortizing on a 360-month
schedule maturing in January 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 124% and 0.77X, respectively, compared to 149% and 0.64X at
last review.


MSC 2007-XLF9: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating of Cl. F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) placed ten pooled classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-XLF9 on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's rating actions are:

Cl. A-2, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. J, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. K, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The classes have been placed under review for possible downgrade
due to the deterioration of credit quality, pending maturities,
and anticipated losses to the trust.

As of the October 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to $1.1 billion
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 12 mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to 36%
of the pool. There are currently four loans in special servicing
(8.6% of pooled balance) which are the Westchester Marriott loan
(3%), the Reunion Land loan (2%), the Hyatt Place Portfolio loan
(2%), and Belltell Lofts loan (2%).

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2011.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review will focus on the potential losses from specially
serviced loans and the performance of the overall pool.


NAVISTAR FINANCIAL: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Navistar Financial Dealer Note Master Owner Trust
II, Series 2011-1 (NAVMT 2011-1), a securitization of dealer
floorplan loans sponsored by Navistar Financial Corporation, a
subsidiary of Navistar International Corporation (B1).

The complete rating actions:

$200,000,000, LIBOR + 1.15%, Class A Asset Backed Notes, rated Aaa
(sf)

$12,420,000, LIBOR + 1.75%, Class B Asset Backed Notes, rated Aa3
(sf)

$11,120,000, LIBOR + 2.50%, Class C Asset Backed Notes, rated A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating U.S. Floorplan ABS Securities, published in January
2010.

V-SCORE AND PARAMETER SENSITIVITY

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is equal to the
Medium V score assigned for the U.S. Dealer Floorplan Loan ABS
sector. The V Score indicates "Medium" uncertainty about critical
assumptions such as dealer default probabilities and recovery
rates. Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the
quality of available credit information and the potential
variability around the various inputs to a rating determination.
The V Score ranks transactions by the potential for significant
rating changes owing to uncertainty around the assumptions due to
data quality, historical performance, the level of disclosure,
transaction complexity, the modeling and the transaction
governance that underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire
transaction (rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Consistent with Moody's
methodology, the analysis of NAVMT 2011-1 included simulation
analysis. Moody's simulation analysis incorporated a stressed
average dealer default rate of approximately 50%. Moody's primary
assumptions for recovery rates of repossessed vehicles from
defaulted dealers ranged from 90% for new vehicles and 85% for
used vehicles with a non-bankrupt manufacturer to 50% for new
vehicles and 45% for used vehicles with a manufacturer in
liquidation. Moody's analysis reveals Class A sensitivity down to
the A level when dealer defaults are increased to 90% and recovery
rates are stressed an additional 20%. The Class B rating shows
sensitivity down to the Baa rating level with dealer defaults up
to 80% and recovery rates stressed an additional 15%. The Class C
rating shows sensitivity down to the Ba rating level with dealer
defaults up to 75% and a recovery rate haircut of 15%.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: Moody's Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1:

US$320,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2022 (current
balance of $285,527,332), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Revolving Floating Rate Notes due 2022
(current balance of $38,212,858), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$22,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$35,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes dues
2022, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$25,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes dues
2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$13,750,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes dues
2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of delevering of the senior
notes since the rating action in September 2009. Moody's notes
that the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes have been paid down by
approximately $25.2 million in aggregate since the rating action
in September 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $462.3 million,
charged-off loans balance of $6.7 million, a weighted average
rating factor of 4303, a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.17%, and a diversity score of 37. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1, issued in June of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.

2) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.

3) Recovery of charged-off loans: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.


PANGAEA CLO 2007-1: Moody's Raises Rating of Class C Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Pangaea CLO 2007-1 Ltd.:

US$16,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$14,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate Notes
Due 2021, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of credit improvement of
the underlying portfolio since the rating action in October 2009.
In particular, based on the trustee report dated October 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2932 compared to 3416
in the September 2009 report.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par balance, including principal proceeds, of $275
million, defaulted par of $12.3 million, a weighted average
default probability of 24.2% (implying a WARF of 3249), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.5%, and a diversity score
of 42. These default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Pangaea CLO 2007-1 Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans with significant exposure to middle market
issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations", published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus selling defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

2. Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

3. Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming worse of reported
and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor and
diversity score. As part of the base case, Moody's considered
weighted average spread levels higher than the covenant levels due
to the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.

4. Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.


PORTER SQUARE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
the class B notes from Porter Square CDO I Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) squared transaction
backed in part by residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) and managed by TCW Asset Management Co. "In addition,
we removed our rating on the class B notes from CreditWatch
with negative implications," S&P related.

"The rating action reflects par loss in the transaction's
underlying asset portfolio since we lowered the rating on
the note on March 10, 2010," S&P said.

According to the Sept. 30, 2011, trustee report, the transaction
had $25.51 million total in underlying assets and principal cash.
"This was a decrease from the $52.89 million total reported in the
Jan. 29, 2010, trustee report, which we used for our March 2010
rating action. Over that same time period, the transaction used
$14.62 million to pay down the class A-2, A-3, and B note
balances, resulting in a $12.76 million par loss in underlying
collateral," S&P said.

In addition, the coverage test ratios dropped during the same time
period. The trustee reported the overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios in the Sept. 30, 2011, monthly report:

    The class A/B O/C ratio test was 49.95%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 62.07% in January 2010; and

    The class C O/C ratio test was 23.79%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 40.29% in January 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

Porter Square CDO I Ltd.
             Rating
Class    To           From
B        CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)/Watch Neg

Other Ratings Outstanding

Porter Square CDO I Ltd.

Class                 Rating
C                     D (sf)


PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Lowers Rating of $42.5-Mil. Notes to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded and left on review for
possible downgrade these certificates issued by PPLUS Trust Series
SPR-1:

US$42,515,000 PPLUS Trust Series SPR-1 7.00% Trust Certificates;
Downgraded to B3 and Remains On Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on October 18, 2011 Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade

RATIONGS RATIONALE

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of $43,297,000 6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint
Capital Corporation which was downgraded to B3 and remains on
review for possible downgrade by Moody's on November 4, 2011.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


REALT 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Class F Notes Rating at 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 18
classes of Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-1:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XP-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XP-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain the existing ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.7% of the current balance compared to 2.0% at last review.
Moody's stressed scenario loss is 6.1% of the current balance.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and performance in the commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward trend will not
be evident until the volume of transactions increases, distressed
properties are cleared from the pipeline and job creation
rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery through the first half of 2011, while recovery
in the non-core office and retail sectors are tied to pace of
recovery of the broader economy. Core office markets are showing
signs of recovery through lending and leasing activity. The
availability of debt capital continues to improve with terms
returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
as the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations, however the
downside risks to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a
greater impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15, which is the same as at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs
the large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology
uses the excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.2 and then reconciles
and weights the results from the two models in formulating a
rating recommendation. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage,
loan structure, property type, and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated January 28, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 45% to
$191.8 million from $347.5 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 40 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 63% of the pool. The pool contains two loans
with investment grade credit estimates that represent 22% of the
pool. Five loans, representing 8% of the pool, have defeased and
are collateralized with Canadian Government securities.

Three loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

The pool has not realized any losses since securitization. There
are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.6 million aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 40%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2010 operating results for 98%
of the pool. Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 66% compared to 71% at last review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.59X and 1.58X, respectively, compared to 1.52X and 1.48X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Bayfield Mall Loan
($25.7 million -- 13.4%), which is secured by a 443,351 square
foot (SF) anchored community shopping center located in Barrie,
Ontario. The loan amortizes on a 25-year schedule. Performance has
been stable. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are
Baa2 and 1.50X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.44X at last
review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Desjardins Visa
Building Loan ($17.2 million -- 9.0%), which is secured by a
201,583 SF office building located in Montreal, Quebec.
Performance has been stable. Moody's current credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.58X, respectively, which is the same as
at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is 33 Isabella Street Loan
($24.0 million -- 12.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
416-unit multifamily property located in Toronto, Ontario. The
property was 95% leased as of December 2010 compared to 97% at
last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 86% and 0.97X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Columbia Wellness Center Loan
($10.8 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 186-
unit private retirement residence located in Kelowna, British
Columbia. The property was 95% leased as of June 2011 compared to
94% at last review. Performance has increased since last review
due to an increase in base rent. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
74% and 1.31X, respectively, compared to 91% and 1.07X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Observatory Place Loan ($8.9 million
-- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 86,915 SF office and
retail property located in Richmond Hill, Ontario. The property
was 97% leased as of January 2011 compared to 98% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.54X, respectively,
compared to 64% and 1.51X at last review.


REALT 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Rating of Cl. F Notes at 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 18
classes of Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XP-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XP-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.7% of the current pooled balance, as compared to 1.5% at last
review. Moody's stressed scenario loss is 7.2% of the current
pooled balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans,
the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could
decline below the current levels. If future performance materially
declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and the
priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the
current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and performance in the commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward trend will not
be evident until the volume of transactions increases, distressed
properties are cleared from the pipeline and job creation
rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery through the first half of 2011, while recovery
in the non-core office and retail sectors are tied to the pace of
the recovery of the broader economy. Core office markets are
showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing activity.
The availability of debt capital continues to improve with terms
returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The pool has a Herf of 25 as compared to 26
at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated January 28, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to $464 million
from $514 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 73 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 54% of
the pool. One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool, has
fully defeased and is secured by Canadian Government securities.
The transaction contains three loans, representing 21% of the
pool, with investment grade credit estimates.

Four loans, representing 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any realized losses to date. The
Impero Properties Loan ($9 million --1.9%) is the only loan in
special servicing. It is a three building office complex located
in Edmonton, Alberta. The loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2010 due to the borrower placing $3 million of
unauthorized subordinate debt on the property. The collateral
properties are 92% leased as of August 2011. The loan is currently
30 days delinquent. The servicer has not recognized an appraisal
reduction for this loan. Moody's has estimated a minimal loss on
this loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 1% of the pool and has estimated a
$1 million loss (10% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 86%
of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 85%, which is
the same as at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 1.28X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Langley Power
Centre Loan ($39 million -- 8.4%), which is secured by 228,000
square foot (SF) anchored retail center located in Langley,
British Columbia. The property was 91% leased at 2010 year-end
compared to 100% at last review. The loan is 100% recourse to
RioCan Real Estate Investment Trust. Moody's current credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 0.93X, respectively, which
is the same as at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit estimate is The Atrium
Pooled Interest Loan ($39 million -- 8.3%), which is secured by a
1.05 million SF mixed-use complex located in Toronto, Ontario. The
loan is a pari passu interest in a $116 million A-Note. There is
also a $74 million B-Note secured by the property. The collateral
was 98% leased as of January 2011, which is the same as at last
review. H&R REIT acquired the subject property from Hines in June
2011. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A2 and
1.73X, respectively, compared to A2 and 1.62X at last review.

The remaing loan with a credit estimate is the PDC Senior Interest
Loan ($19 million -- 4.1%), which is secured by a 165,000 SF
office property located in Verdun, Quebec. The property is fully
leased to the Yellow Pages Group through December 2017. Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.40X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.43X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 20% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Conundrum Portfolio Loan
($37 million -- 7.9%), which is secured by a 15 property portfolio
containing nine industrial, five unanchored retail and one office
property all located in Ontario. The portfolio was 92% leased as
of April 2011 compared to 86% at last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 100% and 1.03X, which is the same as at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Mississauga Office Loan
($30 million -- 6.3%), which is secured by two office/flex
properties, one office and one industrial property, all located
in Mississauga, Ontario. The portfolio was 95% leased as of
October 2011, similar to last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 91% and 1.07X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.12X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the Sundance Pooled Interest Loan
($26 million -- 5.5%), which is secured by a 180,000 SF office
building located in Calgary, Alberta. The property was 100%
leased as of March 2011, which is the same as last review and
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 0.95X,
respectively, compared to 93% and 1.02X at last review.


RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE: DBRS Confirms Class B-1 Rating at 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed its outstanding ratings on 35 U.S. Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) transactions based on a review
of the assignment, transfer, conveyance and delivery of all of
Litton Loan Servicing LP's (Litton) right, title and interest in
and obligations under all pooling and servicing agreements,
servicing agreements or similar or related agreements, for which
Litton is a party, to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (OLS), effective
November 1, 2011.

C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class A-5 Confirmed BBB (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class A-6 Confirmed BBB (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class M-1 Confirmed B (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB5, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB5, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB5, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB5, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB5, Class M-1 Confirmed BBB (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB5, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB5, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class AF-3 Confirmed BBB
(high) (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class AF-4
Confirmed A (low) (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class B-
1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class B-
2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class B-
3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class B-
4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class M-
1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class M-
2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust C-BASS
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class M-
3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7 Trust C-BASS
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB7, Class
AF-4 Confirmed AAA (sf) Stb Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7 Trust C-
BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB7,
Class AF-5 Confirmed AAA (sf) Stb Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB7, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB7, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB7, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB7, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB7, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB7, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB7, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB8, Class AF-4 Confirmed AAA (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB8, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB8, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB8, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB8, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB8, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB8, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2004-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-
CB8, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB1, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB1, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB1, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB1, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB1, Class M-1 Confirmed BB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB1, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB1, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB2
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB2, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB2
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB2, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB2
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB2, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB2
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB2, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB2
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB2, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB2
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB2, Class M-1 Confirmed A (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB2
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB2, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB2
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB2, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class AF-4 Confirmed AA (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class B-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class M-1 Confirmed BB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB3, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class AF-2 Confirmed AAA (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class AF-3 Confirmed AAA (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class AF-4 Confirmed AAA (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class B-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class B-7 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class M-1 Confirmed BBB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class M-2 Confirmed B (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB4
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB4, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class AF-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class AF-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class AF-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class AV-2 Confirmed BB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class AV-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB5
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB5, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class A-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class A-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB6, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class AF-3 Confirmed BB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class AF-4 Confirmed BB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB7, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class AF-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class AF-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class AF-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class AF-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2005-CB8
Trust C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
CB8, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class AF-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class AF-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class AF-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class AV-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB1, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class AF-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class AF-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class AF-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class AV Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB2
TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB2, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class AV-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class AV-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB3
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB3, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class A-I Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class A-II-2 Confirmed B (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class A-II-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class A-II-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB6
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB6, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class A-2 Confirmed AA (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class A-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class A-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class A-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB7
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB7, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class A-2A Confirmed AA (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class A-2B Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class A-2C Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class A-2D Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-CB8
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
CB8, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-MH1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
MH1, Class B-1 Confirmed BB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-MH1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
MH1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-MH1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
MH1, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-MH1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
MH1, Class M-1 Confirmed A (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-MH1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
MH1, Class M-2 Confirmed BBB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-RP1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
RP1, Class A-2 Confirmed AA (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-RP1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
RP1, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-RP1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
RP1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-RP1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
RP1, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-RP1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
RP1, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-RP1
Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-
RP1, Class M-1 Confirmed A (low) (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2006-
RP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-RP1, Class M-2 Confirmed BB (high) (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-RP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-RP1, Class M-3 Confirmed BB (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class A-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class B-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2006-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-SL1, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS
2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-CB1, Class AF-1A Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-
BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class AF-1B Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class AF-2 Confirmed C (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class AF-3 Confirmed C (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class AF-4 Confirmed C (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class AF-5 Confirmed C (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class AF-6 Confirmed C (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB1 TRUST C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB1, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class A-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB5 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB5, Class M-9 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class A-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class A-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-CB6 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB6, Class M-9 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-1 Confirmed A (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-2 Confirmed BBB (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-3 Confirmed BBB (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-4 Confirmed BBB (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class M-1 Confirmed BB (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class M-2 Confirmed B (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SL1, Class A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SL1, Class A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SL1, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SL1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SL1, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SL1, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SL1, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SL1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SL1, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class A-2 Confirmed AAA (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class A-3 Confirmed BB (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class A-4 Confirmed BB (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-10 Confirmed C (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-11 Confirmed C (sf)
-- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-9 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class A-1
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
CB3, Class A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class A-3 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class A-4
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
CB3, Class A-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class B-2
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
CB3, Class B-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class B-4 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class M-1
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
CB3, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class M-4
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
CB3, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-CB3 C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-CB3, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM1, Class
B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-FM1, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM1, Class I-A Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-FM1, Class II-A-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home
Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM1, Class II-A-4 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-FM1, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home
Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM1, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan
Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM1,
Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan,
Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FM1, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM1, Class
M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-FM1, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM1, Class M-7 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-FM1, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home
Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM1 Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM1, Class M-9 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan
Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2,
Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan,
Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class B-2 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class
I-A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan,
Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class II-A-1 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class
II-A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan,
Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class II-A-3 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class
II-A-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan,
Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class
M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-FM2, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class M-4 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-FM2, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home
Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -
- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan
Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2,
Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan,
Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-FM2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-FM2, Class
M-9 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-2, Class B-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class I-A-1 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
2, Class II-A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity
Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class II-A-2 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class II-
A-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-2, Class II-A-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class M-1 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
2, Class M-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity
Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class M-4
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-2, Class M-5 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class M-6 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
2, Class M-7 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity
Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2007-2 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class M-9
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-3, Class I-A-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class II-A-1 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
3, Class II-A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity
Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class II-A-3 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class II-
A-4 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-3, Class M-1 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class M-2 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
3, Class M-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity
Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class M-4 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class M-5
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc.,
Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-3, Class M-6 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class M-7 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity
Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
3, Class M-8 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 Nomura Home Equity
Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-3 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class M-9 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-1 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-10
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust
Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2,
Class I-A-11 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2
Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-QS2, Class I-A-13 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series
2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-14 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI
Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-15 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-16 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-17
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust
Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2,
Class I-A-18 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2
Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-QS2, Class I-A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series
2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-3 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI
Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-4 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-5 Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-6
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust
Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2,
Class I-A-7 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2
Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-QS2, Class I-A-8 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series
2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-9 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI
Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-P Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class I-A-V Confirmed C
(sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-1
Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust
Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QS2,
Class II-A-2 Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series 2006-QS2
Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-QS2, Class II-A-P Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI Series
2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-V Confirmed C (sf) -- Nov 2, 2011 RALI
Series 2006-QS2 Trust Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class III-A-1 Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class A Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011 Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-2 Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class A-IO Confirmed C (sf) --
Nov 2, 2011


RFC CDO: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on 11 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of RFC CDO 2006-1, Ltd./LLC
(RFC 2006-1), reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of
47.3%, an increase from 44.3% at last review.  Fitch's performance
expectation incorporates prospective views regarding commercial
real estate market value and cash flow declines, and factors in
its concerns regarding the outsourced third party management of
the collateralized debt obligation (CDO).

The transaction has paid down by $126.2 million (21% of the
original balance) since the last review.  The paydown was the
result of loan disposals, asset repayments, and interest diversion
due to the failure of all overcollateralization (OC) tests.  Since
last review, the disposal of two loans resulted in realized losses
of approximately $24.4 million.  The combined percentage of
defaulted assets and Fitch Loans of Concern totals 47.4% compared
to 43.2% at last review.  The weighted average rating of the rated
securities has remained the same at 'CCC+/CCC'.

RFC 2006-1 is a commercial real estate (CRE) CDO. The transaction
exited its reinvestment period in April 2011.  As of the October
2011 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was
substantially invested as follows: 45% whole loan/A-notes, 18.4%
mezzanine loans, 6.6% B-notes, 20% commercial mortgage-backed
securities, and 10% principal cash.

The CDO's asset manager is Realty Finance Corp. (RFC).  As stated
in a public press release in February 2011, RFC entered into an
agreement to outsource its asset management functions for the CDO
to Waldron H. Rand & Company, P.C. (Waldron).  As of Feb. 18,
2011, RFC was expected to have no active employees of its own.
Waldron is an accounting firm with real estate experience and its
capabilities are consistent with the current ratings assigned to
the notes of the transaction.  The press release further stated
that RFC's board of directors continues to explore various
strategic options for RFC, including a liquidation, in the event
it is unsuccessful in consummating a strategic transaction.
Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 76.6% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 10% from, generally, either year-end 2010 or trailing
12-month first- or second-quarter 2011.  Fitch estimates that
average recoveries will be 38%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
whole loan (8.6%) secured by a 72-room boutique hotel located in
the Times Square area of New York City.  Performance has been
below expectations.  Fitch modeled a substantial loss in its base
case scenario.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine position (6.1%) secured by interests in a 1,310-
room full-service hotel located in Honolulu, Hawaii.  Fitch
modeled a full loss on this highly leveraged position in its base
case scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine position (4.9%) secured by interests in a 575-room
full-service hotel located in Tucson, Arizona.  The loan is a non-
performing matured balloon.  Debt service reserves have been
completely depleted.  Fitch modeled a full loss on this highly
leveraged position in its base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.

Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term
capitalization rates.  Although the model passing rate for the
class A-1 and A-2 notes are higher than the class' current rating,
upgrades are not warranted at this time given the uncertain
financial status of the asset manager and the issuer.  Per Fitch
criteria, cash flow modeling was not performed as part of the
analysis as the difference in expected loss from last review is
less than 10%.  Class A-1's Rating Outlook is revised to Stable
from Negative reflecting the class's senior position in the
capital stack.

The ratings for classes A-2 through K are based on a deterministic
analysis which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class' credit enhancement, as well as the likelihood for OC
tests to cure.

The transaction was formerly known as CBRE Realty Finance CDO
2006-1, Ltd./LLC.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Recovery Ratings (RRs) and Rating
Outlooks on these classes:

  -- $159,345,619 class A-1 at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $33,000,000 class A-2 at 'CCCsf'; to 'RR1' from 'RR5';
  -- $34,500,000 class B at 'CCCsf'; to 'RR1' from 'RR5';
  -- $15,000,000 class C at 'CCCsf'; to 'RR1' from 'RR6';
  -- $13,500,000 class D at 'CCsf/RR6';
  -- $9,000,000 class E at 'CCsf/RR6';
  -- $10,500,000 class F at 'CCsf/RR6';
  -- $13,500,000 class G at 'Csf/RR6';
  -- $4,500,000 class H at 'Csf/RR6';
  -- $24,000,000 class J at 'Csf/RR6';
  -- $20,250,000 class K at 'Csf/RR6'.


SCHOONER TRUST: DBRS Confirms Class F Rating at 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed these ratings of all 15 classes of Schooner
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-
8:

Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
Class A-J at AAA (sf)
Class B at AA (sf)
Class C at A (sf)
Class D at BBB (sf)
Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
Class F at BB (high) (sf)
Class G at BB (sf)
Class H at BB (low) (sf)
Class J at B (high) (sf)
Class K at B (sf)
Class L at B (low) (sf)
Class XP at AAA (sf)
Class XC at AAA (sf)

DBRS does not rate the $5.8 million first loss piece, Class M.
The trends for all rated classes of the transaction are Stable.

The rating confirmations are supported by transaction-level
performance that is in line with the metrics at the time of the
last DBRS review.  The transaction has a healthy weighted-average
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.53 times (x) and a
weighted-average debt yield of 15.65%, based on the most recent
financials.  Since the last review, credit enhancement to the
bonds has increased, primarily as a result of loan amortization.

There are currently four loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 7.65% of the pool balance.  Three of the watchlisted
loans are highlighted below:

Prospectus ID#8, 195 Cote St. Catherine (3.7% of the current pool
balance), has been on the servicer's watchlist since December 2010
because of an unauthorized second mortgage.  The collateral for
the trust loan is a 167-unit multifamily property located in the
Outremont neighbourhood of Montr‚al.  According to the servicer,
the loan will remain on the servicer's watchlist until the
unauthorized second mortgage is no longer in place.  The
performance of the loan has been stable, with a YE2010 DSCR of
1.28x and an occupancy rate of 97.5% as of April 2011. DBRS will
continue to monitor this loan.

Prospectus ID#12, Royal Bank Building (2.7% of the current pool
balance), was placed on the servicer's watchlist in May 2011 for
having taxes in arrears in excess of $500,000.  The collateral for
the loan is a 75,000 square foot (sf) Class A office building
located in New Westminster, British Columbia.  As a result of the
overdue taxes, the servicer was forced to make a property tax
advance.  Further exacerbating the issues with this loan is the
fact that the property is only 57% occupied, based on a May 2011
rent roll.  The YE2010 DSCR was 0.96x and this does not reflect
the depressed occupancy for 2011. DBRS will continue to closely
monitor the tax and occupancy rate issues.

Prospectus ID#33, Days Inn Dartmouth (0.8% of the current pool
balance), has been on the servicer's watchlist since November 2010
because of a low DSCR, which resulted from declining occupancy and
RevPar.  The collateral for the loan is a 142-key limited service
hotel in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.  The property was a Future Inn at
issuance but changed flags and is now a Days Inn.  Performance at
the property has declined since YE2008 when the DSCR was 1.67x and
the occupancy rate was 50%.  The YE2010 DSCR was -0.60x and the
occupancy rate was 36%.  Despite poor performance over the past
two years, the loan has remained current and the borrower has put
money into the property by renovating the banquet room and common
areas and by adding an indoor pool.

DBRS continues to monitor this transaction on a monthly basis in
the Monthly CMBS Surveillance report, which can provide more
detailed information on the individual loans in the pool.


SIERRA TIMESHARE: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Sierra Timeshare 2011-3 Receivables Funding LLC's
$250 million vacation timeshare loan-backed notes.

The note issuance is a securitization of vacation ownership
interval (timeshare) loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 4,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

"The preliminary ratings reflect our opinion of the credit
enhancement available in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and available excess
spread. Our preliminary ratings also reflect our view of Wyndham
Consumer Finance Inc.'s servicing ability and experience in
the timeshare market," S&P said.

             Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at

      http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111241.pdf

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
Sierra Timeshare 2011-3 Receivables Funding LLC

Class         Rating       Amount (mil. $)
A             A (sf)                186.17
B             BBB (sf)               38.57
C             BB (sf)                25.26


SPRINT CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Rating of $38-Mil. Notes to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded and left on review for
possible downgrade the following certificates issued by Structured
Repackaged Asset-Backed Trust Securities ("STRATS") Trust for
Sprint Capital Corporation Securities, Series 2004-2:

$38,000,000 6.500% STRATS, Series 2004-2, Class A-1 Certificates;
Downgraded to B3 and Remains On Review for Possible Downgrade;
Previously on October 18, 2011 Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of $38,000,000 6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint
Capital Corporation which was downgraded to B3 and remains on
review for possible downgrade by Moody's on November 4, 2011.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


T2 INCOME: Moody's Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by T2 Income Fund CLO I Ltd.:

US$22,000,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due 2019, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$9,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due 2019, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; and

US$12,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Subordinated Deferrable Notes
Due 2019, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

US$30,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Notes Due 2019,
Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect the consideration of credit improvement
of the underlying portfolio since the last rating action in
September 2010. Based on the trustee report dated October 4, 2011,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2789 compared to
2995 in August 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $298.2 million,
defaulted par of $3.2 million, a weighted average default
probability of 28.12% (implying a WARF of 3599), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.67%, and a diversity
score of 25. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

T2 Income Fund CLO I Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans with significant exposure to senior secured
loans of middle market issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

2) Collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to reinvest and
the manager has the ability to deteriorate the collateral quality
metrics' existing cushions against the covenant levels. Moody's
generally analyzes the impact of assuming the worse of reported
and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor, weighted
average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity score.
However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered spread level
higher than the covenant level and weighted average rating factor
lower than the covenant level due to the large difference between
the reported and covenant levels.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided with necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.


TIAA REAL: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Two Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five and affirmed two classes issued
by TIAA Real Estate CDO 2003-1, Ltd. (TIAA 2003-1) as a result of
continued negative credit migration.

Since the last review in December 2010, approximately 19% of the
collateral has been downgraded while 5.1% has been upgraded.
Currently, 32% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 17.6% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and
below, compared to 29.1% and 10.5%, respectively, at the last
review.  Additionally, interest shortfalls on the underlying
collateral have increased to 10% from 7.9% at the last review.
Over this period, the class A-1MM notes have received $21 million
in paydowns.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near term
maturities.  Based on this analysis, the class A through D notes'
breakeven rates in Fitch's cash flow model are generally
consistent with the ratings assigned below.

For the class E notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to
the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below).  Given the
high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class E
notes have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.  The class E notes are currently receiving interest
paid in kind (PIK) whereby the principal amount of the notes is
written up by the amount of interest due.

The Stable Outlook on the class A-1MM notes reflects Fitch's
expectation that the notes will continue to delever.  The Negative
Outlook on the class B and C notes reflects Fitch's expectation
that the underlying CMBS loans will continue to face refinance
risk.

TIAA 2003-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on Nov. 6, 2003. The current portfolio consists of 62 bonds
from 54 obligors, of which 73.9% are commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS), 24.6% are real estate investment trust (REIT)
debt securities, and 1.5% are structured finance CDOs.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

  -- $116,854,157 class A-1MM notes to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
     to Stable from Negative;
  -- $10,000,000 class B-1 notes to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $2,000,000 class B-2 notes to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $16,000,000 class C-1 notes to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $14,000,000 class C-2 notes to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $13,500,000 class D notes at 'CCCsf';
  -- $13,013,406 class E notes at 'Csf'.


TRUP CDO: Moody's Raises Rating of Class A-2 Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these three
notes issued by Trapeza CDO VI, Ltd.:

US$155,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $93,378,334.06), Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 13, 2010 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

US$21,000,000 Class A-1B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2034, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 13,
2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

US$59,350,000 Class A-2 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2034, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 13,
2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating upgrade actions taken are
primarily the result of significant deleveraging of the Class A-1A
notes and the improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio. The deleveraging is due to significant pay down of the
Class A-1A notes, which has received about $48 million since the
last rating action due to overcollateralization tests failure. The
$48 million of pay down came from a combination of excess interest
proceeds, sales and redemptions of underlying assets. The
improvement in credit quality of the portfolio is indicated by a
weighted average rating factor (WARF) decrease to 1400, from 1732,
as of the last rating action date.

Moody's has also observed an improvement in the
overcollateralization levels. Since the last rating action,
four assets have been redeemed at par and the sales proceeds
were used to cure the coverage tests by paying down the Class
A-1A notes. Moreover, interest proceeds are also used to pay
down Class A-1A notes due to failure of the coverage tests. As
of the latest trustee report dated October 15, 2011, the Class A
Overcollateralization Test is still failing at 118.70% (limit
139.40%), and the Class B Overcollateralization Test is still
failing at 74.51% (limit 103.10%), versus 115.74% and 79.80%
respectively, as reported by the trustee as of May 8, 2010, values
that were used for the last rating action.

Trapeza CDO VI, Ltd., issued on April 20, 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (the 'TRUP CDO'). On July 13, 2010, the last
rating action date, Moody's downgraded three classes of notes as a
result of the deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction's underlying portfolio.

In Moody's opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain
negative although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of bank failures in 2011 has declined
compared to 2009 and 2010, and some of the previously deferring
banks have resumed interest payment on their trust preferred
securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly composed of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks
that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To evaluate
their credit quality, Moody's uses the RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit
scores for these non-publicly rated bank trust preferred
securities. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority
of bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data
received as of Q2-2011. Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of
the rated transactions to the volatility of the credit estimates,
as described in Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions,"
October 2009.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings. Amongst these are
an analysis of how much in additional defaults and how much of an
increase in WARF are needed for the current ratings to be
breached. Moody's also examined the likelihood that current
deferring bank TruPS will resume interest payments.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's also considers the structural protections
in the transaction, the risk of triggering an Event of Default,
the recent deal performance in the current market conditions, the
legal environment, and specific documentation features. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. The
transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to Moody's rating
approach, using CDOROM v.2.8 to develop the default distribution
from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter was obtained.
This parameter was then used as an input in a cash flow model
using CDOEdge. CDOROM v.2.8 is available on moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon return of a
signed free license agreement.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certificates to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C27, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
"In addition, we affirmed our ratings on six other classes from
the same transaction," S&P said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria, the deal
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust. The
downgrades reflect credit support erosion that we anticipate will
occur upon the eventual resolution of 19 ($297.0 million, 11.9%)
of the 21 specially serviced assets ($431.5 million, 17.3%) and
four loans ($89.8 million, 3.6%) that we determined to be credit-
impaired. We also considered monthly interest shortfalls affecting
the trust and the potential for additional interest shortfalls due
to revised appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) on the specially
serviced assets. We lowered our rating on the class J certificate
to 'D (sf)' because we believe the accumulated interest shortfalls
will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future," S&P stated.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class XC and X-P interest-only certificates
based on our current criteria," S&P related.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of the remaining assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.23x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 112.8%.
We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.83x and an LTV ratio of
157.0%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 95.9% and 36.9%, respectively. The DSC and LTV
calculations noted above exclude 19 ($297.0 million, 11.9%) of the
21 specially serviced assets ($431.5 million, 17.3%) and four
loans ($89.8 million, 3.6%) that we determined to be credit-
impaired. We separately estimated losses for these specially
serviced and credit-impaired assets and included them in our 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $144,415
primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
(ASER) amounts of $193,301 and special servicing fees of $92,073.
The interest shortfalls were reduced by an $186,432 ASER recovery
this period. The interest shortfalls affected all classes
subordinate to and including class J. "Class J experienced
cumulative interest shortfalls for four months and we expect
these interest shortfalls to continue in the near term.
Consequently, we downgraded class J to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

                          Credit Considerations

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, 21 assets
($431.5 million, 17.3%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR). The reported payment status
of the specially serviced assets as of the October 2011
trustee remittance report is: four are real estate owned (REO;
$57.1 million, 2.3%), one is in foreclosure ($12.3 million, 0.5%),
six are 90-plus-days delinquent ($47.1 million, 1.9%), one is 60
days delinquent ($35.6 million, 1.4%), one is 30 days delinquent
($9.7 million, 0.4%), four are less than 30 days delinquent
($69.8 million, 2.8%), one is current ($123.3 million, 5.0%), and
three are matured balloon loans ($76.6 million, 3.0%). ARAs
totaling $53.6 million are in effect against 13 of the specially
serviced assets. Details of the three largest specially serviced
assets, one of which is a top 10 asset, are:

The BlueLinx Holdings Pool loan ($123.3 million, 5.0%), the
fifth-largest asset in the pool, consists of 57 master leased
industrial/distribution facilities and one office property
totaling 9.0 million sq. ft. in 36 U.S. states. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on June 9, 2011, due to
imminent default. LNR indicated that the loan has since been
modified and the reported payment status is current. The
modification terms include, but are not limited to, changing
the transfer provision of the loan documents and paying down
the principal trust balance. The reported DSC was 1.43x as of
year-end 2010.

The Sierra Health Services loan ($50.7 million, 2.0%) is secured
by a 204,123-sq.-ft. suburban office building in Las Vegas. The
loan was transferred to LNR on Aug. 12, 2011, due to imminent
maturity default. The loan matured on Aug. 11, 2011. LNR stated
that it is currently negotiating a forbearance agreement while
pursuing receivership and/or foreclosure. The current reported
occupancy is 100% and the reported DSC was 1.75x as of year-end
2010. "We expect a moderate loss, if any, upon the eventual
resolution of this loan," S&P said.

The National Bank Plaza loan ($35.6 million, 1.4%) is secured by a
266,166-sq.-ft. suburban office building in Phoenix, Ariz. The
loan, with a reported 60-days-delinquent payment status, was
transferred to the special servicer on May 3, 2011, due to
imminent default. LNR indicated that it is exploring various
workout strategies, including a loan modification. The reported
DSC and occupancy were 0.77x and 72.7% for the six months ended
June 30, 2011. "We expect a moderate loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan," S&P said.

The 18 remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 1.0% of the trust balance. ARAs
totaling $53.6 million are in effect against 13 of these assets.
"We estimated losses for 17 of the 18 assets, arriving at a
weighted-average loss severity of 37.6%. For the remaining loan,
LNR indicated that it is in discussions with the borrower for
a loan modification," S&P related.

"Subsequent to the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report,
the master servicer informed us that the Glendale Center loan
($125.0 million, 5.0%), the fourth-largest asset in the pool, was
recently transferred to the special servicer due to imminent
default. According to the master servicer, the borrower indicated
that it will not fund projected operating shortfalls due to rent
abatements for the largest tenant. The loan is secured by a
382,841-sq.-ft. office building in Glendale, Calif. The master
servicer reported a 1.11x DSC for the six months ended June 30,
2011, and occupancy was 100%, according to the Aug. 31, 2011 rent
roll," S&P related.

"In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined four
loans ($89.8 million, 3.6%) to be credit-impaired primarily due to
delinquent payment status and/or a low reported DSC. The master
servicer indicated that three of four loans have recently been
transferred to the special servicer," S&P said. As a result, S&P
view these four loans to be at an increased risk of default and
loss. Details on these four loans are:

The Beverly Hills Office Pool loan ($47.0 million, 1.9%) is
secured by three suburban office properties totaling 208,872 sq.
ft. in Beverly Hills, Calif. The master servicer stated that the
loan, which has a reported 60-days-delinquent payment status, was
transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 18, 2011, due to
payment default. The reported DSC and occupancy were
0.73x and 61.6% as of year-end 2010.

The Regency Park Shopping Center loan ($25.2 million, 1.0%) is
secured by a 201,974-sq.-ft. retail center in Overland, Kan. "The
loan has a reported less-than-30-days-delinquent payment status.
The master servicer recently informed us that the loan was
transferred to LNR on Oct. 31, 2011, due to imminent default. The
reported DSC was 0.93x for the six months ended June 30,
2011, and reported occupancy was 72.7% as of March 2011," S&P
said.

The 101 North Monroe Street loan ($16.5 million, 0.7%) is secured
by a 109,564-sq.-ft. office building in Tallahassee, Fla. The
loan's reported payment status is current. The master servicer
stated that the loan was recently transferred to LNR on Oct. 31,
2011, due to imminent default. This is because the largest tenant
that occupied 17.0% of the net rentable area vacated the property
after its lease expired on Oct. 31, 2011. The reported DSC was
1.15x as of year-end 2010 and the reported occupancy was 81.4% as
of June 2011.

The Quality Inn & Suites - Hickory, NC loan ($1.1 million) is
secured by a 100-room limited-service hotel in Hickory, N.C. The
loan, which has a reported less-than-30-days-delinquent payment
status, has a reported cash flow that was insufficient to pay
operating expenses and the reported occupancy was 26.6% as
of year-end 2010.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Oct. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $2.5 billion, which is 80.9% of the balance at
issuance. The pool consists of 133 loans and four REO assets, down
from 162 loans at issuance. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. (Wells Fargo), provided financial information for 95.9% of
the loans in the pool, of which 87.2% was partial- or full-year
2010 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.28x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio were 1.23x and 112.8%. Our adjusted DSC and LTV
figures excluded 19 ($297.0 million, 11.9%) of the 21 specially
serviced assets in the trust ($431.5 million, 17.3%) and four
loans ($89.8 million, 3.6%) that we determined to be credit-
impaired. We separately estimated losses for these specially
serviced and credit-impaired assets and included them in our
'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures. The
transaction has experienced $87.9 million in principal losses from
10 assets to date. Thirty-two loans ($705.2 million, 28.3%) in the
pool are on the master servicer's watchlist. Twenty-four loans
($301.3 million, 12.1%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x and
10 loans ($286.4 million, 11.5%) have a reported DSC between 1.00x
and 1.10x," S&P related.

                        Summary of Top 10 Assets

"The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.1 billion (42.5%). Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.31x for the top 10 assets.
Two ($248.3 million, 10.0%) of the top 10 assets are currently
with the special servicer. In addition, three ($259.1 million,
10.4%) of the top 10 assets are on Wells Fargo's watchlist, which
we discuss below. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top 10
assets were 1.15x and 118.2%," S&P said.

The RLJ Hotel Pool loan, the third-largest asset in the pool, has
a $494.8 million whole loan balance that is split into eight pari
passu pieces, $143.3 million of which makes up 5.8% of the trust
balance. The loan is secured by 43 hotels totaling 5,429 rooms in
eight U.S. states. The loan is on Wells Fargo's watchlist due to a
low reported combined DSC, which was 1.05x for the 12 months ended
June 30, 2011. The reported combined occupancy was 66.5% for the
same period.

The Pan Am Building loan ($60.0 million, 2.4%), the ninth-largest
asset in the pool, is secured by a 210,670-sq.-ft. office building
in Honolulu, Hawaii. The loan is on Wells Fargo's watchlist due to
a low reported DSC, which was 0.94x for the six months ended June
30, 2011. The reported occupancy was 85.4% as of June 2011.

The Embassy Suites - South Lake Tahoe, CA loan ($55.8 million,
2.2%), the 10th-largest asset in the pool, is secured by a 400-
room full-service hotel in South Lake Tahoe, Calif. The loan is on
Wells Fargo's watchlist due to a low reported DSC, which was 0.44x
for the six months ended June 30, 2011. The reported occupancy was
55.0% for the same period.

"We stressed the collateral in the pool according to our current
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent
with our lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C27
                Rating
Class      To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
A-M        A- (sf)      A (sf)                       21.19
A-J        BB (sf)      BBB (sf)                     12.23
B          B+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)                      9.45
C          B (sf)       BB (sf)                       8.21
D          B- (sf)      BB- (sf)                      7.90
E          CCC+ (sf)    B+ (sf)                       6.36
F          CCC (sf)     B+ (sf)                       5.28
G          CCC- (sf)    B (sf)                        3.73
H          CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)                       2.34
J          D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                     0.95

Ratings Affirmed

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C27


Class      Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-2        AAA (sf)                             33.55
A-PB       AAA (sf)                             33.55
A-3        AA (sf)                              33.55
A-1A       AA (sf)                              33.55
X-P        AAA (sf)                               N/A
XC         AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


WBCMT 2005-C22: Moody's Lowers Rating of Cl. A-J Notes to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) downgraded the ratings of
seven classes and affirmed nine classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C22:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2011 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans. The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

On October 27, 2011 Moody's placed seven classes on review for
possible downgrade. This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.9% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 10.1%. Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 21.3% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and performance
in the commercial real estate property markets. While commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent
upward trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The hotel and multifamily sectors are
continuing to show signs of recovery through the first half of
2011, while recovery in the non-core office and retail sectors are
tied to pace of recovery of the broader economy. Core office
markets are showing signs of recovery through lending and leasing
activity. The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms. Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery as
the most likely scenario through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations, however the downside risks
to the outlook have risen since last quarter.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.60 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 42, the same as at at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $2.35 billion
from $2.53 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 143 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 32%
of the pool. Three loans, representing 4% of the pool, have
investment grade credit estimates. Two loans, representing 0.5% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities.

Seventeen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $22.5 million (47% loss severity). Currently 14
loans, representing 17% of the pool, are in special servicing. The
largest specially serviced loan is the Westin Casuarina Hotel &
Spa Loan ($146.0 million -- 6.2% of the pool) which is secured by
an 826-room luxury hotel spa and casino located in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The loan was transferred to special servicing March 2010
due to poor financial performance and is presently in foreclosure
proceedings. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$190.2 million appraisal reduction for the specially serviced
loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $198.4 million loss (48%
expected loss on average) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $16.8 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and partial year 2011
operating results for 86% and 90%, respectively, of the performing
pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV for the conduit component is 100% compared to
98% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs for the conduit component are 1.45X and 1.00X,
respectively, compared 1.57X and 1.03 X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Metro Pointe at
South Coast Loan ($51.7 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a leasehold interest on a 386,000 square foot (SF)
retail center located in Costa Mesa, California. The property was
99% leased as of June 2011, essentially the same as at last
review. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1
and 2.12X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and 2.15X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Shoppes at East
Chase Loan ($26.3 million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is secured
by a 364,400 SF retail center located in Montgomery, Alabama. The
property was 81% leased as of January 2011, compared to 87% at
last review. Financial performance remains stable. Moody's current
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.69X, compared to A3
and 1.71X at last review.

The third loan with a credit estimate is the 1201 Broadway Loan
($10.8 million -- 0.5% of the pool) which is secured by a 132,000
SF office building located in New York, New York. The property was
93% leased as of July 2011, compared to 92% at last review.
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa2 and
2.06X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and 2.08X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Hyatt Center Loan ($160.6 million -- 6.9%
of the pool), which represents a 50% participation interest in a
first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.5 million SF Class
A office building located in Chicago, Illinois. The loan is
structured with a revolving mezzanine loan, and Moody's has
accounted for the additional debt in its analysis. The property
was 94% leased as of July 2011 compared to 95% as last review. The
loan had a 60-month interest-only period, and is now amortizing on
a 360-month schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and
1.05X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.06X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Extra Space PRISA Pool Loan
($145 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by 22,717
self storage units at 35 properties located in 18 states that
are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted. The portfolio's
performance is stable. The loan is interest-only throughout the
seven-year loan term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and
1.25X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.22X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Abbey Pool II Loan
($134.8 million -- 5.8%), which is secured by a portfolio of
14 (originally 16) retail, office, industrial and mixed-use
properties totaling 1.3 million SF. Two of the properties have
defeased and all of the properties are located in California.
The portfolio was 86% leased as of March 2011, the same as at
last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.97X,
respectively, compared to 100% and 1.03X at last review.


* S&P Affirms Ratings on 1,140 Classes from 259 US RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 1,140
classes from 259 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions and removed seven of them from CreditWatch
with negative implications. "Concurrently, our ratings on 10
classes from seven of the transactions will remain on CreditWatch
negative because they are insured by Assured Guaranty Corp. or
Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. We also withdrew our ratings on
three classes from three transactions because they have been paid
in full," S&P said.

The complete rating list is available for free at:

        http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_RMBSRatings_1103.pdf

"In our review of these transactions, we applied the assumptions
we discussed in 'Methodology And Assumptions For U.S. RMBS Issued
Before 2005,' published on March 12, 2009, on RatingsDirect on the
Global Credit Portal, at www.globalcreditportal.com," S&P said.

"The affirmed ratings reflect our belief that the amount of
available projected credit enhancement is sufficient to cover the
current projected losses at their current rating levels. Certain
classes that benefit from a bond insurance policy reflect the
higher of the rating on the bond insurer and the tranche's
underlying rating," S&P related.

"To assess the creditworthiness of each class, we review the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration and the effect that projected losses will have on
each class," S&P stated.

Subordination, any applicable overcollateralization, bond
insurance, and excess spread provide credit support for the
transactions in this review. The underlying collateral for these
transactions consists of Alternative-A, prime jumbo, and subprime
mortgage loans.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 5 Sprint-Related Transactions to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes from five Sprint Capital Corp.-related repack transactions
to 'B+' from 'BB-'. "At the same time, we removed the ratings from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with negative implications on
Oct. 17, 2011," S&P related.

All of the transactions are pass-through structures. The ratings
on the transactions are dependent on the ratings on one of the
following underlying securities (see the ratings list for more
detailed information): Sprint Capital Corp.'s 6.875% notes due
Nov. 15, 2028 ('B+'); and Sprint Capital Corp.'s 8.75% notes due
March 15, 2032 ('B+').

"The downgrades follow our Nov. 4, 2011, lowering of our ratings
on the two underlying securities to 'B+' from 'BB-' and their
removal from CreditWatch with negative implications. We may take
subsequent rating actions on these transactions due to changes in
our ratings on the underlying securities," S&P related.

Rating Actions

COBALTS Trust For Sprint Capital Notes Series 2002-1
$25 million corporate backed listed trust securities ("COBALTS")
trust series sprint capital certificates series 2002-1 (underlying
security: Sprint Capital Corp.'s 6.875% notes due Nov. 15, 2028)
                          Rating
Class              To                  From
Certs              B+                  BB-/Watch Neg

Corporate Backed Trust Certificates, Sprint Capital Note-Backed
Series 2003-17 $25 million sprint capital note-backed series 2003-
17 (underlying security: Sprint Capital Corp.'s 6.875% notes due
Nov. 15, 2028)
                          Rating
Class              To                  From
A-1                B+                  BB-/Watch Neg

PPLUS Trust Series SPR-1
$42.515 million trust certificates series SPR-1 (underlying
security: Sprint Capital Corp.'s 6.875% notes due Nov. 15, 2028)
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
Cert               B+                  BB-/Watch Neg

Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings (SATURNS) Sprint Capital
Corp. Debentures Backed Series 2003-2 $30 million callable units
series 2003-2 (underlying security: Sprint Capital Corp.'s 8.75%
notes due March 15, 2032)
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
A                  B+                 BB-/Watch Neg
B                  B+                 BB-/Watch Neg

Structured Repackaged Asset Backed Trust Securities (STRATS) Trust
For Sprint Capital Corp. Securities Series 2004-2 $38 million
certificates series 2004-2 underlying security: Sprint Capital
Corp.'s 6.875% notes due Nov. 15, 2028)
                           Rating
Class              To                  From
A-1                B+                 BB-/Watch Neg

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
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